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PSF: office of Strategic Services: Donovan Reports, January 15-24, 1942
Folder # 4
PSF Subject File
Box 164
PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
1942
Donovan Report
No. 4
January 15 to 24
No. 150
January 15, 1942
12 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Here is a letter which was intercepted -- written
by someone in Rio de Janeiro to his friend in New York:
"Nov. 22, 1941
"Dear Mr. Gans:
"There seems to be a serious tug of war going on be-
tween General Miller of the American Army Mission and
General Goes Monteiro, the Army's Chief of Staff, center-
ing around the very delicate point of who is to garrison
the new bases, the North-American Marines or the Brazilian
Army.
"There are many conflicting rumors about a conversa-
tion between General Miller and General Monteiro in which
the former frankly stated that the American Army did not
trust either the Brazilian Army or its Staff, and, in their
last interview, when General Monteiro asked why there con-
tinued to be the delay on the part of the USA in delivering
the war material that had been promised him during his visit
to the United States, General Miller is said to have replied
- 2 -
that the material would not be forthcoming until they had
obtained from Brazil what they (U. S. Army) considered
they must have in return.
"The Brazilian viewpoint is that the Brazilian General
Staff has agreed all along to the fullest "cooperation" with
the United States and has accepted to carry out all measures
advocated by the Staff of the U. S. Army for the defense of
the Brazilian sector in the general hemispherical plan. In
recognition, perhaps, of this, the Americans arranged with
General Monteiro during his visit to the United States that
they would supply the armaments that Brazil was no longer
receiving from Krupps and that the Air and Naval bases were
to be built with American funds and according to American
plans and under American technical supervision.
"As subsequent events have proved the Brazilian Army
crowd believes it was a mistake on their part to have gone
so far as they did in their initial negotiations as they
have left themselves wide open for further demands and these
demands have now crystalized into the insistence of landing
U. S. Marines to guard the new base at Natal.
"This is the storm center and whether the U. S. demands
may or may not be justified in the present contingency by
the lack of skill on the part of Brazilian troops and by the
- 3 -
half-heartedness of the Army Command, it is doubtful that
national pride would accept this admission and it might be
that even the President's unique grasp on the country would
not be strong enough to withstand public indignation. A
fine moment and opportunity for the Nazis and Integralists
to exploit the situation on that appealing slogan "Brazil
for the Brazilians"!
"Exaggerated Nationalism can be loaded with dynamite and,
dangerous as a Nazi putsch within Brazil might be, it would
take second place to what could and would be worked up in
the line of opposition to "Yankee Imperialism" if the U. S.
Army persists in their present demands. The Brazilian soil
by U. S. land forces will have serious reaction on the other
South American countries and endanger the whole "Good Neighbor"
policy. The Army feels that as the Brazilian Government has
gone full out in establishing definite and complete coopera-
tion with the United States as to Continental Defense, as
is demonstrated by the President's recent speech and the
solemn declarations of his Foreign Minister during the
latter's tour of the three southern Republics of the Continent,
undertaken to coordinate the task of defending the hemisphere,
that the "landing of the Marines" can be shelved as a concrete
demand and quietly treated as a mere technical point that can
- 4 -
be resolved by mutual agreement of the technicians of the
two countries. The immediate result would be to relieve
tension and to remove the label as an attempt at political
domination - an interpretation, through Axis propaganda,
that would readily be accepted by public opinion.
"In the course of conversations between the Army
representatives of the two countries, Brazil and the USA,
I understand General Monteiro remarked that "in the whole
of Brazil's history the country's Army command had never
been changed at the bidding of a foreign power; that no
Brazilian General could be found who would, under existing
circumstances, be willing to meet U. S. demands, and that
if such a General could, in fact, be found that he would
immediately hand over his post as Chief of Staff to same".
After this convérsation he called in the various Generals
on the active list for consultation and carried out his offer
to turn his office over to anyone of them who could be
willing to turn Natal over to the U. S. Marines. They all,
so it is said, refused. General Ary Pires, the Staff's
sub-Chief and an out-and-out anti-Nazi, was particularly
contrary to the U. S. demand.
- 5 -
"There is no doubt that this attitude is very exas-
perating to the U. S. Army Mission and the removal of Gen-
eral Monteiro may be insisted upon, but, absurd though it
may seem, there are those who believe that the situation'
is far safer in the hands of this intelligent but shifty
personality and arch-conspirator than to have him thrown
out by "foreign" manipulation. He could then pose as a
martyr-patriot. Incidentally, he has been responsible for
promoting all the existing troop commanders to their present
posts.
"I have heard that the local office of the Standard
Oil Company recently received definite instructions to
suspend all deliveries of aviation gasoline to the Condor
and Latti lines but later the order was cancelled. I am not
familiar with the true reason for the cancellation of these
instructions but quite probably the moment was not considered
opportune to take this drastic step. It is inevitable that
sooner or later that supplies, especially to the Latti line,
will be stopped as it is generally known that "bootleg"
diamonds continue to be shipped by these planes."
- 6 -
Under the bed was an open box containing boots and
shoes, various tools, and a lead.
On Friday, November 21, the whale boat was moved
overland to the Rio Negro, and from there sailed down Rio
Tadec to Isla Del Diablo and the Golfo De San Esteban.
In four days nothing noteworthy was seen, but from Henuel,
one of the laborers from the canal whom he took with him,
our source learned that the Maniguales and Kornizoff named
on Grosse's rough sketch were the Indian names for the Canal
Tuahuencayec and Seno Cornish. Hehuel had been there with
Grosse, who had gone on alone from the head of Estuario
Puelma, and he knew that at high tide it was possible to
cross a low fall at the head of the estuary and continue
up a river to two lakes which, in turn, were linked with
Seno Cornish.
On Sunday, November 23, they returned to Ofqui,
our source with the conclusion that a man posted at either
Cabo Raper or at San Pedro would be able to control all
movements through the Golfo De Penas.
He intended to leave the following day, but at
dawn Grosse arrived, delighted at the news of his Lago
Buenos Aires trip, and after breakfast invited our source
to his room while he packed. In the course of the conver-
sation Grosse:
(1) Showed our source two albums of photographs, but
not those he had already seen.
- 7 -
(2) Said that he had climbed the San Rafael glacier,
and that from there it was possible to reach
Lago Buenos Aires in two hours.
(3) Said that he had climbed all the other glaciers in
the Ofqui district.
(4) Invited our source to make a trip with him to the
Alacalufes to make a film.
(5) Lied in saying that he did not know the Guaytecas.
(6) Said that he was a farmer, that his hobby was
expeditions, and that he was expecting news in
Aysen of a friend who might be accompanying him
to Lago Buenos Aires: that he might be going to
Santiago first.
(7) He was taking all his things as he did not know
whether he would be returning to Ofqui or not.
(8) Lied in saying that Max Yunge, who had come to
Chile with him in 1930, had returned to Germany.
Yunge is in the south.
At 3 p.m. Grosse left for Puerto Aysen in the launch,
our source having refused his offer to take him with him.
On Wednesday, November 26, our source also sailed
and reached Estero Quesahuen that night.
The following morning the launch Crucero towed him
to Puerto Traiguen, and from there he rowed to the head of
Estero Pueima. At 3 p.m. on Friday the tide was high and
the whale boat was able to cross the fall mentioned by Nehuel.
The lake above the fall is some 5 miles long by one and a
half to two wide; 10 metres from the eastern end the depth
was three fathoms, the boat's length further, six fathoms,
and from there it gradually deepened until in the centre a
- 8 -
45 metre lead did not touch bottom. At the far end of
the lake a navigable channel of half a mile connects it
with another smaller lake to the west, and this opens out
into Seno Cornish and the open sea.
On Saturday, November 29, they sailed back down
Estero Puelma to Puerto Traiguen, and from there were
towed to Colonia on the Isla Traiguen by the same launch,
the mechanic of which said that on several occasions he
had left Grosse there, once at the fall at the north of
the island, and that there he had seen, some five or six
months before, a grey, two-funnelled ship which he thought
was a destroyer.
On Tuesday, November 2, the launch left them at
this fall which proved to be the eastern outlet of the vast
lake they had reached from the western side of the island
on November 15. Here, too, trees had been cut with axes.
The following day they sailed north to Isla Mineana
where another large lake was reported to be located, but
Antonio Ampuero, an old friend of our source, who has lived
on the island for two years and knows the interior well,
denied the existence of any inland. stretch of water.
From there they continued north to arrive back at
Melinka on Tuesday, December 9, only noticing on the way
a newly-installed automatic light at Cayo Blanco.
- 9 -
CONCLUSIONS
From his own observation and from isolated pieces
of information picked up in many conversations, our source
has reached the conclusion that the Nazis are using the
canal works at Ofqui as a cover, that Grosse has organized
a ring of Nazi purveyors (e.g. wood and meat at unéconomic
rates from Puyuhuapi and Koop in Puerto Aysen respectively)
and that the object of his, Grosse's, explorations has been
to find suitable lakes for seaplane bases. The indications
on his marked map cover all the navigable waters, both internal
and the open sea. Our source assumes that the exploration
has continued further south under Max Yunge.
All of this would be in preparation for the closing
of the Panama Canal and the forced diversion of shipping to
the southern route.
This oversized item has been
filmed in sections
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ACTIVITY
IN
CHILE
No. 151
January 15, 1942
12 Noon
The
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Here is a report on "Enemy Naval Activities
in Chile" which I obtained through friendly
sources.
I attach also photostatic map of the west
coast of Chile.
15.
I think you may be interested in examining
both the report and the map.
ENEMY NAVAL ACTIVITY IN CHILE
On November 10, 1941, our source left on a voyage
of inspection of the southern channels and islands down to
the Isthmus of Ofqui. The inspection lasted a month and
was carried out in a whale boat without an auxiliary motor
and with a crew of four Indians.
In Lagunas an old Indian told him of movements by
"the gringo from Ofqui" (Augustus Grosse) at Sepulcro on
the island of Traiguen. On Saturday, November 15, he
reached this point, and the information was confirmed by
Juan Ranchul, an Indian from Punta Pescadores, who added
that Grosse had been there with a gang of men from Chonchi
and had cut a path along the side of the river leading up
into the woods.
On Sunday, November 15, our source with two of his
men set out along the path, which seemed to have been cut
about a year ago, and after ten hours hard climbing came
out on the shores of an enormous lake some 300 metres above
sea level. It stretched for kilometres, was several kilo-
metres in width, and on the far side, using his telescope,
he could see that another river left the lake.
The following day he continued south along the Canal
Errazuriz and into Estero Elefantes to Punta Pescadores,
and on Tuesday, November 18, after sailing 40 miles in six
and a half hours, reached Punta Leopardo. There he found a
- 2 -
hut in which small pieces of coal (a rarity in the region)
scattered generally over the floor suggested that a consid-
erable quantity had been stored there. In the neighborhood
he found broken pieces of iron, two slightly rusted bolts,
and trees cut by people unaccustomed to the work and using
axes of at least six pounds; those used in the district are
of a maximum of four.
On the Wednesday he climbed the small hill behind
the hut with two of his men. They too commented on the
"crazy" axe work, and our source was able to determine that
two objectives had been pursued--first, to bring some heavy
object up to the top of the hill along the narrow path, and
secondly, to open a view commanding the Taitao Peninsula.
On a clear day and with a good glass it would be possible
to see to the Golfo De Penas. On the same afternoon,
through a storm of wind and snow, he crossed Lacuna San
Rafael and arrived at Ofqui.
At Ofqui he presented himself to the Administrator,
D. Marcos Vallejos, in his capacity as Government Forestry
Inspector, and was put up in the Administration building.
He found that Vallejos was a member of the Socialist Party
and anti-Nazi, that Jose Figueroa, an old friend and the
non-commissioned officer in charge of the official radio,
had already denounced Grosse to the Ministry of Fomento as
a spy, that of the other officials of the canal works Manuel
Neira was neutral and Pedro Bocke and Jorge Diaz were rabid
- 3 -
Nazis. Grosse himself was not officially connected with
the works and figures on the pay roll as a simple laborer
at 25 pesos a day; he was away in Puerto Aysen, and was
expected back imminently.
In the course of the night our source entered Grosse's
room in the administration building. He found:
(1) A map with the following markings:
A red circle in the middle of Rio Lucac
An arrow to the north of Peninsula Sisquelan
pointing to the head of Estero Pueima
A question mark to the north of Traiguen Island
Various red lines pointing to the east of the
Estero formed by Seno Cornish and a line of dots
joining Seno Cornish and Estero Pueima
A question mark to the north of Canal Proeromat
A question mark, an arrow, and a figure, perhaps
a date, in Isla Benjamin
A circle and an arrow pointing to Huafo on Isla
Ipun, a circle and an arrow, pointing towards
Isla Benjamin on Isla De Guamblin
A circle and an arrow pointing to Ruafo from Isla
Ipun
A circle and an arrow pointing to the west on Isla
Magdalena, a cross in Estero Pangal, another in
Seno Magdalena, the size of which had been doubled
with red dots and marked with numbers, apparently
soundings, from one to nine
A cross in Estero Cuervo in Canal Jacaf
Crosses at Coigue, Santo Domingo, Palena and Tic-Toc
An arrow, with one head pointing east and another
west, on Isla Huafo, with a circle in the middle
of Huafo or Guafo.
- 4 -
A question mark on Isla Ascension with numbers
from 1 to 16.
A carefully drawn cross between the points
marked 69 and 105 opposite Canal Manzano on
Isla Leucayec
(2) Unused and unmarked charts of the Taitao Peninsula
and of the Golfo De Penas.
(3) Various personal possessions, none of them marked
with an indication of ownership, and
(4) Two boxes, one of wood and the other of metal.
Thursday, November 20, was spent in conversation
with the various employees, and our source learned that
Grosse acted as liaison between the works at Ofqui and
Puerto Aysen and Putuhuapi, constantly making the trip
in the launch Rio Cisnes. He was well liked and very
obliging, and for this reason had been given a room in the
administration building although he was not officially con-
nected with the works. This, however, was likely to be
his last trip as he had received a telegram from Santiago
about an expedition to Lago Buenos Aires. This was con-
firmed by Figueroa, who showed our source a copy of the
telegram, signed Espinosa, and by Catelican, one of Grosse's
Indians, who also said he had been in San Pedro to take food
and some parcels to a friend of Grosse's there. Figueroa
added that some months ago Grosse had given a sealed parcel
to an employee of the Ministry of Fomento for delivery in
Santiago to a woman who had turned out to be an employee
- 5 -
of the German Embassy: when he, Figueroa, was in charge
of the radio at San Pedro lighthouse, a German, 40 or 45
years old, named Schwenke or Schenke used to come to buy
provisions and ammunition. Our source himself had informa-
tion that a German named Yunge was in that part.
By midnight Grosse had still not arrived, and in
the night our source again entered his room, this time going
through the contents of the wooden box. They included books
on aviation and gliding, in German; a small compass and a
barometer; two albums of photographs including views of two
farms, "Aparacion de Paine" and "La Aguada", and three pages
devoted to a small seaplane; and a packet; wrapped in a small
Nazi flag, containing:
(1) A photograph of a German officer in uniform, of at
most 30 years old.
(2) A photograph of a woman, aged from 30 to 35.
(3) A notebook containing many addresses and a rough
sketch of a canal or river named Maniguales, two
irregular circles inside which were many numbers,
and the word Kornizoff.
(4) Ten handwritten letters in German.
(5) Copies of six typewritten letters in German, in which
our source was able to recognize the names of islands
in the Guaytecas archipelago and such words as
Wasser Fall, Flut, Ebbe. The letters were all
addressed to "Lisber Herr Doktor."
(6) A stamped envelope addressed to Dr. Otto Reuter,
Casilla 1596, Puerto Aysen.
(7) A list, evidently of Casilla numbers, covering Puerto
Monit, Calbuco, Ancud, Castro, Chonchi, Osborno and
Puerto Aysen.
No. 152
RESURE OF THE CITUATION IS SPAIN AS OF
January 15, 1942
20. 1941.
6:00 P.M.
Sevin is undoobtedly influenced or Geraway,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT this country, which sm THEY
tabily out under Gearson occiantion one though the
FROM: William J. Donovan
pross in 100% Gerech contralled. The 0.000 has owen provided
nioricht by the Germans Net misresents betther the
not the majori Here is a report from William L.
bain real fear is Spain that the smeat of =
Brewster, who has just come back after seven
of the entremeral Banque Prints SEX
Yes weeks in Spain. 093 were Tonders to the Loyalist
start (no Civil car and who 8375 NNW in the
any be supported in R the to revern to occur and the
18 the this taing the majority of the Spanish people desire,
Spells, it is simost certain, will eventually restite the -
by recelling Don Fand and in only wathing for the pay-
photogical unders to do on. This in the polter time Transo
1.9 or Schlowing out,
Tha in the government STR THE for
the to
birth to day nore and More
note
-
and
dir
RESUME OF THE SITUATION IN SPAIN AS OF
DECEMBER 20, 1941.
While Spain is undoubtedly influenced somewhat by Germany,
contrary to the general opinion of this country, she is çer-
tainly not under German domination even though the Spanish
press is 100% German controlled. The press has been purchased
outright by the Germans but represents neither the government
nor the majority of public opinion. There is, however, a cer-
tain real fear in Spain that in the event of a German defeat
Aguirre of the ephemeral Basque Republic, Negrin, Prieto and
Fernando de los Rios who were leaders in the Loyalist Govern-
ment during the Civil War and who are now refugees in the allied
countries, may be supported in a bid to return to power and this
is the last thing the majority of the Spanish people desire.
Spain, it is almost certain, will eventually restore the mon-
archy by recalling Don Juan and is only waiting for the psy-
chological moment to do so. This is the policy that Franco
himself is desirous of following out.
The German sympathizers in the government are led by
Serano Suner and the Falangist Party, which latter is netly
pro-Axis, but is becoming every day more and more discredited
with a corresponding lessening in influence and power. The
generals, who are whole-heartedly supporting Franco, are
neither pro-German nor pro-Ally, they are pro-Spanish and are
- 2 -
striving to steer Spain through the present crisis by avoiding
war.
If the present war lasts very much longer it is doubtful
if Spain can maintain it's independence without outside help.
Her situation is desperate and bordering on starvation and
she must receive assistance which can-only come from the demo-
cracies and principally from the United States. Unfortunately,
we have failed conspicuously to understand that the opportunity
exists today for us to bring Spain into sympathy with the
democracies. The British now understand this clearly and the
British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare, said to me in
November that it had taken him eighteen months to persuade Mr.
Churchill and his government to adopt this policy of limited
aid to Spain.
By "limited aid" is meant sending regularly enough sup-
plies to increase the present very low standard of living and
prevent the entire internal economy from breaking down. Great
Britain, in view of the difficulties in obtaining her own re-
quirements, is not in a position to assist Spain materially.
Therefore, the responsibility falls on us.
Of our own exports so far to Spain, I think it can be
safely said that nothing (with the exception of such negligible
quantities as may be bootlegged) is reaching Germany or Italy
either directly or indirectly, in spite of rumors and reports
- 3 -
to the contrary. This conclusion is the result of my own
investigations and is concurred in by both the British repre-
sentatives in Madrid as well as our own Naval Attache, who
is exceptionally well posted. Conditions in Spain are so bad
and the country so near the starvation line that, even if
the wish were there, none of the exports would be allowed to
be re-exported to the Germans or Italians because, if discovered,
the resultant Allied naval blockade, which would certainly
follow, would definitely spell revolution.
It should be thoroughly understood that it is the German
policy to keep Spain in this condition of destitution and, one
can almost say, desperation. By not assisting Spain we are
actually supporting Germany's game. The German desire back
of this policy is that some day trouble sufficiently serious
may arise to force France to call on Hitler for help in putting
it down and thus give the Germans the chance they are looking
for to come in and "protect" Spain as was done in Roumania.
The continuous rumors and statements in the press to the
effect that German troops are moving into Spain originate from
German sources and are part of the German war of nerves. Un-
fortunately, these reports are published in our press with
obviously no effort to substantiate their authenticity. There
are no German troops nor is there any other form of German control
in Spain and, with the xenophobia for which the Spanish people
- 4 -
are known, no attempt at foreign control would be tolerated.
As Franco said to Hitler at his last meeting with him at Irun,
"If you come through Spain, I cannot be responsible for the
actions of my army or my people". Spain feels she has long
since repaid the debt for German assistance during the Civil
War and the Germans have no illusions as to any real love
the Spaniards may have for them.
Spain is in vital need of cotton, wheat, petroleum
products, beef and other foodstuffs and is ready to pay for
whatever purchases she can make in this country, providing
credits cannot be arranged. As materials exportable to this
country she has tungsten, mercury, pyrites, cork and olive
oil. However, in all dealings with these people one is
obliged to take into consideration the Spanish character and
it's exaggerated pride. It is impossible, as past experience
has shown, to attempt to force Spain into any kind of trade or
barter agreement. On the other hand, if we would for a period,
say of from three to six months, sell or at least authorize
the necessary export licenses for Spain's mírimum requirements
without tying any strings to our actions, I feel confident
we will find the Spaniards ready to offer us whatever we need
of their exportable surpluses.
It must be remembered that the Spaniards will never come
to us, hat in hand, begging for assistance. They will allow
- 5
their country to go under first. While it is not of great
importance, still the following shows the feeling of the
Spanish Government towards us. When Ambassador Cardenas
visited Spain last September, Franco said to him in effect,
"The great trouble with the country to which you are accredited
is that they never offer anything with the right hand until
they are certain of receiving something back with the left,"
and of course with the Spaniards such a policy is doomed to
fail. The Spaniards are probably the most trying people in
the world to deal with but, conscious of our strength and
position I feel we should ignore any minor annoyances and
keep before us the larger issue of detaching Spain from the
Axis.
It has been suggested that radio or propaganda of other
sorts might be used effectively by the Allies with the Span-
iards. I can definitely state that anything of this sort
would be just so much wasted effort as the only propaganda
at present that will carry any weight in Spain will be ship-
ments of their very much needed supplies. The effect of just
a few shipments arriving regularly will far exceed any other
form of propaganda in obtaining Spanish sympathies. Regard-
ing propaganda, the following may be enlightening. Senor
Carceller, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, told me that
whtn in Berlin in November, a member of the German government
- 6 -
asked him how he felt concerning the assistance Germany was
giving to Spain and his reply was that all the assistance
he had noticed so far was propaganda and literature which
wasn't of much help to empty stomachs.
I am convinced that by easing up a little in our policy
towards Spain and endeavoring to understand them a little
better, we will be able in the course of a very few months by
diplomatic handling of the situation to accomplish two things.
1. The virtual elimination or neutralization of
Serano Suner.
2. The altering of Spanish policy from one of non-
belligerancy to one of neutrality.
The key to this situation lies entirely in our hands and
in any attempt to assist Spain we can count on full British
cooperation and, as I have said before, it seems doubtful if
Spain will be able to weather the present storm unsupported.
Our present policy towards Spain has certainly not succeeded
and, if Spain is still struggling to remain out of the con-
flict, it is in spite of and not because of this policy.
Therefore, in adopting a policy of limited aid which I propose
it would seem that we have everything to gain and nothing to
lose. Should this new policy after a few months prove to be
unsuccessful we will have lost nothing nor will we have been
in any way of assistance to Germany.
7 -
There are several points in connection with the pros-
ecution of the war that it may be of interest to note here:
There are no German or Italian submarine bases in
Spain nor are there German or Italian submarines operating
out of Spanish ports or harbors. That a submarine of one
of these nationalities may obtain a few supplies once in a
while by bootlegging is perhaps possible but if so the
quantities so obtained are negligible and it is done without
the knowledge of the authorities.
Neither are there any airfields in Spain from which
German planes are regularly operated. There have been oc-
casions when German Bombers returning from raids on allied
shipping lanes have landed on Spanish airfields for minor
repairs and, in some instances, fuel has been furnished to
allow them to reach their nearest landing fields in southern
France though such instances are the exception. On the other
hand, there are also instances where German Bombers have
landed in Spain with all or a portion of their bomb loads and
have been obliged to discharge and leave these behind before
being allowed to proceed.
Since the fall of France in June 1940, particularly
from the submarine angle, Spain no longer holds the same
interest for the Germans who now have Bayonne and Bordeaux at
their disposal.
- 8 -
It is my definite opinion there will be no invasion of
the Iberian Penninsular by German forces unless Hitler is
forced to play a desperate card in an attempt to reach North
Africa: As of December 20th there were no German first line
troops or mechanized units south of Bordeaux. The inevitable
troop movements towards the Spanish frontier, which will be
the prelude to an invasion, are certain to be reported by
reliable British and American sources in Spain who are ever
on the lookout and until then all rumors and reports to this
effect can be discounted as being so much German propaganda.
In connection with North Africa I heard certain reports
in Spain that I feel warranted in noting in this memorandum.
The Spanish government believes that if the British persue
Rommel's retreating army into Tunisia the French forces there
might then become involved. In this case Spain would also be
forced to take a stand to protect her position in Morocco for
which she is determined to fight. If the United States and
Great Britain could reassure the Spanish government that it's
present position in North Africa will, naturally with the ex-
ception of Tangier, be respected it will undoubtedly prevent
Spain from entering the conflict in that area. Such a
guaranty will also give Germany one less excuse for putting
pressure on Spain to become involved.
- 9 -
Finally it should be pointed out that with fifteen
inch guns covering the Straits of Gibraltar from Spanish
territory on both sides of the Straits, the dock yard and
naval base at Gibraltar could have been rendered quite use-
less without attacking the rock itself. That Spain to date
has resisted German pressure to take some such action is
material evidence that the Germans are not in control of
Spain as the reports would have us believe.
I would add that in addition to speaking Spanish I re-
sided in Spain from 1924 to 1930 and since the beginning of
the Civil War in July 1936 I have been very close to the
Franco government in view of assistance rendered in furnish-
ing their much needed supplies of petroleum products. I
have now just returned to the United States after having
spent seven weeks in Spain, commencing November 1, 1941.
No. 153
January 15, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
We have just been advised from a very re-
liable source that a Japanese military attache in
Europe has spoken privately as follows. We do not
know whether the statements in paragraph 3 represent
only personal views of the attache.
1. Japan will conduct war in the Far East
exclusively in own interests and will not necessarily
link operations there with the war in Europe. Japan
distrusts Germany. Japanese objectives are Singapore,
all Malaya, Philippines, Netherlands East Indies,
Borneo, New Guinea and whole Archipelago.
2. Japanese objectives: (a) Elimination of
all Far Eastern bases of Great Britain and the U.S.A.
-2-
with least possible delay; (b) Obtain military and
political hegemony in the Far East; (c) Secure
sources of raw material, principally oil and rubber.
Japanese General Staff is confident that this can be
obtained in six months in view of ample Japanese forces
available, a strong Fifth Column and Quisling of
U.S. fleet.
3. Having obtained objectives Japan will
intiate peace negotiations with Great Britain and the
U.S.A. independently of the other Axis powers. Next
step, peace offer, failing which they will threaten a
sudden attack on India.
Copies have been given to Mr. Hull, Colonel
Knox and Colonel Stimson.
No. 154
January 15, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Our San Francisco office sent the attached
transcript of a Takio Broadcast in English at 10:30
P.M., EST, January 14th. It is Tokio's first direct
response to the President's last speech.
It is also the first direct personal attack
on the President by a Japanese commentator in English.
It shows that Tokio has taken over the Nazi "Lord
Haw-Haw" method.
An analysis of Arima's talk indicates the
following appeals:
1. An attempt to create suspicion in the
minds of American listeners on the question of the
President's sanity, by recalling "New Deal theories"
-2-
and the "openly expressed conviction that President
Roosevelt's mind was becoming unbalanced."
2. An attempt to instill doubt as to the
President's veracity by attacking his charge that Japan
fought Russia in 1904 as part of a scheme for Japanese
conquest. Theodore Roosevelt, history books and other
sources are cited to undermine the President's asser-
tion.
3. In an effort to justify Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, the Tokio broadcaster appeals to
American realism and tries to place the blame entirely
on President Roosevelt, as Commander-in-Chief of the
American Army and Navy, "He should have seen to it
that they were ready at any moment and at any place and
for any method of attack, but President Roosevelt, the
Commander-in-Chief of the American Army and Navy fell
-3-
down on the job."
4. An appeal to superstition in America by
explaining that the Japanese "deliberately chose the
Lord's day for attack on the U. S. There can be no
doubt that God in His wrath at the machinations which
have been committed by the President in joining forces
with anti-religious organizations, enabled us to
crush the American Pacific fleet." The Japanese
commentator says that a storm was raging almost to the
moment of Japanese attack, when the sky suddenly cleared.
5. An appeal to anti-Communist sentiment in
the U. S. by ridiculing the President's assertion that
the U. S. is fighting for freedom of all Nations. The
commentator cites the absence of religious freedom in
Soviet Russia.
6. An appeal to the colored races in America
-4-
citing the President's declaration that the U.S. is
fighting for racial equality, "That would be laughable
if it were not such an insult to the members of the
so-called colored races. It is an established fact
that there is less racial equality in the United States
than in any other country in the world."
8X6
EDD JOHNSON AND SHORTWAVE NY
(COPY PFLAUM WASHN)
TOKYO ENGLISH 10:30P.M. EST 1/14/42 NAO MILLIS TRANSCRIPT
COMMENTARY:
"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. MOST OF YOU IN AMERICA
TODAY ARE BEING TOLD TO BELIEVE ONLY THE STORY AND STATEMENTS AS
ADVANCED BY THE STATESMEN AT WASHINGTON. YOU, AS A LOYAL AMERICAN,
SHOULD BY ALL MEANS SUPPORT THE WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES. BUT WHAT
TO DO WITH THE DISGRACED AND BROKEN PROMISES THAT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED
BY YOUR HONORED AND RESPECTED LEADERS? YOU HAVE BEEN ENJOYING FOOD
AND ABUNDANCE IN THE LAND OF PLENTY, ONLY FIVE WEEKS AGO. ARE
YOU AS HAPPY AND SATISFIED TODAY AS YOU WERE FIVE WEEKS AGO?
"YOUR LEADERS IN WASHINGTON (THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) TO (1
WORD) THE IDEA THATTHE BLAME FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS RESTS
ENTIRELY ON THE TREACHERY OF THE JAPANESE WAR MACHINE. ANYONE
REJECTING THIS IDEA IS NOT A LOYAL AMERICAN, AND ALL OF YOU WOULD
LIKE TO BE A LOYAL AMERICAN. BUT WOULD YOU BE so LOYAL TO YOUR
LEADERS AT WASHINGTON AS WOULD (THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) ALL THE
MISTAKES AND BROKEN PROMISES MADE BY YOUR LEADERS? ARE YOU
PREPARED TO BE so LOYAL AS TO LET THEM SPOIL YOUR COUNTRY AND ROB THE
NATION OF ITS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE IT HAS HAD ENJOYED FOR CENTURIES
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD? WE HAVE ENTIRELY TO MUCH RESPECT FOR AMERI-
CANS TO ASSUME THAT SUCH IS THE CASE. AMERICA IS FOR THE AMERICANS,
AND NOT FOR ONE FUTILE JESTER OR FOR A HANDFUL OF SELF-DESIRING
STATESMEN AT WASH
LNGTON. THAT IS THE REASON YOU WILL HAVE A
SPEAKER TODAY WIDELY KNOWN FOR HIS CALM STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS. WE HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO OBTAIN
MR.
HAJIME ARIMA, WHO WILL SPEAK TO YOU TODAY, AND FOR THE
NEXT FOUR DAYS AT THIS SAME TIME, ON THE SUBJECT OF "ROOSEVELT,
HIS FAULTS AND PROMISES". MR. ARIMA:
(MORE) JS114APST
SX7
ADD TOKYO COMMENTARY--2
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, ON JANUARY 6 IN HIS MESSAGE TO CON-
GRESS ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, MADE A NUMBER OF DUMBFOUNDING
CHARGES AGAINST JAPAN, CHARGES WHICH CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO GO
UNCHALLENGED, CHARGES WHICH NO MAN WOULD OR COULD MAKE. A FEW
MONTHS AGO REICH FUEHRER HITLER QUESTIONED THE SANITY OF THE AMERI-
1.
CAN PRESIDENT. BEFORE THAT, WHEN ROOSEVELT RECKONED TO UPSET
THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES - SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM
WITH HIS CRACKED-BRAIN COMMUNISTIC NEW DEAL THEORIES, MANY OF HIS
OWN COUNTRYMEN, MEN WHO HELD RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS AND WERE HIGHLY
RESPECTED BY THE PEOPLE, OPENLY EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS MIND WAS BECOMING UNBALANCED. IF THERE WAS
ANY DOUBT OF THIS, WHAT HE TOLD CONGRESS IN HIS RECENT MESSAGE
OUGHT TO LEAVE NO UNCERTAINTY THAT THERE IS SOMETHING RADICALLY
WRONG WITH THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS MIND.
"IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS HE MAKES THE SPECIFIC CHARGE THAT
JAPANS WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1904 WAS FOUGHT IN A SCHEME FOR
CONQUEST. THAT IS THE VILEST AND MOST SHAMELESS AND DISHONORABLE
C
2.
THOUYHT THAT HAS EVER BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE HEAD OF A SUPPOSEDLY
FIRST-CLASS POWER. RARELY HAS THE LEADER OF A NATION STOOPED
80 POW IN AN EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THE WARPED JUDGMENT AND MISCALCULATION
BY WHICH HE DRAGGED HIS COUNTRY INTO A WAR WHICH HIS OWN PEOPLE DID
NOT WANT. THERE HAS IN THE PAST NEVER BEEN A GREATER DISTORTION
OF HISTORY THAN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS CHARGE IN HIS MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS THAT JAPAN FOUGHT RUSSIA IN 1904 FOR CONQUEST. HIS
NAMESAKE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, LED THE WORLD CRY WHICH HAILED JAPAN
AND ENCOURAGED HER. HE AND THE ENTIRE AMERICAN NATION AGREED WITH
US THAT CZARIST RUSSIA BROUGHT ON THE WAR BY MOVING DOWN INTO ASIA
STEP BY STEP UNTIL IT FINALLY THREATENED TO GOBBLE UP KOREA. YOU
CAN READ THE SCORES OF BOOKS THAT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ON THE RUSSO-
JAPANESE WAR OF 1904, YOU CAN READ ANY HISTORY OF THE WORLD SINCE
THEN AND
(MORE)
SS
4DD TOKYO COMMENTARY
YOU WILL NOT FIND A SINGLE LINE TO TESTIFY TO THE HIDEOUS
CHARGE WHICH PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT HAS MADE IN HIS
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN THIS SAME MESSAGE, DECLARES THAT
JAPANS DREAM OF CONQUEST INCLUDES THE DOMINATION OF THE PACIFIC
OCEAN BY JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN COAST
OF NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.
"THAT CHARGE IS AS DISTORTED AND AS FALSE AS HIS STATE-
MENT THAT JAPAN WENT TO WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1904 FOR THE SAKE
OF CONQUEST.
"MOST OF ALL THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES KNOWS THAT
JAPAN DID EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO KEEP THE HOSTILITIES IN
EAST ASIA FROM SPREADING TOWARD OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND THAT
WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE TO MEDDLE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, LEAST OF ALL TO CONTROL THE WESTERN COAST OF
NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, AS YOUR PRESIDENT WOULD
HAVE YOU BELIEVE.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR
AMBASSADOR TO WASH
UNGTON ALL THROUGH LAST SUMMER AND AUTUMN.
HE KNOWS WHAT SINCERE, EARNEST AND WHOLEHEARTED EFFORTS WE MADE
3.
TO REMAIN AT PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES, HE KNOWS HOW
(THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) BY SENDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OUR
ENEMIES, BY CUTTING OFF TRADE RELATIONS WITH US, AND, FINALLY,
BY INCITING AND INSTIGATING THE BRITISH, THE DUTCH, THE SOVIETS
(?) AND a CHUNGKING TO FORM A MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ENCIRCLEMENT TO
STRANYLE US.
"SO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, OFFERS
THE RIDICULOUS EXPLANATION THAT WE DID NOT WAIT FOR AN ACT OF WAR
ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE STRIKING. WHAT DOES HE
CALL THE SYSTEM OF (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) AND THE SENDING OF
MILITARY
(MORE) JS126APST
8X9
ADD TOKYO COMMENTARY
EXPERTS AND THE DISPATCHING OF OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMED
FORCES TO OUR ENEMIES?
"WHAT DOES HE CALL THE SHIPPING OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION, AND
THE ERECTION OF AN AIRTIGHT ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AGAINST US?
"IF SUCH ACTIONS ARE NOT DEFINITE ACTS OF WAR, WE WOULD LIKE
TO HEAR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS ENLIGHTENING INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS LUST FOR POWER AND IN HIS INSANE
AMBITION TO BECOME THE LORD HIGH PROTECTOR OF THE UNIVERSE, HAS
PLUNGED HIS COUNTRY INTO WORLD WAR BY COMPELLING JAPAN TO FIGHT TO
PROTECT ITS RIGHTS AND ITS HONOR. HIS BIG MISJUDGMENT OF OUR
FIGHTING POWER WILL GO DOWN IN AMERICAN HISTORY AS THE BIGGEST
ERROR MADE BY ANY PRESIDENT.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DECLARED THAT WE CHOSE THE TIME AND THE
PLACE AND THE METHOD OF ATTACK. WHAT UNDER THE SUN DID HE EXPECT
US TO DO? HE DISCLAIMS (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) TO US AS A THREAT.
WE ADOPTED DEFINITE ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THEM. IF EVERY ANY COUNTRY
(1 WORD) SUCH A QUALITY, OUGHT TO HAVE SENSE ENOUGH TO KEEP ITS
ARMED FORCES IN FULL PREPAREDNESS. HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN TO IT THAT
THEY WERE READY AT ANY MOMENT AND AT ANY PLACE AND FOR ANY METHOD
OF ATTACK. BUT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
THE AMERICAN ARMY AND NAVY, FELL DOWN ON THE JOB.
"HE WAS, IT IS NOW CLEAR, MERELY (1 WORD) AND WHEN JAPAN
(1 WORD INAUDIBLE) HE PROVED TO BE NOTHING BUT A FOUR-FLUSHER.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, BERATES
JAPAN FOR THE CAUSE OF THE (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) WE SET AT HAWAII.
IT WAS ON A PEACEFUL SUNDAY MORNING, IN OTHER WORDS, ON THE DAY
WHICH IS SET FOR THE LORD. JAPAN SHOWS THAT THEY DO (TWO WORDS
INAUDIBLE).
(MORE) JS131APST
SX10
UDD TOKYO COMMENTARY--5
"IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THE MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF MEN LIKE
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, WHO WILL CONSORT WITH COMMUNISTS AND AT
THE SAME TIME EXPECT OTHERS TO (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE). COMMUNISM
DOES NOT BELIEVE IN ANY FORM OF RELIGION, MUCH LESS IN THE VIRTUES
4.
OF GOD. THAT IS WHY WE DELIBERATELY CHOSE THE LORDS DAY FOR OUR
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT GOD, IN
HIS WRATH AT THE MACHINATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN-COMMITTED BY THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN JOINING FORCES WITH THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS, ENABLED US TO CRUSH THE AMERICAN PACIFIC FLEET.
WHAT BETTER PROOF OF THIS CAN THERE BE THAN THE FACT THAT A STORM WAS
RAGING IN THE HAWAIIAN WATERS ALMOST UP TO THE MOMENT OF OUR ATTACK,
WHEN THE SKY SUDDENLY CLEARED AND BROUGHT THE FLEET OF THE (1 WORD
INAUDIBLE) NATION DIRECTLY INTO THE VIEW OF THE EAGLES OF OUR
GLORIOUS NAVY. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT, EITHER, THAT GOD, IN
HIS WRATH, WOULD SMITE AND BLAST THIS ENEMY AND THEN ALL COUNTRIES
WHICH REFUSED TO JOIN THE (1 WORD) CORPORATION. IF YOU HAVE
ANY DOUBT ON THIS POINT YOU MUST MERELY LOOK AT THE FATE OF FRANCE
AND NORWAY AND BELGIUM AND YOGOSLAVIA AND GREECE.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN, HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECLARED
THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM OF THE NATIONS ALL
5.
OVER THE WORLD. CAN THIS MAN BE IN HIS RIGHT SENSES? DOES HE
MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
THE SOVIET UNION, WHERE MORE CHURCHES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND
MORE PRIESTS MURDERED THAN IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD?
DOES HE MEAN FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AMONG THE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN
CHINA? DOES HE MEAN FREEDOM OF RELIGION FOR GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK,
WHO LED THE MOVEMENT IN CANTON IN 1926 TO DESTROY ALL CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES IN CHINA? AND WHO TODAY IS FIGHTING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE
COMMUNIST ARMIES OF CHINA? DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT MEAN THAT?
THEN WHY IS
(MORE) JS136APST
SX11
ADD TOKYO COMMENTARY--6
THE UNITED STATES NOT FIGHTING AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA AND
CHUNGKING?
RESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECLARES
an
THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR RACIAL EURALITY. THAT
WOULD BE LAUGHABLE IF IT WERE NOT SUCH AN INSULT TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE SO-CALLED COLORED RACES. IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT
THAT THERE IS LESS RACIAL EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES THAN IN
ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD.
"DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT AMERICA IS
FIGHTING JAPAN TODAY TO BRING ABOUT GREATER EQUALITY FOR THE
AMERICAN NEGRO? CAN WE BE BLAMED FOR QUESTIONING THE SANITY OF
A MAN WHO ADVANCES SUCH AN INSANE ARGUMENT? WE SUGGEST
REMEMBERING THE DAY WHEN WE HEARD THAT.
"MERELY IN CONTRAST, IF JAPAN SAID IT WAS FIGHTING THE UNITED
STATES TO BRING ABOUT RACIAL EQUALITY, FOR THE JAPANESE AND ALL
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE YELLOW RACE HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM ENTERING THE
UNITED STATES EXCEPT AS VISITORS AND ARE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE
GRANTED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE WHITE RACE OF TAKING OUT
CITIZENSHIP PAPERSI (COMMENTARY SUDDENLY INTERRUPTED, STATION
APPARENTLY JAMMED. LAST TWO MINUTES INAUDIBLE.)
END
EGGLESTON SX 1/15/42 JS140APST
No. 155
January 15, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
We have received the following cable from our London
office:
"During the last few days, I have had intimate un-
official conversations with Sutton, Morton, and
Bowes Lyon, and these conversations lead me to
urge, in the strongest terms, that the question
of our providing at least token forces of American
airplanes for leaflet operations be vigorously
pressed in Washington before we ask the British
to handle United States leaflet No. 2.
"I also urge that it would be extremely valuable if
we could give some tangible proof that the question
of token Naval and Air Forces in Africa and the
Mediterranean was also being pressed.
"No American pilots or American-made planes parti-
cipated in the initial leaflet operation, evidently
because unusually increased, specifically, military
commitments made their use impractical.
- 2 -
"As these commitments are, at the moment, so urgent and
extensive, the Air Ministry is balking somewhat in
continuing to carry out continuous and extensive
British leaflet operations, which include Courrier
de L'Air and which have-included all the major
Roosevelt speeches up to now.
"The Air Ministry has used the United States leaflet
operations to take the position that the fulfillment
of American requirements should be taken as satisfy-
ing all political warfare needs of both America and
Britain.
"This has obviously created a difficult position for
PWE and they feel that a token American Air Force,
assigned to the leaflet work, would answer the Air
Ministry's argument.
"The United States leaflet No. 2 has been prepared and
will be ready for dropping by the end of the week.
This cable has been examined by our Planning group here and
they urge that some portion of our air force be designated to
handle the distribution of American leaflets on the Continent.
I think it is fair to recognize, after the impression created
by our Leaflet No. 1, that the dropping of propaganda leaflets on
1
- 3 -
enemy territory is a very important feature of modern warfare.
I am sure you agree that we should be furnished mechanical
facilities for distributing these leaflets. These facilities
should be American planes operated from British bases. The
fact that these leaflet-dropping operations would be valuable
training for American pilots is an incidental advantage which
does not detract from the proposal.
Our Leaflet No. 2 will consist of excerpts from your last
speech and it would give point to what you say in that speech
if the leaflets containing those excerpts could be dropped by
your fighting planes.
No. 156
January 16, 1942
12:00 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
The attached is the second in a series of
short-wave broadcasts from Tokio in English. This
one was at 10:30 P.M., EST, January 15. An analysis
indicates that this deals with the following:
1. An attempt to undermine confidence in
American news as given to the American people. "America
today needs men who are great enough to face unpleasant
facts, to act to eradicate all the mistakes committed by
their leaders."
2. Most of the program is an attack on the
President's message to Congress January 6th. "His
-2-
utterances are the work of a mischievous propaganda
artist, perhaps the most mischievous propaganda
artist of modern times."
3. Attacking the President's demands for
airplanes, tanks, etc., in 1942, the Japanese commentator
states that their military forces are ready and willing
to pay a million dollars for that information, if it is
true. "So the American people can hardly expect these
figures to be correct. It is just a bluff."
4. The courage, patriotism and preparedness
of U. S. fighting men is questioned. "Those at Hawaii
made such a spectacle of themselves that a Board of
Investigation has had to be sent to the Island and
the commanding officers of the Army and Navy forces
replaced."
5. Quotations from the President's campaign
-3-
speeches are quoted to cast doubt on his assurances to
the American people.
6. The broadcast closes with the "American
people are somewhat to blame. Knowing better, they are
permitting their bombastic egoistic (one word inaudible)
leader to deceive them."
SX74.
THE SECOND RADIO ATTACK UPON PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN A FOUR-TALK
SERIES ENTITLED "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES," WAS HEARD
OVER TOKYO IN ENGLISH AT 10:30 P.M. EST., THURSDAY NIGHT, JAN. QTM
AFTER A SHORT INTRODUCTION, THE RADIO COMMENTATOR TURNS THE
MIKE OVER TO MR. HAJIME ARIMA. BOTH INTRODUCTION AND SPEECH ARE
GIVEN BELOW, TRANSCRIBED CAREFULLY BY MILLIS.
-0-
TOKYO, ENGLISH 1030 PM EST 1/15/42 MILLIS TRANSCRIPT.
COMMENTARY (CONTINUED FROM 1/14/42)
"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. THE WAR IS NOW GOING ON IN FULL BLAST
IN THE PACIFIC. BUT BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE PRESENT WAR YOU HAD
BEEN INFORMED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO BACK UP ITS
CLAIMS BY FORCE OF ARMS IF NECESSARY. YOU WERE TOLD THAT ALL
PREPARATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) ARGUMENT
HAS BEEN FORCED DOWN YOUR THROAT THAT so MANY AIRPLANES, BATTLE-
SHIPS AND SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT WOULD WIN AN EASY VICTORY OVER POORLY
EQUIPPED FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JAPAN.
"DID ALL THESE ARGUMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS TURN OUT TO BE TRUE?
WELL, PERHAPS, THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOMETHING WRONG, SOMETHING
RADICALLY WRONG WITH WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO KNOW so FAR.
"ALL MEN OF EXPERIENCE WILL BEAR OUT THAT SUCCESS IN ANY ENDEAVOR
CANNOT BE EXPECTED IF ONE ACTS ON MISCONCEPTIONS OR FALSE PROMISES.
ONE MUST HAVE ALL FACTS IN HAND BEFORE HE DECIDES TO ACT. HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO LOOK AT ONLY THOSE FACTS WHICH ARE PLEASANT. HE MUST MAKE
AN EFFORT TO LOOK AT UNPLEASANT FACTS AS WELL, IF HIS REASONING
IS TO BE SOUND AND (ONE WORD INAUDIBLE).
"AMERICA TODAY NEEDS MEN WHO ARE GREAT ENOUGH TO FACE UNPLEASANT
FACTS, TO ACT TO ERADICATE ALL THE MISTAKES COMMITTED BY THEIR
LEADERS.
"WE CAN FIND NO MAN BETTER FITTED TO POINT OUT TO YOU THOSE BARE
FACTS THAN MR. HAJIME ARIMA, OUR SPEAKER FOR TODAY, AND WHOSE
TOPIC IS "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES". AND THIS IS THE
SECOND INSTALLMENT OF HIS RADIO ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
"ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES":
(MORE)--1/15/42...1115PST..(GE)
X75
JAP-ROOSEVELT)
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON JANUARY SIXTH,
ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, IS AN INSULT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OF ALL
PEOPLES AND FOREMOST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HIS UTTERANCES ARE THE
WORK OF A MISCHIEVOUS PROPAGANDA ARTIST, PERHAPS THE MOST MISCHIE-
VOUS PROPAGANDA ARTIST OF MODERN TIMES. LET US LOOK AT THE TWO
MODELS HE HAS USED AND THE WONDERFUL GRANDILOQUENCE WHICH HE HAS JUST
DRAWN FROM THAT ENTERPRISE.
"IMMORTAL IS THAT OF THE WEAKENED, DISABLED FIGHTING FORCE
WITH A BLACKENED EYE, A CRIPPLED HAND AND A HUNG LIMB NOW RUSHING
TO THE AID OF THOSE IT PROMISED TO DEFEND, LOSING EVERY BATTLE THAT
IT IS NOW FIGHTING. NOW, LET US TURN FROM THE EAGLE AND LOOK AT
HOW MAGNIFICENTLY THIS POWERLESS, SHATTERED FIGURE HAS BEEN
DEPICTED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
"WE SEE A MIGHTY, UOEBLZYBDHTING MAN, A MORTAL SAMSON,
HOLDING IN ONE HAND 120,000 BOMBERS AND IN THE OTHER SIXTY-FIVE
THOUSAND TANKS. BUT THIS, ALAS, IS ALL ON PAPER. ON THENHNEZLW
SZ
JZF
ER
IS NOTHINOHA SHARKS TOOTH, A WEAKENED AND HELPLESS ARMY I OSEEDXNAVY, TO
DL00 SP SIXTY BILLION DOLLARS.
WHERE DID THAT ZSYZLAU
AQUQ AIHERE WILL THE TENS OF BILLIONS OF
BOHANES WHERE WRESIDENT ROG8EV50TT02 NOW ASKING THE AMERICAN PEOPL XJ IF
DOMBSSSZF
ZEEDXAPPROPRIATION OF FIFTY-SIX BILL
BALANCE OF SIXTY-EIGHT XILLIOPHDOLLARS HE HAS ALRADY ASKED
OKAYED AND SPENT OSTENSIBLY FOR ARYGA HE PROMISES THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS WILL NOW BE TAKE
AURLJSZAJ
J YEDCJT HZBILLIONS
1
R
SX76...3... (JAPXZROOSEVELT)
/ "THIS IS THE SAME PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WHO MAINTAINECJ AS
RECENTLY AS 1939, THAT EVERY NEW DEAL PANACEA OF THE LAST SEVEN
YEARS WAS THAT OF A PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, THAT EVERYTHING THE NEW
DEA WANTED TO DO WAS NECESSARY TO NATIONAL DEFENSE. AND WHAT COST OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE DID PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT STILL SET ALSGSPENDING
TENS, NO HUNDREDS OF BILLIOPL OF DOLLARS FOR SUCH A NATIONAL DEFENSE
THAT IS so REMISS THAT HE IS ASKING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TODAY TO LET
HIM HAVE ANOTHER FIFTY-SIX BILLION DOLLARS TO START ALL OVER.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PLEDGES THAT IN 1942 THE UNITED STATES
SHALL PRODUCE SIXTY-THOUSAND WARPLANES AND IN 1943 ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND WARPLANES. HE PLEDGES THAT IN 1942
THE UNITED STATES SHALL PRODUCE FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND TANKS AND
IN 1945 IT SHALL PRODUCE SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND TANKS. BY HIS
SAME PROMISES IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE GRAND CLIMAX OF THIS NEW ORGY
OF SPENDING WILL COME IN THE YEAR 1943, THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION YEAR.
"TODAY, BARELY A MONTH AFTER THE NAVY OF WHICH HE IS COMMANDER
IM CHIEF SUFFERED THE WORST NAVAL DEFEAT IN HISTORY, AFTER EVERY
AMERICAN OUTPOST IN THE PACIFIC HAS BEEN TOPPLED, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
HAS THE BRAZENNESS TO GO BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO DELIVER
TO THEM A MESSAGE OF VICTORY. NOT EVEN PRIME MINISTER WINSTON
CHURCHILL OF ENGLAND HAD THE EFFRONT TO DO THAT. PRESIDENT...
PREMIER CHURCHILL WAITED AT LEAST 18 MONTHS AFTER THE BATTLES OF
DUNKIRK AND YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE BEFORE BOASTING ABOUT WHAT (THREE
WORDS INAUDIBLE.)
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DECLARED THAT HE WILL BUILD 120,000 WAR-
PLANES AND 65,000 TANKS IN 1942. IF THAT IS TRUE, THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES IS THE MOST INTELLIGENT SQURCE JAPAN AND
GERMANY COULD HAVE. OUR MILITARY FORCES ARE READY AND WILLING TO
PAY A MILLION DOLLARS FOR THAT INFORMATION IF IT IS
(MORE)---1/15/42..1130PST...(GE)
SX77
(JAP-ROOSEVELT)
X X X IF IT IS
TRUE JUST AS THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD
BE GLAD TO PAY ANYTHING FOR THE EXACT FIGURES OF OUR MILITARY PRO-
DUCTION. so THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN HARDLY EXPECT THOSE FIGURES TO
BE CORRECT. IT IS JUST A BLUFF. AND, IF THOSE FIGURES ARE
NOT CORRECT, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IS UNDER THE (ONE WORD INAUDIBLE)
OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INTO SELF-COMPLACENCY, JUST AS
HE MISLEAD THEM INTO A SENSE OF SECURITY DURING HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE
ELECTION IN 1939, WHEN HE PROMISED THEM TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES
OUT OF THE WAR.
"AFTER SPENDING SIXTY-EIGHT BILLION DOLLARS DURING THE PAST
FEW YEARS THE UNITED STATES STILL DOES NOT POSSESS A SINGLE HEAVY
TANK OF THE TYPE USED BY GERMANY. TWO YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II
BEGAN AND AFTER SPENDING SIXTY-EIGHT BILLION DOLLARS IN ACTUAL
CASH, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE AS RECENTLY AS IN OCTOBER LAST
YEAR ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT,
ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASSURED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHEN HE
ASKED THEM FOR THOSE BILLIONS, THAT THIS WOULD MAKE THE UNITED
STATES IMPREGNABLE.
"BUT, GRANTING THAT AMERICA WITH ITS VAST INDUSTRIES AT
PEAK, MAY TURN OUT HEAVY FLYING FORTRESSES BY MASS PRODUCTION,
WHAT THEN? IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WHAT COUNTS MOST IN A WAR
IS NOT EQUIPMENT BUT THE COURAGE AND PATRIOTISM OF THE MEN WHO OPERATE
THEM. THE GIGANTIC, HIGHLY-TOUTED AMERICAN PACIFIC FLEET WAS
CRUSHED IN A SINGLE DAY BY THE HANDFUL OF OUR MEN WHO STORMED THE
FORMIDABLE CITADEL AT PEARL HARBOR WITH A SINGLE AIRPLANE CARRIER.
THE PRIDE OF THE BRITISH NAVY, THE PRINCE OF WALES AND THE REPULSE,
WERE SENT TO DAVY JONES LOCKER NOT BY A FLEET OF JAPANESE BATTLE-
SHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS BUT BY THE PLANES OF A SINGLE
JAPANESE AIRPLANE CARRIER.
(MORE) JS1132PPST
SX78...5.. (JAP-ROOSEVELT)
WHAT DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT SAY OF THE COURAGE, THE
PATRIOTISM AND THE PREPARDNESS OF MEN OF HIS FIGHTING
SERVICES? THOSE AT HAWAII MADE SUCH A PAINFUL SPECTACLE OF THEM-
SELVES THAT A BOARD OF INVESTIGATION HAS HAD TO BE SENT TO THE
ISLAND AND THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY FORCES
REPLACED. HE ASKED THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS AT PEIPING TO SURRENDER TO THE JAPANESE ARMY WITHOUT FIRING
A SINGLE SHOT, JUST AS THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES
GUNBOAT WAKE ON THE YANGTZE RIVER SURRENDERED TO THE
JAPANESE NAVY WITHOUT FIRING A SHOT. FOR THE INFORMATION OF PRESI-
DENT ROOSEVELT, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AND
NAVY, LETS US REMIND HIM THAT THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE
BRITISH GUNBOAT PETREL, WHICH WAS MOORED ALONGSIDE THE WAKE,
REFUSED TO SURRENDER.
"TO DEFLECT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DISASTROUS DEFEAT OF THE AMERICAN FIGHTING FORCES IN THE
HAWAIIAN AND PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IS MAKING
A LOT OF TALL PROMISES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. CAN HIS PROMISES
BE ACCEPTED? ON OCTOBER 30, 1940, JUST BEFORE THE LAST
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IMPLANTED IN THE AMERICAN
MIND THIS STATEMENT: AND WHILE I AM TALKING TO YOU, MOTHERS AND
FATHERS, I BID YOU ONE MORE ASSURANCE. I HAVE SAID THIS BEFORE
BUT I SHALL SAY IT AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN. YOUR BOYS ARE NOT
GOING TO BE SENT INTO ANY FOREIGN WARS.
"ON NOVEMBER 2, 1940 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IMPLANTED IN THE
AMERICAN MIND THIS ASSURANCE: THE FIRST PREMISE OF OUR
FOREIGN POLICY IS TO KEEP OUR COUNTRY OUT OF WAR. YET, NO
SOONER WAS HE RE-ELECTED THAN HE DEMANDED THE CUTTING OFF THE
NEUTRALITY ACT WHICH HAD SERVED ITS PURPOSE so WELL THAT IT KEPT THE
UNITED STATES
(MORE) JS1137PPST
SX79 (JAP-ROOSEVELT)
OUT OF ENGLANDS WAR DESPITE ALL THE FRANTIC EFFORTS OF MR.
ROOSEVELT AND HIS WAR CABINET. so THE NEUTRALITY ACT WAS
REVISED AND THE LEND-LEASE LAW PASSED, AND THUS WERE THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOVED INTO THE FATE OF WAR AGAINST THEIR WILL.
"JUST BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES, ON DECEMBER 8, POLLS OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOWED
THAT BETWEEN SEVENTY AND EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
WERE AGAINST THE ENTRY OF THEIR COUNTRY INTO THE CONFLICT.
TODAY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF
THE UNITED STATES ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND HIM. THAT IS
UNBELIEVABLE.
"LATE LAST YEAR SENATOR HIRAM JOHNSON OF CALIFORNIA, IN
DENOUNCING MR. ROOSEVELT, DECLARED TAKE YOUR PEOPLE INTO
THE WAR, IF YOU WISH--BUT, WHEN THE CASUALTY LISTS COME ROLLING
IN, (REMEMBER THAT) CALIFORNIA DID NOT WANT TO GO TO WAR,
"IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DECLARED
THAT AMERICA IS FIGHTING TO UPHOLD THE DOCTRINE THAT ALL MEN ARE
CREATED EQUAL IN THE SIGHT OF GOD. A GREATER PRESIDENT THAN
ROOSEVELT MUST HAVE TURNED IN HIS GRAVE WHEN HE ASKED THAT, FOR,
IN THE SIGHT OF GOD, THE AMERICAN NEGRO IS THE EQUAL OF ANY
WHITE MAN. DOES FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THE
UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING JAPAN TO UPHOLD THAT DOCTRINE, OR THE
DOCTRINE THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE YELLOW RACE, WHO ARE BARRED BY
LEGISLATION FROM ENTERING AND FROM BECOMING CITIZENS OF THAT COUNTRY,
EXCEPT BY BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES? IS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
TELLING US THAT HE IS FIGHTING TO UPHOLD THE DOCTRINE THAT WE ARE
CREATED EQUAL? THAT IS SOMETHING WE OBSERVE, THAT IS WHAT WE
ARE FIGHTING FOR. THAT IS WHAT WE KNOW TO BE RIGHT IN THE SIGHT
OF GOD.
"A MUCH GREATER, A VERY MUCH GREATER PRESIDENT THAN
(MORE) JS1142PPST
sxso....7.. SX80 AP-ROOSEVELT)
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT HAS SAID YOU CAN FOOL SOME OF THE PEOPLE
ALL THE TIME, AND YOU CAN FOOL ALL OF THE PEOPLE SOME OF THE
TIME, BUT YOU CANNOT FOOL ALL OF THE PEOPLE ALL OF THE TIME.
IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, LET PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS
HYPOCRISY LIE WHERE IT BELONGS. AND YET, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE
SOMEWHAT TO BLAME. KNOWING BETTER, THEY ARE PERMITTING THEIR
BOMBASTIC, EGOISTIC, (1 WORD INAUDIBLE) LEADER TO DECEIVE
THEM.
"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE JUST HEAR HAJIME ARIMA SPEAKING
IN THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF HIS RADIO ADDRESS ON THE
SUBJECT "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES." LET US HOPE THAT THE
INFORMATION AND FACTS LAID BEFORE YOU BY MR. ARIMA MAY HELP YOU
TO VISUALIZE THE TRUE SITUATION AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.
"FROM THE LAST 25 MINUTES YOU HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO RADIO
TOKYO IN ENGLISH
END
EGGLESTON SX 1/15/42 JS1146PPST
NY
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SX
NY
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SX
No. 157
January 19, 1942
12 M.
DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
By Authority of C/A
FROM: William J. Donovan
007622
By DBS Date SEP 1.0.1974
The following is a digest of a secret survey of home
morale in England for the week ending January 12, 1942:
Public confidence is fairly high, but because of the
remoteness of the theatres of war, there is a slight
revival of complacency and apathy.
In the minds of a great majority, the most cheering
factor is Russia, with considerable enthusiasm evidenced for
the regime in Russia. Appreciative comment was made on
Stalin's "war aims." The widespread horror and interest
produced by Molotov's statement is summed up as "our leaders
have much to learn from the Russians."
Serious anxiety over the Far East is confined to the
"intelligent minority." There is, however, widespread
criticism "muddle and unpreparedness," with 8. disposition to
blame Duff Cooper, Churchill, and Simon. The feeling is that
Brooke-Popham is being made scapegoat. There are misgivings
as to whether the wholehearted carrying out of scorched earth
policy was prevented by private interests. The Wavell
appointment was approved, with widespread satisfaction that
an American was not chosen. A minority, especially the
industrial areas, favors dominion status for India.
Roosevelt's speech was approved by 10 out of 12 regions.
8 out of 10 doubted the possibility of realizing the figures.
-2-
"America still talking big, acting small" was said in some
regions, especially the North Midlands.
There was not unanimous approval of proposed American
forces for England, but the possibility of an AEF was welcomed.
There ware some caustic comments to the effect that America
was garrisoning England so that Englishmen may actually bear
the brunt of fighting elsewhere.
Great speculation as to length of war. Most think that
Japan's entry will prolong war in the East, despite American
power, whereas Russia may break German power more quickly in
the West.
There are renewed complaints that the radio is trying
ineffectually to gloss over defeats and keeping facts from
the public.
There was little interest or approval in the dropping
of American leaflets on France. It is described as a waste
of paper, more bombs on Germany would have been preferred.
There was a marked change in Eire's attitude caused by
American entry into the war. 800 out of 950 letters from
Eire predict Anglo-American victory, nearly all expect Eire
will be affected, through commerce and bases, by American
entry. It is generally believed that American will take over
Eire bases, and there are no signs indicating the possibility
of resistance.
On the home front: the cut in rations was accepted
philosophically. The question of service pay and industrial
wage is causing increased disgust and dissatisfaction.
No. 158
January 16, 1942
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
We have received the following cable from London:
"Adcording to high RAF circles, all
propaganda mention of American flying fortress
planes is being banned. This is because the
first type supplied to the British has been
found to be extremely poor, especially as
regards difficulties in manoeuverability and
vulnerability of armament.
"Kittyhawks, Tomahawks, and Marylands are
being given high praise.
"Navy circles tell me that propaganda
mention of the British navy's activity in the
Mediterranean is being discouraged. This is due
to the fact that two Axis convoys, including one
of nine large ships, have succeeded in getting
to Tripolitania. The British navy based at
Alexandria was to prevent their passage. The
whole Italian fleet served as escort."
No. 160
January 19, 1942
8:00 A.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
The following is a cable coming to me from our
London representative relating to German domestic
propàganda:
"German domestic propaganda has entirely abandoned
the attempt to subordinate Russia to the Far East and
now seeks to cover retreats by deliberately creating
confusion over geographical location of new German posi-
tions. Little was said about the stabilization of posi-
tion or winter quarters.
"Clothing collection was featured with implied ad-
mission of compulsion such as Gauleiter Hanke: 'only ex-
tent of gift is voluntary, not the principle.'.
"Revolution in Germany was said to be impossible
because (a) the enemy expect it, (b) clothing collection
shows home solidarity.
"Japan's economic and strategic gains, threat to
Singapore plugged as meaning interruption Anglo-Saxon sea
communications with India, Australia, hence loss of half
of Asia."
No. 161
No. 1
January 19, 1942
"I 00 Informed by Lord Cranborne British Govi 8:00 A. M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT that CRD
FROM: William J. Donovan well that A11
upons The attached cables refer: must to
prits (1) To Britain's estimate of Eire's attitude life
(2) To Britain's unwillingness to engage in
"It
propaganda in Eire.
community
has
in
realistic
torns become 8 Tistion which 10 people who value
-freedon and n Tree way of His one 2018 st, on white to
maintein,
"Loid Crestome points out best, perhaps reventy
to electy percent of citizens on nectrility, A
very rapidly growing magority - Britinn victory, even
V
before America's entry into was
"Exact figures 00 southern, now anreine in Brittick
forces are issure time hentrality has
unde it necessary for to setter under technically
pretences, usually n through from tin
Kater than between
X no - 189,000 wouthorn Trichnoù ere serving. in
numbers 55 Telin Laborate 178 enenged on
ove met mark tx Voe Inter
No. 1
"I am informed by Lord Cranborne that British Government's
attitude towards Eire will be that present conflict can no
longer be regarded as an imperialist war and that all
specifically Anglo-Irish controversial matters must be sub-
ordinate to the joint struggle to maintain a way of life
and a civilization which Eire herself enjoys.
"It will be pointed out that neutrality has in realistic
terms become a dangerous fiction which no people who value
freedom and a free way of life can dare for its own sake to
maintain.
"Lord Cranborne points out that, although perhaps seventy
to eighty percent of citizens of Eire favor neutrality, a
very rapidly growing majority favored 8. British victory, even
before America's entry into war.
"Exact figures on southern. Irishmen now serving in British
armed forces are unavailable because Eire's neutrality has
made it necessary for volunteers to enlist under technically
false pretences, usually by infiltrating through from the
Ulster border. Cranborne declares, however, that between
100,000 and 150,000 southern Irishmen are serving. In
addition large numbers of Irish laborers are engaged on air-
port buildings and other vital war work in the British Isles
(
- 2 -
to
help
part
with the consent of Dublin authorities.
Nr.
to
"Sir Eric Machtig, head of Irish Department at Dominions
Office, points out that the number of men with Irish blood
in England, Dominions and America now serving in anti-Hitler
armies totals more than the whole population of Ireland of
military age. installation in Fire of
"Sir Eric promises to supply any material on Ireland you
may want if you make specific request for it through me.
di-
"Gilbert is seeing Lord Dufferin of Ministry of Information
tomorrow." startions.
"Morten
our to it should be purity
Amordoan in every vey,
the surgests that if take Time that No should enter
wer st be internely to allow British government
to 206 our material before WE put 18 out to that minutar-
mandings de not srice."
No. 2
"Morton believes H.M.G. would probably not care to take part
in propaganda which might be designed to convince Eire to
enter war.
"Believed here that advantages such as using ports might be
offset by disadvantages such as need to protect Eire against
bombing and against enemy submarines using waters adjacent
to her. For example, installation in Eire of anti-submarine
devices now used in Britain might take six months.
"It is also felt that whereas no important questions now di-
vide Eire politically, entry into war might cause serious
internal situation.
"Morton says British government whole-heartedly appreciates
our propaganda to Eire but believes it should be purely
American in every way.
"He suggests that if we take line that Eire should enter
war it might be extremely useful to allow British government
to see our material before we put it out so that misunder-
standings do not arise."
"Present Impenese superiority on land, No. 162
making inviluble continuence of January 19, 1942
Singapore Steelf will defenced 8:00 A.M.
tensejsy. If sivance belied on mainlard will
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT reduce 14 rether then
FROM: William J. Donovan
"Reports
from
to
The attached comes to us from our London office
and shows the material sent out by the British Minis-
50 treated, Should play up eage avidence
try of Information as weekly guidance.
"Libyet has 100g DE at present
strangth. strutegic object of and shetty ochieved.
Rosmol's strategic retract not to be " E
the crust. Free French contributions to to be
strensed.
"Asside Gennary: LE mories of wrent person
box charges E Compand do not after fact that
undisparked dictor of and any, the Idea NA
Gestape remutos in poper se possibility of
ST the provides 1918 MTS 30 organizations certers
of advance ver once
or is united in
of Trest every story or sie-
bone my De of origin.
"Present Japanese superiority on land, air, and sea
makes inevitable continuance of her advance down Malayan
Peninsula. Singapore itself will be defended with utmost
tenacity. If advance halted on mainland Japanese will
probably try encircle Singapore and reduce it rather than
attack directly.
"Reports from Singapore designed to cheer up local
population, do not give an accurate picture and should be
treated cautiously. Situation is critical and should be
so treated. Should play up any authenticated evidence
of scorched earth and demolition during retreat.
"Libya: As long as Rommel's forces remain at present
strength strategic object of campaign not wholly achieved.
Rommel's strategic retreat not to be treated as 'Rommel on
the run'. Free French contributions to campaign to be
stressed.
"Inside Germany: In assessing stories of unrest remem-
ber changes in High Command do not alter fact that Hitler
remains undisputed dictator of nation and army. As long as
Gestapo remains in power there is no possibility of revolt
of the people. Unlike 1918 there are now no organized centres
of resistance. While continued Russian advance may cause
sudden collapse of German morale it also unites people in
desperate defense of Fatherland. Treat every story of dis-
sension with utmost caution. Some may be of German origin.
- 2 -
"There are signs that the major German propaganda
campaign charging Britain with selling Europe to Stalin
and giving up her influence in Near East may have some
effect in occupied countries, also Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Sweden, Switzerland and Spain. These should be countered
by reference to the source or the non-existent source of
the story, and positively by displaying concern and re-
sponsibility for post war arrangements in Europe and Near
East.
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
January 19, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
COL. WM. J. DONOVAN
The enclosed program is very in-
teresting and I think before any decision
is made you should talk it over in a
conference with General Marshall and
Admiral King.
F.D.R.
No. 163
January 19, 1942
12:00 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
As you know, any plans that we work out in poli-
tical and psychological warfare we have passed upon by
a committee on which sit representatives of the State,
War and Navy Departments, and from time to time such
other agencies of the Government as are particularly
concerned.
I am attaching a plan that is to be used simply
as a basis of discussion, but before taking it up with
the committee, it would be very helpful for us if you
will look at it and let us know whether or not it is
consistent with your policy.
OUTLINE FOR WAR NEWS PROPAGANDA PLAN
I. Strategic Aim
The basic aim of American propaganda strategy in
the present phase of the war must be to convince public
opinion throughout the world that American participation
in the war makes an eventual Allied victory certain,
thereby laying the foundation for future campaigns to
undermine enemy morale and bolster the morale of our
allies and of our friends in occupied territories.
II. Appreciation.
1. The fact that we are on the defensive, that it
is the Axis which has declared war on us, that important
U. S. and Allied strategic positions in the Far East are
gravely menaced, that we have lost the Philippines and
that we began the war with a crippling and humiliating
naval defeat, all tend to weaken our propaganda and
strengthen the propaganda of the enemy. He is in the
strong position of being able to base his propaganda upon
-2-
facts whereas we are in the weak position of having to
base ours upon promises -- i.e. expansion of war pro-
duction, creation of eventually powerful expeditionary
forces, restoration of the navy, etc.
2. To accept this situation and content ourselves
with a purely defensive policy of counter-propaganda
while awaiting major American military victories would
be the negation of all political warfare strategy.
3. On the other hand, to disregard our temporary
reverses and inferiority and attempt to give our propa-
ganda the form and content suitable to that of a success-
ful belligerent would merely expose us to ridicule
(vd. The present worldwide reaction to Mussolini's
bombastic propaganda).
4. The psychological requirements of the situation
are clear:
a) Before taking the offensive in our propaganda
-3-
we must wait some favorable news from a battle area in
which American forces or American strategic interests
are directly engaged;
b) but we must not wait for a positive victory
over the enemy.
5. To take the offensive in our propaganda we can
base it upon a negative victory as the British did with
Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain and as the Russians
have successfully done on a number of occasions. As soon
as the enemy has encountered a tactical set-back, we can
use this to create a myth of a great strategical defeat.
6. Barring unexpectedly favorable developments in the
Buropean theater, it seems advisable to key our propaganda
strategy to possible favorable developments in the Pacific.
After consultation with the President and high military
and naval authorities we should therefore set ourselves
-4-
the following propaganda objectives:
III. Objectives.
1. To commit the Axis to a Japanese victory over
the United States and Britian -- i.e. to establish in
the public mind in all countries--including Axis countries--
the conviction that Japan is Hitler's last desperate card,
that the Nazi strategy triumphs or collapses according
to whether Japan fails or succeeds in smashing England
and America as Pacific powers. (At first glance it might
seem a reversal of the proper strategy to proclaim a
victory over Japan necessary to achieve a victory over
Hitler. The reason for this is as follows:-
It is Japanese not German victories against the
United States which cripple our propaganda at the moment.
We are not likely to have any effective propaganda until
we can at least stabilize our lines in the Far East.
-5-
When we have done this, we might as well get the Maximum
benefit out of it by claiming that it automatically
insures the defeat of Hitler as well as of Japan. No
real harm is done abroad if logically this seems to con-
flict with our official line that Hitler is the real
enemy.)
2. To commit the Japanese to objectives they are
unlikely to attain -- e.g. establish that Japanese victory
depends upon destroying the U. S. fleet, occupying Aus-
tralia or Alaska, cutting the Panama canal, etc. (List
of Japanese strategic objectives need not convey any
useful information to the enemy because we can select
objectives which, from a Japanese point of view, are
quite imaginary.)
3. Await the first Japanese set-back in the attain-
ment of an unattainable objective fixed for them by us,
-6-
then dramatize by every means this set-back as a turning point
in the Pacific campaign and therefore in the war.
IV. Conditions for Realization.
1. The Japanese objective, the non-attainment of
which is to be dramatized, must seem a reasonable one and
the more modest it is, the more disastrous will seem the
set-back. Singapore is the ideal objective for this pur-
pose if sound military opinion is that it can be held.
2. To proclaim a turning point it is not necessary
to be able to name a single decisive engagement, but it is
necessary to be able to name some date in a continuing
campaign on which it is possible to announce categorically
that the Japanese attempt to capture Singapore has failed
or that the Japanese fleet has been put on the defensive, etc.
3. To be really convincing this turning point must be
followed by a veritable landslide of favorable and
-7-
optimistic news from America, and no major reverses in
our battle area must be in propsect.
4. Similarly it must be possible to announce that
for us the defensive phase of the war is over and that we
are at last preparing our offensive. This implies:
a) That our defensive bases in the Pacific are
fully equipped so that all supplies from then on will be
available to our allies or for the offensive use of our
own forces.
b) That at least token American expeditionary
forces have been dispatched to some war theater or are
about to be dispatched.
c) That the O.P.M. end military and naval
authorities are able and willing to supply us with a con-
siderable amount of favorable information about supplies
and effectives.
-8-
d) That we can obtain from official sources or
from prominent public figures a number of strikingly
optimistic and confident statements.
e) That the shortwave radio will cooperare with
us in following instructions regarding the tone of voice
of speakers, manner of presenting news, etc., and that
the censorship authorities will cooperate by suppressing
or discouraging news conflicting with the themes we wish
to emphasize.
V. The Campaign
1st Phase. The Public at home and abroad will gradually
be familiarized with the strategic themes mentioned in III -
(1) and (2). All "good" news that can be withheld during
this phase will be withheld and all comments minimizing
the enemy's gains will be discouraged so as to benefit from
a strong emotional reaction when the turning point comes.
-9-
(In foreign propaganda these directives may be disregarded
when it seems vital to keep morale from dropping in a
given area).
2nd Phase. There must be created rapidly and for a
brief period, a state of suspense and acute alarm. Theme
III (3) must be played up and the home and foreign public
made to feel that an historically decisive battle in which
the odds are against the United Nations is looming.
3rd Phase. The turning-point is proclaimed.
4th Phase. The victory is exploited. A great American
or Allied counter-offensive must be made to seem imminent
even at the risk of some let-down if it is delayed.
Appendix: The following questions and suggestions
should be submitted to the military authorities to determine
the possible events on which our-propaganda strategy can be
based:
-10-
1. What is the soundest or at least the most plau-
sible argument which can be invented to support the thesis
that an Axis victory is only possible if Japan can knock
out the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?
2. Could the Japanese in propaganda, be committed
to such objectives as the following without the suggestion
seeming absurd?
a) Alaska?
b) Australia?
e) The Canal?
d) The Hawaiian Islands?
e) India?
3. If so, with which of these objectives can any
Japanese offensive operations likely to occur in the near
future be most directly and plausibly related?
4. Of the real Japanese objectives, which, if any
of the following, are they unlikely to attain:
-11-
a) Singapore?
b) Java and Sumatra?
c) The Burma road?
5. Assuming that one of the objectives listed above
stands some chance of being successfully defended by us,
will it be possible to claim at least a share of the credit
for the victory for the United States. (Even relatively
insignificant U. S. reinforcements might suffice for
propaganda purposes).
6. Instead of basing the plan purely upon territorial
objectives, it might be possible to base it upon keeping
open an American supply line to the Far East. In that
case the Japanese would be committed as their major objec-
tive to isolating Malasia and Australia from American aid
and we would announce winning the "Battle of the Pacific,"
as we have won the Battle of the Atlantic. This would
only be effective if some marked slowing down of the Jap
-12-
offensive were apparent after the announcement. The theme
might well serve to play up the American contributions
whenever it appears that the Allied position in the Far
East is improving. The "Battle of the Atlantic" has been
somewhat unsatisfactory from the propaganda point of view
because of its indefiniteness. Some specific factor,
limited in time, must be dramatized to make the theme
effective.
7. Enormous propaganda use could be made of any suf-
ficiently dramatic re-appearance of the U. S:, fleet in
the Pacific battle picture. If the Navy Department feels
confident that the fleet will be heard from somehow before
Spring, this could be taken as the basis of our propaganda
strategy. It is not necessary for the Fleet to win a
major victory over the Japanese fleet; it is sufficient
that it show power to strike, if only symbolically from
-13-
home bases.
If the Navy feels hopeful on this point, we would
begin at once working up the theme that destruction of
the U. S. Fleet was the principal Jap objective and the
key to the whole question of the outcome of the war.
8. If the United Nations are likely to achieve air
parity at any point in the Malasian campaign, this might
serve as the dramatic turning point of the battle for
propaganda purposes.
9. In committing the Japanese to any objectives at
all, efforts should be made to inject the time-factor.
If, for instance, we can say that the Japanese must take
Singapore before the snow melts in Siberia, or before,
the Libyan desert gets too hot for an Axis thrust against
Suez, there is an obvious advantage. If the objective
falls after the time-limit set, it takes some of the
-14-
sting out of it, and if it doesn't fall at all, it
makes the victory a more positive one.
No. 164
January 19, 1942
12 M.
Tab
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
I am sending you the attached paragraphed
summary.
Paragraphs A and B have been obtained through
very reliable channels entirely independent of
that through which the remainder has been obtained.
January 16, 1942
A. THE JAPANESE
The Japanese Embassy in Stockholm in intimate con-
versation at the end of December last, spoke very pessi-
mistically on the German outlook. They remarked that the
situation was critical and even dangerous and might have
unforeseen consequences. Crisis in High Command coupled
with economic difficulties made it hard to see how Germany
could carry on and win. Holding down the whole of Europe
might also react seriously on the position at the front.
B. They went on to say that the Far Eastern situation was
quite separate. Japan intended to bring her war to a
successful conclusion at great speed before the United States
and Britain could get ready. Japan would then be prepared
to conclude compromised peace. They might even be prepared
to give up a little.
C. GERMAN MORALE
A good neutral source in Berlin (independent of those
previously quoted) reported on Christmas Day that the atmos-
phere was one of gloom and pessimism, but there was consider-
able perturbation that the United States was now a direct
enemy, as hopes of a compromised peace had been dashed.
Reverses in Russia and North Africa are not under-rated by
- 2 - .
the German people, and they were a great shock, as the
German Army is always believed to be invincible. They
are beginning to wonder whether the eastern war is not
a major blunder after all.
Doubt and depression is increased by Brauchitsch's
removal, this being taken as confirming previous rumors
that all is not well between Hitler and the High Command.
Another cause of gloom is the serious food and other re-
strictions.
D. FRANCE
It is reported, on what should be good authority, that
the proposed Petain tour of Occupied France in the first
half of January has been cancelled owing to strained rela-
tions between Vichy and Berlin.
E. NORTH AFRICA
General Juin is in favor of disarming Axis forces if
driven into Tunisia; Vichy's attitude considered doubtful.
F. The German Armistice Commission is pressing for half of
the total petrol stocks in Algeria being sent to Tripolitania.
No. 165
January 19, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
I think you might be interested in being informed
of the material we are stressing with the short-wave
stations in exploiting the following paragraphs of your
speech:
"These figures and similar figures for a multitude
of other implements of war will give the Japanese and the
Nazis a little idea of just what they accomplished in
the attack at Pearl Harbor."
"And I rather hope that all these figures which I
have given will become common knowledge in Germany and
Japan."
I. Immediate Handling on Short-wave U.S. Radio Stations:
The speech itself was translated into all languages
broadcast, including German and Japanese. It was broad-
cast in full in the chief languages and in summary, in
others. BBC also broadcast the speech in full to Germany;
this could be picked up on German domestic radios not yet
within our range.
-2-
One minute "spots" - similar to commercial plugs
on the American domestic radio have been used one
hundred and seventy-five times since the speech, in
eléven languages by all ten U.S. short-wave stations.
This will continue for at least ten more days.
Stories breaking down the production figures for
comparison in enemy and occupied countries have been pre-
pared and used, i.e.: the fifty-six billion dollar program
is so big it is six times the total Japanese national in-
come; or, it would provide six hundred and fortyfour winter
overcoats "for every German soldier alive before the Rus-
sian campaign and retreat". Neutral countries -- Sweden,
Turkey and Spain -- were also given such examples.
II. Continuing Program for Short-wave Radio
Daily from five to fifteen stories on arms produc-
tion are furnished the stations. Virtually all contain a
reference to "President Roosevelt's program for sixty
thousand airplanes this year...." All regular broadcasts,
usually fifteen minute scripts, contain references to the
program.
Stories are being prepared daily with reference to
our ability to carry through the plan -- our manpower,
our material wealth, our machinery, our financial strength.
-3-
III. Long Pull Plans - Radio and Others
A regular fifteen minute feature program, "United
America Fights", going to Europe and Asia, is being
altered so that its prime objective is to show that the
President's production program can and will be accomplished.
The broadcast will end with some such statements as:
"While you were listening to this fifteen minute broadcast
two of the 60,000 planes America will make this year were
finished."
New "spot" announcements, similar to the one cited
are being prepared with sound effects -- planes, motors,
grinding tanks, marching men, riveting machines, and so
forth -- to emphasize that the job is being done.
"U.S. Leaflet No. 2" is being dropped by the R.A.F.
over occupied France and possibly over other occupied
nations. The leaflet contains the President's production
figures and quotes from his speech together with full
color photos of our best plane types and 60,000 tiny
silhouettes of a plan, to get over the idea of the over-
whelming number of planes we will make THIS year. Such
a leaflet will be aimed at building up hope of deliverance
and consequent resistance to the Nazis.
COPY
THE
SECRETARY
OF
No. 166
Wishington
January 20, 1942
12 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
In order that you will be fully informed on
the subject of our Foreign Nationalities Branch,
I attach a copy of my letter of January 12, 1942,
to the Secretary of State, and a copy of his reply
Department
of the same date.
COPY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington
January 12, 1942.
Dear Colonel Donovan:
I have your letter of January 12 and also photostatic
copy of your memorandum to the President, relating to proposed
set-up of a branch in your office which would study and report
upon foreign politics as it unfolds in the United States in
connection with our foreign nationality groups. I observe from
your copy that Mr. Welles on behalf of the State Department .
in
the
requested such action by you, and that the President has given
his OK to this proposal.
I am satisfied, of course, that the merits of the proposal
are all that is indicated, and I cheerfully concur in the action
of the President and Mr. Welles.
Sincerely yours,
(signed) CORDELL HULL
Honorable William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.
COPY
January 12, 1942
The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
Conversations took place some time ago between Mr. Welles,
Mr. Berle and others at the State Department and myself in the
course of which I was asked to undertake for the State Department
the study of foreign political activities and trends in the
United States. The project was submitted to the President and
received his written approval. I proceeded with the necessary
organization, and results of some importance have already begun
to appear.
Last week estimates to provide for the new Branch were
presented to the Bureau of the Budget. It then transpired that,
- 1 -
according to the understanding of the Budget, the Department of
State felt that the situation had changed. Similarly it was
indicated during a conversation on Saturday between Mr. Berle
and Mr. Poole that the Department might no longer desire to have
the Office of the Coordinator undertake to render the service in
question.
From Mr. Berle's remarks, it appears that misunderstandings
may have arisen. In order to remove any misunderstanding which
may in fact exist, I take pleasure in assuring you again that it
would not be the purpose of the Branch which I am in course of
setting up under the direction of Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole to
interfere in questions of policy. Such are of course the
province exclusively of the Department of State. The new Branch
would gather information such as the Department of State may
desire from time to time on foreign political activities and
trends in the United States and submit to the State Department
memoranda and reports.
- 2 -
I should be most grateful if you would let me know as soon
as you conveniently can whether the State Department has in fact
changed its mind and no longer desires me to undertake this work
on its behalf. If such is the case, I shall of course make the
needed readjustments. At the same time I should point out that I
cannot fulfill the general directive given me by the President
without entering to some extent into this field of foreign
nationalities.
On the other hand, if you still desire me to assist in this
matter I shall be most happy to do SO. In order that we may
start, will you kindly send affirmative word to the Bureau of
the Budget, or indicate your desires in a letter to me?
Sincerely,
(signed) WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
No. 167
January 20, 1942
12:00 Noon
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
On January 2nd, source was invited by Otto Strasser
to have tea with him. Strasser is living with his
secretary, Mme. Margaret de Planellas, in an apart-
ment building at 400 Kensington Avenue, Montreal -
Apartment 44, telephone Firzroy 4559. He appears
locally under the name of Oswald Bostock, although his
presence in Canada is now fairly widely known. Source
had previously been introduced to Strasser under an
alias. The interview, which lasted for two hours, was
most friendly.
Strasser began by saying that, thanks to the English
he had succeeded in making a very fortunate excape from
-8-
Portugal when the Gestapo were close on his heels. He
was also particularly indebted to the British for
enabling him to remain in the seclusion of Bermuda
for seven months. He paid a special tribute to Major
Eric Cutton, H.M. Colonial Secretary in Bermuda, whom
he appeared to think possessed an unsually high type
of intelligence for a member of the British Colonial
Service.
His main theme, to which he continually recurred
during the course of the conversation, was the possibi-
lity of an internal revolution taking place inside
Germany in the near future. He thinks this will come
in 1942. The proximate cause would be the secession
of the more influential elements in the Reichswehr from
support of the present regime. In this connection he
foresees Hitler's dismissal of von Brauchitsch as the
-3-
beginning of the rift between the Fuehrer and the army.
However, he thought that England was not doing
enough to promote internal subversive elements in
Germany because:
1. She is practical rather than theo-
retical;
2. She is constitutionally opposed to
the idea of promoting internal revolution
anywhere;
3. She is still pinning hopes on the ulti-
mate achievement of military superiority.
In this last connection, he went on, the situation
with the Allies in the Far East is extremely serious,
because, as he put it, "even if the British army finds
itself in Berlin and at the same time Singapore and Burma
are in the possession of the Axis, then you cannot say
that the war has been won."
Asked by source for recent proofs of popular
-4-
discontent in Germany, Strasser replied that letters
and reports which reached him regularly via Switzer-
land were most encouraging. For instance, a well
known S.A. leader in South Germany, who commanded
100,000 men, was already deep in a conspiracy against
the present rulers.
"That is not enough", he continued, "the allies
must play their part in psychological warfare -- in
propaganda, Fifth Column and so on. You must fight
Hitler with his own weapons -- above all with the very
secret weapon of which he has boasted. This secret
weapon is simply the Fifth Column whose enjoyment in
the Occupied countries of Europe before their fall was
so conspicuously successful." Questioned about the
attitude of the police and Gestapo, Strasser expressed
the opinion that they would soon come over to the side
of the revolutionaries simply out of self-interest,
-5-
since many of them and the army have already realized
that Germany cannot now win the war.
Strasser feels certain that Von Papen, whom he
hates more than any of the men surrounding Hitler, is
intriguing with the Reich Generals against the Fuehrer.
On the other hand, Strasser thinks that Turkey, by reason
of Papen's subterranean diplomacy, may shortly throw
in her lot with the Axis powers, largely because Germany
has more to offer her physically and economically than
the Allies.
Turning to South America Strasser expressed the view
that the Nazis by covert as well as open means were
making every effort to enlist support. Their great
argument was that Germany would always have more to offer
them in the way of commercial edvantages than either the
United States or Great Britain. In this connection he
-6-
mentioned the recent arrival of Herr Buest as a suc-
cessor to Gottfried Sanstede in charge of Gestapo
and Secret Intelligence operations. He mentioned
Peru, Argentine, Brazil and Columbia all as providing
danger spots.
Questioned about his attitude towards Dr. Fernando
Artuccio, Strasser stated that although he sympathizes
with Artuccio's anti-Hitlerian aims, he felt that Artuccio
possessed too deep left-wing affiliations for his liking.
"Artuccio is almost a Communist", he said. Nor did
Strasser attempt to disguise his anti-Semitic leanings
which have certainly alienated sympathy from him and
his Free German Movement in South America.
Strasser was at no pains to conceal his fears for
what he considers will be the future effect of the
Russian alliance on the western democracies. He is
-7-
convinced that after the general peace has been con-
cluded the Soviet Union would endeavor to proselytise
her former Allies politically and will not hesitate
to take the most drastic steps towards the achievement
of her aims.
As for the peace itself, Strasser feels that so
far as Germany is concerned, there will be a reversion
to a confederation of states on the pre-1870 basis.
The military elements will endeavor to obtain as satis-
factory terms as possible, having ousted the party
from power and stressing the fact that they had never
been in agreement with either the principles or aims
of the party.
Strasser gave the general impression of an indealist
whose enthusiasm is great and who occasionally exhibits
-8-
real flashes of insight but whose judgement on many mat-
ters is imperfect. He is not a political leader nor
has he the makings of one, although he would very much
like to be one. Above all he is by no means 80 much
anti-Nazi as anti-Hitler and anti-present Nazi leaders.
At heart he subscribes to the principles of National
Socialism, although he naturally cannot endorse the
manner in which those principles have been applied by
the present leaders who were responsible for the murder
of his brother, Gregor, and for the placing of a price
upon his own head. He thinks in terms of weltpolitik
to the exclusion of ideas of the Liberal and Social-
democratic school, and he believes that some form of
authoritarian rule in which the elements of confidence
order and fear appear, is best suited to the German
people. There is, however, no doubt of his intense
-9-
hatred of the present rule in Germany, to whose over-
throw all his energies and those of his followers
are primarily directed.
No. 168
January 20, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
I have received a report from our London Office
that a showdown between Churchill and DeGaulle is
imminent and DeGaulle may be ousted.
DeGaulle has been openly flirting with the
Russians and may go to Moscow. He has been saying
he would never deal with the Americans again.
Comte de Paris may come into the foreground.
No. 169
January 20, 1942
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
The following, which came to us from a British source,
is of possible particular interest currently:
"We have been informed that on the morning
of January 15th, Italcable informed the German
Embassy in Rio that they were unable to transmit
cypher telegrams to the German Embassy at Buenos
Aires, because new instructions issued that
morning stated that cypher telegrams from missions
of European countries may be sent only to their
own country. (Note: This regulation has not
been enforced against the British as yet.)
"Further, the German Embassy has a load of
ashes which tends to confirm the newspaper
report of three days ago that the Germans were
burning documents, but which Rio discounted as
probably being put out deliberately by the
Germans. The Embassy also ordered three strong
packing cases and previously they ordered
several beds."
DECLASSIFIED
NND 844008
TTG/KS NARS, Date 19Aps
No. 170
January 21, 1942
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
-
137
-
167
1
206
FROM: William J. Donovan
-
296
The following information has been furnished me from
a source in a position to be well informed and in whom I
place very high confidence:
POSITION OF GERMAN FORCES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT AS OF DECEMBER
1st. 1941
Total number of divisions on Russian Front - 165
Divided as follows:
FINNISH FRONT, under command of General Dietl.
2 army corps, in which are included the following
divisions: 163rd, 169th, 186th, 199th
One division of S.S. troops
Composition of the remainder of this force will be
furnished later.
NORTHERN SECTOR, under General Ritter Von Leeb
2 armies - divisions among which include the following:
1 - 11 - 12 - 30 - 32 - 58 - 121 - 122 - 214 - 215
217 - 219 - 253 - 255 - 290 - 291
A total of 16 divisions are under the command of
General Busch and 18 under General Kuchler.
CENTRAL SECTOR
3 armies under General Von Bock, with a total of 40
to 45 divisions, included among which are the following:
-2-
4 - - 6 - 7 - 9 - 15 - 17 - 26 - 27 - 31 - 35 - - 62 - 78 - 86
87 - 98 - 106 - 112 - 128 - 129 - 131 - 137 - 167 - 206 - 212
213 - 254 - 258 - 260 - 263 - 293 - 296
The army commands are as follows:
2nd army - General Von Weichs
4th army - General Von Kluge
9th army - General Strauss
Also under General Von Bock's command are 12 Panzer and 10
mixed divisions, the latter representing armored vehicles and
light tanks.
The Panzer divisions are as follows:
1 - 3 - 4 - 6 - 7 - 8 - - 10 - 12 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20
The known mixed divisions are as follows:
2 - 10 - 13 - 20 - 29
The whole of the Panzer and mixed divisions are under the
general command of General Reinhardt, who in turn has three
separate divisions under the command of General Guderian,
General Hoth and General Hoppner.
SOUTHERN SECTOR, under General Von Runstedt, composed of
three armies with a total of 40 divisions, plus six Panzer
and six Mountain divisions, of which the following are
definitely identified:
22 - 46 - 50 - 56 - 57 - 61 - 68 - 72 - 73 - 75 - - 79 - 94
95 - 113 - 170 - 184 - 190 - 198 - 221 - 239 - 296 - 297 - 299
-3-
The three army commands are as follows:
6th army - General Von Reichenau
11th army - General Von Manstein
17th army - General Von Stulpnagel
The first Panzer division, including the mountain troops, is
under General Von Kleist.
The following compose the six Panzer divisions:
5 - 9 - 11 - 13 - - 14 - - 16
Included among the six mountain divisions are the following:
16 - - 25 - 60
In addition, there is a division known as the Viking.
Whether this is included among the six mountain divisions
is uncertain.
The actual numbers of the divisions given in the
several groups of armies are definite. All divisions not
identified have been omitted.
Since December 20 two divisions, 81 and 88, have left
France for Russia. Within the last three weeks four or five
divisions have returned to France from Russia, including the
5th and the 28th.
The casualty figures in the German army up to November
30 are conservatively estimated at:
Dead
1,100,000
Wounded 1,200,000
I have sent copies of this to the Army and to the
Navy.
No. 170
January 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
The following is a statement made on December 29,
1941, by the Venezuelan Minister in Washington to his
Government, commenting upon Mr. Churchill's visit to
the United States:
"The principal object of Churchill's journey was
undoubtedly to discuss with President Roosevelt the problem
of the uniting of the Allied Commands. Strictly speaking,
this object was not obtained, owing, among other things,
to the peculiarities of the present war, whose fronts
are scattered in the most various and distant corners of
the globe. Unlike the war of 1914-1918, there is now no
front on which Allied Armies are fighting side by side;
the Russians are struggling alone of the four thousand
kilometers of the Eastern Front; the British Empire Forces,
except for a little help from the De Gaulle Frenchmen
and the abyssinians, are defending the British Isles
and fighting alone in Africa and Malaya; the Chinese Army
has practically no foreign personnel on Chinese territory;
nor have the Dutch in the Indies. The North Americans
-2-
are fighting in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands.
Although an unification of the allied naval forces
under a single leadership would present less difficulties
than in the case of land forces, it would also lead to
confusion and delays in action owing to the different
methods, tactics and terminology of the English and
North American fleets."
He continues: "Mr. Churchill, while dispelling, by
his answers to the Press any possibility of a Combined
Command being set up for all Allied Forces, did not al-
together exclude the possibility of a Combined Command
for naval forces." The Minister considers that the chief
results of the meeting between President Roosevelt and
Mr. Churchill has been "the elaboration of a vast strategic
plan, it appears that this plan divides the world into
various strategic regions, each of which will be under an
independent command, which will be united by a Supreme
War Council. Possibly the leadership of each area will
be, as hitherto, in the hands of the Nation directly
concerned in that region: the Russians on their own
territory; the British Empire in Africa and the Near and
Middle East, the Americans in the East Pacific and the
Philippines; the Chinese on their own front; and the
Dutch and French cooperating on the British Empire's
-3-
various fronts".
He considers that naval problems were the main point
of discussion at the Washington meeting. "It is believed
that the naval strategy agreed upon was that of defending
the vital lines of communication, which serve today for
the transport of material to danger-spots and will, in
the future, serve for the transport of great masses of
troops for the offensives of 1942. Each fleet will remain
independent for the time being, and will co-ordinate their
activities in such a way that the North American fleet can
concentrate in the Pacific and the British fleet can
control the Atlantic and the Mediterranean."
No. 171
January 21, 1942
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
Following the direction in your memorandum of
January 19 on our outline for a war news propaganda plan,
I talked yesterday afternoon to General Marshall and Admiral
King.
They felt, first, that the one thing which could be
stressed now was the tactical action in the Pacific which
had resulted from unity of command; also, that we had
played an important part in those actions through our air
power. Second, that until there had been stabilization
no definite positions could be stated -- the failure to
capture which would be considered a defeat for Japan.
At my suggestion that it was necessary to prepare
for these things long in advance, they agreed that they
would have our proposal (which I said was intended to be
provocative) taken up with their people.
No. 172
January 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
The following is an excerpt from a letter written
on December 4, 1941 by a resident of Switzerland to his
brother in New York City:
"Today one hears nothing but very bad news from
Germany. A Swiss Doctors' Mission went to the German
East Front and now one hears, on the quiet, that the
conditions there are really frightful. Nothing but am-
putations day and night in incredible dens and damp
cellars, terrible wounds and horrible cripples. And
other reports that Hitler is obliged to keep on talking
about victory in Russia, because the people themselves
are beginning to doubt
Most of the people here are
more or less convinced that Germany has already lost the
war and now this conviction is also said to be growing
amongst the Germans themselves. They will, of course,
defend themselves madly to the end and will go to inhuman
lengths when they are threatened with complete defeat.
- 2 -
It is anticipated that they will then resort to the most
terrible gases.
"In the October number of The Readers' Digest, was
an article about the Swiss Army, by Denis de Rougemont
introduced thus: Denis de Rougemont is a Swiss, so out-
spoken against the Nazis that his government has sent him
off on a 'mission' to the U. S.
"Rougemont was sent to America by a private company,
the Gottharbund or the 'Oxfordianer' and had absolutely
no official mission. Moreover, the Anti-Nazis are not sent
away by us, we still have much more outspoken Anti-Nazis
than Rougemont."
No. 173
January 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
You might be interested in the attached map
which shows the distribution of Japanese in the
South British Columbia District.
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Lite Col Eoruyan THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
from
January 23, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Steve has checked on Lamont Belin.
State Dept. says he is all right -- very
wealthy man who was nominated by Hoover
as Ambassador to' Poland; was never con-
firmed by the Senate because it was a
last minute appointment before you came
into office; he went to Poland and stayed
there for several months without pay.
Donovan would like him to represent
him and Byron Price says it is all right.
It is not a very important assignment.
Steve thinks it would please Donovan
to give him the "green light".
G.
CKLR
No. 174
January 22, 1942
12 M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
We need to select a representative for the
Censorship Board. It requires a man with an appreciation
of world communications and the significance of the censor-
ship raw material for intelligence. State Department
experience is desirable. Lannet ont Belin, formerly
Ambassador to Poland, may be available. Before asking him
to serve, I would like to know if you have any objection.
No. 175
January 22, 1942
12 M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
We have received the following through our representa-
tive in London:
"This information is from the highest secret sources.
"In spite of growing doubt in high quarters at Vichy
about the certainty of German victory, negotiations begun
early in December between Berlin and Vichy are continuing
on the German proposal to return 850,000 prisoners and
abolish at Pas de Calais the 'forbidden zone' in exchange
for:
a. The creation along the Mediterranean of the
forbidden zone and free German use of Toulon and Marseilles.
b. Free passage through and permission for Germans
to remain in the unoccupied area.
C. Permission for the German forces to enter
08 callo
NND804056.
DECLASSIFIED
Algeria, Tunis, and perhaps Morocco.
"As a result of Petain's request, a further demand
that Vichy call up four additional military classes has
been dropped in return for Vichy's offer to supply Germany
with equal number of laborers.
"In Spain, anti-German feeling is increasing because:
a. Japanese bombings in the Philippines
b. Fear lest supplies from the Argentine will be cut
off.
-2-
C. Fear of whatever action the Germans may take if
the British reach the Tunisian frontier and win over the
French in North Africa.
"In Spain, the Germans are conducting intensive
whispering campaigns that Britain and America will soon
occupy the Canaries and the Azores."
No. 176
January 22, 1942
IEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
Yesterday I carried along further our nego-
tiations relative to establishing communication between
the Cape Verdes and the United States. We now have up
with the Maritime Commission the question of obtaining
a ship. We do not need more than 1500 or 2000 tons.
I have worked out arrangements with the Cape
Verdians here and also with Bensaude, who is to obtain
clearance with the Portuguese.
No. 178.
January 23, 1942.
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM For The President.
From:
William J. Donovan.
The following is a reliable RAF aircraft report
in the Libyan Campaign:
Total number of aircraft available at start of the
campaign in November, 1941
925
Total number available January 8, 1942
975
RAF combat losses from November 18, 1941, to
December 14, 1941
Aircraft
Personnel
...
260
370
It was estimated at first by the British that the Axis
losses were running about 50% higher than their
own. The very latest figure however admitted
that the Axis losses were about equal to their
own. This figure is combat losses and does not
include the large quantities of aircraft destroyed
on the ground by the RAF.
RAF losses from the start of the Libyan campaign in
November to December 25, 1941, by type:
6 - Beauforts
134 - Curtiss Tomahawks
9 - Douglas Bostons
20 - Beaufighters
(It is estimated that
124 - Hurricane I's
76 - Hurricane II's
between 35% to 50% of
38 - Martin Marylands
32 - Wellington I's
these aircraft are
16 - Wellington II's
100 - Blenheim IIII's
repairable.)
Supplies required by RAF daily:
Ammunition
- 40 Tons
Gasoline
- 200 Tons
No. 179
January 24, 1942
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
The Flomarcy Company (which is owned by Bensaude,
the Portuguese shipowner with whom we are working on West
Africa) has been requested by the Post Office Department
to consider carrying the U. S. Mails for Europe and the
Azores in the vessels which it operates in a transatlantic
service between New York, the Azores and Lisbon. Flomarcy
is willing to do this but wants to do it on a basis which
will enable it to assure the Post Office of regular and
satisfactory service within the limits of existing emergency
conditions and at the same time obtain a dependable
minimum compensation.
The mails have a volume of about 3000 bags every two
weeks, divided 1/3 First Class and 2/3 Third Class.
The Flomarcy Company would wish for this work a
guaranteed minimum payment of $20,000 for each voyage on
which these mails were carried and would be willing to
conclude an arrangement upon this basis, subject to the
approval of the Portuguese Maritime Commission, which it is
believed could be readily obtained.
If we could be assured of such service it would give
us access to the Azores which we do not have now.
If you approve of this, I will take the matter up
with Frank Walker.
No. 180
January 24, 1942
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
David Lu of the Washington Bureau of the Central
News Agency of China reports that he has received a
telegram from his head office saying that they are
receiving all of the material we are sending to Chungking.
Hollywood
the
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which 17) to be broadenst
by Bing Greening and which will be dedicated to General
Hearther and hie troops.
No. 181
January 24, 1942
8:30 A.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan
I received another cable from MacArthur asking
us to put on a Hollywood radio program for them for
tomorrow night. This has all been especially arranged
at our request. Jack Benny and a group of Hollywood
celebrities will present a one-hour program at the
time and on the frequency requested by General MacArthur.
On Thursday of next week there will also be a
one-hour program which we have arranged to be broadcast
by Bing Crosby and which will be dedicated to General
MacArthur and his troops.
if
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No. 182
January 24, 1942
IORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
The following is one segment of our attack on North
Africa. It deals with the Navy, and I propose to take
it up with Admiral King:
I. Objectives:
1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds
of officers and sailors of the French Fleet 80 that in
the event of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they
will:
(a) desert with their ships to our side;
(b) if it is not possible to rally the
whole fleet, certain units will desert;
(c) in the worst case, should the French
Fleet ever come into contact with American
Forces, their fighting morale will be low
and the resistance opposed to us nominal.
2. In 80 doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in
any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising
our present policy toward France which is based upon con-
ditional support of the Vichy regime.
II. Specific Target:
Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should
be directed primarily at career officers actually serving
in ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen in the
French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry
out orders received from their superiors. At some French
Naval stations there is evidence that officers between the
ages of 30-40 years renging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to
Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly
susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not
appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the
officers actually serving on board ship who are most
important from the point of view of attaining the objectives
listed above.
III. Channels:
Material transmitted by shortwave from this country
will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world
through three channels:
(1) radio operators on ships will pick up
some American programs and spread them
around by word of mouth.
(2) officers of French Naval Intelligence will
be listening to American broadcasts as
part of their professional duties and will
similarly discuss them in private conver-
sations.
(3) There will be a very substantial amount of
collective listening in officers' ward-rooms
particularly on board ship. The radio sets
provided for the officers' wardroom are ex-
ceptionally powerful ones and adapted to
shortwave reception. There is greater
likelihood of shortwave programs from
this country being heard in French ports
like Toulon than there is of the same
programs being heard by the civilian popu-
lation in France.
In Martinique and North Africa American
programs are heard clearly and are widely
listened to.
IV. Form of Broadcast:
The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be
conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific
target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach
officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels
mentioned above -- collective listening in wardrooms -- is
by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will
be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content
that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden.
If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for
French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will
be banned at least at some stations.
(1) Immediately following a short program of music,
there should be a special news commentary in French, which
is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily
slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners.
For instance, comments on naval developments and naval
warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail
than in an ardinary commentary.
(2) Following the news commentary, there should be
a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length,
which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and
non-political -- for instance, talks by or about movie
stars who are popular in France -- but which could be used
on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a
direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or state-
ment. Historical subjects - especially from French
Colonial and naval history - are particularly indicated.
(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously
be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following
as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be
listened to by officers we wish to reach as they will always
be able to say, if ciriticized for listening to American
broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the
music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started.
Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact
that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above
all, not to use any cirticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.
It is desired to ask the approval of the Navy Department
with a view to the prompt inauguration of a detailed Radio
program which, due to its length, has been omatted from this
particular memorandum.
In in principle the project is approved it is suggested
No. 183
January 24, 1942
6:00 P.M.
that a representative of the Navy Department be assigned to
cooperate closely with the Radio Division of the Office of
the Coordinator of Information.
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No. 183
January 24, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J.-Donovan
We have just been able to get a 1500 ton coal burner,
eight knots, now in Philadelphia, which will be ready
the first week in February.
We have having Bensaude go down there and look at
it, and his next step will be to get the assurances of
the Portuguege Government to leave it exclusively for
this run.
As I told you previously we expect to have it in
touch with the Canary Islands.
No. 184
January 24, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
From: William J. Donovan
As part of our penetration for Dakar we are
arranging for a young Frenchman named Basset who has
been Assistant to our Consul at Dakar for three
years and who is now ready to return to Dakar, ostensibly
representing Pan American Airways. Through him we are
hopeful of not only establishing a line of communica-
tion but alsó some more affirmative action. When
next I see you I can tell you more about this.
I have just arranged to get in by pouch a
Sonatone hearing set for the French Governor of Dakar.
No. 185
January 24, 1942
6:00 P.M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
We have brought on from the Coast Nordhoff, of Nordhoff
and Hall. He knows the Islands of Tahiti intimately and has
described the only available site for a major airdrome on
the Island, together with its facilities, approaches, etc.
He is familiar with all of the Society Islands, but thinks
that nothing can be done there from an airdrome standpoint.
He has, however, a lot of suggestions for sea planes.
He knows the Caledonia situation only second-hand as
he does the Marquesas.
As soon as we have a complete statement you may be
interested in seeing it.
Harry Hopkins spoke to me about him in the hall and
we are trying to see what might be done by having him
work through Hall, who is now in Tahiti.
No. 186
January 24, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan
As I told you previously we have for our S.I.S. ser-
vice in the Far East, Dr. Esson Gale. We have made arrange-
ments with the British for a tie-up with him through repre-
sentatives we are sending out in India and Australia. He
is going to negotiate for us the possibility of using the
Koreans to operate against the Japanese in Japan proper and
in Korea and certain occupied areas on the Continent, in-
cluding Manchuria.
The distribution of the Koreans in important centers
opens the way for their employment in intelligence and
sabotage work against the Japanese. This is not the case
with other nationals, particularly whites and Chinese,
who are readily identified in the Japanese Domain.
Korean sources report a so-called Korean provisional
government army in China. The total given of 35,000 men
I think is questionable. Of these, 9250 officers and men
are said to be in Chungking, where the exiled Korean
provisional government is functioning.
-2-
It is believed that this national bloc can be uti-
lized to play a highly effective part in S.O. work against
the Japanese.
I have obtained the permission of General Marshall to
bring Lieut. Colonel Morris B. DePass, Jr., from Fort
Benning, Georgia to take charge of a selected group of
Americans experienced in the languages, terrain and people
of designated East Asiatic areas. This group will have
special training at the Toronto school so that they may be
prepared to conduct a training school for Koreans. In
the meantime, we are exploring the situation with the State
Department and the War Department, and as soon as we have
our plans definitely set we will take it up with the Chinese
military authorities and the American Military Mission in
China.