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PSF
Benjamin V. Cohen
Subject File
Box 140
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
fullsmal
memo- -
Return to The
President, \
CH
PSF:Cohen
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
October 13, 1938.
Dear Miss LeHand:
Last night Felix spoke to the President over the telephone about
the Palestine situation. The President suggested that Felix dictate
to me a draft of a note which the President might send to Mr. Neville
Chamberlain. The following is the draft which Felix dictated to me:
"With increased pressure on the Jews in Central Europe
the tasks of sheer humanity we set for ourselves at Evian have
become even more difficult of fulfilment. Apart from mere num-
bers Palestine is a significant symbol of hope to Jewry. There-
fore I earnestly urge that no decision may be made which would
close the gates of Palestine to the Jews. Shutting the gates
of Palestine to Jews would greatly embarrass efforts towards
genuine appeasement because it would be interpreted as a distur-
bing symbol of anti-Semetism."
Sincerely yours,
Ben
Benjamin V. Cohen.
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
note Charnberlain: from the President to herlle
Please convey the following personal
With increased pressure
against the your in Central
Europe almost mevitable as
a result 2 recent events, the
great humanitarian taska
we set for ourselow at Evian
will become increasingly deffi-
terrible refuge alleriation problem of m the
cult char decent the fulfilment
Europe, no Ceorlized reation
can whoch shirk responsibility]
I trust that no decesion
will be made which would
close wew the gates of Palestine
to the yearsh settlement. apart
from more numbers, Palestine
is a segnificant syntol 8
hope to Jury
Palestine to Jewry
interpreted as a sincoter synbol
of anti-semiticism
PSFiCohen
fill
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
1
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
I thought you would be interested to know that your talk with
Isaiah seems to have had unexpected repercussions upon our juris-
prudence.
The Morgan case - the Kansas City Stockyards case which caused
Secretary Wallace to lose his temper with the Chief Justice last sum-
mer - came up for argument on its third appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Government argued that the commission men were not entitled to
the rate monies impounded in the Court merely because the Court had
held that the hearing before the Secretary was defective, but that
they were entitled only to a rehearing before the Secretary. If the
Government were to be successful in this appeal, Fred Wood's victories
in the first and second appeals would be little more than pyhric vic-
tories. In view of the past history of the case we feared that the
Court would not be particularly sympathetic to the Government's argu-
ments.
But Isaiah surprised all of us by his vigorous and zealous defense
of the Government's position. He scarcely permitted a single sentence
in Wood's argument to go unchallenged. We cannot be certain of the
final decision as that will depend on the Chief Justice's or Roberts'
vote, and both of them were discreetly silent during the argument. But
we are hopeful.
Yours,
Ben V. C.
Ben V. Cohen
The President
The White House
PSF:Cohen
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
March 20, 1939.
Public
Dear Missy:
I thought the President might wish to make some remarks
in response to an appropriate question which would indicate
that the Douglas nomination was not uninfluenced by Douglas'
western origin. As the press and radio announcements have
generally alluded to the nomination as that of a westerner,
I should think that it might help to give the President greater
freedom in the event of future appointments if he said some-
thing along the lines of the enclosed statement. I have tried
to make the purpose of the statement not too obvious.
Yours,
Ben V.C.
Ben V. Cohen.
Miss Marguerite Le Hand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Have you anything to tell us Mr. President about your recent
nomination of Mr. Douglas for the Supreme Court?
It was not an easy task to select a successor to Mr. Justice Brandeis.
It was not an easy task to find a man with Brandeis' great knowledge of
the intricacies of corporate law and practice and with Brandeis' passion
to use his knowledge and skill to improve the lot of the common man. Mr.
Douglas' training, experience, and outlook are such I believe as to give
every assurance that he will creditably uphold the great Brandeis' tra-
dition.
Although Mr. Douglas' voting residence is in Connecticut, none who
knows him has ever considered him a "Connecticut Yankee". He was brought
up in the West, and in spirit as well as appearance he is unmistakably
western. But 1 don't think that ought to be held against him.
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
PSF:Crlin
June 29, 1939.
Like
Dear Mr. President:
Mr. Groesbeck of Bond and Share is quite proud of his
ability to sell an issue of long-term bonds on very favorable
terms for the Washington Power Company. This Company is located
round-about the City of Spokane right in the range of Grand Coulee
and Bonneville.
Mr. Groesbeck feels that he was able to carry through
this financing, which had been troubling him for some time, largely
because, in transmitting the report of the New York Power Authority
to the Congress, you made favorable reference to his recent annual
report which urged that both private and public facilities be used
to bring the benefits of the federal power projects to the people.
Mr. Groesbeck feels that we, and incidentally himself,
should take a little credit for this first piece of private utility
financing within the range of a large federal power project.
In view of the utility situation in general and Mr. Groes-
beck's present cooperative attitude, I should think some remarks by
you at your press conference along the lines of the attached memorandum,
would be very helpful.
Yours,
Ben V. Cohen
The President,
The White House.
Question
Mr. President, have you anything to say about the pending
TVA legislation?
Answer
I am leaving that in the hands of Senator Norris. I stand
four-squere behind him.
But speaking of utilities, I wonder whether you noticed that the
Washington Water Power Company, e subsidiary of Electric Bond and Share, has
sold at 105 a $22,000,000 issue of long-term bonds bearing an interest coupon
of 3½ per cent. Those are pretty good terms. And those were the terms
which a utility right in the mew of the great federal power projects in the
Northwest, was able to obtain.
It has frequently been said that it was impossible for utility
operating companies in the range of federal over developments to do any
financing. I have always contended that the difficulties these companies
encountered in selling their securities were due either to their poor capital
structures or to the misleading celemity-howling of propagendists trying to
make investors believe that public power developments would ruin even sound
private investment.
The Washington Water Power Company, e subsidiary of Electric Bond
and Share, is within close renge of both Bonneville and Grand Coulee. The
sale of its bonds is pretty convincing proof that the federal power projects
do not obstruct the sale of operating company securities if the managers of
those compenies make up their mind that they want to cooperate in bringing
the benefits of these great public power developments to the consuming public
and set about convincing the investing public that they intend to cooperate
with and no. fight the government.
PSF:Cohen
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
File
Carded under
June 29, 1940
wilkie
Filed lincles
coken
"Rev cotten
Dear Missy:
I thought that the President might be
interested in the attached minute of an off-the-
record talk I had with Willkie last December when
he invited me to lunch with him. The President
might be particularly interested in some of the re-
marks on pp. 2 and 3.
Yours,
Ben i. C.
Ben V. Cohen
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.
CABLE FROM ENGLAND RECEIVED JUNE 23rd, 1940
Terms of French capitulation present no surprises and
we have reasonable grounds for believing ultimate victory possible.
Grain and potato crops in Europe and Russia record failure: no
food in Europe for livestock next winter; no fertilizer for next
year's crops; German grain reserves rotting for lack of adequate
storage. Confusion and illwill in Poland and other captured agri-
cultural districts; famine 1941 if we can maintain blockade; and
with splendid material aid from America already beginning to arrive
in useful quantity hope to retain control of sea, and bomb and
starve enemy into submission. Britain, headed by trade unions,
united as never before; determined to take any punishment and
fight to absolute finish under Churchill's magnificent leadership.
Temper of country at highest pitch of resolution and activity; no
time being lost; no slackness in administration now; women and men
completely undismayed; no faint hearts here. Britain has risen to
occasion and, with America's material assistance, she intends to
win.
can Record feductial and off the
Conversation at luncheon with Mr. Wendell Willkie, President
of Commonwealth & Southern Corporation on December 11, 1939.
After a pleasant greeting, Mr. Willkie asked me whether I
had read Justice Frankfurter's new book. He had been asked to review it
for the Harvard Law Review. I said I had read most of the articles in
it some years past, but I had not reread them in book form. He expressed
great
admiration for Frankfurter's style. I complimented him on his
review of David Cecil's Life of Lord Milbourne. Ee explained how he
had come to review that book after he had refused to review Jerome Frank's
and other books where he would have had to intrude his own political
views which might be considered propaganda.
The conversation veered to Paul McNutt. He pooh-poohed the idea
that they were close friends. He had not seen much of Paul since college
days. Paul had sought his advice in 1936. He suggested that he ought to
take some of the private offers he had had so as to take care of his
family and not to be dependent on the vicissitudes of politics. He had
no objection to his becoming President of Indiana University, but he had
objected to his holding the office vacant while he made up his mind. In
a speech out in Indiana, he had pleasantly referred to Paul's aspiration to
be President of the United States, but that was only a pleasantry. Ewing
and McHale had approached him to support McNutt for President, but he had
refused because of a difference in principle and he had 80 told Paul. Paul
was, he thought, a New Dealer and he was not. After that some disparaging
remarks about his corporate dealings appeared in a number of Indiana papers
and he had traced these to the Democratic State Committee.
-2-
I remarked that a number of politicians seemed to think issues
did not count. "Yes", Willkie said, "Farley thought he had made Roosevelt
President by garnering the delegates, but that would not have been possible
if the President's ideas had not appealed to the country at the time." I
agreed, but said there were times when issues did not count, as back in
1920.
I told Willkie a number of us had been embarrassed by reports
circulated, probably by Paul's lieutenants, that the President had put
his hand upon Paul. We thought that was premature. Many things might
happen before the convention. He might then put his hand on Paul and then
again he might put his hand on someone else.
Willkie agreed that one could not make premature decisions. He had
talked with Arthur Vandenburg, an old friend, over the weekend. He pre-
ferred him to Taft or Dewey, and yet he told him he thought he was all
wrong on neutrality. We could not be isolated in the modern world. He
also told him he profoundly disagreed with him on the tariff. He felt
deeply that lower tariff and freer trade were of vital importance. He was
frank to say that he might favor Hull over the prospective Republican
candidates.
I twitted Willkie about his talk on life beginning at forty. He
said the first he heard of his candidacy was from Arthur Krock's column a
few weeks ago and Arthur had said he got it from a New Deal source. I told
him that reports of his candidacy had come from New York over six months
ago, had been brought to us by newspaper men.
Willkie could not imagine himself a candidate. People had
come and offered to put up money (several hundred thousand) to finance
-3-
him and get him delegates. He said nothing doing. He could not imagine
himself making the equivocating statements which a candidate for office
usually must make. Of course if he got a telegram informing him that
he had been nominated for President on a platform that embodied principles
with which he agreed, he would not refuse, under those circumstances, you
wouldn't refuse. Few people would.
But generally speaking he thought he was much too outspoken to
run for office. People told him that he was too outspoken in business
affairs. Other people said the way to handle government was by favors,
or by kidding government officials along, saying nice words at Washington,
giving them nice words to their face and the stiletto to their back.
But he could not really understand why Washington did not try
to work with the more progressive elements in industry, those in the
utility industry like himself who had tried to simplify their corporate
structures, to integrate their properties and reduce their rates.
I remarked that we did want to, but it was difficult at times.
Take, for example, the unprovocative statement of the President that we
were studying the possibilities of a super-grid was countered with a blast
(Willkie)
from him that such a grid was wholly unnecessary.
^
Well, he reported, Dave Lilienthal and Lister Hill had made an
unprovoked attack on him in connection with rural electrification -
Hill's statement had come right after a White House conference. These were
followed up by Norris' attack on Consumer's financing. It looked like
concerted action to him.
I assured him that I knew nothing of Lilienthal's speech before
reading it in the newspapers. It was rediculous to talk of a high command
-4-
As he knew from the columns, Lilienthal and Norris, perhaps with some reason,
had objected to even a loose association of TVA with the Interior Department.
There was no justification for his brutal attack on Norris. Norris
may have misunderstood the Consumers' financing, that was readily
explainable owing to the complications of holding company finance. The
average man could not understand why it made no difference whether the
holding company paid $30 or $60 a share. Certainly it was difficult to
judge the reasonableness of the deal by comparison with outside bids under
such circumstances.
But Norris' confusion should have been proof enough that there was
no concerted action. Certainly he ought to give me credit for being able to
avoid that confusion, had I been advising on general strategy. He smiled.
I then pointed out that the Chamber of Commerce had made an attack
on the grid in almost the same terms that he had used. Their release said
that they had issued a report. But when I tried to get the report they said
that none heen was available or would be available for several days.
Willkie said that I was quite mistaken in my surmise that he had
anything to do with the Chamber of Commerce. He thought it was a stupid and
ineffective organization and he had never had anything to do with it. You
will probably find that back of their report are some of those who come down
here professing to be your firends.
I told him that Scattergood had been brought East for the very purpose
of trying to work out the grid proposition amicably with the utilities and
Scattergood apparently had the best of relations with the private utilities.
He said that may be - but Bauer of Southern California Edison who
professes to be a friend of Scattergood had been a trouble-maker for his own
ends. Willkie, a few years ago, had a long and friendly conversation with
-5-
the President. McNinch who was then adgising the President gave out
reports that the conversation had been acrimonious and that he, Willkie,
had been offensive. Then McNinch was using Bauer as his stooge and as
a foil to Willkie. Willkie spoke to Bauer, Bauer said he was in a tough
spot over Boulder Dam, and he had to play McNinch's game. Then he promised
to leave town. But McNinch got hold of him and got him to send a telegram
that he loved competition.
"Just for fund and off the record, let me try to find out for
you who is back of the Chamber's report. I shouldn't be surprised if
Ned and Floyd had a hand in it."
Willkie first phoned to Merle Thorpe, but he was playing golf. Then
he phoned the Edison Institute in New York, asking first for a Mr. Bowinger (?)
who was not in and then for Charlie Kellogg. I could hear only one side of
the conversation but its tenor was obvious. Willkie asked if Kellogg knew
anything about the report, It seemed that the Institute did and had helped
somewhat on the report which was written by Illendorf - an official of
Southern California Edison, and John F. Owen, a Vice President of Standard
Gas & Electric. I believe Willkie said that one or the other of these was
the head of Oklahoma Gas and Electric. Willkie asked Kellogg who he thought
was back of this grid idea, was it Cohen and Corcoran - Kellogg apperently
replied yes, and they want to feed government hydro and steam into their
grid so 8.8 to compete with the private utilities. Willkie asked whether
Ned and Floyd had helped on the report and the answer apparently was they
had to a limited extent, but the main work was done by Millendorf, Willkie
remarking that Oweng was a stuffed shirt.
Willkie spoke about his dislike of administrative and commission
-6-
government which encouraged favoritism and chicanery and penalized those
who were outspoken and truthful. I said that we wished to make our
standards as definite as possible, but to deal with the complexities of
modern business you had to have flexible standards. The utilities had
even complained that section 11 was too inflexible. I said I thought that
we would have to resort to the administrative process as a means of making
certain the inevitable area of uncertainty embraced in the Sherman Anti-
Trust laws. I expounded some of my own ideas on this subject which are
not relevant to the present discussion of the utility industry and Willkie
was inclined to agree with me.
I then told Willkie that I thought that he ought to try to conform
with section 11 and free himself from attack on that score. He said he
had put his integration plans before the Commission. He was willing to
swap or sell for a fair price his southern properties if he could acquire
an equivalent amount of properties in Michigan and Indiana. I said although
there may be some difference of opinion on the Commission and I could speak
only for myself, I did not think section 11 obliged the Commission to
integrate to preserve the top-holding company. I thought that unless the
top holding company was itself able promptly to comply with the Act, the
thing for the Commission to do, was to compel the top company to give up
its control of its operating systems, so that integration instead of being
directed from above for the benefit of the top companies should proceed
from the bottom as dictated by operating economies. Too much attention was
being given to preserving the slender equities of the top companies which
ought to become passive investment companies. Willkie pretended that he
had never heard of these ideas before and obviously he did not like them.
-7-
Willkie again interjected the thought that we were not willing to
play with the most progressive elements, and scoffed at the idea that he
was tied with the Morgans, whom he had not met until after the Holding
Company Act, when he went to them to see whether they would not help work
out and furnish money for integration developments. And he left me with
the impression that he was mistaken in thinking that the Morgans had either
ideas or money.
Throughout our talk Willkie sought to give the impression that
he had been punished for his outspoken candor. He also expressed hurt at
remarks in some columns about his mother giving him intellectual food
but not caring much about her housekeeping, and that he was told the
columnist got his information for a New Deal source. I told him I had
not seen the particular column, but what I heard of his mother from
Lowell Mellett and others was, I thought, highly complimentary, and I
thought he probably had missed the compliment intended by the columnist
In leaving I asked Willkie to be sure to have a talk with
Scattergood, who had already spoken with his colleague, Yates, about the
value of a super grid. He said that he would. We left on most amicable
terms, Willkie promising to come over and have lunch with me soon. He
suggested and I agreed, that our talk was completely off the record.
PSF: Cohengtor yes ene
fresmed
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
August 16, 1940
Dear Missy:
I neglected to tell you when I sent you, for the President,
the Burlingham-Thacher-Rublee-Acheson letter on the destroyers that
the letter had also been approved by Frank L. Polk and Allen Dulles.
Polk did not sign because he feared his signature would do more
harm than good. Allen Dulles did not sign because he had on a few
occasions advised the British Purchasing Agency.
I should think today (Friday) or Saturday would be the best
possible time for the President to announce the arrangements for the
transfer of the destroyers. It 1s absurd to think, as Hugh Johnson
suggested in the News on Wednesday, that the announcement of the
destroyer deal would blot out interest in Willkie's acceptance speech.
Each has its own and distinct significance and the Battle of England
cannot be stayed. But it is true that with Congress away for a few
days and the political scene momentarily shifted to Elwood, it would
be difficult for the isolationists to stage an exhibition against the
destroyer deal. When Congress reconvenes the transaction would be
regarded as settled policy, and no matter which way the war turns,
the wisdom of that policy will become increasingly evident.
Yours,
Ben V. C
Ben V. Cohen
Miss Marguerite Le Hand
The White House.
PSFiCohen
2-40
NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON
August 16, 1940
Dear Missy:
I think the President might be interested to know about a
telephone call I had today from Senator Wheeler in regard to re-
appointment of Brown to the FCC.
Wheeler said that while the evidence had not directly
linked Brown with the Hastings-Moses disclosures, the situation
was "smelly". He and others had kept Tobey from introducing evi-
talk. dence about Brown's private morals, but there was a lot of nasty
Both White of Maine and Reed of Kansas had come to him
(Wheeler) and asked whether Brown's name could not be withdrawn.
Wheeler said that he thought the withdrawal would be for the good
of the industry as well as of the Commission and that the dis-
closures and talk had impaired Brown's usefulness.
But Wheeler stated that he was only reporting the situation
and was not personally requesting the withdrawal. Although Tobey
would make a disagreeable fight on the floor he thought that Brown
probably could be confirmed.
Yours,
Ben he
Ben V. Cohen
Miss Marguerite Le Hand
The White House
PSF:Cohen
OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
NUSTICE
file fillowed
aplow
AA-8
October 8, 1942
MEMORANDUM OR GRACE TULLY.
Ben Cohen
You will remember tre talked about
Ben last night. If the President can
find to second, maybe he would send the
attached note. I know he has sent at
least six before to no effect but every-
thing seems all right-now. As F. F. said,
"Ben is like & boy who hesn't seen his
best girl For seven months".
2HR
James Rowe, Jr.
P5F: Cohen
3-44
fullsomed
March 13, 1944.
Dear Ben:-
That is a tremendously interesting
analysis -- and I think a very just one.
You have only left out one matter -
and that is the matter of my own feelings!
I am feeling plaintive.
As ever yours,
Ben V. Cohen, Esq.,
Office of War Mobilisation,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
VICTORY
OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION
BUY
PTATAS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JAMES F. BYRNES
DIRECTOR
March 8, 1944.
Dear Mr. President:
I thought you might be interested to read the
attached memorandum of mine concerning the fourth term.
It considers soberly, and possibly too gloomily, some of
the difficulties which would confront the Administration
during a fourth term, and it stirs the question whether
there is any practical alternative.
As ever,
Yours,
Ben V.C.
Ben V. Cohen
The President,
The White House.
12
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE FOURTH TERM:
This memorandum seeks to analyze briefly the situation with
reference to the fourth term from the point of view of those generally
sympathetic with the President's program on both the home and foreign
front. It may be taken for granted that those sharing this point of view
would, because of their beliefs, loyally and actively support the Presi-
dent if he concluded, in light of all the facts available to him at the
time of the Democratic Convention, that it was his duty to stand for
another term. It is assumed, moreover, that notwithstanding the diffi-
culties and disadvantages of a fourth term, the President would and should
consider it his duty to stand for another term unless he felt reasonably
assured at the time he must make his decision that the succeeding Adminis-
tration would: carry out the major aspects of his foreign policy in the
prosecution of the war and the organization of the peace.
In considering the advisability of the President's standing for
another term, it is believed reasonable to assume that if he did stand he
would be reelected. It is also believed reasonable to assume, despite the
prevalence of less favorable prognostications, that if the President stood
for reelection, both the Senate and the House would probably retain
nominally Democratic majorities.
The real difficulty concerning the fourth term lies in the
probability that the President will not be able to command working majorities
sympathetic with his general policies and programs in either House, parti-
cularly with reference to important domestic issues, and that these dif-
ferences on domestic issues would in various ways, logically and illogically,
-2-
be carried into the foreign field.
The significance of the recent Barkley incident cannot be ignored.
It revealed a lack of cohesion and teamwork on the part of men upon whom
the President must rely that cannot be lightly passed over. Obviously the
President's message which was used as the occasion for the attack on the
President offers no real explanation of the majority leader's resignation
without oral or written communication of his intention to the President.
The majority leader could have urged the overriding of the veto without
going out of his way to give comfort to the President's enemies.
Every administration is in a sense a coalition of diverse
political forces. No administration can govern for long without giving
a feeling of grievance to some of the forces upon which it must rely for
support. The long continuance in power of the same Administration has
resulted in a situation in which nearly all the forces supporting the
Administration nurse real or imagined grievances against the President
and his Administration for a variety and contrariety of reasons. Barkley's
remark, "my cup runneth over" is all too symptomatic of the feeling of
many of the oldest and most devoted of the President's teammates. Every
little incident or appointment that is displeasing to any of them is
viewed not as an isolated event but is projected back on a whole pattern
of past grievances. The conservative friends of the President are ever
fearful of a revival of radicalism, while his liberal and labor supporters
are ever suspicious of being let-down. Jealousies and enmities within
the Administration even in the higher echelons are faintly concealed.
-3-
The war still brings the necessary support back of the President
to carry through the most urgent parts of the war program. But the
Administration lacks even a sufficiently solid basis as a coalition govern-
ment to command the unified support of its own members in the executive
branch, and energetic and articulate support of working majorities within
the Congress for any program sponsored by the Administration is sadly want-
ing.
There is no ground to justify the expectation of an improved
political situation during a fourth term. The problems of reconstruction
will be as difficult and intricate as, possibly more difficult and intri-
cate than, the problems which had to be met during the depression and during
the war. Management, labor and agricultural groups have tended during the
war to become less conscious of their common interests. It will not be
easy to revive the driving faith which mass opinion had in and gave to the
New Deal. The soldiers are likely to return, feeling that they got the
shorter end of the stick. They are likely to be biased against whatever
party is in power.
There is danger which cannot be wholly ignored that a fourth
term would be an anti-climax. There is danger that Rooseveltian ideas,
like Wilsonian ideas, may be discredited for a considerable period, not
because they are basically unsound but because political conditions will
not permit them to be accepted or even fairly understood. There is a
question whether the influence of Roosevelt and his ideas may not be great-
er in the period following the war if there is no fourth term. If there
is no fourth term, the people will always remember that in no crisis or
emergency did Roosevelt ever let them down. Whoever succeeds the President,
-4-
the common people will always be asking whether the new President is fight-
ing for and watching out for their interests as did Roosevelt. (In a sense
the enduring value of Roosevelt's ideas lies in their power to survive
a change in administration, and the prospect of their survival may depend
upon his ceasing to be President before he enters upon a period of anti-
climax., Whatever temporary reaction there may be against the President
and his ideas, such reaction may be much shorter-lived and much less in-
jurious to the best interests of the country if he himself does not try
to fight through an anti-climactic term.
Against all these circumstances which argue against a fourth
term, particularly from the point of view of the President and his supporters,
must be weighed the danger--to some extent to the war but to a much greater
extent to the peace--of a change in administration during the very climax
of the most momentous war in all history. There is little question that
the American people do not want a change now, and that a change in
administration now would create great uncertainties, doubts and misgivings
throughout the world in regard to American foreign policy in the prosecution
of the war and the organization of the peace. It is not a question whether
these uncertainties, doubts and misgivings should exist. They do exist.
The President's refusal to run again, particularly in view of the likeli-
hood of a Republican being elected as his successor, would undoubtedly
have a tendency to aggravate these uncertainties, doubts and fears, and
it would not be easy to counteract the impression that the election in
some way involved a repudiation of the President's foreign policy.
-5-
Unless, therefore, some way can be found to dispel or reduce
greatly these uncertainties, doubts and misgivings about our foreign policy
in the prosecution of the war and the organization of the peace, a. fourth
term whatever its hazards will probably be inevitable and unavoidable.
The problem that confronts the President and those most
sympathetic to the President is not to find justification for another
term. That is very easy. The real problem is to discover whether there
is any practical alternative to a fourth term. And that problem urgently
requires the best thought that the friends of the President can give to
it.
Possible alternatives to a fourth term are suggested here to
stir thought on the subject and to question the widespread assumption that
no possible alternative can be found.
Any alternative, of course, must be discarded unless it can
command bi-partisan support. Fortunately there are conditions which make
it advantageous for both the Democratic and Republican parties to approve
a reasonable alternative, and from the President's own point of view and
from the point of view of getting acceptance of a reasonable alternative,
it is even helpful that the advantages to the Republican party somewhat
outweigh the advantages to the Democratic party. If a way can be found to
relieve the President from running for a fourth term, it is obvious that
the chances of a Republican victory at the next election will be immeasurably
increased. On the other hand, if the President is relieved from running
for another term, though the Democrats may lose the next election, they
would have an excellent chance for a quick comeback. They would escape
-6-
an anti-climactic term which would be likely to be characterized by deadly
internal party strife and which would be likely to drive them from power
for years. Moreover it is not wholly impossible that deprived of the
opportunity of riding into office on the popularity of the President, they
would yield to intelligent party leadership and discipline which might
even gain for them the next election over an excessively confident Republican
party.
But regardless of partisan advantage or disadvantage, no alterna-
tive to the fourth term can be regarded as practical unless it helps to
unify the country behind the war and the organization of world peace. If
the issues of the war and of the nature of the peace must be fought out
in the next election, a fourth term would probably have to be regarded as
unavoidable.
The most realistic alternative therefore to a fourth term would
seem to be an agreement between the Republicans and Democrats to adopt
a common foreign policy platform sufficiently clear and comprehensive to
remove from the election of any controversy about America's position in
the war and at the peace table. It is a little doubtful, however, whether
the spirit of such an agreement would carry through the campaign unless the
agreement was accompanied by some tangible act demonstrating to the country
and to the world that the agreement was more than a formula of words.
The best means of giving vitality to the agreement and safeguarding its
performance would be to have both parties pledge themselves and their
nominees to the support of the suggestion that President Roosevelt accept
an invitation to become the Chief Executive Officer of the new international
-7-
organization to maintain the peace. This would, it is true, deprive
America of having President Roosevelt as its own responsible leader during
the critical period of peace negotiations. But it would demonstrate to the
world, possibly as effectively as a victorious but bitterly contested fourth
term election, the confidence of the country in President Roosevelt and his
foreign policy.
Another alternative which has been suggested in a constitutional
amendment postponing all federal elections for one year. This suggestion
has been favorably considered by some prominent Republicans on the
assumption, of course, that the President would not stand for 8. fourth
term in 1945. If the high command of both parties vigorously supported
the proposal, it might not be wholly impossible to get it through the
Congress and have it ratified by the requisite number of states by the
convention method. But the time for getting such an amendment is short and
the difficulties in the way very great. Although the amendment, if ratified,
would go far to establish the unity of the country behind the war and the
peace, it does not seem to be nearly as realistic and as practicable as
the first alternative suggested.
There are undoubtedly disadvantages and difficulties connected
with both of these proposals. But the proposals do come sufficiently near
the realm of possibility to suggest that the quest for a practical
alternative to a fourth term should not be abandoned. Even though the
search for a practical alternative is unsuccessful, the knowledge that
a search is being made may have a salutory and sobering effect on public
opinion. It would help to emphasize that if the President does stand for
-8-
another term ,it will not be to preserve his own power or personal position
or the power or position of his party, but to secure the acceptance and
faithful execution of the policies and principles for which he has fought.
-
PSF; Cohen Sen 3-V4
FORVICTORY
OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION
BUY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JAMES F. BYRNES
October 11, 1944
DIRECTOR
file
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I
I was in New York Tuesday for Willkie's funeral. That evening I
spent considerable time with Senator Ball, Ulrich Bell, and Arthur
Goldsmith. Bell and Goldsmith have been working with Russell Davenport
to get a group of nationally known Republicans to come out and work for
you. While they have made considerable progress, they feel that more
decisive speaking on the foreign issues 1s necessary to enable them to
get some of the most important Republicans on their list to become
affirmatively active in your support.
Senator Ball himself indicated that if you came out clearly and
definitely on the foreign issues, which most concern him, he would
publicly support you. The issues which most concern him are: (1) the
earliest possible formation of the United Nations Security Organization
and our entry therein before final peace settlements are made; (2) the
commitment, by virtue of the vote of our representative on the Council
without further Congressional approval, of the use of an agreed upon quota
of our military forces for action to maintain peace ordered by the
Council; (3) Opposition to Byreservation on our entry into. the
Organization which would. weaken its power to act to maintain peace and
stop aggression.
When questioned whether he would talk to you along these lines if
the opportunity was presented, he indicated that he would be glad to if
there was no publicity as he did not wish his purposes misunderstood.
Other Republicans mentioned as being in a similar position included
Dr. Ernest W. Hopkins, Nicolas Murray Butler, Arthur Sulzberger, Mrs.
Henry Breckinridge, Mrs. William Henry Hayes, Tom Lamont, Spyros Skowras,
Mrs. Samuel Barlow, Mrs. Kenneth Simpson, J. A. Migel, and Hugh Moore.
I should think a talk with Senator Ball would be particularly helpful
both in regard to the election and the situation after election. While
I hope Senator LaFollette is not completely lost to us, I think he can
occupy much the same position in relation to the Administration as Senator
LaFollette did in the early days.
II.
I also talked with C. C. Burlingham and urged him to use his
influence to get Secretary Stimson to speak out. C.C.B. did not believe
WATER -
- 2 -
Stimson would, but said he would probably spend the weekend with
Stimson. I thought that you might wish to get some word to C.C.B.
to encourage him to press strongly.
Bin u. C:
Ben V. Cohen
General Counsel
hims
PSF:Cohen then
/ ROBAM
3-45
PERSONAL AND
January 13, 1945
Dear Bent
I have been giving a good deal of thought
to our talk the other day about the State Department.
There seem to be a good many difficulties about the
particular designation of "Counsellor", due to lack
of appropriations - the fact that Mr. Hull agreed
not to fill the job without the approval of the
Appropriations Committee - and that departmental
regulations put the Counsellor over all Assistant
Secretaries in rank.
What I wish you would do, Ben, is to get into
the Department and give your talents and convictions
to making the kind of a peace to which you and I are
devoted. The Department needs you and both Ed and
I want you to work with us - on this, the most 1B-
portant task - short of winning the war - that faces
this country. I am sure you can do this, even the
it be as an Assistant to Ed.
No one knows better than you all my own immediate
problems in relation to foreign affairs and I would be
relieved and greatly pleased if I knew you were in the
Department. If you will accept my judgment in this
I will be ever BO grateful.
F.D.R.
OR"
ELEGRAM
The White House
Mashington
For The President.
Here 18 a draft of a letter to Ben:
"Dear Ben:
I have been giving a good deal of thought to our
talk the other day about the State Department. There seem to be
a good many difficulties about the particular designation of
'counsellor', due to lack of appropriations - - the fact that
Mr. Hull agreed not to fill the job without the approval of the
Appropriations Committee - - and that departmental regulations
put the counsellor over all assistant secretaries in rank.
"What I wish you would do, Ben, is to get into
the department and give your talents and convictions to making
the kind of a peace to which you and I are devoted. The department
needs you and both Ed and I want you to work with us - - on this,
the most important task - - short of winning the war - - that
faces this country. I am sure you can do this, even though it be
as an assistant to Ed.
"No one knows better than you all my own immediate
problems in relation to foreign affairs and I would be relieved
and greatly pleased if I knew you were in the department. If you
will accept my judgment in this I will be ever 80 grateful.
"F.D.R."
Copy follows in pouch.
Harry.
11:18am-mc
Jan.13,1945.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Dear Mr. President:
Here is a draft of &
letter to Ben, copy of which
was sent you over the wire this
morning.
Ham
H.L.H.
encl.
P5F: Cohen
3-45
January 20, 1945
Dear Ben,
Your note of January 16th was a severe blow to no.
I can only say how deeply I regret that you felt
unable to accept the position in the Department of
State which I hoped you would take, and that you have
at the same time requested Justice Byrnes to accept
your resignation.
Your decision means that the Administration is
losing one of its most able and conscientious servants
and that I am losing one of my most trusted advisors.
The services that you have rendered to the government
and to the country during the past twelve years have
been outstanding.
I wish that your decision had been a different
one. Knowing you, however, I know that you will con-
timue to serve the country with great distinction and
that I shall be able to call upon you as a friend in
the future as in the past.
Very sincerely yours,
Mr. Ben V. Cohen,
The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
Will you and Ed Stettinius
prepare reply for my signature?
F. D. R.
1
THE MVS MHI
POLYICTORY
OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION
BUY
WAR
WASHINGTON, D. c.
SOME
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
January 16, 1945.
Dear Mr. President:
Your note of January 13th, has just reached me.
When we talked together I tried to explain to you why I did not feel
that I could be effective working in a subordinate position in the State Depart-
ment. You told me that you wanted me to go in as Counsellor and only technical
obstacles which you thought could be removed stood in the way. I expressed
grave doubts as to the wisdom of my becoming counsellor after it had become
widely known that I had been offered and refused a subordinate position as it
would appear that I had brought pressure to bear to secure the appointment.
But you were then unwilling to heed my doubts.
It is now abundantly clear to me that I am not really wanted in the
State Department unless I wish to accept some undefined, subordinate position
and unless I understand that my services do not rank with those holding Presi-
dential appointment. Accepting that judgment on my services, I must respective-
ly ask you to accept my judgment that I cannot effectively serve in the State
Department under such conditions.
I hope that you will believe me that I have come to this conclusion
not without a heavy heart. You know of my work and deep interest in the peace
both before and at Dumbarton Oaks. And my interest has not abated, although I
have not been invited in any capacity to a single conference on the work growing
out of Dumbarton Oaks since the State Department has been reorganized.
As I explained to you in our talk, I have always worked without rank
or position, but I have found my work and effectiveness increasingly handicapped
by those who put rank and position ahead of merit and service. In these cir-
cumstances I feel, as I have told you, that I can work more effectively out of
office than in office for the things for which you stand. I have accordingly
submitted my resignation to Justice Byrnes and at my request he has accepted it.
Of course in a private capacity I shall continue to do whatever I can
to help in winning the war and the peace. At Justice Byrnes insistence I have
agreed to continue to help him with the understanding I can do so without title
or compensation.
Sincerely yours,
Ben r. Cohn.
Ben V. Cohen
The President,
The White House.
bleatqeur: Dofe of Falled for DE an
OFFICE OE MYB WORLD
tom
Desi. ML.
of THE I
OLLICE
PSF:Cohen
3-45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
Will you and Ed Stettinius
prepare reply for my signature?
F. D. R.
Personal and Confidental letter from Hon.
Ben V. Cohen, 1/16/45, to the President, in reply to
the President's note of 1/13, and explaining why
he feels that he cannot accept a position in the
State Dept. He says he has tendered his resignation
to Justice Byrnes and it has been accepted. He states
he will continue to do whatever he can to help in
winning the war and the peace.