Office of Strategic Services - Reports, March 1, 1942- March 26, 1942

Office of strategic Services: Donovan Reports, Fabrie- Mar. Mar. 26,1942 Folder #7 Box 165 PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 1942 Donovan Report No. 7 February 28 to March 26 No. 299 March 1, 1942 8:30 A. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan We are advised by our London office that the French Section of the British Propaganda Warfare Executive is making up a leaflet giving a translation of the President's speech, together with a strategic map of the world, to be distributed over France. No. 300 March 1, 1942 8:30 A.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Donovan The following is a summary taken from the British Ministry of Information weekly Empire Guidance: BURMA It is doubtful that Rangoon will be able to hold out. We shall be forced to fight a series of rear-guard actions until allied numerical superiority is obtained. However, the Japanese naval supremacy will ultimately be wrested from her as the Pacific war is largely naval and the allies possess the largest navies and almost unlimited resources for naval expansion. In the mean- time, every successful attack on her merchant and war navies should be stressed. LIBYA Rommel's anxiety to be sure of absolute superiority before attacking is indicated by his long pause. He has obtained sub- stantial reinforcements with which we are unable to compete due to commitments in other theatres. We must be prepared for further retreat. Do not play up Tobruk as a strong point or as a prototype of successful defense as we cannot be absolutely sure of holding it. -2- INDIA Stress that any possible proposals put forth in London will be the logical development of the British policy toward India and not the result of pressure on the British government. For years the government has expressed its willingness to accept almost any form of government on which the various Indian parties can agree. Also emphasize the immediate cooperation of the Indians in government, if it should come to pass, has been made possible by the recent change in the attitude of the Congress party towards the war. This has resulted in the China and India association in a common anti-Japanese front. BOLSHEVISATION OF EUROPE Refute this favorite Nazi propaganda theme by these points: a. Stalin has made it perfectly clear that Russia is fight- ing a defensive war for her own liberation with no intention of destroying German freedom. He has far less intention of destroying German freedom than have the other Central European countries. b. Cripps, in his Bristol speech, did not at all recommend Russian control of Europe as the Nazi propagandists charged. Rather he asserted that it was to "urope's interest that our troops should invade Germany at the same time as the Russian army. This thesis has the enthusiastic support of the Russian government. -3- C. We intend to play an equal part with Russia in the re- construction of Europe. The collapse of France has made any reversion to the state of affairs existing before the war impossible. d. London, the source of news for peoples of occupied Europe and the temporary home of the allied governments, is the natural center for their cooperation in rebuilding Europe. No. 301 March 2, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Donovan The following is the summary of the Home Intelligence report for the week ending February 23. It, therefore, contains no reference to the Churchill and Roosevelt speeches of Monday and Tuesday. Public Morale Unmistakable though partial recovery is noted. Al- though feeling angry and confused and even some realiza- tion of the possibility of defeat, the majority of the re- gions suggest that "the slump in spirit caused by the fall of Singapore seems to have passed away and morale, on the whole, is proving resilient after a succession of hard blows". But now "the same spirit of national resurgence which was so inspiring" after Dunkirk. Attitude toward the government Lack of confidence in the "higher direction of the war" continues in spite of the cabinet changes. British methods are unfavorably contrasted with Australia's "total mobiliza- tion of resources and manpower." There is strong feeling in favor of putting the country on an emergency basis. "If they - 2 - will strike while the iron is hot, the government now has a golden opportunity. Attitude toward Churchill The cabinet changes "have done much to restore his popu- larity". There is relief not unmixed with surprise that he has "at last yielded to pressure". "There is some feeling that he has conceded just sufficient ground to his critics to avert a major crises only just in time." There is relief that Churchill is freed of routine duties. In regard to his retaining the post of Defense Minister "on the balance, the view is taken that a Prime Minister's first preoccupation in war time must naturally be with defense in its broadest sense". Concerning Churchill personally there are indications that he has not yet recovered the complete command of public confidence he enjoyed a year ago, although speculation that he will be forced from. office has ceased. Cripps He enjoys universal approval on three counts: a. "Relief that a personality has loomed up who should really be able to take some of the strain off Churchill's should- ers and who could succeed him if necessary." b. "Cripps' presence in the war cabinet will mean a closer more productive relationship with Russia." - 3 - C. Hopes of gingering up the cabinet. "Now we shall see more butting in instead of standing back". The Cripps broadcast was felt to be the direct cause of applications for work by women not hitherto employed in the war effort. Concerning Beaverbrook Mixed, feelings. Though ominous that the one man who has no fear of red tape should go. Skepticism about reasons of health given for his departure. Do not think he gets along with Cripps and Bevin. Other cabinet changes They are widely acclaimed. There is special satisfac- tion that Moore-Barbizon and Margesson are out. The retention of Atlee met some disparagement as politically caused. Far East The angry criticism has somewhat died down, giving way to anxiety over Burma. People with relatives out there are very bitter. "The government knew Singapore could not hold out so it was a murderous thing to send so many men out there". There are sour comments on lack of air support, and on "sacri- fices of junior officers and men to the inefficiency of those higher up". There is fear that the leaders lack aggressive spirit and tenacity. Scathing comparisons are made to MacArthur and his endurance and resources in defense of the Philippines. - 4 - India There is growing anxiety. The impression is current that Churchill personally is responsible for British slowness in making a move. Great satisfaction was felt over Ching's visit but also some "feelings of humiliation". Libya Pessimism is, however, no longer regarded as of primary importance. Navy Confidence remains high with, however, some fears that it is short of warships. Army Very noticeable and widespread skepticism about the leader- ship. R.A.F. There is a further decline in confidence accentuated by the channel episode. Disappointment that the prophecy that "Germany was going to be decisively bombed this winter" has not proved true. There is disquiet lest the entire bombing policy may be wrong and the question is raised: are the initiative and imagination of the staff equal to the courage and skill of the pilots? 3 - 5 - Information Irritation is caused by minimizing of bad news. Some of the public is again demanding that BBC offer bare official statements instead of "upholstered" news. People will not accept geographical or meteordogical excuses for reverses. Newspaper experts are deprecated because they are so often inaccurate. People accuse the headlines of arousing false hopes which are not born out by the texts. Industry There is a growing feeling that "the people in control of industry may not be the best people for the job". The public is almost eager for drastic measures, if necessary, to allow the maximum output in the minimum time. The workers complain if they are forced to be idle in war factories. Mismanagement is held responsible for hold-ups or lack of material. Public opinion seems to feel that the financial interests are inter- fering with all-out prosecution of the war for the following reasons: the charge that certain factories are concentrating on post-war problems to the serious detriment of production, and the cost-plus system. No. 302 February 28, 1942 6:00 P. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: William J. Donovan I have been following up with correspondence Lytle S. Adams' proposal in relation to the use of bats. We have been taking up the matter with Dr. Remington Kellogg, Curator of the Division of Mammals, U. S. National Museum, Washington. While he is somewhat skeptical, he believes that extensive tests should be conducted before any conclusion is reached. We will therefore take it up with the Air Corps and see what we can work out before any decision is reached. No. 303 March 1, 1942 8:30 A.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT. FROM: William J. Donovan Word has come to us from certain sources that the Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Office stated on the night of February 25/26 that the Brazilian Government was genuinely worried by the concentration of Argentine troops on the Brazil-Argentine frontier. No. 304 March 2, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan The following is the weekly review of German home propaganda: "Most noteworthy feature is the almost total lack of any visible attempt to tide over or explain away the great personal hardships of life in Germany. Coal, tobacco, and vegetables are very scarce; the potato ration is one pound weekly, transport is inconvenient and crowded; schools are closed; businessmen are faced with closedown or cutdown and formidable state control; workers are confronted with the choice of speed up or call up. The heavy restriction on giving information to the enemy is probably the chief reason for silence. "Russia is still the most mentioned subject, with more frequent references to a Spring offensive and intimations that, despite the hardest winter in a century, Germany is successfully regaining the initiative. "Stalin's order of the day was suppressed inside Germany -2- as his disclaim of any intention to destroy Germany cuts the roots out from under the main fear which Goebbels has fostered. Vansitart's speech was garbled and Roosevelt's given as a series of distorted quotations interspersed with a torrent of invective. The promise to liberate Austria, made by Churchill, was played down as sentimental daydreaming, especially U-boat successes in American coastal waters and 'German submarines destroyed in four week more shipping space than Americans built in nine months.' "Japan is being pictured as the absolute monarch of the southwestern Pacific, and the helplessness of the British is stressed in quotations such as 'In sixty six days Britain has lost mastery which took one hundred and fifty years to attain. American help is derided, with such comments as: 'American talks a great deal, but has neither the means nor the intention to be a really effective help. It would seem that the Americans find the risk too great.' "Cripps is called Stalin's loudspeaker, and British cabinet changes are represented as a landslide toward Bolshevism. "The Riom trial received little mention." No. 305 March 2, 1942 6:00 P.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT. FROM: William J. Donovan We have arranged for a retired Army Air Corps officer to supervise personnel for securing and transmitting information of value on the situation in Africa which will include the following: Bathurst, Freetown, Marshall, Morovia, Fisherman's Lake, Takoradi, Accra, which is also an army base, Lagos, Kano, Maiduguri, Fort Lamy, El Ganeina, El Fasher, Khartoun, Wadi Halfa, Cairo. The plan of operations is being worked out and several cameras have been purchased for the use of the agents. - Filed between #305, 3-2-42 and #306, 3-4-42, 6 p.m. This is probably the memorandum for which #307, 3-5-42, was a substitute. Box 165 RHP, 2-25-81 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Donovan It is purposed to set up a special service unit under independent command. It is intended as an auxiliary or a supplement to existing military organizations. This unit shall be 80 constituted as to be strong enough to conduct particular operations independently, and yet sufficiently flexible to enable it to participate in joint or combined operations of any or all arms of the military service. For purposes of administration and supply the unit shall be attached to the Navy and its Commanding Officer shall report to the President through the Secretary of the Navy. The reason for constituting such a force is the present military position of our country. For the next year and a half we will be under enemy pressure. Yet it will be necessary to strive for the offensive, and to make use of all means to develop initiative and daring in our armed forces. From -2- a strictly strategic standpoint the war for the next year may be a war of islands. How can they be recaptured? How can they be held? Of course the final answer to those questions must be found in the presently constituted forces of the army and the navy. While the amphibious force and the "raiding battallions" of the Marines are important and necessary in the conduct of this kind of war, they could be greatly aided by a force of independently trained, all arms, specialists, whose single continuous purpose is this particular type of desperate warfare. It must also be kept in mind that since we have now under- taken to work more closely with our principal ally, the type of separate force proposed is better adapted for combined operations with British task forces which employ the same kind of special organization. Apart from small raids, and in addition to the type of operation of a limited scope generally required for the pro- secution of a naval campaign, these joint operations with the British may include such operations as would require similarity of organization in the different phases of attack. Already the British have organized what they call "Commandos" -3- consisting of a small, flexible, unencumberred, fast moving force as an essential element in their combined operations. The individual soldier carries all his equipment, food and ammunition and when necessary "lives off the country" until he can return to his point of re-embarkation. We have no such force. This proposal contemplates a unit similar to that of the British "Commandos", but adapted to our own needs and to the genius of our own people and our traditions. In all our wars, excepting the last, we have had some such partisan force, whether it went under the name "Scouts", "Raiders", "Rangers", or "Guerillas". Apart from the military advisability of such a force the moral effect on our people will be felt whén even a small force is created for daring, offensive, far-flung objectives. ORGANIZATION Assuming therefore that the need for such a unit exists, the question is the manner in which it shall be organized. This will be an independent command, both as to training and operations, but a component part of the armed forces of the United States. It will be composed of volunteers from all branches of the Army and the Navy who have had at least -4- six months service, and of non-service men who are specially qualified. The Commander of the forces shall be of such rank as shall be determined by the President. The Commander will require a specially selected staff to assist and advise him. The Commander should be given the right to select his officers. As the raiding forces will include personnel and equipment from the Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Corps, the Commander should have a deputy of at least the rank of Colonel from each of these services. These officers should be of a generally high standard and should have had general experience with combined operations and with the preparation of plans and orders for such operations. Hydrographer A hydrographic officer should be attached to the staff, to obtain, handle and prepare charts and maps required, and to furnish or obtain from the Navy Department hydrographical and navigational data required in the preparation of plans for operations. Transport Officer A specially qualified transport expert should serve on -5- the headquarters staff to study and advise on questions of the loading of vessels carrying the raiding forces. Intelligence and Operations Section These, of course, are essential, whether they be joint or work separately. Materiel and Manning Sections This section should include two Naval, one Army and one Air officer. These officers should study and advise on the present and future requirements of ships and craft, arms and equipment. British Liaison Officer A British Liaison officer, of experience in combined oper- ations, should be permanently attached to the organization so that he may be available to give or obtain any information required. Athletic Officer An Officer, trained in modern aggressive methods of conditioning and hardening men should be attached to the staff. -6- FORCE SPECIAL UNITS Signal Unit There should be a Signal Unit consisting of six officers and approximately sixty enlisted men. Special Headquarters Unit There should be a special headquarters unit consisting of a Captain, two Lieutenants, and sixty enlisted men, trained as specialists in demolition work. Medical Unit There should be a medical officer, with a corps of at least six medical officers of other rank. Chaplains Appropriate chaplains in adequate numbers should be provided. UNIFORM There should be a distinctive uniform, suited to free movement. It is also suggested that each Lieutenant Colonel's unit should have a distinctive emblem. PERSONNEL This rests upon the vital question of leadership and discipline. It is recommended that there be adopted the essential basis of guerilla organization, that is, the man -7- to man relationship of a leader with his followers. The principle of personal selection of troop leaders, junior officers and enlisted men should be followed throughout. Each man selected by his superiors should be interviewed by them so that the officers would know personally every men they are called upon to lead in the field. Non-com- missioned officers selected should lose their rank and be entered as privates; they should be promoted only on the basis of actual merit and performance. A troop commander could return any of his men at will, without appeal, and without having to give any reason. Similarly, each man should have the right to return to his original unit upon giving a minimum period of notice, without stating reasons. Recruiting could be started by à circular letter from the President to the heads of the various services, asking them to call for volunteers "for special service", and giving a list of qualifications required. It is suggested that the nature of the service be not indicated; that a promise be given that every volunteer would be interviewed privately by an officer and be given an opportunity of withdrawing after receiving an indication of what was involved. The essential qualifications would be: -8- (a) Youth and physical fitness. (b) Intelligence, self reliance, and independent frame of mind. (c) Ability to swim. (d) Immunity from seasickness. COMPOSITION OF COMMAND The Command will be comprised of two units: (1) Fighting Unit (2) Supply Unit It is considered that, like the guerillas, the members of such force should be one hundred percent fighting men. This should not be done as the British have done it by having the men fend for themselves at all times and under all con- ditions by being given an allowance with which to provide themselves with food, lodging, and the up-keep of a suit of civilian clothes. Concentration on fighting could be dealt with by the inclusion of an administrative and supply unit. The staffs of these units would not be designed to go on raids, but would devote themselves solely to their designated function, and would remain at base stations. The organization of the men should be formed on this principle -- That its smallest unit shall be based upon the -9- capacity of a raiding boat, that is, approximately one officer and thirty men. (Note: Particular tasks could be carried out by smaller units or by individuals) Two of such units should be commanded by a captain. Six captains commands should constitute a Lieutenant Colonel's Command, with a major as second in command. The total force should include not more than twelve Lieutenant Colonel commands. TRAINING Training must be designed for purely offensive purposes. It should include swimming and boating practice and profi- ciency in the handling of weapons. Practice in night work of every kind should be particularly stressed. This would be its strongest distinguishing characteristic. The success of most raiding operations depends upon the silence and pro- ficiency with which the unit could operate at night. It must be impressed upon all ranks that no type of operation, however peculiar, must be regarded as unusual. To carry this into effect it would be necessary to set up a guerilla warfare school. This should be done for the training of officers and non-commissioned officers selected for this command. -10- The curriculum of the school should include training in boat work, landing exercises and seamanship, daylight and night raids. SUMMARY 1. General Headquarters Staff Commander 4 Deputies Hydrographer Intelligence Staff Transport Officer Materiel & Manning Officers British Liaison Officer Athletic Officer 2. Summary Of The Force: Attached To remain at bases Military Naval administrative, etc. Officers - Other Ranks Officers Officers - 0. Ranks, HEADQUARTERS Commander & Staff 3 20 1 2 22 Chaplains 2 Army Supply 1 21 Medical 1 6 Ordnance Corps (Armorers) 2 SIGNAL UNIT. 6 60 SPECIAL HEAD- QUARTERS UNIT 3 60 Lt. Col. Commands. No. 1 20 360 1 2 5 2 20 360 1 2 5 3 20 360 1 2 5 4 20 360 1 2 5 5 20 360 1 2 5 6 20 360 1 2 5 7 20 360 1 2 5 8 20 360 1 2 5 9 20 360 1 2 5 10 20 360 1 2 5 11 20 360 1 2 5 12 20 360 I 2 5 TOTAL 255 4,468 13 27 103 -2- 3. Raiding Vessels The necessary raiding ships and craft, and their personnel including shore and communications parties, under the command of a Naval Officer of Captains' or higher rank. No. 306 - March 4, 1942 6:00 P.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan Rumor has come to me that the propaganda services of the government, both domestic and foreign, are to be consolidated -- and that this would include us. I have not heard the source of such a proposal, nor have we been asked for our views -- so the rumor may be false. But if any such suggestion has been made to you, I would respectfully ask that you keep in mind certain considerations. They are the same considerations that led you to decide at the very outset that domestic and foreign propaganda should be separate. These considerations are still con- trolling. They are even stronger when we keep in mind what has transpired in the last six months. In theory it would seem logical and advisable to have one agency cover the field both at home and abroad. But -2- I don't need to stress with you that the difference in aims, purpose and methods in each field calls for a difference in administration. Now that we are at war, foreign propaganda must be employed as a weapon of war. It must march with events. It is primarily an attack weapon. It must be identified with specific strategic movements often having within it the flavor of subversion. To do this kind of work effectively it must be allied with the military services. It must be to a degree informed as to possible movements. The more closely it is knit with the intelligence and the physically subversive activities of the Army and the Navy the more effective it can be. All of this necessitates security. In point of fact the use of propaganda is the arrow of initial penetration in conditioning and preparing the people and the territory in which invasion is contemplated. It is the first step -- then Fifth Column work, then militarized raiders (or "Commandos"), and then the invading divisions. All of our experimentation in the last five months, all the trial and error we have had, have been governed by the purpose of preparing just such a weapon. As I have advised you from time to time, our Planning Committee has worked -3- in conjunction with the Army and Navy upon certain strategic plans. At the moment we are discussing with the State Department a plan directed toward a counter-attack against the Japanese propaganda now being used in India. Apart from the importance of the short-wave radio (to which must be added the leaflets, pamphlets, publications, etc) as an in- strument of war which must be closely knit with our military strategy, there is another aspect that should not be ignored. In the day to day criticism, inquiry and close super- vision of our war activity at home our whole political structure is involved. The elections that will take place during the course of the war accentuate the close examination of what government undertakes to do in the domestic field. There will be strong differences of opinion as to what should be said and what should not be said in the field of domestic propaganda. As it is now organized, any such inquiry in the domestic field does not affect, or affects only in- directly, our foreign broadcast policy. However, if there were a tie-up between domestic and foreign propaganda agencies it would compromise or destroy the necessary security, would impair the effectiveness of psychological warfare as a weapon a ORIGINAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION WASHINGTON, D.C. March 5, 1942 Miss Grace Tully The White House Washington, D. C. My dear Miss Tully: I spoke to Mrs. Brady about this. It is a substitute for a similar memorandum left with the President by Secretary Knox yesterday at noon. Could we have the other returned? Thanks. Sincerely, J. R. Murphy No. 307 March 5, 1942 6:00 P.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: William J. Donovan It is purposed to set up a special service organization under independent command. It is intended as an auxiliary or a supplement to existing military organizations. This organization shall be so constituted as to prepare operations; its forces strong enough to conduct particular opera- tions independently, and yet sufficiently flexible to enable them to participate in joint or combined operations of any or all arms of the military service. For purposes of administration and supply the unit shall be attached to the Navy and the Commander of the organization shall report to the President through the Secretary of the Navy. The reason for constituting such an organization is the present military position of our country. For the next year and a half we will be under enemy pressure. Yet it will be necessary to strive for the offensive, and to make use of all means to develop initiative and daring in our armed forces. From a strictly strategic standpoint the war for the next year may be -2- a war of islands. How can they be recaptured? How can they be held? Of course, the final answer to those questions must be found in the presently constituted forces of the Army and the Navy. While the amphibious force and the "raiding battalions" of the Marines are important and necessary in the conduct of this kind of war, they could be greatly aided by a force of independently trained specialists from all service branches, whose single continuous purpose is this particular type of desperate warfare. This special service force should be prepared and trained for any type of raiding operation, no matter how hazardous or unusual it may be. While having the advantage of their background of regular training, their tasks require that they be especially organized and trained B0 that they may be able, when the occasion arises, to divorce themselves from traditional indoctrinated training and rely instead upon the ruses, Fifth Column, and general guerrilla methods of irregular troops. They must learn to depend upon themselves individually or on their immediate leader rather than upon a chain of command. They must be physically fit, and especially trained for arduous tasks of cliff-scaling, hill climbing, and boat work of all types, in addition to maintaining a -3- superior standard in arms. They must be accomplished in demolition work, close combat, street fighting, removal and placing of obstacles, etc. Much more will be required of them than of units of the regular force and therefore they must be an elite, especially recruited corps. It must also be kept in mind that since we have now undertaken to work more closely with our principal ally, the type of separate force proposed is better adapted for operations with British task forces which employ the same kind of special organiza- tion. Apart from small raids, and in addition to the type of operation of a limited scope generally required for the prosecution of a naval campaign, these joint operations with the British may include such operations as would require similarity of organization in the different phases of attack. Already the British have organized what they call "Commandos", consisting of a small, flexible, unencumbered, fast-moving force as an essential element in their combined operations. The individual soldier carries all his equipment, food and ammunition and when necessary "lives off the country" until he can return to his point of re-embarkation. We have no such force. This proposal contemplates a force similar -4- to that of the British "Commandos", but adapted to our own needs and to the genius of our own people and our traditions. In all our wars, excepting the last, we have had some such partisan force, whether it went under the name "Scouts", "Raiders", "Rangers", or "Guerrillas". Apart from the military advisability of such a force, the moral effect on our people will be felt when even a small force is created for daring, offensive, far-flung objectives. I. ORGANIZATION Assuming, therefore, that the need exists, the question is the manner in which such an organization shall be constituted. This will be an independent organization both as to training and operations of the force, but a component part of the armed services of the United States. It will be composed of volunteers from all branches of the Army and the Navy who have had at least six months service, and of non-service men who are specially qualified. A. THE COMMANDER AND HIS HEADQUARTERS STAFF The Commander of the organization shall be of such rank as shall be determined by the President. The Commander will require a specially selected staff to assist and advise him. He should be given the right to select his officers. As -5- the raiding forces will include personnel and equipment from the Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Corps, and will conduct operations requiring the closest cooperation between sea, land, and air units, the Commander should have a deputy of Colonel's rank from each of the services. These officers should be of a generally high standard and should have had general experience with combined operations and with the preparation of plans and orders for such operations. 1. Hydrographer A hydrographic officer should be attached to the staff, to obtain, handle and prepare charts and maps required, and to furnish or obtain from the Navy Depart- ment hydrographical and navigational data required in the preparation of plans for operations. 2. Transport Officer A specially qualified transport expert should serve on the headquarters staff to study and advise on questions of the loading of vessels carrying the raiding forces. 3. Intelligence and Operations Section These, of course, are essential, whether they be joint or work separately. -6- 4. Materiel and Manning Sections This section should include two Naval, one Army and one Air officer. These officers should study and advise on the present and future requirements of ships and craft, arms and equipment. 5. British Liaison Officer A British Liaison officer, of experience in combined operations, should be permanently attacked to the organi- zation 80 that he may be available to give or obtain any information required.from British sources. 6. Athletic Officer An officer, trained in modern aggressive methods of conditioning and hardening men should be attached to the staff. B. SPECIAL FORCE COMMANDS The Commander of the organization shall be authorized to set up one or more Special Force Commands. Each of these commands shall be commanded by an officer specially selected for his daring and powers of leadership. Each such officer should have a small headquarters staff. The Force under his command should consist of not more than twelve units, each commanded by an officer of Lieutenant Colonel's rank. It is considered that it might be desirable to appoint an officer of appropriate rank who will act as -7- the Commander of the Special Force Commands, to coordinate administration, training, and operations of the several Special Force Commands if more than one such command is constituted. Each Special Force Command should have the following special units: Special Headquarters Unit There should be a Special Headquarters Unit, consisting of a Captain, two Lieutenants, and sixty enlisted men, trained as specialists in demolition work. Signal Unit There should be a Signal Unit consisting of six officers and approximately sixty enlisted men. Medical Unit There should be a medical officer, with a corps of at least six medical officers of other rank. Chaplains Appropriate chaplains in adequate numbers snould be provided. -8- 1. COMPOSITION OF SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND The Special Force Command will be comprised of two units: Fighting Unit Supply Unit It is considered that, like the guerrillas, the members of such force should be one tundred percent fighting men. This should not be done as the British have done it by having the men fend for themselves at all times and under all conditions by being given an allowance with which to provide themselves with food, lodging, and the up-keep of a suit of civilian clothes. Concentration on fighting could be dealt with by the inclusion of an administrative and supply unit. The staffs of these units would not be designed to go on raids, but would devote themselves solely to their designated function, and would remain at base stations. The organization of the men should be based on the capacity of a raiding boat, i.e., a Lieutenant's unit should consist of approximately 30 men. There should be a high proportion of non-commissioned officers in each unit, and the training of the men snould be such that they could carry out independent tasks in -9- smaller units or as individuals, when required--using their own initiative and not dependent on the leadership of an officer. Two Lieutenants' units should be commanded by a Captain. Six Captains' commands should constitute a Lieutenant Colonel's Command, with a Major as second in command. The total force should include not more than twelve Lieutenant Colonel Commands. 2. PERSONNEL OF SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND This rests upon the vital question of leadership and discipline. It is recommended that there be adopted the essential basis of guerrilla organization, that is, the man to man relationship of a leader with his followers. The principle of personal selection of troop leaders, junior officers and enlisted men should be followed throughout. Each man selected by his superiors should be interviewed by them 80 that the officers would know personally every man tney are called upon to lead in the field. Non-commissioned officers selected should lose their rank and be entered as privates; they snould -10- be promoted only on the basis of actual merit and per- formance. A troop commander could return any of his men at will, without appeal, and without having to give any reason. Similarly, each man should have the right to return to his original unit upon giving a minimum period of notice, without stating reasons. Recruiting could be started by a circular letter from the President to the heads of the various services, asking them to call for volunteers "for special service", and giving a list of qualifications required. It is suggested that the nature of the service be not indicated; that a promise be given that every volunteer would be interviewed privately by an officer and be given an opportunity of withdrawing after receiving an indication of what was involved.. The essential qualifications would be: (a) Youth and physical fitness. (b) Intelligence, self-reliance, and independent frame of mind. (c) Ability to swim. (d) Comparative immunity from seasickness. -11- 3. TRAINING This special force would be organized, equipped, and trained 80 that it could commence its offensive operations in the interim before the regular forces are ready to conduct combined operations on a large scale. When the regular forces are ready, tnis specially trained force would be an invaluable adjunct. Training must be designed for purely offensive purposes. It snould include close cooperation with the naval units in embarkation in and disembarkation from the raiding snips and their landing craft. Emphasis should be laid on proficiency in swimming, general boating practice, and handling of weapons. Practice in night work of every kind should be particularly stressed. This would be its strongest distinguisning characteristic. The success of most raiding operations depends upon the silence and proficiency with which the unit could operate at night. It must be impressed upon all ranks tnat no type of operation, however peculiar, must be regarded as unusual. To carry this into effect, it would be necessary to set up a guerrilla warfare school, as part of the organization for the training of officers and non-commissioned officers selected for the special force. -12- 4. UNIFORM There should be a distinctive uniform, suited to free movement. It is also. suggested that each Lieutenant Colonel's unit should have a distinctive emblem. C. RAIDING SHIPS UNIT The necessary raiding ships and craft, and their personnel, including shore and communications parties under the command of a naval officer of Captain's or higher rank, should be provided to operate in conjunction with the Special Force Command. The commanding officer of the Raiding Ships Unit should report to the Commander of the organization and should cooperate and consult with the said Commander and his Headquarters Staff in planning and carrying out operations. The training of the personnel of this Unit will be carried on jointly with the training of the personnel of the Special Force Command. SUMMARY 1. General Headquarters Staff Commander 4 Deputies Hydrographer Intelligence Staff Transport Officer Materiel & Manning Officers British Liaison Officer Athletic Officer 2. Summary Of The Force: Attached To remain at bases Military Naval administrative, etc. HEADQUARTERS Officers - Other Ranks Officers Officers - 0. Ranks Commander & Staff 3 20 1 2 22 Chaplains 2 Army Supply 1 21 Medical 1 6 Ordnance Corps (Armorers) 2 SIGNAL UNIT 6 60 SPECIAL HEAD- QUARTERS UNIT 3 60 Lt. Col. Commands No. 1 20 360 1 2 5 2 20 360 1 2 5 3 20 360 1 2 5 4 20 360 1 2 5 5 20 360 1 2 5 6 20 360 1 2 5 7 20 360 1 2 5 8 20 360 1 2 5 9 20 360 1 2 5 10 20 360 1 2 5 11 20 360 1 2 12 5 20 360 1 2 TOTAL 255 5 4468 13 27 103 3. Raiding Vessels The necessary raiding ships and craft, and their personnel, including shore and communications parties, under the command of a Naval Officer of Captain's or higher rank. Additional Units Additional units may be added to the raiding force as required, for any operation, and placed under the Force Commander - e.g.: Air Parachute Troops Tanks Artillery Engineers A number of these units should be placed under the organization for periods of training with the raiding forces so that they may be ready for any specific task to be undertaken requiring the use of such units. No. 308 March 6, 1942 8:30 A.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: William J. Donovan The following is a summary of an interview with Mr. Kiding Wang, Senior Secretary of the Chinese Minister of Communications, and may be of interest to you. His confidential statements embrace the following: (1) His chief sent him some months ago to make a personal survey of the proposed substitute road from India to China. (He had previously been active in connection with the Burma Road because his chief was custodian of this road). He regards the completion of the proposed Indian route as a major engineering operation and most difficult. It was his opinion that it would be something of a miracle if large armies of labor, both Chinese and Indian, working on each end, could complete this task in six months. (2) He is familiar with the Hindu population and has no hope that effective armies could be raised from that part of the population which has not for centuries been -2- participating in military activity. He has reasonable confidence, however, in the effectiveness of Punjabi troops plus, of course, the well known fighting qualities of certain Northern troops such as the Sikhs and Gurkhas. He thinks it will depend on whether or not the English grasp the nettle firmly and immedi- ately offer India complete Dominion status with self government. (3) He agrees that Russia will be governed wholly by self interest without emotional loyalties to any foreign people. "We must be wholly realistic about their future course, it will depend on events". He thinks there is little or no loyalty to the British Empire in Asia. He cites the conduct of the Burmese, Siamese and the pulation on the Malaya Peninsula. He believes, however, that we can count on the loyalty of the Philippine population, where our policy was altrustic and in complete contradiction of British policy. (4) He asserts that even if completely cut off China can maintain herself about as at present for one year. They have powerful, natural barriers of rivers and mountains with precipitous cliffs. Japanese mechanized forces cannot operate effectively in such terrain. The Chinese can maintain an army of about two million. They can continue to supply such an army with sufficient rifles and ammunition for the same. 1 -3- They can also maintain & considerable, though not wholly adequate, supply of machine guns. Chinese troops are accustomed to a few staple items of food and can survive with limited quantities of such staples., There is not the slightest doubt of their determination to continue the fight. The maximum size bombs which they, themselves, can manufacture is 100 pounds. Hence, no flying fortresses should be sent them but as many medium sized bombers as we can possibly spare. He regards the Cantonese as their best troops. Their armies include few, if any, Mongols or Tartars. The latter groups are almost entirely under Russian jurisdiction, and to some extent Japanese. (5) In conclusion, he argues that if we are to deliver medium and light bombers their shorter range will probably require that they be delivered over Russian territory if the Japanese occupy Burma and Eastern India, as he fears will take place. (6) If we can deliver a reasonable quantity of medium bombers and reopen connections with China some time in early 1943, he thinks their effective resistance can be counted upon, though otherwise unaided in 1942. No. 309 March 6, 1942 8:30 A.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan The following statement we must use with great care to avoid compromising the source: "Japanese Ambassador at Vichy has been receiving information re Anglo-American fleet movements from French Ministry of Marine." No. 310 March 6, 1942 8:30 A. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan VERY CORCLENSSITED The following has been received from our represen- tative in Tangier: "Have completed arrangements with responsible French leaders to receive the first installment of supplies which are needed immediately to establish communications pre- liminary to operations. We have completed all plans for transferring cargoes from the ships to hiding places at the hour and place." We are arranging for the shipment and I will keep you advised. DECLASSIFIED No.311 March 6, 1942 8:30 A. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan The following cable was sent on the 3rd or 4th of March by Admiral Darlan to Henri Haye: "Suite. mon numero 610. Le Comite de Gaulliste de Londres a publié à la radio que M. Sumner Welles avait formellement reconnu l'autorité du Comite Gaulliste de Londres en declarant qu'il reconnaissait officiellement qu'il detenait l'autorite sur les possessions francais due Pacificue et qu'il la detenait a l'exclusion de tout autre gouvernement; M. Sumner Welles a ajoute, d'apres la meme source, que l'appui du gouvernement des Etats-Unis etait assure au gouverneur gaulliste de la Nouvelle-Caledonie. "Ces déclarations, si elles étaient confirmees, appelleraient de la part du Gouvernement français la protestation la plus formelle car elles mainfestent le plus parfait mepris des autorités legitimes et constituees emanant du Gouvernement français, en meme temps qu'elles constituent un encouragement inadmissible a des rebelles contre le gouvernement francais, -2- lesquels ont éte condamnes par les tribunaus reguliers français, pour haute trahison et complot contre le surete de l'Etat. "Le Secretaire General a deja fait connaitre le point de vue du Gouvernement français au Conseiller de l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis, appele a cet effet. J'attends cependant avant de vous envoyer des instructions sur cetter affaire le compterendu de votre conversation avec M. Sumner Welles et les explications qu'il ne peut manquer de vous fournir sur la prise de position du gouvernement federal si elle est conforme aux descriptions qu'en font les Gaullistes de Londres et la radio britannique." At about the same time he sent this additional cable to the Ambassador. "En reponse a l'aide-memoire que m'a remis l'Amiral Leahy au sujet du deplacement du Dunkerque, j'ait fait connaitre a l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis que les reparations qui etaient absolutement nécessaires a ce navire ne pouvaient etre differees plus longtemps et ne pouvaient avoir lieu allleurs qu'a Toulon. "J'ai d'autre part fait connaitre à l'Amiral Leahy, comme j'ai deja eu l'occasion de vous le telegraphier, que les -3- conditions auxquelles avaient ete subordonne le 9 avril 1941, le maintien du Dunkerque a Oran avaient toutes ete voilees. Le Gouvernment français, par suite, n'avait plus de raison de maintenir au mouillage d'Oran, un navire de guerre dont une partie de la presse americaine reclamait d'ailleurs le torpollage sans avertissement. "Vous marquerez, une nouvelle fois, si vous en avez l'occasion que le Gouvernment français reitere que jamais la flotte francais ne sera livree aux puissances de l'axe, pas plus d'ailleurs qu'a n'importe quelle autre puissance et que cette flotte ne se livrera a aucune attaque, a moins, bien entendu, qu'elle ne soit contrainte } se defendre. No. 312 March 6, 1942 8:30 A. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan The following three telegrams were sent on the 3rd of March from Vichy to the French Ambassador: "En reponse aux preoccupations du gouvernement federal qui on fait l'objet de diverses communications et notamment du message du message du 10 febrier, du President Roosevelt au Marechal Petain, le gouvernement français a fait connaitre à l'Amiral Leahy que la France affirme, une nouvelle fois, qu'elle ne permettra l'utilisation d'aucune de sês possessions de l'hemisphere occidental c'est dire des Antilles franciases, de la Guyane française et de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, aux forces navales, terrestres ou aeriennes d'aucune puissance belligerante. "En confirmant au Secretaire d'Etat cette communication, veuillez lui faire connaitre que, bien entendu, la France compte sur un engagement des Etats-Unis concernant l'intergrité -2- des susdites possessions et le reglement de l'incident de Saint-Pierre. "Les dispositions pour assurer la mise en oeuvre des engagements pris par la France au sujet de sa neutralite seront prises aussitot que le gouvernment federal vous aura fait connaitre ses reponses, et specialement lorsque sera enfin reglee l'irritante question de Saint-Pierre.' No. 2. "En reponse aux preoccupations du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis concernant la flotte francais, et aux divers articles de la presse americaine, notamment du Washington Post et de l'International News Service sur le meme sujet, voulez-vous bien confirmer une nouvelle fois, que sous aucun pretexte, le gouvernment français ne cedera la flotte pas plus à l'Allemagne, qu'a n'importe quelle autre puissance. Jamais depuis l'armistice l'Allemagne n°a fait la moindre tentative pour s'assurer le controle de la flotte francais, car elle sait trop bien que cette tentative n'aurait pas la moindre chance de succes. "Pour votre information, je vous signale que j'ai rencontre a Paris, à titre prive au cours du mois dernier, a Paris, l'Amiral Raeder, et qu'a aucun moment, dans notre -3- conversation, il n'a ete question, ni de pres, ni de loin, meme de l'eventualité de la reddition ou de l'utilisation de nos navires. "Marquez par la meme occasion au Secretaire d'Etat la stupefaction du gouvernement français devant la persistance de campagnes de presse, largement reproduites en Allemagne, et qui tendent toutes à demontrer aux dirigeants du Reich a quel point il serait precieux pour eux a l'aube de 1942 de s'assurer le controle d'une flotte qui leur a ete refusee a l'Armistice, c'est a dire au moment meme ou la France etait le moins en mesure de resister aux exigences du vainqueur." No. 3 "La radio britanníque, entendue ici, a Vichy publie une declaration du Comite de deGaulle, affirmant que le gouvernment des Etats-Unis a fait connaitre au delegue dissident a la Nouvelle-Caledonie qu'il apportait son appui complet aux soi-distant Free French. La radio salue cette declaration comme une reconnaissance de facto par le gouverne- ment federal du mouvement gaulliste. "Voulez-vous me renseigner d'extreme urgence sur le texte meme des declarations du Department d'Etat et sur la portee que ces declarations ont, a votre avis et, notamment, dans quelle mesure elles vous paraissent en contradiction sur les assurances repetées qui vous ont ete fournies par M. Cordel Hull." No. S-1 March 6, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan We have just received word that the following mes- sage was received by Admiral Darlan from Henri Haye: "J'ai vu ce matin M. Sumner Welles. "Je lui ai remis une note tres précise sur les rapports de la France et des Etats-Unis au sujet des affaires d'Extrême- Oreint, dans laquelle remontant jusqu'a la Conference du Pacifique de 1937, je fais ressortir a quel point les reti- cences americaines ont pu obliterer la politique française. J'ai dit au Sous-Secretaire d'Etat qu'en presence des injures quotidiennement proferees dans la presse contre la France, a propos de l'Indo-Chine, la tentation etait forte pour de publier un dossier don les textes font ressortir lumineusement la responsabilité certaine des Etats-Unis dans la position prise par la France en Extreme-Orient. -2- "En me remerciant de ma discretion, le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat n'a promis de porter une particulière attention a` la lecture de la note que je lui remettais et de me faire part des reflexions qu'elle lui suggererait. "J'ai alors aborde la question de la Martinique. M. Welles n'a dit qu'il avait eu l'impression en lisant la note par laquelle votre Excellence expliquait les raisons pour lesquelles l'Amiral Robert avait permis le debarquement d'un blessé allemand, que ces raisons constituaient une novation aux accords Grenslade-Horne-Robert. Je lui ai confirme qu'il était absolument rien et que dans l'esprit du Gouvernement français, il etait formellement entendu que rien n'avait varié dans l'application des accords Grenslade- Horne-Robert que nous tenions pour integralement intacts. "M. Welles n'a paru tres satisfait de cette affirmation et je lui ai demande si, dans ces conditions, et etant formellement precise que les accords susvises n'avaient subi aucune espece de changement, il me garantissait à son tour que la position des Etats-Unis, en ce qui touche l'integrité de nos possessions dans cet hemisphere, restait immuable. Il n'a repondu avec energie affirmativement. "Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat n'a parle du deplacement du -3- Dunkerque. Il m'a dit que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis considerait que les engagements qui avaient ete pris le 8 avril 1941 à propos de ce bâtiment etaient inconditionnels. Je lui ai retorque les arguments contenus dans les communi- cations de Votre Excellence, dont je lui ai meme donne lecture. "J'ai ajoute qu'au surplus quand ces engagements avaient ete souscrits les Etats-Unis n'etaient pas en guerre et il n'y avait aucun inconvenient à faire connaitre d'avance la date du déplacement de cette unite. Aujourd'hui par contre, ou les Etats-Unis sont eux-memes en guerre et allies de la Grande-Bretagne, il est clair qu'ils se seraient trouve dans une positions embarrassante si-ayant connue le projet de deplacement du navire, ils avaient garde le silence ce qui aurait pu leur etre reproché par les Anglais, ou s'ils avaient parle, ce qui leur aurait ete reproche par nous. J'ai fait ressortir que le recent torpillage du P.L.M. 8 par un sous-marin britannique dans les eaux mediterraneennes montrait que nos alarmes n'etaient pas sans justification et j'ai ajoute que mon Gouvernement avait pu egalement se trouver preoccupe des campagnes de la presse et de la radio des Etats-Unis qui demandaient le torpillage du Dunkerque sans avertissement, dans un nouveau Pearl-Harbour ou un -4- nouveau Mers el Kebir. "M. Welles m'a dit qu'il maintenait le point de vue que dans cette affaire, nous n'avions pas observe l'engage- ment du 8 avril qu'il continuait a considerer comme in- conditionnel et non pas lie au ravitaillement de l'Afrique du Nord ou a la nonsaisie de nos navires par les Britanniques. "Sur quoi nous sommes passes l'examen de la position prise par le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat dans l'affaire de la Nouvelle- Caledonie. J'ai dit à M. Welles à quel point le gouvernement français s'etait montré alarmé des interpetations et affirma- tions de M. deGaulle dont le bureau de propagande avait fait publier par la radio qu'il y avait eu reconnaissance de jure et de facto de son existence par M. Sumner Welles en personne et meme echange de lettres entre le consul des Etats-Unis à la Nouvelle-Caledonie et le delegue gaulliste dans cette ile. "M. Sumner Welles n'a declare qu l'interpetation donnee par la radio gaulliste etait purement fantaisiste, qu'il n'y avait aucun echange de lettres, amis que la position du gouvernement americain etait qu'il valait mieux pour la France que les Americains soient a la Nouvelle-Caledonie dont ils ont la forme intention de restaurer la souverainete apres le guerre au profit de la France, plutot que d'y -5- voir les Japonais s'y installer avec l'appui de l'Amiral Decous. "J'ai dit a M. Sumner Welles que la comme sur maints autres points, il se laissait impressioner par les accu- sations d'une certaine presse, a l'egard de l'Amiral Decous qui n'etait pas plus "japonais" que Votre Excellence ou moi- meme n'etions 'naziè" Je lui ai dit que je pourrais lui montrer maintes communications de l'Amiral Decous qui prou- vaient a quel point, au contraire, il était eloigné de toute sympathie personnelle à l'egard des Nippons. Il n'en reste pas moins qu l'Amiral Decous qui est de par ses fonctions, en contact permanent avec les autorities japonaises ne peut pas traiter avec elles en refusant de leur addresser la parole. "Revenant a la Nouvelle-Caledonie et a la communication qu'il aurait beaucoup mieux valu, meme en tenant pour abso- lument justifiee la postion prise par les Etats-Unis a l'egard de nos possessions du Pacifique entre les mains des dissidents, qu'il me fit appeler pour me faire connaitre l'intention du gouvernment federal de s'etablir dans cette ile. "En terminant sur ce point, M. Welles m'a reaffirme la volonte des Etats-Unis de restaurer la souverainete français -6- dans son intégralite partout ou elle avait subi des atteintes, dès que les operations de guerre le permettraient. "J'ai tres fermement indiqué au Sous-Secretaire d'Etat que mon Gouvernment avait profondement ressenti le fait qu'un Gouvernment ami comme le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ait cru devoir entrer en relations meme of icieuses avec des dissidents rebelles, condamnes par les tribunaux de droit commun français pour crimes de haute trahison a l'egard de la France. "Je lui ai parle a`ce moment de l'entretien du bombarde- ment de Paris par les avions anglais et je lui ai reproche avec cordialité mais avec force, de Niavoir pas cru-lorqu'l a donne aux journalistes son point de vue sur la legitimite de ces bombardements prononçer une seule parole de sympathie a l'egard des victimes de ce massacre. M. Welles n'a repondue que j'avais peut-etre raison mais qu'il avait ete amene a ne rien dire parce que le Marechal avait parle de 'lachete' quand il avait qualifie l'attaque des avaiteurs britanniques. J'ai fait remarquer qu l'expression du Marechal se justifait amplement par le fait que Paris, du fait de l'application de l'armistice n'etait defendu ni par l'artillerie anti-aerienne, ni par les escadrilles de chasse et que Sir Archibald Sainclair -7- avait dit lui-meme que cette attaque, comme toutes celles sur les regions occupees, etaient plus faciles et contraid- draient les Allemands a disperset leurs defenses contre- avions actuellement toutes concentrees sur le territoire du Reich. "J'ai dit a M. Sumner Welles qu'il n'y avait aucun doute que des expéditions de ce genre provoqueraient dans le peuple français un sentiment unanime d'indignation et de douleur et un regroupement plus serre que jamais autour de la personne du Marechal. "Abordant alors le point de vue plus general des relations franco-americaines j'ai dit au Sous-Secretaire d'Etat combien devenaient de plus en plus intolerables les campagnes et les injures de la presse et de-la radio dont la violence à l'egard de la France a atteint depuis quelques jours un paroxysme tout a fait inquietant. "J'ai dit combien il etait inadmissible qu'on demande a mon Governement des engagements precis a l'egard de la non- utilisation de notre flotte de guerre et de la non-utilisation de nos bases, engagements que je renouvelais solennellment et don j'ai dit que Votre Excellence les renouvelait a l'Amiral -8- Leahy, en meme temps que la presse et la radio pourtant aujourd'hui soumises a la censure résultant de l'etat de guerre, s'acharnent a ridiculiser lesdits engagements et à en constester la valeur: "J'ai demande au Sous-Secretaire d'Etat de m'aider a combattre la deterioration des rapports franco-americains que tant de conseilleurs americains ou français, animes par les interets personnels les plus sordided s'acharnaient a comprom ettre et a detruire. "Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat m'a dit qu'il reprouvait de la facon la plus enargique les aggissements de certains journalistes et de certains commentateurs de radio et qu'il estimait que les bons rapports entre les Etats-Unis et la France etaient absolument necessaires, mais que dans une lutte ou son pays combattait pour son existence meme, il ne pouvait pas admettre les demi-mesures ou les positions ambigues. "J'ai souligne à M. Welles dans la tourmente actuelle, la France, meme s'il pouvait lui être reproche ce qui restait a voir certains incidents de detail, etait restee immuablement fidele a ses engagements de neutralite, et ce non sans merite, si l'on pensait aux prieres des -9- familles des prisonniers. Depuis le 23 juin, 1940, jour de l'Armistice, lui ai-je dit, nous sommes accuses tous les matins ici d'etre sur le point de livrer la flotte francaise et les bases navales aux Allemands. L'avons- nous fait. Non. Songeons-nous a la faire. Pas davantage. Dans ces conditions, il y aurait tout a gagner a ce que le gouvernement americain usat de son influence a l'egard des directeurs des grands journaux et des commentateurs de radio jouissant d'une particuliere autorite pour que cessat une campagne dont le moins qui puisse etre dit c'est qu'elle ne peut manquer de rejouir ceux qui en Europe veulent la rupture des relations entre les Etats-Unis et la France. "Le fait, ai-je conclu, que cette campagne d'injures pour- suit le meme but que la presse inspiree par certains des ennemis des Etats-Unis suffit a montrer quelle est la folie de ses auteurs. Cette folie, c'est le devoir du gouvernement americian de la faire apercevoir a qui de droit. "Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, tout en me rappelant les difficultes qu'il y a ici a interferer avec des habitudes de liberte qui frisent le plus souvent la licence, n'a dit qu'il etait fort preoccupe par la question. -10- "Il a exprime le desir de me revoir prochainement pour achever de mettre au point les questions qui pourraient encore exiger des exlaircissements. "J'ai emporte de mon entretien la conviction que M. Sumner Welles etait sincerement desireux, tout en recherchant les garanties indispensables, a la securite des Etats-Unis en guerre, de collaborer avec moi dans le maintien des bonnes relations entre nos deux pays. "Il m'a paru tres sincerement satisfait des assurances formelles que je lui ai donnees tant en ce qui concerne la libre application des accords concernant la Martinique, que de la non-utilisation de notre flotte et de nos bas S par les adversaires des Etats-Unis. "J'ai ete interroge en sortant par les journalistes accredites, sur les repercussions politiques que pouvait avoir le bombardement de Paris. Je me suis refuse a toute declaration et j'ai renvoye mes interlocuteurs aux decla- rations faites par le Marechal et publices dans la presse americaine." No. 313 March 6, 1942 12:00 noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: William J. Donovan The following is the General Directive of BBC for the week of March 1 to 8. 1. German propaganda is concentrating on: a. Bolstering the morale which is flagging in the Vassal countries and Germany. b. Promoting disunity among the Allies and putting a damper on the rising morale in the occupied countries. They are saying that the Americans and British are sunk in selfish sloth beset with alarm over Bolshevism and are not capable of helping themselves or of aiding Russia. They also assert that the Russians being faced with disaster are clamoring for aid. Destruction of these Nazi pictures should be given close attention. 2. We look upon the Russians as a great Ally, as pursuing an ideal with wholehearted sacrifice and as a mighty fighting nation. We are true allies, being neither disloyal nor distrustful. We will not allow our strategy to be determined by jealousy or fear of Stalin and we have not the slightest intention of allowing Russia to fight our battles. Russia's reasons for non-belligerency in the Far East are appreciated by us. -2- 3. In the meantime we are doing four invaluable services for Russia. a. German forces in Libya are being diverted. b. Holding Middle East bastion and keeping the Persian supply route open. C. Keeping the Northern supply route open. d. Occupying the Japanese to keep her from an assault on the Russians. 4. This week a high level of British projection should be reached, and also an effort to project America to mar the German picture of a spineless, decadent, disunited nation capable only of blustering big talk. United States offensive spirit accented and desire to hit the enemy this year, if possible in the Spring. 5. The infectious spirit of attack must be communicated to our European friends, but must qualify that we must grit our teethsand face a prolongation of the war if, despite all our efforts, the enemy achieves substantial successes. If Germany is successful in the Spring, it will mean another winter of war for Europe and in Asia a prolonging of Japanese terror. The final issue could not be affected. Show ruthlessly and clearly this week the choice which lies before all Europeans: To allow Hitler to prolong the misery for another winter or aid the Allies in ending it this year. -3- 6. Something more positive than mere release from the Nazi grip must be promised in order to stimulate the Europeans to take big risks to defeat Hitler this year. The closer we approach the war crisis, the more need there is for talk of peace. This is for operational reasons and not simply from a vague desire to emit hot air about Utopia. We must paint a convincing and attractive picture of what peace in Europe would mean. No. 315 March 6, 1942 6:00 P.M. March 6, 1942 MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WILLIAM J. DONOVAN Belligerent activity has spread and involved the Arctic regions. The advance and progress made in aviation, with the present-day long-range capabilities of aircraft, have permitted no land or sea however isolated and distant to escape the attention of war and its strategy. The United States' compelling interest in Green- land, the spread of activity to Spitzbergen and the north- eastern North Atlantic, around Northern Scandinavia and beyond, and more recently the threat to the Bering Sea re- gion and Eastern Siberia, and the large-scale construction of defanses and outposts in Alaska -- all bear testimony to the strategic importance of the Arctic regions as a whole. Many traditions and reports regarding natural conditions in the north have been found to be inaccurate and misrepresented as a result of the pioneering work and operations of the present Army and Navy force in the North. Concurrently with aerial and naval operations in the Alaskan and Greenland sectors there should be under- taken the reconnaissance and investigation of the Canadian Arctic sector, with particular reference to learning the practical usefulness of a sea route connecting Greenland and Alaska. Such a project would have for its objectives the military consolidation of Alaska and Greenland, and the improved defense which would result from such discoveries. A more far-reaching consequence which holds the promise of possible military use and practicality is a route between the Pacific and the Atlantic in case of the loss of the Panama Canal. It is unnecessary to point out that the Northeastern Passage (the route between north Alaska and Bering Strait) has been explored and tested and used for many years, whereas the complementary route (the Northwest Passage) has never been tested or tried by a modern ship. Long-range airplanes are now being based in Greenland and Alaska and large, strong ice cruisers are being constructed for the U. S. Coast Guard Greenland patrol. These could be used to investigate the military importance of this sector. I am sending you a large visual presentation of this project, whereon you will see the various proposed routes and the suggested locations for aircraft and weather stations. No. 316 March 6, 1942 6:00 P.M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: William J. Donovan The following is a summary from the Weekly News Guidance of the British Ministry of Information: There are two Japanese divisions in Burma, four in Java, and others are available in Malaya, Siam and Indo- China to be used as reinforcements. The Japanese division consists of twenty thousand men. We are thus at a serious numerical disadvantage which we are unable to reinforce. Russia's offensive is being stiffly resisted. It is believed that there are still a number of German fortified posts remaining behind the Russian forward lines. It is now clear that Stalin intended his references in the Red Army Order of the Day for external, not home consumption. Home propaganda by the Russians shows no abatement of incitements to hate and destroy the enemy. Britain will stress that the best method of beating the Germans quickly is to send material assistance to the Russians. The increase in losses of merchant ships is due partly to German submarine activity in the Atlantic and partly to losses in the Pacific. The German production of submarines is high, -2- but the rate of destruction is believed great enough to cause them difficulty in providing enough trained crews. When an adequate convoy system comes into effect for the United States Atlantic seaboard coastwise traffic, the situation is likely to improve. Until further construction is available, our Mediter- ranean naval position will be difficult since available strength is occupied in safeguarding the vital Atlantic Arctic supply routes. We are now unable to prevent reinforcements from reaching Rommel. Here are some facts to correct exaggerations on German naval strength. Germany has one battleship, the Tirpitz. There are no sister ships under construction; two pocket battleships, the Lutzow and the Admiral Scheer; two battle cruisers, the Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst; two eight inch cruisers, Hipier and the Prinz Eugen; four six-inch cruisers, two of which are used for training, one aircraft carrier and one eight-inch cruiser which is not yet complete. The sea war is in a critical phase and its seriousness should not be concealed. In all aspects of the war strategy, shipping is the vital factor. It is the key to Russian supplies, Far East reinforcements and the impracticability of a British invasion of the continent in the near future. British propaganda will stress the fact that American and British production will be large enough to make good. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 9, 1942. MEMORANDUM FOR W. J. D. I assume Land wholly approves of this plan and I assume also that the vessel OLIVIA is a very small ship and will not interfere with our shipping arrangements. This whole matter should be kept very secret, and I suggest that this letter to Land be given to him in person. F. D. R. No. 317 March 7, 1942 8:30 A. M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan The attached letter refers to the ship which we wish to purchase in order to carry out the project of the Cape Verde Islands. In my No. 176 of January 22nd, I told you the manner in which we plan to bring the situation there within our control. In completing the arrangements for the transfer of the ship, the Maritime Commission has drafted the attached authorization for your signature. No.318 March 7, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Donovan REPORT ON PROPAGANDA WARFARE DURING WEEK ENDING MARCH 13 This report concerns Axis broadoasts for the week ending Friday, March 13, 1942, and is based on: 1. Monitoring reports of the Federal Communications Commission. 2. Available information from the British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service. 3. Reports of the Columbia Broadcasting System's short- wave listening station and National Broadcasting Company's listening post. 4. Independent listening by the staff of the short-wave intelligence unit of my office. 5. Analysis of other available news from Axis sources. AXIS PROPAGANDA SPEEDS UP We face our hardest job now. There is no doubt that Axis propaganda is developing momentum and is augmented against the United States proper and pounding at definite objectives. It seems to be based on the expectancy that we shall continue to suffer military reverses for several months. Its principal and repetitious work seems to be to SOW discord and distrust, not only on a broad scale among the United Nations, but among the individual oitizens of our own particular sector. To comprehend how successful this has been so far, one has only to read the newspapers, ride in a bus or visit his club, bar or coffee shop. If the pattern used in dissolving France (particularly) is followed further, the only missing ingredient is fright. United States medium-wave newscasters have been cannier, on the whole, in avoiding Axis bait than some metropolitan and other newspapers. The lustiness with which Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo now fall to the task of discouraging the faint-hearted and victualing the de- featists plainly indicates that their propagandists expect sub- stantial results. Ever bolder pressure is evident at causing a spiritual rupture between the United States and Great Britain; as we are told that the British are fumblers and double-dealers now existing only at the pleasure of Stalin and they are assured that - 2 - we are ineffectual allies, greedy for such possessions as they have left, unable and unwilling to aid them where they need it most. This is not new. The point is, it is being driven home with renewed vigor. All the United Nations, the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and the Latin-American nations are bombarded daily and almost hourly with propaganda in which the defeatist theme now pre- dominates. It may be noted in passing that even the Russian successes automatically become grist for Axis mills in quarters where they have implanted fear of Bolshevization of England. The Cripps elevation has been made a monstrous Red menace. CERTAIN CHANGES Our own propaganda offensive is becoming stronger. During this week it is in the process of an extensive expansion designed to make it more directive, less of a blunderbuss affair, a weapon that can be sighted at specific targets and that quickly. The close coordination between our analysts, writers, and editors and the men who run the short-wave transmitters need not be detailed in this report. THE BRITISH RAID PARIS An accomplishment of the week was the special broadcast by William L. Shirer. This went out first to the American nation - 3 - over a National hook-up. Later it went out translated into Danish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. The French and German broadcasts, as we now do in our "United America Fights" series and all specials, were angled to gain their especial attention and to fulfill their especial propaganda needs. Mr. Shirer's radio talk followed swiftly the stunning impact caused by news of the tremendous damage and great loss of life, from the British bombs. It was in no sense an apologetic talk. It was clarifying, expository, and pugnacious. Mr. Shirer began it informally, almost casually, by men- tioning a friend, a former editor of an important newspaper in Paris, who escaped from France and reached New York only a few weeks ago. "You could see he'd had a tough time getting out - nerve-wracking days and nights dodging the Gestapo in occupied France and dodging the Vichy Gestapo in unoccupied France", said Mr. Shirer. "But he didn't talk much about that. 'Why', he kept repeating, 'don't the British bomb all factories in France, which are now turning out mountains of material for Hitler's armies?' Coming from Paris, he was particularly concerned about the vast network of factories which surround the French capital. 'Why doesn't the RAF bomb them?' he kept saying. ""....The Treat Citroen and Renault works...have been en- gaged since the Armistice in turning out tank parts for the Ger- - 4 - mans, and also army trucks They had not turned out nearly 80 much when France was at war. There were labor troubles and also management troubles.' "But my French friend, who had just escaped from Paris, as- sured me they were turning out plenty for the Germans; workers who didn't like to produce for Hitler were disposed of by the Gestapo - murdered or sent out in forced labor gangs to Germany..." At the close of Mr. Shirer's talk, the announcer's script emphasized Shirer's points. The announcer said that the whole country shared a feeling of horror caused by the news of the numerous victims of the bombardment . the same horror that was caused by the news of the execution of hostages by the Nazis. Certainly, the announcer added, the workers killed in these raids were so many hostages, chained to their machines by conquerors who knew perfectly well that they were exposing them to frightful dangers. "No doubt", said the announcer, "these bombardments will be repeated and perhaps they will become more frequent". The script ended with the words: "In these tragic circum- stances, laments or shouts of victory are equally in bad taste. We repeat . - - - the war is not ended. It has only begun." - 5 - OTHER SPECIAL BROADCASTS The output of daily special broadcasts, translated into the eight languages employed in the Shirer broadcast, and angled by experts for any especially receptive ears in certain nations, is increasing in quantity and seems to be in quality. Senator Austin of Vermont sent a message directly to the people of China on the Thursday "Victory for China" program . Among other things, Senator Austin tied up the Atlantic Charter with Oriental peoples and particularly with the Chinese people. The personal message that Senator Elbert D. Thomas sends out each month in commemoration of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor of course does not reach "the people of Japan", to whom it is addressed. But it reaches a great many other Oriental peoples and undoubtedly some Japanese leaders. It also reaches the Japanese forces on the mainland of Asia. In his March 5th talk, Senator Thomas told the Japanese: "It is nothing new for you to find yourselves disliked, opposed, fought by the other in- habitents of the Eastern Hemisphere. What is new is not that just a few of the Asiatic peoples, but all of them, have in the space of three months seen you reveal your plan to enslave the world, and have achieved a new feeling of intensity against you." - 6 - THE RIOM TRIALS We have played the Riom trials straight. But there are puzzling aspects to the Axis handling which do not immediately fit into a recognizable pattern. One of our analysts made a hazard as follows: "The Nazis and the Italians have feverishly been expressing their dissatisfaction with the handling of the Riom trial. Granted that that trial, as we learn about it through an apparently un- censored press, is proving to be something of a boomerang, granted that the Axis would like to have it brought out that Daladier plunged France into war because England told him to do SO. But why does Berlin resort to the radio to cry out that the judges are not doing, their duty, that they are beating about the bush, that they are exposing the French government and the French people to ridicule? "Is the Berlin radio the only point of contact between Ribbentrop and Riom? Cannot Petain collaborate? "Possibly the Nazis are opportunistically taking advantage of the fact that the defendents' day in court is about over. Perhaps from now on, the Fascist inquisition is scheduled for unhampered progress. If such is the case, the Axis Diatribes are part of the script. Berlin wants it to appear that she is - 7 - propagandizing for the "truth" in the war guilt question. When the "truth" in the Nazi definition emerges, a conditional audience will be ready to accept it Goebbels will be able to say: 'German fears, openly expressed, have been relieved. The fact that we openly criticized the court proves that the British radio lies when it says that Germany managed the trial behind the scenes.'" ROME'S COMIC VALENTINE It is a cheery thing to be able to report that some of our efforts have not gone unnoticed. A full fifteen-minute broadcast from Rome in English, March 5th, constituted a heavy-handed and obvious attempt to annoy President Roosevelt and Colonel Donovan. It also presented a picture of poverty and riches "midst the pleasure domes and hovels of New York City" that was most en- lightening. TWO WARS: A COMPARISON Our broadcast with the above title has become a continuing line of presenting deadly parallels between World War One and World War Two. It has brought no direct reaction as yet from Axis propagandists but is almost certainly a very effective effort. A good example went out over WLWO in German Tuesday afternoon. It began by recalling the words of President Roosevelt on February 24, when he assured the world that the United States would carry - 8 - the war into enemy territory. It said that Hitler is now behaving like a man who is afraid. It said that the Scandinavian countries are arming and gave details. It quoted the "Nation" article on the President's promise to give weapons to the suppressed countries. It said that in the last war the Balkans were the point where revolts began. Norway is thought to be the starting point this time....but the collapse may begin at any other place....or every- where at once. Quotations from various articles and correspondents backed up assertions of growing unrest. Correspondence from Ankara was quoted that the Balkans are again expected to become the center of revolt. It was effective stuff, ending: "Enemies in the whole world, enemies in occupied territory, enemies in his own country - - that's what Hitler sees in the future. Invasion and revolt will destroy Hitler." HITLER'S GUILELESS HELPERS On Monday, Rome in Spanish reported that the United States was planning to occupy Portugal, basing the report on an editorial in the New York Daily Mirror. On Tuesday, Rome in Spanish to Spain, continued: "It is evident that the editor of the Daily Mirror -.... has a very strange idea of the dignity and pride of the Iberian peoples." - 9 - A check revealed that the mirror, on February 28, ran an editorial headed, "Attack. Attack. Attack." The Mirror outlined a grand strategic scheme. It included the following: "American expeditionary force to occupy Portugal and push up through Vichy, down through North Africa object being to win alliance of the French fleet or to blast it out of the water." No. S-2 March 8, 1942 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM: William J. Donovan In continuation of the report of Henri Haye's con- versation with Sumner Welles the following message was received at Vichy: "Au cours de notre entrevue d'hier, j'ai fait part a M. Sumner Welles des protestations elevees par l'Amiral Robert contre des aviateurs militaires ou navals americains qui viennent se livrer & des acrobaties a basse altitude au dessus du porte-avions Bearn. "Le Sous-Secretaire detat a tres fortement blame de telles pratiques et il m'a assure que des instructions severes allaient etre données pour que de telles practiques ne se renouvelent pas. "Parlant de l'Amiral Decoux et de ses sentiments soi- disant pro-japonais, M. Sumner Welles a tire argument de radio-diffusions qui auraient ete faites par la radio due poste emeteur de Saigon et qui suraient pris vivement a partie le gouvernement americain. -2- "Ces emissions ont ete enregistrees par les postes d'ecoute de l'excellent service monte aux Etats-Unis par l'organisme du Colonel Donovan, et M. Welles m'a fait remarquer en plaisantant que les emissions de Saigon n'avaient ici d'autres auditeurs que le President et lui- meme qui ont pu les entendre sur les disoues enregistreurs. "Il serait desirable, si tant est qu'elles aient jamais eu lieu, que les dites emissions prennent fin et que des instructions energiques soient donnees par l'Amiral Decoux aux dirigeants de la radio saigonnaise." No. 319 March 9, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Dónovan The following is a report on German home propaganda: "1. The Far East is still subordinated to Russia in German home propaganda which takes the line 'England can no longer do anything to us. The British Empire is being taken care of by Japan. Germany's only serious enemy is Russia and when she is beaten the rest will be easy though not of necessity short.' There is no longer & ban on stating that in certain parts of the Eastern Front the German position has been 'dangerous.' The impression is given that the German troops have almost entirely been on the defensive, but in spite of incredibily bad weather condi- tions they have repelled all 'tough and vigorous Soviet attacks, all tasks mastered', Russians claim advances 'absurd'. In prophesying the results of the coming spring offensive, great caution is being displayed. "2. Churchill is personally and consistently blamed -2- for the 'irretrievable loss' of the British Far Eastern possessions and the 'grim hopelessness' of the allied position. The role of America is minimized as 'too weak to help'. Much less talks are devoted to Japan, but 1/5 is all news. "3. Much greater prominence is given to the Japanese and German sinkings of allied shipping in the Atlantic and Pacific Production in America is belittled, inadequate to replace the huge losses and 'propaganda bluff'. "4. The report of Petain's Comment on Billancourt raid was given in such a way as to make it appear that he was accusing the British openly of a cowardly attack worse then Mers-el-Kebir. "5. Norwegian news was wholly suppressed including the resignation of the Norwegian bishops. "6. There is no increase in general home morale in spite of the successes of the Japanese. There is a strong suggestion of a drop in morale among the officer--supplying upper middle classes of East and North Germany. "7. As the majority of the people are so strained, they haven't the power to concentrate and absorb exacting -3- programs, Goebbels advised the film industry to concen- trate on producing relating entertainment. DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A No. 320 007622 By DBS Date SEP 107A March 9, 1942 12 Noon MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: William J. Donovan The following is a summary of opinion trends in occupied France and is based upon reliable and secret information which has come to us: "The French were tremendously depressed over the fall of Singapore and the escape of the German battle- ships, but the parachute raid on the French coast by the British had a heartening effect out of all proportion from military significance. A flood of rumors of im- minent Anglo-American invasion of the Continent were un- loosed. "The already pro-British feeling was stimulated by the Billancourt raid. However, it gave German propaganda an occasion to exploit the accusation of indiscriminate action against civilians by the RAF. This caused wide- spread ill feeling, especially in such coastal areas as Bordeaux and Le Havre. "Because of increasingly successful radio jamming few people in Paris are aware of Japanese shipping losses. - 2 - 1 The listeners want only news and are averse to talks. "A great deal of latent feeling over France's future was brought out at the Riom trials. This brought to light intense end widespread attachment to the idea of a Republic which conceived however as different from Third Republic. A strong emotional hold is had on large sections of people with such words as "liberate". "Because of fear and the effect on French opinion of a break between Vichy and Washington and because of American pressure it is generally felt that Vichy is trying to avoid sending supplies to Rommel. COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION WASHINGTON, D.C. COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION March 10, 1942 The President The White House Washington, D. C. My dear Mr. President: There is attached herewith Report No. 20, prepared by the Economics Division of the Coordina- tor of Information, entitled AMENDMENTS 10 REPORT ON GARMAN FOOD SITUATION CONTAINED IN GERMAN : TUDY OF DECEMBER, 1941. This report is a supplement to the re- port THE Gerson MILITARY AND ECOHO IC POSITION, MONOGRAPH NO. 3, Rev., which this office trans- mitted to you in December. Faithfully yours, Lilliam William L. Langer Langer Director of Research Attachment DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78 By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972 21 CONFIDENTIAL ECONOMIC REPORT NO. 1 February 25, 1942 A...I.D.E.TS TO REPORT ON GERMAN FOOD SITUATION CONTAINED IN GERMAN STUDY OF DECEMBER, 1941 The accompanying tables, which were included in their original form RS estimates of the German situation with respect to the busic agricultural commodities, have now been modified. Additional information now available in this office has prompted the following alterations. I. Estimated Wheat and Rye Balance, 1941-42. The new computation suggests that the August 1942 carry-over will be less than our earlier estimate of 4,950,000 tons by some 1,400,000 tons. At present, the situation indicates a carry-over of 3,550,000 tons of breadgrains in August of this year. This change has been brought about principally by n smller estimate of the expected yield in the old Reich. The original filure of 13,000,000 tons for whoat and rye has now been reduced to 11,500,000 tons. This is in part compensated for by our estimate that Germany will receive (or has received) as much as 100,000 tons - mostly in soft wheats - from Algoria and Tunis in North Africa, Though there is some indication that the Danubian countries may not deliver what we have estimated to be 750,000 1 1972 By B. H. Parks Date, -2- tons to Germany, there is not enough evidence yet to warrant adoption of a new figure. Similarly, the exports Germany will have to make (to Austria, the Sudetenland, Belgium, the Nether- lands, Finland and Greece) may exceed our estimate of 1,500,000 tons. Again, however, there is not enough positive evidence to warrant & change in our earlier computations. It is probable, however, that any alteration during this year will operate to- ward further reduction in the August 1 carry-over. Yet it con- tinues to appear unlikely that the German breadgrain picture will change significantly from the favorable one depicted in our December survey. II. Estimated Meat Balance, 1941-42. Our December estimate suggested a deficit for August 1942, which we computed to be 350,000 tons. Actually, it was stated in our study that though the German stock position, as far 0.8 stored meats were concerned, would be impaired, the German position with respect to livestock on the hoof was a very strong one, and even the computed deficit would not be significant for the German meat situation in 1941-42. The computations in the earlier study were made on the assumption that the meat ration reduced on June 1, 1941, by about 20%, would be re-established before the 1941-42 crop year had gone very far. This rostoration has not been made. It appears, indeed, that the Germans do not intend, as they earlier stated, to increase the meat rations. Therofore, total requirements for the old Reich population, all Germen soldiers, prisoners of war, and foreign workers in Germany DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 By R H. Parks Data JUN 1 1972 -3- cour are reduced from the previous figure of 3,375,000 tons to one of 2,845,000 tons. This significant reduction in amount of meat utilized changes the accounting picture so that the stock position in August, 1942, is now presented as a small surplus one rather than the deficit position previously indicated. Lloreover, though evidence does not yet warrant changing any of the previous estimates on Germany&supply, there is some reason to believe that imports and requisitions for 1941-42 may exceed the figure of 430,000 tons indicated. Any further change in the German situation at the end of the current year is likely to suggest an even better picture than indicated by our new estimates as far as stored meats are concerned. Also, the German position for livestock may be somewhat better than was indicated in our survey of December, 1941. III. Estimated Fats and Oils Balance, 1941-42 We have previously ostimated that the Germans would encounter difficulties in meeting essential demands for fats and oils for the year 1941-42. Llowever, though our statistical posi- tions show a deficit by August, 1942, the belief was expressed that DECL adjustments could be made so that the 1941-42 situation would be in balance. There is now enough evidence that slight improvements in the German situation in the direction expected have actually talen place. These improvements are the net rosult of several in- fluences working in .different directions. Thus, the butter ex- ports form Donnarl, originally estimated at 100,000 tons, will probibly reach 60,000 tons at most, However, margarine pro- duction from imported oilseeds will be considerably larger than originally estimated. It appears that the Danubian countries them- -4- selves may yield at least 50,000 tons. Greater imports from North Africa than were originally expected have taken place (or will take place). The figure for margarine from imported oilseeds is now raised to 65,000 tons, to replace the earlier estimate of 25,000 tons. The unusual olive oil crop in Spain also prompts an increase in our former figure of 45,000 tons of olive oil from Italy, Spain, and Turkey. The new estimate is 110,000 tons, with the addition attributable almost completely to imports from Spain. On net, the German position now suggests a 65,000-ton reduction in the deficit previously estimated. It should also be pointed out that there is even some indication that German domestic production of fats and oils will be above the million-ton figure previously stated. This will further improve the balance for 1941-42. However, none of these factors makes any fundamental change in our appraisal of the German fats and oils situation for the present year and of prospects here- after. State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78 DECLASSIFIED By R H. Parks Date 1972 Geruany: Estimated Wheat and Rye Balance, 1941-42 Supply 1,000 Short Tons Requirements 1,000 short Tons Carryover, August 1941 : 5,400 : Seed and waste : 1,600 : : : 1941 Crop, Old Reich : 11,500 : Rations for Old Reich population, : : : all German soldiers, & prisoners : Imports de Requisitions, : : of war and foreign workers 9,200 : 1941-42: : : : : : Less 10% for admixtures 920 : Danube Countries 750 : : : Western Poland 350 : : Net 8,280 : North Africa 100 : 1,200 : In terms of grain 10,350 : : : : : Exports: : : : Austria : 500 : : Sudetenland & Protectorate : 200 : : Alsace, Belgium, Greece, Finland : 800 : : : : : Feeding of 1941 breadgrains not usable : : : for human consumption : 1,100 : : : : : Carryover, August 1942 : 3.550 : : : 18,100 : : 18,100 : : Carryover, August 1942 3.550