Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
16620498
label
Office of Strategic Services - Reports, December 18, 1941- December 27, 1941
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
16620498
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Office of Strategic Services - Reports, December 18, 1941- December 27, 1941
citationUrl
collections
President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Subject Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
16620498
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b06d4acf21c14a49
ocrText
PSF: Office of Strategic Services : Donoven Reports, December 18-21, 1941
Folder # 2
PSF Subject File
Box 163
PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
I
1941
Donovan Report
No. 2
December 18 to 21
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Memorandum
Donovan to the President, and attachments
12/21/41
A
Book of Secret Instructions to Captains
Cuaderno de Instrucciones Secretas a Capitanes
(Sanitized versions opened in fille)
FILE LOCATION
PSF O.S.S., Donovan Report, No. 2, December 18-21, 1941
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information,
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
December 18, 1941
12 M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Attached is the text of the Fulda Pastoral
of the German Catholic Bishops. It was issued in
July and was referred to in the press at the time
but this is the first complete text that could be
obtained.
I thought that you might went it as possible
source material in future speeches.
Amount
THE PASTORAL LETTER OF FULDA, 1941
(X).
The pastoral letter of the Bishops' Confer-
ence at Fulda in 1941, which was read from
all pulpits on July 6th, 1941, and about
which the most contradictory information
was to be found in the Press, had the fol-
lowing wording: (copy of the letter has
only just reached KIPA)
Dear Members of the Dioceses: We, the Bis-
hops of Germany, are conscious of fulfill-
ing a serious duty towards the members of
our dioceses with this common declaration,
a duty which has been imposed upon us by
our holy education. We feel also that we
are satisfying an urgent need and expecta-
tion of our followers. In agreement with
our holy creed, we shall make our position
clear towards urgent contemporary problems
in order to give you the desired enlighten-
ment and to strengthen you in your faith
in God.
I.
Dear Members of the Dioceses: In the most
difficult time when the Fatherland is on-
volved in a war of an extent unknown be-
fore, and theatres of war, we ask you to
fulfil your duty, to be courageous, enduring,
and ready for sacrifices in your work and
your fight for our people. We send you
greetings of grateful love and warmest
wishes to your soldiers, your husbands,
your sons and brothers in the field, who
are performing the most outstanding feats
with spirited courage and under great hard-
ships. The war asks effort and sacrifice
from all of you. In fulfilling the diffi-
cult duties of our time in hard afflictions
which come to you as & consequence of the
war, the consoling certainty will strengthen
you that you are not only serving your coun-
try but that you are following at the same
time the holy will of God who directs all
things, the destiny of the people as well
as of the individual with His divine provi-
dence. We, too, are confident in Him, the
Almighty Eternal God, and ask Him for His
protection and blessing for people and
Fatherland.
II.
Dear Members of the Dioceses: Not only the
war but contemporary events which touch the
religious field lead you to ask for a word
of enlightenment and encouragement from your
Bishops. In answering your call and your
expectation
(2)
expectation, we are fulfilling our superior
pastoral duty. We want you to know that
your Bishops are at their posts in these
upsetting times; that they stood up for and
will continue to stand up for the interests
of our holy religion in complete unanimity
with all permissible and possible means.
Again and again have the Hishops brought
their justified claims and complaints be-
fore the proper authorities. Be meassured
that the Bishops speak as openly as their
holy duty as teachers of the creed and as
defenders of the rights of the shurch asks
them to do. Through this pastoral declara-
tion the Bishops want to help you to are
the real situation of the shurch in the
light of your creed and enable you to judge
it. We want to spare you an omenous spir-
itual conflict which might make it difficult
for you to do your duty gladly. We exalt
you to strive for a quiet and decided atti-
tude which results from a true belief and
strong confidence in God.
The events we speak of are all well known
to you and the object of yours and our
deepest concern. They are the restrict-
ions and limitations which have been put
upon the free preaching of our creed and
upon our church life.
Our church is God's visible empire, willed
by God on this earth into which man enters
through baptism and which must and will
lead him in complete independence to a
supermatural destination. The church has,
therefore, the right and the duty derived
from God of religious and moral instruct-
ion and education of the youth from child-
hood onwards and of the free preaching of
the Gospel of Christ in the degree which
the church itself thinks necessary.
The church has the right to freedom of
service and the right to establish a cal-
endarof religious festivals which is reg-
ulated according to the religious needs
of the faithful.
The church is and will be the guardian
of moral laws given by God and it will
never abide that which God has forbidden.
In this way, the church saves for its
people the firm foundation of moral stren-
gth and social order. The church has the
right and the duty given to it by its d1-
vine foundation to practice charity. The
credit for fulfilling this task and for
having cared for the well-being of the
people is particularly due to the relig-
ious orders and societies. They have
always possessed the love and esteem of
the Catholic people in a high degree. In
all
(3)
all these fields, the shurch has found
great obstacles during the past few years
and particularly during the last months.
When we are asked to shoulder our share
of sacrifices because of the hard necessi-
ties of the war, we gladly do so out of
love for the whole people. Convents, mon-
astries and shurch institutes have been
made available for military purposes or
for the housing of re-settlers or for the
evacuation of children for the duration
of the war. Our nuns have gladly taken
over the nursing of wounded and sick sol-
diers. The readiness to fight and the
soldierly attitude of our priests who are
serving as stretcher-bearers in the field,
of our nuns, of our students of theology
and our pupils of monastries who bear arms
for the Fatherland, are second to none.
We cannot, however, understand and we are
deeply grieved by some of those regulat-
ions put into force now which interfere
strongly with church life without being
necessitated by war emergency. We remind
you of the restrictions in the field of
religious education and religious public-
ations and of special pastoral work of
devote exercises and periods of religious
contemplation, of the practising of the
pastoral office in hospitals, and of the
restriction of the church service and
church holidays. We recall with deep
sorrow the closing down of monastries,
convents and church institutions during
the last months and of their confiscat-
ion for non-religious purposes. We have
a deep pity for the members of the church
orders who have had to leave their homes
of retirement. The Catholic people thank
them for everything they have done in
their pastoral offices or in the field
of public charity or in prayer and atone-
ment in the calmness of their peaceful
monastries and convents and they will
never fail those who are faithful them-
selves to their Fatherland and to their
church.
It is quite incomprehensible
to us and to you that such
regulations should be enforced
during war time when unity of
the people should be preserved
and not endangered nor dimmed
by offending the religious feel-
ing of an important part of the
population.
Dear Members of the Dioceses: The fact can-
not be denied that at present, either caused
by the emergency or without reason, a very
far
(4)
far reaching restrictions of the practice
of our holy religion exists, but that must
not discourage us or make us negligent.
Every time of hardship 19 a test and confirm-
ation of our religious faithfulness. Here
we wish to point out some duties which are
particularly brought upon us by these times.
There are no more religious Sunday papers
and bulletins of your dioceses which, up
to now, preached the creed and strengthened
the moral powers of the family. As long as
they are not published you parents must on-
deavour to replace what you and your child-
ren miss in printed religious instructions
by regular attendance at church and by sup-
porting the pastoral work in your community.
More then ever it is the duty of you parents
to concern yourselves about the books which
get into the hands of your children and to
provide at least a few good books in the
home library for the family so that they
could be read together.
with deep sorrow we heard the news that the
Catholic kindergarten (nursery school) has
now been abolished in large districts of
the Reich in spite of the protests of the
Bishops. They were treated and loved by
the Catholic people as a supplement of re-
ligious education. The Catholic Schools
have already been taken from us. Religious
teaching in the schools has been cut down
or completely dropped. For you parents have
the strict commandment to become the relig-
ious teacher of your children. Our priests
will gladly give you directions to fulfil
this first and finest duty of a parent. It
is up to you to follow their proposals con-
scientiously. The more difficult it becomes
to attend a service in church regularly, the
more the house of every Christian family be-
comes a small house of God. In the sanctity
of the Christian family, it must become a
sacred custom for everyone to gather as of-
ten as possible before the cruicifix in or-
der to offer a common prayer and to think
of the anxieties of the church and of the
people and of the ecclesiastical and world-
ly authorities. Pray also for your beloved
dead, for the sick; pray for husbands,
fathers and sons who are fighting in the
midst of war. The creed and the virtue of
your children must be the object of your
fervent prayers - particularly so if the
circumstances have brought about a local
separation from your children and if they
cannot have religious service and religious
care. If they are far away, you must not
only remind them in your letters of their
duty towards God but your prayers for them
must be like the holy angels of God and
give them guidance.
Dear Members of the Dioceses: We Bishops
meeting
(5)
meeting at the tomb of Saint Beniface whose
life work it was to bring the German people
to our Master and Saviour, Jesus Christ, and
who died the glorious death of a martyr in
fulfilling this task, feel an even greater
serrow about the existence of powers work-
ing to dissolve the blessed union between
Christ and the German people than we do
about the incidents mentioned above. The
existence of Christianity in Germany is at
stake. Quite lately a book has been distri-
buted in Germany in hundreds of thousands of
copies which contains the assertion that we
Germans had to chose between Christ and the
German people.
Dear Members of the Diocesses: with burning
indignation we German Catholics refuse to
make such a choice. We love our German
people and we serve them, if necessary, with
our lives, but at the same time we live and
die for Jesus Christ and want to be united
with Christ in time and sternity. We are
convinced that we serve our beloved German
people best when we preserve Christ and His
Gospel for them. It would mean a terrible
impoverishment of our people if we relin-
quished those Christian principles which
for more then a thousand years have been
the foundation of its spiritual and moral
culture. out of the Christian creed grew
for our people that noble conception of
human personality which asks the individ-
ual to fit himself into the order of the
human community ready for sacrifices, but
which on the other hand preserves for every
individual his God-given rights and duties.
God willed that they should be respected by
all living creatures. If we care for the
preservation of Christianity in our people,
then we must fight and stand up for the
personality and dignity of the German man.
Before all things we hold firm to Jesus
Christ because he is"the son of God who
came into this world that we might have
life and that we might have it more abun-
dantly" (John 10-10); "because there is no
other name given to man under Heaven by
which he can be blessed" (Apg.4,7 and 12).
At the request to leave Christ we answer
like Saint Peter, "Master to whom shall we
go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.
And we believe and are sure that thou are
that Christ, the son of the living God."
(John 6-69).
As we are faithful to Christ nothing can
separate us from His holy church which He
has founded on the rock foundation of the
pontificate. with a representative of
Christ on earth, our holy Father, we are
united in filial love.
We
(6)
No shall obediently follow our church, the
teacher of the truth, guardian of Christian
customs even if the following of the command-
ments, which the church proolaimed in the
name of God, asks sacrifices from us. of
course, there are commandments in the Catholic
code of morals which are not binding if their
following is connected with too great diff-
iculties, but there are holy duties of the
conscience from which no one can be freed and
which we have to fulfil even if it costs us
our life. Under no circumstances is man al-
lowed to blaspheme his God. He shall never
hate his brother. He shall not kill the in-
nocent outside of war and outside of justi-
fied self-defence. He shall not commit ad-
ultery and never lie. He shall not denounce
his religion or be enduced by threats or prom-
ises to leave the church. We remind Catholics,
who think they should leave the shurch for
earthly and human reasons, of the impressive
words of Pope Pius XII "Here the point is
reached where it means the last and highest
salvation or destruction, and, therefore,
heroic courage is the only way to salvation.
If the temptor raises his head with a Judas
request for you to leave the church then he
can receive only one answer even if it means
great earthly sacrifices. The answer is
found in the words of our Saviour: "Get thee
behind me Satan" because it is written "you
shall pray to God and serve Him alone, "but
to the church he will speak, "You, my mother
from the days of my childhood, my consolation
in life, my intercessor when I am dying, my
tongue shall cleave to the roof of my mouth
if, falling under earthly temptation or
threats, I become a traitor to my baptismal
vows. But those who think they can combine
the external desertion of the church with the
internal adherence to the church might take
as a serious warning the Saviour's words:
"He who denies Me before man, I shall deny
before My Father who 1s in Heaven."
Dear Members of the Dioceses: Certainly in
these times there are zome who are shaken
by these religious struggles or who have left
Christ and the church completely. This is a
deep sorrow to us. We can, however, say with
great joy like Saint John:"I have no greater
joy than to hear that my children walk in the
truth" (3 John 4). Many, very many, walk in
the truth and stand firm in faithfulness to
Christ and his shurch under all tribulations
and fulfil their religious duties even with
great sacrifice. We all, bishops, priests
and faithfuls will unite anew on the rock
foundation of our holy church beneath the
Cross of our Saviour. In love and confid-
ence we shall continue to strengthen our-
selves and to sustain ourselves through
prayer, instruction and example. When this
time of earthly tribulation has passed, upon
entrance into Eternity, we shall learn from
the mouth of Our Saviour his judgment:" Who-
soever, therefore, shall confess Me before
men, him will I confess also before my Father
which is in Heaven." (Matt. 10-32)
941;
Archbishops and Bishops of Germany assembled
at the tomb of St.Bonifece.
December 18, 1941
Eight-thirty A. M.
Memorandum for the President:
The following is a summary of home public
opinion as of December 15, by the British Ministry
of Information cabled by Whitney:
1. Japan. Relief that things have come to
a head. At last we know where we are.
2. United States General. "At last in with
us." Great relief. Expect increased development
of America's war potentialities. These are the
dominant views, but several regions report "under-
lying irritation" that America should only do "for
selfish reasons what she would not do to cooperate
in fighting for democracy." A certain "malicious
delight" in comments such as "America will now have
a taste of war and about time too". Strong hope
from several regions that America will bomb Tokyo.
Should "Give the Japs a taste of what they gave
the Chinese women and children."
3. United States Supply. Some anticipate in-
creased volume of lend lease because United States
on war footing, but majority fear decrease because
United States will need for own use. Some fear of
decrease of supply lines due to withdrawal of convoy
support. Many, particularly working class women,
fear cutting off food supplies.
4. Russia. Timonshenko's thrust has created
new "thrill of hope." Rostov considered Hitler's
"first real defeat on land." Constantly "greater
evidence of complete solidarity with Russia." But
still some suspicion that "persons in high positions
-2-
are not one hundred percent in favor of helping
Russians."
5. Libva. Prevailing attitude is disap-
pointment. But Eighth Army regarded as young,
vigorous, well-commanded (this was to December
eighth). Optimistic statements of Cairo military
spokesmen again caused howl of annoyance.
6. Finland, Hungary, Roumania. War decla-
rations accepted as inevitable.
7. Labor conscription. Generally well
received. "At last we are getting down to it."
But some regions report that minority labor amend-
ment for nationalisation of central industries
finds much more general support than final vote
in House of Commons would indicate, and this is
not confined to labor party of working class.
-3-
also widespread criticism of exemption for service
mens' wives, it being felt that they are even, more
available for industry than working mens' wives.
8. Industry. Reports of slackness becoming
alarming during debate on conscription. "What is
use of bringing in more people to join us in standing
easy." Appeals for increased production are becoming
outstandingly unpopular.
9. Women workers. Emphasis on three needs:
Part time work, nurseries, and shopping facilities:
10. Food. Consumers find points scheme of
rationing satisfactory, but small traders dislike it.
Salmon, sardines, and tongue snupped up ahead of
American canned meat, but those who have over-come
reluctance to try new-fangled foods seem to find
-4-
Spam, etc. highly palatable.
11. Chief shortages, Cigarettes and tobacco
lighters and flints, chocolate and confectionery,
wines and spirits, boots and shoes, particularly
childrens', paraffin, radio batteries and tubes,
kitchen equipment and cheap crockery, fresh fish
and eggs.
December 18, 1941
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Before General Magruder left for China, I
suggested that we should give him an officer who
could be attached to the mission for the activities
connected with our agency. At that time I thought
that we might be able to help him, not only in the
gathering of information, but also on broadcasting.
He said it was unnecessary.
Now, we have just received word from the War
Department asking for our help because, as General
Magruder says: "China is being deluged with all
kinds of propaganda by the Japanese through the
different radio stations that have been taken over;"
and this news is published in all the local newspapers
-2-
and press, with the resulting affect on the Chinese.
General Magruder has now asked us to see if
we can give him some aid.
I am taking this matter up at once and we hope
we may be able to make use of some people who are
already there. As you know, we have a man there now
who is carrying on certain of our work in China, and
has in his possession microfilm equipment. We are
entering into discussion with the Army and Navy, and
I will keep you advised.
December 18, 1941
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Yesterday, there came to see me Mr. Jan Stanczyk,
Minister of Labor and Public Welfare, of Poland. With
him was Mr. Leo Krzycki, American-born citizen of
Polish origin, and a member of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers Union of America. I think that he is identified
with Sidney Hillman.
Mr. Stanczyk was reporting on his experience in
Poland and in France, and told us of the sabotage work
carried out in the factories in both these countries
and the aid given by saboteurs in the course of the
fighting by destroying bridges, stations, and power
plants.
He then told us of the counter-action for sabotage
which they had set up in the factories and the warehouses,
and in manufacturing concerns. He has been talking with
-2-
members of his own race in this country, and lining
them up to aid in seeking out saboteurs by organizing
committees among these Polish workmen. He thinks that
the American workmen of Polish, Czechoslovakian, and
Yugoslavian descent have the most trustworthy elements
to work with because of their hatred of Hitler. It
is the Minister's idea that the labor organizations in
the country should organize labor committees in the
various industries to deal with this question. These
committees could then collaborate with the F.B.I.
The Minister feels that this organization is
particularly important now because the members of
the sabotage organizations are chiefly German and are
especially strong in airplane factories, port ware-
houses, and on ships. Stanczyk is going to discuss
this matter with Messrs. Kennedy, Green, and Philip
Murray.
It may well be that you might want to urge the
-3-
labor organizations to carry on this committee
organization work more affirmatively than they are
doing now.
December 18, 1941
Eight Thirty A.M.
Memorandum for the President:
The following is a recent report on the
activities of one Pucheu, who has been more pro-
minent in Vichy affairs recently:
We had received information early in Novem-
ber that Pucheu was carrying on an intrigue de-
signed to undermine Darlan's position. Later in
November it was learned that Pucheu and Marion
were active in setting up new organizations in
Vichy, including an information service and a
corps of shock troops, directly under the Ministry
of the Interior. More recently we are informed
that:
1), Weygand's dismissal was not de-
sired by Petain, but was maneuvered by
Pucheu, with Darlan's complicity, in
close collobaration with the Germans,
the plan being to face Petain with a
"fait accompli".
2) German pressure was applied
by ordering the Army of occupation to
"stand-to".
3) The struggle between Darlan
and Pucheu is very bitter.
4) Pucheu is "Germany's man"
even more than Darlan. He is preparing
with Marion and Benoist-Mechin, a big
police organization, by means of which
he hopes to gain control of unoccupied
France.
-2-
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 18, 1941
8:30 a.m.
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:
The attached is taken from a report
from a very reliable source of ours in Brazil,
giving general impressions of the present
situation there.
Respectfully,
hulm William/J. J. Donovan
The Lati line continues to be a leak in the blockade
with political as well as economic implications. Rare
metals and strategic items are being flown to Brazil from
Chile, marked "silver" and are shipped from Brazil to Europe
via Lati. The Brazilian authorities with whom the matter
has been discussed take the position that they cannot in-
terfere with transshipments from a friendly country or go
behind the description of contents contained in the offi-
cial shipping documents.
There was considerable comment in Brazilian official
circles shortly before I left, about the coolness with
which Aranha's pro-democratic speeches had been received
in Chile. This comment was enlarged upon by anti-American
elements to support their contention that Brazil should
not identify itself with the United States.
On October 19 there was a reunion of former
Integralista leaders in the office of Dr. J. Loureiro in
Rio de Janeiro. Dr. Loureiro is the son-in-law of Plinio
Salgado, former Integralista chief, now in exile in Portu-
gal. Several City administrators attended. The main
discussion concerned the reorganization of Integralista
"combat units" in order to determine which members of the
former Integralistas could be relied upon for action once
more in the future. A police "delegado" has said that the
most reliable among the Integralista leaders in the interior
of Brazil have been instructed cautiously to reorganize their
units and verify their strength.
At this meeting there was read a letter and mani-
festo from Dr. Salgado. The gist of the letter and manifesto
were that the Integralistas should lend their support to the
present regime in Brazil. While admitting that the govern-
ment had in the past fought and oppressed the Integralista
-2-
movement, Dr. Salgado contended that the present policy
of the Brazilian government was in harmony with Integralista
ideals, and was in many respects pursuing the Integralista
program. Dr. Salgado urged the members not to be swerved
from this main issue by opposition elements of the Integralista
party. This was presumably a reference to Dr. Belmire
Valverde and his followers, who have refused to cooperate
with Vargas because of the police repression of their acti-
vities and members. The manifesto of Dr. Salgado called for
the submersion of personal issues in the major task of
strengthening the Estado Novo, which, he said, was most
important at precisely this time when Europe is being reshaped
into a "new order" because it is most necessary that Brazil
be in position to participate in the benefits of that order.
The manifesto praised several parts of Brazil's new consti-
tution which, it sáid, put Brazil in better case to defend
-3-
its sovereignty against threats stemming from abroad.
(Contextual implication -- the USA) The general tone
the
of the manifesto and letter was sympathetic to the
Hitler concept of European and world reorganization.
The peroration of Dr. Salgado's communications
appealed to the members of the Integralista party to
make new efforts and sacrifices in the reorganization
of their activities which the present moment made neces-
sary, to accept loyally the leaders whom he was appointing,
and to manifest a spirit of unity and cooperation in
Integralista ranks which was demanded at the present
time when Europe was being reorganized.
The police were aware of this meeting, though it
is not clearly established whether they had advance notice
or learned of it immediately after it had taken place.
During the month of November, Raimundo Padhila
-4-
spent considerable time in Sao Paulo and established
contact there with former members of the Integralista
the
of
War
party. Also active in Sao Paulo during the month was
an unnamed representative of the Rio police chief,
Felinto Muller (an outspoken pro-Nazi), whose function
seemed to be to establish social contacts (night clubs,
parties, etc.) with as many military officers in the
region as possible for the purpose of determining their
political views.
These renewed Integralista activities coincide,
at least in time, with the arrival in Brazil, specifically
in Sao Paulo, of a German officer, recently on the Russian
front, who has already visited Chile and Argentina. He is
traveling on a diplomatic passport under the name of Albach.
The army commander at Natal, who is known to be pro-
Nazi, in a recent address, cautioned his troops to be on
-5-
the alert and to "look upon our flag -- our forces will
It seems 8 well-ostablished fact that there has been to
never permit any other to wave higher than ours." At
the last year 02 sightean months 8, considerable decline
about the same time, the Ministry of War issued a circular
in overt German propeganda activity. The publication of
to unit commanders warning against the infiltration of
the two-v-luse report of the police investigation of Negl
Communist and Liberal elements in their ranks. In a
notivities in the of Brazil, the intens?-
manifesto issued to the army on November 27, the anniversary
flortion of and activity ON the
of the 1935 uprising in Rio, the Minister of War, Eurico
st gevernment, the of
Dutra, Inaguage also generally accepted as a Nazi sympathizer, used
the phrase Deus, Patria, Familia -- word for word the Inte-
gralista slogan.
all
In Sao Paulo, Nazi groups meet regularly at the German
by
the
the
Hospital with the active participation of Herbert Sachs, Trans-
German to Prazillan integrity and
ocean director.
secount for the diminution in German Newer-
It is naturally difficult to obtain a clear-cut un-
theless there many indications that 18 is
derstanding of the political situation in Brazil with respect
too to do In
to its orientation vis-a-vis the United States and Germany.
Brasillan
-6-
It seems a well-established fact that there has been in
(b)
the last year or eighteen months a considerable decline
in overt German propaganda activity. The publication of
the two-volume report of the police investigation of Nazi
activities in the southern 8 tates of Brazil, the intensi-
fication of nationalistic propaganda and activity on the
part of the Brazilian government, the prohibition of foreign
language schools and newspapers, the recent pro-Pan-American
speeches of Brazilian officials, including some who had until
recently been identified with the Axis cause, all point toward
a recognition by the Brazilian government of the threat which
German activity represents to Brazilian national integrity and
account for the marked diminution in German activities. Never-
theless there are many indications which suggest that it is
that
much too sanguine to assume, as there is a tendency to do in
some foreign circles in Brazil, that: (a) the Brazilian
-7-
government has the internal situation well in hand and that
German activity is no longer a real threat; (b) the Brazilian
government is now committed to sympathy with and ultimate
assistance to the American cause. found few if any
Despite the recent public pronouncements in favor of
inter-American cooperation made by eminent governmental
officials in Brazil, the prevailing atmosphere is one which
prevents them from being taken at their face value in Brazilian
circles. Critics and opponents of the Vargas regime interpret
them as part of a considered scheme to lull American suspi-
cions and relieve American pressure for more practical evi-
dences of cooperation. Persons more friendly to the regime
explain the inconsistency between these public statements
and the continuance in office of such men as Eurico Dutra,
Felinto Muller, Ernani Reis and Goies Montero by saying that
these men are being kept on as insurance just in case Germany
-8-
should win the war. The, explanation is also offered that
Vargas is under personal obligations to this group and that
he is not yet powerful enough to dispense with their sup-
port or to risk their enmity. But I found few if any
informed persons who believed that the present Brazilian
Government was sincerely committed to a pro-American
program.
-9-
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 18, 1941
DECLASSIFIED
The President
By Authority of C/A
007622
The White House
By WBS
SEP 10 1974
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:
The attached is the text of a letter
written August 25, 1941, by Henry Helfant,
former Rumanian Commercial Attache at Madrid,
from Santiago, Chile, which was circulated
to all members of the Rumanian Government.
The letter was an offer to conduct a Rumanian
propaganda drive in South America.
Respectfully,
William V. Donovan
During the five months I have been here, I have
got into contact with my friends in the countries of
the Pacific Zone and in the Greater Antilles; I have
got into touch with various learned societies of which
I have been 8. member for many years, and I have renewed
my relations with newspapers and reviews to which I was
for years a permanent contributor.
The information I have gained as far as Rumania
is concerned is deplorable and I consider it my duty to
call attention to the fact.
In this zone we are almost entirely unknown. We
are the only European country that does nothing to
spread the knowledge of its problems and historical
rights in the fifteen countries of the two zones I have
mentioned. We have left untouched the press, public
opinion, the ruling and administrative circles of those
-1-
lands. Other countries do all they can to gain friends
and establish relations which will be to their advantage
later on.
I am troubled by the thought that we have risked
everything on a single card; when events are looked at
from here, it is obvious that Germany cannot win this war.
The fifteen countries, to which I referred above,
are: Pacific Zone: Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador,
Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico. Antilles: Cuba, Haiti,
San Domingo:
In all these countries there are interesting people
who should be cultivated and might at some time be useful
to us. For instance, here in Chile, I have made the ac-
quaintance of the famous internationalist, Alejandro Alvarez,
with whom I am on the very best terms.
-2-
THE
If I were in such a financial position as to move
about in these zones, I could gather many friends for the
Rumanian cause. I could lecture in Spanish on Rumania's
historical rights; the columns of many of the most im-
portant of the newspapers and reviews are open to me as
an old contributor, etc.
I suggest the following plan of action:
On the pretext of studying the possibilities of
Rumanian emigration to these zones (v. my report No. 9488
of 6/12/40 to the Ministry of National Economy and my note
of 6/8/41), I could visit these countries and carry out an
intensive programme of propaganda on the lines of the vital
and permanent interests of Rumania, reunion of the country
with the provinces that have been snatched from her.
My past career and my work are known to my former
chiefs and will guarantee that I am capable of creating an
-3-
atmosphere favorable to our country, and that the problems
and rights of Rumania will be explained as clearly as pos-
sible to the greater public.
My activity will also counteract the opposed propa-
ganda which is actually very busily at work in all these
countries.
-4-
December 18, 1941
SUBMARY 6 P.M.
The Banque Worns is association w
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Attached is a memorandum on Banque Worms.
I have been informed that the Treasury is
investigating their connections in this country.
she
True
introducting
No
the Allier, the opportunity
I.
COMPUSITION
THE
THE BANQUE WORMS
The Banque Worms SUMMARY
Worms &
The Banque Worms is an association of
French financiers and industrialists who have
organized themselves into a political pressure group
for the maintenance and extension of their economic
power in the New Order. The group operates not as
a party, but by insinuating its members into the
most important political positions in Vichy France.
The political aims of the Banque Worms group
are:
1. To prevent Marshal Petain from introducing
paternalistic social reforms;
2. To advocate maximum political and economic
collaboration with Germany;
3. To facilitate a negotiated peace between the
Axis and the Allies, should the opportunity
present itself.
of
in
I. COMPOSITION OF THE BANQUE WORMS
of
Frangaine
The Banque Worms group takes its name from
its parent organization, Worms & Cie., an old established
banking house which long before the war had considerable
political influence through its financial, armament,
shipbuilding, aviation, and coal-importing interests.
It has had extensive connections with American and
English big business groups. Hyppolite Worms, nominal
head of the House, represented France at London during
the war on a Franco-British Committee for Economic
Coordination.
Through its heavy industry interests Worms & Cie.
also has long standing German connections.
The leading personalities in the group and their
financial connections are as follows:
Jacques Barnaud - Director of Air France, Director
of the Lyon Water and Light Company, and representative of
the Banque Worms in Dutch oil enterprises.
H. Worms - Former Director of the Societe Française
de Dragages et de Travaux Publiques, and in 1928 Representa-
tive of Worms & Cie. in the formation of the Anglo and
foreign industrial corporation, in which Lazard Frères, the
Morgan Bank, and Krueger and Toll participated.
M. Gillet - Of the noted Lyon silk family.
M. Peyerimhoff - Leading French coal magnate.
Gabriel LeRoy-Ladurie - Director of the Banque.
Personal friend of the Comte de Paris. Jacques, his
brother, wields great influence as head of the National
Confederation of Agriculture.
Paul Baudouin - Director of the Banque d'Indo-Chine,
member of the Administrative Board of Air France, Crédit
foncier de l'Ouest Africain, the Societe des Salines de
Djibouti, de Sfax et de Madagascar, and many other colonial
enterprises. These holdings make him a particularly bitter
opponent of the Anglo-Saxon plutocracies. Baudouin was
Secretary of the Comite de Guerre in Reynaud's Government
and was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Petain
Industrial and Domestic
Commerce
after the Armistice.
Banri Lafond
Secretary General for
François Lehideux - Brother-in-law of Louis Renault,
Bernsud
Secretary
of
State
for
the great automotive manufacturer whose factories are now
working full blast for the German War Machine.
Pierre Pucheu - Former Secretary of the Cartel
Siderurigique (steel trust) and Director of Japy Steel.
II. POLITICAL POWER:
The Banque Worms neither constitutes nor controls
a political party. It calls itself, in its political aspect,
the Mouvement Synarchique, but remains an amorphous small
clique. It exerts control not through wide political
agitation but through pressure on persons in high places.
The group has succeeded in placing its men in the
following positions:
Paul Baudouin
-
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pierre Pucheu
-
Minister of the Interior
Rene Belin
-
Minister of Labor
Jean Berthelot
-
Minister of Communications
Jean Bichelonne
Secretary General for
Industrial and Domestic
The
Commerce
Henri Lafond
-
Secretary General for
Electric Power
Jacques Barnaud -
Secretary of State for
Franco-German Economic
Relations
/
The group thus controls all the truly strategic
positions in the Vichy cabinet.
Pierre Pucheu in particular has made the most of
the vital post which he commands. He has revamped the
entire prefecture and police system of France and has thus
built up a personal following of well-entrenched office
holders.
III. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES:
a. Domestic Policy
While temporarily supporting Petain, the
Mouvement Synarchique outspokenly opposes all aspects of
the Marshal's program which smack of social reform. It
stands for an intransigeant anti-labor policy.
b. Foreign Policy
The fundamental assumption of the
Banque Worms in the formation of its foreign policy
is the firm belief in a Nazi victory. The aim of the
New
Disape.
group in the foreign sphere, therefore, is to achieve
complete economic collaboration with Germany. Its
members patently expect to preserve their economic
position by acting as Hitler's faithful apostles of
the New Economic Order in France.
At the same time there are
indications that the Banque Worms hopes to restore economic
relations with the United States. The earlier economic
connections with this country would render such an aim
understandable. P. E. Flandin, who is apparently the
Banque Worms front man for relations with the United States,
has had talks with American diplomats in Africa, and has
urged upon them the advantages to the United States of a
negotiated peace.
Thus, while the Banque Worms is essentially anti-
British in its orientation, it would be only too delighted
to facilitate the restoration of amicable relations between
the United States and the New Europe.
December 18, 1941
6 P.M.
Memorandum for the President:
into
-
100
This is only to tell you that following the
cable from Chungking we are arranging to aid
the Magruder Mission of Propaganda from Chung-
king.
The War Department is endeavoring to fly
some of our men out there in a bomber. In
addition, in response to the request of the
Navy, we are arranging to get men put in to
Honolulu and Manila. It is solely a question
of transportation..
The only present American station that has
been able to maintain programs is KGEI, for the
December 18. 1943
6 P.M.
maintenance of which we obtained approval from
you on priorities in order to to convert it into
a 100 KW station.
The
of
You
The flood of Japanese propaganda has made
the armed services realize that we must also
wage a war of ideas and a war of facts. We
have to have a weapon of prestige.
the
Law from point. For
exemple: If you were to press 5 button at your dear,
that signal of yours vould rench receiver equipped
with this device. It is not difficult to conseive the
to st can be yan.
December 18, 1941
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
There was demonstrated to us today what was called
an "Alert Receiver." The specific principle of the
apparatus is that a device can be attached to a radio
broadcasting station which will superimpose upon the radio
program a controlling signal (which will operate a bell
or a light) on specially designed receivers. This
signal does not interrupt the radio broadcast.
If every home were equipped with such a receiver,
it would be possible to give instructions over the radio
loud speakers from some central control point. For
example: If you were to press a button at your desk,
that signal of yours could reach every receiver equipped
with this device. It is not difficult to conceive the
military uses to which it can be put.
If, one day, you would like to have a demonstration,
we can have it arranged for you.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 19, 1941
8:30 a.m.
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:
The attached is a memorandum prepared
by our Far Eastern Section, which deals
with the Burmese situation.
Respectfully,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Att.
BURMESE AND THE WAR
The question is: what do ten million Burmese feel
about the British, the Indian, the Chinese and the Japanese
peoples, and how effectively can they make themselves felt
if they take sides in the war. The evidence is that the
Burmese are anti-British, anti-Indian, and anti-Chinese,
and might be opportunistically pro-Japanese if promised
national autonomy. And they could be effective allies of
the Japanese as the effectiveness of their 1930-31 revo-
lution proved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Burmese Nationalism and Its Attitudes.
II. Attitude Toward the Indians.
III. Attitude Toward the Chinese.
IV. Attitude Toward the British.
V. Attitude Toward the Japanese.
VI. How Effective Could the Burmese Be?
VII. Sources.
Burmese Nationalism and its Attitudes
the
The question as to the part the Burmese may play in
the present Far Eastern situation is raised by the fact
that the Japanese are driving through Thailand into Burma.
It is desirable to know whether the Burmese will cooperate
with the British or the Japanese. The question is shar-
pened by the fact that China's resistance to Japan largely
depends on the free passage of war materials through Burma
to the Burma Road. It is desirable to know whether the
Burmese are interested in helping or hindering the passage
of materials -- and this again is part of the larger question.
Burmese nationalism is young and energetic. Its first
really violent expression was in December 1930 when an out-
break occurred in the Tharrawaddy district about 75 miles
-2-
north of Rangoon. The people were registering their
unwillingness to pay the capitation tax which they had
been protesting for years. But the tax issue was only
the occasion of a larger issue. According to the Secretary
of State for India, who spoke before Parliament in June
1931, the movement was organized to overthrow the govern-
ment (Report on the Rebellion in Burma up to May 3, 1931,
(London, 1931) pp. 1-19.) Spurred on by the depression,
Burmese nationalism tended to assume racial attitudes toward
the British, Indians, and others.
Attitude Toward the Indians
As long as the Burmese found it easy to make a living
they tolerated Indian laborers, who had a lower standard of
living, and Indian merchants, who were engaged in occupa-
tions generally not sought by Burmese. When the depression
of 1929 and 1930 forced them to compete with Indian laborers
-3-
and Indian merchants, they found themselves in an impossible
situation. Their higher standard of living militated against
successful competition with the laborers while their lack of
business acumen made them inferior to Indian busine SS men.
As a consequence, the Burmese developed a substantial hatred
for the Indians and attempted by various means to discourage
Indian immigration. Their first method was by rioting in
1930 when several thousand Indians were killed or injured.
This led to consideration of the Burmese problem by Parlia-
ment and the drawing up of a Constitution which became
effective in April 1937. The Burmese were now in a posi-
tion to deal legally and effectively, so they thought, with
the Indian labor problem.
Attitude Toward the Chinese
Hardly had the Burmese begun to take steps to limit
Indian immigration than the opening of the Burma Road led
-4-
to the development of a Chinese problem. The Chinese
held the lion's share of the rice-milling and timber trades,
and they shared profits with the Indians in retail trade.
Most of them lived in Rangoon. As waves of Chinese came
out of war-torn China along the Burma Road, the Burmese be-
gan to fear them as an economic threat. Most of them drifted
to Rangoon, strengthening the Chinese community there. How
the Burmese felt about the Chinese was shown by their boy-
cotting of collectors for China relief funds. The Burmese
even began to sympathize with the Japanese, not because they
loved the Japanese, but because they felt that the Japanese
might possibly help solve their Chinese problem. The Burmese
would like to close out the Chinese, and to them that means
the closing of the Burma Road.
-5-
Attitude Toward the British
The Burmese feel that British democracy has not been
extended to include the Burmese. When discussion of a con-
stitution for Burma arose, the British attitude was that the
Burmese should receive a less favorable constitution than the
Indians because they considered them unable to govern them-
selves. The Burmese were profoundly resentful of this
attitude and all the more determined to gain a clear title
to self-government.
The ordinary affairs of life have been generally con-
ducted, in Burma, in such a way as to uphold British prestige
and to put the Burmese in their places. In motor traffic,
the Englishman has taken it for granted that he could run
through red lights and damage Burmese persons and property
and escape with no official hurt beyond a fine and a repri-
mand. But a Burmese involved in a similar situation is re-
garded as a criminal and severely dealt with. Or in so
-6-
slight a matter as driving along a highway which was dusty,
the Englishman is deeply angered if he is unable to drive
past the Burmese driver ahead and escape his cloud of dust,
but thinks nothing of deliberately driving slowly and blocking
the road to force Burmese drivers to keep to the rear in his
dust.
An English magistrate gave it as his opinion that: "We
had done two things there, which we ought not to have done.
In spite of declarations to the contrary, we had placed
English interests first, and we had treated the Burmans
not as fellow creatures, but as inferior beings."
There is no point in piling up examples, but a casual
reading of Burmese-English relations leaves one with the
conviction that the Burmese deeply resent the contemptuous
treatment the British have given them. Even in so slight
a matter as that of club-life, not even the Burmese Governor,
-7-
Sir Joseph Maung Gyi, would dare attempt to enter those
sacred portals.
The rebellion of 1930-1931 had but one motive and one
object -- hatred of the British Government and intention to
destroy it. So the Government itself said. Although the
British have vaguely promised the Burmese to consider giving
them dominion status after the war, the Burmese realize that
the time to get concessions is when the British need their
cooperation -- and that is now.
Attitude Toward the Japanese
In commenting on & speech made by Sir Archibald Cochrane,
former Governor of Burma, ("Burma in War Time", Asiatic
Review, October1941, P. 694) Mr. F. Burton Leach said:
"The Japanese were newer arrivals and had not made a place
in the country to the same extent, (as the Chinese). It was
quite natural that Burma should admire the qualities which
-8-
the Japanese displayed, and when politics became a
matter of interest in Burma, many of them looked towards
Japan for inspiration." He went on to say: "Did they
(the Burmese) realize that, if they did not throw in their
lot wholeheartedly with the British Commonwealth, they
would find it extremely difficult to stand alone
that
the Japanese had good grounds for looking upon Burma as a
useful acquisition." He implied that many Burmese were
dangerously pro-Japanese. But probably nothing further
can be said on this theme than that the Burmese are inter-
ested in any tool or agency which might help them to achieve
the national freedom they covet.
How Effective Could the Burmese Be?
The Burmese Premier, U Saw, on his recent visit to the
United States, gave his interviewers, W. Norman Brown and
Conyers Read, the impression that not only were the Burmese
-9-
exceedingly dissatisfied with the treatment that the
British were giving their demands for political autonomy,
but they might resort to action of some sort; perhaps by
failing to cooperate with British defense measures, perhaps
by sabotaging the Burma Road. Naturally, the Premier gave
no indication of any specific action, but he implied that
the Burmese were capable of action of some sort.
The opinion of Edgar Ansel Mowrer, reporter for the
Chicago Daily News, recently returned from a tour of the
Far East, likewise is that the Burmese are both dissatisfied
with the British and capable of some sort of strong action
against them.
A more conservative estimate of the abilities of the
Burmese, which reflects official British opinion, is that
the Burmese are unable to obstruct Burma Road traffic or to
interfere seriously with Empire defense in Burma. This opinion
-10-
was confirmed by correspondence with Professor John L.
Christian of the University of Washington, author of
The
Modern Burma which is to be published in January 1942,
by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Christian says
that he doubted very much whether there could be a Burma
revolt, or effective sabotage of the Burma Road. He feels
that the Burmese, in general, were not that ambitious.
However, it needs to be remembered that, in their
rebellions of 1930 and 1931, they showed their ability to
freeze up internal commerce and trade. The British had to
put considerable forces, about four brigades, in the field
before the Burmese were quieted. The rough terrain and
heavy jungle areas of Burma make it possible for poorly
armed men to carry on guerrilla warfare with a minimum of
personal danger. is, & Fabor, 1938)
But this is speaking of the effectiveness of the
-11-
civilian population of Burma and not the armed troops.
Burmese troops exist to the extent of about 15,000. The
question may be asked as to whether Burmese troops in
British employ would fight against the British. The
British are confident they would not, even in the event
of a Burmese revolt. Their officers are largely British.
And they are regarded by the civilian Burmese as somewhat
apart from the rest of the Burmese people. They are iden-
tified in Burmese minds with the British. This is true of
the police as well as of the soldiers. There is always the
possibility of their joining a popular Burmese movement, but
no evidence that they would do so.
Sources
In addition to those mentioned above:
Maurice Collis, Trials in Burma (Faber & Faber, 1938)
Asiatic Review, especially July and October, 1941
Memorandum recording interview with V Saw (prepared
in the British Empire Section of COI)
Statement of the Impressions of Japanese Desires,
Capacity and Intentions Obtained by Edgar Ansel Mowrer
during 8. recent trip in Southeastern Asia.
-18-
December 19, 1941
8:30 A. M.
civilian and which with them.
Memorandum for the President: Prefect of Police
of Paris. Admiral Berrois has been placed the
The following is a report from a French Navy
of the French Line. Labordo
captain, Yves Boju. As Captain he made several
trips to Algiers, Casablanca and Dakar. His
orders were that whenever he met British ships to
report to the French Admiralty their number, class
and position, and to act as a collecting agency for
the Germans. He says that it is an illusion that
the free zone controls its own Merchant Marine,
and that there is a German and Italian commission
at Marseille charged with inspecting and checking
the
every ship entering or leaving that Port. He
pointed out how the admirals who had fallen in
line with Darlan's policies received high
civilian positions and moneys which go with them.
Hat
the
DAVY
curries
Admiral Bard has been named Prefect of Police
05
of Paris. Admiral Barrois has been placed at the
16
Gaullist
head of the French Line. Admiral de Laborde is
Governor of Dakar. Admiral Robert is Governor
of the Antilles. All these posts were previously
held by civilians. As a further reward for their
compliance, naval officers are granted furloughs
of twenty-three days, which they usually spend in
Paris. But they do not dare to wear their naval
uniforms in that city so great is the popular
hatred of what they represent.
"In Africa, there is a real feud between the
Army and Navy," said one, "The army, at least under
Weygand, was pro-French and executed only offenders
-2-
against French interest. But the navy has carried
out drastic measures against anyone suspected of
,
De Gaullist sympathies. .
-3-
December 19, 1941
8:30 A.M.
Station
in
Schensotady.
Memorandum for the President:
1.
in
Turkish.
(Servieed
by
to
The attached is a report of our Radio Section
be
on American Shortwave broadcasts to the Middle
East from Casablanca to Burma.
A. Present Shortwave From America to Middle East.
1. Four times weekly in Turkish.
(Serviced exclusively by the Co-
ordinator of Information. These
programs to be sent seven times
weekly beginning on Monday,
December 22, 1941.)
2. Five times weekly in Persian, Armenian and
Classical Arabic.
(11 to 11:30 A.M. EST.).
3. Five times weekly in Turkish.
(11:30 to 11*45 A.M. EST.)
4. Five times weekly in Classical Arabic.
(11:45 to Noon EST.)
Station WGEO in Schenectady.
West
Const
of
Africo
Process
and
1. Four times weekly in Turkish.
(Serviced exclusively by the COI and to
be sent seven times weekly beginning
Franch
.
-
Monday, December 22, 1941.)
the
Station WRCA, New York.
1. Seven times weekly in Turkish.
(11:30 to 11:45 A.M. EST.)
Prepared for broadcast by COI. Daily program
of five minutes in North African languages, mainly
French. To be used by most SW stations covering
this area. Scheduled to begin within a fortnight.
B. Present Facilities for Additional Broadcasts to
the Middle East.
Prior to about one week ago no scheduled broad-
casts were going to the Middle East. Our radio
section is now ready to serve the area between the
-2-
Illns
Prefrod MCRO In
West Coast of Africa and Burma, with news and
features in Arabic, Berber, Turkish, Russian,
English, French and Chinese. We have set up a
Middle East desk in charge of specialists in the
area covered. Cooperation of the State Depart-
ment will be requested through consuls and
diplomatic missions. It is expected that all
arrangements will be completed within one to
two weeks, including tests, time schedules,
facilities, translations and background preparation
December 19, 1941
12 M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
to
FROM: William J. Donovan
In answer to the plea of General Magruder, we have
sent through the State Department a message which embodies
these essential points:
1. Arranging to obtain the services of F. M. Fisher
from United Press, who will take over at Chungking immediately.
2. Made arrangements with R.C.A. for direct trans-
mission of material to Chungking from San Francisco.
3. Arranging transmission of news reports to Chungking
daily, between 5 and 6 P.M., and 1 and 2 A.M., EST.
4. Editing of news reports done by Walter Wilgus
employed today by this office as Far Eastern editorial
specialist. Wilgus has had much experience in the Orient
and has been editor of leading Manila English language
newspapers.
5. Our pictorial department arranging to send
material to Chungking as rapidly as possible.
6. Problem of telephone communication between
the United States and Chungking being taken up immediately.
December 19, 1941
12 M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT,
I have received a request from the War Depart-
ment to examine, classify and assemble from the mass of material
which is undoubtedly available in this country, a series of
motion pictures of areas of potential military interest, de-
picting the topography, inhabitants and other pertinent data,
in a form suitable for presentation to a military staff.
We have been urging that upon both Services
because we believe that, through visual presentation, the
military personnel can better plan military operations.
We have already started a collection of this
through the studios of the motion picture companies.
Furthermore, we have been making use of the
pictorial presentation group under Commander John Ford to
carry out the following:
1) Two camera groups in Iceland - photographic, still
and charting.
2) Two camera groups in Panama.
3) Five camera groups with the Atlantic convoys,
covering this first great convoy movement.
In addition we have in mind West Africa,
particularly
a) Liberia and the terrain adjacent to Dakar
b) Iran and the Persian Gulf - Karachi to Basra
c) We hope to move a group to Port Darwin, Australia,
moving north to cover the surrounding islands.
This would supplement the air photography
and would meet the need of the Army to have close pictures
of highways, railroads and general topography.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 19, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Dr. Hornbeck of the State Dept.
called in regard to the attached memo-
randum from Colonel Donovan. They are
anxious to take up the offer of the
University of California and wish to
have word from you as to whether you
approve.
G.
OK1NR
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 14, 1941
Memorandum for the President:
Dr. W. B. Pettus, President of the Cali-
fornia College in China, has suggested that the
work of that College be now undertaken at the
University of California. I understand that the
matter has been submitted to the Department of
Commerce and that Department has indicated its
willingness to handle the program in the interest
of furthering our commercial relationships. I
am also advised that the Secretary of State
has recommended aid be given this College from
the emergency fund, and that the same recommen-
dation has been made by Dr. Lauchlin Currie.
The University of California has offered
the College hospitality on the campus at Berkley.
Private donors have pledged the sum of $54,000
toward the program, and a total of $90,000 is
required. It has been suggested that the balance
of $36,000 now needed be allocated from the
emergency fund to the Department of Commerce to
establish the College of Chinese studies at the
University of California.
I undestand that some of the functions of
the College will be to provide instruction in
Chinese for officers of our government, civil and
military, which cannot now be obtained at any
other institution or branch of the government.
Members of my staff with personal knowledge of
the College state that its work is essential for
various types of training and instruction, and
for special services which it will provide, in
connection with broadcasting to China.
I have been requested to submit the matter
to your consideration.
file
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 18, 1941.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Miss Tully:
At the 6 o'clock delivery on Decem-
ber 14, I sent a memorandum to the President on
behalf of W. B. Pettus, President of the College
of Chinese Studies in Peking, China.
Would you let me know what action has
been taken on this?
Thanking you for your many courtesies,
Sincerely yours,
William her J. Donovan
December 20, 1941
8:30 A.M.
of
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
Far
Best
FROM: William J. Denovan
The following is information given to one of my
staff yesterday by Captain Ivan A. Yegorichev, Naval
Attache for Soviet Russia, and Commander Nicolai A.
Skriagin, Assistant Naval Attache:
"The Captain stated that on the basis of reports
received yesterday at the Embassy, they have complete
air control over all fronts, due partly to the moving
up of new Soviet air units and the withdrawal of serious
numbers of German planes. He stated that their most
serious deficiency is in tanks and that with 15,000
additional light and medium tanks they could underwrite
the defense of at least their present positions. It is
his personal opinion that the military command could not
afford to take any action in the Far East until they have
-2-
assurance of these supplies. He said that it is the
but
of
to
personal sentiment of every official of his government
here that Russia should join us in the Far East as soon
as possible. He stated that the war industries which
have been transported beyond the Urals would be formally
opened with ceremony this coming Monday.
"He criticized with some bitterness and considerable
perplexity the fact that our government has allowed so
many enemy aliens to remain at large, and stated that in
his opinion our defense industries will receive the full
impact of skillful sabotage.
"Among Russians the Captain is recognized as an
authority on Japanese affairs, since he has spent
considerable time in Japan. He said that while he was
there he saw complete descriptions of virtually every
naval installation and important naval unit of the
United States."
I do not vouch for the accuracy of these statements
-3-
but what these people have to say may be of interest to
you.
December 20, 1941
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
to
The following is a cablegram received from Percy
Winner of our London office concerning a proposed
propaganda move directed toward Italian sailors:
1. The head of the Italian sections of both
P.W.E. and B.B.C., Colonel Stevens, requests our
cooperation in connection with a speedy, intensive
propaganda drive intended to induce Italian sailors
to refuse to serve on ships carrying German reinforce-
ments in Libya.
2. Pamphlet with this purpose will be produced by
Stevens' organization and dropped by R.A.F. planes on
Italian and Sicilian ports and coastal areas.
3. Stevens is negotiating to have American-built
planes carry out the operations and to use this fact in
the rest of the leaflets.
-2-
4. He asks whether it would be possible to get a
group of Italians, resident in the United States, or a
group of Italo-Americans to allow their names to be
used as joint signers of the leaflets with groups of
Italians in Britain.
3.
is
the
December 20, 1941
for
the
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
to
FROM: William J. Donovan
718
The following report has just come to us
regarding Dakar:
1. According to an American report regarded
as reliable in Freetown, there is greatly increased
and bitter anti-British feeling in Dakar consequent
on the interception of antagonistic merchant ships
which is regarded as taking food out of the mouths
of relatives in France, and creating furore in
Dakar. Not more than 10 or 20% of the Europeans
there can be considered pro-British.
2. Anti-British feeling reported only slightly
less bitter throughout Senegal and Guinea.
3. General opinion at Dakar is that the
American Consulate there exists solely for the
transmission of information to British authori-
ties via Washington (though Wasson is personally
popular). Every American in Dakar is suspect.
4. A French plane arrived from the Ivory
Coast on November 30th, or December lst, with two
Germans and medicine, and taking six Germans with
over 1,000 ounces of gold.
5. French morale throughout French West
Africa gradually stiffening. Weygand's dismissal
turning interest to antagonism towards Britain.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 20, 1941
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Miss Tully:
I am sending separately a memorandum for the
President, which, if he agrees, I wish he would
mark approved so we could take it up with the
Budget.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bul Imman
William J. Donovan
two bettleshipo be 7188 12:00 Noon vine
December 20, 1941
because loss of the mary would note defense
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
of the long coust line practically impossible.
FROM: William J. Donovan
I have today received the following cable
from Percy Winner, of our London office:
A person who normally should have access to
reliable information has informed me that all six
of Italy's battleships have been sighted convoying
troop ships carrying German reinforcements to
Libya and perhaps also to Bizerta. If this is true,
it is the first time Mussolini has been desperate
enough to risk openly exposing Italy's full battle-
ship strength to sea and air attack. Previously
he took the personal position, often against the
wishes of the Italian Admiralty, that no more than
two battleships should be risked at any one time
because loss of the heavy ships would make defense
of the long coast line practically impossible.
-2-
December 20, 1941
12:00 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
the
FROM: William J. Donovan
A young lawyer named Owen McGivern of New
or
York came to see me yesterday. He is a member
the
of
of Tammany and also an assemblyman. He is now
applying for a commission as a reserve naval
officer. He is a good active man politically
and yet he has traveled a great deal abroad.
McGivern is very concerned about Ireland's
position; says that there is a group of the
younger men of Irish blood of the third and
fourth generation, yet have contact with some of
the group that aided de Valera. They wish to
take advantage of that to try and prevail upon
de Valera to consult with us as to what might be
done in any respect to aid England and ourselves
in the war.
He therefore suggested that a group see
de Valera and express the considered opinion of
the friends of Ireland in this country.
I told him that while I could not speak for
the Government, my opinion was that the Government
would not want to take cognizance of anything they
had; that they would have to do it on their own,
but certainly I felt that the time might come for
making Ireland feel the war the same as other
countries, and perhaps it would be better that
priorities on materials be given to other countries
that were standing with us.
McGivern said that he was going to talk
with his young friends and see what they could
do about it.
-3-
SUBMARY OF INTRILIGENCE
OF
COUTH AMERICA
December 20, 1941
6 P.M. 12/18/41)
(A) BRAZEL
1. Signa of activities and meetings of known German
agents.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT German air pilots ere
standing to for come job.
FROM: William J. Donovan
dengvrous monors emong
I have obtained today the attached La to be
officered by American
Summary of Intelligence on South America.
control
since night of December 15,
5. AND and 078 strougly oppoathe the
U.S. of baeir New Lakes,
A. Un December 32 the Italian is Rio hold
OF now Visastry of
Foreign cans Arts action world Boon
be denteres So Live South and that it
resulted neutral abo would escape such
?. Gorman, Japaness san Ivalian fifth columns working
sow imder unified Germen command. Liminon centers
in Sso Paula and Rio changed every 24 hours. Hond-
dusines just outside Ris.
3. Action will protelly be desegned until after Primare
American Conference. (Degasser 18)
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE
ON
SOUTH AMERICA
(Since 12/13/41)
(3)
(A) BRAZIL
1. Signs of activities and meetings of known German
agents.
2. One report that several German air pilots are
standing to for some job.
3. Germans are circulating dangerous rumors among
junior army ranks that Brazilian army is to be
officered by Americans.
4. Rio airport has been under military control
since night of December 15.
5. Air Minister and Army are strongly opposing the
U. S. occupation of their new bases.
6. On December 12 the Italian Ambassador in Rio told
Nabuco, Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, that Axis naval action would soon
be centered in the South Atlantic, and that if
Brazil remained neutral she would escape much
damage.
7. German, Japanese and Italian fifth columns working
now under unified German command. Liaison centers
in Sao Paulo and Rio changed every 24 hours. Head-
quarters just outside Rio.
8. Action will probably be delayed until after Panama
American Conference. (December 18)
(B) ARGENTINA
1. December 17, Vice President Castillo declared a
state of siege. It is reported to us that this
is being used to stifle public criticism, which
was considerable, as 90% of the press and
populace are anti-Nazi. 5 to plans, base
2. Report dated December 18, 1941 that Axis are
definitely concentrating on Argentina as possible
rift in Pan-American Union.
2. The head of Presenteen 12 to
fustructions December 18 BS be to
bandle direct V/I
Governacy sad recondick.
Chile - for
- South
Assession
& Japenase 0346 12 in the
piuk RP BUSH we Jaychece as arrive
from other ocontries. (Beceater 15)
(c) CHILE
1. Nazi activity on Southern Coast, already
of
reported, has been fully confirmed. (December 17)
Further evidence:
(a) On Traiguen Island
(b) Indications of a sea plane, base
46'13" south 74' 37" east.
(e) German survey parties are moving
further south.
2. The head of Transocean in Chile has received
instructions December 15 to be prepared to
handle direct W/T communications between
Germany and other American republics.
Chile is to be a concentration center for
Germans who have to abandon other South
American countries.
A Japanese boat is expected in the south to
pick up such Germans and Japanese as arrive
from other countries. (December 18)
(D) PERU
1. Evidence that Germans are planning action,
including the neutralization of 12 Englishmen,
by the end of December.
2. The Peruvian government, for fear of criticism
at home, has been underestimating the total
number of Japanese settled in Peru, given for
some years as 20,000. Most recent information
indicates a figure of 50,000 which is reckoned
as a conservative estimate.
(E) VENEZUKLA
1. German Consul at Maracaibo, known to us as
Gestapo agent, has burned his papers and has
flown to Caracas.
(F) ECUADOR
1. Eleven Nazi leaders reported here. They have
been training numbers of Equadoreans as storm
troopers.
December 20, 1941
6 p.m.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Sumner Welles, on behalf of the State Department,
requested me to set up a branch in my office which would
study and report upon foreign politics as they unfold in
the United States in connection with our foreign-nationality
groups. Its tasks would be:
(1) To keep currently informed about foreign politi-
cal personalities in the United States, such as Sforza, Otto
of Hapsburg, Hodza of Czechoslovakia, Chautemps, and 80 on;
(2) To keep informed generally respecting foreign
political activities among the nationality groups in the
United States, their leaders and factions;
(3) To appraise this information and submit timely
reports to the State Department and other policy-making
branches.
I have made considerable progress in the direction
desired, having placed the work in the hands of John
Wiley and DeWitt C. Poole, both of whom have had long
diplomatic experience. The work has been discussed with
Archibald MacLeish, and he has given it his blessing.
Precise estimates are now about to be submitted to the
Bureau of the Budget and I should like therefore to ask
if you approve.
OK
FDR
-2-
December 21, 1941
8:30 a.m.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
I think that Frank Knox has shown the attached to
you. These papers were obtained from the Captain of a
Spanish merchant ship. These secret orders are still in
force. It is important that there be no indication that
we have them.
C
I have suggested to Frank that any wallets obtained
from any Spanish ships be not ripped open, but turned over
to us. The orders are usually sewn inside these wallets.
There is a possibility of counteracting these secret
instructions in the event of war. We are in touch with a
basque leader, who has some 90 odd of these ships and, with
the British, I think that we could work out something with
him.
DECLASSITIED
By
the
of
CIA
007622
By DBS Date SEP 9 1974
-1-
To me, the significant things are:
(1) That Spain, since April, has expected war;
(2) That she designates Argentina as the prefer-
able port.
If we can handle this with skill, we may be able to
bag some ships.
-2-
SANITIZED DOCUMENT
MINISTRY OF MARINE
Transmissions
BOOK OF SECRET INSTRUCTIONS
TO CAPTAINS OF MER-
CHANT SHIPS.
SANITIZED DOCUMENT
SECRET INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH THIS
BOOKLET
In the possibility that the Navy High Command
must give you orders you must follow exactly the
following instructions:
1. The radio services of your ship must be kept
in the very best condition not only in regard to per-
sonnel but also as far as material is concerned.
2. You must take personal care that the regular
listening hours be kept with every efficiency and
severity.
3. Orders must be given that the radio personnel
gives every attention to the warning OI the Spanish
radio stations, civilian as well as war Marine, and
that they be immediately advised upon receiving any,
whatever may be the hours and circumstances.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
4. When you receive exactly the following warning:
"At 46°--15' Lat. N. and 29°--25' Long. W. a
group of mines was found in ths ship's course"
you will proceed to open the document which is found
sewn and sealed at the end of this book of secret instruc-
tions cutting it exactly with scissors along the punctuated
line.
5. You will abstain to communicate and comment with
C
any person, outside of the Navy authorities, the contents
and existence of this document.
6. The book of secret instructions must be kept in
a perfectly safe place and in case of misplacement or
observing any abnormality in it immediate account of
this must be given to the Spanish Navy authorities or
consul of the first port which you visit if the consul
is Spanish. In the contrary case send the following
3
-2-
cable or urgent radio to the Ministry of Marine:
"Arrived (name of port). Awaiting Orders.
Captain."
7. If for any reason you are relived of the
ship's command the book of secret instructions must be
delivered to the Spanish Marine authorities 80 that they,
in their turn, can deliver it to the captain who will
relieve you.
C)
8. As soon as you arrive at any port you must pre-
sent yourself, without delegating anybody else to the
commander or assistant of the Marine of said port with
the book of secret instructions so that proper note can
be made by the corresponding commander or assistant of
the Marine.
9. The text of warning may be changed frequently
and a new text will be received in time.
C
10. In case these instructions should be changed
-3-
you will receive new instructions by the same procedure
and of the same nature as these.
11. Once a captain of a ship is in possession of
this book he alone is responsible for its preservation
and safety.
12. The obvious loss or destruction of the book
of instructions will immediately bring upon its possessor
the perpetual disqualification for commanding ships with-
out prejudice to the verdict pronounced by the War
Council which will judge him for the crime of high treason.
Madrid, April 30, 1941
By order of the Admiral-in-Chief of Marine.
C
DECLASSIFIED
By
Authority
of
C/A
007622
ARS
Date
SEP
10 1974
By
MINISTERIO DE MARINA
ESTADO MAYOR DE LA ARMADA
OPERACIONES
ASUNTO: Instrucciones secretes con arreglo a las cuales debe
proceder Inmediatamente que se reciba el avur-
nave de aviso.
TEXTO:
1) Con objeto de cerciorarse que el avurnave recibido
procede del Estado Mas de la Armada, deberá ordenar al per-
sonal radio que continúe a escucha sobre la onda y Estación que
dió el avurnave de aviso.
2) Media hora espués de haberse recibido el avurnave
de aviso, deberá recibir ctamente este otro:
-Eviten navega en zona 50 millas alrededor
punto avurnave ante-ior. lo que le confirmará su autentici-
willing procedente del fstado Mayor de la Armada.
3) Una vez cerciorado de este punto procederá inmedia-
tamente a dirigirse al puerto nacional más próximo.
4) De no poder alcanzarlo antes de las 48 horas, de.
berá dirigir su buque, segun su situación geográfica y reserva de
combustible, a puerto Noruego, pasando por el Norte de Irlandia,
o de la América del Sur, con preferencia en este caso, Argentino.
De no poder realizar lo expuesto en el párrafo anterior por
falta de a Jonomia, se dirigirá a puerto español aunque tarde más
de 48 horas.
5) Desde el momento en que reciba el avurnave de con-
firmación se abstendrá en absoluto de emitir ninguna señal radio-
telegráfica, quedando desde ese momento en suspenso la orden de
dar la situación al mediodu
6) Del exacto cumplimiento de estas instrucciones será
responsable con arreglo a las leyes de Guerra.
M trid, 28 de Abril de 1941.
Be orden de
El Almirante Jefe des Estado Mayor de to Armads.
ERIO
DE
el Seguado H.
MINIS
+
FRANK
DE
LA
MINISTRY OF MARINE
-
NAVAL HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONS
-
SUBJECT:
SECRET INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE YOU TO RECEIVE IMMEDIATELY
THE WARNING NOTICE.
TEXT:
(1) In order to make certain that the warning received emanates
from Naval Headquarters, you will instruct the wireless operator to
keep tuned in on the wave-length and station that gave out the
warning.
(2) One half hour after receipt of the warning, you should receive exactly
the following :
"Avoid navigating within a zone 50 miles from the position
previously warned against.", which will confirm the
authenticity of the message as having come from Naval
Headquarters.
(3) As soon as you are reassured on this point you should proceed
immediately to make for the nearest Spanish port.
(4) If you are unable to reach a Spanish port within 48 hours,
you should immediately make for, depending on your position and
your fuel reserves, either a Norwegian port, taking a coubse North
of Ireland, or & South American port, preferably in this case,
Argentine.
If you are unable to follow the instructions in the preceding
paragraph for lack of means, you will proceed to the nearest Spanish
port even though this will require more than 48 hours.
(5) From the time you receive the confirmation of the warning, you
will refrain from sending any wireless signals, ignoring from that
time the order to report your noonday position.
(6) You will be held responsible for the exact carrying out of
these orders, in accordance with the laws of warfare.
MADRID, April 28,1941.
By Order of
The Chief Admiral of Naval Headquarters
The Vice-Chief
(STAMP)
(RAPALLO)
NOTE:
This photostat is an
enlargement of the original
(about six times).
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
/
E.M. DE LA ARMADA C = = = = 1. C
TRANSMISIONES
CUADERNO DE INSTRUCCIONES
SECRETAS A CAPITANES
DE
BUQUES MERCANTES
MAYOR DE LA LA
ARMADA
SANITIZED DOCUMENT
Instrucciones Secretas
para el uso de este cuaderno
Ante la posibilidad de que el Estado Mayor de la Armada
tenga que darle órdenes, se servirá Vd. seguir exactamente las
instrucciones siguientes:
1.°-Mantener en inmejorables condiciones de eficiencia
los servicios de Radiotelegrafia de su buque, tanto en lo que
se refiere al personal, como al material.
2.°-Cuidará personalmente de que las horas de escucha
reglamentarias se efectúen con toda eficiencia y seriedad.
3.°-Se ordenará, que por el personal de la Radio se preste
la mayor atención a los avurnaves de las estaciones de R. T.
españolas, tanto civiles como de la Marina de Guerra, y que se
le avise inmediatamente de recibir alguno, cualesquiera
que sean las horas y circunstancias.
4.°-Cuando Vd. reciba exactamente el siguiente avurnave
"En 46° 15' Lat. N. y 29° - 25' Long. W. fué avis-
tado grupo de minas a la deriva," procederá a abrir
el documento que se encuentra cosido y lacrado al final de este
Cuaderno de Instrucciones Secretas, cortándolo, precisamente
con unas tijeras, por la raya punteada.
5.°-Se abstendrá de participar ni comentar con persona
alguna, distinta de las autoridades de Marina, el contenido
la existencia del presente documento.
Esta*reserva será llevada hasta el extremo de negar su exis-
tencia, alegando ignorancia, cuando sea interrogado por cual-
Instrucciones Secretas
para el uso de este cuaderno
Ante la posibilidad de que el Estado Mayor de la Armada
tenga que darle órdenes, se servirá Vd. seguir exactamente las
instrucciones siguientes:
Mantener en inmejorables condiciones de eficiencia
los servicios de Radiotelegrafia de su buque, tanto en lo que
1C refiere al personal, como al material.
-Cuidará personalmente de que las horas de escucha
reglamentarias se efectúen con toda eficiencia y seriedad.
3.°-Se ordenará, que por el personal de la Radio se preste
la mayor atención a los avurnaves de las estaciones de R. T.
españolas, tanto civiles como de la Marina de Guerra, y que se
le avise inmediatamente de recibir alguno, cualesquiera
que sean las horas y circunstancias.
4.°-Cuando Vd. reciba exactamente el siguiente avurnaye
"En 46° 15' Lat. N. y 29° - 25' Long. W. fué avis-
tado grupo de minas a la deriva," procederá a abrir
el documento que se encuentra cosido y lacrado al final de este
Cuaderno de Instrucciones Secretas, cortándolo, precisamente
con unas tijeras, por la raya punteada.
5.° Se abstendrá de participar ni comentar con persona
alguna, distinta de las autoridades de Marina, el contenido
la existencia del presente documento.
Esta*reserva será llevada hasta el extremo de negar su exis-
tencia, alegando ignorancia, cuando sea interrogado por cual-
2
quier persona, aunque ésta sean alto personal de la casa arma-
dora o compañeros de profesión.
6.° Fl Cuaderno de Instrucciones Secretas debera ser
conservado en lugar perfectamente seguro y caso de que sufra
extravio " " observe alguna anormalidad en el deberá dar
cuenta inmediatamente a la autoridad de Marina española o
Consulado del primer puerto que visite, si el Consul CS espa-
ñol. En caso contrario enviará al E. M. de la Armada el si-
guiente cable o radio urgente: Liegué (nombre del
puerto) espero Instrucciones. Capitán.
-.° Cuando por cualquier circunstancias cese en of mando
del buque, entregará el Cuaderno de Instrucciones Secretas a
la autoridad de Marina española para que ésta a su vez lo ca-
tregue al Capitan que le releve.
8.° Tan pronto llegue a cualquier puerto deberá presen-
tarse, sin delegar para ello en nadie, al Comandante o
Ayudante de Marina de dicho puerto con el Cuaderno de Ins-
trucciones Secretas para que le sea hecha la anotación corres-
pondiente por el propio Comandante o Ayudante de Marina.
9.° -El texto de la avurnave podrá cambiarse con fre-
cuencia recibiendo oportunamente el nuevo texto.
10.° En caso de variación de estas Instrucciones recibira
las nuevas por el mismo procedimiento y con el mismo ca-
rácter que le son entregadas éstas.
11.° Una vez el Capitán del buque en posesión de este
Cuaderno será el único responsable de su conservación y.
custodia.
12.° La pérdida, o deterioro manifiesto, del Cuaderno
3
de Instrucciones Secretas, traerá consigo automatic amente para
su poseedor la inhabilitación perpetua para mando de huques,
in perjuicio del fallo que emita el Consejo de Guerra que lo
juzgará por el delito de Alta Traición.
Madrid, 30 de abril de 1941.
De orden del Almirante Jefe del E.M. de la Armada.
Tran
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
December 21, 1941
12 noon
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
It seems to me that, in considering the Azores, there
-
must also be considered the mainland of Africa, even though
a thousand miles away. Accordingly, early in September I
requested that our research group, together with our Army
and Navy officers who were here, make an examination of North
Africa. That study is prepared. It consists of 177 pages,
and I do not wish to inflict it on you. However, the thesis
is that the military and political advantages of occupying
Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even maxi-
mum costs to Germany, and the study embodies the following:
1. The German Occupation of Northwest Africa --
Objectives and Costs.
2. Chronology of events and significant rumors
dealing with Western Mediterranean problems.
-1-
Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
3. German "Eurafrican" Objectives as developed
in Geopolitical Theory.
4. The Problem of Vichy.
5. The German Political and Economic Problem in
Iberia.
6. Germany's Economic Stake in French North and
West Africa.
7. The Military Problems of a German Conquest of
Northwest Africa.
I am attaching the summary and conclusion. If these.
would make you wish to look at the complete study, I will
send it to you.
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
L. OBJECTIVES.
The positive military advantages to Germany of
occupying Northwest Africa are considerable: First,
in connection with the Mediterranean campaign; second
with respect to the South Atlantic counter-blockade;
third, and less urgently, with respect to long run
exploitation of areas bordering on the South Atlantic.
Equally, if not more important, would be the
negative advantage of denying access to an important
European flank and Mediterranean rear position.
Economically, the advantage of occupation are at
best slight in the short run, problematical in the long
run. The maximum increment to occupied Europe of North-
west African supplies cannot be regarded as a signifi-
cant factor in the German decision. Occupation would
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
however, have the important negative advantage to Germany
of preserving a considerable leak in the Allied blockade.
Politically, occupation would remove the last re-
maining important bargaining levers of France and Spain.
There would be, for them, no real alternatives to full
collaboration. Further, occupation might be the basis
for a significant strengthening of the morale of Italy.
Negatively, occupation would serve to insulate the
politically vulnerable peoples of Southern Europe from
Allied influence.
II. COSTS.
Military advice is to the effect that an action by
Germany against Northwest Africa would take the form of
a pincer movement through Spain and Tripoli. It is most
unlikely that the Germans will move through Spain without
Spanish collaboration or acquiescence. The force mobilized
by the Germans would be of a size capable of overcoming
-4-
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
full French resistance in Northwest Africa, whether or not
that resistance is, in fact, expected. On these assumptions
it is calculated that occupation would require roughly 9-14
divisions and sufficient planes to achieve air superiority.
The transport, landing and subsequent supply of the required
force, against the air and naval resistance available to the
British and French in this theater would be a difficult but
not insurmountable problem for Germany; this assumes Spanish
collaboration or acquiescence and the maintenance of the
existing supply facilities from Italian and Greek ports
across the central Mediterranean.
The net political and economic costs of a campaign
against Northwest Africa will vary considerably, depending
upon. the decision taken by Vichy with respect to collabora-
tion. Other costs would include the loss of entrepot supplies
through Spain, Portugal, and the Canaries; the probable
necessity of economic and territorial compensation to
-5-
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
Spain and Spanish Morocco; the danger of emposing German
troops to typhus; the burden of occupying French Morocco,
Tunis and Algeria; and the cost of furnishing the goods
not supplied by the country.
In addition, Germany must reckon with probable Allied
occupation of Azores and Cape Verde Islands; probable
strengthening effect on American morale and unity, caused
by German bases at Casablanca and in Canaries.
III. FINAL CONCLUSION.
The military and political advantages of occupying
Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even
the maximum costs to Germany.
IV. TIMING.
Available evidence on the probable timing of a German
move is not adequate for sure prediction. The best guess,
however, seems to be that they are making preparations for
-6-
[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, 54-55]
that move. With that in mind, I have a guerrilla
project I would like to submit.
-7-
December 21, 1941
12:00 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Frank Knox spoke to me:
1. As to the possibility of having someone
negotiate with the natives in North Africa. I have
Peschkoff, now in London, who is prepared to do
this. (I think you remember him from the last war.
He is the son of Gorky)
2. As to the possibility of developing a
Fifth Column movement in the Azores. The same
group that was prepared to work on the airline in
the Azores also is prepared in this other operation.
I will send you an extensive plan, either on the
six o'clock delivery this afternoon or sometime
tomorrow.
December 21, 1941
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
I have received the following through reliable
intermediaries from (1) Vicente Lombardo Toledano,
President of the Confederation of Laborers of Latin
America (2) Dionicio Encina, Secretary-General of the
Communist Party of Mexico:
1. There is a strong possibility that the
Japanese have hidden bases for small submarines and
airplanes in Lower California. There are probably no
more than 1,000 Japanese on the Peninsula, but enough
to do considerable damage. The current immigration of
the Sinarquistas, allegedly Axis stooges, accompanied
by at least one known German agent, represents an
added threat.
-2-
The Mexican armed forces are totally inadequate
front,
to patrol the Peninsula and its waters. However, a
The
Confederation
Mexican fishermen's cooperative union which has a
the
Communiet
concession to fish in the Gulf of California can be
used to obtain information on Japanese activities in
the Gulf, and peasant unions can be used to obtain
information about activities on the Peninsula itself.
Their information would be most reliable.
2. The most important organized anti-Axis forces
in Mexico are (1) the Confederation of Mexican Workers,
800,000 membership, and (2) the Communist Party, 5,000
to 10,000 membership, the latter, though small, has a
highly developed information service.
3. Though traditional "anti-Yankee" feeling is
widespread among the people, anti-Axis sentiment on the
part of organized labor and peasant movements is far
stronger. With the cooperation of labor and peasants,
a majority of the Mexican people could be organized into
-3-
a powerful anti-Axis front.
4. The Confederation of Mexican Workers and
the Communist Party will cooperate with the United
States on condition that the American Government does
not support any reactionary Catholic political action
or influence, directly or indirectly.
Numbered paragraph four gives the ostensible
price for cooperation. Undoubtedly the cooperation
in question would be more costly. Certainly the question
is one of the greatest delicacy.
In view of the fact that Japanese submarines
may already be based along the coast of Lower California,
the element of great urgency is present. May I, therefore,
have your instructions with regard to enlisting the
services of the fishermen's cooperative union and
peasant unions in an endeavor to ferret them out?
We have just received a mass of highly confidential
material on Mexico which is being processed and will be
-4-
made available to you at the earliest possible moment.
W.J.D.
December 21, 1941
copy
marshall & State
Take up with
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
Dept. FOR
FROM: William J. Donovan
Pursuing the subject I referred to in my memo-
randum on North Africa, and also emphasizing my answer
to Frank Knox, who discussed the same subject:
I talked this afternoon with a man who has a
Holy man whom he has befriended. My man was a friend of
Lyautey and lived there for six years. His friend, the
Holy man, is very close to the Sultan. He thinks that
he would have a reasonable chance of inducing the Sultan
to carry out the project we have in mind. He thinks
money would not be required, but arms and equipment plus
a promise of semi-autonomy.
Our agent is an Englishman, graduate of Sandhurst,
excellent education and experience. Our only chance of
getting him in, however, would be under an American passport
On the operational side, I would have it handled by
our S.O.S. here who will be returning from England where I
have had him at the guerrilla school.
It would be necessary to get our supplies in there
at once.
If you feel that you wish this to be taken up, please
let me know as quickly as possible. I think we could work
it jointly with the British.
December 21, 1941
6 P.M.
Copy
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
William J. Donovan
I told you on my No. 82 dated December 20,
1941, 12 M. delivery, that this young Tammany man
came in to see me about Ireland. He reported to me
today that they had discussed the matter with Martin
Conboy. He thinks Martin Conboy would be prepared to
act but was of the impression that he would like some
suggestion from you.
Do you wish to make it directly, or do you
wish me to do something about it, or have anything
to do with it at all?
ask martin FOR Conloy?