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Departmental Correspondence
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PSF TREASURY
MORGENTHAU 1943-45
PSF
741
Social Message Hmgs
BYWESTERNUNION
COPYRIGHT 1987 WRETERN TEL. ce
QM61 16 SC XC=CLOISTER HOTEL SEAISLAND GA
THE PRESIDENT=
file
WARMSPRINGS GA=
JUST HEARD GRAND NEWS OF ARRIVAL OF YOUR LATEST GRANDSON.
OUR VERY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AFFECTIONATE GREETINGS=
HENRY AND ELINOR.
furmal
PSF mngenthan folder
R-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
H. M., JR.
I wish you would work up
two things for me.
1. A memorandum showing
the number of people with
salaries over $67,000 a year
who will be exempted by the
amendment to the debt limit
bill, followed by a list of
the ten largest salaried
people based on last year's
income tax report, showing
the amount saved by them
individually.
2.
Start getting data
on the Ruml Plan to show
how it would affect:
(a)
The income groups.
(b) The hundred largest
taxpayers.
(c) The ten largest tax-
payers.
No names, of course.
F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
February 11, 1943
Memorandum to the President:
I thought you might like to have
a short statement showing the defects of the
Ruml plan.
DEFECTS OF THE RUML PLAN
The so-called "pay-as-you-go" income tax plan
proposed by Mr. Beardsley Ruml 1s unacceptable.
1. By fully cancelling individual income taxes
on the high 1942 incomes and profits, it would seriously
violate the principle of ability to pay.
a. It would bentow the greatest benefit
on those best able to pay and the smallest
benefit on those least able to pay. About
60 taxpayers with million-dollar incomes in
1942 would each receive a benefit of at least
$854,000. At one stroke, the Ruml plan would
add to their wealth more than they could save
in six years, even 1f they saved every cent of
their income after taxes. The benefit to a
person with 8. $100,000 net income would be about
$64,000; to one with $10,000 income, about $2,150;
and to one with $2,000, only $140. Those who had
no income in 1942 would receive no benefit
whatsoever.
b. In view of war revenue needs, tax col-
lections will have to be increased substantially.
Speeding up the payment of taxes, without the for-
giveness of any taxes, will provide part of the
increase in tax collections needed. Complete
forgiveness will mean that tax collections can be
increased only by tax rate increases. These
increases will necessarily fall in large part on
the smaller incomes because the rates on large
incomes are already very high. Forgiveness would
in effect shift part of the tax burden from the
few at the upper end of the income scale to the
many at the middle and the lower end.
0. Only those who had incomes in 1942 would
benefit from tax forgiveness but all who will
receive incomes after 1942 will bear the burden
of the tax increases. In other words, tax burden
would be shifted from old to new taxpayers. Those
in the armed forces would not share in the benefits
but would share in the costs when they return to
civilian life.
- 2 -
2. The cancellation of a year's taxes would be a
psychological deterrent to the war effort.
a. It would be injurious to the morale of
the armed forces, since it would imply economic
gain rather than economic sacrifice on the home
front.
b. It would lead people to expect lower
taxes at 8 time when higher taxes cannot be
escaped.
C. It would release funds which had been
set aside for taxes already due and would thereby
contribute to the psychology of inflation.
3. The Ruml plan cennot place the income tax on a
pay-as-you-go basis. The tax paid in any one year would
be determined by incomes received during the two preceding
years. Tax payments in 1944 would consist of a tentative
tax based on 1943 income, together with an ad justment to
take account of the change in income between 1942 and
1943. The Ruml plan presupposes that incomes are stable,
whereas in more than two-thirds of the cases, income
fluctuates substantially from year to year. The continual
adjustments made necessary by income fluctuations would
throw tax payments even further out of step with income
than they are at present.
4. The collection of taxes under the Ruml plan,
which requires both the taxpayer and the Government to
work with two years' incomes to determine each year's
taxes, would complicate tax administration and taxpayer
compliance.
5. As you indicated in your Budget Message, it is
important that the income tax be placed on a pay-as-you-
go basis. Collection at source must be the keystone of
a pay-as-you-go plan. If collection at source 18 com-
bined with the Ruml plan, it would have to be unneces-
sarily complex. A workable collection at source plan
can be achieved directly without cancellation of &
full year's taxes.
file
PSF: Morgenthan folder
March 4, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
In response to your request of March 2nd, I submit the following
information:
I. Salaries of $67,000 and over
The number of individual income tax returns filed for 1941
reporting salaries and wages of $67,000 and over totalled 2,090.
The total number estimated for 1942 is 2,500.
There follows a list of the ten (eleven on a community property
basis) individuals reporting the largest salaries for 1941 with re-
lated income and tax data. The salaries represent the total amount
reported as salaries and other compensation for personal services
from all sources during the year.
Salaries
and other
Net
compensa-
Total
Net
Income
income
Taxpayer
tion for
income
income
tax
after
personal
tax
services
A
$628,839
$897,920
$893,593
$650,389
$243,204
B
522,537
544,390
336,953
222,051
114,902
C
517,221
572,746
476,029
329,666
146,363
D
486,244
488,219
480,535
330,290
150,245
E
448,000
512,907
496,922
317,339
179,583
F
442;142
447,353
445,776
304,667
141,109
G
439,813
500,132
471,915
332,310
139,605
H
431,935
707,558
679,074
486,936
192,138
I
358,203
401,085
352,912
258,244
94,668
J
352,213
256,895
202,408
130,174
72,233
K
352,213
252,419
193,652
125,022
68,630
These returns filed on a community property basis.
- 2 -
II. Effect of Ruml Plan
a. All Income Groups.
The total estimated amount of income taxes to be reported by
individuals on 1942 incomes is $9,815,000,000. Under the original
Ruml Plan, this represents the amount to be canceled in order to
place all taxpayers on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The distribution by net income classes is as follows:
Table 1. Estimated number of taxpayers, net income,
and taxes for 1942, by net income classes; also per
cent of taxes to net income and average tax
Number of
Net
Income Percent of
Average
Net income
taxpayers
income
tax
income tax
tax per
classes
(in thous-
(In millions
to net
taxpayer
ands)
of dollars)
income
Under $1,000
9,385
$ 7,518
$ 318
4.23
$
33.88
$1,000 - 2,000
17,363
25,802
2,170
8.41
124.98
$2,000 - 3,000
6,887
16,564
1,176
7.10
170.76
$3,000 - 4,000
2,697
9,349
927
9.92
343.72
$4,000 - 5,000
1,176
5,252
645
12.28
548.47
$5,000 - 10,000
943
6,178
1,024
16.57
1,085.90
$10,000 - 25,000
299
4,369
1,193
27.31
3,989.97
$25,000 - 100,000
75
3,051
1,470
48.18
19,600.00
$100,000 - 200,000
4.3
568
397
69.89
92,325.54
$200,000 - 500,000
1.2
345
275
79.71
229,166.67
$500,000 - 1,000,000
.2
147
126
85.71
630,000.00
$1,000,000 and over
.06
99
94
94.95
1,566,666.64
Total
38,831.5
$79,242
$9,815
12.39
$
252.76
(Source: Division of Research and Statistics)
- 3 -
Table 2. Amount of taxes to be canceled at selected levels
of net income
Married persons - No dependents
Net income
Amount of
Percent of
Net income
before personal
tax at 1942
tax to
after tax
exemption
rates 1/
net income
$ 1,200
$
-
-
$ 1,200
1,300
13
1.00
1,287
1,500
48
3.20
1,452
2,000
140
7.00
1,860
2,500
232
9.27
2,268
3,000
324
10.80
2,676
4,000
532
13.30
3,468
5,000
746
14.91
4,254
10,000
2,152
21.52
7,848
15,000
4,052
27.01
10,948
20,000
6,452
32.26
13,548
25,000
9,220
36.87
15,780
50,000
25,328
50.66
24.672
100,000
64,060
64.06
35,940
500,000
414,000
82.80
86,000
1,000,000
854,000
85.40
146,000
5,000,000
4,374,000
87.48
626,000
Excludes Victory tax. Rates based on 1942 Revenue Act,
assumes maximum earned income credit and no net long-term
gains.
b. The 100 largest taxpayers
There follows a list of the 100 taxpayers who reported the
largest net income for 1941. (Returns for 1942 have not as yet
been received so it is not possible to set forth the 100 largest
based on 1942 income.)
- 4 -
Tax-
Net income as reported
Tax-
Net income as reported
payer
1941
1940
payer
1941
1940
1
$5,280,923
$3,789,204
51
$987,626
$1,246,739
2
5,238,059
129,019
52
985,129
1,657,698
3
3,948,794
Loss- 264,498
53
981,005
645,054
4
3,878,047
291,013
54
972,637
246,906
5
3,861,678
4,069,178
55
969,350
953,829
6
3,737,023
5,074,832
56
965,015
1,260,734
7
3,420,855
4,021,264
57
960,525
672,878
8
2,730,076
3,140,642
58
954,376
616,211
9
2,661,148
2,074,634
59
948,448
996,309
10
2,408,556
3,483,889
60
945,461
697,475
11
2,354,277
Under 100,000
61
940,811
930,782
12
2,207,248
1,883,406
62
936,854
163,021
13
2,194,144
211,628
63
912,482
Under
100,000
14
2,193,030
2,054,765
64
909,394
826,945
15
2,106,390
2,819,498
65
908,839
851,741
16
2,039,313
3,029,144
66
908,211
584,471
17
1,873,444
1,805,384
67
893,593
Under 100,000
18
1,755,683
1,785,279
68
879,499
1,475,478
19
1,611,624
209,380
69
878,409
623,735
20
1,522,022
1,458,160
70
878,767
860,257
21
1,496,175
1,304,815
71
876,788
763,455
22
1,468,666
1,623,670
72
872,553
918,183
23
1,463,022
2,152,426
73
868,712
Under 100,000
24
1,462,627
339,754
74
868,712
Under 100,000
25
1,452,668
1,596,543
75
865,642
1,126,001
26
1,445,077
2,933,531
76
849,976
236,207
27
1,394,246
1,702,128
77
829,471
397,370
28
1,332,909
117,247
78
827,353
818,883
29
1,322,853
122,757
79
813,894
767,878
30
1,320,944
126,632
80
810,832
706,051
31
1,310,351
1,310,094
81
805,680
371,272
32
1,304,360
Under
100,000
82
804,276
763,187
33
1,273,210
1,101,090
83
803,601
269,247
34
1,241,687
Under
100,000
84
800,026
534,490
35
1,235,113
1,046,439
85
790,779
1,007,876
36
1,204,395
950,436
86
787,604
361,062
37
1,174,715
118,582
87
786,308
616,440
38
1,173,862
1,244,800
88
785,564
464,400
39
1,158,904
1,109,660
89
783,811
381,877
40
1,155,794
1,357,449
90
781,813
690,665
41
1,145,770
1,125,524
91
779,476
533,852
42
1,144,924
1,432,434
92
777,817
Under
100,000
43
1,136,365
1,138,971
93
774,600
772,073
44
1,115,949
Under 100,000
94
768,689
726,204
45
1,102,838
1,079,321
95
767,576
687,694
46
1,089,042
1,301,990
96
759,255
773,189
47
1,087,706
1,025,286
97
757,886
757,626
48
1,074,253
1,172,345
98
753,423
719,416
49
1,061,404
357,543
99
744,601
789,699
50
1,056,207
875,502
100
741,987
381,121
- 5 -
C. The 10 largest taxpayers
There follows a list of the 10 taxpayers who reported the largest net income for 1941, showing net
income for such year in comparison with net income for the years 1936 through 1940.
The tax which would have been canceled for these taxpayers for 1942 if their incomes for this year
equalled that for 1941 is as follows:
Net income reported for
Tax which
would be.
Remaining
Taxpayer
canceled
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
liability
under Ruml
Plan 1/
A
$2,572,176
$6,985,052
$3,524,972
$2,724,884
$3,789,204
$5,280,923
$5,478,958
None
B
Under
Under
100,000
131,577
100,000
176,310
129,010
5,238,057
None *
$2,622,351
C
Under
Under
Under
Under
Loss -
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
264,498
3,948,794
None *
2,259,171
D
Under
279,821
171,590
191,167
100,000
291,013
3,787,047
1,771
1,933,719
[x]
3,795,070
993,210
1,861,150
3,660,641
4,069,178
3,861,678
4,074,374
None
F
2,082,133
2,431,457
1,326,571
2,973,951
5,074,832
3,737,023
2,664,029
346,557
G
3,717,763
953,461
1,797,901
3,618,283
4,021,264
3,420,855
3,670,791
None
H
2,849,225
2,533,086
1,710,156
2,925,205
3,140,642
2,730,076
2,376,467
None
I
1,594,846
2,438,328
866,168
3,309,152
2,074,634
2,661,148
1,917,244
226,321
J
3,824,064
1,388,053
93,349
1,428,178
3,483,889
2,408,556
2,089,407
2,080
Capital gain and loss provisions, personal exemption, credit for dependents, and rates of 1942
Revenue Act applied to 1941 income.
#
No cancellation in these cases because practically all of the income in 1941 resulted from capital
gains. Under this Ruml plan there is no forgiveness of capital gains.
PSF: Morgenthau folder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Will you speak to me about this
after the Cabinet meeting today?
F.D.R.
Letter to the Secy. of the Treasury
from Commissioner of Internal Revenue
March 4, 1943 a memo re Hamilton Fish
and his alleged evasion of income taxes
for the year 1939.
PSF
Morgenthan folder 2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Will you speak to me about this
after the Cabinet meeting today?
F.D.R.
Morgenthau's letter to the Pres. of 3/11
re reasons for the practice of prosecuting
in the criminal courts in advance of any
attempt to establish a taxpayers civil
liability in tax fraud cases.
PSF:morgenthan folder
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
Personal
March 27, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
After Cabinet, in the discussion which
Cordell Hull and I had with you, you referred
to the Treasury's attitude towards the dollar-
franc rate in North Africa. I have reference
particularly to the comment you made that the
Treasury apparently favored a gradual reduction
in the franc rate -- a course which would have
been very profitable to the speculators.
I should like to make it clear that the
Treasury at no time recommended a gradual reduc-
tion of the rate nor believed that such procedure
was desirable.
I am sending you herewith a copy of a
cable which we sent to General Eisenhower, on
December 31, 1942, explaining our position in
detail in regard to the dollar-franc rate.
This cable expressed not only the Treasury's
viewpoint, but also that of State and War. The
Treasury position was arrived at after much dis-
cussion in which representatives of both State
and War participated.
Yours sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
SECRVT
60
December 31, 1942
No. 4802
TO: Commanding General, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
After careful study of all the facts and after the fullest discussion by
interested departments of this Government, the exchange rate of 75 francs to
the dollar was set. The objectives were to fix an exchange rate that would
be in the interests of the people of French North and West Africa that would
be fair to American troops stationed in these areas and that could be expected
to be maintained. It is our considered judgment that the rate of 75 francs
to the dollar is more likely to achieve these objectives than any rate that
sets a higher value on the franc, particularly the pre-war rate of 43.90
francs to the dollar. It appeared to us wholly unreasonable and impracticable
to fix and maintain in French North and West Africa the exchange rate of 43.90
francs to the dollar which prevailed before the war and which was confirmed by
the French exchange control regulations of September 3, 1939. In view of the
changed conditions, particularly in the past two and one half years, the
economic basis for this rate has entirely disappeared. (Reference your radio
#3561, December 30, our SPBFN)
French North and West Africa have undergone a very considerable inflation
which makes the pre-war exchange rate completely untenable. Because of the
close monetary ties with continental France all of the areas of French North
and West Africa have been affected by the extreme inflationary forces operating
in continental France. The exploitation of the economy of French North and
West Africa for the benefit of the Germans contributed further to the inflation
in these areas. Other local conditions of an inflationary character have also
(1)
DECLASSIFIED
@SD Letter, 5-8-73
R
SECRET
tended to reduce the value of the franc in French North and West Africa. A
rate that would have set a higher value on the franc than 75 francs to the
dollar would have increased immeasurably the difficulty of maintaining
stability of the exchanges and the administration of exchange control. Black
markets would inevitably have developed to take advantage of the disparity
between the official rate and the real value of local currency. The wider the
disparity between the official rate and the rates prevailing in the black
market the greater the incentive to evade the established controls and to deal
in the black market. It is clearly preferable to establish an exchange rate
that can be maintained without the use of unnecessarily repressive measures.
With an exchange rate of 75 francs to the dollar the controls re-
cently instituted in French North and West Africa should succeed in reducing
black market operations and other evasions. It is not in the immediate or
future interests of the people of France and the French empire to establish
an exchange rate that does not reflect the real value of the franc and which
cannot be maintained without severely disturbing the economic balance.
It is important to stress that after hostilities cease a rate of 75 francs
to the dollar can contribute more actively to industrial, financial and
business recovery in France than a rate of 43.90 francs to the dollar. A
grossly overvalued franc will inevitably pave the way for serious depreci-
ation after the war at the very time when France would be most eager to
manifest strength in her currency rather than weakness. It would appear
that if a further adjustment of the franc rate becomes necessary after the
war because of basic disequilibrium it should then be possible for France
to make the requisite adjustment either upward or downward from a rate of
(2)
DECLASSIFIED
OECRET
0SD Letter, 5-3-72
75 francs to the dollar with less disturbance than from a rate of 43.90
francs to the dollar.
It is possible that economic conditions in some of the smaller French
colonial areas could justify a higher value for the local franc in such
areas than 75 francs to the dollar. We are not fully enough informed on
this point to express a definite view. However, it is hardly likely that
during the past two and one-half years these areas have been subjected to
any considerable extent to the inflationary forces resulting from German
occupation of continental France. Some of these areas have been covered
by the credit and financial agreements with Great Britain which have added
to the strength of their currency. Under any circumstances the rate of ex-
change in such colonial areas cannot be a significant factor in the deter-
mination of an appropriate rate for French North and West Africa. Because
of the great role of French North and West Africa in the economy of the
French Empire it is of the utmost importance to set the exchange rate for
the franc on the basis of economic and monetary conditions in these central
areas rather than on conditions in colonial areas of small economic impor-
tance. (For Eisenhower signed Marshall)
Moreover an additional factor which the Army would probably wish to
consider is that it would be wholly unfair to American troops stationed in
French North and West Africa to require them to accept and use a local
currency considerably overvalued in terms of the dollar. In justice to
these men the established rate must reflect as far as possible the real
value of the local currency in which they are paid and with which they must
make their purchases. If the rate of 43.90 francs to the dollar were in
(3)
DECLASSIFIED
a
QSD Letter, 5-3-72
GRET
effect, the American soldier receiving any part of his pay in French North
and West Africa would get for it little more than half of its real value.
It would not be long before the American soldier would become aware of that
fact. He would feel that he was being unfairly treated by his own Govern-
ment and he would tend to lose confidence in those responsible for such
arrangements. The difficulties of such an overvalued currency, the hardships
imposed on American troops using such a currency and the ill-will engendered
under such circumstances are clearly evident in other countries where that
situation prevails. The determination of the exchange rate for French
North and West Africa was made with the fullest consideration for the well-
being of the French Empire whose cooperation we seek and whose interests
we defend. lie find it difficult to understand how any one fully cognizant
of all the factors in the situation could regard a rate of 43.90 francs to
the dollar or any other rate that places a higher value on the franc prefer-
able to the rate of 75 francs to the dollar.
Marshall
(4)
DECLASSIFIED
QSD Letter, 5-3-72
R
R
fun fullowed
PSF Morgenthan folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 30, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Eden (he is not a Sir)
is going to do the best he can
about the de Gaulle franc and
will push it again as soon as
he gets back.
F. D. R.
PSF magenthan folder
May 11, 1943.
filersmal
to Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
with gift
In President's handwriting:
"Happy Birthday! Now you know why
I can't come to the party." "
F.D.R.
folder
2-43
May 21, 1943.
Dear Hen:
Many thanks for those very grand
pajamas. They are really needed. I had
got to the point where I was afraid I would
have to pass my nights in either my under-
wear or nothing at all!
My best to you.
Affectionately,
Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.
The Secretary of the Treasury
x
may 20 A 1945
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
my dear me President
I want to
thank you for the lovely silver
high hat ash hay. I am afraid
Ican not wear it, but I will
he glad to have it on my cleak.
I am sending you a
helated christmas has of
four hair of hajamas. Those
you will like them
Sincerely, your friend,
Herry
Morgenthan folder
2-48
May 24, 1943
FILE
Card in President's handwriting accompanies
flowers to Mrs. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
"Ellie dear
Its grand that all is getting
on so well. See you very soon.
Affec.
F.D.R."
PSF: morgenthan focer
the
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
May 25, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith a one page memorandum
and a brief summary of amazing and shocking corres-
pondence between Edsel Ford and Mr. Dollfuss, Managing
Director of the Ford interests in France.
As late as July 17, 1942, after the French
company had been bombed on June 6, 1942, Mr. Edsel
Ford wrote as follows to Mr. Dollfuss:
"I have shown your letter to
my father and Mr. Sorenson and
they both join me in sending best
wishes for you and your staff,
and the hope that you will con-
tinue to carry on the good work
that you are doing."
Yours thrumthan sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
P.S. This letter was dictated before
Edsel 7nd died.
P
Y
May 25, 1943
Secretary Morgenthau
Randolph Paul
A short time ago a brief investigation was made of the
files of the Ford Motor Company of Dearborn, Michigan, in
order to determine the extent of its relationship and its
control over its French subsidiary. Since the investiga-
tive report is rather lengthy, I have attached hereto a sum-
mary thereof which discloses that from the fall of France to
July 1942 -- the date of the last letter in the files from
Ford of France to Ford of America: (1) the business of the
Ford subsidiaries in France substantially increased; (2)
their production was solely for the benefit of Germany and
the countries under its occupation; (3) the Germans have
"shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interests"
because of the attitude of strict neutrality maintained by
Henry and Edsel Ford; and (4) the increased activity of
the French Ford subsidiaries on behalf of the Germans re-
ceived the commendation of the Ford family in America.
I am sure you will want to read the attached report.
We propose to submit informally copies of the investigative
report to Military Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and other similar
investigative agencies.
If you are in agreement, please so indicate below.
(Initialed) R.E.P.
Attachment.
Approved: (Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.
MEMORANDUM
The Ford Motor Company of Dearborn, Michigan, has operated
subsidiaries in France since 1925. Prior to the war, the opera-
tion was not a profitable one. The Ford Motor Company of Dearborn
was constantly called upon to lend money to these subsidiaries and
to make further capital contributions. The French subsidiaries
declared only one dividend in the period from 1929 to 1940.
Beginning shortly before the outbreak of war in 1939, the
subsidiaries in France cooperated with the French Government in
manufacturing army trucks and gun parts and did all the preliminary
work, including the installation of new machine tools and the
building of a new plant for the manufacture of airplane engines.
At the time of the fall of France, these subsidiaries were
operating three plants, all in areas which were immediately occu-
pied by the Germans. The plants suffered no material damage and
the German authorities immediately appointed two Commissars to
operate the plants. Both men were German citizens and long-time
executives of the Ford subsidiary in Germany. One of these men
was the son of the Chairman of the Board of the Ford Company of
Germany, Doctor Heinrich F. Albert. It will be recalled that Dr.
Albert was the key man of the German Espionage Organization in the
United States during the first World War. It was from him that
the brief case was seized by a Secret Service agent on a New York
elevated train in a famous international incident in July 1915.
The two German Commissars received Maurice Dollfuss, the
Managing Director of the Ford subsidiaries in France, with courtesy
and introduced him to the German military authorities.
On July 19, 1940, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford. Mr.
Dollfuss comments as follows on a visit paid him by a German
Colonel to whom he was introduced by the two Commissars:
"...I
had with him a long and very satisfactory talk."
Mr. Dollfuss stated further:
"We are working within a common scheme and I can
confirm to you that we shall have the best protection
that can be obtained for a purely French concern; and
furthermore, we will benefit from the main fact of be-
ing a member of the Ford family which entitles us to
- 2 -
better treatment from our German colleagues, who have
shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interest
as much as they can.
"The damage for us is hence thus smaller than in
any other company
After stating that the condition of the three companies is good
and the profits for May, in his own words "brilliant," he con-
tinued:
"We cannot, of course, know the results for June
and July, although we have delivered considerable quan-
tities of spare parts to the German authorities, which
were paid for with requisition bonds, which have an
official value. Furthermore, we have delivered quite a
number of trucks and passenger cars to the same German
authorities from which we received bonds of the same
type."
Mr. Dollfuss discussed the difficulty he faced in taking care of
3,000 employees and then stated that "the good graces of the
authorities" enabled the company to requisition a school to pro-
vide housing for employees and enabled the company, also, to sup-
ply the employees with food.
There is no indication that Mr. Edsel Ford replied to this let-
ter; however, Mr. Sorenson, to whom a copy of the letter was sent,
stated in a reply dated August 19, 1940:
"We are pleased to learn from your letter of July
18, which we received and read very carefully, that
our organization is going along, and the victors are
so tolerant in their treatment. It looks as though we
might still carry on in spite of all the difficulties."
August 31, 1940, Mr. Dollfuss informed Mr. Edsel Ford that
production had reached twelve trucks a day, would reach fifteen
trucks a day within a week, and within three weeks would reach
twenty trucks a day, which was better than -
11 .our less fortunate French competitors are
doing. The reason is that our trucks are in very
- 3 -
large demand by the German authorities and I believe
that as long as the war goes on and at least for some
period of time all that we shall produce will be taken
by the German authorities."
He indicated that the German authorities were receiving the entire
production. He stated further:
If in order to safeguard our interests - and I
am here talking in a very broad way - I have been to
Berlin and have seen General Von Schell himself, who
is the highest executive responsible for the motor in-
dustry, both from the military and the civilian points
of view.
"I will satisfy myself by telling you that my
interview with him has been by all means satisfactory,
and that the attitude you have taken together with
your father of strict neutrality has been an invalu-
able asset for the protection of your companies in
Europe." (Underscoring supplied)
Mr. Dollfuss added a note in long-hand in the margin opposite this
paragraph:
"I was the first Frenchman to go to Berlin."
Immediately after this visit the German authorities reinstated
Mr. Dollfuss as Managing Director of the French subsidiaries of the
Ford Motor Company at Dearborn, subject only to the slight control
represented by a visit from one of the executives of the Ford Motor
Company of Germany once every three weeks.
September 12, 1940, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford and
stated that up to the first of August the Ford companies had made
a profit of 1,600,000 francs. He recognized that their cash po-
sition was very weak in dollars -
.but, as you know, our gold standard has been
replaced by another standard which - in my opinion - is
a draft on the future not only in France and Europe but,
maybe, in the world."
In this letter Mr. Dollfuss also stated that he had worked out a
- 4 -
plan for shipping machinery not needed in the French plants to the
Belgian and Netherlands plants for the purpose of manufacturing
parts to be distributed amongst all of the Ford factories in
Europe.
In a short acknowledgment of these letters on November 12,
1940, Mr. Sorenson stated:
II
.We all realize that you are carefully guiding
our business in the unusual situation that it is now."
October 31, 1940, Mr. Edsel Ford replied to the letters men-
tioned above congratulating Mr. Dollfuss on the fact that his
trading results had been profitable and stated:
"I think that this is a remarkable achievement in
view of the difficulties that are present at this time.
"I also appreciate your great effort to keep the
organizations intact and desire to produce something.
Raw materials must be very hard to find. You are do-
ing a fine job in cooperating with the other companies
in the allocation of raw materials for the various
Ford companies."
In reply to a cable informing him of the date on which com-
plete installation was expected in a new plant Mr. Ford replied
by a cable of October 10, 1940:
"DELIGHTED TO HEAR YOU ARE MAKING PROGRESS. YOUR LET-
TERS MOST INTERESTING. FULLY REALIZE THE GREAT HANDI-
CAP YOU ARE WORKING UNDER. HOPE YOU AND FAMILY ARE
WELL, REGARDS. EDSEL FORD."
In a letter of October 11, 1940, to Mr. Edsel Ford, Mr.
Dollfuss seemed quite pleased by the fact that the Ford business
was equal to what it had been before the war, whereas the busi-
ness of Renault and Citroen was only 20 percent of what it had
been before the war. He stated:
"Naturally the advantages that we have are be-
cause we belong to the Ford family, advantages which
we cannot overestimate under the present circumstances."
- 5 -
In this letter he also stated that the Ford enterprises in France
were working for the Ford Company of Germany in the tool depart-
ment.
November 27, 1940, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford, and
pointed out once more the favorable position of Ford compared with
other French firms and emphasized that profits were substantial.
He explained in this letter that the two men from the German sub-
sidiary became Commissars because of a plan they presented to the
German authorities to create a European Ford organization under
the leadership of the German company. However, when military
operations ceased, Mr. Dollfuss was able to arrange through General
Von Schell to have the French enterprise continue on a completely
independent basis. He stated:
"At this stage I would like to outline the importance
attached by high officials to respect the desires and main-
tain the good will of 'Ford' - and by 'Ford' I mean your
father, yourself, and the Ford Motor Company, Dearborn.
"What the future organization of the Ford companies
should be in Europe after Europe is remade - or main-
tained - is a matter for 'Ford' to decide, and not for
Dr. Albert or Mr. Schmidt. Anything done actually to
force a decision would be both premature and risky -
your interests must be defended by yourself, and not by
disinterested parties.
"Were you today to approve of a Ford organization
different from what it was, would be equivalent to tak-
ing a position which would separate you of the neutral
attitude - an attitude which you have been able to safe-
guard so successfully.
"Even in the case of a completely victorious German
peace, the rights of the shareholders will be. protected;
this because it is one of the basis of the Nazi theory,
and in France, it is the theory upon which the future
organization of this country is to be founded; in conse-
quence, the rights of shareholders are intangible and
your right of control will remain. Therefore there is no
reason for you to give away one of those rights today.
"After the above considerations, and if we admit the
possibility of a German victory, in my opinion, we cer-
- 6 -
tainly must:
(a) Maintain the independence of the French
company and eventually that of the British
company;
(b) Have a company or organization somewhat
similar to the Guernsey company - evidently
comprising representatives from every coun-
try, all the more so that by then the United
States of Europe will be contemplated, and
each state will have to be represented there.
In that company you should have independent
men of your own choice, and not satellites
placed there to protect Cologne's interest."
This letter was not mailed to Dearborn, but was carried by Mr. G. A.
Lesto, an employee of the French Ford subsidiary who came to Dear-
born arriving early in January 1941. Immediately after his arrival
on January 6, 1941, Mr. Edsel Ford cabled Mr. Dollfuss, noting the
arrival of Mr. Lesto:
"APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT FORD
INTERESTS FRANCE. HOPE IT UNNECESSARY TO CHANGE STATUS
OF COMPANY CONTROL."
On January 20, 1941, Mr. Edsel Ford wrote to Mr. Dollfuss
stating that Mr. Lesto had arrived and that he had an interesting
conversation with him. The letter continued:
"It is gratifying to learn of the efforts you have
made to continue the Ford manufacturing program which
began prior to hostilities and especially to know that
you have been able to get the cooperation of various
interested parties and to make some progress towards
the completion of this program since the Armistice."
In addition to the letters from Mr. Dollfuss, Mr. Lesto brought
with him to Dearborn a letter of November 28, 1940 to Mr. Edsel
Ford signed by J. C. Charpentier, a Director of the French subsid-
iary. In the main this is a personal letter, but the writer extols
the manner in which Mr. Dollfuss has conquered great difficulties
and says of the French Ford Company:
- 7 -
"I feel that you have got there a child worthy of your-
self."
Mr. Edsel Ford replied on January 29, 1941:
"I am very appreciative of your direct personal
word regarding the reopening of our plant in Paris and
the slow return to something like a normal manufacturing
operation. I am quite sure that this has been done under
the utmost difficulties and with much hard work.
"We are very proud of the record that you and your
associates have made in building the company up to its
first great position under such circumstances.
On January 29, 1941, Mr. Edsel Ford wrote to Mr. Dollfuss
stating that he agrees with Mr. Dollfuss as to the status of the
European companies and in addition:
"I am gratified to hear of the financial results
as of October 31, 1940, of the Matford Company which
seems to me an excellent showing considering the cir-
cumstances under which you are operating."
In reading this statement by Mr. Ford it should be borne in mind
that he was referring to the financial statement as of October 31,
1940, which shows a debit balance of 26,128,000 francs in the
account of the German authorities. In a letter accompanying this
statement the accountant explained that while this debit balance
was unusually large, the German army was paying regularly and the
total business 80 far had amounted to 34,000,000 francs.
The correspondence in the spring of 1941 is not particularly
significant. On June 9, 1941, Mr. Dollfuss informed Mr. Edsel
Ford that the French Government had asked him to supervise the
Hispano-Suiza Works in Paris making certain parts for aviation
motors. He declined since he did not have the time to spare.
In a letter of August 6, 1941, Mr. Dollfuss stated that pro-
duction had reached 1,000 units per month, which is considerably
in excess of the pre-Armistice level. The letter also states that
they are now delivering trucks to civilians for the first time.
- 8 -
Mr. Edsel Ford replied to this letter as well as an inter-
vening one of August 21, 1941, by a letter of October 16, 1941,
as follows:
"It is encouraging to hear that you are going along
in spite of the terrific handicaps. I heartily approve
of your fight to keep salaries and wages up to our
standards, as there is no other way to keep the morale
and working spirit of employees at a high pitch."
October 13, 1941, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford com-
plaining bitterly of the difficulties which he believed had been
placed in his way by "those who should really be supporting us."
He said that he "finds it easier to deal with the authorities
themselves." He also said that he had just been called personally
to Berlin to see General Von Schell.
Mr. Edsel Ford replied on November 14, 1941:
"I am also glad to hear that the difficulties in con-
nection with this consolidation have been overcome and I
also fully understand where the difficulties have arisen."
On December 5, 1941, Mr. Dollfuss wrote Mr. Edsel Ford and
Mr. Henry Ford II notifying them that they had been elected
Directors of the new company which was a merger of the former Ford
subsidiaries.
January 28, 1942, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford that
production continues at the same rate and is distributed between
the French and the German authorities. He also said that this
production rate was the highest of all the French manufacturers.
A letter of February 11, 1942, from Mr. Dollfuss to Mr. Edsel
Ford gives 1941 net profit as 58,000,000 francs.
Early in March the largest Ford plant in France was severely
bombed by the R.A.F. and the slight amount of correspondence between
France and the Ford Motor Company of Dearborn within the next few
months was concerned primarily with this matter. The plant was
bombed four times by June 6, 1942, which was reported in full by a
letter of June 6, 1942, from Mr. Dollfuss to Mr. Edsel Ford.
ninev
- 9 -
Mr. Edsel Ford replied by a letter of July 17, 1942, the final
paragraph of which is as follows:
"I have shown your letter to my father and Mr.
Sorenson and they both join me in sending best wishes
for you and your staff, and the hope that you will con-
tinue to carry on the good work that you are doing."
(Underscoring supplied)
The letter of July 17, 1942, was the last letter from Dearborn in
the file.
On August 15, 1942, Mr. Dollfuss wrote to Mr. Edsel Ford
stating that production had been resumed at the same rate and that
production had been dispersed among various plants.
No reply was made to this letter from Dearborn.
The last communication from Mr. Dollfuss was the transmission
of information by the Department of State that the French company
had received from the Government of France an indemnity in the
amount of 38,000,000 francs for damages incurred in the bombings.
T-114
PSF: morgenthau forder 2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PERSONAL
June 5, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
As you know, Nan Honeyman is
an old personal friend of ours. Do
you think there is any chance for
making the shift?
F.D.R.
Letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, May 26, 1943
from Nan Honeyman (Mrs. David Honeyman)
1728 S.W. Prospect Dr., Portland, Oregon,
who is now Collector of Customs for Oregon;
asks if the President will appoint her as
Collector of Internal Revenue for Oregon,
since she has heard that Mr. Maloney, now
Collector of Internal Revenue, is going to
resign.
PSF
Margeathan
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
July 15, 1943
some
My dear Mr. President:
Undoubtedly you will remember
that when you had Madame Chiang
Kai-shek for lunch, you asked me
to see representatives of China in
regard to giving them assistance.
The enclosed memorandum is the re-
sult of several conferences with
them, and I understand they are
very pleased.
Sincerely H.m yours,
The President,
The White House.
MENORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:
On July 14, 1943, we sent a message to Dr. H. H. Runs, the
Chinese Minister of Finance, informing him that the Treasury is
prepared in principle to agree to the Chinese request to purchase
$200 million of gold out of the $500 million financial aid as a means
of helping to check inflation in China. Dr. Kung was also informed
that a formal request was, of course, necessary before any definitive
decision and action could be taken.
The Chinese Government has already drawn on the Treasury to the
extent of $240 million out of the $500 million financial aid:- $200
million has been set aside as backing for Chinese Government savings
certificates and bond issues; $20 million WAS used to purchase gold,
end (20 million is being used for the printing of banknotes and the
purchase of relative materials. The purchase of gold with an add1-
tional $200 million will mean that in total the Chinese will have
used 0440 million out of the $500 million financial aid,
In the message to Dr. Rung, as well as in discussions with the
representatives of the Chinese Government in Washington, it has been
made clear that the Treasury is acquiescing to the Chinese proposal
because the Government of China deema that the sale of gold to the
public will aid its war effort by helping to fight inflation and
hoarding and that, therefore, the decision to purchase the gold is
primarily the responsibility of the Chinese Government. Furthermore,
the Chinese have been urged to give coreful consideration to the
best ways of using the gold, particularly because of the great costs,
difficulties and dengers inherent in the use of gold as a means of
checking inflation under conditions existing in China at present.
We especially stressed the fact that the Chinese Government will by
this step be sacrificing large amounts of foreign exchange, which
could be used in the post-war period to pay for imports needed for
reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The use of gold coins as against bullion for the purpose was
carefully considered. It was falt both by us and by the Chinese
Government that this technique for selling the gold to the public
would not be feasible in the present instance, primarily because it
would be necessary to give the gold coins a fixed monetary value,
while it 1a contemplated that the price of gold in terms of yuan
will change frequently and substantially as time goes on.
The suggestion was therefore made to the Chinese representatives
in Washington that the gold might be sold to the public in China in
small bars of one or two ounces in order to reach the widest pos-
sible section of the Chinese public and such bars might have some
engraving which might suggest the United States origin of the f1-
nancial aid, if the Government of China so wished.
Secretary of the Tressury
Capy of mime filed. China folder, 1.43
PSF: Morgenthan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1943.
AW HEN:
The weather is hot and I
am goin' off fishing.
I decline to be serious
even when you see gremlins
which ain't there.
F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
July 27, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:
I am badly in need of your help and guidance 8.8
to the Treasury's present responsibility and its
relations with others in the Administration and with
Congress in matters of tax policy. The situation now
seems to be one of muddle and confusion which I think
only you can clear up.
During the last ten years you have looked to me
as Secretary of the Treasury to direct tax research and
planning and to represent you before Congress. It has
not been an easy job because, as you know, we have been
pressing constantly for increases in revenue, for the
removal of rank discriminations in the tax laws and
for other salutary reforms in which you have been keenly
interested. The fight has often been bitter and the
Treasury has been the subject of criticism and abuse by
the political and economic foes of your Administration.
I have been fortified, however, by your support and the
fact that you looked to me to carry forward so important
& part of your general program.
Now the situation has taken a different turn and
I am in doubt whether you want me to go on doing for you
what I have done in the past.
A combination of circumstances has led to the belief
in Washington and throughout the country that the Treasury
is "out of the tax picture" so far as tax policy and
legislation are concerned. First Mr. Byrnes, the Director
of War Mobilization, and more recently Mr. Vinson as
Economic Stabilization Director, are represented as
"tax policy makers." I have had no notice from you of
any such transfer of responsibility, and you will recall
that when you set up the Office of Economic Stabilization
you exempted the Treasury from the direction of the
FORVICTORY
BUY
ENITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
- 2 -
head of that office. Nevertheless Mr. Vinson has under-
taken negotiations on tax matters with the chairmen of
the two committees of Congress and has called members
of the Treasury staff to meet with him and representatives
of the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation to discuss tax policy and changes in the law.
Newspaper stories reflect the conclusion that he is in
charge of coordinating Administration tax views and may
even present an Administration program to Congress.
This creates a situation which makes it very diffi-
cult for me and for members of my staff to work effectively
on tax matters. Our authority to get the views and
assistance of other departments and agencies of the
Government is made doubtful and we can't even carry on
with any confidence dealings with the Committee leaders
and their staff representatives.
The whole atmosphere is one of doubt and uncertainty
which I think will very greatly prejudice your ability to
make recommendations on taxes to which Congress will give
serious heed. My own view--and I think it agrees with yours--
is that we need very substantial additional taxes, both for
revenue and to combat inflation. There is a different
view on the Hill. I should like to see your views presented
in a manner to make them most effective. I don't think
that can be done if the present confusion of authority
continues.
I urge therefore that you give me a clear and definite
answer to two questions and that you make your decision
public. The questions are:
(1) Do you continue to look to me as your Secretary
of the Treasury to coordinate the views of others in the
Administration and to present a tax program to you for
your approval?
(2) Do you wish me to be in charge of presenting such
a program to the Congress, as I have been doing over the
last ten years?
- 3 -
I am taking the liberty of enclosing 8. form of
directive which would indicate your affirmative answer
to both these questions.
Sincerely,
Secretary of the Treasury
The President
The White House
To:
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of War Mobilization
The Director of Economic Stabilization
It is my desire that the Secretary of the Treasury
as the chief fiscal officer of the Government shall
continue to be in charge of the formulation of tax poli-
cies and of a tax program to be submitted to me and
shall represent me in presenting the Administration's
program to Congress.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in the formulation
of the tax program, will be expected to consult with and
to obtain the views of the Director of War Mobilization,
the Director of Economic Stabilization and representatives
of other interested departments and agencies.
is
The joint committee will have
7
larger part than usual in the pro-
n
gram for two reasons. Mr. Vinson
8
has worked with Mr. Stam and has
confidence in his judgment, and
Mr. Stam's committee is exercising
it
for the first time the powers
3
granted to It under the 1942 reve-
VINSON SEEKS UNITY
nue act to call upon any depart-
7
ment of the Government for infor-
mation.
3
FOR TAX PROGRAM
The tax committees placed in
that act powers which, in effect,
Page
8
set up the joint committee as the
I-11
central agency for collecting tax
15
Consults With Executive and
e
data, with subpoena power, and
8
33
gave It statutory authority to put
27
Legislative Experts in Drive
to work other agencies, including
9
33
the Treasury.
12
to Draft Wartime Bill
as
The most important implication
6
-20
of the Vinson program for a united
-11
tax front, according to experts out-
33
SAVINGS PLAN IS PUSHED
side the Treasury, will be to force
Secretary Morgenthau to accept
!ed
compulsory savings. Sentiment on
Compulsory Measure on Lines
Capitol Hill is represented as
5
strong for compulsory savings as
of Victory Measure Is Favored
the only means of taking consider-
of
e3
by Some Congress Groups
5
ably larger segments of spending
power from individuals in the fight
ch-
against inflation.
e5
de-
By JOHN H. CRIDER
As early as the Spring of 1942
the Federal Reserve Board's chair-
e5
Special to THE New YORK TIMES.
man, Marriner Eccles, Leon Hen-
ion
WASHINGTON, July 20-Fred
derson, then the head of the Office
e 5
M. Vinson, Economic Stabilization
of Price Administration, and the
var
e?
Director, is moving to bring to-
Bureau of the Budget agreed CT
gether all the fiscal agencies of the
the urgency of adopting compul-
oal
e 7
executive department on a single
sory savings but could not per-
tax program for presentation to
suade Mr. Morgenthau to adopt it.
ge
(
Congress in September when it re-
It was learned today that it was
18
1
only after Mr. Vinson received
turns to prepare the country's larg-
eat wartime revenue bill.
jurisdiction over taxes that Mr.
Mr. Vinson was pictured as meet-
Morgenthau attended inter-de-
on
partmental conferences on this
ce 1
ing frequently with a group from
subject.
the Capitol, a group from the
nts
In a report privately circulated
ce 1
Treasury, and then meeting them
together.
among members of the Ways and
ent
Means Committee and the Senate
[e 8
At the same time he is attempt-
ing to sound the view of members
Finance Committee, the staff of
lan
the Joint Committee on Internal
ge 9
of Congress in advance of any tax
Revenue Taxation has suggested
presentation.
nse
that the victory tax, which it de-
10
He does this as an expert, having
fends as a valuable part of the
served seven times in the House as
wartime tax structure, might form
. a
chairman of the sub-Committee on
13
1
Taxation of Ways and Means Com-
the nucleus for compulsory sav-
gis-
ings. The committee staff said:
mittee. Whether Mr. Vinson, in-
17
1
"The victory tax affords the
stead of the Treastiry, will present
best model for a simple compulsory
"ish
the Administration's tax program
17
savings plan, except that In the
to Congress has not yet been decid-
ed, it was learned.
case of compulsory savings, there
ued
would be no limit on the credit
17
With only a little more than a
for the amount of bonds pur-
ts:
month to get together an accept-
chased.
18
able tax program to raise as much
"Moreover," the staff report
se,
as possible of the $12,000,000,000
continued, "the principle of allow-
18
additional asked by Henry Morgen-
ing deductions for insurance, debts
on
thau Jr., Secretary of the Treas-
and other expenditures of a non-
18
ury, activity on the tax front has
inflationary character should be
int
been intensified this week at Mr.
adopted under any compulsory
18
Vinson's office, the Treasury and
savings scheme. If we adopt a
to
the Joint Committee on Internal
compulsory savings plan, there is
34
Revenue Taxation of Congress.
merit in using for that purpose a
Unless Mr. Vinson is successful
tax which is familiar to all and
in his efforts to shape an Adminis-
in good working order, rather
tration program with which Con-
Hill
than experimenting with an un-
91
gress can agree in principle, it is
tried and probably more compli-
possible that the joint committee
or
cated method."
15
and the agencies of the Executive
Department will develop conflict-
the
17
ing programs. Activity centers in
the group of experts around Colin
È
F. Stam, staff chief of the joint
17
committee, and around Randolph
A
Paul, general counsel of the
17
Treasury.
morgenthan freder 2.43
ASF
October 11, 1943.
My dear Alexander:-
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., our
Secretary of the Treasury, 18 going to
North Africa and hopes to get to Sicily
and Italy, looking into matters finanosal
and economic. I hope he will have a
chance to ... you.
I think things are going
extremely well, and I wish I were with
you.
Always sincerely,
General Sir Harold R. L. 6. Alexander
October 11, 1943.
Dear Ike:-
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., will be in the
Mediterranean area soon and I hope you will
give him all information in regard to currency,
exchange and economic matters. Also give him
the "lowdown" on the attitude of the French.
Don't tell anybody but it is possible
that I may see you in a little over a month --
probably in North Africa.
My best wishes to you,
As ever,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
October 11, 1943.
My dear Clark:-
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., is leaving
for North Africa to discuss many financial
and economic matters, and he hopes much to
get to Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia and also,
if the going is good, as far as Maples.
You are doing a grand Job. Keep
it up.
As ever yours,
Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark
October 11, 1943.
Dear George:-
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., will take
this over with him. I hope you can see him.
He wants to get as far as Sicily anyway and
perhaps to Naples.
By the way, that map you sent to
me which you carried in Sicily is on exhibit
in the Archives' building and is drawing a
lot of attention from the public.
You have been doing a grand Job.
My best wishes to you.
Always sincerely,
Lieutenant General George 8. Patton
THE WHITE HOUSE
file
WASHINGTON
October o, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The Secretary of the Treasury called
to say that you told him to remind me to
remind you that you wanted to write a
letter for him to take to Generals Eisen-
hower, Patton, Clark and Alexander. He
also said that you suggested that he might
visit Naples and Sicily. He would also
like to visit Sardinia and Corsica and
be allowed to see as much as possible.
G.
PSF: Morgesthan folder 2-16
THE WHITE HOUSE
file
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1943.
CODE ROOM
STATE DEPARTMENT
HON. HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
CAIRO
Think best for you not to
80 to London. Meanwhile I will
try to get an agreement here.
All well here. Delighted
you saw the boys.
ROOSEVELT
JG
Algiars
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased bE-
Dated October 23, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 4:30 a.m. 24th
foR
Secretary of State,
Washington,
1824, October 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
SECREE
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY
Your 1946 October 22, 12 p.m.
This is in reply to your message, dated
October 2 suggesting that I might discuss with Sir
John Anderson in London considerations raised in
the memorandum on financial position, dated
September 14, 1943, sent to ME by Sir Kingslay -
Wood.
I think it would bE desirable to reach agreement
among the interested Department's of our own Government
before taking up the matter with the British. An
informal committee, consisting of representatives
of the State Department, Lend-Lease, War, Navy,
Treasury, and Mr. Crowley's organization, have been,
for a long time, considering problems of that
character. The draft of proposed letter to Mr. Crowley
was submitted to each of the members of that committee
for the
REGRADED DECLASSIF UNCLASSIFIED
ERANCH
-2- 1824, October 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Algiars
for the purpose of obtaining their reaction before
making any definite recommEndation. I learned,
by cable, that there was E difference of ViEW among
the /.merican members with respect to the wisdom of
taking action such as was indicated in the draft
of the proposed letter to Crowley. I had already
cabled home that no further action should bE taken
with respect to the letter until my return.
Inasmuch as there appears to bE a difference
in V1EW among the members E.S to the wiaest course
for us to pursus, I would suggest that WE can make
prograss more Effectively if WE first attempted to
reach agreement among the interested agencies.
The British Government has kept us fully informed
as to their views on the matter and have supplied
us with all the data needed upon which to base &
recommEndation.
If there is agreement among members of informal
committee indicated above and if you approve of their
recommEndations WE can them take it up with British
representatives in Washington before taking any final
action.
WIIEY
RR
FMH
Alcitrs
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrasad bE-
Dated October 23, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 3:52 a.m., 24th
Secretary of State,
Washington.
1824, October 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
There are in Washington several representatives
of the British Government who are thoroughly conversant
with the problem and who have participated in
discussions bearing on matter for many months.
After having read this cable if you still
wish me to go to London I will of course bE glad
to do so but should you wish me to so I think it
highly important that I should bE instructed to
present to Dir John Anderson Treasury viswpoint this
matter and the Treasury viswpoint should of course
bE the administration viewpoint.
Arrive Cairo Monday morning. llanning spend
two days there. Would appreciate hearing from you
at Cairo.
END OF MESSAGE.
WILEY
RR
PSF
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
pussual
November 4, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith a
report on the atrocities committed
by the Germans in the Naples area,
submitted to me by Colonel Edgar
Erskine Hume.
Yours sincerely,
through
The President,
The White House.
20 October 1943
Hon. Henry Morgenthau,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Care of Lieut. General Mark W. Clark, U.S.A.,
Headquarters, Fifth Army,
NAPLES.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
In compliance with your request I give you herewith
a brief report of acts of German cruelty and wanton destruction
committed in Naples, chiefly during the three weeks before our
capture of the city. This period is called "The Reign of Terror"
by Neapolitans. I am, of course, not giving any instances of
damage to the city or to individuals which took place as a re-
sult of acts of war (bombings, etc.). The things that I list were
unnecessary from any military point of view.
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CITY
AS A WHOLE
1. Water Supply: When the Fifth Army reached Naples
we found that there was an almost total failure of the water
supply. People were carrying water in pails, jugs, bottles
and every type of container. There was a small trickle of water
from some of the hydrants but many persons standing in line
were unable to receive enough to quench thirst. Naples had been
famous for an abundant supply of pure water. The Germans had
blown up the main aqueduct in seven places and all of the res-
ervoirs save one had been drained. By chance an Italian had
saved one reservoir by cutting the fuse after it had been
lighted by departing Germans. Allied Military Government took
charge of the remaining reservoirs and by rationing made the
supply go as far as possible. The hardship in the people of
Naples, particularly those unable to go for water was great
and there was much suffering, until the supply was rationed and
until we established water distribution points for water dis-
tilled from the bay. The Germans were well aware that there
was ample facility for our bringing in water for the troops, as
was done in the desert campaign, so that this destruction of
the city supply was an act of cruelty against civilians, young
and old. The enemy likewise destroyed the pumping plants,
thereby making it impossible to raise the water, had any been
available, to the higher parts of the city. The water mains
in many parts of Naples were deliberately cut.
2. Sewage System: The pumping facilities of the sewage
disposal system of Naples were destroyed. Thus, even had there
been enough water to enable sewers to function, they would have
been unable to do so because much of the Neapolitan sewage
disposal depends not on gravity but on a series of pumps. The
city is built on volcanic rock so that, even had there been
space available for them, it was all but impracticable to dig
latrines. The danger of epidemics of intestinal diseases, such
as typhoid fever and dysentery, was obviously very great partic-
ularly at this season of the year.
-1-
3. Electric Light and Power Systems: Naples was in dark-
ness when we took over. The Germans had destroyed both the
generators of the current and likewise the transformers. The
Italian metropolis depends largely on hydro-electric power not
only for lighting, but for the water and sewage pumps, the mills
for grinding wheat, the newspaper presses, the heating of build-
ings, cooking, and indeed practically all power machines. This
was one of the most serious conditions we had to meet. Hy hard
work by our engineers the current is now restored, in part,
though we have had to follow a certain priority in alloting it
at first.
4. Transportation System: The street car system was
wholly out of commission both because the electric current had
been cut off (see above) and because the Germans carried away
or destroyed the greater part of the rolling stock. Buses also
were taken away. A large number of them were found to the north
of the city where the enemy, unable to carry them further, had
burned them. There are of course no taxicabs other than a few
old wrecks, and only 8. few horse-drawn vehicles in the city.
People who are not physically strong enough to walk from one
locality to another are practically prisoners. This has serious-
ly affected the earning capacity of many. The Germans carried
away every automobile, both passenger and truck, that they could
find. In some instances they took only the tires and destroyed
or abandoned the bodies of the cars. Ambulances and fire-
fighting vehicles were not spared.
5. Communication Systems. The telegraph lines were put
out of commission. The main telephone exchange was blown up.
Fortunately the Germans overlooked two small subsidiary ex-
changes. By splicing the 1 ines we were able to give the mili-
tary authorities a limited number of lines within ten days.
However business firms and private families are still without
telephones. The Post Office was looted and destroyed (see
below).
6. Demolition of Hotels: The group of magnificent hotels
along the Via Partenope, facing Vesuvius, used to be one of the
outstanding groups of such institutions in the world. Such
names a.8 the Excelsior, Vesuvio, Santa Lucia, Royal, etc;, are
known to travelers everywhere. These buildings, without ex-
ception, were blown up and fire set to what remained. They
cannot be repaired. The only first-class hotel left was the
Park Hotel (Parker's Hotel), which was mined (see below).
7. Blocking of Tunnels: There are a number of tunnels in
Naples built to give ready access from one quarter to another
at B. saving of much hill climbing. These were blown up.
8. Bombing of Public Buildings: Besides the bombing of
various public buildings for their immediate destruction, the
Germans showed their usual cunning in setting time bombs BO as
to explode after our arrival, thereby both destroying property
and causing human death and suffering. A few instances will
illustrate. On October 7, at 2:30 P.M., a violent explosion,
-2-
caused by a time bomb hidden in the corner of the Post Office,
destroyed the end of that building and tore an enormous hole in
the street. There was considerable loss of life, chiefly civil-
ians. In all 30 people were killed, 84 were severely injured
(hospitalized) and 25 were slightly injured. I was in my office
across the street when the explosion occurred. I went to the
scene at once and helped give first aid to the wounded. Many were
women and children. In the Via Partenope a time bomb in the
street exploded on October 3rd, at about dusk. Fortunately
nobody was hurt though a few minutes before a group of workmen
had passed over the spot. On October 11th, at 8:55 A.M., a time
bomb set in the Italian Artillery Barracks, occupied by our
307th and 36th Engineers, exploded. Some 24 of our men were
killed and 47 wounded. This cannot be justified as an act against
our armed forces, for it was only by chance that we were using
the barracks for soldiers. It had been previously used by Italian
families. Every effort has been made to locate unexploded bombs
and with much success. A time bomb and about 1500 pounds of TNT
were removed from the basement of the Park Hotel on October 2nd,
before explosion occurred. On October 16th, an unexploded time
bomb and 1600 pounds of TNT were removed from the building
housing a part of the 82nd Airborne Division. Ordnance officers
estimated that the bomb had about 3 days and 17 hours more to
run, on the timing device, before explosion.
9. Opening of Prisons: Before their departure, the Germans
released all prisoners in the jails and prisons of Naples, of
which there are about a dozen, one of them the largest in Italy.
while we have been able to re-arrest many of the criminals, this
act of the Germans has been productive of danger and loss of
morale to the civil population.
10. Demolition of Flour Mills: Naples, like most Italian
cities, grinds its wheat a little at a time, rather than con-
verting a whole crop to flour at once. Thus flour mills are an
essential feature of the city's economic and welfare system. All
of the large mills were wrecked by the Germans.
11; Destruction of the University of Naples and of its
Famous Libraries: The University of Naples is one of the oldest
and most famous in existence. The library of the Royal Society
of Naples, one of the great learned societies of the world, was
housed therein. It was put to the torch on 12 September, a little
more than 8 fortnight before we took the city. We are collecting
affidavits of the Rector and many faculty members and students.
They agree that at about 3:00 P.M., a party of some 600 Germans
entered the University and announced that they were about to burn
it, in retaliation for the fighting of Neapolitans, including
students, against their troops. Cans of gasoline were brought in
and the walls, furniture and books covered with it, and the fire
was started. The firemen arrived soon thereafter but the officer
in charge refused to allow them to enter. Two Carabinieri
(military police) who tried to stop the destruction were taken to
the front entrance and shot. Many of the nearby houses were
robbed, not only those of professors but of others. Several
witnesses agree that the notorious Col. Scholl, Commander of
German troops garrisoned in Naples, arrived in person when the
-3-
work was finished and read a proclamation in German and Italian
announcing that the university had been wrecked as a punishment
to Naples. When I first visited the ruined buildings the ashes
of the Library of the Royal Society were still warm and the pool
of blood on the front steps, where the shooting of the Carabinieri
was reported to have occurred, was still evident.
12. Robbing: / Directors of the several hospitals of Naples
of Hospitals;
agree that the Germans before departure, carried off all of the
hospital equipment and supplies that they could find. Some of
these institutions had practically no medicines or dressings when
we arrived. Even establishments of the Italian Red Cross were
not spared.
OFFENSES AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
In a report of this kind, prepared on a few hours
notice, it is not possible to give 8 detailed account of offenses
against individuals. That must wait until our final report on
German misdeeds in Naples is completed. The following incidents
are taken at random from a mass of documentary evidence thus far
gathered.
There is general agreement that Germans collectively
and individually robbed shops, homes and even people in the
streets. This varied all the way from ordinary highwayman's
technique to burglary. Many individuals, not excepting those in
high position, were carried off as hostages. Among such hostages
were the Bishop of Cava dei Terreni and the Abbot of Badia at
Corpo di Cava. Many people were beaten to make them disclose the
whereabouts of supposed valuables. Women as well as men were
subjected to such treatment. There were many murders, some of
a sadistic nature, with mutilation of dead bodies, particularly
those of women. One deposition says that the eye witness saw
a man buried in a grave he had been forced to dig himself, being
bayonetted before being thrown in. Often the populace were told
to help themselves after the Germans had begun looting. Many of
the more intelligent witnesses state that the killing of Italian
civilians was not merely acts of individual German soldiers, but
often in response to direct orders of their officers, all as a
part of a campaign to terrorize the people. "Booby traps" were
placed not only in places where they might be set off by our
troops, but where children and other civilians would find them.
Many such people have been mutilated or killed. There was much
wanton destruction of property, frequently associated with phys-
ical harm to people. Furniture not desired was smashed or
burned, live-stock killed, supplies of food destroyed or fouled
BO that it could not be used. Particularly cruel were the meas-
ures against those Italians between 18 and 35 who failed to respond
to the German proclamation of September 22nd, requiring them to
report for forced labor with the German Army.
I wish that there were time to give you more details and
to complete the report of the first two weeks of the work of the
Allied Military Government of this great city. I should like to
give you further particulars beyond what I could tell you in a
few minutes last night. I think that I may say, however, that
-4-
we have achieved our dual goal. First that of keeping the
burdens of governing this war town city from the shoulders of
our military Commander, whose entire attention is needed for the
leading of a great army. Secondly, we have been able to keep the
city running in something like a normal fashion, despite the
handicaps imposed by war and by the German studied policy of
destruction.
May I wish you a safe journey home and once more thank
you for your interest in what we are doing.
Respectfully yours,
EDGAR ERSKINE HUME,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
United States Army,
Chief of Military Government.
PSF
Personal
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
DEC 2. 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
You may be interested in knowing how we handled the Lazard
Freres matter, concerning which I spoke to you some time ago.
An investigation by the Foreign Funds Control disclosed that
in the autumn of 1940 remittances totaling $1,825,000 had been
made without license from New York by a Panamanian corporation
in which the French partners of Lazard, Paris, had a substantial
interest. The remittances were to a Swiss banking firm and the
explanation given was that they represented the liquidation of a
Swiss interest in the Panamanian corporation. This explanation
was not convincing and we took steps with respect to the Swiss
firm's accounts in this country calculated to elicit from it the
ultimate destination of the funds. At the same time, we advised
Lazard, New York, that we were not satisfied with the explanation
and informed them of the steps we had taken. Meyer and David-
Weill thereupon admitted that there never had been any Swiss
interest in the Panamanian corporation and that the remittances
were, in fact, transfers of credit by Meyer in New York to David-
Weill in Chatel-Guyon, then unoccupied France. The Swiss banking
firm was merely an intermediary in effecting the transaction. In
fuller explanation of why the remittances were effected, David-
Weill and Meyer testified in substance as follows:
Upon the fall of France, Lazard, Paris, moved to Chatel-
Guyon. Although the firm was technically in a sound position, a
substantial part of its assets was in commercial bills and credits
that could be discounted only in the occupied zone. David-Weill,
who was then in charge of the office at Chatel-Guyon, felt that
Laval, who bore a grudge against Lazard because he believed its
partners had opposed him politically, might take action to cause
a run on Lazard Freres and force its public failure, thereby
accomplishing the dual objective of punishing a political enemy
and discrediting "international Jewish bankers. Indeed, depositors
were already withdrawing their funds at a rapidly increasing rate.
- 2 -
Consequently, David-Weill communicated with Meyer, who had re-
cently arrived in the United States, and asked that funds be sent
to the French firm to enable it to meet its obligations. Deeming
it imperative that David-Weill obtain the funds promptly, Meyer
arranged to have the $1,825,000 remitted to David-Weill via
Switzerland. David-Weill has testified that he used the proceeds
of the remittances solely to meet legitimate business obligations
of Lazard, Paris. Information presently available does not
establish that Frank Altschul or any other direct partner of
Lazard, New York, knew of the remittances.
After full consideration, we decided to permit Lazard, New
York, to continue to operate provided that the firm gave adequate
guarantees of the truthfulness of David-Weill's explanation as to
his use of the $1,825,000 and that the freezing order would be
complied with in the future by the firm and its partners.
Accordingly, on November 10, 1943, Lazard, New York, deposited
$2,000,000 in Government bonds with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. By the terms of & consent, simultaneously executed by
the firm, these bonds may be vested and become the property of the
United States if Lazard, or any of its partners, should engage in
any material violation of our financial controls or if it should
be determined that David-Weill's testimony as to his disposition
of the $1,825,000 is untrue. Thereupon, a license was issued to
Lazard authorizing it to admit David-Weill and Meyer as partners.
We have also referred this matter to the Attorney General for
such action as may be appropriate.
Henry munthant
THE WHITE HOUSE
staking taking Bx. 101
WASHINGTON
in
December 21, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I spoke with Congressman John McCormack
last evening and gave him your message
about Burke. He howled over the telephone
-- and I suppose it was because he had been
in to see Henry Morgenthau a few days before
and was very upset after his visit because
H.M. Jr. told him that there were things
against Burke's character, but refused to
tell Mr. McCormack who the people were who
attacked his character.
McCormack feels that if there are
accusations made against a person he should
know who the people are who make them.
Also McCormack mentioned that he was
waiting to see the Secretary and Asst.
Secy. Gaston came in at the same time.
H.M. Jr. sent for his own assistant first
and let the Congressman wait. The Cong.
said if the positions were reversed he
certainly would have made his assistant
wait while he saw the Secy. of the Treasury.
This may seem a very trivial story
but these little things make a great
difference on the Hill.
He asks that you do nothing about
filling the vacancy of Collector of Customs
for Boston úntil after his return when he
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
- 2 -
hopes to have a chance to talk to you
about it. He says Burke has been loyal
and devoted and has gone down the line
both for your interest and his and he is
the only man he can depend on in the Party
in Boston. He feels very strongly that
Burke should get this job, SO I think you
will have to talk him out of it if the
Secretary refuses to appoint him.
G.G.T.
PSF: Treasury Dept 2-43
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
December 18, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I saw Congressman John McCormack and Mr. Dave
Niles this morning with regard to the appointment
of Mr. Burke as Collector of Customs for Boston.
Unfortunately, I could not go along with
Congressman McCormack's recommendation which angered
him considerably. The reasons for my not being
able to go along are the following:
Burke has been State Chairman for the last
four years. He is a Curley protegee. Aside from
any income he may have derived from the office of
State Chairman, his recent sources of support have
been a salary of $2,000 a year as a "contact man"
for J. L. Sullivan & Company, heating and plumbing
contractors, and similar service for the last year
at a salary of $6,000 a year for the Builders'
Lumber & Supply Company, which has been engaged
largely in supplying Government contracts.
Burke is 37 years old and has a wife and two
children. Up to 1940 he had been associated with
his father in various small businesses at Northampton
and Hatfield. He was clerk in his father's store;
helped his father run an ice business; worked on
his father's farm, and ran a beer and lunch room in
which his father set him up.
Curley picked him up as a political protegee
in 1935 and he held several part-time political jobs.
He was an unsuccessful candidate for State Treasurer
in 1938.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND 1
STAMPS
-2-
There is nothing in this record which seems
to qualify him for appointment to the important
job of Collector of Customs at Boston. In addi-
tion, our investigators obtained some confidential
opinions about him on the promise that their names
would not be revealed.
Judge Abner McLaud, of the District Court at
Greenfield, Mass., said he got well acquainted with
Burke when the latter was a Placement Officer for
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in 1935 and 1936.
He described Burke as "uncooperative, ignorant, un-
gentlemanly, uncouth, overofficious, overbearing, a
person who drank to excess and who lacked ability
and personality".
Judge Welch, of the Probate Court for Hampshire
County, described Burke as a "boob" and not fitted to
be appointed to the most menial position in the Govern-
ment service.
Dr. T. F. Correden, Medical Examiner for Hamp-
shire County at Northampton, said the appointment of
Burke as Collector of Customs would make the Demo-
cratic party the laughing stock of that section of
the State. He said Burke had no qualifications for
the position, that he lacked education, background
and ability and he doubted that any self-respecting
citizen who would speak frankly would recommend Burke
for such a position.
Jesse Andre, an attorney at Northampton, des-
cribed Burke as a big bluff and a mouthpiece for some
bigwig who is actually running the Massachusetts State
Committee and that he is merely tolerated by the party.
He described Burke as a man of no character, no ability,
no education, no qualifications, no background, and a
drunk.
-3-
The investigator reports "some talk" that Burke
is being advanced for the position of Collector of
Customs SO that a more satisfactory and more reputable
man can be put in as Chairman of the State Committee.
I was unable, under the circumstances, to give
the information and opinions of these four men to
Mr. McCormack, but regardless of these statements by
persons who would not permit their names to be used,
it does not seem to me that Burke's record would war-
rant our considering him for appointment.
Yours sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
C
PSF morgethanfolder 2-44
0
P
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 5, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:
I think Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
is right, and that I agree with him.
Please speak to me about this before
anything like what he says goes into
print.
F.D.R.
Transmitting copy of letter which
the President received from the Sec.
of Treasury, 1-5-44, in re proposed
Budget Message; original letter re-
tained for our files.
(ong.cames. filed Budgetfeder, 2.K4)
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
January 5, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
The Dureau of the Budget has submitted
to the Treasury its first draft of the
pronosed Budget Message which, I under-
stand, you contemplate sending to Congress
the middle of next week. In this draft
of the Message there is a recommendation
that Congress provide législation which
would inaugurate a program of compulsory
savings.
You and I have for some time been
publicly opposed to such a program. I am
still onposed to it and so far as I know
you are also. I believe that we have
demonstrated beyond doubt our ability to
raise the necessary funds with which to
finance the war through voluntary means.
On the assumotion that you are still
in favor of the voluntary method of raising
funds, I would appreciate it If you will
advise the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget to this effect. I know that you
appreciate the importance of this matter
in view of the Fourth War Loan Drive which
will commence on January 18.
Faithfully yours,
S/ HENRY MOPOENTHAU, JR.
The President,
The White House.
PSF morgenthau folder 2-44
feba THE WASHINGTON WHITE HOUSE
February 4, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM:
In regard to your inquiry as
to whether the President would like
to have the Secretary of the Treasury
and Mrs. Morgenthau for dinner on
Monday evening, I am informed that
the Secretary is leaving Washington
tonight and will not return for
several weeks.
GRACE TULLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Do you want Secretary and Mrs.
Morgenthau invited to dinner on
Monday evening, Feb. 7th? Mrs.
Roosevelt asks.
GGT
I
PSF H.M.Jr. Trasury Dept. folder 2-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRIVATE AND
February 24, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
3
H. M., JR.
I think that Herbert Gaston is
making a mistake -- or trying to
cover up. It seems pretty well
established that a letter does
exist in the Treasury files, in
spite of Herbert's inability to
find it.
This is really important and
I think you ought to put a sleuth
on it.
F. D. R.
By By 1. Deputy DECLASSIST OF of the
J. Stowart patoMAR1.6.1072 U.S.
ROBERT E. HANNEGAN
Memorandum
February 17, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I did see and read the letter from Senator
O'Daniel, or a copy of his letter; Mr. Timothy Mooney,
former Deputy Commissioner in Charge of Income Tax
Division advised me today that he also recalls having
seen the letter and the fact that I discussed the
letter with him at the time that I had read it.
Faithfully yours,
Bab.
The President
The White House
Hand to Miss Tully and tell
her that this is in reply to
a personal note from the President
to Mr. Gaston.
WITHO 2RM MON's
THE WHITE HOUSE
file
WASHINGTON
February 14, 1944.
Dear Bob:-
Please read enclosed. It
does not get us very far. Please
return for my files.
F. D. R.
Enclosure -- letter to the
President from Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Gaston re Senator
O'Daniel.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Washington,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
February 11, 1944.
Dear Mr. President:
Referring to your note of yesterday, I have had
the correspondence file cards of the Secretary's
office searched and have made inquiries in other of-
fices, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
without turning up anything that is at all significant
or important from Senator O'Daniel.
The Secretary's office files contain more than
one hundred cards listing communications from 'Daniel
back to May, 1939, when he was Governor of Texas.
Practically all are of an entirely routine nature,
mostly forwarding questions and suggestions from con-
stituents. In January, 1944, the Senator asked for
information as to the public debt. In January, 1943,
he wrote asking for definitions of sales tax, turnover
or transactions taxes and the spendings tax. These
seem to be the only cases in which the Senator has asked
for information on his own account.
While Mr. Hannegan was Commissioner of Internal
Revenue a rumor arose from some source that Senator
'Daniel had written a letter to the Treasury Depart-
ment or to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or had
in some other way expressed interest in a tax investi-
gation then in progress. A thorough search of the
files of the Treasury and the Bureau at that time failed
to reveal any such letter, and inquiry of former Com-
missioner Helvering and in the field did not disclose
either any letter or any expression of interest in the
case by Senator O'Daniel.
I regret I am not able to be any more helpful on
the basis of information I now have.
FORVICTORY
Faithfully,
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
The President
STAMPS
The White House
21
February 10, 1944.
Dear Herbert:
I understand that Senator (w.y)
0' Daniel sometime ago wrote a letter to
X the Treasury Department to ask for certain
information. Would you mind letting me
see a copy of it?
As ever yours,
(Sgd)FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Honorable Herbert E. Gaston,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.
PSF: forear
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I thought you would be interested in this
very encouraging cable from Mr. Ira Hirschmann in
Ankara to Mr. Pehle. Things at last are beginning
to move.
Unfortunately, we have to continue to keep
this matter confidential.
Yours sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
STAMPS
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:
American Embassy, Ankara
TO:
Secretary of State, Washington
DATED:
March 4, 1944
NUMBER: 388
FOLLOWING FOR PEHLE FROM HIRSCHMANN.
There arrived today in Istanbul the first group of
Jewish children from Bulgaria and on Monday they leave for
Aleppo by train for Jerusalem.
Bulgarian and Gestapo officials and bureaucratic delays
held up certificates of release for these children for 8
months. It is our belief that this constitutes the begin-
ning of a fairly continuous movement of children provided
new obstacles do not interfere. We were assured today by
Turkish authorities that they have issued instructions for
140 children with 10 adults to pass from Rumania through
Turkey in two groups of 75 each every 10 days until further
notice.
In the last 10 days ninety refugees came from Bulgaria
via Istanbul to Palestine in addition to the above. Further-
more, seventy-four refugees came to Izmir from Greece. The
stoppage in refugee movement through Turkey which had existed
since the first of January has been overcome. We are now
directing our efforts towards increasing the movement. We
are hopeful of obtaining steadily increasing results with
the War Refugee Board's continuing uncompromising support of
our daily efforts. Moreover, a solution in Turkey of a more
difficult and complex situation than can possibly be under-
stood in Washington could serve as a formula for other parts
of the world where similar humanitarian efforts are being
made by the Board.
This morning Ambassador Steinhardt was notified by the
Foreign Office that the immediate charter of the SS VATAN
for a single voyage from Constanza was approved in principle
by the Foreign Office and that at the earliest possible
moment the matter would be submitted with a favorable
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 16 1972
By J. Schauble Date
- 2 -
recommendation to the Council of Ministers (the equivalent
of our cabinet) without the approval of which no vessel may
be chartered.
The Ambassador was further informed by the Foreign
Office that they had taken this action as a personal courtesy
to him subject to the understanding that if the vessel is
desired for additional trips it will be necessary for the
Ambassador to discuss with the Foreign Office reimbursement
for the financial loss resulting from the Turkish Govern-
ment's continued sacrifice of one of the very few ships
which it has available for carrying its products.
It is estimated by us that on each trip the SS VATAN
should be able to carry a maximum of eight-hundred and a
minimum of six-hundred refugees. As yet we have received
no information concerning changes which may have to be made
in the vessel to accommodate passengers since it is a
freighter. A substantial agreement has been reached with
the owner as regards the charter price. However, there will
be the matter of obtaining from the Russian and German Govern-
ments safe conduct for the vessel and attempts to obtain this
through Geneva are being made by the International Red Cross
representative here. Information regarding the progress of
this matter will be sent to you.
STEINHARDT.
morgenthau 2-44
file
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
April 21, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I thought you would like to know some of the things
that have been happening behind the scenes in connection
with our testifying before the Senate and House Commit-
tees.
Only by telling the English that I would go up and
testify whether I heard from them or not were we finally
able to get an agreement out of them to go along with
the principles involved. The Russians also have been
stalling us, and yesterday I called up both Harriman
in Moscow and Ambassador Gromyko here to put all the
pressure I could on them to get the Russians to come
along. I never got an answer from the Russians until
I was in the middle of my testimony before the four
Committees in the Senate this morning. You will find
the message attached to this letter. I thought you
would be most pleased that the Soviet Government de-
cided to go along with us "to secure due effect in the
rest of the world". In other words, they want to be
associated with us in the eyes of the world. State and
Treasury both think this is highly significant, as I
am sure you will also.
Before leaving the hearing in the Senate, Senator
Vandenberg whispered to me that he would support this
program. The fact that I was able to tell the Senate
that you would appoint members of Congress to the
American Delegation made a great hit.
I am dictating this letter between hearings, so I
do not know how I will be received in the House this
afternoon, or what kind of publicity we will get in the
FOR VICTORY
morning papers, but I am hoping for the best.
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
- 2 -
I was so happy to learn that both Jimmy and Franklin
received highly deserved promotions, and may I extend my
congratulations to you as their father.
With warm regards,
Sincerely yours,
Henry
The President,
The White House.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:
Moscow
DATED:
April 20, 10 p.m.
NUMBER:
1380
I was asked by Molotov to call this evening near
midnight and received the following statement from him:
Among our financial experts there exists a major
discord with respect to the basic conditions of the
establishment of the international monetary fund. The
objection was made by the majority of our experts to
a series of points. Speaking with complete frankness,
the Soviet Government has not succeeded in studying
yet fully the basic conditions of the proposal.
If it is necessary, however, to the Government
of the United States of America to have the concurrence
of the Government of the Soviet Republic to secure due
effect in the rest of the world, the Soviet Government is
willing to instruct its experts to associate themselves
with Mr. Morgenthau's project.
It was explained by Mr. Molotov that this was not
to be considered as a reservation made by the experts
- 2 -
but for your information, it expressed the actual attitude
of the Soviet Government. If you wished it under these
circumstances he would issue instructions to his experts
to associate themselves with the monetary fund statement.
Molotov was informed by me that there was not time
for me to get a reply from you, and I suggested to him
that he give instructions to his experts to associate
themselves with the monetary fund statement, provided
however, you approved under the circumstances. To this
Molotov agreed, and he will instruct his experts on
receipt of this cable to get in touch with Mr. White.
My suggestion is that you telephone me as early
as possible in order to give me advice of your decision
SO that I may tell Molotov, who said, if you approve, he
is prepared to publish the monetary fund statement in
Moscow.
PSF morgenthan freder 2-44
\
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
filmal filsonal
May 13, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
That advertisement is really
interesting. I had not seen it.
On the lighter side, I am
glad to know that a "Clabber Girl"
can be got for 8¢ and in a larger
size for 19¢.
I also notice that the cost
of Toilet Bowl Brushes remains
constant!
F. D. R.
THE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
May 9, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I don't know whether you saw the enclosed ad-
vertisement in last night's Evening Star, but on
the chance that you did not I am sending you a copy
of it, because I think this advertisement more than
anything else that I have seen recently demonstrates
conclusively the accomplishment of your Administra-
tion, during the past year, in holding down the cost
of living.
May I extend my congratulations to you personally
on this great achievement.
Sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
PSF margenthare fredu
THE WHITE HOUSE
tile them
WASHINGTON
June 12, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
If we are going to do anything
about Burke in Massachusetts I
think we should do it now. All
of your opposition people were the
"parlor type". I still think
Burke would make a good Collector.
Why not send over his name?
F. D. R.
-
margenthan folder 2-44
Dear grace;
For your information:
The Secretary of the Treasury
file PSF July 6 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
S.C. I. Manshell
Fthick stafood idea
for Nec. Marganthair -
Jack me May T90 arra
a broatJuly 21 W2.3W 23 G
all how The new intering
is working in France 1.
Will you Transport
78P
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MISS TULLY.
In response to the request of the
Secretary of the Treasury for & para-
phrased copy of the Prime Minister's
message number 703 (14 June 1944) to
the President, with reference to the
French currency question, the following
is believed to be the part of the
message he desires:
Paraphrased extract from message No.
703, from the Prime Minister to the
President:
"It is my understanding that last night
a statement about the currency was issued
by you. Rest assured that I shall endeavor
to support you in every way possible. Should
copy klotz
an old lady in Bayeux sell a COW to an
American quartermaster and be paid with this
currency, I feel sure that Morgenthau will
have to see that she is no loser on the
transaction when she presents the currency at
his office in Washington. The French people
are taking this currency according to my
information from France last night."
By Deputy Archivist of the W.D.Dirm BROWN.
DECLASSIFIED
FEB 0. 1972
By T. J. Stewart Date
1
PSF
morgerthan peder 2.VY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMO FOR GRACE:
TO EXPLAIN TO H.M. JR. THE
PRESIDENT DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN WRITE
TO GEN. MONTGOMERY BECAUSE HE DOES NOT
KNOW HIM.
DOT
July 15, 1944.
Dear Winston:
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. will be in
England the latter part of this month. He is
going over to discuss currency problems and I
hope much that you will be able to see him, if
only for a short visit.
With my warn regards,
Always sincerely,
The Right Honorable
Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London, England.
(copy of this letter filed - Churchill folder, 1-44)
July 15, 1944.
My dear Tke:
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. will be in England
the latter part of this month. He is going over
to discuss currency problems and I hope very such
you will be able to 000 him and I know you will do
everything you can to be helpful.
Also, Secretary Morgenthau would like to
see something of the troops in France while he is
there, if you can conveniently arrange it.
With my vars regards,
Always sincerely,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force,
London.
(copy of this letter filed - 2-44)
July 15, 1944.
My dear General Bradley:
This will introduce to you Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury,
who is going to France to discuss currency problems.
I shall be most grateful for any courtesies you
may be able to extend to him.
with all good wishes,
Always sincerely,
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley,
Commanding General,
First Army Group and First Army.
(copy of this letter filed - Gen Corres "B", 3-44)
morgenthan freder 2-44
S.C. Form No. 7
(Revised Aug. 1942)
Signal Corps, United PSF States Army
Received at
TOP SECRET
AUGUST 15, 1944.
FOR LONG OR MISS TULLY FROM UNDER SECRETARY OF TREASURER, BELL:
SECRETARY MORGENTHAU ENROUTE FROM LONDON ASKING IF
PERMISSABLE FOR HE AND MRS MORGENTHAU GO HYDE PARK WITH THE PRESIDENT
ON THE SPECIAL FRIDAY NIGHT. MR. BELL WANTS ANSWER TO PASS ALONG TO THE
SECRETARY TODAY.
NO SIG.
RECEIVED
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
STATION
STATE 9 MINI 12 w 2 3 TEE
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
S.A.
4.
Date- 3-19-59
6
Signature- Care d. Specer
Lown PM
GP-7103
TOP SECRET
file hot approved
morgenthan folder 2.44
PSF
August 25, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
1. It is agreed by the British and all agencies of the
U. S. Government that no general exchange note will be estab-
lished for Germany until some time after the Allied armies
take over.
2. It is necessary to give our troops their pay and
allowances in German marks and therefore we need a military
rate of exchange.
It is my opinion that our first concern should be to
give our soldiers ample purchasing power for their pay
when they are in Germany and therefore I recommend that this
military rate be 20 German marks to the dollar.
The British propose 5 marks to the dollar. The State
Department proposes 8 marks to the dollar. The British and
the State Department feel that a low rate of exchange for the
German mark and high purchasing power for our soldiers' dollar
will disrupt the price and wage structure in Germany, unbalance
the German economy thus retarding its rapid rehabilitation
and recovery.
PSF: morgenthan folder 2.44
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
September 8, 1944
Memorandum
To:
Mr. Latta
From: Mrs. Klotz
For your records, I am sending you
herewith two photostats of a memorandum
which the President approved for Secretary
Morgenthau yesterday.
THE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
SEP 7 1944
ME ORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
As the Allied Armies are already within u rola-
tively few miles of Germany, it is ossential that a
currency program for Cormany be confirmed to General
Eisenhower as quickly as possible. The proposal that
U.S. yellow seal dollars be used for the pay of U.S.
troops in Germany, though it has its merits, has the
following disadvanta, es:
a. American military penetration into Vermany
is imminent. There is a serious question whether
adequate supplies of yellow seal dollars could be dis-
bursed in time to army finance officers in the forward
fighting areas and through them to the troops.
b. The German people would acquire dollar cur-
rency on a large scale, twenty to forty million dollars
a month. It is extremely unlikely, even under a man-
datory currency conversion program, that the U.S. could
ever recover the yellow seal dollars from the German
people in exchange for marks. The U.S. would then be
compelled either to redeem or repudiate the yellow seal
currency, either of which alternatives appears undesir-
able.
C. The use of dollars instead of marks by our
troops would quickly create dissatisfaction among our
troops because there would be no uniform rate of ex-
change. Some soldiers would get many more marks than
others for their dollars. However, the Germans would
soon be quoting their prices in dollars and thus taking
advantage of the American troops. Under these condi-
tions, the morale of our troops might be impaired. The
benefits received by soldiers from their pay should be
uniform and not dependent upon individual bargaining
ability.
d. The British would strongly object to our use
of dollars, inasmuch as such action on our part would
force them to use sterling. Hitherto, all important
FORVICTORY
BUY
SHITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
-
STAMPS
- 2 -
actions taken in Europe with respect to occupation has
been the result of a bilateral or tri-partite decision.
For us to use dollars in the face of strong British opposi-
tion would constitute the first important break in the
Allied decisions. Unfortunately, from the British point
of view, our use of dollars would virtually force the
British to use sterling. In other words, action by us,
though seemingly affecting only the U.S. Army would, in
fact, force a similar action to be adopted by the British,
which, in the case of Germany, they have indicated they
would strongly resist.
e. The Russians might misunderstand our use of yellow
seal dollars. Agreement has been reached with the Soviet
Government to use Allied Military Marks in Germany. More-
over, the Soviet Government has already completed a large
printing program of Allied Military Marks for the use of
its own army. Some of these marks may already be in use
in East Prussia. It would appear politically undesirable
for the United States to breach this agreement by unilateral
action.
For the above reasons we recommend that the Allied
Military Mark be used by the U.S. Army in Germany both for
the pay of troops and the purchase of local services and
supplies. The question of the establishment of a general
rate of exchange between the dollar and the mark need not
be settled now but could be postponed until some time after
surrender when there will be an opportunity to better evaluate
the situation and to determine a rate more nearly in conformity
with the actual conditions then existing. In the meantime,
we recommend that a military rate of
10 10 Tm marks
7 OP
to the dollar should be employed exclusively for the pay of
troops and military accounting purposes.
The use of Allied Military Marks offers some positive
advantages in addition to avoiding the undesirable features
that would currently be associated with the use of yellow
seal dollars.
a. It provides the simplest and most effective means
of placing the financial burden of occupation on Germany,
inasmuch as any future German Government will be compelled
to assume responsibility for the redemption of the Allied
Military Mark.
b. Use of the same occupation currency by the three
occupying powers would aid in demonstrating Allied unity.
- 3 -
C. Adequate supplies of Allied Military Mark currency
are already available at SHAEF headquarters in France for
American and British troops and are also available in Russia
for Soviet troops.
d. The Allied Military Mark currency is denominated
in units already familiar to the local population and avoids
the establishment of a two price system.
e. By using Allied Military Marks and establishing
only a military rate of exchange the way is left open to
review the question of the exchange rate when and as necessary,
without precipitating a flight from the mark into foreign
currencies, thus facilitating the secretion of assets by
the Germans. If only mark currency is used, the foreign
exchange regulations to be imposed upon a defeated Germany
would be facilitated and strengthened.
J.m withouth
Sept. 7th 1944
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
SEP ' 0144
LE ORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
As the Allied Armies are alroady within LL rola-
tively few miles of Cermany, it is essential hat a
currency pro ram for Cormany be con imed to .eneral
Eisenhower as quickly as possible. The proposal that
U.S. yellow seal dollars be used for the pay of U.S.
troops in Germany, though it has its merits, has the
following disadvanta.es:
a. American military penetration into Jermany
is imminent. There is a serious question whether
adequate supplies of yellow seul ..ollars could be dis-
bursed in time to army finance officers in the forward
fighting areas and through them to the trooos.
b. The German people would acquire dollar cur-
rency on a large scale, twenty to forty million dollars
a month. It is extremely unlikely, even un er a man-
datory currency conversion program, that the U.S. could
ever recover the yellow seal dollars from the German
people in exchange for marks. The U.S. would then be
compelled either to redeem or repudiate the yellow seal
currency, either of which alternatives appears undesir-
able.
)
C. The use of dollars instead of marks by our
troops would quickly create dissatisfaction among our
troops because there would be no uniform rate of ex-
change. Some soldiers would get many more marks than
others for their dollars. However, the Germans would
soon be quotin; their prices in dollars and thus taking
advantage of the American troops. Under these condi-
tions, the morale of our troops might be impaired. The
benefits received by soldiers from their pay should be
uniform and not dependent upon individual bargaining
ability.
d. The British would strongly object to our use
of dollars, inasmuch as such action on our part would
force them to use sterling. Hitherto, all important
FORVICTORY
BUY
ENITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
STAMPS
- 2 -
actions taken in Europe with respect to occupation has
been the result of a bilateral or tri-partite decision.
For us to use dollars in the face of strong British opposi-
tion would constitute the first important break in the
Allied decisions. Unfortunately, from the British point
of view, our use of dollars would virtually force the
British to use sterling. In other words, action by us,
though seemingly affecting only the U.S. Army would, in
fact, force a similar action to be adopted by the British,
which, in the case of Germany, they have indicated they
would strongly resist.
e. The Russians might misunderstand our use of yellow
seal dollars. Agreement has been reached with the Soviet
Government to use Allied Military Marks in Germany. More-
over, the Soviet Government has already completed a large
printing program of Allied Military Marks for the use of
its own army. Some of these marks may already be in use
in East Prussia. It would appear politically undesirable
for the United States to breach this agreement by unilateral
action.
For the above reasons we recommend that the Allied
Military Mark be used by the U.S. Army in Germany both for
the pay of troops and the purchase of local services and
supplies. The question of the esta lishment of a general
rate of exchange between the dollar and the mark need not
be settled now but could be postponed until some time after
surrender when there will be an opportunity to better evaluate
the situation and to determine a rate more nearly in conformity
with the actual conditions then existing. In the meantime,
we recommend that a military rate of
10 Tm marks
7 UP
to the dollar should be employed exclusively for the pay of
troops and military accounting purposes.
The use of Allied Military Marks offers some positive
advantages in addition to avoiding the undesirable features
that would currently be associated with the use of yellow
seal dollars.
a. It provides the simplest and most effective means
of placing the financial burden of occupation on Cermany,
inasmuch as any future German Government will be compelled
to assume responsibility for the redemption of the Allied
Military Mark.
b. Use of the same occupation currency by the three
occupying powers would aid in demonstrating Allied unity.
- 3 -
C. Adequate supplies of Allied Military Mark currency
are already available at SHAEF headquarters in France for
American and British troops and are also available in Russia
for Soviet troops.
d. The Allied Military Mark currency is denominated
in units already familiar to the local population and avoids
the establishment of a two price system.
e. By using Allied Military Marks and establishing
only a military rate of exchange the way is left open to
review the question of the exchange rate when and as necessary,
without precipitating a flight from the mark into foreign
currencies, thus facilitating the secretion of assets by
the Germans. If only mark currency is used, the foreign
exchange regulations to be imposed upon a defeated Germany
would be facilitated and strengthened.
Sept. 7th 1944
T2 PSF morgenthan freder
Sept 9:30 20, 1944
Secy Hull
will Dr White
From: Mr. FitzGerald
The New York Times.
SEP 22 1944
The Summons to Quebec
This last attitude was the guiding
In The Nation
Mr. Roosevelt, to whom Mr Margen-
principle of the Army invasion manual
thau's views were vigorously trans-
in
France which is said to have art used
mitted, found them to his liking.
the Secretary of the Treasury. ('om-
Why Secretary Morgenthau
When, therefore, the plans at Quebec
pojed in the absence of a firm
Went to Quebec
depended on an understanding between
line, and addressed to military prob-
the United States and Great Britain
lems only, it nevertheless stirred up
(which presumably Russia has ap-
many of those who have never accepted
By ARTHUR KROCK
proved) with reference to the treat-
the necessity of General Eisenhower's
WASHINGTON, Sept. 21-A number
ment of German nationals after the
invasion policy in North Africa and
of inquiries have come to this depart-
war and during the occupation, the
who fear that the national trait of good-
ment, of which the following is typical:
President sent for the Cabinet member
nature may operate to make it too easy
Both Foreign Minister Eden and
who had pretty much taken over the
for the conquered German people. Sec-
Foreign Under-Secretary Cadogan
retary Morgenthau never was known as
problem.
were summoned to Quebec for con-
This is the explanation, giyen by
a critic of the North African policy.
ference, but the Secretary of the
But he seems to think that the Ger-
those who should know, of this pres-
Treasury, and not the Secretary of
ence of the Secretary of the leasury
mans may not be taught their merited
State, was the only Cabinet mem-
with Mr. Eden and Sir Alexander Cad-
lesson unless he and others of like
ber summoned from Washington.
ogan and the absence of the Secretary
mind watch for and stamp out anything
Does this mean that Mr. Morgen-
of State. The Quebec conference dealt
which may stimulate a psychology of
thau has become the President's
largely with military matters, war and
leniency.
adviser on foreign affairs instead
post-war, but the line to be followed
In an orderly administration the
of Mr. Hull?
by our civilian representatives in Ger-
State and War Departments would be
In a general sense the answer is
many must be integrated with military
the central figures in this problem, par-
"no," but in a limited way it appears
measures for some years to come.
ticularly since neither Secretary Stim-
to be "yes." This is only with respect
In a way the discussion in Washing-
son nor Secretary Hull can even faintly
to one sector of foreign policy: The
ton over these measures is a very mild
be suspected of any inclination to be
post-war treatment of Germany. Mr.
descendant of that which arose over
easy with the Germans. And in that
Morgenthau has become the central
our North African policy for a few
type of administration the Cabinet
civilian government official concerned
months after the invasion. General
Minis er for Foreign Affairs would
with da matter, and he seems to have
Eiserpower, finding that General Gi-
have jonferred at Quebec with his op-
persua led the President that the poll-
raud could not maintain the order
posite number, Mr. Eden. Bu the
cies he proposes during the occupation
United States Government these] days
which the safety of his military opera-
of Germany are more in line with Mr.
tions required, accepted the aid of the
is much too personal to be thus eye-
Roosevelt's ideas than those of ome
late Admiral Darlan. On the latter's
tematised.
other advisers and that the Trea fury
advice, General Eisenhower installed in
Secretary can be relied on to press
civil posts some Vichy Frenchmen who
them firmly in the event of disputes.
were anathema to the de Gaulle group
As in so many other difficult areas
and to the most vocal anti-Fascist
of policy, the President, on the private
groups in the United States.
testimony of associates, hesitated until
just before Quebec to make a choice
Defense of Policy
of guiding principles for occupled Ger-
A blast of criticism, which if still
many and then demanded a new set to
blowing in some degree, assailed that
be ready in forty-eight hours. This is
policy, and fear was expressed that it
why, according to these witneases, the
forecast "soft treatment" and even ex-
Quebec conference assembled with our
culpation of European fascists after the
post-war German program so new that
war was won. To this the official re-
the British were obliged to reopen re-
sponse was that the policy had saved
view of the subject by their Foreign
a great many American lives in North
Office.
Africa and preserved order at General
The President some weeks ago ap-
Elsenhower's back-the only way, it
was asserted, this could have been
pointed to formulate a blueprint a.
achieved. The President and Mr. Hull
Cabinet committee composed of Sec-
retaries Hull, Morgenthau and Stim-
also denounced the suggestion that they
are disposed to be lenient with fascista
son. In this Mr. Morgenthau, following
his visit to the Normandy front, fook
during or after the war. And it, was
the ead, partly because of the air-
argued that a. policy which was invoked
during the perilous military stage of
dens of other matters on his Call net
invasion had to be prompted by con-
colle) gues, partly because he did not
siderations which could be disregarded
like juggested programs he had seen
after victory and therefore was not part
and an invasion manual prepared by
of a. permanent pattern.
the Army.
MORGENTHAILPLAN
ON GERMANY SPLITS
CABINET COMMITTEE
Secretary of Treasury Would
Convert Country to Small
Agricultural Holdings
STIMSON, HULL OPPOSE IT
other European countries. Until
Mr. Morgenthau had presented his
Say Program Cannot Work
proposals and won Presidential
Because of Interlocking
support for them It had been ten-
tatively planned that Germany
Economy of Europe
would be permitted' to function as
an Industrial state after surrender,
By The Associated Press
toe offent Poland's loss of easters
but under Allted military and eco-
WASHINGTON, Sept. 23-Pres-
territory to Russia: (UP) Ruand
nome controls that would deny her
wants German labor battalions put
any opportunity to become a great
Ident Roosevelt's Cabinet commit-
war-making state,
tee on German peace policy has
to work on Russian reconstruction;
To date Mr. Morgenthau's plan
split wide open, It was learned
(c) with her own huge needs for
has served chiefly as a basis for
today, over & plan sponsored by
manpower, Russia is not interested
hot arguments in the secret sex-
Secretary of the Treasury Henry
in prolonged military occupation oz
stona of war, state, treasury and
Morgenthau Jr. for completely
Germany and would be willing to
other Government agency experts
have Britain, the United States and
charged with evolving practical
destroying Germany as a modern
other Allied countries do the job.
controls for the Reich of the fu-
industrial state and converting it
Mr. Hull la known to be deter-
ture. It has been instrumental also
into an agricultural country of
mined that whatever plan is de-
in bringing about modifications of
small farms.
cided on finally here must be
the basic handbook being prepared
Mr. Morgenthau's plan, drawn
agreeable to Russia. He feela that
by the Government for the guid-
after his recent return from Euro-
It la easential to have British-
ance of military administrators in
American-Russian cooperation in
post-war Germany,
pean hattlefronts and England, is
immediate post-war Europe as a
Post-war Germany is defined by
reported to have had the general
basis for long-range cooperation in
these experts as the German state
approval of the President since
a world security organization.
that will come into existence some
before his Quebec conference with
Mr. Morgenthau's plan is under-
time after the armistice. The first
stood by those who have followed
perfod of German occupation is nl-
Prime Minister Churchill. It has
its development from the first to
ready beginning with the Allies'
failed to win support, however,
include:
advance on German soil. It was
from Secretary of State Cordell
1. The removal from Germany to
with this period in mind that Gen.
Hull and Le violently opposed by
devastated countries of whatever
Dwight D. Eisenhower announced
Secretary of War Henry L. Stim-
industrial machinery those coun-
the directives for the control of
son. Measrs Hull, Stimaon and
tries want: the destruction of
Germany by the Allies' combat
"ommanders.
Morgenthau form the Cabinet
the rest of Germany's industry.
2. The permanent closing of what-
It is now expected that General
committee,
ever mines remain in the post-
Elsenhower will serve as Ameri-
was German State,
can military chief in Germany un-
(American policy tends toward
til the second period of occupation
removing the post-war capital
3. The cession of the Saar and
western German industrial areas
sets in after the war. Whether
of Germany from Berlin as part
to France as well as the cession
that period will be one of three-
of a drastic decentralization
to Poland of eastern German
way occupation under a three-
areas that Russia might want
power commission as originally
plan, according to a diplomatic
handled in that way.
planned or whether It will follow,
informant quoted in a dispatch
4. The diasolution of large German
Mr. Morgenthau's plan more close-
to THE NEW YORK TIMES from
ly remains to be determined.
landholdings into small farms
London.]
that would enable the 40,000,000
Mr. Morgenthau has always
to 50,000,000 people remaining in
been regarded by his associates as
For the time being, the dispute
over Mr. Morgenthau's plan has ao
Germany to exist largely on an
an advocate of ruthless handling
agricultural basis.
of Germany after the war, His in-
snarled up the Treasury, War and
5. The refusal by other countries
terest in detailed planning, how-
State Departments' work on de-
ever, is reported to stem from his
to extend any assistance, eco-
trip to England and France a
tailed arrangements for the post-
nomicio otherwise, to the people
month ago.
war control of Germany that the
of Germany to that they would
three-power planning by this coun-
have *make their own way out
of the wreckage of their war on
Morgenthau Has No Comment
try, Britain and Russia on long-
Europe.
Special to THE New York Times.
range German policy has also vir-
6. The prolanged control of Ger-
BOSTON, Sept. 23-Secretary
tually stalled. This planning. car-
many by an Allied military com-
Morgenthau said here tonight
missión.
ried on through the European Ad-
that he had no comment on The
7. No outright reparations-since
Associated Press report of the
visory Commission, had been pro-
a German agricultural state with
aplit in President Roosevelt's Cabi-
ceeding along lines other than
little or no commerce would not
net committee. The Washington
those advocated by Mr. Morgen-
be able to pay them-although
dispatch was read to him over the
thau, as far as American leaders
the distribution of German ma-
telephone.
were concerned.
chinery might be considered as
reparations in some respects.
Presented to Churchill
Called Unworkable
Mr. Roosevelt presented Mr.
The principal criticisma that
Morgenthau's plan to Mr. Church-
have been leveled against this plan
III at Quebec. Mr. Morgenthau and
by War and State Department
planners is that It will not work
British Foreign Secretary Anthony
because Germany occupies a key
Eden were present. Measrs. Stim-
position in European economy be-
son and Hull were not. Mr. Mor-
cause of her Industrial capacity to
genthau came away from the con-
produce needed goods and because
ference with the Impression that
of the markets that she affords to
Mr. Churchill had found his pro-
possis acceptable, especially since
Mr. Eden is reported to hold some-
what similar views.
What Premier Stalln plans with
respect to Germany is apparently
still not known here. Mr. Morgen-
thau based his plan on three as-
sumptions with respect to Russia:
(a) Russian wants East Prunsia
and most of Stlesia to go tó Poland
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
SEP 23 1944
Post-War Germany
Plan Would Take Many Years
Power System Has Been Damaged
The Treasury plan is designed to bring
The electric power industry would be sub-
about fundamental changes not only in
ject to very little direct action. The Treas-
Treasury Plan Calls for
physical Germany, but in the German way
ury's thought here is that facilities would
of living and thinking. To effectuate it
shrink when heavy industry was reduced, to
would require two or more generations in
nt the lower requirements and would not re-
Dismemberment, Ban on
time and close political and economic super-
main a threat. Also, much of Germany's
vision and direction from an Allied gov-
power system has been damaged by bombing.
Most Heavy Industry
ernment organization over this period.
Some of it would not be rebuilt.
This is regarded as one of the more dras-
As the plan would work out, Germany
tie plans for post-war Germany. It has run
would be left with little more than a. civilian
Wall Street Journal
into considerable opposition from advocates
goods industry-textiles, food processing, for
Morgenthau-Sponsored Policy,
of proposals which are designed to achieve
example-to support her agricultural econ-
the objective of making Germany incapable
omy.
One of Several Proposals
of waging war by less severe means.
Supporters of the Treasury plan agree
Under the Treasury plan, East Prussia
this would not be adequate to support the
and the Polish corridor area would be turned
Now Under Consideration
German population, except on & starvation
over to Poland. To France would go that
economy They say it would encourage up-
part of Germany which lies west of the
ward of 30 million persons to move to other
September 23 1944.
Rhine River. The remainder of Germany
portions of the world and that this, in Itself,
It Meets Official Opposition
would then be split into two major states-
would be a major contribution to future
& northern state and a southern state. There
peace.
would be other, but less important geographic
Competing proposals for post-war treat-
changes.
BY ALFRED F. FLYNN
ment of Germany would allow Germany to
Staff Correspondent of The Wall Street Journal
States Would Be Separated
keep & much greater portion of her industry.
There would be no federation of states.
WASHINGTON - A proposal that Ger-
They would take out portions of the chemical
Each part would be & distinct entity. Officials
many be diamembered and stripped of her
industry and do away with the synthetic
who support the Treasury plan say this
industrial might has been prepared by the
fuel industry, without which Germany could
would be necessary to prevent the parts from
not have waged the present war. Much of
Treasury Department.
growing back together. To make certain
the electric power generating equipment
It is one of a number of exploratory
that trade did not promote a political tie,
would be located outside the country so it
plans developed within the Government to
provision might be made for & customs union
could be eut off if Germany threatened war,
make certain that after this war Germany
beween Auaria and the southern state. The
Schools Would Be Closed Temporarily
does not stand as a threat to world peace.
theory of this is that resulting trade would
The Treasury plans for education are
While these proposals agree on this general
tend to pull the southern state's economy
based on the belief that the schools must be
objective, they show official thinking divided
farther away from that of the northern state.
cleared of the Nazi doctains If Germany is
on how far the Allies will have to go to
There is considerable opposition to the
to be led away from its war-like ways.
achieve it.
partitioning proposal. It is based largely on
Schooler would be closed until new text books
Here are the highlights of the Treasury
the argument that the various parts of Ger-
which would omit the Nazi doctrine could be
plan which was prepared under the direc-
many are interdependent and their separation
prepared. Universities would be closed in-
tion of Secretary Morgenthau and is said to
would mean economic chaos, with the pros-
definitely, largely on the basis that the first
have reached the Cabinet level of discussions:
pect the states would become & burden to
students ready for higher education have the
Germany would be split into northern
the world.
Nazi ideology well established in their minds.
and southern states, with & portion of
On the Industrial side. the Treasury plan
This is also thought to be true of the pro-
her lands on the east and west going to
would change Germany's whole economic
feasors Medical colleges might be permit-
Poland and France.
system, the chief source of livelihood would
ted to continue, so that there would be no
She would lose the bulk of her heavy
be agriculture.
shortage of doctors
industry. Steel mills, chemical and syn-
The German steel plants would be stripped
The Treasury plan, while worked out in
thetic fuel plants would be transferred
to a fraction of their present or pre-war
constant consultation with the State De-
to nations she invaded. The Ruhr Valley
capacity. The excess facilities would be
partment, does not represent this Govern-
would be operated under an Allied com-
moved to Russia and France, as a sort of war-
ment's position. An official policy with re-
sion.
damage payment. The chemical industry
gard to post-war Germany has yet to be
Education would be supervised by the
also would be dismembered. The synthetic
determined.
Allied powers. The lower "schools would
motor fuel industry would be removed com-
Then, when the United States plans are
be chesed until new text books could be
pletely. The theory here is that it is essen-
made, they will have to be taken up with the
prepared. Universities, with the excep-
tially a war industry. Germany would be
British and the Russians. These countries
tion of medical departments, would be
permited to buy what fuels she needs for
will have some very specific ideas of their
closed indefinitely.
normal uses from producing countries.
own as to what should be done with Germany
Times Therald
WASHINGTON,
SEP 26 1944
Morgnthau
Plan Irks Foe
LONDON, Sept. 25 (C.T.P.S.).
The Nazi party paper Volkischer
Beobachter, commenting on Sec-
retary of the Treasury Morgen-
that's plan for treatment of Ger-
many after the war, says, accord.
ing to the German Overseas News
Agency, "Morgenthau is outdoing
Clemenceau. Clemenceau said
there were 20,000,000 Germans too
many-Morgenthau- wants to see
40,000,000 Germans exterminated.
(Georges Clemenceau, known as
"The Tiger." was French premier
in World War I.]
"Dermany holds not the slight-
estallusion as to what fate will be
in store for her population if she
were not to struggle with all the
means in her power to prevent
execution of that plan."
The New York Times.
SEP 29 1944
ROOSEVELT TO ACT
The President made it clear in
a policy statement now familiar to
high-ranking officials of the State,
Tass Denies Small-State Plan
ON PLAN FOR REICH
War and Treasury Departments
LONDON, Sept. 28 (P)-In the
that he was for a hard policy to-
first detailed Soviet comment on
ward Germany and that the whole
post-war plans for defeated Ger-
German people must be made to
many, Tass reaffirmed today that
Compromise on Issue Likely
know they had been defeated so
the Tripower European Advisory
they would never again undertake
Commission proposed three sepa-
in Cabinet Group Session-
to assault humanity.
rate zones of occupation, but de-
While Secretaries Stimson and
nied there was any plan under dis-
Soviet Aim Clarified
Hull were described as disturbed
cussion for cutting Germany into
over the Treasury proposals, which
small states.
appeared for a time to be on a sin-
In & Moscow broadcast, the of-
Special to THE New YORK TIMES.
glé track toward Presidential ap-
ficial Russian news agency jumped
WASHINGTON, Sept. 28-A
proval, officials say the differences
into the discussion that has devel-
have been overemphasized in the
oped since the disclosure from
compromise between the severe
Treasury plan for the virtual de-
press and are concerned with
Washington that President Roose-
method rather than principle. All
velt's Cabinet was split over the
industrialization of Germany after
the Cabinet officers concerned
question of how harsh peace terms
the war and those who favor &
were said to agree that the treat-
should be after the unconditional
more moderate method of prevent-
ment should be "hard" as distin-
surrender.
ing the enemy from arming again
guished from "soft" and that under
The broadcast was prepared be-
was anticipated today as it became
no circumstances must Germany be
fore Prime Minister Churchill
permitted to rearm.
called in his Commons speech for
known on high authority that
What made matters look so bad
a new big-three conference, indi-
President Roosevelt probably would
for the State Department was that
cating that no final decisions had
summon his three-man Cabinet
the President called Mr. Morgen-
been made at the Quebec confer-
Committee to meet with him at an
thau as the only member of the
ence concerning Germany.
early date.
Caminet committee to meet with
Tass noted that both the British
The committee, consisting of the
Mr. Churchill and himself in Que-
and American press had raised the
Secretaryles of State, War and the
bec. Mr. Hull's British counter-
question of dismemberment of
Treasury, which the President ap-
part, Foreign Secretary Anthony
Germany into several independent
pointed to work out an Adminis-
Eden, also was present.
states, but insisted "projects of
tration policy for dealing with Ger-
this kind have not been and are
many during the occupation period,
Inquiries at the Treasury as
whether the situation might have
not considered by the European
has been reported split wide open
been explained by the fact that Mr.
Advisory Commission." The com-
and unable to agree.
Morgenthau was called to Quebec
mission is composed of United
What has appeared to be a situ-
ation latent with high tension will
to discuss economic or financial
States, Russian and British repre-
sentatives.
be composed as a. consequence of
matters other than those related to
the treatment of occupied Germany
On the basis of reports from
the forthcoming meeting, it was
have been brushed aside,
London, the Russian agency said,
authoritatively predicted.
It is understood that Secretary
the commission has achieved: Ap-
Cabinet Row Discounted
Morgenthau has taken the position
proval of "the most important
that he has "played square" with
document, namely, on Germany's
Secretaries Cordell Hull, Henry
L. Stimson and Henry Morgen-
his fellow Cabinet members at
unconditional surrender"; agree-
ment on the procedure for disarm-
thau Jr. were appointed to the
every stage of the committee's
ing Germany; approval of a docu-
committee a month ago when the
work. Moreover, Treasury offi-
ment on the procedure for the oc-
President, aprised of an Army man-
cials remind inquirers of an old
cupation of Germany, and approval
ual prepared in Europe for guid-
rule of Mr. Morgenthau's that
of an Allied control council of the
ance of civil officials of the Ameri-
when he has matters before the
three Allied commanders in chief
can Military Government of Ger-
President he does not discuss them
to exercise supreme power in Ger-
many, felt that the Army had got
until the President speaks or gives
many.
off tos a wrong start, called the
him clearance,
The agency added that the com-
manual pretty bad" and began
Secretaries Morgenthau and
mission had concluded no decisions
making policy from the top down.
Stimson canceled their proga cop-
on Austria.
Secretary Morgenthau brought the
ferences ordinarily held on Thurs,
manual back from London.
day,
Part of this upsurge was based on
Wi
the obvious use German propaganda
id
would make of a fixed Allied program
M
to transform Germany from an indus-
W
trial to an agricultural country. It was
e)
clear that Dr. Goebbels would ask why
TEMBER 29, 1944,
Germans should not die to the last
fi
man to resist a conquest after which
or
$,
In The Nation
,
(he would say) no German could hope
M
to enjoy even the driest fruits of in-
11
d
cessant labor.
g
y
&
A Good Example of the Value
Spiking the Guns
b
P
9,
of Publicity
The German propaganda machine
tion of the machinery, stockpiles, etc.,
p:
Cr
took this line very promptly, but the
hich
n
to other countries might well include
de
publicity by which Mr. Morgenthau's
By ARTHUR KROCK
busly
activity and the details of his plan were
the United Kingdom, cutting down its
th
8
g
them
WASHINGTON, Sept. 28-Familiar
revealed also carried the news that the
u
need for importing such costly gear
signs point to the abandonment by the
Tor
can
V
until its industries have been restored
ce
1
It
administration was violently split. This
their
L
President of Secretary Morgenthau's
fact undoubtedly made its way into
a
and converted to peacetime manufac-
have
also
d
Carthaginian post-war plan for Ger-
deal
Germany and rendered It more difficult
I
ture. The subtraction of Germany from
atu-
many, which was briefly in the ascend-
for Dr. Goebbels to persuade the people
C
world markets-by destroying its in-
re
un-
ant here and got much encouragement
elect
y
the plan was fait accompli. Such is
p:
dustry and making it agricultural-
Dent
aid
ce
5
at Quebec.
the information from the underground.
yo
would also increase the export markets
dence
and
or
t
The usual "high administration
Therefore it can be said that, if the
fa
of other nations, among which the
ding
th
sources" are passing out word that Mr.
ordir
project was unwise and an impediment
as
o be
United Kingdom would surely acquire
a[
Roosevelt does not favor the plan, after
clear
to the promptest possible conquest of
El
y to
a goodly share.
27
all, and that he never really was ready
of tl
Germany-as most comment holds-the
Le
Jew
These "advantages" of the Morgen-
to adopt its basic philosophy. From
men
publicity by which it was made gener-
m
thau plan would help to improve the
or-
ca
these same inspired sources come state-
sped
ally known, and by which also the pow-
yr
financial position and prospects of the
ly
ments that arrangements for post-war
sulte
erful opposition to it in Washington
W
United Kingdom, it could be urged by
P
Germany are again being handled in
Ician
was made known, not only brought
h
peo-
an advocate of that plan. At any rate,
CE
an orderly manner: The State Depart-
Govi
about abandonment of the plant but
F
to
some of the British at Quebec are said
BE
5
ment dominant in the political sector,
In
spiked the propaganda guns of Dr.
(
olic
to have been impressed by such repre-
tie
the War Department in the military,
reas
Goebbels.
1
a
sentations, and consequently by the
pe
at
d the Treasury confining itself to its
as
The President is expected to issue a
my
plan from which the benefits would
no
P oper concerns instead of trying to
read
statement assuring the German people
R
to
flow.
Pr
take over the whole problem.
tion
as well as opponents of the Morgenthau
al
an
Whatever the facts as to this, pub-
inc
Some very careful and well-informed
vote
plan among the Allies that it is not to
er
de
licity and the return of common sense
he
reporters have ample evidence that this
of
be high policy, and announcing that the
B4
in
which it evoked have apparently solved
ever
attitude is an about-face by the Presi-
aft
State and War Departments will retain
Si
a
the Cabinet crisis, restored order in
Ade
dent, however, and If his position is as
to
their proper responsibilities. This ex-
la
è
the administration in handling the
quat
now stated by spokesmen with good
fac
pectation was fortified by the procla-
b
de
German problem, and produced recon-
of 11
credentials the change can largely be
re)
mation issued today by General Eisen-
tl
y
sideration by the President of wiser
In
attributed to publicity.
hower in which he said that the forces
in
a
measures. If he would now undertake
priati
Secretary Hull's objection to the
un
under his command have entered Ger-
n
n.
to remove the phrase "unconditional
Navy
plan, and his disapproval of the as-
It
many "as conquerors but not as oppres-
le
surrender" from the political atmos-
per c
sumption of management of the whole
S
sors."
r
6
phere which envelope It and define it
increr
matter by Mr. Morgenthau and the
T
3
e-
Bait for Britain
as the military matter it really is, an-
In
Treasury, were well known to many
k
o
ar-
other of Dr. Goebbels' guns would be
dati
in the government. And Secretary
of
Yet there is a belief in high adminis-
a
xt.
spiked.
lavy
Stimson had made plain to a number
to
tration circles that Mr. Morgenthau re-
ti
of influential persons his resentment
celved encouragement at Quebec as
o
and disapproval of, and positive alarm
well as in Washington before he de-
t
over, the turn the situation was taking
parted for the conference. This cor-
o
with the encouragement of the Presi-
respondent was informed today that the
u
dent. But not until It was published
British lent an interested ear to de-
or
that Mr. Morgenthau had become the
P
scriptions of the beneficial effects on
P
administration authority, and had been
&
their hard-pressed economy If Germany
I
permitted to press ideas at Quebec
&
were turned into an agricultural nation.
rd
while Messrs. Hull and Stimson were
th
The British lend-lease debit account
ca
left at home, and not until the details
th
with us is now about $6 or $7 billions,
a,
T1
which would be a large item on their
th
of these Ideas were published also, did
the domestic reaction begin that ap-
en
ost-war ledger, growing larger and
9
parthtly affected the President's at-
pr
ore difficult to liquidate the longer
titude.
to
duration of the war. If German in-
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try were to be dismantied, alloca-
as
-
morgenthan folder 2-44
WHITE HOUSE PSF
THE
Had
WASHINGTON
September 26, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
D. J. B.
The President said he would
see H. M., Jr., tomorrow. Will
you give the President the attached
memorandum before the Secretary
sees him just as a reminder to
discuss it with the latter?
G. G. T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 22, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The Secretary of the Treasury telephoned
to make some suggestions. He has just arrived
in Boston from Chicago and he thinks it is
terribly important, after talking with people
out there, for you to hold a political meeting
at Hyde Park -- similar to your meeting in
Quebec -- when you would arrange through the
day to see the political leaders and map out
the campaign and put some life into it. He
says they need somebody to give them a little
enthusiasm to go out and do their jobs.
He suggests some of the people he thinks
should be invited -- Mayor Kelly, Ed Flynn,
Bob Hannegan, Frank Walker, Harold Ickes, Leon
Henderson, Senator O'Mahoney and himself.
Yesterday afternoon he attended a
meeting in Chicago of about twenty of the most
important industrialists. The political people
were anxious for him to talk to them and then
they were going to see if they couldn't get
them interested and so get some financial
help from them. Among these people were Mr.
Epstein of the American Tank Co., President of
the Pabst Brewery, etc. H.M. Jr. says these
men are all agreed that you are the only one
who can run the war. The one question they all
asked him was what your plans are to give
people jobs when the war is over.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-2-
AS you know, Leon Henderson is heading up
an independent committee and the Secretary
asks if you would like to have Leon Henderson
and some of the Treasury people try their hand
at drafting a speech along the lines of pro-
viding jobs when the war is over. He feels
it is very important that you tell the people
your plans.
The Secretary plans to stay in Boston
until Sunday afternoon and then to return to
Washington unless you wish him to come back
to Hyde Park.
GGT
Telephone: Kenmore 7550
Sarry
THE WHITE HOUSE
PSF morgenthan file freder 2 -YV
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
When I spoke with the Secretary of
the Treasury the other day he said when
he saw you at Hyde Park the other Sunday
he had an opportunity to ask you about
a speech on jobs. He has had a group
of our friends working on this speech
and he will have a draft to show you
by next Monday. He asks if he could
bring it up to Hyde Park and also he
might want to bring one or two of the
people who have worked on it.
What shall I tell him?
G.G.T.
THE WHITE HOUSE OR
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The Secretary of the Treasury wants
to know if he can go up on the train with
you on Saturday night after the dinner.
He asks if he and Mrs. Morgenthau,
who has been ill, could return with you
on Monday night.
GGT
PSF:Morgenthan
[Draft for Dct. 28, 1944 FDR
speech at Soldiers Field, Chicago.
THE ECONOMIC BILL OF RIGHTS
This evening I want to talk to you about the future
which I feel is in store for the American people and to
outline to you my plans for meeting here at home the
problems of peace.
For the second time in twenty-five years America has
proved her capacity to meet the challenge of total war.
Twice in twenty-five years we have amazed the whole world -
and ourselves - with our daring conception of what America
could do when forced to war. We have astonished a grateful
world by the stupendous number of planes, tanks and guns
rolling off our assembly lines; with the bridge of ships
we have erected across the oceans; by the overwhelming
force with which America has turned the scales of battle.
Thus has America met the challenge of war - with
boldness, courage and determination. Thus has America
become the symbol - the world over - for the dynamic
force of a free people fighting for a free world.
But what of the peace-time problems here at home
which will follow the successful conclusion of this war?
Is America prepared to meet the challenge of these peace-
time problems as it has twice met the challenge of war?
Will we approach the problems of peace with the same
boldness of conception, the same courage and determination
8.8 we have approached the problems of war?
- 2 -
In the answer to these questions lies the future of
America. To anyone who has faith in America the answer
is clear. The American people are prepared to meet the
problems of peace in the same inspiring way that they have
met the problems of war. The American people are resolved
that we shall insure that the youth of this nation will
never again be called upon to fight in another war. And
the American people are equally resolved that when our
boys return home from this war, they shall come back to
the brightest possible, the freest possible, the finest
possible place on the face of this earth - to a place
where all persons, regardless of race, color, creed or
place of birth, shall live in peace, honor and dignity -
free from want - and free from fear. To do otherwise
would betray the faith of every soldier, every worker,
every businessman, every farmer in this country who is
giving his best for America.
In determining the course of action we should pursue
after the war, it is well for America to pause and take
stock of her capacities. For America's capacities should
be the measure of America's future.
America's known capacities are not difficult to
calculate. We are now producing goods and services to
the gigantic total of $200 billion a year with 52 million
workers and 12 million soldiers. In simple language that
- 3 -
means that today America is producing nearly twice as
much as she had ever produced before the war. But an
enormous part of the goods and services we are producing
today does not find its way into the American home. No,
it represents the ships, the guns, the planes and tanks
we are using to fight this war.
But I know, and you know, that, if we can produce a
huge flow of ships and guns and planes and tanks, we can
also produce an abundance of houses and cars and clothing
and provide education and recreation and the other good
things of life for all Americans.
And I know, and you know, that when our boys return
home from the war and are again able to put their power
into the stream of peace-time production, America's
capacity to produce will be even greater than it is today.
Yes, much greater than today even when we remember that
some of our returning soldiers will prefer to resume their
education; that some older people will begin a retirement
delayed to participate in war work; and that many women
will give up their jobs in favor of home-making. Making
full allowance for these groups, the fact remains that
America will have the capacity after the war for producing
houses, cars, clothing, education, recreation and all of
the other good things of life on B. scale that staggers the
imagination. That is what America can and will do if we
have the courage and vision to give her the chance.
- 4 -
But to accomplish this task of utilizing our full
productive capacity year after year, it is childish to
think, as some would suggest, that we can depend upon the
accumulated backlog of demand for 6 million automobiles,
3-1/2 million vacuum cleaners and 7 million alarm clocks
and so on! Why an America geared to that limited
conception of the future will find itself faced with
millions of unemployed. In fact that kind of thinking
sounds to me as though our doughboys returning from this
war would have to face the prospect of peddling alarm
clocks this time instead of apples.
I say to you here and now that we cannot set our
sights to 8. level which we have long since passed. The
same people who set their sights too low for war are now
asking the American people to set their sights too low
for prosperity. They do not grasp the strength and the
spirit of America.
Nor do any of us think for a minute that there is
any quack remedy or cure-all that can be automatically
applied. The sober facts are that genuine progress will
be achieved only through concrete plans and 8. real effort.
I made plain my views on this subject to Congress in
January of this year. In that message, I set forth eight
self-evident economic truths. I said then and I say now
that these economic truths represented 8. second Bill of
Rights under which B. new basis of security and prosperity
- 5 -
can be established for all - regardless of station, race
or creed.
America led he world in establishing political
democracy. It must lead the world once more in
strengthening and extending political democracy by firmly
establishing economic democracy. Let us not forget the
painful lessons of the rise of Fascism. Let us remember
that political democracy is at best insecure and unstable
without economic democracy. Fascism thrives on domestic
economic insecurity, as well as on lack of or divided
resistance to external aggression. Fascism is not only
an enemy from without, it is also potentially an enemy
from within.
We now must establish an Economic Bill of Rights not
only out of common decency, but also to insure the
preservation of our political freedoms. We must accord
to this Economic Bill of Rights the same dignity - the
same stature - in our American tradition as that we have
accorded to the original Bill of Rights.
Let us therefore affirm this Economic Bill of Rights -
and keep affirming it - - until it is as familiar and real
to us as our political Bill of Rights.
The Economic Bill of Rights as embodied in my message
to Congress last January is:
- 6 -
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the
industries, or shops or farms or mines of the nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food
and clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his
products at & return which will give him and his family
8. decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to
trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition
and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to 8. decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity
to achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic
fears of old age, sickness, accident and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
But the achievement of this American Economic Bill
of Rights will not come of itself. These rights will not
come to those who merely sit and wait. Nor will they come
through merely pious repetition. Our forefathers had to
struggle for our political Bill of Rights; we will have
to struggle for our Economic Bill of Rights. If we are
going to make those Rights a living reality we must map
out a vigorous and concerted course. We must set as our
goal the implementation and fulfillment of the 8 self-
evident truths which together constitute our Economic
Bill of Rights.
- 7 -
The key to making this Economic Bill of Rights a.
part of the American way of life is as self-evident as are
the rights themselves. The key is the wholehearted
recognition by all our people of the simple fact that in
America the future of the American worker lies in the
well-being of American private enterprise; and the future
of American private enterprise lies in the well-being of
the American worker. The greatest single thing that this
war has demonstrated on the home front is that when the
American worker and the American businessman and the
American farmer work together as one team, there are no
limits on what America can accomplish.
But to work together as & team, however, there must
be a common goal. In this war that goal has been the
defeat of our enemies in the shortest possible period of
time. In the peace to come the goal must be the well-
being of America - and that is synonymous with the well-
being of every American.
As I outline to you tonight my program for making
each of these economic rights a part of our way of life,
you will note this striking fact, namely, that to the
extent that private enterprise grows in strength, the
Economic Bill of Rights grows in reality and to the
extent that the Economic Bill of Rights grows in reality,
American private enterprise grows in strength. Thus, all
the measures which are proposed in this program for the
- 8 -
implementation of the Economic Bill of Rights are at the
same time designed to make American capitalism and private
enterprise work in the same great manner in peace as it has
worked in war.
When I enunciated this Economic Bill of Rights last
January I said that after this war is won we must be
prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these
rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.
I asked the Congress to explore the means of implementing
these rights and stated that from time to time I would
have more to say on the subject.
Tonight, I want to discuss this Economic Bill of
Rights with all of you. I want to outline how the
adoption of concrete measures to implement these rights
represents the very foundation of American prosperity in
the years to come.
And I also want to emphasize what the implementation
of these rights will mean to our service men and women.
They have given America the opportunity to work out its
destiny as a free nation in & free world. The America to
which they return must be a land of economic opportunity
in which they will find full opportunities not only for
jobs but for economic advancement and independent
enterprise in industry, commerce, agriculture and the
professions. A grateful nation can do no less for her
returning service men and women. The G. I. Bill of Rights
- 9 -
which became law in June of this year, following a. series
of recommendations which I made to the Congress, is only
designed to fulfill the special needs of our men and women
in the service. The Economic Bill of Rights is designed
to fulfill the needs which they value most, yes, the needs
which they value more than life itself - the needs of
America.
I
The first economic right is "the right to a useful
and remunerative job in the industries, or shops, or
farms or mines of the nation."
To assure the full realization of this right to a
useful and remunerative job, an adequate program must
provide America with 60 million productive jobs. We must
have more jobs than workers; not more workers than jobs.
Only with more jobs than workers can every man be
guaranteed a job with good wages and decent working
conditions. This requires private enterprise working at
expanded capacity.
This necessary expansion of our peace time productive
capacity will require new facilities, new plants and new
equipment.
It will require large outlays of money which should
be raised through normal investment channels. But while
private capital should finance this expansion program, the
Government should recognize its responsibility for sharing
- 10 -
part of any special or abnormal risk of loss attached to
such financing.
Therefore I propose that the Government guarantee
the lender against all special and abnormal risks which
may be involved. This will provide new and expanding
industry with plenty of private credit at reasonable
interest rates. Through this program we will merely be
extending to the financing of old and new business the
principles which have proved so successful in our
experience with the V Loans, T Loans and the Federal
Housing Administration loans.
A comprehensive investment program dedicated to
expanding the peace time productive capacity of America
is the very epitome of the American way of raising our
standard of living. We build the plants for greater
production so that all of us may share in their greater
output. But greater output is not our only benefit from
this plant expansion. In fact, our benefits also include
the wages paid to the labor employed in building these
plants, in constructing the machinery to be used in the
plants and in operating the plants after they are erected.
These payments as wages all contribute to the nation's
buying power so that as a nation we will have more money
with which to buy the goods produced by these expanded
plants.
- 11 -
As a matter of fact & comprehensive investment program
of this character could make possible $20 billion of new
private investment each year. Why, just the job of
building these plants and the machinery for them would give
America 5 million more jobs a year than we had in this work
before the war. And this does not include the workers who
would be needed to operate these plants after they are
built.
In a nutshell, then, if we are going to have
remunerative jobs for all, we must have an expanded private
industry capable of hiring millions more men. I propose
that the Government do its part in helping private
enterprise finance this expansion of our industrial plant.
It will be privately owned, privately operated and privately
financed but the Government will share with the private
investor the unusual and abnormal financial risks which
may be involved in getting started.
*******
But, in providing jobs for everyone, we shall not only
have to increase demand for our industrial and agricultural
production here at home; but also abroad. Some parts of
our industrial and agricultural production demand a high
level of foreign trade to be efficient and prosperous.
This is particularly true in our heavy equipment industries
where our war demand will fall sharply but whose output
will be needed by other countries for reconstruction and
- 12 -
development. The foreign demand for such farm commodities
as cotton, tobacco and wheat will also be great if other
countries have the opportunity to buy. We therefore must
take steps, in cooperation with other countries to see
that international trade and investment is resumed promptly
on a sound basis.
This Administration has pioneered in the direction of
international economic collaboration with its reciprocal
trade program and the establishment of the Export-Import
Bank. It has again taken the lead in suggesting
international monetary stabilization and sound international
investment measures - measures that are & fundamental
prerequisite to healthy foreign trade and commerce. It
was for the purpose of working out concrete measures of
this character that I convened the United Nations Monetary
and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods last summer. At
the Bretton Woods Conference, forty-four countries agreed
upon plans for an International Monetary Fund and an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The International Monetary Fund, when approved by
Congress, will aid the nations of the world in establishing
sound currencies. It will clear the channels of foreign
trade of discriminatory restrictions and controls so that
there can be a genuine expansion of world trade.
- 13 -
With the help of the International Bank, American
capital can play a great constructive role - and a
profitable role - in the development of the economies of
other countries. It will provide us with enormous post-
war foreign markets. For our greatest markets are in
prosperous, industrialized countries.
But America will not be merely a seller of goods
abroad. A truly prosperous America - an America with jobs
for all - will be & tremendous buyer of raw materials and
products from abroad. It will be an America constantly
enlarging the scope of our reciprocal trade agreements.
It will be an America with the time and money to spend on
tourist travel abroad as well as at home. It will be an
America from which other countries can afford to buy more
because they are selling more.
With Congressional approval of this program and with
our program of jobs for all in this country - the foreign
trade of the United States can be trebled after the war.
This increase in our foreign trade should mean 3 million
more jobs after the war than we had before the war.
Nor are the benefits of increased foreign trade and
investment confined to increasing our prosperity. I want
to emphasize that such cooperative measures for expanding
international trade and investment are at the same time
the economic foundation for a lasting peace. A prosperous
world will be a world free of both economic and political
- 14 -
aggression.
******
There is one further phase of this program of providing
jobs for all which must be made an integral part of any long
range program. That is the task of seeing to it that there
are not just jobs for all next year or for the year after
that. No, we are talking about jobs for all 8.8 8. permanent
part of our American way of life.
But it is inevitable, however, that an economy of free
enterprise like ours will have some fluctuation in the
number of jobs it can provide. Adjustments in employment
are an essential part of an expanding free economy. And
for these minor fluctuations, we provide unemployment
insurance. But we must not allow such fluctuations ever
to deteriorate into panic or depression. We cannot again
be caught in that vicious downward spiral of unemployment,
wage outs and stagnated business.
I say to you that whenever the number of gainfully
employed in this country falls below 57 million, your
Government must and will take prompt steps to see that
new jobs are made available to keep the total from falling
significantly below that figure. This is the floor below
which we must not allow employment to fall.
The basic function of your Government in taking care
of any such slack in jobs is to see to it that private
enterprise is assisted until it can absorb this slack.
- 15 -
This is entirely possible. During the war the federal,
state and local governments have found it necessary to put
aside the construction of roads, buildings and public
facilities to the value of many billions of dollars. We
have & need, too, for vast programs of the type exemplified
by TVA.
Some of this construction will have to be undertaken
immediately after the war. A good deal of it, however,
can be postponed 80 that its construction could be timed
with periods when the volume of employment that industry,
commerce and agriculture can offer begins to fall. We
must have a reservoir of planned and approved federal,
state and local projects ready to be tapped. And when
employment falls below this floor of 57 million jobs, this
reservoir of planned and approved public works should be
opened up to provide more jobs and take up the slack.
Such useful and essential public works should not
produce Government or "relief" jobs, however. No, they
should produce private jobs. This is possible if we
insist that this construction be done by private firms
under contract with the Government; private firms employing
labor at the prevailing rate of wages and under standard
labor conditions.
This assurance of 8. reserve of private jobs, through
constructive public works when needed to take up the slack,
will have a profound effect on the whole direction of our
- 16 -
economy. In fact, the knowledge that Government accepts
this responsibility of maintaining a floor under jobs will
act as an immense stabilizing force on the whole economy.
II
The second economic right is "the right to earn enough
to provide food and clothing and recreation."
America must remain pre-eminently the land of high
wages and efficient production. Every job in America must
provide enough for a decent living.
During the war we have been compelled to hold down
wage increases that might have provoked runaway inflation.
With all the arms and war materials we were producing,
there was only a. limited amount of consumption goods
available. Increasing wages without increasing the amount
of goods available to the consumer would have been an open
invitation to inflation. By resorting to drastic price
and wage control measures, I am proud to report that
America is succeeding in holding the line against inflation.
However, the end of the war, even the end of the war
in Europe, will change this picture. Then there will be
more goods available for America to buy and it is only
good common sense to see that the working man is paid
enough to buy these goods.
The gains made by labor during the war must be
retained in full. After the last war, as part of the
process of returning to "normalcy", the old guard of the
- 17 -
Republican Administration adopted the slogan "labor must
be deflated." This won't happen again. This time we must
make sure that wage rates are not reduced when the wartime
demand for labor is diverted into peace time channels. We
must make sure that the labor market is not broken by un-
employment and wage slashes.
I can say now that so long as I am in the White House,
American labor can be assured that there are not going to be
any wage cuts that I can stop. What is even more important -
I am going to see that when the worker's hours are out back
to peace time levels a real attempt is made to adjust wage
rates upward.
And I propose that wages should be constantly increased
as the productivity of industry is increased. An expanding
American economy can continue to expand only if the
increased productivity is divided equitably between business
and the worker. In fact - you know, and I know, that unless
the worker does get his share of America's increased
production in the form of increased wages and unless
business gets its share in the form of increased profits -
neither will prosper and all will lose.
But an increase in wages is not the only benefit the
American worker should secure from increased productivity.
He should also benefit in the form of shorter hours of
work, in the form of increased leisure and opportunities
for healthful recreation. Thus increased wages and shorter
hours go hand in hand in solving prosperity the American
way.
- 18 -
There is one further aspect of the wage-earner's
problem that I want to touch on tonight. That is his
aspiration for an annual wage or guaranteed annual income
from his job. It is a terribly important part of any real
attempt to implement America's Economic Bill of Rights.
The size of the wage-earner's pay envelope is important -
vitally important to American prosperity. But we all know
that it is equally important to know how many pay envelopes
he gets during a year. I want to see him get 8. guaranteed
minimum annual wage and I think the time has come for
America to begin tackling this most difficult problem.
Now this goal cannot be attained overnight. It cannot
be achieved in a. manner to harm business. Nor can it be
achieved with the same speed in every business.
But we can start on the job of giving labor an annual
wage. We can do a lot if we all will only agree that it
is a problem business and labor must solve and if we all
approach the problem with a genuine desire to succeed.
And Government must do its part too. It must aid business
in stabilizing its labor needs so that the burden of an
annual wage will not be uneconomical. This in my opinion
is the American way to bring about the annual wage and I
have confidence in the American way of doing things.
III
The third economic right is "the right of every
farmer to raise and sell his products at a rate which
will give him and his family a decent living."
- 19 -
American farmers now have by far the largest farm
income in history. This is their due reward for the
greatest agricultural production in history. We must
assure the farmers that there will always be a market for
all their output at good prices. Concretely I propose to
maintain an adequate floor on farm prices and thereby
assure the farmer against the dangers of falling prices
for his products. Our farm program must be one of
expansion rather than curtailment. With jobs for all at
good wages and with foreign markets greatly expanded, the
farmer will be able to sell at good prices all that he can
raise.
But this is not all. The farmer's income must have
stability. To that end, I propose to establish a
comprehensive federal crop insurance program which will
secure the farmer against the hazards of crop failure.
To this must be added concrete steps to raise the standard
of living on the farm and in the rural areas. We need a
complete program of new and modernized homes and farm
buildings. We must press forward with rural electrification
and improvement. Only in this way can we bring to the rural
communities modern facilities for decent and healthful living.
IV
The fourth economic right is "the right of every
business man large and small to trade in an atmosphere of
freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies
at home and abroad."
- 20 -
Where this Administration is to be distinguished
most sharply from some others is in its refusal to curry
favor with big business or entrenched monopoly. Our
Economic Bill of Rights like our political Bill of Rights
is based on freedom of enterprise - freedom of enterprise
not merely and exclusively for the few, but broadly and
inclusively for the many. The political Bill of Rights
insured the destruction of special prerogatives and
privileges. The Economic Bill of Rights will insure the
destruction of special economic prerogatives and privileges.
No special class of business deserves to be the spoiled
darling of government. This Administration has been mindful
from its earliest days, and will continue to be mindful, of
the problems of small business as well as large.
We must break through the barriers of monopoly and
international cartels that stand in the way of & healthy
expansion of free enterprise. Against these real enemies
of free enterprise we shall continue unremitting warfare.
We must overcome the monopolistic frame of mind which
thinks of business in terms of restricted output at high
prices per unit. We must pass on to workers and consumers
the benefits of technological progress and large scale
production. Free enterprise in the American tradition can
flourish only by doing a large volume of business at a
small profit per unit.
- 21 -
My Administration is determined to protect free
enterprise against monopolies and cartels through continued
vigorous enforcement of the anti-trust laws. Private
enterprise yields its full advantage to the consuming public
and to other business only when it is genuinely free and
competitive. Beware of that sinister enemy of free
enterprise who pays lip-service to competition but also
labels every anti-trust prosecution a "persecution."
Our economy has important new expanding sectors in
air transport, frequency modulation, television, synthetic
rubbers and fibers, plastics, and many other fields. These
new expanding areas in particular must be kept free of the
constricting hand of monopoly. There must be a place in
them - as everywhere in our economy - - for enterprising
small firms. It is from these new and small firms that
the great industries of the future will grow. We need
new industries, new firms to have industrial progress and
shall not permit them to be stifled by monopoly.
V
The fifth economic right is "the right of every family
to a decent home."
Concretely, I propose that we adopt a housing program
looking toward the construction through private enterprise
of 2 million housing units a year and ridding this country
of its urban and rural slums. We need to build at least
- 22 -
15 million new housing units if we are to eliminate all
our slums and sub-standard dwellings. The right to a home
is meaningless when that home is a hovel. We cannot afford
slums.
A well-housed America must have modern homes - homes
with all the latest electrical and mechanical equipment
which will eliminate the drudgery of household work. We
must be a land of homeowners, and to that end we must assure
every family an opportunity for home ownership by making
certain that there is available private credit on terms
which will reduce the down-payment and out by one-third
the monthly cost of buying homes.
New residential construction and the modernization of
America's homes alone can provide jobs for 4 million people
a year. This is 2 million more than the maximum amount
engaged in such work prior to the war.
VI
The sixth economic right is "the right to adequate
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy
good health."
As Selective Service has revealed, too large a
proportion of our younger men now fall below reasonable
health standards. This is a warning signal to America
with respect to the state of health of all segments of
our population. This condition calls for immediate and
drastic action.
- 28 -
We cannot permit the health of our people to be
C
impaired by poverty or lack of medical and hospital
facilities. I say to you that your Federal and State
Governments have just as much responsibility for the
health of their people as they have for providing them
with education and police and fire protection. Health and
adequate medical and hospital care are not luxuries. They
are basic necessities to which all are entitled.
We must see that medical attention is available to
all the people. But this health program must be achieved
in the American way. Every person should have the right
to go to the doctor and hospital of their own choosing.
My program calls for the Federal and State Governments to
work hand in hand in making health insurance an integral
part of our Social Security program just as old age and
unemployment benefits are today. And these health
insurance benefits must be adequate to provide private
medical and hospital care for every person in the United
States.
We need more hospitals and doctors. I propose that
we make sure that such facilities are available and that
we build hospitals in every community, rural and urban,
that does not now have such facilities for all of its
people.
- 24 -
Never again can we afford the waste of poor health
in America because of poverty or inadequate facilities.
And I say to you now that this program will prove in the
long run to be a saving to America.
We must not be content to provide medical attention
for people after they become sick. We must implement and
extend our knowledge of preventative medicine. To the end
that we shall be much better able to attack diseases and
to prevent illness, I propose that the Government appropriate
needed funds to finance a greatly expanded program of medical
research in private and public institutions.
VII
The seventh economic right is "the right to adequate
protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident and unemployment."
We must assure people who are disabled and temporarily
unemployed that they will be taken care of adequately. We
must assure them that they will not be in want because of
loss of income during this period of compulsory unemployment.
We cannot neglect these groups without incurring serious
dangers to the stability of our whole economy.
But We should be wary of those who only pay lip-
service to the principle of Social Security but have a
sorry reputation when it comes to delivering on their
promise. In 12 years of Republican Administration this,
the richest country in the world, fell far behind other
- 25 -
industrial nations in the development of Social Security
legislation. Every step in the establishment of our
=
social security system has been fiercely resisted by the
Republican Old Guard. Even now while advocating the
extension of social security in vague, vote-catching terms,
the Republican party evades all major concrete steps to
expand Social Security. The Republican candidate for the
Presidency, some weeks ago, made his formal obeisance to
the need for Social Security by limiting his remarks to B.
few piddling generalities.
Meanwhile, for more than 8. year, there has languished
in Congress B. carefully-drawn, comprehensive Bill to extend
the coverage and increase the benefits of Social Security.
I refer to the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, introduced into
Congress by three liberal Democrats. It gives effective
universal coverage and provides benefits for old age,
unemployment, medical care and disability. Yet no prominent
Republican - in or out of Congress - has raised his voice
in support of this Bill. That in my mind is the tip-off
of what America can expect when the "chips are down."
Being introduced in wartime, when we have been
concerned about restraining consumers' demand rather than
expanding it, the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill will need to
be revised to suit our postwar world - revised in both its
scope and method of financing.
- 26 -
A broader program will be needed after the war. Old
C
age insurance should be adequate to provide all of our
older men and women with the means for decent living. Our
present old age benefits are definitely inadequate. I
propose that we immediately establish the principle of
giving a minimum Federal old age pension of $60 per month
to every person who has reached the age of sixty. This
minimum $60 per month pension should be available to every
man and woman over the age of 60 who makes application.
If both husband and wife are over sixty, this will mean
8. monthly income of $120 per month. It should be deemed
to be & right, not a charity, a right springing from the
years of service each person delivers to the sum total of
8. better America.
This social security program will, of itself, by
adding to the spendable purchasing power available to the
people and by placing a floor on consumption, add from
two to three million jobs a year.
VIII
The eighth economic right is "the right to a good
education."
We must have an educated and informed America. Even
now most of our rural areas and some of our urban areas
are poorly provided with schools. Our teachers are
underpaid. Our schools are badly understaffed. We need
more schools and at least one-half million more teachers.
- 27 -
Through Federal aid to poorer communities for the develop-
C
ment of locally controlled educational programs, we propose
to equalize and extend educational opportunities throughout
the land. We propose to provide facilities for technical
and higher education for all qualified young men and women
without regard to their financial means. In this America
the pioneer of free education, the right to technical and
higher education should be as universal as the right to a
secondary school education.
******
This is the program that will bring to reality our
Economic Bill of Rights. It is 8. program that will provide
jobs, economic security and rising standards of living for
all Americans - regardless of race, color or creed. Our
democracy can be a living force only if it means the good
life for all the people.
The millions of more productive jobs that this program
will bring are jobs in industry. They are jobs based on
the expanded demand for the output of our economy for
consumption and investment. And this program need place
no real burden on the Federal budget, notwithstanding the
reduction in taxes which must come after the war. On the
contrary, a program of this character can provide America
with a national income of $200 billion. With a. national
- 28 -
income of this magnitude it will be possible to reduce the
tax rates still further on personal incomes, on business
6
profits, and on consumption, and still collect enough tax
revenues to meet the needs of the Government, including
orderly retirement of the national debt.
This, my friends, is our immediate goal, once final
victory over our enemies has been achieved.
Now there will be, I am sure, those who will say that
the goal which I have set for you is fantastic. These are
the persons of limited vision and blunted imagination.
These are the same persons who said I was dreaming when I
declared in 1940 that the American people would produce
50,000 planes in one year. In fact the American people
produced over 100,000 planes in one year. These persons
also labelled 8,000,000 tons of shipping in one year &
dream. The American people actually produced
tons.
45,000 tanks was supposedly another dream. In fact We
produced
. And these are also the same persons who
scoffed at the idea that America could in less than 4 years
build the greatest Army, the greatest Navy and the greatest
air force in all the world. Do these Monday morning
quarterbacks have that great faith in the American people,
and in their way of life, which is required in order to
understand the meaning of America?
And yet these same great visionaries who see but dimly
into the future have excellent hindsight. As the great
events of history march forward, while they look back,
they are at least able to recognize what has passed them
by. Only then do they shake their heads wisely and
proclaim that of course it must be so. They have seen it
with their own eyes. Thus, for example, they say, and I
- 29 -
an quoting:
E
"Of course, we need security regulation.
Of course, We need bank-deposit insurance. Of
course, we need price support for agriculture.
Of course, the farmers of this country cannot be
left to the hazards of a world price while they
buy their goods on an American price. Of course,
we need unemployment insurance and old age pensions
and also relief whenever there are not enough jobs.
Of course, the rights of labor to organize and
bargain collectively are fundamental."
I suppose that after this program to which my
Administration is pledged has become an accepted part of
our way of life, the battle-cry of the hindsight artists
will go something like this. They will say that of course
the right to 8. useful and remunerative job in the industries
or shops or farms or mines of the nation is self-evident;
of course the right to earn enough to provide adequate
food and clothing and recreation is self-evident; of
course the right of every farmer to raise and sell his
products at a return which will give him and his family
a. decent living is self-evident; and of course this and
of course that. Oh, I forgot - there is one more "of
course" that they will add. They will say, "Of course,
we could have done it better."
******
- 30 -
I an confident, however, that the great majority of
g
the American people share the same great faith in
America and in the American way of doing things which I
have expressed tonight. We know our way and the road
ahead is straight and broad although there are many hills
which we must climb. The program which I have set forth
is only the first milestone, for the capacity of the
American way of life in the years to come is beyond the
vision of man. The American system of free enterprise
is the best the world has ever known and through it we
can obtain, God willing, the best that this world has to
offer.
T-427
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRIVATE AND
CONFIDENTIAL
November 21, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. JAMES F. BYRNES
Please speak to me con-
fidentially about this idea.
F.D.R.
ADDITION 108
THE STAVING
1HE
magenther
a
PSF
Y
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
November 15, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
T think that it is ensential in the interest of good
government that there be a drastic revision upwards of the
salaries of ton government officials. Only on this boats
1s the government going to be able to cornete offectively
with private business for the best brains in the country.
To start the ball rolling I succest that you send n
message to Congress along the following lines:
(1) Recommend that the Congress immediately increase
the salaries of Congressmen and Senators to 215,
e your - such increase to take effect six months
after V-E Day.
(2) Inform Congress that you are giving consideration
to the need for increases in the executive and
judicial branches of the government and that you
hope to be able to furnish Congress with your
views in the near future.
There may be some advantage If this proposal could be
acted upon before January 20, 1945 in order that its nro-
visions could be made effective with the new Congress (but
six months after V-F Day). This seems particularly true
because there appoars to be a practice of making Congressional
salary increases effective only with respect to the next sue-
ceeding Congress and delay might result in postponing the ef-
fective date of this increase until January 20, 1947. If
this happened It would be more difficult to get speedy action
by Congress on increasing cularies in the executive brench of
the government.
saide from the desirability of this measure in the
interests of good government, T think your sponsorship of
this proposal might have a very wholesome effect unon
relations with Congress.
3845
PSF magenthan from 2-44
hmo
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 9, 1944.
MORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
TO READ AND PLEASE RETURE
FOR MY FILES.
F. D. R.
Memorandum dated 11/14/44, in re statement that
English are bankrupt and required $7,000,000,000;
Memorandum dated 11/14/44, in re tax program.
Memorandum, undated, "Physicial Disposition of
Germany-Austria and Satellites"..
1-21-15
PSF
Hmgs
The President
and
The Secretury ofthe Treasury
Hung- Shind
1-2-90
PSF,
Hmgr
The President
Jan21,1945 Jan 21, 1945
The Secretary of the Treasury
H you can ure
Theseat at Tmcottare
in thave springs
Mas.Henar MORGENTHAU, JR
with
and our Core.
2404 BELMONT ROAD
PSF
HMG
January 1, 1945
Not Final, Final will be issued January 2, 1945.
TAL
fet
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
DECEMBER 1944
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
Dec. 1944
Dec. 1944
Dec. 1943
1
3
20,000,000
*$
19,072,319.58
$
4,909,880.14
2
4,000,000
3,470,238.22
7,918,243.61
3 Sunday
4
20,000,000
19,369,006.92
10,355,973.86
5
10,000,000
9,563,572.95
16,809,871.51
6
13,000,000
15,624,216.85
24,909,940.36
7
15,000,000
33,748,118.42
28,753,756.56
8
20,000,000
59,973,947.06
32,670,092.86
9
25,000,000
29,753,486.51
53,461,862.35
10 Sunday
11
35,000,000
78,005,598.84
66,362,781.52
12
50,000,000
56,956,957.82
55,110,427.73
13
73,000,000
79,382,327.84
116,413,250.34
14
105,000,000
99,118,777.87
129,231,176.44
1 to 14
390,000,000
504,038,568.88
546,907,257.28
15
160,000,000
278,763,427.55
224,765,127.66
16
280,000,000
280,480,915.29
357,691,074.07
17 Sunday
18
440,000,000
595,003,645.38
500,619,764.74
19
410,000,000
447,377,026.62
339,586,594.65
20
350,000,000
390,203,348.18
387,573,595.20
21
310,000,000
355,804,195.18
359,737,105.32
1 to 21
2,340,000,000
2,851,671,127.08
2,716,880,518.92
22
230,000,000
267,344,573.05
285,357,676.36
23
168,000,000
94,491,653.03
309,338,511.99
24 Sunday
25 Christmas
26
150,000,000
82,670,311.24
247,753,540.69
27
120,000,000
92,300,041.13
233,345,339.74
28
90,000,000
87,883,331.91
127,103,299.25
29
60,000,000
78,450,618.89
146,797,803.64
30
50,000,000
30,133,108.06
127,871,738.18
31 Sunday
126,266,819.88
3 3,208,000,000 (a)
3,584,944,764.39
3 4,320,715,248.65
Total 1 to 30 $ 3,208,000,000
$ 3,584,944,764.39
$ 4,320,715,248.65
* Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,200,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about 3780,000,000 will be paid
Dec. 15 to 21, 1944 Incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes paid for Income Taxes Dec. 1 to30 1944-$ 1,239,966,900.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
January 1, 1945.
2r4
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
DECEMBER 1944
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
Dec. 1944
Dec. 1944
Dec. 1943
1
$
20,000,000
*$
19,072,319.58
$
4,909,880.14
2
4,000,000
3,470,238.22
7,918,243.61
3 Sunday
4
20,000,000
19,369,006.92
10,355,973.86
5
10,000,000
9,563,572.95
16,809,871.51
6
13,000,000
15,324,216.85
24,909,940.36
7
15,000,000
33,748,118.42
28,753,756.56
8
20,000,000
59,973,947.06
32,670,092.86
9
25,000,000
29,753,486.51
53,461,862.35
10 Sunday
11
35,000,000
78,005,598.84
65,362,781.52
12
50,000,000
56,956,957.82
55,110,427.73
13
73,000,000
79,382,327.84
116,413,250.34
14
105,000,000
99,118,777.87
129,231,176.44
1 to 14
390,000,000
504,038,568.88
546,907,257.28
15
160,000,000
278,763,427.55
224,765,127.66
16
280,000,000
280,480,915.29
357,691,074.07
17 Sunday
18
440,000,000
595,003,645.38
500,619,764.74
19
410,000,000
447,377,086.62
339,586,594.65
20
350,000,000
390,203,348.18
387,573,595.20
21
310,000,000
355,804,195.18
359,737,105.32
1 to 21
2,340,000,000
2,851,671,127.08
2,716,880,518,92
22
230,000,000
267,344,573.05
285,357,676.36
23
168,000,000
94,491,653.03
309,338,511.99
24 Sunday
25 Christmas
26
150,000,000
82,670,311.24
247,753,540.69
27
120,000,000
92,300,041.13
233,345,339.74
28
90,000,000
87,883,331.91
127,103,299.25
29
60,000,000
78,450,618.89
146,797,803.64
30
50,000,000
30,253,989.95
127,871,738.18
31 Sunday
126,266,819.88
3 3,208,000,000 (a)
$
3,585,065,646.28
8 4,320,715,248.65
Total 1 to 30 $ 3,208,000,000
$ 3,585,065,646.28
$ 4,320,715,248.65
*
Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,200,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about 3780,000,000 will be paid
Dec. 15 to 21, 1944 Incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes paid for Income Taxes Dec. 1 to 301944-$ 1,240,045,225.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
January 2, 1945.
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
:
36,814,747.76
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
29,237,695.25
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
38,409,408.94
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
46,878,703.04
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
27,404,455.38
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
28,588,412.46
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,639.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,508.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
3 5,809,000,000 (a)
5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 7
$
255,000,000
$
207,333,422.83
$
200,675,728.43
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 7
1945-$ 22,246,825.
March 8, 1945.
REGRADED TRICT ASSIFIED
emp
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,092,447.57
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
29,751,037.50
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
42,609,833.62
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
47,128,098.57
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
27,404,455.38
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
28,617,288.92
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
36,691,409.10
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,597,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,508.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 8
$
310,000,000
$
249,294,570.66
$
238,754,656.96
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 8 1945-$ 30,105,200.
REGRADED A SCIFIED
March 9, 1945.
CONFIDENTIAL
Eng
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,145,570.70
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,729,596.25
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
52,248,732.53
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
28,885,197.76
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
28,638,995.51
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
36,713,407.14
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
35,360,952.78
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 9
$
370,000,000
$
293,065,606.50
$
284,939,653.21
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 9 1945-$ 35,413,750.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 10, 1945.
CO.
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,729,596.25
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
53,895,025.05
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
32,031,506.21
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
30,550,860.72
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
36,714,197.21
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
35,445,058.61
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
35,361,269.76
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 10
$
435,000,000
$
335,221,578.50
$
347,746,008.10
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 10 1945-$ 38,214,475.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 12, 1945.
CO
files
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*
04
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,729,596.25
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,151,656.48
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
32,876,561.81
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
33,467,136.17
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
38,606,008.87
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
35,480,991.25
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
35,413,977.28
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
59,994,042.02
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 12
$
510,000,000
$
401,214,014.62
$
402,164,067.37
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid' for Income Taxes March 1 to 12 1945-$ 53,000,950.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 13, 1945.
fut
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1.
$
36,000,000
*
37,343,153.85
$
21,613,287.68.
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,735,411.66
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,343,859.22
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,224,539.14
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,166,748.37
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
43,318,494.36
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
39,242,681.29
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
37,700,683.78
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
60,087,198.20
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
60,478,660.16
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 13
$
605,000,000
$
476,792,340.67
$ 491,648,643.53
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 13 1945-$ 68,185,250.
D.W.B.
REGRADED UNCI
March 14, 1945.
COD
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,735,411.66
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,353,167.38
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,250,483.57
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,605,304.83
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
45,405,510.63
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
44,105,412.55
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
60,184,022.41
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
60,478,660.16
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
86,159,342.04
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
578,151,018.32
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
149,976,056.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,508.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 14
$
740,000,000
$
578,151,018.32
$
595,565,629.41
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 14 1945-$ 95,941,700.
REGRADED UNCLASSIRIED
March 15, 1945.
CON
fils
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,735,411.66
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,353,167.38
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,250,483.57
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,610,527.47
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,047,783.81
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,192,811.11
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
65,200,877.48
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
60,489,518.10
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
86,237,940.13
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
584,992,223.80
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
121,081,706.70
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 15
$
990,000,000
$ 706,073,930.50
$
745,541,696.27
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 15 1945-$ 142,650,400.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 16, 1945.
COM
Fles
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
* 3
37,343,153.85
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,150,910.66
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,735,411.66
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,353,167.38
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,250,483.57
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,077,279.60
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,765,988.73
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
74,364,952.23
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
67,077,400.45
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
86,278,988.39
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
601,525,884.53
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
121,081,706.70
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
469,259,642.88
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 16 $ 1,480,000,000
$
1,191,867,234.11
$
1,253,176,261.08
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 16 1945-$ 375,641,500.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 17. 1945.
CORP
filer
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,147,499.17
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,738,823.15
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,344,715.48
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,091,234.81
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,793,956.13
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
74,581,804.65
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
76,699,267.42
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
95,449,354.55
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
620,576,892.69
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
121,604,426.28
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
469,354,893.13
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
444,990,736.22
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 17 $ 2,030,000,000
$ 1,656,526,948.32
$
1,786,763,572.76
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 17 1945-$ 522,859,875.
REGRADED
March 19, 1945.
CO
fee
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*
OF
37,343,153.83
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,147,499.17
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,738,823.15
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,346,948.44
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,091,234.81
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
74,986,349.75
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
79,989,189.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
98,363,303.49
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
627,190,309.21
595,565,639.41
15
250,000,000
159,090,734.90
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
469,395,731.94
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
445,099,920.43
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
341,627,250.17
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
3 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 19 $ 2,650,000,000
$ 2,042,403,946.65
$
2,272,389,071.41
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 19 1945-$ 624,959,125.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 20, 1945.
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1.
$
36,000,000
*3
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,147,499.17
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,738,823.15
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,346,948.44
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,091,234.81
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,467,107.90
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
102,245,412.37
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
631,699,753.22
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
177,327,371.09
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
483,906,832.02
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
450,926,457.35
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
352,463,743.36
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
329,626,972.11
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 20
$
3,215,000,000
$ 2,425,951,129.15
$ 2,723,162,519.36
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 20 1945-$ 701,422,650.
RECRADED UNCLASSITED
March 21, 1945.
CO
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,147,499.17
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,738,823.15
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,346,948.44
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,091,234.81
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,200,894.62
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
632,886,836.95
595,565,639.41
15
250,000,000
179,790,039.14
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
501,790,852.22
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
476,098,360.60
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
352,467,887.04
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
329,654,852.52
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
252,048,988.95
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,724,737,817.42
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 21 $ 3,665,000,000
$ 2,724,737,817.42
$
3,031,647,357.10
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 21 1945-$ 745,538,900.
REGRADED UNCLACCIFIED
March 22, 1945.
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
0.00
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,147,499.17
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,738,823.15
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,346,948.44
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,093,746.33
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,200,894.62
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
632,889,348.47
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
179,846,436.28
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
502,594,037.18
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
482,446,905.41
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
370,581,431.47
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
329,659,249.99
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
252,054,520.60
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,750,071,929.40
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
296,250,954.17
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 22
$ 4,015,000,000
$
3,046,322,883.57
$ 3,380,894,851.66
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately 31,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 22 1945-$ 858,520,525.
March 23, 1945.
REGRADED UNCI ASSIFIED
CONF
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,305,697.01
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,827,945.16
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,453,587.17
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,258,935.47
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,093,746.33
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,208,861.45
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
633,251,273.88
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
179,853,928.39
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
502,631,811.84
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
484,266,296.07
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
381,013,980.23
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
348,879,397.63
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
252,082,950.31
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,781,979,638.35
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
296,250,984.18
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
187,570,489.85
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 23 $ 4,335,000,000
$ 3,265,801,112.38
$ 3,643,050,428.65
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 23 1945-$ 890,058,725.
REGRADED A SCIFTED
March 24, 1945.
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*3
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,305,697.01
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,827,945.16
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,453,587.17
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,689,017.25
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,093,746.33
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,208,861.45
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
633,681,355.66
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
179,853,928.39
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
502,631,811.84
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
484,271,795.12
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
396,293,114.57
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
363,752,822.47
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
271,435,315.40
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,831,920,143.45
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
296,322,363.51
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
187,570,829.36
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
210,603,356.07
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,508.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 24 $ 4,635,000,000
$ 3,526,416,692.39
$ 3,914,944,671.28
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 24 1945-$ 918,119,325.
March 26, 1945.
REGRADED TED
C
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
-
3
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,305,697.01
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,827,945.16
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,453,587.17
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,689,017.25
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
46,093,746.33
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,725.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,208,861.45
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
633,681,355.66
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
179,853,928.39
149,976,056.86
16
490,000,000
502,631,811.84
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
484,544,071.60
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
396,689,563.12
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
367,886,879.41
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
285,827,342.16
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,851,114,952.18
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
316,610,058.10
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
187,638,089.22
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
210,605,873.67
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
289,490,929.96
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
246,021,608.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 26
$
4,915,000,000
$ 3,855,459,903.13
$ 4,106,642,814.63
*Adjusted daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Paid for Income Taxes March 1 to 26 1945-$ 1,012,544,825.
RECRAPTE
March 27, 1945.
C
file
ESTIMATE
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEPOSITS
MARCH 1945
Actual Deposits
Date
Estimate
Actual Deposits
Corresponding Day
March 1945
March 1945
March 1944
1
$
36,000,000
*
04
37,427,037.63
$
21,613,287.68
2
30,000,000
30,305,697.01
35,854,637.07
3
42,000,000
43,827,945.16
40,050,869.85
4 Sunday
5
52,000,000
54,453,587.17
25,185,359.11
6
45,000,000
33,689,017.25
33,756,117.22
7
50,000,000
37,379,638.60
44,215,457.50
8
55,000,000
45,748,509.43
38,078,928.53
9
60,000,000
45,093,746.33
46,184,996.25
10
65,000,000
45,796,723.69
62,806,354.89
11 Sunday
12
75,000,000
75,051,882.56
54,418,059.27
13
95,000,000
80,698,709.38
89,484,576.16
14
135,000,000
103,208,861.45
103,916,985.88
1 to 14
740,000,000
633,691,355.66
595,565,629.41
15
250,000,000
179,853,928.39
149,976,066.86
16
490,000,000
502,648,430.68
507,634,564.81
17
550,000,000
484,544,071.60
533,587,311.68
18 Sunday
19
620,000,000
397,513,194.66
485,625,498.65
20
565,000,000
369,340,271.96
450,773,447.95
21
450,000,000
288,914,700.98
308,484,837.74
1 to 21
3,665,000,000
2,856,495,943.93
3,031,647,357.10
22
350,000,000
324,472,651.65
289,247,494.56
23
320,000,000
206,334,594.12
322,155,576.99
24
300,000,000
213,000,719.23
271,894,242.63
25 Sunday
26
280,000,000
289,492,933.80
191,698,143.35
27
250,000,000
212,928,174.41
246,021,508.62
28
200,000,000
239,489,367.76
29
174,000,000
182,979,293.60
30
150,000,000
174,314,461.11
31
120,000,000
133,741,275.73
$ 5,809,000,000 (a)
3 5,083,188,821.45
Total 1 to 27
$
5,165,000,000
$
4,102,725,017.14
$
4,352,664,423.25
*Ad justed daily to include mail
reports from General Depositaries.
(a) Approximately $1,500,000,000 Treasury Tax and Savings Notes will be
surrendered in payment of income taxes, of which about $950,000,000 will be paid
March 15 to 21, 1945 incl.
Try. Tax and Sav. Notes Faid for Income Taxes March 1 to 27 1945-$ 1,081,529,425.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
March 28, 1945.
BEBLE THEIR T-464 D. PRIFIED Roosevelt Libr.
PSF; morgenthan folder 2-45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 22, 1945.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:
If you have any urgent messages
which you wish to get to me, I suggest you
send them through the White House Map Room.
However, only absolutely urgent messages
should be sent via the Map Room. May I
ask that you make them as brief as possible
in order not to tie up communications. If
you have very lengthy messages the Map Room
officer will have to exercise his die-
cretion as to whether it is physically
possible to send them by radio or whether
they will have to be sent by pouch.
F.D.R.
(Identical memos sent to all Cabinet Members.
Memo, 1/19/45, from adm Brown re this is
filed. adm. Brown folder, 45.)
PSF.7401genthan folder 2-45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1945.
FIL E MEMO:
The President said as far as he
knew, Mr. Baruch was not going to Germany
and wanted to know who Mr. Lobell was.
I asked the Secretary again and
he said he knew Mr. Baruch was going to
London on reparations in connection with
Germany and that Mr. Lobell was the person
who wrote Mr. Baruch's reports and was to
accompany Mr. Baruch to London.
I told the President this and he
said to tell the Secretary if the material
was not confidential to show it to Mr.
Lobell and if it would make the Secretary
feel any better to say he had not even
shown it to the President.
This I did.
ajb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Mr. Baruch is asking to see
a lot of material on Germany which
Mr. Morgenthau has in Treasury. The
Secretary says a man by the name of
Lobell 1s asking for it. Mr. Morgenthau
wishes to know is Mr. Baruch going to
Germany for the President and should
he let him see this material?