War - Germany, Handbook of Military Government for, 1944

PSF War Dept, 1944 Handbook of Military Gout. for Germany Phone return t.Jbp The Whit Nouse Cang 21 NY "2" pSF,Wark Sept HANDBOOK OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(R) and 5(D) or (E) 08D letter, May MAY & 1972 21 1973 RT, NAME Date 15 AUGUST, 1944 C3% SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE HANDBOOK OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY This Handbook is published for the guidance of all concerned. It contains the objectives and policies to be pursued by Commanders and Staffs in planning for and in operating Military Government in Germany, whether in the mobile, transitional or static phases. The Handbook indicates the principal tasks to be performed by Military Government Officers, but does not enter into the details of the tasks of Specialist Officers, which aro elaborated in the Functional Manuals, issued separately. The Handbook will be used as the basis of Training for all M G. Officers, whether US or BR, who are to be employed in the Military Government of Germany, whother operating independently, or in collaboration with Officers of other Allied Countries. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CONFIDENTIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Page AUTHORISATION FOREWORD Ch I Introductory Ch II Bradication of Nazi Institutions and Personnel Ch III Machinory for Military Government Ch IV ... Public Safety on V Logal Ch VI. Financial Ch VII Property Control Ch VIII Public Health and Welfare Ch IX Displaced Persons and Refugees Ch X Food and Agriculture Ch XI Supply Ch XII Economics and Public Utilities Ch XIII Labour Ch XIV Posts, Telephone, Telegraph and Redio Services Ch XV Transportation Ch XVI Education end Religious Affairs Ch XVII Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Ch XVIII Information and Historical Ch XIX Instructions to MGOs APPENDICES: A Regional and Local Government under the Nazio. B Proclamations and Supplemental Documents. C. Summary Guide to Archive Centres. D. Currency now in circulation in Germany. E Allied Military Marks. P Notes on Water Purification. G Table of Regional Food Offices, showing relation to administration. H Comparison of Political, Economic and Military Government Administration Areas, I Universities and Schools Location Statement. J Regional religious denominations' Statistics. K Information on activities of PWD. L Forms List and Certain forms. M. List of books and manuals GLOSSARY MAPS INDEX CONFIDENTIAL FOREWORD 1 FOREWORD I. Germany in Defeat The Handbook of Military Government in Germany which follows 1s intended not for the Staff Officer or the special- ist, but for the general administrator, the Military Govern- ment Officer in the Detachments placed at the key points of administration up and down the US/Br zones of Western and Southern Germany. Very much will depend upon the conditions under which the Armies of the Western Allies enter Germany, whether they have to fight their way Restword from the Rhine to a junction with the Russians in Central Germany, or whether they enter under the terms of a surrender resulting from battles fought outside Germany itself. This book is written in the main to fit the second of these two conditions, that of a German collapse. This is the more probable of the two contingencies; in addition, it is the one calling for such a book as this to explain to Military Government Officers the structure of ad- ministrative and economic controls through which Germany is governed. Nevertheless, the alternative demands some consideration. If the Germans pursue a policy of 'scorched earth' in fighting backwards across their own country, they will not do so helf-heartedly, as their record in retreet in other coun- tries has shown. When allied armies gain possession of a district, there will not be found in it any officials or police, doctors or nurses, priests or other potential leaders, only a handful of dazed civilians and refugees needing food and shelter; economic life will have consed. Under such circumstances the work of Military Government assumes simplicity; there is no administration to control, starvation and disease are the enemies, and Food, Public Health and Welfare, Supply and Displaced Persons present the critical problems to be solved. Control would therefore have to be direct but limited, 88 indirect control presupposes the existence of a German administrative machine to be controlled, and only the most elomontary tasks of military government could be undertaken. The conditions to which most of the planning for Germany has been directed are other than these. A German military defeat followed by collapse, surrender, and the rapid entry of allied forces would still leave the German administration functioning to a variable extent, but functioning amidst chaos and confusion. The elements going to make up that chaos and confusion, and their probable offect upon the different sections of the Germon machine are doalt with in detail in the functional chapters in Part II of this book. They require, however, to be considered here in their relation to one another and to the Germany that the MGO will find on his arrival. Undoubtedly the most important element will be the violen dissolution of the Nuzi party. This party has had eleven years of unchallenged power, ruthlessly exercised within Ger- many, proceded by thirteen years of the successful end wide- spread propegation of its doctrines and ideology. This is a long time; the impress left upon the people will be deep, and the sudden removal of the pressure will cause numerous 2 FOREWORD reactions. Nazi party mombors occupy, almost without exception, every key position in Germany! when they are removed, it is unquestionable that the whole machine will rock violontly. Many Nazi ideas, as for instance their racial doctrines, will remain as a part of the unconscious thought processes of the German people and be accepted as exiomatic truths even by those who are quite suro that they have repudiated politically the fallen Nazis. X Specifically, the problems here are likely to arise from the close and curious interweaving of State and Party organizations and activities in all fields and at all levels, and the sudden passing of the Nazis will, perforce, leave numerous rents in the administrative fabrio which will need quick cobbling by Military Government. Military dofeat is frequently accompanied by social revo- lution, which at least in its carlier stages, is a notable crea- tor of chaos. In Germany in 1918 there was no true social revo- lution, only 8 general collapse of the functions of government; what 1944 will hold is not yet clear. The noxt most important element in the design of post- surrender Germany will almost certainly be represented by those unhappy beings referred to in official language as Displaced Persons. Some sevon million enslaved foreign workers, end two million prisoners of war all cager to return home, plus four and a helf million Germans evacuated from their places of abode, go to make up such a problem as the world has never seon. (For the US/Br zones, approximate figures would be 2 3/4 million workers, 3/4 million prisoners of war and 1g million Gorman evacuees). Immediately next in importance, end arising from the former considerations, comos all that is comprised under the general heading 'relaxation of controls'. The patriotic impulse of wertime, the omnipresent terror of the Gestapo, the power of accustomed routine, have all combined to hold the German people to an ordered way of life - ordered that is by their Nazi mast- ers. When all these bonds of restriction fall off simultan- eously amid possible revolution, and the undoubted fear of in- flation, the effects cannot but be noteworthy. These effects will be widely felt. The rise of the black market, food hourding, infletion, and the spread of crime will be four of the earliest phenomena. The MGO has to work through what may remain of the German buresucratic machine, but he must not expect fo find the old automatic response to rules and regulations from a public that knows it to be little bet- ter than an even chance whether the official who signed the original order is still alive, let alono in office. The only counter balance here may prove to be the widespread apathy among the population of which all recent reports from Germany speak. Crime has boon spoken of. It will assuredly be 5 major problem for many years in Germany. Life is cheap enough in Europe today and proporty becomes utterly insccure in disor- dered communities. Demobilized soldiers lacking employment, "wanted" Nazis gone underground, clashing political partisans, and plain bondit gangs will be the main feeders of crime. Against these can be set only the instrument of allied combat troops, ill adapted for dispersed action against guerrillas, and El demoralized police force undergoing reorganization at the hends of foreignors. The passing of the system which has filled the foreground of German national life for the past twelve years; the consequent FOREWORD 3 relaxation of all controls; migratory mass movements, and the prevalence of crime, those and thoir consequences will occupy almost overy waking hour of the MGO. After theso, Food, Dis- case, Employment and Housing will be compoting for his atten- tion. From the Military Government point of view, they are all somewhat technical, that is to say the measures to grapple with them must result from planning and organization above the Detachment level. But the MGO will have to put his back into supervising the administration of those measures before he can regard the state of his area with any satisfaction. Two other points remain upon which the MGO may require somo guidance boyond the functional confines of his duties. They are politics end the German mentality. German politics us they may effect the MCO are of two kinds, national and regional, which are inclined to react upon each other. This time things will be somewhat different from 1918. The allied occupation will cover the whole and not merely a portion of Germany; there will be no old Army element to sup- port anyone, and the Nazis have seen to it that no normal Op- position exists as an alternative to them. The factors which will remain constant are that any central government remaining, or rather re-emerging, will be week - it cannot very well be propped up by allied bayonets, or overy German would be against it - and that the political complexion of the different regions of Germany will very considerably. This is a possible picture of national politics: regional politics have one edditional aspect. Though the process of unification wes completed by Hitler in 1934, the spirit of regionolism and local State petriotism has survived. X It is quite likely that when contralized Nazi Germany goes down in defeat, there may be a strong reaction towards region- alism. The days when Bavoria, Badon, Württemberg and the rest stood upon their own feet may appear as the 'good old days' of peace and prosperity. Borlin will suddenly seem to be very far away once again; communications will be bad in any case, and most administration at first will be on a regional basis. Such on outbreak of regionelism would not be enduring; modern economics are against it for one thing, but it may be looked for. If it is to bo encouraged, you will be so directed) In relation to politics your duties as 8 MGO are perfectly simple and straightforward, the key being that not politics but administration is your conoarn. In the first instance no purely political activity of any kind will be permitted, nor will you favour any perticular part if such exists. Later on, this rule may be relaxed to allow the resurgence of normal democratic and anti-Nazi political forces, but in this matter you will meroly follow your instructions from above. You have in this book a picture of the normal German Ad- ministration. What you will find in certain arees my not be normal. In somo Rhineland towns, and in Hamburg, for instance, instead of the Oberburgermeister (or Chief Mayor) you may find & collection of citizons describing themselves 8.3 the local Soviet. Your course is clear, and your interest is administra- tion. In the absence of the regular official you will work with and through eny group which you ere satisfied has effectiv. 4 FOREWORD administrative control of its area. Thirdly, although you will take no pert in politics. you must keep your onro open and know what is going on in your area. Officers from the Psychological Warfere Branch will be circulating continuously in the US/Br zones in search of Polit- ical intelligence. They will look largely to the MGOs in the Detachments for the basic information of what is actually hop- pening, which their exporience and training will enable them to evaluato correctly. II. The German Mentelity What of the ordinary Germann population when the first state of dazedness has worn off? Thore will be a number of black looks and glum faces; that is only natural; no people welcomes defeat, particularly when it has been told for so long that it is a Herrenvolk. It may prove more difficult to understand the opposite attitude which will also be found in the form of 6 wave of em- barassing, over effusivo friendliness, great airing of n little bit of English, many eager enquirios as to the possibilities of emigration to the United States or to British Dominions, and the liko. Several reasons will combine to produce this condi- tion. Minor reasons will be the remains of the Nazi theories of the closo racial affinity of all Anglo-Sexons, and the remains of the Nozi propagando which has for 80 long paraded the Russians as the especial sub-husan bogey. The main explanation is that the German is a great admirer of success. He worships It. Ee lifts it into power in his own country. After surrender be will be asking himself continually in a puzzled way why these Allies who appear to him less mill- tary, loss well educated, less industrious, and less well on- dowed with every quality considered desirable by a Germen, have not only besten him, but benten him twice within thirty years. He will be filled with en insatiable desire to find out by getting to know us what it is we have got that they have'nt, what mystic talisman enables us to win wars, so that by copying us they con acquire thomselves that same gift. Mistrust the over-friendly German. Some ex-Nazis, perhops many, will hasten to assume this attitude in en effort to cover their tracks. And there will be others --- members of the of- ficer corps, business men, lerge landowners --- who will be as likesblo as any Gorman you meet, but who have sponsored two world wars and may be looking ahond to a third. Be cautious of Germans who know Britain and the United States well, perhaps hold a degree from one of our universities and speak good English. Germans with these qualifications are not necessarily untrustworthy, but, when coupled with on effort to ingratisto themselves with you, they constitute a warning sign. You will also find some Germens who st great secrifice or risk have romained faithful to democratic principles and opposed to Nezism throughout, and others, a larger number, who have ao- copted Nazism to a degree but who ere cepable of genuinely sloughing this off. Beyond the fect that resistance to Nazism was proportionately more extensivo end determined among the Ger- man workers than in any other class, it is impossible to predict FOREWORD 5 the size or exact comploxion of those groups, which will vary from one region to another. Moreover, ns stated above, when political activity Le pormitted to revive, you must observe neutrality among the enorging porties, always excepting any which are openly or covertly Heri in character. But romember that the regeneration of Germany depends upon those Germens who have remained feithful, or our bo rowon, to domocratic principl AB you learn who these cro. you will find them valuelbe sources of advice upon your many problems. Every officer who resds this book will have been told at some time during his training of the mothod by which Gormans, and especially German officiels must be handlod. The main rules for the conduct of allied administrators may be summrized 08 follows: Show self-confidence and appoar es if one had the right to dominste the Gorman. Bo firm, decisivo and rather remote. With officials this must ba based upon en exect knowledge of the allied policies and actions to be corried out. Only thu: con clear instructions be issued, the carrying out of which cen be insisted upon in a just but absolutely firm manner. A Gor- men official may somotimes be consulted 88 to how e cortain policy may best be put into effect in a given area, but he must never be asked what is to be done next or his respect will be forfeited. Before giving a docision one should appear to consider ver: carefully the rights of the 0030. The Germen is a greet stickl. for his rights and believes in the power of the law. He will, as Hitler has shown, accept logal excuses for the most arbitrer: and even illegol sorts of cotion. One important smeller point of Gorman mentality: The basic gullibility of many Gormons purmits of the creation by their leaders and the ready acceptonce of a groat veriety of legends and the legendary treatment of events, even those which lie within the momory of all. Those legends are generally nationalistic in their neture, and do much to prepere the ground for future wars. After the last wer, the Nazi party, from its very infency in 1920, industriously cultivated the legond of the 'stab in the back'. This averred that the German Army had not boon defeated in the field but had bcon stabbed in the book by 'Jows and crim- inals' on the home front. This is now believed by 95% of the German people. There will be similar logends to account for defoat in this war. The beginnings of ono could be seen in cer- tain aspects of the propeganda treatment of the attempt on Hit- ler's lifo in July 1944. These logonds should bo watched for and reported, so that they may as for as possible be counter- acted by P.W. Branch and similar agencies.