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PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY'S FILE
Subject File
Executive Office the President:
Rosenman, Samuel: Report... (2)
Box 133
FOOD
SULVARY CONCIUSI tis
The most critical imedinto deficiency in
Northwest Euro, # is food. The orld is facud with an
approaching crisis in the attempt to provide sufficient
food to the areas liberated from energy control to keep
the populations on even a minimum subsistance basis.
Even though France produced sufficient food
to moet her minimum requirements in nost categories,
the intornal distribution facilities are so inadequate
that for some time, particularly in the South, food will
have to bo imported.
In Bulgium and Holland the food problem is
acuto, especially in the presently occupied area of
Holland. ith the liberation of the congested popu-
lation of ostorn Holland and the uncovering of div-
placod United Nations nationals in Cormany, a colossal
feeding problem will be presented.
The attached schedule reflects the require-
munt for food, which Genoral Eisenhower's lluadquarters
have stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the
months March to August, both inclusive, This is based
on a program of the minimum necessary to prevent disease
and unrest in order not to prejudice military operations.
Requirements for June are double those of March, and in
view of recunt military developments the requirements
which it was anticipated would be needed in June are, in
fact, nooded now. The increase is in part attributable
e
to the nuc_asity of caring for displaced United Nations
nationals found in Company.
In addition to the military requirements, which are
set forth in the attached schedule, the National governments
each have their individual food requirements which are
supplamental to and over and above the basic military
requirements. All of these figures are in the possession
of the Foreign Coonomic Administration and the Foreign
Shippunts Condittoo. In view of the fact that these figures
change from work to work no attempt is made to state them
in this report.
If the Yalta agreement 1a au interpreted as to require
the fooding of displaced Soviet civilians on the U.S. anay
ration scale, I believe it may lecome necessary to troat
all displaced United Nations nationals on the same buris,
because of the administrative difficulty in sogregating
Soviet citizens in ono camp from all other nationalitive
in the 88.20 gamp. Tido would result in an increase In
the requirements stated of over 60,000 tons a month, which
in view of existing world shortages would be difficult of
fulfillment. Thile 1t might be possible to establish
entirely separate camps for Soviet citizens, the increase
in the food requirements would still be a substantial factor.
In viow of these difficulties, the military leaders in the
fiuld are trying to work out the maximum ration for all
displaced persons which availability of supplies will
permit. 5,
The seriousness of the food problem io emphasized by
the fact that the current military ship.dnc and supply
situation dous not pondt noting oven the present military
requirements for civilian fueding. SILEF as able to
import only'200,000 tons against the March requirements
-2-
S.CH.T
of moro than 300,000 tons. The military have never boan able
to establish on the Continent or in the U.K. adequato food
reserves to meet unforeseon continguncios, and any unexpected
or unphased demand creates a situation of gravity. Only a
part of SHARP'S inability to most requirements has been due to
shipping difficulties. For DODO time supply sourcos available
of the U.S. and the U.K. have not buen ablo to meet requirements
in the essential 1tems of must, milk, fate and odible oilo.
Apparently those requirements cannot be not without making
deoper inroads into the U.S. and U.K. civilian economics.
Except for relatively small amounts of wheat and flour,
present British commitments to furnish food to SHAEF have boon
met and the stocks which the British considered available have
been exhausted. Until the present negotiations betwoon the
British and the U.S. on the subject of the British stockpile
are completed, I believe, from By conversations with them,
that it is unlikely that substantial additional amounts will
be released by the British. Regardless of the disposition
to be made of the U.K. foodstocks, the source for the bulk
of food supplies, as between the U.S. and the U.K., must be
the U.S.
Normal European food surplus areas, such as Eastorn
Germany, Rumanda and Hungery, are, or will be under Soviet
control.
Based on evidence now at hand it sooms to me that the
only sources from which any large additional supplies can no
obtained to prevent extremo privation in the liberated aroas
are:
1) Any food surpluses which the Russians might have
in the territory they control in Eastorn Europe.
2) Incroased production of food in the U.S. and
other food producing countries, including the encouragement
of fishing activities by the countries of North Cost Europe.
-3-
SECRET
3) Additional tonnugue of food which might be
obtainable from the Argentine.
4) "inally, to decrease the U.S. and U.K. civilian
ration.
Recommendations.
I recommend the follo:Ing:
1) The denands of all claimants on U.S. food
supplies should be reexamined and respond ed with a view
to caking available additional quantities to the liberated
countries of Northwest Durups. This choule Include - Plu-
oxamination of the nueds dei deriando of our OWT armed forces,
the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and our own civilian population at
home,
2) The U.S.S.R. has now occupied parto of Surope
which can produce groat quantities of food which are- in
short supply. I recomend that is technical miscion be sent
to the U.D.S.R. to examine the extent to which those food
supplies of Lastom Europe (other than Cormany and lustria,
which are -ithin the jurisdiction of the European Advisory
Commission) can be shipped to the doficit areas of 'astorn
Europe.
3) The combinud military authoritics should be
given a directive instructing than to provide for all
displaced pursons on the muximum scale possible in the
light of availability of supply.
4) The minimum ussential requirements for all
countries which are related directly or indirectly to the
production, processing and transportation of food should se
accorded such a priority as will accure their delivery at
the varliest moment in order that the full potential of
indigenous production and utilization of food may be
realized. This in particularly true in connection .ith
-
SECRET
Dennark from which surplus food supplies in important quantities
should be imediately forthcoming.
5) Every possible assistance should be given to the countries
of N.W. Europe, particularly Norway, to oncourage fishing activities;
and their requirements for fishing gear and oquipment to main-
tain and expand their fishing floots should be accorded the
highest possible priority consistent with competing demands.
Expansion of production may be necessary to make such supplies
available in sufficient quantities and, if so, should be under-
taken as soon as possible.
6) Since the allocation of civilian supplies to
liberated countries will in all probability cut into the
ration of the American consumer, we should embark immedi-
ately upon a widespread official and public campaign to
oducate the American people on the cravity of the needs of
our allies in liberated Europe. Conversely, there is no
adequate knowledge or understanding by the ordinary civilians
in those liberated areas of what the Americans and British
have done for the civilian population of those countries,
Nor do they realize that Americans are not rolling in meat
and butter at home. We should improve the transmission
abroad of the story of the American war effort and of the *
further sacrifices which we are being asked to accept in
order to improve the lot of our allies.
- 5 -
SECRET
A. THANCE
Metropolitan France VAS r.bout AOS self-sufficient
in food production before the var. Brandgrains and feed were
isported in large quantities especially from North Africa and
Indo-China. Ground nuts and edible oils ware imnorted from
lost and "orth Africa and early vegotables and vine from
african colonies. haw sugar vas imported from
and the West Indies.
Livestoor production vas one of the most important
branches of acriculture and contributed the bullr of cost and
dairy products for home consumption.
The general calorie level in France before the war
was an average of 3,000 per canita.
1. Under German Occupation.
The acriculture! pottern in France YES drustically
changed during the German occupation. Not only VAS France
thrown upon her own resources unon the Continent by the complete
elimination of immorts. but the Germans laid have irposition on
the French for food. Production decreased as e result of short-
ages of labor, fertilizers and reduced feed imorte. The
following table indicates the changes in the overall French
food supply position up to the last year of Garryn occuration:
Metimated Production, Trade in and Available Sumplies
of Principal Foods, Pre-Ver and 1943-44 (thousand notric tons)
Consodity
Production
"ot Trade
Available Supplies
Pre-"ar
1943
Pre-Ver
1943-44
Pre-"er
1847-44
Wheat & Rye
8,500
7,000
4136
-678
2,635
6,222
Other grain
6,670
5,170
4017
-650
7,547
4,630
Potatoes
15,700
17,000
+ 75
-400
15,775
12,500
sugar
815
500
4115
- 14
930
41G
Heat
1,718
1,135**
+ 37
-102
1,745
042
Fats
253
329**
4255
- 2
508
227
.
Plus means net innorts; minus means net exports including Gerrvin
requisitions.
" 1947-44
-6-
SCRET
Gerzan controls over food collection and distribution
were not effective. This vas due in part to the fnot that illegel
channels of food distribution were developed for the purpose of
getting food to the French people rather than having it RO to
the Gernans. The net result of this VES that legal rations were
low, the volume of black market trading considerable, and distri-
bution uneven. Black market trading became firmly established
as a profitable and natriotic activity. This fact has had
important consequences for food control since the liberation
of France.
1
2. The Situation After Liberation.
Destruction of food stocks, growing orone, farm
buildings and equipment, and food processing facilities occurred
mainly in the Normandy region where the fighting vas heaviest.
In terms of France as a whole, the military destruction of food,
of food production and processing facilities was very small.
The most serious damage in France from the food supply
standpoint was the widespread devastation of transport facilities.
This included farm horses taken by the Germans, autos, buses and
trucks taken away or destroyed, railway rolling stock moved or
destroyed and marshalling yards and other rail facilities
destroyed. The destruction of bridges blocked both rail and
canal traffic and tied up rolling stock and barges. Threshing
of grain and its collection, and the movement of food to the
cities and deficit areas vas & problem of the first magnitude.
The heavy demands made by military traffic through France
intensified transport difficulties.
The inadequacy of transportation led to failure to
preserve sufficient quantities of neat during the beak season
so that the meat ration became uniformly unavailable. Paris,
for example, has (tone (and is still going) for weeks at a time
without any meat. Large surpluses of certain commodities
developed in producing areas while large marketing areas would
-7-
SXCRNT
be in critical short supply or entirely without those commodities.
Despite high production, potatoes had to be rationed because of
inability to transport them to the consumption centers.
The short supply of fats is seriously accrevated by
the inability to distribute fats vhich are available. In fact,
the low ration of 250 premise per month is not being net at the
present time.
Receipts of milk in Paris today have only reached a
level of 350,000 litres, which connares to a peace time daily
rate of 1,000,000 Litres.
a) The 1944 Harvest and its Utiliration
The 1944 crop was ressounbly good though somewhat
below that of 1943.
Difficulties in utilizing the 1944 crop began on the
farm with shortages of labor, draft animaln, power, fuel for
tractors and threshere and such sumplies as milk cane, repair
parts for machinery and equipment. The grain cro") was sub-
stantially all harvested at the time of liberation, but
threshing lagged below schedule because of lack of electric
power, coal and Diesel fuel. The potato crops suffered by
lack of labor and by lack of transport to nove the potatoes
to market before they spoiled. Sumr beèt lifting vas delnyed
and transport for moving the beets to factories was inadequate.
There vas insufficient coal to refine all of the best
which vas transported to the factories. of the total beet
croo of 4,800,000 tons, at least 2,000,000 tons were not
processed. Instead they were used as livestock feed or allowed
to spoil. Suppr production reached E. total of only 300,000
tons and alcohol 700,000 hoctograms as commred with the 1943
production of 553,000 tons of sugar and 1,700,000 hectograms
of alcohol.
The rate of production of dairy products and noat
continues to suffer from lack of imported feed supplies such
-8-
STORMT
as oil cakes, from the reduction in animal numbers that has
taken place, and from the fact that dry weather late in 1944
reduced the yields of hay and pastures. Itilk production for
1944 is estimated at 72,000,000 hoctolitres as compared with
80,000,000 hectolitres in 1943. This in turn has reduced
production of butter, chesso and condonsed milk. Meat pro-
duction for 1944/5 is estimated as 870,000 tons as compared
with 920,000 tons for 1943/4.
b) Deficit Areas.
There are two primary deficit regions of Prance
which depend upon the flow of food supplies from other areas
of France. One is the Paris area, and the other is Southern
France.
Chan Paris was liberated the supply of food
available in Paris was sufficient for not over 48 hours,
To meet this critical situation about 11,000 tono of Civil
Affairs supplies were delivered to Paris by plane and truck
during the first month. The daily average receipts of food
in Paris from all sources has rison from a low of 1,135 tons
per day in August to 7,051 tons per day in March,
Southern France specialises in production of wine and
vegetables, but fallo far short of meeting its own needs of most
of the stale foods. L'ovement of supplies from central and
northern France has beon strictly limited by lack of transport.
Although the French Government agreed in October that it would
be responsible for moving 45,000 tons of wheat from the north
to the Mediterranean area, lack of rail transport prevented
its doing 80,
3. Civil Affairs Imports
Civil Affairs imports from D-day to the end of the
year 1944 in Northern France were 21% of advance estimates of
requirements and in Southern France 7% of advance estimates
of requirements.
-9-
SUCRET
In northern France the small percentage inported
compared with the advance estimate is in part explained by
the fact that the 1944 crop became available about the time
of liberation and that local food supplies were depended
upon to neet immediate needs. Critical shipping shortage
and port reception and clearance capacities were other
important factors.
The total civil affairs food imports from D-day to
February 28 were 239,937 tons. An additional 119,000 tons were
scheduled to be received in March and April.
The SHAKE estimate of requirements are 70,305
tons & month for April and May. These are prodicted upon
the amount of food which SHAKP estimates will be required
to bring the average calorie level to 2,000 per person in
order to prevent disease and unrest.
A table setting forth the dilitary estimates of
food requirements for France from January to August 1945 to
provide a 2,000 calorie lovel is attached as Annex 1.
4. Rations and Consumition Level,
Food controls in France have nover been very
effective. During occupation by the Germaus, evasion of
controls and blnok market practices were patriotic. Since
liberation nany of the well-estcbliched evasive practices
have continued.
The legal rations actually distributed in Paris
provided 1,450 calories in October, 1,280 in November, 1,330
in December and 1,340 in January. A significant part of
the total food consumition has obviously been outside the
rations. Consumption in addition to rations includes non-
rationed foods, packages from country relatives, black
market supplies of rationed foods not institutional meals
(factory centeens, school lunches and aid to the unemployed).
-10-
SECRT
No reliable information is available as to the total consumption
of foods from all sources. The best estimate 1s that the average
diet of the non-ferm population in just under 2,000 calories a
day.
5. The Current Cron Year
n) Brend Graine: The French Hinister of Agriculture
estimates that 5,704,000 tono of brond grains should be nvailable
for non-producer food consumption. This 10.78% of estimated total
production. It seems extremely unlikely that such a collection of
grain from farms can be realized. This would involve collections
of 370,000 tons in excess of the year from & crop of about
the same size. Collections to into have been running far below
the rate for last year. This is due in vert to delays in threshing
and lack of transport to nove the grain to market.
There is also reason to believe that farmers will hold
back more crain than normally because of the prospects of a short
crop in 1945, nnticipation of a currency exchange program, fear
of inflation and lack of consumer goods. There 1s also some
reluctance on the "art of officials to "ress as hard as they
night.
It is estimated that deliveries my fall short of
requirements by na much as 500,000 tona.
b) Pototoes: The notato supply available to non-producers
for the year is estimated 20 3,900,000 tons. Consumption 80 far
has been limited by shortage of transport to move potatoes to
deficit areas. Summly is just about sufficient to continue the
present rate of consumtion until the nev crop begins to be
harvested in August.
c) Sugar: The past cron year's production (285,000 tons to
date) only began to reach consumers in January. Requirements are
estimated nt sbout 46,000 tons ner month 80 domestic supplies
can be expected to 1nst only through June unless supplemented by
imports.
-11-
SECRET
The French authorities have indicated their intention
to reduce the target for sugar beets planting for 1945 to 335,000
hectares as cornared with 1944 target of 300,000 hectares because
of the outlook for fertilizer and labor for growing boets end carl
for processing. This is serious in terms of the continued 11:ht
world sugar situation and the shipping shortage.
a) Heat: Collections planned to that non-producer retions
are 51,000 tons per month for Avril, "ay B/V. June after vise
they increase to 74,000 tons by August. This reflects the normal
sensonal increase in slaughter of gross fed cettle. If these
collections are realized and nent distribution Ls well c introlleu
it would be nossible to naintain a ration of at losst 300 gransee
per venit during the senson of lowest production and 450 grames
nt August level. Meat sloughter, hourver, has been below expects-
tions nno control of supplies is inodequete with n. large black nar-
ket existing. Meat rations have been reduced from 350 (Tarmos weekly,
which its maintained until mid-vinter, to 150-20°) cremes nt present.
o) Deiry products: The milk surgly in Buronean areas has 80
far been limited by transport rather than production. Hall: production,
however, has continued to decline as - result of lock of imported
protein feeds.
The collection and control of butter has proved trouble-
some. Margarine production from the 1944 cilseed crop is being used
to supplement butter in order to suprort the current slender fat In-
tion of 350 grannes, or roughly a ounces, ner month. The oilseed
crop was disappointing. The hanviest producing nives are Mormandy
and Brittery, where fighting occurred in hervest tive nné resulted
in considerable destruction. The areas are exacted to yield only
24,000 tons of oil of which 8,000 tons will be used by "roducers.
6. &cricultural Supplier:
The var deringo to agricultural mechinory was not as
great ne had been anticipat-d. France has anole planting capacity
in excellent working conditions to produce enough to neet her
-13-
SECRET
own needs, with the exception of tractors and & few special
items, Fuel and transportable power to get industry going
is the primary need, A shortage of pesticides had been an-
ticipated, but considerable German stocks for treatment of
grain seed have been found.
There is an urgent need for Spring wheat seed to
offset reduced Fall seeding due to bad weather. This 1a most
important in terms of the 1945 grain crop.
Fertiliser and feed are urgently needed.
7. Fishing.
Arrangements were made to reopen fishing on the
coast of the Cherbourg peninsula about July, The aree was
extended as the French coast was cleared of Germans.
While fishing boats and gear were in poor condi-
tion may of the boats were fit to & out as soon as motor
fuel was available. Notor fuel allocations have been made to
the extent possible and & valuable addition to the supply of
protein food has resulted. At first the fish were either
consumed in areas and cities near the coast or processed
for future distribution. with the improvement in transports-
tion, however, approximately 60% of the catch is being
distributed fresh to the large inland centers. The average
monthly catch for all of France will probably reach 7,000
tons in /pril and this figure will increase substantially
with enlargement of fishing limits and with the return of
French fishing boats now in the service of Great Britain.
Arrangements have been rade by the Army and Navy
authorities to permit French herring boats to fish in Belgian
waters. This has 60 far supplied 4,000 tons of herring for
French consumption.
-13-
SECRET
B. belgium
The food position of Belgium is unique in that the
country is primarily industrial with less than one fifth of
the population engaged in fairing. Belgian agriculture
before the var was characterised by livestock production
and the very intensive use of most of the arable land for the
production of livestock feed. Belgium imported roughly half
of her food supply. Imong the important items imported are
cereals, meats, fats and oils.
1) The German occupation.
During the German occupation Belgium was forced to
live almost entirely on her own resources, though in 1943-1944
the Germans permitted imports of 100,000 tons of grain, 20,000
tons of fruit, and some seed potatoes. On the other hand the
Cermans drew upon Belgian supplies for amall quantities of meet,
fish, sugar and pulses. The Belgians were forced to reduce
their hog and poultry numbers drastically to free more grain
for human consumption. They increased the production of
potatoes, sugar beets, and oil seeds.
The following table indicates the changes which took
place during the period of occupation,
Estimated Production, Trade In and Available Supplies
of Principal Foods, Pre-Tar and 1943-44 (000 metric
tona)
Compodity
Production
Net Trade*
Available Supplies
Pre-Mar
1943
Pre-Mar 1943-44
Pre-war
1943-44
Wheat, rye & rixed
grain
871
829
41,139
4100
2,010
929
Berley and oats
704
473
4459
- 20
1,163
453
Potatoes
2,400
2,500
437
4150
2,437
2,650
Sugar
206
208
+ 31
-25 -
237
183
liest
340
165**
+25
- 4
365
161
Fats
72
48**
+ 71
--
143
48
.
Plus means net imports; ninus menno net exports including German
requisitions.
** 1943-44
-14-
SECRET
2) The situation after liberation.
Fortunately liberation case prior to the harvest and
there was very little destruction of crops. Accordingly,
there were sufficient indigenous supplies of most foods to
most the Relgian minimum needs for a for months. Wide-
spread loss and destruction of transport facilities, howover,
croated a serious problem of internal assembly and distribu-
tion of foodstuffs. But the distances that food must be
noved'in Bolgium are substantially loss than in France, and
consequently the internal food transport problem, while
serious, has been less acute.
a) 1944 Harvest.
C-op production in Bolgium was well maintained
during the war. The 1244 harvest was about the same as that
for the previous year, but there were certain important changes
in utilization which are shown in the following table:
Not Quantities of Principal Crops Available for
Human Consumption in Belgium after Deduction of
Seed, Food, and Taste, pre-war, 1943-44 and
1944-45 Consumption years (000 metric tons)
Crop
Pre-war
1943-44
1944-45
theat, rye / lixed
crain
261
705
611
Sugar boots
1,401
1,620
1,970
Potatocs
1,363
1,408
1,020
Pulses
N.A.
31
26
Oil Seoda
N.A.
30
29
Production of most grains has been maintained at
about the prewur lovel but reduction in use for unimal feeding
has increased the quantity available for human food from both
the 1943 and 1944 crops. The reduction for the 1944 crop as
-15-
SECRET
compared with that for 1943 results from greater non-food
use rather than from a decline in production. Sugar beet
production was actually increased in 1944. Production of
potatoes, pulses, and oil seeds was reduced,
Physical facilities for harvesting, threshing,
transport, and processing 1944 crops were seriously restrict-
ed but all crops, with the exception of sugar beets, were taken
care of without unusual mote. The major problem has been
that of getting farmors to release as much of their products
as utilization plans contemplated. There have been several
reasons for this. Prior to the liberation, instructions
were broadcast to the farmors to delay the harvest and throsh-
ing so that the Germano could not requisition products for their
cm use. The food collection organization established under
German control was dissolved at the time of liberation. There
was, therefore, a break in the enforcement of food controls and
the Government has not been strong enough since the liberation
to enforce unpopular control measures, Another disturbing
factor was the program to reduce the volune of the circulating
media which was unpopular with the farmers and added to their
disinclination to make products available to the local narkets.
of an estimated broad grain crop of 929,000 tono, the Tol-ian
Government expects that not over 400,000 tons will be collected
for comercial use. Last year 530,000 tons were collected
from a crop of about the same size, The excessive farn reten-
tions are probably being used in art to feed livestock for sale
at high prices in black markets, There is also a strong desire
on the part of the farmers, as woll as the Government to rebuild
SECRET
- 16 -
the depleted livestock herd.
Sugar beet production was sufficient for the nanufacture
of about 250,000 tons of sugar. Transport difficulties and
look of coal for the operation of sugar mills will, however,
reduce production far below this figure. The latest estimate
is 160,000 tons, Production last year was 200,000 tons.
b) Livestock
Preliminary estimates indicate that the number of
milk cows at the beginning of the year was about 55 lower than
a year carlier, although the total mmber of cattle was higher.
with the continued shortage of protein feed, milk production
will probably be slightly lower this year than last year. The
main result of this reduction will be a decrease in butter
production. Since the number of cattle and hogu is at least
as large as a year ago, meat production may be expected at about
the same levels as for the proceding year, although more young
animale will be kept on the farms to build up livestock numbers.
All livestock production is at a level considerably below that
of prewer years.
3) Civil Affairs Imports.
Civil Affairs imports were in limited quantity until
the port of Antworp was opened in December. Until that time
supplice for Belgium had to como into the country through the
badly congested ports of France. Theyrare then moved by truck
to Belgium at a time when facilities wore being strained to their
utmost in order to support military operations. Asi a result
only 6,790 tons of food were imported into Belgium from D-day to
December 31st, 1944. or this total 1,500 tone were flour, 1,300
tons neat and fish, and 1,000 tono bulses.
- 17 -
SECRET
o
Even after the port of Antworp was opened it yes
impossible for some 60 days to bring in any appreciable
amount of food supplies. A critical food situation develop-
ed in January and February & a result of the continued
stringent shipping conditions; the Ardennes offensive with
the consequent loss of food supplies; and the severe weather
conditions in December and January. Emergency measures were
taken and over 100,000 tona of foal supplies were brought in
quickly, SHATE believes that the current flow will be adequate
to met the military target. The SHARP requirements figures
are attached as annex 2.
4) Rations and Consumption Lovel.
From the tino of literation until January, 10/ml
rations more gradually improved as the restoration of inter:al
distribution facilities permitted. Distribution of rationed
foods, excluding milk, averuged 1,535 calories per day for the
non-farm population, in December, 1,575 calories in January and
February, and 1,767 calories in March. This compares with
1,375 calories for January, 1944. In February, 1945, rations
were reduced, but the back-log of unused fat ration coupons TAB
rade good 80 that the total consumption of food distributed
against rations was not reduced.
There is a flourishing black market in food in Relgium.
Considerable quantities of food are obtained from the black
market and from unrationed commoditions in addition to the legal
rations. No satisfactory estimates of total food consumption
are available, but the national diet is probably not over 1,850
to 1,900 calories, From the physical condition of the people
it would appear that it cannot be far from 2,000 calories per
person per day.
-18-
SECRET
0
5) The Current Crop Year.
There are two staple food crops, potatoes and sugar,
of which production was estimated as sufficient to last through
the consumption year. Bread grains and vogetable oil, however,
have already been nearly all consumed and dependence will be
mainly on imports until the next crop is harvested. Other
commodities that will have to be supplemented by imports are
meat, dairy products and pulses.
A total of 76,000 tono of grains por nonth are
necessary to maintain a 400 (This 'nsic daily broad ration. The
total supply available from drriastic sources TRUE estimated at
400,000 tons. By January lot, 200,000 tons of this had been
used. The local supply, therefore, has heen supplemented by
imports and this will have to continue. The Civil Affairs
program calls for 54,000 tons is month through May and then the
full requirement of 76,000 tons a month in June, July and August.
The nonthly requirements of fato and oils to meet
the 2,000 calorie diot are about 7,500 tons. The donestic
supply of vegetable oil was oxhausted in January. Remaining
donestic resources are current butter production and about 650
tons per month of beef fat and lard.
Ment requirements to meet the 2,000 calorie diet are
11,400 tons por nonth. Domestic sources are estimated as
capable of supplying 4,600 tons por month.
Monthly cheese requirements are 2,600 tons, of which
1,200 can be supplied from donostic production.
Pulse requirements are 4,100 tons and donestic supplies
were exhausted in February. The entire supply must be imported.
-19-
STORT
0
0
The monthly requirement of milk is 32,500 tons,
of which it is expected 24,250 tons can be net from domestic
production. The deficit is to be m.de up from imports in
the form of evaporated milk.
6) Agricultural Supplies.
Since Belgium has a highly developed and diversified
industrial economy she has been able to meet most of her
agricultural requirements. Upon liberation diesel fuel was
the most critical farm supply item. Some difficulty has
developed in regard to vegetable seeds. These requirements,
however, along with the other urgent requirements for potato
aneds, milk cans and binder twine are set forth either in the
Civil Affairs import program or the Belgian National
Government program.
7) Fishing.
The Belgian fishing fleet ons in good condition and
reasonably well supplied with geer at the time of liberation.
Arrangements were made for its operation in time for the winter
herring season, which extends from December let to March lst.
The herring run ves exceptionally favorable and the total catch
reached 37,000 tons by Larch lot. Unfortunately, the Belgian
fish processing facilities could not be fully utilized and a
very small quantity of the catch was preserved.
It is expected that the catch of other fish vill
average 4,000 to 7,000 tons per month, depending upon the
extension of fishing limits and the number of Belgian fishing
boats released by Great Britain.
-20-
SICRET
C. LUXEMBOURG
The Grand Duchi of Luxembourg is a sparaly populated
country which, before the war, produced food supplies in a
volume which fell only alightly short of the country's require-
ments, except for sugar and vegetable oils. Nost of the
concentrates and feed grains for livestock were imported but
bread grain and meat imports were amall. There was some export
of potatoes.
-
1. Under German Occupation
During the German occupation Luxembourg V68 treated
as a part of the Gorman Reich 80 far as its food economy was
concerned. Rationing was at the German scale and production
adjustments were attempted in line with German policy. The
whole organization of supplies was under the Reich Food Tstate,
Supply of feed for livestock was sharply reduced under
the German occupation. Cattle population mas maintained but hos
population was out drestionlly. Both meat and milk production fell
off. The 1943 grain crop THE at about the pre-ver level. The
potato crop was smaller than usual. 011 seed production was
introduced by the Germans as a new enterprise. Vogetable product-
ion was increased.
2. The Situation After Liberation
Luxembourg was liberated quickly without much destruction.
The front line was stabilized, however, approximately along the
eastern border of the country for many weeks during fall and early
winter. As a result a strip of territory just inside the eastern
border was essentially an area of military operations and most of the
crops in this part of Luxembour : were lost. For the remoinder of
the country the food situation was reasonably satisfactory. There
was sufficient bread grain, mest and potatoes, milk and vegetables.
Fats were short. Sugar was brought in from Belgium in exchange for
some surplus meet animals. Control over food supplies was generally
-21-
SECRET
0
good.
Imports of about 4,000 tons of food a month had been
planned by Civil Affairs but the situation was BO favorable during
the fall and early vinter that this plan was not carried out,
The Ardennes offensive which began December 16th, completely changed
this situation. The northern half of Luxenbour : use overrun by
the German forces. The population moved out of this area ahead of
the offensive, taking a considerable part of the meat and work
animals. The result of this movement cas an increase in the
number of people to be fed from the food resources of central
Luxenbour: and an addition to the livestock numbers with no.
addition to the feed supply.
The second liberation of northern Luxembourg left behind
widespread destruction. This vas en important rain area and grein
that had been throshed was mostly removed or destroyed. It is
protable that nearly half of the commercial grein su ply of Luxenbourg
was lost. Lost of the potatoes were destroyed. Loss of vegetables
and fruit Cas heavy. The livestock that use not noved out was killed
or taken by the Germans.
Production in northern Auxembourg will be very low for the
remainder of the crop year. There 1a an acute shortage of seed,
draft animle and vurious supplies aneried for the spring planting
season, There are also many land nines which will interfere with farm
work until removed.
3. Civil Affairs Imports.
Programmed imports for the resainder of the crop your are
presented in Annex 3. In tonnage these imports amount to sbout
40° of the food supply necessary to mintain an average 2,000 onlorio
diet for the non-farm population. In calories the imports would
provide a still higher proportion. Roughly speaking the programed
food importo represent the cuantities needed to nake up that part of
Food resources lost un e result of the Ardornes offensive.
-22-
SECNT
o
4. Rations and Consumption Level
la December, prior to the Ardennes offensive, the
le not normal consumer ration ves estimated to provide about
1575 calories per day. The average for non-ferm consumers
was somewhet higher. Since that time the situation in the
northern part of the country has bren too chaotic for any average
fi ure to be presented GB significant.
5. Acricultural Supplies.
The farmers of Luxembour: seen reasonably well
provi ed with essential supplies prior to the Ardennes offensive.
The Germons when they withdres from this ares in January, took
every available draft animal with then, Appreximately 2400 horses
were lost. Tractors are being supplied in an sttempt to make
up for this loss. Binder twice and supply reterials ore also needed
and have been programed. A very serfous good shorts on existe and
an attempt to neet this is being nade by drawing on other liberated
countries and from stocks in the U.K.
-23-
SECRIT
o
0
D. THE INTHERIANDS
Domestic production of food in the Nethorlands before
the var wes equivalent to about two-thirds of consumption.
There was an important livestock industry producing meat and
dairy products for export but largely dependent upon imported
foed. The main crops produced were cereals, potatoes, sugar-
boots and specialized horticultural crops. Grain, sugar and
vegetable oils were imported for home consumption.
1. The Germen Occupation.
During the German occupation, the Netherlands cas out
off from imports of both food and feed and had to manage almost
entirely on her own resources. The area in cultivated crops
was extended by 20%. Brood rain production increased slightly
and potato and vegetable production more substantially. Live-
stock production declined drestically. In spite of this the
Germans took some meet and butter as well as considerable quanti-
ties of fruit, vegetables and potatoes. The German control over
food supplies and their distribution was well organized. The
drastic wartine edjustments in production and net trade are shown
in the following tablet-
Estimated Production, Trade In and Available Supplies of
Principal Foods in the Netherlands, Pre-Far and 1943-44
(thousand metric tons)
Comodity
Production
Net Trade**
Available Supplies
Pre-Der
1943
Pre-Nar
1943-44
Pre-Err
1943-44
Wheat and Rye
910
973
4610
-19
1,520
954
Other grain
487
385
4245
-26
732
359
Potatoes
2,650
4,464
-330
-360
2,320
4,104
Sugar Beets
1,567
1,460
--
--
1,567
1,460
Liest
400
148*
-39
-43
361
105
Fats
138
80*
-28
- 9
125
71
# 1943-44.
** Plus means net imports; minus means net exports, including German
requisitions
In 1944, en imundation of extensive areas of low lying
farm land began partly as a result of not continuing to pump out
drainage water and partly as a result of allowing both fresh and
-24-
SECRET
salt water to come in and through the dykes and cluices. About
forty five percent of the total aree of the country including
most of the best agricultural land is susceptible to flooding.
About 10% of the farm land DES flooded before the 1944 harvest
seeson and most of the crops in this area were lost. This is
estimated to have reduced 1944-45 food production by 15 to 20%.
2. The Situation in the Liberated Part of the Netherlands.
An area populated by about 2 million people, nearly 266
of the total population of the country, was liberated in September
and October 1944. The area uncovered includes an important part
of the country's agriculture and none of the larger cities.
Normally deficient in bread grains it should have been about self-
sufficient as a result of wartine adjustments in production and
consumption. It is normally 8 surplus producing area for potatoes
and sugar. Before the war it had a surplus of dairy products
and of pork, but livestock production, especially pork, has been
sharply reduced. /The 1944 crop was a fairly good one with the
exception of certain areas in the west where inundation occurred
and very little of it, except the oil seeds, THE taken by the
Germans.
Practically all of the usable trucks and cars were taken
by the Germans in their retreat. Food collection quickly came to
a standatill. Many cattle were killed during the military operations
and milk could not be moved to oreameries and consumption fell off.
Coal was not available and flour mills could not be operated for
lack of power. All movement by rail and barge was halted for an
extended period. Such surpluses as existed in some parts of the
country could not be noved to other parts where they were needed.
The extreme length of supply lines from French ports prevented
assistance during the early period of liberation. By the end of
1944 only about 15,000 tons of imported food had been turned over
to the Dutch authorities and hence the population has depended
minly on indigenous supplies.
-25-
SFCRPT
3. Rations and Consumption levels in liberated Holland.
Rations providing about 1700 calories per head por day
had been generally maintal ned until July 1944 for the non-farm
consumer. In October, the level fell to about 1,000 calories; in
Novomber it rose to 1,100 calorios and in December when imported
supplies began to arrive through Antwerp rations were raised to
1,500 calorio lovel. In January, furthor increases were possible
bringing the level up to about 1,700 calorios and the ration scale
now in effect produces an averuge of 1,875 calories. The black
market has been curtailed in the liberated Nothorlands and, con-
sequently, little food is available except through logal sources.
4. The Occupied Areas,
The most heavily populated area including the cities of
Ansterdam, Rottordam and the Hague lios to the west of the Zuider
Coo and at this writing is still occupied by the Dermans. It is
normally dependent for food upon the surplus producing areas of
eastern Holland. In the fall of 1944 a strike by the Dutch railway
workers tied up the rail traffic and the Germans refused to move
food into the deficiency area in anything like adequate volume,
The flooding destroyed a considerable part of what production there
was in this region. The food supply problem in this area will be
the most critical one to be faced in Northwest Europe.
5. The Military Plans.
For planning purposes, the Notherlands has been divided
into four parts. The liborated portion is known as area A. That
portion of the occupied area which is the heavily populated North-
west deficit region is designated area B and the food surplus
producing Northeast region, area C. Area B is subdivided into the
eastorn portion called Bl and the western portion cal. led B2. Area
B2 includes nearly 40% of the population of the entire country and
it is in this area that the most critical food shortapes exist at
the present time and for which the largest volumo of imports will
be required after liberation.
- 26 -
SECRET
Starvation conditions presently exist in the B2 area
and it is alleged that the ficial rations in the cities have
fallen to as low as 320 calorios a day. In view of transport
difficulties and the distance from surplus food areas it is
improbable that official rations have been substantiallysupple-
monted for the consumption of the urban population in Mcer
centers. In order to provide emergency food in the B2 area, a
stockpile of 44,000 tons of food, sufficient to feed the entire
population for 21 days, is boing built up south of the present
front line. By the end of this 21 day period, it is anticipated
that west Dutch port facilities will have been sufficiently
restored that food supplies may be brought in directly to the
large port cities. Hence, a stockpilo of the sise sufficient to
allow of a 2,000 calorie diet for the population of the n2 area
is boing cotablished in the U.K. for imodiate movement when the
ports open. This stockpile will include emergency rations for 60
days and supplies for the following 30 day period,
For the remainder of occupied Holland, areas B1 and c,
which are normally self-sufficing or surplus producing, it is
assumed in the planning that all surplus will have been removed
OD destroyed by the Germans and that the entire non-farm population
will have to be completely fed on imported food,
The total military import program for all of the Nether-
lands for the first eight months of 1945 is shown in Annex 4.
This includes the special emergency programs for which stockpiles
have been created and the continuing flow of supplies to the areas already
liberated and for the romainder of the country after the emergency
period,
6. Agricultural Supplies.
There is an urgent need in the Netherlands for farm
machinery. Tractors, disc plows and furl plows are being provided
from the U.K. under the Nethorland Civilian Import Program. About
22
necess
250,000 grain and flour sacks are being turned over to the Dutch
authorities. Shipments of binder twine for the 1945 harvest till
arrive in the country in Kay,
Thile the country normally produces vegetable seeća for
export the seed groving regions are still occupied by the Gormans
and seeds are being imported from the U.K. and Irance for the
spring planting in the liborated creas.
7. Fishing.
Fishing TaB opened in the 'est Schelde Estuary in early
January and in the loter East Schelde Estuary by the end of the
sare tonth. Catches in the Tost Schelde have been small and the
fish is being consumed fresh in the torns near the coast.
Arrangements have been sade with the Delgians to permit
a limited number of Dutch boats to fish in Belgian raters.
Six large Dutch trawlers based in England are fishing in
English raters and lancing their catch in Holland. Of the catch,
40% is being procossed and the balance cistributed there.
The Dutch shell fish industry in the Rest Schelde is now
operating at 33% of capacity. lt 1a expected that 5,000 tons of
oysters and 12,000 tons of musselo will be collocted this year.
EDONEARK.
Denmark is a surplus producer of foodstuffs. Its
agriculture TES organised prior to the var rith a vier to the
most efficient production of rest and dairy products. Practi-
cally all of the grains produced, including the breadgrains,
wheat and rye vare used as feed for livestock. In addition,
there 1070 large imports of oiloake and carn for animal feed-
ing. Breadgrains for human consumption rere largely imported.
In terms of calories, however, Danish importe vere more than
counterbalanced by exports.
1. Under Cersan Occupation.
Denmark has ranaged to maintain her pre-tar calorie
intake and has also exported significant quantities of reat and
dairy products, fish and potatoes. Dennur's apriculture is
highly muchanized and has Leen dependent upon supplies of fuel
from Cermany. This has been supplied by the Cermans during 00-
cupetion in order that they night benefit from l'anish surpluses.
The output of reat and dairy products for the calen-
dar year 1944 has appreciably increased over 1943. It is un-
likely, horever, that e high output of pork and bacon +ill be
saintained during 1945 in vier of the declino since 1943 by
almost one-third of the pif populution and, in particular, of
broeding sora.
It should be noted that the ability of Denmark to
export depends in a large reasure upon available supply of
pover for refrigeration, slaughter houses, refineries and do
on, and on liquid fuel for tractors and farm machinery. At
the present time imports of lubricants, diesel oil and Faso-
line have practically ceased. Hoocuse of the shortare of ml
and lubricants transport has been reduced to a onall fraction
of its normal operation. Pover plants and Fan works have in-
stituted strict rationing.
SHART's estimate of Dennark's shility to export
critical foodstuffs in the first six months after liberation
ini-
Butter
34,000 Tone
Cheese
1,300 -
Rega
6,400 #
Bacon 6. Pork
50,000 Tone
Fish
53,000 "
Beef & Veal
17,000 .
tilk Products
40,260 #
2. Imports l'acced,
It is the judgment of the SIGN Lission to Morray
that in order to secure the potential available ex orts from
lennark it will be necessary to import those require-
ments to Demark which have a direct relation to the produc-
tion of food. The proposed SHART import program for the six
ronths following the liberation of Lemark totals 1,622,000
tono of t.ll commodities. of these st is an ostinate of the
SHART Dission that 660,200 hear E. direct relation to the pro-
duction, processing and transportation of Food. An addition-
al 626,113 hear an indirect relation to the production of food,
A breakdorn of these requirements vill be found in Tab 6 which
is & report on Lonmark.
- 30 -
SECRET
7
NORAY
Hormy is sparsely populated and natural
conditions are generally not favorable for acricultural
production. Host of the agricultural area produces
feed and the country's production is predominately a
livestock enterprise. Only 3% of the total area is
cultivated and there is intensive farming of small plots.
Norway had to import all her sugar, nearly
all bread and feed grains, vegetable oil seeds for the
manufacture of margarine, and oil cake for livestock
as well as some petatoes. On balance Norway produced
less than half her food requirements, in torms of
calories, and depended upon imports of food stuffs and
feed stuffs more than any other country on the Continent.
Supplies of fish were abundant resulting in
high consumption, exports and an extensive industry for
the manufacture of herring oil and neal. Pre-war
Normy exported approximately 700,000 tons of fish a
year.
I. The Cormen Occurs tion.
During the German occupation fishing production
has fallen from 1,000,000 tons to790,000 tons and, of
that amount 500,000 tons was shipped to German occupied
territories, leaving 200,000 tons for domestic consumption.
In return for this export of fish, the Germans provided
other food products necessary to maintain a minimum
diet in Norway. Under the German ration program approx-
imately 2,200 calories per day per head was provided
with extra rations for those engaged, in heavy industry.
As a practical matter, this calorie program has not
been net. During the past three or four months food
scarcity has been severe.
Farm production has suffered considerably
-31--
SECRET
During the past. five years. No fortilizers have been
imported to Norway and the productivity of the land
has decreased acutely, Animal population has beon
reduced due to shortage of animal fodder nd the kill-
inc of animals due to the shortoge of food,
The most recent information in Forway indicates
that the food situation in 1944-45'18 declining from that
of 1943-44. This results from both Lower production and
reduced imports, In addition transport difficulties are
hampering distribution. The fruit and vegotable
harvett have been reported as poor, the milk situation,
adversely affected by lack of cattle fodder, has become
considerably werse since the and of 1944 It had been
difficult to mintain the milk ration for children and
the sick, Dren the skim milk ration for adults has not
been honored for some time.
2. Supply Plana for Normy.
The SHALP Mission to Norway developed in
cooperation with the Norwegian dovernment, a compre-
honsive supply program for Normy for the first six
months after liberation, The national program as
developed calls for the importation of 300,000 tons of
food supplies for the first six months. The amount of
this which is presently available through nilitary
sources 10 about 70,000 tons against the first three
months' requirements,
FINTARK
The liberation of Firmark or ated in mer-
gency dervind for relief supplies. CHALL released 3,000
toms of food supplies and this togather dish 2,200 tons
of supplies procured by the Covernment from
civilin sources sare shipped to Plassr's during the
rinter notified. These supplies will provide for the
-32-
SECRET
LC,000 people in Finnary: for four months. The
requirements for the next six months, approxi-ately
10,000 tons, are nor Loing procured by the Morne: ian
Govern ont.
SECRET
0, GERMANY
Agricultural production had expanded and reached &
high lovel in Cermany before the war, About 85% of the nation's
food supply cumo from domestic resources, the main deficita being
in fats and oils.
According to surrary findings of an ad hoc Committee on
German Food Supplies, composed of personnel from the Food and
Agriculture Branches of the U.S. Group C, C. and the British Element
of the Control Commission and advisory British and American civilian
personnel, Cermany's food position throughout the first five years
of war remained satisfactory. The decline in total agricultural
output was held within relatively narrow limits and comprohensive
farm and distribution control regulated production and utilization
to such an extent that on even higher output of ultimate food
energy was secured than before the war. Moreover, imports and
requisitions from other countries added from 10% to 15% to the home
food supply,
The lovel of caloric intake in 1943-44 was placed at
2,600 calories for the total population as compared with 2,850
before the war, Pare consumption in 1943-44 approximated a level
of 3,300 and non-frim 2,300 caloric. As in other countries, com-
position of the diet has changed in the direction of more broad
grains, potatoes and vegetables, and less of other foods, particularly
liquid milk, fats and oils and mests, but not to the same extent.
In 1944-45, Certany faced a considerably more difficult
situation. Domestic production of food has somewhat dealined and
takings from other countries are greatly curtailed. Home production
in 1945 is likely to decline further in view of the cumula tive
effect of shortages of basic agricultural requisites (particularly
the increasingly curtal led supply of nitrogen and phosphoric
fertilizer) over the war years. Ity personal observation of the
-34-
result of military openitions in agriculturel arons west of the
Kidne loads se to bolieve tint Curran food production in 19/5
will 1.0 and stretically less the normal. Hundreda of inruers have
been evacunted. corn BIX animale baw been carried
away. I do not believe either the ranpower or imple ents of
production 002 be replaced in 1945. As a result much of Gerrany's
normally productive land will be idle in the next orop year.
degional problems complicate the Cerven food situation;
Northwest and Southern Germany are food deficit aroes, to which the
East supplies substantial surpluses of bread, grain and flour,
potatoos and refined sugar and from which livestock, fats and fish,
for example, were exported to the Last. Grave food problems will
arise if these areas have to exist on their own resources.
SEARF has estimated import recuirucents, of wheat for the
feeding of civilians in the Gorman area occupied by the British and
Amoriorn !ordes will be a total of 175,000 tons a sonth for the
months of June, July and to rat. As in other areas, for which
STATE iss a responsibility for tue importation of food supplies,
horever, these sur-lies will not be called forward or distri:uted
by SHALF unless it because necessary as & matter of military
necessity to do so. The min amount of food which will to
provided to the normal Genwn civilians (as distinguished from
heavy workers) from all sources will be approximately 1500 calories
per head per day. This compares with the SHARP minimum target of
2000 calories por head per day for civilians of the liberated
countries.
-35-
?
3302A
1. SIGNAGE Public
The total nurtor of displaced persons vhic': it is octi-
mtor -111 ho uncovered in Germany is approximately 7,000,000. of
this quantity it is outbated tet t.oro will :.o approximately
3,300,000 in the Russion some of cocupation and 3,700,000 in the
U.S. and C.F. sonos. In accition it is estimated there vill le
uncovered " total of approximately 1,200,000 in Austria.
The feeding or displaced persons has been planned to
the military authorities on the same basis as for t.o population
for liberated arons, that is & 2,000 calories retion. T10 follow-
in; table indiontes the nontaly inport recuirements of food which
have alrondy been presented by SAN to the Corbined Chiefs of
Staff for neproval:-
Jonuary
20,000
February
18,L18
Chrch
27,271
April
30,492
"ay
38,903
June
56,527
July
50,164
August
35,05
Deptumber
00.516
October
59,503
November
50,008
Lecember
German indigenous resources are to be used to the :ax-
1mum nnd proference is to be iven to displaced persons over the
noods of "erman civilians. The accitional recuirements have been
estimated on the basis that 25% of the food recuired for feeding
displaced persons in Commany will be obtained from ver.an resources.
Under agreements signed separately et Ynlta by t.o U.S. and
tal. governments with the Soviet Union, all Soviet citizens liborated
by foroes under U.S. and U.A. CO. sand and all U.S. and U.E. citizons
lilerated by forces under Soviet ore tó be provides*with "ado-
qunto food, clothing, housing and edionl attention". It should be
noted tirt the prooments cover oll Soviet citizons, including prison-
ore of will 10 will 00 dispinced -croons, and that to ento provide
that "the busis fixed for civillino shall DO for as nonsible
be the 11:0 If that for crivates."
The effret of the & recrent in difficult to ADDPORT
at this the Insurance AS the -Tecine interpretation of itc
terre 10 rtill under study, but tope carecially because no
cefinitive directive has yet bren forward to the rilitary
authorities in the field.
Present SHATF estimates of the surply In-lientions of
the Yeltn currements, on the hypothesis that the Soviet citi-
zens should be provided the core flet 00 A: Aperican or Aritish
rrivate coldier, are that approximately 00,000 tone of fond
mould he necessary in addition to resent recuirements. irior
to the Yelto accerrents it me en exceptial mrt of the cill-
tery "Conning to circl -ith the disclosed - on An inter-
actional-"nited "etions 'visis. 1.° the -leaning in discripted
by -iving N brond interpretation to the Yalts. agreements, and
if agreements DIF not rade for the benefit of countries
other than the 255, grove administrative difficulties -111 arise.
If all displaced persons ATP to be fed the our Ciet us & rivite
soldier, SHARP estirates that agrroximately 330,000 tons of food
additional to that presently recuired NO ld be necessary to
naintain the increased ration.
I. THE U.K. in & :07 TI/L SHIPLE OF your,
The extent to which the ".". in in 6 rosition to fur-
nish cry surplier of foods to the liberated DIANS of "orthmest
Europe in not discussed in this paper in vier of the current
negotiations in ashington during which the level at which the
".". food stockniles will be reintained +111 be unreed.
It is evident, homever, that the ".". cannot be
locked unon LS = source of continuing surrly of foodsturrs, and
that any contribution which in -cée vill have to result free the
⑉37⑉
2011
lovering of the rresent ".". stock Invel. It is equally clear
that eny contribution which the U.K. ray raise from its resent
stockpiles vill be a non-recurring one and -111 not be significant
in terms of the total recuiremente of the Northwert "uropean
countries.
-38-
DIC:NT
ANNE< 1
TABLE VII - VILITARY IMPORTS OF FOOD REQUIRED FOR FRANCE
January - August 1945 (Net long tons)
Total
Total for
Commodity
January
February
March X
April
X
May
June
July
August
Delivery
Shipment
XXX
Wheat
34,706
50,000
30,000
30,000
30,000
---
---
---
154,706
173,646
Rice
---
---
---
---
3,000
5,000
5,000
9,000
10,800
Canned meat
6,334
7,776
7,334
7,334
7,354
6,750
6,750
8,750
56,361
66,175
Fats and oils
6,168
5,600
6,166
6,165
6,166
5200
6,200
6,200
45,860
53,682
Cheese
420
---
420
420
420
---
---
---
1,680
2,061
Pulses
528
---
500
500
500
---
---
I
2,028
2,434
Sugar
6,007
5,750
6,010
6,010
6,010
10,000
10,000
10,000
59,787
69,444
Coffee
3,238
3,587
3,238
3,238
3,258
---
---
--
16,639
18,979
Carmed milk
2,471
5,300
3,971
3,971
3,971
5,000
5,000
5,000
34,684
41,261
Dried m' 1k
1,500
1,500
---
---
---
---
---
---
3,000
3,000
Vit chocolate
66
---
500
500
500
2,500
2,500
2,500
9,066
10,879
Dried egga
447
---
450
450
450
---
---
---
1,797
2,166
Total for delivery
61,882
59,512
58,588
58,668
58,688
32,450
52,450
32,450
394,508
Allowance for
loss 20%
2,882
2,409
11,717
11,717
11,717
6,490
6,490
6,490
Total for shipment
XXX
64,764
61,921
70,306
70,305
70,305
38,940
38,940
38,940
454,420
X Requirements for l'aroh and April are not the same as the scheduled deliveries for theee months shown in Table 1. page 3.
since the latter are based on the prospective shipping and stook rosition.
XX "Aotual requirements for delivery are increased 20% for all except the SOLOC area for January and February to cover losses.
XXX These totals are for the period January to August if added to total deliveries prior to I January shown in the preceding
table will not equal the figures shown for France for the entire period in Table 1. page 3. because the latter table shows
issues for January and February and scheduled roosipts for Varch and April.
BELOIUM
ANNEX - 2
Filitary Imports of Food Required for
Belgium, January - August, 1945 (net long tone)
@
e
Total
Total for 00
Commodity
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
Delivery
Shipment ass
Wheat
20,000
82,400
52,400
52,400
52,400
76,000
76,000
76,000
457,600
503,200
Flour
1,768
---
---
I
---
---
---
---
1,768
1,852
Cenned Meat
8,724
8,855
8,835
10,315
10,315
6,768
6,768
6,768
67,328
71,401
Neat & Veg. Stew
202
---
---
!
---
I
---
I
202
202
Fats
2,490
7,026
5,026
5,055
5,055
3,413
3,413
3,413
34,891
36,942
Soup
90
---
---
---
---
!
---
!
90
90
Cheese
1,141
1,227
1,227
1,407
1,407
1,374
1,374
1,374
10,531
11,355
Pulses
210
---
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,100
4,100
4,100
25,110
27,594
Sugar
1,045
-
-
---
---
I
---
1,045
1,045
Salt
5,026
3,112
3,112
3,457
3,457
0,665
6,665
6,865
36,159
40,159
Evap. Wilk
3,396
8,300
3,300
3,300
3,300
3,300
3,300
3,800
26,496
28,495
Coffee
950
1,416
1,416
1,573
1,573
1,504
1,504
1,504
11,420
12,341
Vit Chocolate
48
---
!
---
-
520
520
520
1,608
1,930
Total for Delivery
43,070
77,316
70,516
81,707
81,707
103,644
103,644
103,644
674,248
Allowance for Loss
---
---
---
-
---
20,729
20,729
20,729
I
-
(20%)
Reserve (Br. Zdne)
--
---
3,706
16,024
16,984
---
!
I
---
36,713
Total for Shipment
43,070
77,516
83,221
97,731
98,691
124,373
124,373
124,373
775,319
&
Requirements for March and April are not the same as the scheduled delivories for these months as shown in Table I. page
3 since the latter are based on prospective shipping and stock position.
et
Actual requirements for delivery in U.S. Zonee are increased by 20 per cent to cover losses. For the British Zone losses
are covered by the reserve shown.
RRR
These totals for the period January to August if added to total deliveries prior to January 1 shown in the preceding table
will not equal the figures shown for Belgium for the entire period in Table I, page 3, because the latter table shows is-
sues for January and February and scheduled receipts for March and April.
ANNEX - 3
"ilitary Imports of Food Required for Luxembourg,
January - August, 1945 (net long tons)
Total
Total for
Commodity
January
February
l'arch
t
April
t
Tay
June
July
August
Delivery
Shipment f
Theat
500
4,800
5,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
23,300
27,760
Canned Meat
130
400
300
son
300
300
300
300
2,330
2,790
Fats
160
211
126
126
126
126
126
126
1,127
1,352
Cheese
--
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
280
336
Pulses
150
280
80
80
80
80
80
80
910
1,092
Sugar
126
126
126
126
126
126
126
126
1,008
1,209
Salt
160
160
126
126
126
-
--
--
698
836
Coffee
30
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
394
473
Trap. Vilk
50
100
--
--
--
--
:
--
150
180
Vit Chocolate
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
240
288
Dried Sgre
--
10
10
10
10
--
--
--
40
46
Total for Delivery
1,336
6,209
3,890
3,890
3,890
3,754
3,764
3,754
30,477
Allowance for Loss
267
1,242
778
778
778
751
751
751
(20
Total for Shipment
1,603
7,451
4,668
4,668
4,688
4,505
4,505
4,505
36,572
t Requirements for March and April are less than the program for these months shown in Table I, Page S, because the program
includes some backlog of unfulfilled requirements of previous months.
# Actual requirements for delivery are impreased by 20 to cover losses
NETHERLANDS
ANNRO - 4
Military Imports of Food Required for Netherlands, January - August, 1945 (not long tons)
Requirements exclusive of B₂ area
All Notherlands
Requirements Total
Commodity
January
February March* April*
May
June
July
August
Total
Total for**
for B₂
Req.***
Delivery Shipment Area Jan-May
Uncooked cereal
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
480
480
Wheat
-
500
500
500
500
-
-
-
2,000
2,000
-
2,000
Flour
3,461
5,400
6,311
20,695
35,666
84,100
83,100
83,100
321,833
376,293
45,200
421,493
Biscuits
-
4,061
4,061
-
-
18,000
18,000
18,000
62,122
73,413
62,240
135,653
Canned Meat
1,753
1,715
2,769
2,769
2,769
5,400
5,500
5,300
27,975
31,338
32,928
64,266
Veat & Veg. Stew
-
-
-
-
-
-
,
-
-
-
6,780
6,780
Fats
1,728
1,808
3,301
3,301
3,301
9,300
9,600
9,900
42,239
48,023
9,394
57,418
Dried REge
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
335
335
Cheese
-
707
707
707
707
2,100
2,100
2,100
9,128
10,388
1,507
11,895
Canned Soup
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3,271
3,271
Pulees
2,858
2,292
5,217
5,217
5,217
10,200
10,200
10,200
51,401
58,346
8,882
66,728
-
Dehydrated Saup
-
-
-
-
#
-
-
-
-
-
4,972
4,972
Sugar
-
-
1,074
2,019
2,964
11,000
13,300
14,600
44,957
52,757
10,757
63,494
Salt
659
638
1,485
1,483
1,483
5,200
5,200
-
16,146
18,226
5,445
21,671
Coffee
360
519
1,272
1,272
1,272
1,800
1,800
1,800
10,095
11,260
633
11,883
Evap "!Ik
3,617
635
635
635
635
4,000
3,500
3,200
16,857
19,157
3,247
22,404
Dried rilk
-
970
1,033
1,033
1,083
5,000
4,600
3,500
17,169
19,789
-
19,789
Vit Chocolate
239
535
1,268
1,268
1,268
3,500
3,500
3,500
15,078
17,263
4,495
21,756
Total for Delivery 14,675
19,780
29,631
40,899
56,815
189,600
160,400
155,200
637,000
-
197,957
Allowance for Loss
479
1,463
1,453
1,458
1,453
31,920
32,080
31,040
-
-
-
-
( 20ff )**
Reserve (BR. Zone)
-
-
5,415
23,419
25,022
-
-
-
-
53,856
-
53,856
#
Total for Shipment 15,154
21,233
86,499
65,771
83,290
191,520
192,480
186,240
-
792,186
197,967
990,144
-
*Requirements for March and April are not the same as the scheduled deliveries for these months shown in Table 1, page 3, since the
#
latter are based on the prospective shipping and stook position.
**Actual requirements for delivery in U.S. Zone are increased 20 por cent to cover losses in transit. For British Zone losses are
covered by the reserve shown.
... These totals for the period Jan-Aug if added to total deliveries prior to 1 Jan shown in the preceding table will not equal the
figures shown for France for the entire period in Table 1, page 3, because the latter table shows issues for Jan and Feb and sohe-
=
duled receipts for Farch and April,
SHARF FOOD REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTATION
(Net long tons)
Earoh
April
May
June
July
August
France
70,305
70,305
70,305
38,940
38,940'
38,940²
Luxembourg
4,668
4,668
4,668
4,F05
4,505
4,605
Relgium
79,516
81,707
81,707
124,373
124,373
124,378
The Netherlands
81,631
93,100
127,583
191,520
192,480
186,240
Germany (primarily dine
65,103
111,323
127,900
266,527
260,464
246,605
ploced United Nations
Nationals)
1
leserves (Br. sone)
9,500
41,086
43,678
Total:
310,923
402,189
45F,696
625,865
620,762
599,663
1. - Covers 15 reserve in British some against losses incident to shipping, transportation and distribution.
Similar provision in American sone is already included in requirements above stated for each country.
2. - This figure is exclusive of wheat. "ilitary authorities have planned no wheat import to France after May
but French authorities estimate that limitations of internal transport will necessitate an import of an
additional 250,000 tons of wheat in Poubhern Prance before 1 July, 1945.
3. - SHARP has recommended that the Silitary food programs casse as of April 30 provided that the French can be
given "reasonable assurance" of the shipping and supplies required to safeguard against disease and unrest
as estimated by SHARF above.
SEGNET
COAL
Prepared by Rosennan Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945
SECRET
INDEX
1) Rate of Production and Availability.
2) The U. X. Position.
3) Military Roquirements and Imports,
4) German Coal,
5) Shipment of Coal from the U.S.
6) Espential Wining Supplies.
7) Conclusions and Recommendations.
SECRET
COAL
Coal is the key to economic recovery in Northwest
Europe. The shortapos in the liberated countries are
souto, and the present deficiencies will be magnified upon
the liberation of Holland, Donmark and Normay. The dotails
concerning the coal situation in Northwest Europe are cet
forth in the annex to this paper.
1) Rate of Production and Availability.
Present production in France is 65% of its prover
tonnage, in Belgium 49%, and in Holland 30% Experts
believe this production will rise slouly over the next 12
months to about 70%, 60% and 65% respectively nt the end
of the year.
The amount of coal available in these countries
compared to consumption in 1937 (indirenous production
plus imports) is 43% in France, 49% in Delgium, and 23:
in Holland. Available supplies for Belgium and Holland
will riso as rapidly as their indirenous production can be
incroased, for these countries were formerly virtually
self-sufficient.
This will not be truo of France, which always
imported about 30 million tono to help meet her require-
nento of 75 million tons. The present off-shoro inports
to France, which are being brought in by SHARP under
military priorities, are at the rate of about 2 ¹ million
tons a year, which together with her own production now
gives her about 438 of hor pro-mr requirements.
Stocks on hand in all three countries are far
helow miniour. stock requirements and coal 13 moved cod
consumed as rapidly as transport permits.
SECRET
2) The U. K. Position,
The coal budget for the U. K. for the coal year
1945-1946 shows a deficit in home requirements alone of
4,200,000 tons. The budget provides for shipments on
SHASP account up to August 31st, 1945, amounting to from
200,000 to 220,000 tons a month. All exports of British
coal, except for 1,000,000 tons of maste going to Fortugal,
Spain and Ireland, will cease after that date in order to
conserve all available production for home use.
3) Military Requirements and Imorts.
The military are using approximately 700,000 tons
of coal a month in Northwest Surope, 400,000 tons of which
are being used in France, "ilitary Imports into lorth-
rest Surope since January average approximately 225,000
tons a month, the balance boing taken from local sources.
SHAEF import roquiroments have been schoduled through
August 1945 and the tonnoro averegos approximately
290,000 tons a month. This requirement is for France
alone, as the requirements for Denoark and Morway have
not boon phased for shipmont. It is expected, however,
that coal for these countries will be needed in early
summer. The Danish requirements are 157,000 tons &
month.
As stated above, U. X. indicated availability of
coal apainst theso roquirements is 200,000 tons a month
until the end of August 1945, at which tire it ceases.
The only other imports scheduled are 25,000 tons a conth
from the U. S. through Carceilles.
The SHAEF estimate of the minimum conthly import
requirements for the first three :sontha aftor V-E day is
573,000 tons. This requirement covers France (290,000
tons), Corray (126,000 tons) and Donmer's (157,000 tons a
sonth).
-11-
SECRET
o
0
4) German Coal,
The future production and transportation of coal
in Germany is subject to ao many unpredictable and unfore-
seeable fectors that no accurate forecast can be made.
The best judgment of the experts investigating the Gorran
coal problem is that for sevoral months after the occu-
potion of Cormany a production of 20-25% of the avorago
obtained in Germany during the years 1939-1944 is
probably the most that can be expected.
Total production of coal in Germany during the
first year of occupation will probably be in the neighbour-
tood of 50 to 65 million tone, compared with a pro-zer
average of about 250 million. It is also estimated
that after allowing for the minimum docostic consumption
of coal approved for use by the occupying powers, and
coal needed for colliory operations, the amount which may
be available for export from Germany will be comerbere
between 10 and 12 million tons for the first 12 months
of operation of the German mines. This could loave for
domestic consumption loss than 252 of Gormany's pre-war
domestic consumption. The demands of France, Holland,
Donmark, Horday and Belgium against German coal in the
first 12 months will probably be of the ordor of 40 to
50 million tons. There will in addition be the domands
of the other European countries.
5) Shirpent of Coal from the U.S.
The possible shipment of coal from the U. S. to
Durope presents a al ipping problem of the first magnitude.
It would take 30 ships per nonti for cach 100,000 tons
of coal par month delivered to continental European
porte, assuming each ship has a two-months turn-round and
7,000 tons carro-carrying capacity.
-111-
DECRET
6) Essential Wining Supplies,
There will be a largo domand for essential supplies
to carry on coal mining operations in Europe. Cost
important of these are oil and lubricants. Eary other
items, however, are scarce and not readily procured by
many countries in Europe oven in poscetime. Among
others are hoisting cable, power transmitters, bearings,
rubber convayor belting, rubber and asbestos components,
and rubber tape, rubber covered cablos, and alloy motals.
7) Conclusions and Recommendations.
I have the following obsorvations and recommon-
dations to nake concerning the coal situation in Northcest
Europe:
4. The rovernments of the liberated countries of
Northwest Curope should be advised imediately of ti.e world
coal situation and of the resultant fact that their ninious
import requirements cannot he met for the first 12 months
after V-5 day.
B. Every effort should be made to exploit the coal
resources of Surope to the fullest possible decroo.
1) The time lar in procuronent and delivery of
ossential mining supplies is seriously affecting the pro-
duction of coal in Northwest Surope. I strongly recommend
that the -ini-up import requirements for essential mining
supplios and naintenance mat-rials he accorded such procure-
mut and shipping ;riorities as -111 assuro their delivery
in Northmost Surope at the earliest possible morent.
2) The maximum production of coal in Corrany is
imperative 1f 0 ATE to hegin to mot the minimum nooda
of the liberated aroas. In ordor to obtain axlan production
of coal in Cormany certain political declaions rill Lnvo to
he made, That is to say, the Allied Control Commission
-iv-
SECRET
or SHARF, as the case my bo, will have to be prepared to
take stops which =111 include:
a) Immediate shipment to Cormany of those essential
wining supplies and maintenance retorials shich are not
presently accessible within Europe. The alternative to
importation of certain of these supplies would be to sook
to secure then from Corran production chick would involve
steps to rehabilitate or maintain important sectors of
Corman industry.
b) The rehobilitation of Cerran rines which have been
damaged by battle action or derolition.
e) T10 rehabilitation and restoration of Corman trans-
port facilities to the extent necessary to transport mining
supplies and workors and the coal shich 1u mined.
d) The supply of adequate food, clothing and footwear
to the Gorman ninora to onsile them to work.
o) Provision of electric power necessary to produce
coal in Gerrany oven where that involves speedy and cotive
rehabilitation of utilities within Germany.
f) The use of enforced Cortan labour shero necessary.
It is obvious that these stops involve {olitical
questions thich are not within my province to ans rer.
Foilure to take these steps, however, vill impose critical
and, I believe, insurmountable limit-tions upon the
production of coal within Cormany.
3) The U. S. should continue ito active advoccey for
the immediate establishment of the Suropean Coal
Organization.
&- I an convinced that the look of coal in Duropo
will be a mattor of preve political and economic concorn
to the governments of the liberated countries. I believe,
*Vr
SECKET
therefore, that the possibility of supplying 3020 coal to
these countries from the U. S. should to carefully
examined. In this connection careful consideration
should be givon to the possibility of shipping coal
during the immediate months nfter V-E day, sten, I 02
advisod, there will be a substantial but temporary
cosing of the shipping situation.
Prepered by Rosonsan .ission
London, Concland, April 15, 1945.
SECRZT
you
COALTAR
A. Production Athin Morthwest Europe.
1. France
a) Production and Inports
b) Condition of ":Ines and Equipment
c) Pitwood
d) Labor
2. Belgium
a) .lining Districts
b) Rato of Production
c) Condition of : Inos and Equipment
d) Pitwood
a) Labor
f) Power
3. Methorlands
a) Ining Districts
b) Rate of Production
c) Condition of Hinos and Equipment
d) Pitwood
.
e) Labor
he Geruany
a) Anchen ining District
b) The Krofuld District
c) Sunnlies
d) Pitwood
e) Power
f) Labor
e) Operating Personnel
h) Finance
1) Production
SECRET
5. Other Areas.
c. United Kingdom.
B.
1rensportation
1. In General
2. Railroads
2. Canale and Totor Transport
C.
Fasential Supplies
I.
Shipping Implications
F.
Organization for Handling the Coal Problem
1 SHATF
2 London Comlined Coal Committee
3 Turopeen Coal Organisation
STORTS
4. PRODUCTION WISHIN "ORGITTS.
1. FRANCE
a. Production and Imports.
France is among the world's imortant coal
producers, but even so, in order to met ell her require-
ments, a third of the coal consumed in peace time 10 in-
corted. In 1936, for example, out of a total of
75,000,000 tons consumed, 45,000,000 tons were produced
in France and 30,000,000 were imported,
There are three main sources from which
indigenous coal is produced. They are:
(1) Yord and Pas-de-Calais with production in 1937
of 27,000,000 tona (57%).
(11) Coselle, 1937 production 6,000,000 tons (13).
(111)Center and South France (known 08 South France
for ourdoses of this report). This area consists
of six tidely scattered lssins. 1937 output
14,000,000 tons (3%),
the types of cosl very greatly, not only from
basin to basin, but also within individual basins. They
range from high and medium volatile bituminous cools
(67) of the total) down to seri-ant racite and antharacite
coale (33%). There are also relatively small denomits
of lignite. All the available types of coel are in
urgent derand and, with the excention of the lignite,
they are nined under difficult conditions.
b. Conditions of "Ince and "ouinment.
(1) the Nord-Pas de Crlcis was liberated early
in September of last year. It was found that the enery
S F C R F T
had hed to re:rect too re tdy to Co my extonsive davage
and that, with the excention of two headzears witch had
suffered from tombing, there "as nothing to cause any
insediate difficulty. Certain sin supplies were,
however, urgently needed and the provision of these was
arranged.
(11) in the Toncile Area it was evident last
Auturn that the Ocrmans would not be evicted without hard
fighting. It was considered probable before retreating
they would satotage the -ince and remove key nersonnel.
Steps, therefore, were taken to have sufficient French
civilien mining and electrical technicians assembled so
that any flooding could be dealt with immediately the
:inew were uncovered. Since 22nd Novembor, 95 civilien
technicians have been assembled from verious parte of
France, cleared end dispatched to this area. They are
under the direction of two officers of the French Sct-
Section and out of the six -ines uncovered to date, four,
though matotaged, have been saved and are now in production.
In addition to sabotaging electrical anceratus, the Germens
removed certain essential equipment such as dnors' lawns,
conveyor belting and haulage locomotives.
(111), Couthern France. These mines were
liberated in part by the 7th Army and in nart by the FPI.
the Germane were evicted DO racidly that they were unable
to carry out systematic sabotage.
It was found that the -ines, when uncovered,
wore short of many requirements essential to production,
to to date, 600 tons of evergency nine supplies have been
imported and distributed by the Solid Fuel Section of
SHAT. Other consignments amounting to 700 tons have
leen ordered. Purther recuisitions are in nrocess of
- 2 -
"TCR'T
compilation.
0, Miwood
(1) Nord-Pas de Colais Lack of sufficient
itwood was evident upon liberation of the nines. This
area depends largely for its sunnly on the LANDES forests
some 500 miles away. To seet the situation it was found
necessary to make delivery of indigenous citwood a
Communications Zone, G-4 Division, Solid Fuels responsi-
bility. A. target of 1,500 tons & day was established and
this was increased on "arch let to 2,500 tone a day.
Trucks, tires and gasoline were, in certain cases, made
available to nitwood contractors. During November-
December 1944 target delivery figures were surpassed with
the result that by the end of the year the stocks at the
mines have risen from a dangerously low level to 145,000
tons. During January and February of this year the
deliveries, as enticirated, fell off due to bed weather
conditions and the stocks at the nines in March stood at
127,000 tons, The mines use about 14,000 tone of nitwood
a week.
(11) Hoselle. Survey made by the French Solid
Fuels Sub-Section disclosed the fact that in the forests
near the mines there were 30,000 tons of nithood ready cut,
This will be enough to meet requirements for some time.
Civilien transport was found in the locality to enable
the necessary deliveries to be made.
(111) Southern France The position, though
difficult, was not until recently considered acute, as
most of the basins have sources of nitwood near at hand,
In January, however, the stocks in some of the basins began
to drop dangerovaly low. In consequence, target figures
totalling 116500 tons 4 day were established and made a
Communications Zone, G-4 Division resnonsibility. The
in
7
SECRET
position is gradually getting letter one the stocks today
stand et 75,000 tons. the tines use about 7,500 tons of
citwood e voek.
6. Letor
in 1938, 215,000 miners produced 44,000,000 tons
of coul, the output of the underground worker mas 1,02
tone. The output oor surface and underground worker was
0.69 tons. In Lecember 1944 the outmut mr underground
worker Tas 0.965 tons. The output nor surface 116 under-
ground worker THE 0.418 tons. If production for 1944
had teen et the rate of the December production, therefore,
the 236,000 -iners then employed would have produced
30,000,000 tons.
It 18 believed that the ton or person production
will innrove as the nines are rehabili atcd, living con-
ditions improved eno as acuitional rat ons are made available
to the miners.
She discovery that liberation TBC going to increase
the hardshios and difficulties of living was € big 61-L o nt-
rent to lalor and has tended to produce discontent. She
hortage of food, clothing, loots, ED. llcycles 1a scrious
and the matter is constartly under review. In regard to
the food problem, G-5 Division was asked to make en inventi-
gation to find out what rations the -iners were actually
receiving. They reported thil 1= soite of local shortages
due to cistritution difficulties, the minors are not, in
their oninion, undermourished. Come clothing and boots
have teen distributed and nore are to be -rovided by the
Solid Fuel Section of SHAFF.
Shere 8 nears to be 8 certein amunt of
insulordination in some of the ines, together with some
FFI interference. the elsentee figure is not s'out 17,
- 4 -
STORES
which, under ,resent circums:ences, 10 not considered
excensive. The febt that the -dnurs PTU progred to
work on Shudrys to nice 11) for loss in reduction due
to the minon Loing: file on holi nys/10 plso oncourcing.
2. UNITED
n. Intr: Listricts
There PT. two conl-producing fiulds in Delgim,
marcly Uw Campino end South Insin. the South woin
consists of four districts -- foni; Contro, Cherleroi
end Lioge. All of the low volatile corls nno reduced
in the South Leain, no are 60; of the redium volatile
conlo, and About 30% of the high volatile corls.
b. Unite of Production
Coal production in Dolgium in 1939 12:0 29,000,000
tome. Under GOTEN occurtion it Croppud in Who year
1943 Lo an catimated 23,700,000 tong. Sinco liberation,
the ,roduction has rison from 650,000 tono in October 19/4
to 1,030,000 tons in Jenuary 1945 end on entimated
1,062,000 tons in Polemary 1945.
The ostimated production through June 1945 is CB
follown:
March
1,200,000 tons
April
1,250,000 -
my
1,322,500 #
June
1,375,000 #
This is probably nn optimistic ,rediction.
The ninimum Dulgian requirements for onel
estimated by the Dulgian Government to Two 2 million tono
n nonth nnd by the SHALP :Hanion to Bolgin DD 1,250,000
tons G nonth. The true figuro in probably conditions
between the two
-5-
SUCRET
Based on estimated ;sroduction for April the
following alloortions of corl have buon for the
month:
Tone
224,600 trrus,ort:
192,500 for milways
16,600 vivinal
12,000 ports
6,500 con,round
3,000 cincellencous
44,100 Allied arrive
40,000 civil (riverily for cooldry)
100,000 control electricity
250,000 150 plants and 000'orios
60,000 food Injustry
121,300 divurao industries, including 36,300 for
vilitary production.
16,000 Lacombourg
12,000 rucervo
950,000
Goal used no the ,1t hundo in not included in
are forugoing schedule.
0. Condition of Mnus rnd Continent
The Delgins nines received little driviço from
Lettle notion. This 20 robebly City to Ww frot Unt
the Commone forced to quickly. Duch demage
PO TO donc 'z'd consed ,rincipally by alliod rir
FLINCE noct of this YOU demage Lo transportation freilities
and suitching yords.
Six requisitions for mission end reterials
votalling JONO 2197 vons were for rocurement
with Com % by the HALF 3olid Price Section between
-(>=
SECRET
0
Lovoniour 15th and Decumber 20th. Those requisitions
covered = six months suply of Interiento, flyourine,
hoisting onlio, HTV, rejeir parts for rir
,nountic horrors, prija rund inll larrings. Additional
requisitions for tyres, modional milities, cable end wire
convuyor letting are wine procumsed. There rse 112
Lone of additional made 4del law book reveduitioned
to cover Un. priod Jamery Int to broh 1nt 1945 con-
clatin; of finished and scri-fl ished estantos benrings
and beering notels.
Up to Freh lot P.. recinity 20 tono of supplica
have issum delivered by Con %. These consist chiefly of
POL flyourine are brll beneings.
The amount of supplies ordered to date 1c not
considered accounto to winthin production. Propoure
10 constrictly being brought LO were 11,000 the Belgin
Government to in,ross u,on the Covernment the scriousness
of the ,roblem of heving to emounts of su, lics
nvrilable.
d. 1twood.
Thun Dolgium the liberated 50,000
cubic mutrus of Atroad APU in stock, These voro
distributed DO that none nines Ind only n day
may while others had unf."afunt crimits for three
would nurmal reduction. An attom,it W D : ande her 20
ailitary to ,ruduce 2,000 tono of Atroad or tiny Pron
indigations Pesources. unly helf of this 1712
reached in October, Lovember end December, As Γ. result
of the tratier] situation in Jemmary nd
Adminy, the chief source of pitwood, Un Ardennua, una
out of end this resulted In the discontinution of o,crn-
tion of of the "Enus, As e remit n° this teritions
citinsion, domo Atrood VID 17, orted /rom the U.S. oring
-7-
the latter art of January, the Goneral Purchasing Agent
of Com = undertook procure ient of nitwood in Portugal,
and the French relowsed some 30,000 cubie notres for
Leurnirury asstatance. Stocks on hand in mid-February
anounted to 32,100 notric tons Alch 10 sufficient for
approximately 1€ days' production.
The target "or "arch and April is 2,500 tons a
day and it in expected Wat this will be reached only
with difficulty. Prosent ritwood production la amoroxi-
nately 2,000 tous a day. This is sufficient for the
mining of 60,000 tons "or day of coal.
e. Labor
In 1930, anproximately 130,000 persons were
employed In Belgian coal minon, In mid-February 1945
the total labor available was 108,000 workers.
During the Corman occupation of Holgium the
Germans had used approximately 25,000 prisoners of enr and
impressed forolgn workers in the minos. Thin liboration
of Delcium and the froeing of these workers accounts in a
large nrt for the shrinkage. It is believed that it
will be difficult to bring the labor force lock to the
total respired. Absentecism is running in the neighbour-
hood of 18%
Following the liberation of Bolgium there was
considerable labor unrest, The tinern ceased ork
on liberation in September and it vas not until October
that any semblance of order was obtained. Efforts to
build up the morale of the vorkers were hampered by look
of transport for then and insufficient food and clothing.
In January and Fobruary 1045, there were strikes which
caused a sharp drop in production. The factors which
contributed to the strike were lack of food, clothing and
-&-
SECRET
0
true, ort rnû the Initiar of the Delgin Covernment and
conl mine operators to recognize e r.ow ninero union -hich
wes seid to Invo commistic offiliations. These strives
lave now been Jettled by the now government end 00,10-
nental food retions and clothing nrw being Trde "wrilable
to the ninero by the 21st Any Gron, and Com Z.
f. Power.
With n for exceptions, the corl commining jour
generating system of Delgium we only alightly dringed by
the Commus. The power alent nt Curr;non W.D suriously
dringed end this C° need P. whomry whorteco in the
Borings (tona) district. Power the rede cyribble
from Holgin to the Dirtch corl mines in the South Linburg
rovince of the for n abort , eriod to relieve
the chortedo there entided by the donolition by the Gordens
of Dutch powr. plants. Subsequently Us Mov of
14.8 revorsed PIS. ,our the bronght into Bulgins from the
Leiherlends when Inc: of trrnsport due to invisiganto conl
musty antwod ,over guneration difficultion in Holgium,
3.
No lining: Lictricts.
All of the Butherleids corl is nined in the
,rovince of South Linburg. This province is located in
the extrune south-onsturn ,art of the country end is
bounder. on the Smith end "unt by Belgin end on the Test
by Company. There mo L2 requeing corl and in the
Methorlends, 8 of which non ;rivately owned and 4 are
State owned,
1.02ET
Metherlands coals are classified as follows:
Class
Description
Volatile
Production
A.
Jry and so-i-bitu-Inous
up to 10%
9.75
3
Rituminous
10 to 154
36.0,:
C
Gas Coal
15 to 20%
3.2%
D
Long Place highly bituminous z plus =
51.1-
5. Rate of !roduction
In 1537 the ..Jthorlands produced 14,300,000 tons, while
in 1938 the -roduction figure van 13,500,000 tors. In 193 production
dropped to 12,860,000 tons and in 1943 the roduction Fac 12,457,000
tors. approximately 61. of coal reduced in the Motherlands Le from
State-owned :Incs and 39.: from privatoly owned ings,
The following: taolo indicatos tie monthly net pithnad
tonnages, beginning in October 1944:
Gotober 1944
176,873 tons
Loverber 1944
196,691
"
December 1944
259,378 n
January 1945
314,000
"
February 1945
312,000 "
It is estimated time the monthly production for the poriod
March through June 1945 will be as follows:
Earch
360,000 motrio tons
Arril
£15,000
"
"
"ay
485,000
-
"
June
520,000
"
"
c. Condition of ines ad Squipment
The province of South Linburg was liberated during the
letter eart of September 1944. The attented to cause a
connlote surpension of the Lutch inin industry following: their
retreat. "hero was systematic demolition of all pair In 0.0038 of that
- 10 -
required for running the Fine pumps, and the Germans recoved such
operational supplion as pit lamps, snare -achine norts, retals,
wire, conveyor belting, lubricating oil, fuel oil, food, clothing,
trucks, automobiles and medical supplies. hile the mines themsolves
suffered almost no battle dasage, the recoval of these essential
supplies, coupled with the disruption and reloval of rail and barge
facilities, caused an almost complete cessation of the Industry.
" requisition for emergency supplies was submitted in
Cotober 1944, and two subsequent requisitions were placed shortly
thereaftor. Those total approximately 605 tono of supplies and
were intended to cover & three -onths period. Further requiritions
for numblics for the period January 1st to and 1st have been
placed. Receipts up to January 1st 1945 consist artroximately of
40 tona of supplies, the largest nart of which WILS 20L.
d. Pitwood
Lormally 1,0% of pitwood used in the Cotherlande mines
came from indigenous sources. Of the 60% imported, 50% was
supplied by Russia and l'inland and 10% by Cermany. At the time
of the liberation of the Interlands rines there was sufficient
nitwood to produce only an estimated 364,000 tons of coul. Pitwood
stocks steadily decreased through Abruary, and as a result
directives were issued to 21st Army Group and Com % to deliver
and procure the necessary require ents, beginning "arch 1st.
It 10 expected that the pitwood will come from Belgiun, Luxembour to
and the Motherlands, and that soto tonnages will be imported from
Fortugal.
The mipply of pitprops is, however, happored by
the lac. of sufficient transportation but is improving
- 11 -
as trucks are cado available by 21st Army Group for this
purpose.
e. Labor
At the mosent time there are approximately
36,400 -iners exployed against an estimated requirement of
41,500. It 1s not expected that the obtaining of nine labor
4111 be a cerious problem, although production has been
hampered by minors' strikes rusultin from the lack of food,
DOBD and transportation.
Under Comman occuration Dutch miners received
EL ration of 4,000 calories & day plus a bonus of cin and
cigarettes for extra work and Gunday work. Throughout
Cotober, after liberation, the -aximu- allowance for miners
was 1,600 calories a day. AB of mid-February, however, the
heavy workers' ration has gradually been increased to 3,300
calories a day. This is still below normal requirements.
The clothing whortage is serious but 1s showing; a slight
improvement.
Cord sining operations in tip Methorlands
require a capacity of 105,000 kwa electrical nower, There
are flve nower stations located in the :::no area having a
total inst.11ed camelty of 250,000. The
available canacity in somewhat lower due to insufficient
boilor facilities. The -aximur de-and in tio province was
approximately 135,000 lows during the prever years, of which
105,000 was consumed by the vires. The Gurmans destroyed all
but 54,000 generating cupacity in the area by de-olishing the
stear turbines. Luccessful repuire have been -ade, however,
and there is now available sufficient generating equipment
to nroduce approximately 200,000 kws.
- 12 -
1,508.7
4. ORGAN
a) Aachen ining District
"aximum production in the Aachón District reached
the figure of 7,934,000 tons in 1937/8 (coal year ends
'arcl. 31st). The Jormans successfully maintained good
Toduction during the war years; the estimated tonnage for
1343/44 being 7,334,000 tons. Aachen is one of the oldest
-ining districts of Germany but the more desirable seans have
been exhausted. The coal produced is chiefly stean grade, but
approximately 17% is used in the -anufacture of coke. Only a
scall percentago of the Aachen coal 1s suitable for loconotive
uso.
The following: rines have Seen uncovered in the
Anohen district:
Eschweiller Sergworks Veroin Group
Others
Anna 1
Carolus "agnus
Anna 2
Marl ..lexander
Adolph "Corkotoin
Sophia Jacoba
:aria
Culmuft (Brown coal)
Cachmeiller
Laurwer
your ires, the Anna 1, arna 2, 44015h erkstein, and Laurweg
aires at .lodorf and Rohlacie la were the least damaged and were
solected for production. The Carolus l'agnus and Karl lexander
:ines are badly damaged, but are now ready for limited production
when lobor is available. Paria and Couley received severe damage
and it will be BOMO time before they can be out into production.
Sonhia Jacoba was recently uncovered. All personnel have been
- 13 -
SECRET
romoved and the condition of this nine is not known. The
Eschweiller mine can be considered as lost, The brown coal
mines at Zuknuft cannot be operated as all personnel were
renoved, in addition to essential equipment. Structures and
buildings have received severe damage.
The German Colid Fuels Sub-Section of SHAKF is
giving technical advice in respect to the selection of
mines to be placed in operation and in operational matters.
b) The Krofeld Matrict
A detachmont of the German !olid Fuel Sub-Section
has completed a preliminary survey of the Krafold district
which before the par produced about 61 million tona a year.
Underground workings have not been dar.nged or affected, and
pumping is roceeding and production has started at two mines.
About half of the workmen employed at these minos
were foreign, all of whom have been evacunted.
The pitwood stocks are low.
c) Supplies
The supply situation is not critical at the
moment when considering available personnel and the
tonnage of coal that can be produced. Combat troons
who have occupied the area have removed many essential
Items of supply, particularly steel timbers, pitwood,
niners' lamps, and electrical arts. Should conditions
change and adequate personnel be provided, extensive
requisitions for supplies and materials would be submitted
to bring these ninos up to or noar capacity production.
The German Colid Fuels Sub-Section of SHAEF
is taking appressive action in order
- 14 -
SECRET
to have present supplies safeguarded. They are
surveying the supply situation in respect to future
tonnage. Fifty-four tons of emergency supplies were
requisitioned in December 1944, consisting chiefly of
lubricants, explosives and soap.
An additional requisition for six tons of supplies
was nade in February.
A list of supplies required for the next six
months' operations of the Aachen nines is in process of
preparation.
d. Pitwood
Pitrood for this district will have to come
from local sources. A survey is being made by the
German Solid Fuels Sub-Section of SHALF so that proper
planning can be completed to insure an adequate supply
when needed. The major domand concerned will be givon
target tonnages for delivery when advisable. At the
moment small stocks are at hand but this problem must
soon be faced as these stocks are now being depleted.
e. Power
Adequato generating capacity in svailable for
nine operation. Utility officers from G-5 Division,
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, have
been studying this matter in coordination with the German
Solid Fuels Sub-Section. One French electrical engineer
with two French electrical technicians familiar with the
equipment at the Karl Alexander and Carolus Magnus mines
is supervising repairs to generating equipment at these
mines. At the same time repairs are being accomplished
at Kohlscheid and Aladorf. Connecting pover transmission
lines are being rebuilt at the request of Solid Fuels
-15-
SECRET
Section in order to gain officialsy at existing
power plants and conserve evailable ocal stocks.
r. labor.
Tormlly the Aschen Listrict does e.ployed
approximately 25,000 workern. If this amount it is
felt that A maxima of 2,800 ORD be recruited, and then
only when the tactionl situation improves. At present
there are about 2,300 at work. Only a few additional
workaen wore attained during the want' of Pobruary and
no immediate improvement is auticipated. Its Gergane
employed e large number of Frisonare of -ar and ot? -
forced foroi,n Intor; ell were received at the tim of
the worden withdrawal, and are consequently not now
available.
A sorious problem has brom creeted by t14 de-
parture of practically all qualified top supervitory
officials. Tone were found at the Varolus Agous inc.
Two remaining at the Earl Alexander due were received
for security reasons. I½ larguat company in the field,
the Techweilar -orgworks eroin, had thrus qualified
sociniers laft by the to sintain the due of
t'nt Coupair. these were removed recently in t's program
of de-Mazification of "ar.an industry 80 that no qualified
top supervisors ora now available for these dines.
Pro ute and t'ree frace} onginetre Isvo E+m secured
by oolid Pugls oution and attnched to the worden Solid
/ouls out-Section to assist in the weintenance and opera-
tijn of 131.00 in the Assion District. Date ore l'ow
skill d working left and a serious problem the the Love
orgated with respect to repoir end unintenance.
-10-
8 Ca T
Awaiting ontr, into the Ger-An Sear are two
officers and five vulisted with and twonty-five /ronet
civilian onginate 15 the United Solid ruale Sub-Saction
to insure t'st proper ATO teken 63 provent
flooding of the nines and to organize available German
personnel 00 tist production OLD be startsd as quickly
ne possible. Additional /reno' engineers are teing.
processed 62 tirt they MAY proceud to the weren wear
when needed at It is anticipated vat the Ver.,Ans will
reacte sll top supervisory personnal. It 18 felt that
t'e labor supply problem will be I.S sorious ne 1. is at
present in the /schep vistrict.
the Lelgian, Fronth and Tothorlands Tational
Authorities Yess Leen requested to Furnish toornical
wining personnel for the Ruhr. It is hoped that
approximately fifty will be nie avoilable.
C. Operatin;
The responsibility for sureguardin e ul mintain-
: in the in the Anotion vistrict rosts with tio Aray
Croup 5:" this srue, Actual supervisior 1s Lein carried
out by llitery overnuent nid Civil stairs
dylnet wints. Tochnicel earlstance is toin: provided by
the 442 Ab onlic regls out-opotion. Frinch civilian
engineers ero in charge of the Carolus agree end horl
Alexander since, subject to the direction of ilitary
Govern not officers. reanining alone are teing
operated 15 "orann officials, also subject to the
direction of ilitar: =avernment Officers.
t. Finance.
Approximately 1,000,000 reichanrks were found
at the dnox winn uncovered. 1910 -Jany was used to not
the initial payrolle under we suporvision of vivil
Affoirs officers. through the afforts of the wolld
-12-
a On I
/usls Secuion, the /inance Officers, 0-5 Division, of
the Are in the area has been provided with l'unce which
he will advance to qualified Ano officials to unit
Docessary expenses upon the presentation of propor
certificates of nocessity. As soon as possible,
financial institutions in the Andhun aroa will be opened
end will be provided with necessary funds to be advanced
to the worth Aning companies whom nonded, and upon
presentation of proper certificates by. qualified officials.
1. Production.
Production has bean limited due to the shortace
of labor; look of adequate supervisory personnel, and the
fact tist the dres have be+n loorted in the ocubat area.
Yor EDWA time the plants roanined under enery shallfire.
'xtensive general desage has provented operation and in
addition W. tactical situation FAB limited circulation
for security PORSOUR. 114 waren bolid Fuels out-Section
Fee assisted in paining permission from tactical unit
comanders and .ilitery - overnment officers for workien
to circulate 63 that they ditt travel to and from work.
Actual production from the adnos, Aladorf and Kohlsoroid,
began alqut the middle or Jotober 1944, not load aftor
the 11:45 W-TO occupiod. Production during the sonth
of suptimber avera ad approximately 4,000 tone a wook,
which tomiego was oligitly lase the that required to
operate the dos power plants. Present stocks ware,
t'oreforo, gradually depleted.
T'st pithead production in thy Amoben area is
outlanted as follows:
December 1944
17,000 mitric tons
January 1145
18,000
#
=
The stockpilo 00 or Vebruary 27th WSE ustimated
at approximately 30,000 tons, or which approximately
-18-
S'OUT
10,000 thes visa 0020 1: 18 not anticipated that any
afterial increase will rusult until additional labor
can Le recruited.
Production has increased sinco this the and
during the wook 21-27 February the idned WES
approximately 6,000 tons, which tonnago is 1,000 tons
in EXCURE of power plant requirosents.
B. 31" at 1573
TM monthly importe requirements of
pross which cost to considered alon; with France, Torway
and Doninrk following the consation if Postilities are
estimated by SPATE to be ES follows:
Swaden
250,000 tone
Switzerland 225,000 -
Italy
160,000 e
The annual total of tlass require.com is
approximately 7,000,000 tone.
6. Un KINGLO
23g L.X. opal position Pas lan the auf joot of
several independent studies and surveys. The facts
w+101 are not Fort) in those studios will not be repented
in this report. the following papers, Fowever, are
asons the basic documents which tevs been asse-2-led by
the ission and reference should be made to then for
dutailed analysis of the present and the prospective
U.K. ocel position:
a. Regort on the Coml Situation in wrost britain,
1943-4, 1044-5, by the Services of Supply,
TOUSA and the Parrisan ission, dated June 17,
1643.
D. Second Report on the Coal Situation in Greet
critain April 1544, propered by the ission for
-19-
STORT
Seonozie Affeirs dated April 29, 1%.
Co The European Coal Problem in the imm-di-te nost
pay years prepared by the Winsion for Economic
Affairs dated August 22, 1944.
The views which have been rerched in the fore-
going reports and which are held by the coal experts in the
U.K. today, Are that there has been, and will continue to ba,
a gradual decline in U.K. coal production. This decline
will continue over the next for years. It is the opinion
of these experts that the present U.K. coal consumption
can not be out.
The total coal imports free the U.K. to Northwest
Surope from June let 19/2 to March 1st 1945 zere 810,812
tons erainst CHARK requirements of 1,336,400 tena. The
Ministry of Fuel and Power has now stated that there -111
be no coal whatscever available for exnort from the U.K.
after August 1945. The U.K. her been moble to belance
its own cool budget and faces nt present a 4,200,000 ton
d-ficiency for the next coal year for home consumption.
B, ILL
1. In General
The transport of coal in the European Thenter 1ª
P.R. much P problem 0.8 is production, During December 1944
approximity 2,700,000 tona of molid fuels and pitprops
TERA transported in liberated Northwest Europe. This
00 pares with the total tonnage of military supplies (ex
colid fuels and POL discharged) imported into the continent
during the shore period of 3,130,000 tons. Extremely
cold werther at the end of December and during the month
of January lessened the efficiency of the milronds and
immobilized canal traffic because of freezing. An coute
transportation shortage resulted and the production of
solid fuels outran the neons of transportation from the
tines to points of destination.
The situation at the prevent time is that
production and imports of coal on the one hand are about
belenced by the availability of the DONE of transportation
on the other. Since it is anticipated that solid fuel
production will continue tc increase produally in France,
Belgium and Holland during the next several months, much
of this increase will have to be atockpiled unless
additional transportation can be provided. Additional
transportation means principally reilroad transport.
2, Reilrouds.
Reilronds carried the bulk of the conl distri-
bution before the Mh? and are doing 80 nt the present time.
For the month of February 1945, 79% of the tonnages
of solid fuels and nitwood transported in liberated North-
west Europe mere carried by rail, the percentage by countries
being na follows: France 99%, Belgium 65%, Holland 59%.
The railroads, however, are operating under difficulties of
wagen and locomotive shortages and ET* corrying a high
percentage of military traffic. Cut of . total of
135,000 open top wigons on the French and Belgian reilroads,
70,000 or 53% have been allocated for the transport of
solid fuels end pitprope. This allocation was based on
the probable maximum number of werens available rather
than on requirements, In order to transport anticipated
consumption needs, it is extimated that the daily rail
engon requi remente for solid fuels and pitprops will
gradually increase from 5,885 in February to 7,775 in
June, an increase of 32%, If this figure is to be met,
additional repons end locemotives will have to be imported
end, if possible, repairs to indigenous equipment will
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have to be increased.
The pattern of coal distribution in pre-war
Burope included n good desl of cross-haulings of sprcial
purpose coal, Because of the extreme shortage of rail
cars this cross-hauling has now been out to 0 minimum.
For instance, imported coal is now distributed only in
the area of France mest of the sero longitudinal
meridian with the exception of the port of Rouen and a
few other localities requiring ninor amounts of coal,
Corl imported into Morseilles is used at the rort and
along the Line of Communication AS fer north no Lyone,
The French authorities have been co-operative in holding
down on mateful cross-hauling of colid fuels,
3, Canale and Motor Transport.
Great destruction vas coused to Lie inland
enterways by the retresting Germand through the systematic
subotage of dons and locks. Much repair work hee been
done on the carials by both the Army Engineers and the
local authorities, and cennl systems of France, Belgium
and Holland are fast returning to normal operation, It
is not anticipated, however, that the percentage of
tonnages that can be transported on the inlend matermays
will increase greatly from now on because of the chartage
of harges end tuge corpared to pre-mr numbers. In
February, it is estimated that the canals carried about
15% of the tonnsge of solid fuels and pitprops in North-
west Europe; 10%'in France, 17% in Belgium, and 28% in
Holland, Every effort is being made to increase the
use of inland mterroys 80 at to relieve the pressure on
the milmys.
Truck transport of solid fuels 10 only used for
local distribution and does not play en important port in
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the large novements, Through the co-operation of
Communications Zone and 21st Army Group, however, acme
trucks, tires, and POL have been mde available to the
local authorities for the coll-ction of nitprops and
their transport to reilheeds and sidings.
c. ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES
Conntant consideration must be given to the
problem of procuring ensential current supplies without
which coul cannot be produced.
Conl reines require 6. multitude of both common and
highly specialized items, few of which or carried in
normal militery stocks. Many items are required at a
more or less uniform rate, depending on the tonnn,'s of
coul mined, conditions of nining, and local practice.
The most esvential one these are pitwood, explosives.
oil, and lubricants. Many other it-ms, the demand for
which is difficult to estimate far in advance, RTP scurce
and not readily procurable in many countries in Europe
even in peace time. Among these may be listed hoisting
cables, power transmission and rubber conveyor belting,
other rubber and asbertos compounde, friction and rubber
tape, rubber covered cables, and alloy metals for eary
uses,
Channels for procurement of supplies required
for nine operation were established on October 11th, 1944.
Determination of supply requir conta inconjunation with
the Nutional Governments concerned become A function of
Solid Fuels Section. The initiation of orders for the
procurement of supplies and equipment not available at
the mines nor available from national resources become a
function of Solid Fuels Section. Procurement end delivery
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of nine supplies became a Communications Zone responsibility.
During the period October 1st, 1944 to March 1st,
1945 M total of 6,631 metric tens of mine supplies (exoluding
mine timber) have been ordered. or this amount, 3,665
metric tons, or 55%, consists of lubricants. The balance
18 made up of orders for belting for conveyor systems,
pneumatic hose for coupressed air-driven nine equipment,
clothing end medical supplies for minore, repair ports for
mine machinery, and miscellaneous expendable supplies.
An estim total of 1,074 tons of mine supplies, or 16%
of those ordered, have been received. Standard petroleum
products and lubriconts are being secured from continental
Arry stocks. Special petroleum products such as turbine,
stene cylinder, and transformer oils are being imported.
Other autorials are also being imported.
The following table shows metric tonnages requested
by months end imports received originating from there requests.
Tons Requested by Months
Rec'd to
Area
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Total
Nor 1 1945
Northern
PRANCE
425
585
164
1,270
330
2,784
665
K TIST LANDS
69 595"
1
10
83
758
121
DELGIUM
- 1,874- 313
10
102
2,299
288
Southern PRANCE
-
-
532
198
-
730
-
Cestern GERMANY
-
-
54
-
6
60
-
Tot 1 by Months 494 3,054 1,064 1,498 521 6,631 1,074
* Three months' requirements of all supplies.
: Six months' requirements of POL, delivery called for on a
monthly basis.
e Three months' requirements POL and clothing.
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In process of compilation and not included in
the above tonnages are nine supply requirements for the
six bonths period following Earch 1st, 1945 for French,
Belgian, Netherlands and uncovered German rines.
As an indication of the quantities of naterial
required over the next six nonths period the requisition
for Pas-de-Calais, France, now in preparation totals
approximately 27,000 net tons, of which 22,000 tone
comisto of stool pitprops, arch roof supports, steel
plates and other structural shapes. Other items consist
of both finished products and raw caterials from which
finished products will be manufactured in Europe. The
amount of material requested is screened to furnish the
minimum requirements neoded to maintain the present
operations without allowance for rehabilitation or extension.
Supply requests from the Netherlands have been
received in an orderly manner because the Netherlands
National Government early established & central agency
within the country to:
a. Secure estimates of needs from all times and
b, Handle receipts and make allocations of supplies
received.
The French submissions have been slow because the
Central National Agency established in France to prepare
requisitions has been unable to perform its function,
principally because of lack of direct contact with the
mines.
The Belgian agencies have been unable to ostablish
a Central Agency with which the Solid Fuels Section can
deal on supply matters. Their requests have been, and
continue to be, received piecemeal.
Piecemeal requisitions are unsatisfactory because
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the principal part of the industrial items required from
the United Kingdom and United States plants are allocated
some nonths ahead. It is, therefore, necessary that
requests for industrial equipment and tools be in the
hands of supply agencies in the United Kingdom or United
States preferably six months ahead of need. This enables
supply agencies in the UK/US to put in requests for mine
supplies with the knowledge that these represent the total
needs for the period stated.
For these reasons the Solid Fuels Section continues
to submit "emergency" requisitions for France and Belgium.
D. SHIPPING IMPLICATIONS.
SHAEF estinatoo the minimum import requirements of
coal for Norway, Denmark, Holland and France to be 573,000
tons a month. (The National governments rininue estimates
are materially larger). of this tonnage, 200,000 tons
are loconotive coal.
The cont of shipping coal from the U.S. to Europe
1s the full time employment of 30 ships per nonth for each
100,000 tons of coal on the basis of an estimated two-conths
turn-around and 7,000 tons cargo capacity per ship.
It is clear that it is highly improbable that
there can be any substantial shipments during either the
European or Japanese war, except possibly during the first
two or three nonths after VE-Day.
E. ORGANIZATION FOR HANDLING THE COAL PROBLEM.
1. SHAEP.
The responsibility for the coal problem in SHAEP
is concentrated in Solid Fuel Section of 0-4, Supreme
Headquarters which was constituted in September 1944.
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The Section was created to provide Supreme Headquarters
with a central control of Solid Fuels for both Military
and Civil use both by the exploitation of continental
coal deposits and by importation. Sub-Sections of the
Solid Fuel Section are operating in France, Belgiun,
the Netherlands and Germany.
As the magnitude of the coal program increased
it because obvious that the relation between the military
agencies and the National Government required clarifi-
cation. AB a result of a meeting in Paris with the
French in September, 1944, & "Torking Party" was formed
in France upon which sit all interested military, as well
as the representatives of those departments of the French
Government concerned with the Solid Fuel problems.
Similar working partics have been formed in Belgium and
the Netherlands. There are no civilian representatives
from the United States or U.K. on these working parties,
either as members or as observeru, although such represen-
tation has been requested by the civilian agencies.
2. LONDON COURIELD COLL CONTITIFE.
The Combined Coal Committees in London and in
Washington were established in August and September 1943
respectively as Sub-Commd ttees of CPRB and CHI'B. The
terms of reference of the London Coal Conmittee are to
report to the London Committoe of the Combined Production
and Hesources Board and to the Vinister of Fuel and Power
on:
a) The requirements of coal for oversoas operational
purposes and for conquered and liberated territories
where the responsibility to ensure supplice resto with
the British Empire or the U.S.A.
b) Requirements of coal sining machinery to facilitate
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the output of coal within the British Empire.
c) The sources and means of supply to neet (a) and (b).
3. EUROPEAN COAL ORGANIZATION.
In December 1944 it was proposed that there should
be established & luropean Coal Organization. It was
suggested that the European Coal Organization operate
either as & Sub-Corad ttee of the proposed European T.conceic
Coundttee or that it be closely connected with it. The
purpose of the organization would be to bring about the
post effective distribution of coal and eining equipment on
the Continent and the coordination of shipments from
overseas.
Meetings with the British, Hussians and French are
now being held in London in the attempt to formally establish
this organisation. There has been general agreement that a
European Coal Organisation should be set up to coordinate
European requirements and surplies in relation to world
shortages of coal, mining labor and equipment. Final
agreement, however, has not yot been reached as to the method
by which such an organisation will function. The question
of whether the organization is to have executive and admini-
strative powers, as favoured by the U.K. and the French, or
whether it would be purely advisory, as favoured by the U.S.
and the Hussians, has been the subject of extensive
discussion. A further factor which has been the primary
obstacle to the formal organization of the FCO is the
position which the Russians have taken concerning the
disposition of German coal. The Hussians have insisted
that a statement be included in the terms of reference
which would give priority to reparation demands.
The
other participants in the discussions have taken the
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position that tids would be inappropriate in such A document.
The Hussians have also raised the question of membership of
the Polish Lublin Committee, which is unacceptable to the
U.S. and the U.K.
In order to get on with the vitally important work
proposed for the European Coal Organisation the U.S., U.K.,
and French representatives are now discussing the possibility
of establishing a Northment Furopean Coal Committee, inviting
the Russians to ait in as observers or members as they may
choose.
The establishment of BODO European conmittee to
deal with the coal problem is considered by the American and
British coal experts to be absolutely escential so that the
maximum utilisation of coal, equipment and labor can be
aclieved.
Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, Tngland, April 15, 1945.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST
AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.
SECRET
EXECAL YRANSPORTATION
Propared by Roouman :ission,
London, Ancland, April 15, 1945
SECRET
I.DEX
INTRODUCTION
RAILROAD T.ANSPORT
I. Conditions of Ways and Structures.
A. France.
B. Relgiun,
C, Holland,
D. Horway and Donmark.
II. Loconotives.
A. Franco.
B. Belgium.
C. Holland,
D. Norway and Denmark.
III. Railroad Cars.
A. Francé.
B. Belgium,
C. Holland.
D. Norway and Denmark.
IV. :laintenance Facilities.
A. France and Belgium.
B. Relgiun.
C. Holland,
D. Norway and Denmark.
V. Impact of 'Ulitary Requirements on Railroad Trans-
cortation Systems in Liberated Areas.
A. France.
B. Delgium.
C. Holland, Horway and Donmark.
INLAND UATERWAYS
I. Condition of Ways.
A. France and Delgium,
B. Holland.
C. Forway.
D. Donmark.
&
II. Barge and Coaster Population
A. France, Bolgium and Holland.
B. Lorway and Denmark.
ROAD TRANSPORT
A. France.
n. Holgium.
C, Holland,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION
D.TRODUCTION
The two most critical lindting factors upon the
rehabilitation of Northwest Europe and its return to oconomic
stability are coal and internal transport.
The Northwest European countries have relied for the
internal distribution of supplies upon railroads, inland water-
ways and motor transport. It is generally true to say that the
order of importance of inland transportation facilities in France
and Bolgium is 1) railroads, 2) inland waterways and 3) motor
transport, In Norway, Donnark and Holland the order of innortance
is 1) waterborne transport, 2) highway transport and 3) railroads.
I have personally observed the internal transport
conditions in Franco, Belgium and in the presently liberated
area of Holland, Because they are still occupied by the enemy,
it was not possible to obtain first-hand information about the
transport situation in Norway, Donnark and occupied Holland.
However, the condition of transport found in the areas already
liberated is indicative of what may be expected in aroas still
occupied by the Germans,
It can be stated generally that all of the liberated
areas are extremely short in all three methods of internal trans-
port. Our own bombing and artillery fire has created substantial
damage to railroad facilities. Similar damage to bridges and
other inland water.my installations has scriously affected the
capacity of the bargo lines,
In their withdrawal, tho Cermins carried out extensive
demolition of railroad bridges and naintenanco facilities and locks
and bridges across the canals, ::oreover the Germans, during the
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period of occupation, removed very substantial numbers of loco-
motives, railroad cars, canal barges and motor trucks from the
areas which they occupied.
Even the small amount of transportation equipment
available in Northwest Europe after liberation has been canable
of use by the local governments on only a very limited scale,
This has resulted from the over-riding military priority for the
use of all forms of Inland transport for the movement of troops
and supplies.
SHAFF and Headquarters Communication Zone, U.S. Aray,
advise ne that VE-Day may not result in any significant decrease
in the military use of inland transport facilities, although it
is not capablo of definite ascortainment at this tine, Moreover
they indicate that there may in fact be some increase in the use
by the military of inland transport facilities due to the require-
ments for the re-deployment of troops and supplies. In the case
of the American army, this will particularly affect France.
Present plans for the re-deployment of Amorican troops not
required for the occupation of Germany contemplate that they
will be re-deployed through France. During this period there
will continue to be a constant burden upon Prench inland trans-
nort for the movement of troops and supplies. A similar burden
will no doubt be cast upon Belgian, and to some degree Dutch,
facilities in order to accomplish the re-deployment of British
and Canadian forces.
In an attempt to evaluato the existing and potential
inland transport cituation, I have discussed the problem with
transport experts at SHAK? headquarters, with the transportation
representatives of the various SHARP country l'issions and with
the intorosted Government officials in the various countries,
The information which I have obtained is detailed below.
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RAILROAD TRANSPORT
Railroad transport is in the nain the basic method
for internal distribution in the countries which I have studied.
The shortage of coal for loconotivo power constitutos a
definite limitation on the rapidity with which rail transport-
ation can approach pre-war levels. This problem I have dis-
cussed in detail in #V robort on the coal situation. In this
report I propose to limit By discussion to the railroad situation
and to the condition of physical plant and equipment.
1. Condition of Says and Structures.
A. France,
At the end of 1939 prior to the Gorman occupation of
Franco, there were in operation by the French railways 26,377
milos of permanent way, On 15 September, 1944, which, for
practical purposos, was the carliost date Allied forces could
commonce rehabilitation of French railways, there were in operation
11,313 niles of way. By lot March, 1945 sufficient restoration
of the French railway system had boen accomplished by the Fronch,
supplementod to a very largo extent by military railway and
ongineering troops, so that there were thon in operation 24,564
niles of permanent trackage.
In other words, by lst l'arch 1945 a 93% of restoration
of railroad ways in Prance had been accomplished. In effecting
this restoration the Allied authorities reconstructed 14,202 miles
of rainlino track and 850 miles of sidings. /lthough the trackage
actually rostored to operation is approximately 931 of pro-war
trackage, the complete use of those ways has not been restored by
an equivalent percentage. This is largely because of the
temporary character of the roconstruction of bridges and tunnels
acconnlished by the military authorities.
As the result of allied bombing or Coman domolition,
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there were 1,005 railway bridges and tunnols badly danaged
or destroyed. of those there have now been repaired and
returned to service 595. llowever, as stated above, the
restoration has been in almost all casos of a temporary
and emergency character, O.C. the use of woden bridges
rather than stool and the replacement of double-tracked
bridges with single-track structures. However it is fair to
say in conclusion that, so far as railroad ways are concerned;
the facilities restored are more than adequate to carry any
traffic which prosent and potential power and rolling stock
can handle within the immediate and foroseeable future.
B. Belgium.
Prior to the German occupation, the Bolgian
railway system included 3,064 niles of permanent way. By the
1st Carch 1945, 2,926 miles of permanent way wore again in
operation. itehabilitation of the Belgion rail:my trackage
required construction or repair of 2,370 milos of mainline
tracks and approximately 500 miles of sidings. AS a rosult of
allied bombing or German demolition, the number of bridges and
tunnols badly damaged or destroyed was 358, of which 295 have been
repaired and rostored to service,
The physical situation and the capacity of the
Rolgian reilroad ways is in connarable condition to those in
France. Às in France, it appears that in Belgium the condition
of railroad ways should not be a limiting factor upon the
ability of the Belgian railways to handle such cargo as may be
anticipated in the foreseeable future.
C. Holland,
As only a very limited area of Holland has now been
liberated, an overall picture of the condition of railroad ways
in Holland 0.0 a wholo is not available. It 10 fair to say,
however, wat the railroad May conditions In Holland can be
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SHORET
expected to be weree than those which prevail in Frence and
Belgium, and therefore will require greator reconstruction
offort. The demolition experience in Belgium and France
17:15 between 10 and 155 on track, 75% on major bridges and
10% on small bridges. In the liberated area: of Holland the
demolition experience on track has varied from 10-85,1, but
the bridge demolition was approximately 100%. In liborated
Holland all railway bridges except one were badly damaged
or dectroyed.
D, Normy and Denmark
Presently available information indicates that no
substantial destruction of reilreed says and structures has
taken place to date in either Norway or Dermark, There is
always the possibility - perhaps the probability - that
damage may be suffered prior to notual liboration.
III Locomotives.
A. Prance.
Prior to German occupation, the total locomotives
on French railways vore 16,575, of which 14,693 wore service-
able. As a result of, German withdrawnlo and alliod bombing,
this anount prior to allied liberation dropped to a total of
11,700, of which only 7,613 were servicoable. It will be
doen from those figures that the serviceable loconotires in
France wore roduced during the Corman occupation by nearly
50% At the present time, as a result of resteration and
allied imports, the total of the loconotives in France is
14,712, of which 9,439 are serviceable. It is apparent that
to bring the power of French railreads back to pre-war lovels
will require an additional 5,000 locomotives, :broover, many
of the locomotivos now in operation are very old and ineffic-
iont in their operation, and require continuque hoavy maintenance
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in order to keep them in operation.
B. Delvium.
Prior to the war the total number of locomotives
available on Delgian ruilroads was 3,500, of these, the Termans
removed 1,000. of the 2,500 rocaining, only approxi-ately
1,500 are in workin- order; and only approximately 25" of the
1,000 bad order locorotives are capuble of repair. In Bel-ium,
ancrodicately 113 locomotives are nov under construction under
contracts initiated by the Germans. Telivery is expected to bagin
at the rate of approximately 10 locomotives a month some time
during the summer of 1945, but delivery cannot be completed
before 1946. It follows from the foregoing that between 2,000
and 2,500 locomotives will be required in Belgium to restore the
power to pre-war level. The physical condition of the
locomotives now operating in Bolgium is somowhat Jetter than the
condition of fronch loconotives, and loss reintenance will DO
required to keep loconotives now operatin; in continuous operation.
C. Holland.
Detailed information as to the corporative locomotive
situation of Dutch railroads as between now and ore-war is not
available, and will not become available until after the
liberation. Powever, the extensive demolition practised by the
Germans in Rolland and the large scale removals from Holland
of motor transport and barge equipment indicate that similar
practices will have been followed in the case of rail equipment,
and that a very real shortage of locomotive power may be antici-
pated.
D. Norway and Denmark.
Locomotives available in Denmark are at approximately
pre-war levels. However, Loncark has no indi_enous coal with
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which to fire ito locomotives, nor does it have indigenous
petroloun to lubricate them. It is anticipated that
existing resources of coal and petroleum will expire in
Donmark on July 1st. Thereafter the operation of her rail-
roads will depend upon importation of these itoms.
So far as Horway is concerned, the Germano during
occupation have added to the locomotive noculation. However,
oporation of Norwegian railroado will be depandent ontirely on
the importation of coal, lubricants and bearings, nono of
which are locally obtainable.
III. Railroad Cars.
A. France.
Prior to German occupation French railroads had a
total of 466,509 railroad cars, of which 404,116 mero service-
able. Upon liberation, these totalo had been reduced, as a
result of military operations and Gergan withdrawnls, to a
total of 208,560 cars, of which only 178,926 were serviceable.
At the prosent time, due to repair of French equipment and allied
importations, the total number of cars on French railroads is
260,583 of which 194,201 are serviceable. It is apparent from the
foregoing that the serviceable cars on French railroads are to-day
less than 50% in amount of those available prior to German
occupation.
B. Relgium
Prior to German occupation the accregate number of
railay care on Bolgian railroads was approximately 90,000.
Today there are slightly in excess of 60,000 cars operating on
Belgian railroads, of which about 193 are now currently in ronair
shops, The percentage of cars under repair was stated to be
normal and covers all types of repairs from light running romiro
to heavy reconstruction types,
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C. Holland.
As vus the case with respect to locomotives, no
detailed information as to the car situation in Holland 10
available. It is expected by the nilitary authorities that,
due to heavy German withdrawnls of equipment, car shortages in
Holland will be proportionately higher than those found to
exist in France and Belgium.
D. Norway and Donmark.
The railroad car situation in both Horway and Donmark
is substantially as favorable as was the cabe before the war.
In Horway, although there has been nose docrease in passenger
equipment, there have been increases In the number of freight
cars in operation.
IV. Maintenance Facilities.
A. Prance and Belgium.
Pacilities for the maintonance of locomotives and
cars in both France and Delgium suffered substantially from
alliod military bombing and in & lesser degree from Gorman
demolition.
Although the facilition have been substantially
reduced for the reasons indicated, in both countries existing
facilities are adequate to maintain oquipment currently available.
One of the serious difficulties in maintonance presented during
the past winter was the fact that round houses and shops, although
in working condition under moderato weather conditions, were not
completely operational during the winter months because of
destruction of roofs and lack of coul, Repair to roofs during the
summer months should increase the efficiency of round houses and
other naintenanco facilities. Subject to ropair of roofs and
provision of heat, the capacity of Pronch locomotivo maintonance
facilities is substantially restored to pro-ter Levels. The
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capacity of car repair shops in Prance has not been as
completely restored. Prior to German occupation large
car repair shops in France had a capacity of 742,100 hours.
Their present capacity is approximately 270,000 hours.
Small car ropair shops in France had a pre-war capacity of
approximately 1,000,000 hours, which now is limited to
approximately 1,250,000 hours. However, the best estimate
available is that French mintenance capacity both for
locomotives and cars can be kept abroast of the ropair
demands which will be placed upon them.
B. Belgium.
The maintenance facilities in Delgium were not
subjected to as heavy damage as were those in Franco. Detailed
statistical data by which a comparison of present capacity and
pre-war capacity can be made is not available. Howdver, both
military and civilian agencies agroe that Bolgian maintenance
facilitios presently existing are adequate.
C. Holland.
No definite information is available with respect to
railroad maintonance facilities in Holland.
D. Norway and Donmark.
It is understood that railway maintonance facilities
in Norway and Donmark are, at least up to the present time,
in substantially as good condition as was the caso before the
war.
V. Impact of ilitary Requirements on Railroad Transportation
Systems In Liberated Areas.
A. France.
Probably the most accurate statiotics available to
reflect the impact upon the French railroad system of nilitary
transportation demands are the figures indicating respectively
the military and civilian tonnage carried. In the first few
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months after the beach landings the civilian tonnage carried
on the French railroads was very small compared to the
military tonnage. This situation resulted from the disturbance
caused by the advance of our armies. In Fobruary, 1945, after
conditions in France had become comparatively stabilized, aggro-
gate tonnage was 6,300,000 tons, of which 5,500,000 tons
constituted military supplies and 2,800,000 tons, or 345 of
the total, constituted French civilian tonnage. :hen it is
remembered that the overall capacity of the French railroads
is somewhat less than 505 of the pro-war normal, it is apparent
that the reilroad transportation currently available for French
civilian needs is in the neighborhood of 15% of the pre-war
availability.
B. Bolgium
It is estimated that the current total daily carrying
capacity of the railway system is approximately 100,000 tons.
Today available capacity 1a divided approximately as follows:
57,000 tons for military traffic, 22,000 tons for coal, 15,000
tons for Belgian civilian traffic and 6,000 tons for Nethorlands
traffic. when,it is ronembered that total rail capacity in
Belgium is approximately two-thirds of that prevailing before the
war, it is apparent that the share in this capacity available for
Belgian civil traffic is very small compared to their pro-war
availability.
C. Holland, Norway and Denmark,
Sinco the major part of Holland has not yet been
liberated, as is likewise the case with Norway and Donmark, it
cannot be said that the alliod military make any demands upon
their rail systems. This, of course, is not applicable to the
relatively small liberated area of Holland where military demands
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SEC.U.T
SLC.ST
are utilizing almost all of the rail capacity available.
INLAND ATTH AYS,
1. Condition of Days.
A. France and Delgium
The navigable waterway system of Ircnce and Belgium
consists of a combination of rivers and canals connected with
a system of dans and locks. This system aggregates 4,125 miles,
of which on "arch let, 1945, 2,438 miles or 50% of the total
were in active service. It vas expected that there would be
heavy decolition of dars and locko by the Jersans as they
withdrew. Althou: such destruction who attempted it was
comperatively incifective. A greater ,roolne in restorin: the
inland unter.ay systems to full capacity was the neconsity for
resoval of rany bridges crossin? the canals and rivors which cere
destroyed and which effectively blocked covement on the canals
for sore poriod.
Repair to dama and locks is going forward continuously,
as well as removal of bridges, sunken craft and other impediments
to navigation. It is estimated that the Belgian portion of the
France-Delgium internal water-eay system is 95% operable. In
France the first priority has been given to the rehabilitation
of the waterways having the greatest military significance. is a
result, the Seine and Rhone sections of the French inland water-
way system have been substantially restored. It will Je some
time Jefore the net-work in the north and nurta-c-st will DO
restored to normal operation. However, Jobl, trunch authorities
and aray engineers are continuously at work, repairing damare
with the result that additions to the matermyr are being put
into operation each rook.
", Polland.
The principal inland mtercays in Holland lie within
the area which is still occupied by the Germans. Therefore the
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condition which vill be discovered upon liberation is unknown.
C. Norway
In Norway, internal distribution by water is
accomplished by coastal shipments rather than by canal or river.
La soon as the námos can be cleared, Norway's coastal waterways
should be completely operable.
D. Tennsork
No problem as to waterways was reported in Dermark,
II. Barge and Coaster Population
À, France, Belgium and Holland
The exact statistics with respect to the present
barge pridation In France, Belgium and Holland, as compared
with that (X) sting before the var, are not available, Howover
it is clear that in all three countries there has been a sub-
stantial reduction in the barges available for operation
This results primarily from tiro caused: (a) with-
drawal by the Germans for the use of Cerman waterways and (b)
deterioration due to lack of adequate maintenance. The SHALF
:Mssion to Belgium ostimates that the present barge populative
is from 50-55% of the pre-mar barge population, However,
because German withdrawals were concentrated on the larger
capacity barges, the present barge population is capable of
handling only slightly in excess of 40% of the pro-war traffic.
It is fair to estimate that the situation in France is
comparable to that of Belgium. Cerman withdrawals of all
types of equipment from Holland have benn proportionately
greater than those in France. As & result, it is probable
that the barge population of Holland will be found to have
been reduced to an even greater extent than was the case in
France and Delgium,
3. Norway and Dennark
In Norway and Demark the limiting factors will
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not be lack of craft. !lere, as is the case with their rail-
roads, the limiting factors are fuel and lubricants. Craft
in these areas are powered both by coal and diesel fuel.
Neither the materials for power nor those for lubricating
purposes are available locally either in Norway or Denmark,
As a result, if their internal water transport systems are
not to be paralysed, these materials must be imported,
ROAD TRANSPORT
A. France
The French Covernment estimates that the truck
population of France pro-war was 473,500, which had been
reduced by Fobruary, 1945 to 137,500.
:y own observation throughout France was first,
that there were very few cargo-carrying vehicles on the
roads and second, that those in operation were old, obviously
in a bad state of repair and subject to frequent road
failures, No new motor vehicles have been made available
for French civilian use between June, 1940 and the early
part of 1945.
Coreover the production of essential spare marts
and batteries during the period of German occupation was
diverted very largely to Corman military use, The result
was an abnormally high mortality of civilian vohicles. This
mortality has been accelerated since liberation, because
deficiencies in rdl transport have caused an increased
burden on France's motor transportation facilities. A
further limiting factor has beon a very great tire shortage.
SHAKF advised ne that in its opinion the stated
French requirementfor 100,000 new vuhicles was not excessive.
France is beginning production of new trucks on
a limited scale. The extent to which this production can be
enlarged is dependent upon the amount of coal which Cilly he
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nade available for industrial production, necessary imports of
run caterials, and improverent in the internal distribution
vyatem.
3. Telpium
Comparatively, Belgium's notor transport is in better
condition than that in France. Belgium is a much smaller and
more compact country than France. In addition to an extensive
railway net-work and a large canal system, Belgium is served by
an extensive system of inter-urban tranways. As a result,
Belgium's dependence upon truck transport is comparatively less
than that of France. In 1938 Relgium had a truck population of
77,600. In late Frebruary, 1945 this had shrunk to approximately
37,600, of which approximately 6,000 were not in operation due to
lack of tires. ShAnk's transportation people estimate 3elgium's
requirements for trucks at 10,000 3-ton vehicles.
C. Nolland
The highway transport problem in Holland is extremely
acute. "y own observation in liberated Holland indicates that
there is almost total absence of motor transport, removal by the
Termans having been practically complete.
Distribution of local supplies in the presently
liberated areas has been made possible only because of the assign-
ment by 21 Army Group of three military truck companies with 600
vehicles which have devoted their entire time to assisting in the
internal distribution of supplies in the area. It 1a expected
that a similar situation will be found in the presently occupied
areas, SEAL# lieadquarters estimated that the number oi vehicles
which will be required are approximately 12,000. They also stated
that, initially, even greater numbers of motor vehicles will be
required in order to accomplish essential internal distribution.
The additional supplementary vehicles required in the initial stares
can probably be provided from military sourcen on a temporary basis.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
1. I an deeply impressed with the fact that no sub-
stantial economic rehabilitation can take place and that in many
areas even a minimum subsistence economy cannot be maintained
unless prompt action be taken to improve the internal transporta-
tion situation in Northwest Europe as rapidly as possible. I
appreciate that immediate and complete rehabilitation is impossible.
2, I recommond, however, that every possible assistance
be given the liberated countries not only in according high
priorities to their requirements for rolling stock and locomo-
tives but also in their efforts to rehabilitate their railway
maintenance and repair shops.
3. Every possible assistance should be given to the
liberated areas in allocating raw material for the local produc-
tion of locomotives and wagons.
4. A survey should be made immediately by the U. 3.
Army of the number of Aray trucks in the theatre which might be
available after V-E day for assignment or transfer to the govern-
ments of the countries of Northwest Europe.
5. The possibility should be earnostly explored of in-
creasing the rate of reconditioning for thoir benefit worn-out
trucks both in the theatre and in the United States, if the latter
is feasible on shipping grounds.
Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London,England,April 15, 1945
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THE UNITED KINGDOM AS AN IMEDIATE
POST V-E DAY SUPPLIER OF THE LIBERATED
AREAS OF NORTH ..EST L'UROPE
Prepared by the Roserman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945
INDEX
A.
Food
B.
Raw Materials,
C. Coal
D.
Consumers Goods (Other than Food)
Conclusions
THE UNITED KINGDOM AS All INVEDIATE POST VE-DAY SUPPLIER
OF THE LIMITATED ARRAS OF NORTH! WEST EUROPE
It has become increasingly apparent that supplies of
many kinds may not be available in the immediately forthcoming
months in sufficient quantities to moet the minimum requirements
of the liberated areas of North Seat Europe. While this applies
with particular emphasis to coal, transportation, and high-protein
food, still there will also be 8 dearth of many other products which
are needed to maintain health, and reactivate industry.
In this connection much thought has been given to the
question whether the United Kingdom will be able to make supplies available
in substantial quantities either from (1) stockpilea of food and raw
materials previously imported, or from (2) new production of con-4
sumero and capital goods,
Discussions in reference to those products which have
been stockpiled in the United Kingdom in greater than usual quan-
tities as & precautionary war measure are now taking place at the
ministerial level in Washington. It is expected that decisions will
there be made,
Therefore, the United Kingdom 65 an immediate or early
post VE-Day supplier of food products and raw materials other than
coal will be considered only briefly in this paper.
A. FOOD:
In view of the food stockpile discussion now under way,
no attempt will be made to estimate the tonnage which might be
made svailable from the food stockpile to the liberated areas.
Novertheless, it can be stated that the tonnage of certain food
products, estimated to bei available in June, 1945, substantially
exceeds the poace-time reserves. It 18 estimated that reserves
of food products for which the United Kingdom largely depended
upon imports were sufficient, in pre-war years, for a three to
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three and one-half months supply. It is estimated that in June
of this year the stockpile will total about 5,000,000 tons, or
& five months supply.
The food stockpile comprehends many items and the quan-
tity available in the stockpile say bear different relationships
to normal paacetino stocks for different items. Thereform, it is
necessary to study the composition of the stockpile as well as
the over-all amount in order to determine possible availabilities
for transfer from the stockpile to the Continent.
Perhaps a reserve supply of this quantity is still
necessary in view of U-boat warfare, shortages of shipping, ir-
regularities of ship arrivals, and other uncertainties in the
situation. If a joint decision is made, however, that the stock-
pile can be reduced without unnecessary risk, it is generally agreed
that this should be done not through direct transfer from the United
Kingdom to the Continental countries, but rather through a diver-
sion of shipments from supply sources which otherwise would have
gone to the United Kingdom,
In any event, it is probable that the United Kingdom
stockpile can be used to a limited extent for direct shipment to
the Continent under conditions of grave emergency.
B, RAT MATERIAIS:
While the situation varies for particular products, the
conclusion appears warranted that substantial quantities of certain
raw materials in the United Kingdom stockpile might be made avail-
able for Continental use if the difficulties of handling and ship-
ping warrant such transfer rather than direct procurement of oup-
plice from original sources. In addition to pipeline stocks there
are in most cases special contingency reserves which the Minister
of Production doems necessary to enable him to meet his various
obligations. These contingency reserves were set at three months
net consumption. This measure was used because, in the opinion
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of the shipping people, it takes about three months to correct
a supply difficulty in any particular material. doth as the
result of the high level of war-time IF oduction and the need
of assurance that supplies will be available when neęded, the stock-
pile 10 in excess of peacetime reserves.
Present raw material stocks in total are lower than the
aggregare of pipeline stocks plus the three months contingency
reserve. For some particular items, however, actual stocks are
above the total required amount and, therefore, could be reduced
without unnecessary risk. Among these products are cotton, wool,
copper and other non-ferrous metals.
However, if a decision is reached during the current
negotiations that the stockpile of certain items can be reduced
for the benefit of liberated areas, it may be desirable to divert
shipments which were destined for the United Kingdom rather than
to transfer tonnage in the United Kingdom directly to the Continent.
Novertheless, it 1a probable that the United Kingdom will
not wish to reduce its stockpile of raw materials as it would be
more advantageous to utilize these reserves in manufacturing in-
dustries and subsequently to export finished products.
C. COAL:
The United Kingdom as & supply source of coal for liber-
ated countries has been fully treated in the section of this report
dealing with coal. It is sufficient to note in this section that
the British coal position has gradually deteriorated, and that
the delivery of additional tonnage to the Continent would seriously
jeopardise transportation, industrial activity, and domestic con-
sumption in forthcoming months in the United Kingdom. In the
opinion of coal experts in the United Kingdom, the combination
of declining coal production, seriously depleted reserves, and
the inability further to decrease British domestic consumption
will soon prohibit the continuation of coal exports now being made
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through military channels to liberated areas.
D. CONSUMERS 00008 (Other Than Pood):
During the was the production of consumers gooda in the
United Kingdom has been sqverely curtailed. Early in 1941 it
became apparant to officials that the civilian goods industries
would have to have their labor supplies cut down, their raw mater-
ials supplies curtailed even more severely than formerly, and conse-
quently their production activity even further reduced.
with these considerations in the background the Hoard
of Trade informed the textile industry, the footwear industry,
the paper industry, and a considerable number of ninor "non-
essential" industries that they would be required to concentrate
their manufacturing facilities in & suitable number of nucleus
firms.
As a result, civilian production was discontinued in
thousands of factories and 50,000,000 square feet of factory space
was released for other purposes. There was a substantial cut in
the production of textiles and blothing. Over 50% of the reduced
capacity is used for Government requirements, another 33% for civil-
ian requirements, and the remainder for exports, largely for the
Empire.
A substantial increase in the production of consumers
goods cannot be expected immediately after VE-Day since it will
be aone months before a sizemble work force becomes available and
can be shifted to the consumers goods industries. The Government's
policy in to relax certain controls over manpower; nevertheless,
it will retain sufficient power to keep the war industries manned,
and to channel the movement of labor from war production into the
essential consumers and capital goods industries, Some loss in the
total labor availability will however occur since control of certain
age groups and women workers will undoubtedly be withdrawn. There
will also be a manpower loss from a substantial group of individuals
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who, though physically unfit, remained at work through patriotic
motives. In the demobilization problem, priority in discharge
will probably be viven to former workers in the building trades
since housing and other physical reconstruction demands will
have the highest of all priorities for labor.
Without additiona 1 production during the early postwar
months it is difficult to see how the United Kingdom can be an
important source of supply of consumers goods for the liberated
areas. hile there would be every desire to furnish such goods
to the continent in order to reactivate the export trade, there
will be rany competitive denands for current output. At certain
tires during the war, the available volume of particular consumers
goods has not Jeen sufficient to maintain established rations.
Furthormore, home consumption of many types of consumers goods
during the long years of the war has been less than one-half of
normal; and stocks in the hands of manufacturers, wholesalers, re-
tailers, and, particularly, in the hands of consumers, are at a
low level.
From the point of view of political feasibility, it 18
doubtful whether substantial volumes of consumers goods could be
exported in view of domestic needs. There is, in addition, a
substantial deferred demand from various parts of the Empire which
must be net, at least in part. Thile there may be odd lots of mr-
chandise which will find their my to the Continent, particularly
textiles, still the volume of exports will not be great even though
some may be dictated by political consider.tions.
E, CAPITAL 300DS:
There is considerably greater prospect that a substantial
volume of capital goods may be rade available to the liberated
nations in the early months after VE-ay.
The capital woods industries were war-inflated rather
than war-restricted; and conversion to the production of peacetime
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goods in certain instances will not be difficult.
The [roduction capacity for reilway wagons was conver-
ted to the extent of 80% for military items, but, according to
the linistry of Production, reconversion can take place quickly.
In fact, the Vinistry already has a program established for de-
liveries of locomotives and wagons to France in the last quarter
of 1945 and the first quarter of 1946.
As for motor vehicles, there is a consideruble production
of trucks; and the military trucks made in the United Kingdom are
more nearly like civilian trucks than their United States counter-
parts, In addition, there are used vehicles in the United Kingdom
available for repair; and a significant number of reconditioned
units have already been sent to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
It is possible, however, to be too optimistic about the
likelihood of substantial exports. It must be remembered that
many economic facilities in the United Xingdom have not received
sufficient repair and replacement during the war period, and that
obsolescence has accumulated, The deferred maintenance is strik-
ingly indicated by a recent report that approximately 20% of the
United Kingdom's electrical power equipment is inoperative more or
less constantly because of needed repairs, as compared to a normal
figure of 58. It is said likewise that flour milling machinery
has been worked 60 incessantly in the war years that certain plants
are now incapable of use.
Moreover, throughout the Empire and in other markets
normally supplied through the export trade, there is likewise
deferred maintenance on capital equipment which originated in the
United Kingdom. Aa in the case of consumers goods, there will be
strong competing demands for automotive, railway and electrical
equipment, and & host of sealler items which will be needed every-
where for repair and maintenance purposes,
However, long-term self-interest will probably dictate
that a certain proportion of the sugmented output will go to the
liberated nations.
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CONCLUSIONS
Wy conclusions in reference to probable availabilities
of products desired by the liberated areas from the United King-
dom are as follows:
(1) The United Kingdom now holds substantial quantities
of food and raw materials, over and above normal peacetime reserves.
Whether the uncertainties of supply and shipping make reserves of
the present size necessary will be decided in current discussions
at the ministerial level now in progress in Washington,
(2) The quantities of different products in the stock-
pile vary greatly in reference to normal peacetime levels. There-
fore, supplies of certain products should be available.
(3) The United Kingdom will not, until at least six
months to a year after VE-Day, be an important source of supply
of consumers goods for the liberated areas of Continental Eupope.
Nevertheless, small quantities of a miscellanoous variety of goods
in odd lots will probably be available,
(4) Significant quantities of capital goods, both new
and used, will be available in the United Kingdom for transfer to
liberated areas. llowever, competing demands for repair and re-
placement of capital goods, both in the United Kingdom and the
Empire, particularly in the fields of transportation, communication,
and power facilities will offer severe competition to the demands
of the liberated areas, and will substantially reduce immediate
availabilities.
Prepared by the Rosenman l'ission
London, England, April 15, 1945
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945
SECRET
INDEX
INTRODUCTION
SITUATION IN FRANCE
I. Electricity
A. Extent of Damage
B. Extent of Rehabilitation to Date
C. Future Situation
II. Gas
A. Extent of Damage
B. Rehabilitation to Date
c. Future Situation
SITUATION IN BELOJUM
I. Electricity
A. Extent of Damage
B. Rehabilitation to Date
C. Future Situation
II. Gas
A. Extent of Damage
SITUATION IN THE NETHER,LANDS
I. Electricity
A. Ratent of Damage
B. Rohabilitation to Date
C. Future Situation
II. Gna
A. Extent of Damage
SITUATION IN NORTAY
I. General Utilities Situation
A. Extent of Damage
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B. Futuro Situation
SITUATION IN DEMARK
I. General Utilities Situation
A. Extent of Damage
B. Rohabilitation to Date
RECOMED/NDATION
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
INTRODUCTION
So far as I was advised in consultation both with several
public utility experts and the representatives of the various
governments involved, no serious problem is presented with respect
to water or severage systems apart from the effect upon them which
may have resulted from damage done to elsotric power systems and
transportation systems. Therefore, in this report on public
utilities, I have restricted myself to a discussion of électric
power and gas producing facilities.
In general, with the possible exception of Holland, the
wide-spread damago to utility systems which had been anticipated
by the allied military authorities did not in feet occur. Prior
to D-day SHAEF had assembled a group of specially skilled and
trained utility experts, some of whom were in uniform and others
of whom remained in civilian status. These experts had made
careful plans for emergency rehabilitation of electric and gas
producing systems.
Two completely equipped oil-powered floating power
plants, each of 26,000 kilowatt capacity, were provided in the
theater for emergency uso in port areas where the most extensive
damage was anticipated. Through collaboration with the Central
Electricity Board in England, SHARF accumulated in the United
Kingdom a lerge stock of miscellanoous electrical equipment and
maintained it for immediate use on the continent. Stocks of
solid fuels, fuel oils and similar operational and maintenance
supplies were accumulated and held available upon D=day. The
group of commissioned technical experts were to go into communities
with the forward elements of the troops in order to accomplish
emergency repairs to power plants as fast as possible. For
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example, these officers were in the electric plant at Caen while
the city TOB still under fire. They started working in Paris on
the day of liberation and in Brussels on the day after liberation.
It TELE not possible to use the civilian technicians so close to
the actual operational front.
These groups of experts provided by SHAMP were limited
in numbers, Their main qualification nos in their experience and
understanding of the most expeditious methods for rebsbilitation.
Their services were, therefore, utilized in the first instance to
supervise the work of the Army engineers; in the latter periods they
furnished technical assistance and advice to the civiliar utilities
people in the countries involved.
By virtue of this advance preparation, it was possible
to restore the gas and electricity producing facilities quite
rapidly. This resulted in the prevention of what night have been
irreparable damage to vital installations dependent for their
maintenance and operation on the public utilities, e.g. the coal
mines, in which serious flooding was in most instances prevented.
It also permitted rapid restoration of utilities essential to the
civilian population and a substantial lessening of what otherwise
would have been serious difficulties. In the field of utility
rehabilitation, the allied military foroes have furnished very
significant aid in the liberated areas.
A brief discussion of the situation as I found it in
each of the countries in question follows:
SITUATION IN FRANCE
1. Electricity
A. Extent of Damage
The overall damage to electrical generating
facilities in France as estimated by SHAEF was approximately 20
percent as to Thermal stations, with a resultant reduction in
capacity of 880,000 kilowatts, and 10 percent as to Hydroelectric
stations, with a resultant reduction in capacity of 389,000 kilowatts.
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The Hydroelectric damage TAB confined almost entirely to the Alp
Region. The Thermal damage extended throughout the areas where
fighting took place, the greatest damage where the heaviest fight-
ing took place.
B. Extent of Rehabilitation to Date
The restoration of the electric power
producing plant in France has been very substantial. It is a
significant faot that the electrical generation in France in 1945
in
will exceed both/Thermal generation and Hydroelectric generation
the kilowatt output of 1938, which was the last normal year before
the occupation. In Paris, in March 1945, the consumption of
electricity exceeded by 30 percent consumption in the sase period
in 1938.
C. Future Situation
It is my impression that, BO far as France
is concerned, there is no serious problem with respect to the pro-
duction of electric power which 1s of immediate urgency. Since
much of the restoration TEB of a temporary emergency type, it will
be necessary for France during the next few years to receive more
than the normal maintenance requirements for her electric power
system. However, the present plant seens adequate for the fore-
secable future.
II. Gas
A. Extent of Damage
The gne industry of France is made up
largely of local plants to serve the local areas. The only grid
of gas mains is in the Northern coal fields and is a comparatively
small one. Although the overall damage amounted to less than five
percent of the aggregate production facilities of the country,
somo important individual plants in areas where heavy combat took
place suffered substantial damage. The principal limiting factor
governing the production of gas in France is not the amount of
destruction which took place, but the inadequacy of the fuel supply.
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Hero again, as with all vital industry
in France, I was impressed with the over-riding importance of
obtaining somo solution to Prance's coal problem. or course
the shortage of internal transport for the distribution of coal
use likevice a contributing limiting factor. As a result of
this situation, gas production has dropped in France to about
60 percent of normal outside of Peris and about 88 percent of
normal within Paris,
B. Rehabilitation to Date
Repaire to damaged gas plants are going
forward with reasonable rapidity. The major effort toward re-
habilitation of gas production, however, has been in the pro-
vision of assistance in the way of transport and fuel. The gas
service in Paris was completely terminated on August 20, 1944,
due to lack of fuel. Through the assistance of the allied
military authorities, within thirteen days some limited service
wes being made available to 90 percent of the population. This
was made possible by the military providing 300 tons of Diesel
oil a day. The efforts of the French government supplemented by
the assistance of the allied military authorities in improving
the coal situation and the internal transport conditions are in
fact the important rohabilitation elements in connection with the
gas industry. I have described the situation with respect to
coal and transport in dotail in special tabe covering those
subjects.
C. Future Situation
The future of the gas production industry
in France depende for the most part upon the future availability
of coal for internal transport.
SITUATION IN BELOJUM
I. Electricity
A. Extent of Damage
of the 31 main electric power producing
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plants in Belgium, only about 333,000 kilowatte or approximately
25 percent of the effective capacity suffered par damage. As of
March 1945 only 224,000 kilowatts or 17 percent of the effective
power capacity is still out of service as a result of war damage.
The transmission and distribution system in Belgium suffered
only slight damage which has been repaired by the local utilities
with military assistance.
In Belgium as in France, the shortage of
fuel and transport has directly affected the capacity of the pro-
duction systems. The solution of this problem is discussed in
detail in the coal and transport tabulations included in this
report.
B. Rehabilitation to Date
One of the difficulties militating against
efficient use of the Belgian distribution system was that the
Belgian electric grid had never been completed. This failure of
completion vas due to deliberate sabotage by the Belgians during
the period of German occupation. After liberation, and with
military assistance, the work was properly completed.
Until quite recently Belgium vas still
the center of active operations. Her electrical distribution
systems were normally coordinated with those of Germany and France.
Under the conditions which have prevailed it 1.8, of course,
impossible to use this normal distribution system completely. This
loss wes replaced to some degree by the use of the two floating
pover plants which the allied military authorities had provided.
The use of these plants, as they are Diesel powered, not only
furnished a necessary supplement in kilowatt output, but also
provided the output without the ordinary use of will for that
purpose. The coal saving is at the rate of about 600 tons per
day for each plant, a total of 1200 tons per day.
C. Future Situation
It is expected that the rehabilitation
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of the Belgian electrical power plant can be carried out by use
of normal supply channels within a reasonable length of time.
Surveys are also being made as to the feasibility of supplementing
the Belgian capacity with power imported from Germany or Switser-
land. The difficulty in importing power from Switzerland is that
Switzerland desires coal in exchange for the power. Here again
the European shortage of coal proves to be a limiting factor on
industrial rehabilitation. It 10 expected that, upon the liberation
of densely populated areas of Holland, the tro floating power plants
now in use in Belgium will be diverted to Holland to meet the greater
need which will develop.
II. Gas
A. Extent of Damage
Except for the limiting factors of shortage
of coal and internal transport for its distribution there seem to
be no serious problem presented in the case of the gas utilities in
Belgium as no significant damage by the Germans was experienced,
SITUATION IN THE NETHCHIANDS
I. Electricity
A. Extent of Damage
Prior to liberation of the Provinces of
Gelderland, Zoeland, Nord Brabant and Limburg, the effective
capacity of the power plants connected with power supply systems
in these Provinces was 450,000 kilowatts. During the operations
preceding liberation of these provinces, destruction by the enery
and operational damage reduced this capacity to 120,000 kilowatts,
which represented a loss in production capacity of 3 percent.
thuch of the damage in Holland was suffered by major transformer
substations. A substantial part of the damage was BO severe that
provision for its repair cannot be made while active operations
must be supported on the continent. The transmission lines
suffered operational damage from shell fire, and their repair
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more
has been made/difficult because it has been necessary to
remove the mines laid along the transmission lines before per-
sitting access to repair crows.
B. Rehabilitation to Date
The type of destruction in the Metherlands
and the necessity for removing the mines along the trensmission
lines has made it essential that the civilian authorities receive
substantial military assistance in the rehabilitation process. By
March 1945, the efforts of the local utilities people assisted by
the allied military forces raised the effective capacity of the
production systems in the liberated area to 227,000 kilowatte, or
approximately 50 percent of normal.
Present plans call for a further increase
to 296,000 kilowatts, a level of 66 percent of normal by September
1945. The balance of generating equipment is 80 badly damaged
that further repair under present conditions is impossible. In
addition to the capacity produced by rehabilitation of existing
Dutch plants, plans have been nade to provide Holland with an
additional 20,000 kilonatts of production from Belgium upon the
completion by the military authorities of the Merxen-Roosendael
tieline. The limiting factor militating against the possibility
is the availability of the necessary coal.
As the arnies nove forward into Germany,
the military authorities will make repairs to the transmission
lines connecting Germany and Holland. It 18 expected that by
September 1945 it will be possible to provide a flow of electric
power into Holland from salvaged German power plants of approxi-
mately 20,000 kilowatte. Eith the provision of the additional
40,000 kilopatts from the sources indicated, September 1945 will
see the area now liberated with a total effective power capacity
of 336,000 kilowatts. Roughly speaking, the normal demands of this
area do not exceed 276,000 kilowatts; so it in expected that by
September 1945 presently liborated Holland will have obtained a
normal production of electricity.
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c. Future Situation
The future f occupied Holland, with
respect to electric power, is not capable of accurate prediction
in the light of facts now obtainable. I was told by everyone with
whom I talked, whether civilian or military, that the looting of
vital power and industrial plants in Holland far exceeded that in
either France or Belgium. The Butch authorities as well as the
military expect to find a serious power situation in the heavily
populated areas of Testern Holland North of the Great Rivers.
Immediate assistance in this area has been planned by SHAEF, to
be provided by moving the floating power plants now operating in
Belgium into Holland. Also some stocks of mobile generating
equipment have been assembled by SHAEF to be utilized in the
areas of greatest emergency.
I believe that after complete German
withdrawal Holland will undoubtedly have requirements for
electricity producing plants which will be of a high order
of urgency. The exact character or amount of these requirements
can only be ascertained after examination on the ground.
The utility experts at SHAEF feel quite
strongly that solution of the electrical power problem in Holland
will rest to a large degree on the amount of power which can be
imported from Germany. The same thing is true in Belgium and
France, but for different reasons. In Holland it is expected
that the shortage of power will result from plant inadequacies;
in Belgium and France it will result primarily from a shortage
of coal and internal transport. It is the belief of the SHARF
exports that the importation of. power from Germany into Belgium
and France will to a certain extent case the already crushing
burden which rests upon their coal production and internal
transport facilities.
II. Gas
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A. Extent of Damage
2
I was not advised of any serious
deficiencies in the gas production capacity of the Netherlands.
I therefore assume that, subject to facts which may result from
an examination on the ground after liberation, no serious problem
with respect to gas utilities is presented in the Netherlands.
SITUATION IN NORWAY
I. General Utilities Situation
A. Extent of Damage
The limiting factor with respect to both
electric and gas utilities in Norway is, in the main, not the
condition of plant but the ability to obtain coal for power and
petroleum products for power and lubrication. Although Horway
is the scene of extensive Hydroelectric development there are
substantial demands in the utilities field for coal and power.
The present information which I was able
to obtain is that at the present time gas and electricity plants
in Norway are in good shape with the exception of those located
in Finnmark and the gas works at Trondheim. What will be their
condition on eventual liberation, of course, is now impossible
to say.
B. Future Situation
The future of the gas and electric utilities
in Norway will vary in direct proportion to the extent to which coal
for power and petroleum products for lubrication can be obtained.
Neither of these vital supplies 10 locally obtainable in Norway, with
the exception of small coal deposits in the North, the size of which
are completely inadequate to meet the most basic of Norway's minimum
coal requirements.
SITUATION IN DENWARK
I. General Utilities Situation
A. Extent of Damage
Denmark's utility situation is analogous
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to that prevailing in Normy. The best information available
discloses that elestric and gas plants have not been damaged.
Here again, of course, it is not possible for no to state what
the situation will be when liberation has actually taken place.
B. Rehabilitation to Date
Even if the physical condition of the
utility plants proves adequate upon liberation, the actual pro-
duotion of gas and electricity which can be expected from them
will be dependent entirely on the extent to which imports of
coal and necessary lubricants can be obtained. Denmark has no
domestic coal or petroloum production.
RECOMMENDATION:
1. As a means of supplementing the electric power
production of the liberated areas of North Test Europe and con-
serving their critically limited supplies of coal, the possibility
of further exploiting Germany's electric power system, second
largest in the world before the war, should be given serious
consideration,
Prepared by the Rosenman :tission
London,England, April 15, 1945
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DISPLACED PERSONS
Propared by the Locorman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945
SECURT
SECENT
INDEX
I. Responsibility
II. Scope of the Problem
A. Administration
B. Supply
III. Relationship of UNERA
IV. Effect on Economic Recovery of Liberated Countries
V. Yalta Agreements for the Treatment of Russian Die-
placed Persons
VI. Elecomendations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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DISPLACED PERSONS
1. RESPONSIBILITY
One of the major problems confronting the Allied
Nations is the care and treatment of displaced persons.
The scope of this problem is increasing daily as the Allied
forces press farther into Germany and uncover more and more
of. these people who find thenselves liberated far from their
homes, The effect on the economies of the liberated countries
of Europe will be not only the additional supply burden
caused by the necessity to house and feed displaced persons
but also the administration and movement necessary to their
repatriation.
The official definition of displaced persons is:
"Civilians outside the national boundaries of their countries
by reason of war, who are (1) desirous but unable to return
home, or find homes without assistance; (2) to be returned
to enemy or ex-enemy territory." Displaced persons are
officially distinguished from refugees, the are defined as
civilians who are, for reasons related to the var, homeless
or distant from their homes in their own countries and require
assistance to return to their homes.
!!!litary authorities must of necessity assume
initial responsibility for the accomplishment of the Allied
objective to repatriate displaced persons and to care for
them until repatriation is effected. All of these persons
are liberated in formird Army areas and their care and treat-
ment must commence immediately. breover, the uncontrolled
movement of displaced persons or outbreak of disease among
them are potential threats to attainment of the military
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objective. For this reason the care and maintenance of displaced
persons has been undo a military command responsibility. At the
same time it is the military policy to transfer responsibility to
appropriate civilian authorities as soon as military conditions
permit. At that time UNRRA may be requested to undertake this
responsibility.
The general principles under which military planning
for displaced persons has proceeded are:
(a) In interior sones of liberated Allied territory
Allied governments have full responsibility for
displaced persons, including energy and ex-enemy
nationals uncovered within their countries, except
Soviet nationals uncovered after 11 February, 1945*,
(b) In forward zones military commanders are wholly
responsible but may delegate partial responsibility
to Allied local authorities as soon as the latter
can assume it, except in the case of Soviet nation-
als uncovered after 11 February, 1945*;
(c) Allied governments are responsible for their own
nationals both in interior and forward sones as
soon as they are liberated;
(d) !filitary commanders are wholly responsible for
United Nations displaced persons uncovered in
Germany, and if such displaced persons are temporar-
11y moved out of Germany to countries other than
their countries of origin because of military noo-
essity, responsibility for their care and maintenance
remains a direct military commitment and my not be.
delegated to Allied authorities.
*See Section V entitled "Yalta Agreements for the
Treatment of Russian Displaced Persons."
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IL SCOPE 07 NW
The total mumber of displaced persons which it 10
estimated will be uncovered in Germany is approximately
7,000,000. of this number it is estimated there will be
approximately 3,300,000 in the Russian none of occupation ard
3,700,000 in the U. 5. and U. K. mones. In addition'it is
estimated there will be uncovered a total of approximately
1,400,000 in Austria, Displaced persons include almost
every nationality of Durope with the predominate nationals
being Russians, Poles and French. The map attached as
Appendix A shows the estimated distribution of displaced
persons in Germany and Austria and the required flow to effect
repatriation. The Gorman policy apparently has been to trans-
plant slove labor as far from their homes as possible.
Repatriation can be accomplished as a result only by the criss-
crossing of Germany from east to weat and west to east,
As of 31 March, 1945 the number of displaced persons
uncovered and their location were as follows:
Location
In known installations
Others estimated
Belgium
26,772
8,000
France
105,041
124,000
Nethorlands
7,391*
-
Germany
59,492
-
*6,600 Germans
In addition to the foregoing, very large numbers of displaced
persons have been uncovered in Germany a nce 31 March as a result
of the rapid advance of the Allied forces.
A. Administration
The administration and controlled movement of this
large population alone presents a major task. The categories
into which displaced persons fall are numerous and each cate-
gory requires special administration. The following list
is representative:
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1. Displaced nationals of the United Nations.
2. Persons claiming United Nations prinoner of par
or civilian internee status.
3. United Nations expatriates residing in Gergany.
4. Neutrals.
5. Energy and ex-enemy nationals persecuted because
of their race, religion or activities in favor
of the United Nations.
6. Nationals of ex-enery nations at war with Germany.
7. Enemy and ex-enemy displaced persons and refugees.
8. Liberated Soviet citizens*.
9. Displaced persons of doubtful nationality claiming
United Nations origin.
10. Stateless persons, defined as persons who have
been denationalized or whose country of origin
cannot after investigation be determined, or who
cannot establish their right to the nationality
claimed.
Each person must be identified and administered
in accordance with the category to which he belongs.
Enemy and ex-enemy nationals, except those in category 5,
are the responsibility of German authorities acting under
the direction and supervision of military commanders.
Persons in all the other categories listed will be accorded
the sture assistance granted to United Nations displaced
persons after investigation and establishment of their
proper classifications. Responsibility for those persons
the are not repatriated rests with the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees, but UNRRA has agreed to care for them
for a limited period of time.
*See Section V entitled "Yalta Agreements for the Treatment
of Russian Displaced Persons."
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I personally visited several displaced persons assembly
centers in Germany and vas tremendously impressed both with
the administrative difficulties in handling this group and
with the way in which our Army is meeting the situation. The
importance which the Army attaches to this problem is evi-
denced by the fact that not only have military government
personnel been made available for the purpose but also units
which would otherwise have been employed with combat troops,
such as medical and sanitary units, engineering detechments
and truck companies,
Forward operations moving at an unexpectedly rapid
pace have uncovered displaced persons faster than planned
facilities for their care could be brought forward and
installed. As a result military staffs behind the lines have
been confronted with the job of providing in a single day
facilities for thousands of these people on an emergency basis.
This has involved location and appropriate preparation of
housing facilities, provision of medical and sanitary services,
transportation of the displaced persons, registering them,
policing the assembly center and providing food and clothing.
Limitations in numbers of available military per-
sonnal have made it essential that the displaced persons
care for themselves to the maximum extent possible. The
Army has housed the displaced persons to the fullest extent
possible in national units, but facilities for this segrega-
tion are not always available. The management and administra-
tion of each nationality, including the care of their quarters,
the preparation of their meals, the maintenance of their cloth-
ing and the ninor care of the sick, have been delegated to
leaders selected from the displaced persons themselves.
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From my own observation in the: portion of Germany
west of the Rhine I am satisfied that this system of handling
the displaced persons is working satisfactorily, although
the problem had not, of course, at that time assured the very
large dimensions which must today be facing the military
authorities.
B. Supply
The necessity to house and feed displaced persons
as well as provide clothing and medical care places a con-
siderable burden on the supply machinery of the United
States as the principal residual supplier. The feeding
of displaced persons has been planned by the military
authorities on the same basis as for the population of
liberated areas, that is a 2000-calorie ration. The
following table indicates the SHARF 1945 monthly import require-
monts of food for displaced persons:
MONTH
NET LONG TONS*
January
28,000
February
22,102
March
32,725
April
46,190
May
46,780
June
67,832
July
60,557
August
42,726
September
68,316
October
59,508
November
50,988
Total
525,724
Gorman indigenous resources are to be used to the
naximus, and preference is to be given to displaced persons
over the needs of German civilians. In addition to pro-
viding its resources, German authorities will be required
by military commanders to pay for all goods, facilities and
# Includes 20% of requirements to cover necessary stock
level, losses in transit, etc.
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SCOLET
services for United Nations displaced persons. In addition
to food & small amount of clothing and medical supplies will
be required, 08 well as the housekeeping necessities for the
displaced persons center.
III. RELATIONSHIP or UNREA
UNERA in authorized by its charter and council
resolutions and by an agreement with the Supreme Commander
to undertake the care, relief and repatriation of United
Nations displaced persons, but it can operate in an Allied
country only after agreement with the Allied government
concerned. UNRRA cannot undertake the care or repatriation
of energy displaced persons or refugees in Germany, except
stateless persons and persons persecuted because of race,
religion or activities in favor of the United Nations.
In order to facilitate the transfer of full responsibility
for United Nations displaced persons, UNREA staff officers
are being attached to all military headquarters at which
there are displaced persons staff officers and UNRRA has
already been requested to furnish 450 displaced persons
teams, of 13 people each, with an expectation that considerably
more treas will be required. Until UNREA takes over
sole responsibility, its personnel will not only as agents
of the military authorities and under their command. UNERA
recruiting has been slow and contimuous pressure has been
necessary on the part of the military. The UNRRA teams are
required, by agreement, to furnish their own "housekeeping"
equipment, including trucks, and in this connection it has
also been necessary for the military authorities to lond a
great deal of assistance to UNRRA in securing short supply
items. Despite such assistance the truck problem has been
and still is a serious one, insuruch no lack of proper
eq: ipmont has prevented UNREA from sending to the Army the
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full essistance desired. To date substantially the only
vehicles which UNRRA has been able to secure have been
reconditioned trucks from the U. X, which have not been
adequate. Inasmuch as the handling of displaced persons
will devolve at various stages upon the Army, UNRRA and the
Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, a clear-cut divi-
sion of responsibility between those agencies must be
established.
IV. EFFECT ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF LUMILATED COUNTRIES
The care, maintonance, movement and repatriation of
displaced persons constitutes a drain upon the economic
resources of the liberated countries of Europe. In addition
to the responsibility for displaced persons in interior zones,
and for refugees in their own countries, national governments
must assume the burden of maintaining displaced persons
uncovered elserhere after they have been repatriated. Many of
such persons -111 return to their native land diseased or in
ill health or without homes or a means of livelihood and under
such circumstances will become a charge upon the State. If
employment is available displaced persons vill provide a
potential source of labor, because the majority of them are of
the working or agricultural cless, However, in the present
economic state of the liberated countries it 10 probable that
repatriation may take place before the displaced persons can
be absorbed in the economic life of the country. Therefore
they represent np much of a potential source of unemployment
and consequent liability to the national governments as they
do n potential source of Inbor. Moreover, under present
circumstances a great majority of the displaced persons rbo
have been received into assembly centers will remain idle for
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a protracted period of time before they can be repatriated,
except for a small minority who may be employed in the manage-
nent, mainten nce and administration of the centers in which
they are situated. This is particularly true of the Eastern
Europeans whose repatriation must await the joining of the
U.S./U.K. and Soviet forces. !!ilitary plans provide opportunity
for employment of displaced persons in military labor battalions
and also approved civilian wrk while awaiting repatriation.
This source of labor will be most beneficial not only to the
amost stagnant agricultural production of certain parts of
Germany but also to the maintenance of the health and morale
of the displaced persons and their effectiveness for employment
after repatriation.
In addition to the foregoing, the extensive use
of transportation facilities for the movement of displaced
persons to their homeland will tend to delay full economic
recovery.
Finally, the supply requirements put forward by
the military authorities will impinge upon the world avail-
ability of supplies for national government import programs
because of the higher military priority on available supplies.
V. YALTA AGREELENTS I'OR THE TREATMENT OF RUSSIAN
DISPLACED PERSONS
Under agreements signed separately at Yalta by
the U. S. and U. K. governments with the Soviet Union, all
Soviet citizens liberated by forces under U. E. and U. K.
commande and all U. S. and U. X. citizens liberated by
forces under Soviet command must be provided with "adequate
food, clothing, housing and medical attention." Although
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the U. S. military authorities are responsible only for
<
Soviet citizens uncovered by forces under their command,
the position of the United States as the principal residual
supplier presumably means that the U. K. must fall back on
U. 5. supplies to implement its agreement. It should be
noted that the agreements cover all Soviet citizens, in-
cluding prisoners of war as well as displaced persons, and
that they provide that "the basis fixed for civilians shall
as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates."
It is also stipulated that the fullest possible effect
will be given to the provisions of the agreements "subject
only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of
operational, supply and transport conditions in the several
theaters."
The effect of the agreement is difficult to assess
at this time inasmuch as the precise interpretation of its
terms is still under study, but more especially because no
definitive directive has yet been forwarded to the com-
bined nilitary authorities in the field. Since tro bilateral
agreements vore signed by the U. S. and U. K. governments
respectively, their implementation might be said to rest
with the U. E. and U.K. theater commanders in the separate
zones for which they are responsible. However, SHARP has
undertaken overall administrative control of the care, control
and repatriation of all displaced persons so long as the
Supreme Constander has responsibility, and SHAFF accordingly
has a direct interest in the manner in which the Soviet
nationals are to be treated. Furthermore, the administrative
difficulties involved in disparity of treatment of any given
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nationality and the effect of such disparity in the handling
of other displaced persons make it necessary that the
treatment of Soviet nationals be coordinated in the U. S. and
U. K. zones by SHARF. Further complications will arise if
other governments request that their displaced nationale
receive sinilar treatment.
The supply implications of the Yalta agree-
ments, if they are to be given the brondest possible
interpretation and generalised to cover other than Soviet
displaced persons, are very substantial. and the quan-
tities of foodstuffs involved on this hasis could be
made available only at the cost of other claimants.
On the assumption that Soviet citizens should be pro-
vided the same diet as'a private soldier, SHALF
estimates that for the six-months period beginning
April 1st, 1945, an additional 80,000 tons of food
would be required for Soviet citizens alone, and if all
United Nations displaced persons are to be fed on the same
basis an additional 360,000 tons of food would be required
for the 88.00 period. The difficulties in moeting these
additional food requirements are the same as those limiting
all expansions of food supply program: the lack of stock-
piles on the continent, world supply shortages, and shipping
and internal transport shortages.
SHAEF policy at present is that, pursuant to
the agreements, Soviet citizens will be fed on the meximin
scale possible in the light of availability of supply
from time to time, and that, in view of the serious
political implications involved, all United Nations dis-
plnood persons will be fed on a similar mexium scule.
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SHAEF requested Army groups and Headquarters,
Communication Zone, to recommend an adequate scale of
feeding for Soviet citizens in the light of present
availabilitios of supply. The answer received was that
under present availabilities the maximum scale that could
be provided was a 2000-calorie ration.
In addition to increased food requirements the
treatment of Soviet citizens required by the broadest
interpretation of the agreements would necessitate addi-
tional clothing and transport as well as additional ad-
ministrative and medical personnel, all of which would
affect the ability to meet requirements of the liberated
countries.
VI. RECOMENDATIONS
1. The military authorities should be given &
definitive directive as to the action to be taken to 100
plement the U. S.-U.S.S.R. and U.K.-U.S.S.R. Ialta agreements
concerning displaced persons unless there are insuperable
political or legal difficulties. This should be addressed to
the combined, and not to the separate national, military
authorities.
2. This directive should specify that for administrative,
supply and transport reasons full endorsement is given to the
present SHAKF policy of providing for all displaced persons,
including Soviet citizens, on the maximum scale possible in
the light of availability of supply, and of dealing with
all displaced persons on an international-United Nations
basis. It is understood that the present ration in the SHAEF
area for displaced persons is calculated on the basis of
2000 calories a day. All interested parties should be
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promptly advised of this directive.
3. Repatriation of displaced persons should be
undertaken as speedily as possible. Persons await-
ing repatriation should be employed to the fullest
extent possible, primarily in agricultural work and
coal mining, but such employment should in no event
delay their repatriation.
4. The displaced persons problem is one peculiarly
international in character. UNRRA should be
encouraged to take as large a measure of responsibility
in this field as is compatible with military necessities
and with the decisions of each of the liberated
countries based on considerations of sovereignty.
5. The respective spheres of action and respon-
sibility of UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee
on Refugees should be established as soon as possible
by agreement between these two agencies.
Prepared by the Rosenman Itission
London, England, April 15,1945
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