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PSF- oss Octo ber 1944 III
Box 169
DE
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
21 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe that the enclosed memorandum would
be of interest to the President. Would you please see
that it is called to his attention.
Sincerely,
Bul
William J. Donovan
Director
Enclosure
DE
SECRET
DE
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
OSS
DECLASSIFIED
23 October 1944
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
By ABS
Date
MAY
1
1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in the following
report dated 30 August 1944 which was received from the OSS
representative in London.
SEMI-OFFICIAL FRENCH VIEWS ON THE TREATMENT
OF GERMANY
The views expressed below are, except where otherwise
stated, those of M. Maurice Dejean, ministre de France aupres
des Gouvernments Allies. It is believed that in most cases
these views would be approved by the FCNL, although it cannot
be stated that they are a complete and official statement of
its position. These views were obtained in an interview with
M. Tony Meyer, who is working on German questions for M. Dejean.
1. Frontiers. France recognizes the frontiers as of
1 January 1933. She will insist on an international control,
primarily economic, of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. She has
no desire to annex German territory, except perhaps the Saar
and (even more doubtful) a strip of the left bank of the Rhine
below Strasbourg. (This strip was not identified in the inter-
DE
SECRET
DECLASSIMED
SECRET
-2-
view).
2. Dismemberment. France opposes the dismemberment of
Germany. The economic disintegration or ecartelement of Germany
is desirable, but territorial dismemberment would only lead to
a great drive by Germany for unity and territorial claims,
which would disturb the peace.
3. Occupation. France favors a long occupation of
Germany in which she would, of course, take part. One cannot
at this stage set forth the exact length of the proposed occupa-
tion, but one would think in terms of five to ten years.
There should be three international bases from which
the Allied Nations could launch immediate air attacks and other
punitive expeditions against any German attempt to violate
armistice or peace terms. These bases are Pomerania, Silesia,
and Westphalia.
4. Economic Disarament. The guiding principle should
be economic decentralization of Germany. The production of war
materials should be stopped, as should part of the chemical
industry; and other phases of industry should be controlled.
Germany's coal supply should be enormously reduced. The control
of the Westphalian region would involve the bulk of German coal
(134,000,000 tons out of a total production of 186,000,000 tons).
DECLASSITED
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
Germany would lose another 31,000,000 tons of coal if Silesia
were taken from her. In this policy of decentraliser l'industrie
allemande et l'orienter vers la peripherie, for example, some
parts of the ehcmical industry which employ few workers might
even be moved out of Germany into France or Czechoslovakia.
The German standard of living should be kept quite
high, however, To lower it very much would be to threaten
European peace.
5. Reparations. The word should be avoided. Germany
should make restitution for her spoilation, that is, restore
the loot she has carried off.
The question of forced labor has not really been
studied yet. It seems unlikely that France will want forced
labor; for one thing, French workmen might feel that they
are losing jobs because of this policy. Perhaps some Germans
might be forced to work on such jobs as the building of roads,
but this is not likely.
6. Financial Control. Germany must be under strict
financial control. The tricks by which rearmament expenses
were hidden before the present war must be prevented. The
German budget and its internal and external credits should
DE
SECRET
-4-
SECRET
accordingly be closely watched and regulated.
7. Possible difference of opinion in France. There
are no advocates of a soft policy towards Germany among the
French.
Immm
William J. Donovan
Director
DESECRET
OFFICE OF SECRETED STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
23 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Rut
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET
SECRET
PSF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OSS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
23 October 1944
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007628
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
By WBS
Date MAY 1 1974
I believe you will be interested in a summary of
a report which was prepared by Ignatio Silone, a pro-
minent Socialist leader who has just returned to Italy.
This summary which was forwarded to us by our representa-
tive in Caserta, reads as follows:
"1.. The Allies are showing themselves incapable
of establishing free and peaceful democracies in Europe.
"2. Roosevelt statement reapplication of anti-
trust measures to I. G. Farben is ray of light midst
confused and contradictory policy, Press has given
little publicity to it.
"3. Democratic European revolution must be given
aim. This does not mean radical and total form of
Socialism but series of structural changes analagous
to Roosevelt anti-trust measure.
"4. American representatives in Europe for
democracy, trusts, republican governments, monarchical
restorations, Catholic clergy. Result will be chaos
SECRET
SECRET
D
- 2 -
and birth of future Hitlers.
"5. Swiss and Italian Socialists will insist
British Labor Party call conference of all western
European Socialist parties to confront public with
problem of democratic revolution in Europe.
"6. Fate of democracy in Italy bound in labor
movement. If movement falls mainly in Communist hands,
hopes for political democracy will vanish.
"7. Fusion of Socialists and Communists would
imperil hope of democratic regime. Danger of fusion
has now faded.
"8. work and bread to masses indispensable.
Freedom propaganda to homeless, starving men ironical.
Allied relief not best solution to elementary needs.
Italians must be given legal possibility to help
themselves.
"9. Promote before elections and formation of
constituent assembly, widespread administrative autonomy
of different regions. Future democratic state will
then arise built by political class with capacity for
local government."
And
William J. Donovan
SECRET
Director
OFFICE Or SECRET SERVICES
IED
WASHINGTON, D.C.
23 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET
SECRET
PSF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OSS
23 October 1944
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
By WBS
CIA 007622 Date MAY 1 1974
I believe you will be interested in the following
report which we have received from our representative
in Cairo concerning the recent reorganization of the
Egyptian Government:
"On the 8th of October at five in the afternoon,
the King of Egypt dismissed Nahhas. At 5:30 p.m. the
formation of a cabinet was entrusted to Mahir. The
people were relieved and happy that the incident was
accompanied by no commotion and no tears. Makram was
released at once by Mahir.
"Nahhas fell because he put pressure on the British
to repay Egypt for her services to Britain. The repay-
ment was to include the Sudan. The King appears to have
made a trade with Killearn in which a less stringent
control of Egypt would be accorded in exchange for
dropping the Sudan claims. On the 3rd of last month
Nahhas told the King he would resign, but the King agreed
with the British that prior to the conclusion of the
SECRET
SECRET
TED
- 2 -
Arab Unity talks the resignation would not be accepted.
Killearn departed for South Africa on an 'extended
vacation' on September 12.
"The new Cabinet is constituted as follows:
Premier and Minister of the Interior: Mahir, SA Dist.
President.
Public Works: Ghalib, Sa'dist.
Education and Social Affairs: Haykal, Liberal Consti-
tution President.
Public Health: Hadi, Sa'dist.
Supply: Siba'i, Ind. Wafdist.
National Defense: Salim, Ind. Wafdist.
Agriculture: Ghaffar, Lib. Constitution.
Finance: Makram, Ind. Wafdist Pres.
Justice: Ramadan, Nationalist Pres.
Commerce and Industry: Hana, Ind. Wafdist.
Civilian Defense - discontinued
Foreign Affairs: Nucrashi, Sa'dist.
Waofs: Raziq, Lib. Const.
"There is no evidence of feeling against the British
or other foreigners. On the 9th of this month Mahir said
SECKET
SECRET
- 3 -
that the British were cooperating in carrying out the
treaty obligations and postwar demands on Britain were
not mentioned. The situation is considered as a purely
internal Egyptian affair by the British press, which
shows that the disposition of the whole affair was de-
termined ahead of time.
"The support of the cabinet by the Royal House
should be of benefit to the USA. The Palace believes
that America and other foreign powers provide a check
against the British, and Haykal is extremely friendly
towards the United States.
"Siba'i, the Minister of Supply, is a Makram
protege, and since Supply is closely related to Finance,
Madram will probably help him.
"Promotions under the old regime are being in-
vestigated.
"Government cooperation with the press regarding
censorship has been promised by Mahir. The old Director
of Censorship, Qabbani, is on an indefinite leave of
absence. Until the war is over martial law is to
continue.
SECRET
SECRET
- 4 -
"On the 12th of this month Mahir said the people
were not represented by the Chamber of Deputies. People
expect that it will be dissolved, and that there will
be no elections."
Donnan
William J. Donovan
Director
I
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
24 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bal
William J. Donovan
Director
PECLASSINED
O.S.S. focher 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DSEGRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
24 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will find of interest the following
report which we have just received from our representa-
tive in Caserta concerning plans for the formation of
a new Italian Government:
"1. Plans for formation new government are being
contemplated. A meeting was held on the morning of
October 21 at the home of Badoglio attended by General
Infante, Dallora, Salvarezza, Maiocco, Cambareri and
Salazar.
"2. Cambareri was authorized see Stone of ACC and
.
present list of new government. If he approves or
refuses to make decision the Prince is ready to ask
Bonomi resignation and place Soleri as new Prime Minister.
"3. A meeting was held on the afternoon of October
21 at headouarters Unione Proletaria attended by repre-
sentatives of 11 dissident parties. British officials
listened to proceedings from adjoining room.
RECLASSIFIED
O. 11652, Bec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E)
C/A 007622
DBS
Date
MAY
1
DECLASSDED
By
1974
D
SECRET
- 2 -
"4. British have approved plans and candidates
for new government. No United States officials were
present at these meetings.
"5. New government plans include the following:
Prime Minister, Soleri; War, Dellora; Foreign Affairs,
Badoglio; Justice, Pertini; Interior, Salvarezza;
Commerce, Cambareri; Railroads, Tullio; Navy, Da Zara;
Education, Maiocco; Public Works, Micheli; Propaganda,
Modigliani; Postal Telegraph, Fano; Finance, Einaudi.
However, all candidates not consulted." 11
Insurance
William J. Donovan
Director
SEORET
PSF; O.S. s. folder 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
file
24 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I think the President would like to have
the Hitler stamp and a copy of the Frankfurter
Zeitung which are enclosed. Will you kindly see
that he receives them.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DECREGRETED
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLSEGRED
O.S.A. folder
5-44
DECLSECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
25 October 1944
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 907622
By DBS
Date MAY 1.1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
We have just received two additional reports from
our representative in Caserta concerning the disturbances
in Palermo mentioned in our previous memoranda.
The first of these reports dated 23 October 1944
reads as follows:
"1. Half-dozen inquiries underway in Italian
troops' use of grenades.
"2. Military, political, police, civil probes
seeking to establish first bomb hurled from demon-
strating crowd.
"3. Own eye-witnesses' reports keep confirming
first and all grenades tossed by soldiers."
The second of these reports which was received on
24 October 1944 is a relay of a dispatch from Palermo
to Caserta dated 21 October 1944.
"The official inquiry is on. Two independent
sources, one of whom is Vincenzo Purpura, Regional
Secretary of the Committee of Liberation, separately
SECRED
SECRE
DECLASSIMED
- 2 -
accuse Separatists of being behind the massacre in
Palermo. Corroborative evidence and statement tend
to prove official claim that the first grenade was
thrown from crowd at Italian army truck and that
soldiers spontaneously retaliated in kind plus auto
gunfire in self defense. Newspaper in Palermo pub-
lished story and editorial this morning. Tension high
all day as 500 gamins roam through city. They threw
three grenades at an Italian soldier, smashed show
windows and ran wild unmolested, though armed with
German potato mashers. No injuries. Although there
is no confirmation, gamins are believed to be organized
by Separatists. This as well as charge of two sources
mentioned above should be viewed with caution."
Dornar
William J. Donovan
Director
DE
SECRETED
PSF:055 PSF:
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
O.A.S folder 5-44
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The White House
D.
C.
I am enclosing a most interesting report
Deug
prepared by our representative in Bern, who has
just returned to Switzerland after a week in
in
France. This report gives his impressions of
the situation in France at the present time.
Donna
William J. Donovan
Director
Attachment
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE 23 October 1944
#229
FROM Berne
HBG
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION
(FOR INFORMATION)
OPO 16-40000-1
RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT
GENERAL
I have just returned after a week spent in France, and this brief
report embodies not only my impressions but the opinions gleaned in France
and here in Switzorland from persons in whose judgments I have confidence.
The general impression is one of apprehension. The crisis 1a In the
offing in France, and no one knows whether or how it will break. The FFI
may have been incorporated into the regular army on paper, but in fact
they are still behaving as if they were & state within a state. The CNR
is negotiating with the Provisional Government on almost equal terms, The
high military official who was charged by de Gaulle with incorporating the
FFI and diserming the elements which would not agree to being incorporated
finds his task almost impossible of accomplishment under his existing in-
structions.
Apparently a now committee, known as the Comité d'Action Militaire
(CAM), has just been sot up to try to solve the FFI problem from another
angle. The point of departure for this connittee's work 1s that the FFI
has a Cood deal of justification for its rofusal to be incorporated purely
and simply into the French African Army, which 1a today the only regular
French army. The FFI regards itself as a part of the French Army of equal
standing and entitled to equal status with the African army. The FFI feels
that the African army is run by & clique of officers who have many of the
faults that contributed to the 1940 collapse. They feel that the African
arry hopes to scatter and weaken the FFI by incorporating it into the
regular army to get rid of the monace which the Resistance spirit rep-
resents for the military caste.
The CAN hopes that, by grouping representativos of the bost FFI and
African army elements, it will be ablo to work out on arrangement under
which the FFI will keep its own individuality in the new French Army with
the assent of the African army,
the
PAGE
2
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
REF.
No.
229
FROM
Berne
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
10-09201-1 GFO
RECEIVED
The best FFI elements realize that the FFI contains many men
who are political agitators rather than soldiers -- men who joined the
FFI when the danger was over and who now want to use it for Communistic
or other political onds. These olements realize that the FFI aim, namely,
equality of status, can only be attained if the FFI divests itself of
these intruders, and they claim that a good deal of progress has already
been made in that direction.
Whether the African army will be willing to meet the FFI's minimum
demands is & question for the CAM to try to clear up. As long as doubt
subsists, the danger of internal disturbances will be present.
There seems to be general agreement that France 1s not Communist.
In fact, the Communists, a remarkably small minority, are greatly concerned
to prevent their numerical weakness from coming to light. Hence, they in-
sist on a united resistance front with one list at the February elections.
They hope by strong-arm methods and intimidation to control this list.
The other parties, especially the Socialists and the Radioals, are deter-
mined to resist this demand. The red is fading out of the old political
parties, and the Socialists are now just a respectable left center group,
and the Radicals have become practically conservative.
Interesting reports have reached me of the sinking circulation of
the Communist papers in Paris and Lyon and of the acrobatic trick the
Communists have resorted to in order to prevent their loss of power from
being roalized by public opinion. Unsold copies of Communist papers
are quietly picked up by Communist agents and destroyed, so as not to
remain too obviously on the sholves.
However, all observers agree in their warning not to underes timate
the danger that the Communists will contrive to cain control when the 0⑉
lections come by using their technique of infiltration. They have won
their victories the world over by tricks put on by small but determined
minorities, and the very fact that they know that thoy are sliding will
make them willing to take bic risks. They know well that this coming Win-
ter 1s streat opportunity. France is without transportation, practically
without heat, without many of the important services, and without rapid
intercommmunication between the various parts of the country. This Winter
may well be a harder one in Franco than even the four preceding /intors
of German occupation. These next months are the great opportunity for the
Communists. #HH there are departments in the South where they have gained
control and where the lawful administration 1a powerless. Here the Com-
munists are well served by the lack of cormmunications and transportation,
the prosence of scattored German forces, and contact with the Communists
from Spain. At times, not long ago, the authority of the central French
government did not effectively extend many kilometers from Paris. Recently,
the situation has somewhat improved, and the (HH) on the whole is probably
in the right direction; but all observers are not agreed on this.
RESTRICTED
Sem 60a
PAGE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
REF. No.
229
FROM Berne
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
RECEIVED
The unrost caused by the differences between the FFI and the
African army, and by the difficulties between the CNR and the men
from Algiers, is still acute. It is as yet by no means certain that
the situation will settle down without open conflict. There is some
reassurance in the fact that, although ### the first fortni ht after the
liberation, it was generally believed that there would be a showdown
before the end of Soptember, October is now nearly over, and the chances
of an agreed solution soom to be at least as good as they were a couple
of months ago.
As for General de Gaulle, personally, he keeps his own counsel
and it is believed that he is now learning a good doal about the France
of today that he never thoroughly understood when he was in London and
Algiers, where he was kept in the dark by many of his advisers. When he
came to France, he apparently thought that France was either Cormunist
or was Clorical-Radical, and that the old bourgeois Socialist Party was
finished once and for all. He had not been long in France, however, before
he realized his mistake, and recent conversations which he has had with
leaders of these bargeois parties, and reports coming from these leaders
indicate that his political onlightenment has made considerable progress.
On one point there appears to be complete unanimity, except in the
ranks of the Communists. The Provisional Government of de Gaulle should
be recognized by the United States, Great Britain and Russia at the earliest
possible moment, in order that it may have the strength and prestige to
cope more effectively with the manifold problems which it has to face.
Even de Gaulb's personal and political opponents, insofar as they are
true Fronchmen, are united on this point. Today they consider the failure
to recognize de Gaulle as a slight, not to de Gaulle, but to France, and
as such they resent it.
We find ourselves in 8 vicious circle. If we say that we will not
recognize that government, until these has been & formal approval by
vote of the Prench people, we may deprive the Provisional Government of
the prestige and authority necessary to proceed to any such consultation
under the conditions permitting a true popular expression of opinion. The
Provisional Government, 1f not strengthened, may not be able to meet the
determined threat of the Comminist minority, and elections held by a
partially discredited unrecognized government might well lead to a Com-
munist victory. There cannot be any real doubt today that the Provisional
Government is the only body which conceivably could exercise governmental
authority in France, unless such authority is exercised by the Communists,
or unless France slips into & condition of anarchy, which many serious-
minded people foar.
The problem is no longer solely a political one; it has its serious
military implications. If we are obliged to ensure necessary order along
essential lines of communications by our own military forces, and if we
cannot rely on orderly French administration, we will be forced to divert
troops which can botter be employed at the fighting front.
DECL
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President may be interested
in the attached memorandum. I shall be grateful if
you could see that it reaches his desk.
Sincerely,
Biue
William J. Donovan
Director
DE SECRET ED
5-44
DECLARSIFIED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
25 October 1944
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Date
MAY
1 1974
By WBS
I believe that you will find of interest the follow-
ing report on the evacuation of American airmen from Bul-
garia. It is based upon a statement by Major Walter A.
Smith, Jr., of the 15th Air Force, who was the senior officer
among the prisoners evacuated, and a report by Second Lieu-
tenant Harry H. Harper, Jr., USMCR, who was the Chief of the
OSS Advance Base in Sofia. This Base has now been withdrawn
from Bulgaria at the request of Colonel Zaitsov, representa-
tive of the local Russian military commander, and subsequent
developments have not yet resulted in its re-establishment.
The following account of evacuation of American airmen in-
dicates, however, thetype of assistance which this Base was
in a position to render.
At 1000 on 8 September, 335 Air Force prisoners at Shumen,
Bulgaria, were informed by the Commandant of the prison that
his government had decided to free all British and American
prisoners of war. On the same morning Lieutenant Harper,
having entered Bulgaria while that country was still at war
'DECI SECRET
DEC
SECRETED
- 2 -
with the United States, made his way to the headquarters of
the Bulgarian Chief of Staff and immediately raised the ques-
tion of the evacuation of the Allied aviators. He was informed
that the prisoners had already been released, but were being
held together at Shumen until plans for their evacuation
could be perfected.
In order to obtain exact information on the number of
prisoners and their condition, Lieutenant Harper requested
that a ranking officer be sent by plane from Shumen to Sofia
with this data. An order for this was given by telephone, in
accordance with which Major Smith arrived at the Ministry of
War, Sofia, at 0600 on 9 September.
Before his departure, Major Smith was informed by the
Commandant of the prison that the balance of the prisoners
would leave Shumen for Sofia by rail at 1300 on 9 September.
Fearing complication from the rapid Russian advance and the
possibility of German bombings, Major Smith tried to arrange
for direct travel by rail to Turkey, but was told that the
Ministry of War had ordered the men sent to Sofia. This order
had been issued by the Ministry of War without consulting
Lieutenant Harper.
DESECRETIED
DEC SEGRET ED
- 3 -
At the Ministry of War, Major Smith found great con-
fusion, with 20 tanks and a number of soldiers guarding the
building while demonstrations were being staged all around it.
Making his way inside the building, Major Smith joined Lieu-
tenant Harper in the office of the Chief of Staff. By strong
protests against the airmen being transferred to Sofia, Lieu-
tenant Harper arranged to have them rerouted to the Turkish
frontier, via Stara Zangora and Svilengrad. By this time
the prisoners' train had left Shumen, departing only a half
hour before the Russians arrived. Although telephone and
cable communications out of Sofia were cut in all directions,
Lieutenant Harper finally located the train about 30 kilometers
beyond Gorna Orekovitsa and had it turned back to Stara Zan-
gora. The Sofia railway station was severely bombed on the
morning of 10 September, about the time the aviators would
have arrived.
After arrangements for the rerouting of the train had
been completed, Major Smith and Lieutenant Harper learned
through the Swiss Legation and the International Red Cross
that there were seven other prisoners hospitalized in Sofia.
DECL SECRET
DESECRET
ED
- 4 -
It was arranged to send these men by train to join the others
at Rakovski.
At 1500 on 9 September, Major Smith left by. special
plane for Svilengrad to make advance arrangements for his
party. At 1700, Lieutenant Harper made his first radio contact
with Istanbul, and a message giving all pertinent information
about the prisoners was sent and received. At 1600 on 10
September the aviators crossed the Turkish frontier, where
they were met by a party headed by Major Seager, the Assistant
Military Attache at Istanbul.
There, in the words of Major Smith, the airmen "met
with a grand reception, beer, dinner, etc., and from then
on in, the farther we went, the better it got...."
I nover
William J. Donovan
Director
DECL
SECRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
William Donovan
Director
PSFi O.S.S. folder 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in
the enclosed report from our representative
in Bern concerning the efforts of the Nazis
to prepare their people for a fight to the
finish.
Donna
William J. Donovan
Director
Attachment
R
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
20 October 1944
DATE
#228
FROM Berne
HBG
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION
(FOR INFORMATION)
GPO 18-40050-1
RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT
PROTHICTED
The German Volkssturm
Tribune de Ganeve, October 19, writes: Himmler is now, more
than ever, the master of Germany. As head inquisitioner, supreme head of
the Gestapo and ss, and organizer of the new Volksstum, he can do practic-
a 11y what he wants. The generals are relegated to the background. It may
be that they are not entirely dissatisfied with the new development, as it
will be possible for them, when worst comes to worst, to throw the blame
for the defeat on the Nazi chieftains. The reaction of the masses of the
people is another question. In order to back up this threat, Himmler must
arm the entire German population and hide rifles, machine guns, and grenades
in every house. He evidently counts on his police to prevent any unauth-
orized use of all these weapons, but he might be disagreeably sur-
prised in case of a collapse.
There is no comparison between the resistance movement
in France, Russia, and other German-occupied countries and the planned
people's war in Germany. The German people know that this is a war of
conquest. They have listened to countless promises which have never
been fulfilled. They cannot take much stock in Hinmler's statement that
the Americans have had enough, and that the British are at the end of
their resources. What will happen when the Allies come through the win-
ter line now being constructed? What will the discouraged workers and
peasants, who have been equipped with arms and ammunition, do when the SS
tries to drag them to their death at the front? The answer will come from
the German people.
Along these lines, the Nationalseitung quotes Berlin cir-
cles as saying that one of the tasks of the Volkssturm would be to quell.
any riots started by the foreign workers in Germany. That is pretty earnest.
The lives of 15,000,000 foreign workers are at stake. The tasks of the
new people's army are fourfold: to counterbalance the regular army; to
crush any opposition among the people; to keep down the foreign workers;
and to conduot guerrilla warfare against the armies of invasion. The Nasis
6rm 69a
PAGE 2
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
226
REF. No.
Berne
FROM
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
10-09201-1 GPO
RECEIVED
are aware of the political risks of arming the whole people. The ruth-
less destruction of Germany factory cities, like Aachen, is the price
which the Nazis intend to pay for the prolongation of a hopeless war.
Berlin correspondent of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Octo-
ber 20: For several weeks now, the Nazi Party has been preparing the
people morally for total popular warfare with a view to strengthening
its will to resist the invaders to the bitter end. Nothing has been
left undone to inspire hatred and loathing and to står up the fighting
spirit, especially against the Anglo-Saxons. The man on the street in
Germany wholly expects the worst in the way of suffering and misery --
plundering rape, and atrocities -- from the invading Red Army, but he
does count on milder treatment at the hands of the British and Americans.
It assumes that they will restore a strict but just regime. He still re-
members the period of occupation of the last war, and refuses to believe
that it will be much worse this time. He feels that his personal safety
will be insured as long as he keeps quiet and is not a member of the
Na_si Party. The German leaders do not like this attitude and are en-
deavoring constantly to persuade the people that the Anglo-Saxons are
just as bad as the Russians. This is the leitmotif of many press articles,
The consequences of a collapse are painted in the blackest
colors, as it is thought that this is the best way to awaken the last
energy of the people. The Norgenthau plan report came in very handy in
this campaign, and the press has been careful not to say anything about
the opposition to that plan in America and elsewhere. So German leaders
are led to believe that the project of the Secretary of the Treasury has
the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill.
Recently a report was circulated that the Americans burned
the town of Wallendorf, near Trier. This 1s taken as proof the Allies
intend to carry out the Morgenthau plan to the last detail, to teansform
the whole land into a desert, to wipe out German villages, and lay waste
the great cities. West German papers print daily reports of alleged mis-
treatment of Germans in the occupied zone, and the presence of Negro
troops in Lorraine is taken as an indication that there will be a black
ahame as after the last war in the Rhineland.
Rene Baume writes in La Suisse, October 20: The advantage
which Germany can expect from resistance to the end is not perceptible
to the human mind. However, it is possible, because the Allies have facil-
itated the task of the German leaders by the insistence on unconditional
surrender and the publishing of plans such as those of Mr. Morgenthau
for the complete destruction of German industry. The idea of compelling
3
form 69a
PAGE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
228
Berne
REF. No.
FROM
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
RECEIVED
80,000,000 Germans to live on their sandy soil means condemming 40,000.-
000 to slow death. Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to call
for a general levee en masse, and the Morgenthau plan has been Goebbels'
best argument to justify super-total mobilization.
Goebbels' current article in Das Reich: The period of this
extreme test of our people, which often threatens to exceed human possi-
bility, will come to an end some day. It is only a question of two alter-
natives: whether we shall emerge from the war as a free nation, or whether
we shall succumb to the power of our enemy. The latter eventuality could
never be made good again (9) for the national sovereignty of ### which
is the absolutely elementary condition of its future existence. It is
perhaps well that there be no doubt as to the enemy's plans in the event
of a German defeat. Even the timid and faint-hearted know perfectly well
what will happen to them if they give in to their cowardice. It makes no
difference whether the Bolshevists destroy the Reich in their way, or
the Anglo-Americans in another -- there is only e difference in the meth-
ods to be used. Both have the same objective, namely, to decimate the Ger-
man people by thirty or forty million,
It is more for our children than for ourselves that we
must carry on this war with all its moral and physical hardships un-
til we try *** for our people and its future. Only cowardly and vacil-
lating characters can even think of any other possibility in these
terrible, bitter hours. There is no choice unless we want to sell our
nation's honor and its very existence as an entity.
DECL SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
26 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe that the enclosed memorandum will be
of interest to the President.
Will you please see that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
Bil
William J. Donovan
Director
Enclosure
DECREGREED
O.S.S
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
26 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in the attached
memorandum which the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave
to one of our representatives in London for transmission
to the State Department.
Donnar
William J. Donovan
Director
Enclosure
DECLASSIFIED
E. G. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 807622
By ABS
Date MAY 1 1974
DECISEORED
DE
SECRET
TED
MEMORANDUM FROM PRIME MINISTER SUBASIC
As the result of Dr. Gavrilovic's mission in the Middle
East and Italy, the Royal Yugoslav Government have decided to
adopt the following measures:
1) Instructions will be sent immediately to the Army
personnel in the Middle East and elsewhere ordering them to
join up with the National Army of Liberation in one single
front, in accordance with the terms of the Proclamation of
His Majesty King Peter II, dated September 12, 1944. The terms
of service will be those that have been agreed upon in the
course of negociations which Dr. Gavrilovic has had at Caserta
and Vis, i.e. officers retain their present rank, same rate
of pay and insignia as those existing in the National Libera-
tion Army, and all ranks to be regarded as reinforcements.
2) The military personnel in the mentioned areas will as
soon as possible be drafted into Italy and thence dispatched
to Yugoslavia. Colonel Zupancic, officer in command of the
Yugoslav Headquarters in Cairo, will be instructed to get at
once in contact with Brigadier Hennessy, as agreed between
Dr. Gavrilovic and General Paget, in order to fix up all the
details regarding the execution of the above order as it
affects the Yugoslav military personnel who are now stationed
in these areas. Colonel Stropnik, officer in command of the
SECRET
ED
DESECRIBUTED
-2-
Batallion in Palestine will be sent to Vis, as agreed by
Marshal Tito in the course of his conversation with Dr. Gavrilovic,
in order to discuss the modalities of their transfer to Yugo-
slavia and their final incorporation into the National Army of
Liberation. The Royal Yugoslav Government undertake to provide
with the necessary monthly allowances their wives and children
who may now be in the Middle East or elsewhere outside the
country.
3) Officers and men who may refuse to respond to His
Majesty's Proclamation and who fail to join up with the National
Army of Liberation for the purpose of taking part in the final
stages of the liberation of their country will be demobilised
and will assume the status of refugees. Negociations will be
entered into with General Paget and other competent British
authorities in the Middle East with a view to making all the
necessary arrangements for their establishment. It is presumed
that the authority under whose charge the refugees are to be
placed will be the U.N.R.R.A. office in Cairo. Sir William
Mathews, the Director of this office will be approached
formally on this point and it is hoped that he may be able
to assume this charge, so as to facilitate the position which
in this connection arises with the Egyptian Government. The
DEOSESRETED
SECRET
-3-
Royal Yugoslav Government undertake to provide the necessary
funds for the upkeep of the refugees and to allot to each
refugee a small sum of money on the basis of regular monthly
payment for out-of-pocket expenses. It is to be expected that
those who assume the status of refugees as the result of their
refusal to join up with the National Liberation Army and to
take part in the final stages of the liberation of their
country will not be allowed to return to Yugoslavia at the
end of the war. It is to be presumed that their future
disposal will be settled in accordance with the existing
international practices governing cases of this kind.
4) Officers and men who belong to the category of "collab-
orationists" or who in a similar way are undesirable or
objectionable will for the time being and for the purpose
of their disposal at the present moment vis-a-vis the Allied
authorities be treated in a similar manner. It is however
in the intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government to
introduce forthwith special legislation in order to establish
their responsibility and to prepare the ground for any
judicial proceedings which may in due course be decided
upon through the normal constitutional processes after the
liberation of the country.
DESECRETIED
SECRET
ED
-4-
5) A certain number of officials belonging to the various
branches of the administration of the Royal Yugoslav Government
who are now in the Middle East and Mediterranean areas will be
placed on retired list or discharged. The officials who are
to be placed on the retired list will be pensioned off and
their allowances will be paid to them out of the funds of the
Toyal Yugoslav Government. The necessary measures will be taken
with the respective Governments for the purpose of securing for
them the permits de sejour where they may be needed. The small
number of officials who are to be discharged will be treated
as refugees and the procedure as outlined here above under point
3 will be applied also to them. It is in the intention of the
Royal Yugoslav Government to introduce forthwith special legis-
lation concerning the responsibilities of the officials who
have so far or who may in the future become involved in activities
which are harmful or contrary to the national interests, on
similar lines as that which is envisaged for officers and men
belonging to the category of "collaborationists" etc. (see
point 3). The officials who have been employed locally during
the years of the emigration will be dispensed with unless
otherwise decided and the Royal Yugoslav Government cannot
undertake any responsibilities in their respect except those
DISEARCHED
-5-
which are arising out of their employment contracts.
6) No illegal or impermissible activities of any kind
on the part of Yugoslav citizens living in the Allied and
Neutral countries will be tolerated and all the necessary
measures will be taken in order to put a stop to any such
proceedings. The Royal Yugoslav Government have already
issued the strictest instructions to their Ambassador in
Ankara for the purpose of dealing with the group in Turkey
(Istanbul) who have operated a secret wireless station and
who have been engaged in propaganda work of a subversive kind
in opposition to Yugoslav national interests and to the National
Army of Liberation. Similar action will be taken in regard
to any other group or individuals who may be now or in the
future engaged in any activities of this kind. It is to be
hoped that the full assistance of the Allied authorities
and in particular of the British authorities in the Middle
East will be obtained in dealing with cases of this type.
In the same way, the Royal Yugoslav Government trust that
the British military and other authorities in the Middle East
will offer them every assistance in dealing with the eventual
cases of insubordination that might arise in the course of the
execution of any of the above measures.
DECRECHETTED
I
DECLARET
-6-
[DECLASSIFIED
7) The Yugoslav Red Cross services in the Middle East and
elsewhere will immediately be reorganized. The Red Cross
personnel in Cairo will be changed and an inquiry concerning
their activities will be instituted. The military personnel
who are now engaged in the Red Cross organization will be placed
at the disposal of the Yugoslav military authorities in Cairo
and will be dealt with as other Army personnel. In the same
way, the civilian personnel will be treated as all other
civilians. New personnel will be appointed as soon as possible.
8) The position in regard to the U.N.R.R.A. organization
is under consideration. It is hoped that all the necessary
arrangements may soon be made which will enable the sorely
stricken population of Yugoslavia to benefit from the supplies
etc. arising of the U.N.R.R.A. agreements.
9) The Royal Yugoslav Government will allot immediately a
lump sum of money to the Central Committee of the El Shatte
and other refugee camps in Egypt to enable them to procure a
certain quantity of commodities of which these camps are in
need. It will also allow them a regular monthly payment in
the future for the same purpose.
10) The intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government in
resorting to these measures is to carry out the terms of the
-7-
DESEGRETED
agreement which was signed with Marshal Tito on behalf of the
National Committee of Liberation on June 16 at Vis and in
this way to intensify their full cooperation with the authorities
in the liberated parts of Yugoslavia aiming at the speedy re-
organization and rebuilding of the country as necessitated by
the existing circumstances arising out of its participation
through the National Army of Liberation under Marshall Tito
in the struggle against our common enemies at the side of the
Allies.
DECISECRET
OFFICE OF GEORET STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
26 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
On October 14th I sent to you a memorandum which
I thought would be of interest to the President in which
there was described briefly a report received from Mr.
Yarrow concerning the conversation which he had had with
President Benes, Smutny, and Masaryk. We have now received
from Mr. Yarrow additional information concerning the lun-
cheon which I have set forth in the attached memorandum.
Would you be good enough to see that it reaches the President's
desk?
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bue
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET ECLASSIFIED
SECRET
o.s.s. folder
5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
T&H
E. O. 11652, Bec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
26 October 1944
By NBS
Date MAY 1 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
You may be interested in the following supplementary
material in further description of the luncheon conversation,
described in my memorandum to you of 14 October 1944, which
our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, had with President
Benes, Smutny, and Masaryk:
"President Benes spoke at length about the Sudeten
Germans. He stated that the three million Germans now re-
siding in Czechoslovakia will be expelled entirely from the
country for they are not going to permit a cancerous growth
in the State which will be shaped after the War. Then the
discussion turned to the possibility of forming a Danubian
Confederation of the Central European States. Benes stated
that although the idea looks excellent in theory it is too
good to be true. He pointed out that the social structure of
Hungary, for example, is so fundamentally different from
Czechoslovakia that it would be practically impossible to
SECRET
o 17825 ger 21
mean
- 2 -
SECRET
create a unified state of feudal countries of an ultra
progressive and democratic country like Czechoslovakia.
He further emphasized that Soviet Russia is at present
definitely opposed to the formation of a Danubian Confedera-
tion for the Soviets regard such a Confederation as another
Cordon Sanitaire and look with suspicion upon any barriers
against her of the kind that existed before the War.
"He indicated that Soviet Russia may change her atti-
tude toward such a Confederation in later years when she is
convinced that it is not directed against her. The implication
in President Benes' statement was that Czechoslovakia would be
against a Danubian Confederation because Soviet Russia is
against it. President Benes started to expound that the key
to the solution of Central Europe does not lie necessarily
in the formation of a Danubian Confederation but in reaching
an agreement and understanding among Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Soviet Russia. He felt that an agreement and a military
alliance between Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland would form
the basis for a healthy state of affairs throughout Central
Europe.
SECRET
-
3
SECRET
"We asked President Benes whether or not he sees any
hope for an independent Democratic Poland, in the light of
present developments. Benes then told us that in November
1943 he discussed for four hours with Stalin and Molotov the
Polish question and persuaded Stalin to recognize the Polish
government in exile with a few changes in the personnel of
the government and carried such proposals to Mr. Mikolajczyk.
The agreement called for military alliance between Poland
and Soviet Russia similar to the one Czechoslovakia has with
the Soviets. Benes related that when he arrived in London
November 1943 he first saw Churchill and told him of the pro-
gress made by him in his discussion with Stalin about Poland
and cited the fact that at the end of a banquet given by
Stalin for Benes, Stalin raised his toast to the health of
Mikolajczyk. Mr. Churchill asked Benes to persuade Mikolajczyk
to sign on the dotted line but Benes did not get anywhere with
Mikolajczyk who refused to accept the then proposed agreement
by the Soviets.
"During his last trip to Russia, Stalin spoke to Benes
about the Japanese situation. He referred to them as bandits
and gangsters who must be destroyed. President Benes said that
SECRET
SECRET
-
4
Stalin has a greater hatred for the Japanese than for the
Germans.
"President Benes, throughout the whole conversation,
again and again referred to the fact that he is not a communist
and never will be but that his whole pro-Soviet political
orientation is motivated by fear and a hope not ever to be
faced by another Munich.
"President Benes and Massaryk were exceedingly cordial
throughout the luncheon and I made arrangements to see Dr.
Massaryk during the coming week."
Donnar
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DE SECRET TAB
WASHINGTON, D.C.
26 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
DECRESS
oss focase 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DECLASSIFIED
SEGRET
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
WASHINGTON, D.C.
CIA 007622
By DBS
Date MAY 1.1974
26 October 1944
PSF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe, that you will be interested in the
following report which has been forwarded to us by
our representative in Bucharest. This report, which
discusses the reaction of prominent Roumanians to the
possible return of former King Carol, supplements the
information previously forwarded to you in our memo-
randum dated 21 October 1944.
"Re effect produced here by rumor of possible
return King Carol to Roumania, one source whose infor-
mation should be evaluated in the light of his strong
anit-Carol and pro-Michael bias, reported on 24 October
1944 that Carol's return to Roumania would help only
those seeking to undermine position of monarchy and pro-
duce state of complete chaos in Roumania.
"A prominent member of the Roumanian Communist Party
stated on 21 October that Carol is an 'outright adven-
turer whose return to Roumania would be most unfortunate
and undesirable'. Informant further stated that Carol
DECLASSIFIED
Drive
11692° TRAD Does 200
A
DECLASSIFIED
- 2 -
while King always placed his personal interest ahead
of that of the country and spent his time amassing a
vast personal fortune and catering to his own extra-
vagant physical appetites. It should be noted, however,
that the statements of this informant are not neces-
sarily representative of the views of the entire Com-
munist Party.
"Niculescu Buzesti, Roumanian Foreign Minister,
stated on 24 October that the return of Carol to Roumania
under present circumstances would produce national
disaster of gravest consecuences; according to Buzesti,
the position of King Michael is only stabilizing factor
in Roumanian political scene today and would be
seriously prejudiced by Carol's return even as far as
Portugal. Buzesti states that if Roumanian official
channels for communications were open he would recuest
Portugal to deny entry that country to Carol.
"Certain sources known to be most apprehensive of
Russia's intentions toward Roumania for purpose of
discrediting monarchy. Russians find Michael enjoys
excellent reputation for democratic sentiments and
DECLASSIFIED
DECEASINED
- 3 -
activities and for personal morality, thus rendering
him difficult target for attack. One such source points
to fact that Carol was on excellent terms with Russian
Ambassador to Mexico during his stay there."
Drrman
William J. Donovan
Director
DESECRIBED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
oss
27 October 1944
PSF
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Rue
William J. Donovan
Director
BECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
C/A 007762
By DBS
Date MAY 1 1974
CONFIDENTIAL
O.S.A. s. folder
5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in the
enclosed study of German civilian morale made
by our Planning Staff. This study is based on
an analysis of letters addressed by writers
in Germany to German prisoners of war in this
country.
Donnan
William J. Donovan
Director
Attachment
CONFIGENTIAL
GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE
PSF
Based on an Analysis of German Letters to Prisoners of War
OSS
SYNOPSIS
Systematic analysis of ten thousand letters addressed by writers
within Germany to German prisoners of war in American captivity
gives the following indications about German civilian morale:
1. Morale Trends, Winter 1943 - Spring 1944
a. There has been a steady decline of German civilian morale in
all regions of the country since September 1943.
b. In general, the focus of attention 1a always the personal and
the immediate and there is little tendency to generalize from
personal experience. The predominant hope is for a quick
decision in the war and for a resumption of normal family
life. There is relatively little direct and positive reaction
to German propaganda themes.
c. In May 1944, morale reached a low point. Yet official German
controls remained fairly intact and effective. There was no
significant evidence of outright defeatism.
2. Reactions to the Invasion of Western Europe by the Allies
a. In June, the initial reaction of the German civilian to the
invasion of Normandy was & great heightening of anxiety and
depression and there was a renewed hope for a quick decision
in the war, without much increase in the belief in a German
victory. The main source of concern was the safety of the
individual soldier. In general, morale was lower than in May.
b. In July, as hopes for a quick German victory began to fade,
morale declined again and there was some slight evidence that
German official controls were less effective than in May.
3. Present Morale Situation
Available evidence suggests an eventual civilian collapse
rather than any effective mass outbreak against the Nazi regime.
The moment of collapse will be determined by the progress of
Allied military operations and by the will of the Nazi regime
to force continuation of the war.
GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE
Based on an Analysis of German Letters to Prisoners of War
INTRODUCTION
The present analysis of German civilian morale summarizes the
salient conclusions reached in a series of systematic studies based
on ten thousand letters written by German relatives, wives, sweet-
hearts, friends and comrades to German prisoners of war in American
captivity for the period between September 1, 1943 and July 31, 1944.
The samples analyzed comprized a random selection of the German
prisoner of war mail received weekly in the New York Censorship
Station. In each case the total letter, irrespective of the nature
of the content, was subjected to systematic analysis, so that it
was possible to obtain a well rounded view of the preoccupations,
opinions and moods of the writers, in so far as these were expressed
or implied in this heavily censored mail.
TRENDS OF MORALE
1. Morale Trends, Winter 1943 - Spring 1944
8. Decline of Morale
There has been a continuous decline of German civilian morale
in all regions of the country and among all classes of people
throughout the period analyzed. After a slight rally in some
parts of the country toward the end of 1943, the decline
became especially marked and rapid during the Spring months.
See Graphs 1 - 7 for morale trends both for all-over Germany
and for six geographical regions.
b. Basic Classification of Morale Groups
(1) Good Morale. The ever shrinking category of cheerful and
optimistic writers includes three groups: (a) those who
fully accept the Nazi ideology, (b) those whose total
outlook is extremely limited and personal, and (c) those
who accept their personal situation with full realization
of its difficulties and possibilities.
(2) Poor Morale. The growing category of anxious and depressed
writers includes two groups: (a) those who are slowly
losing interest in human relationships and withdraw from
the events that surround them, and (b) those who feel an
increased need for contact with a small group of trusted
people (family members, intimate friends and single
individuals who have shared a common experience). With-
drawal tends to occur under conditions of severe and
prolonged physical and emotional strain (e.g., in the
Rhineland and other parts of Western Germany where bombing
has been continuous over a very long period of time).
The increased need for contact tends to occur when the
strain is sporadic rather than continuous (0.g., in the
South of Germany).
(3) The non-committal or cautious category of writers is made
up of people who do not express their opinions or feeling
about the subjects that preocoupy them. They tend to
write relatively less frequently than either of the other
categories of writers about such vital subjects 8.8 the
end of the war. However, the kind of subjects that
preoccupy them show that they more nearly resemble the
depressed than the cheerful writers. The non-committal
group always tends to increase sharply when the internal
pressure of official German controls grows heavier.
C. Basic Reactions to the Events of the War and on the Home Front
(1) During the spring of 1944, the principal reaction of
civilians to events of the war and changes in the home
front situation has been clearly a negative one. That 1s,
civilians tend to express themselves with ever-increasing
caution (with greater awareness and fear of official
German controls) or with growing frankness about their
personal anxieties and depression. Expressions of
enthusiasm and of optimism, on the contrary, continue to
shrink and to be ever more limited to the small group who
still respond positively to German official propaganda.
(2) The predominance of the attitude of fearful caution in
most regions during the spring months indicates that,
- 2 -
despite the poor mood of the population, public controls
remained fairly intact and effective. Any breaks in the
system of controls that may have occurred (e.g., in South
Germany) were temporary and localized. A resumption or
increase in the pressure of official controls, although
temporarily effective, seems to lead eventually to greater
expression of depression rather than to continued caution.
In areas where the population has been subjected to
extremely prolonged and severe strain (e.g., in the
Rhineland), the problem of control appears to be far less
pressing, but it is difficult to get the population there
to react in any way at all.
(3) Among all groups and in all areas there has been a decline
in the hope for a German victory, but & steady rise in
the hope for a quick decision in the war. See Graph 8,
on trends of major attitudes toward the end of the war.
d. Morale on the Eve of the Invasion
In May, on the eve of the invasion of Western Europe by the
Allies, German civilian morale had reached a low point. At
that time the most critical area was the South where dis-
satisfaction with the home situation and fears about personal
safety in air raids indicated a possible crisis. At no other
time was the hope for an end of the war so widely expressed.
The mood of the civilian population as a whole was exceedingly
subdued and evidences of combativeness and of enthusiasm for
the Nazi regime and its leaders were almost wholly lacking.
The predominant mode of behavior was.a rather dull and apathetic
acceptance of the situation, since no alternative suggested
itself to the war weary civilians. The phrases "We must
accept our fate" and "We can't change anything" express the
common mood. Yet there was no significant evidence of outright
defeatism.
- 3 -
2. First Reactions to the Invasion of Western Europe by the Allies
a. June
The initial reaction of the German civilians to the invasion
of Western Europe was a great heightening of anxiety, and
there was only a very slight increase in the hope for a German
victory. Yet the general hope and even the belief that the
war would end soon increased appreciably. Direct references
to the invasion were marked by the virtual absence of bombast
and aggressiveness. The launching of the V-I (robot bombs)
caused only a small flurry, limited mostly to the very young
and to those little affected by air warfare; among these groups
there was a considerable emotional response for a short time.
References to Hitler as a leader, to other Nazi officials and
to the Nazi regime were very few, References to the strength
of the Wehrmacht were almost lacking. References to soldiers
were almost entirely personal in character: the men were
viewed not as members of an organization, but as individuals
who might or might not survive the heavy fighting in the West,
as their personal "fate" decreed. On the whole, morale was
lower than in May. The only groups that showed slight signs
of a rally were the upper and to a far less extent the upper-
middle classes, some of whom because of their traditional
social position perhaps, seemed to be setting a good tone
by expressing group confidence about the outcome of the war
for Germany.
b. July
When hopes for a quick German victory began to fade again
there was less talk than in May or June about the end of the
war and there was a definite shrinking in the normal horizons
of interest in most parts of Germany. Attention obviously
focussed on subjects (1.0., those closely related to the
progress of the war) about which the correspondents dared not
write. A further decline in general morale indicates the
effect of the Allied invasion successes upon the thinking of
the German civilian and also suggests that German official
- 4 -
COM DESTRAD
propaganda and public controls were somewhat less effective
than in the period immediately preceding the invasion. In
July there was less evidence of optimism in rural than in
urban areas, but a greater freedom in the expression of
anxiety and depression in most urban sections than in rural
ones.
3. Present Morale Situation
The available evidence points toward an ever increasing
anxiety on the part of the civilians which will be more and
more difficult for the German government to control, but the
trend of morale seems to indicate an eventual civilian collapse
rather than any effective mass outbreak of action against the
Nazi regime. The speed of the collapse will be determined
largely by the progress of Allied military operations (external
pressure) and by the will of the Nazi regime to force continuation
of the war (internal pressure). A severe internal crisis, such
as a serious breakdown of transportation and of fuel and food
distribution (both subjects about which there is considerable
anxiety among civilians), might result in some local revolts,
especially in the South and in Berlin and other large urban
centers. A center of possible resistance to the Allies within
Germany may well be the central region (Saxony, Province Saxony,
Thuringia and Anhalt) which has been comparatively less affected
by the war and has maintained fair morale.
- 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
I. GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
All Germany
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
75
75
PERCENT
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
o
o
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
2. GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
CODE
IDF
N
TIAL
"
150
Regional Perspective
NORTHEAST
East Prussio, Pommerania, Brandenburg, Mechienburg and Silesio
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
o
o
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
3. GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
CONFIGNTIAL
Regional Perspective
NORTHWEST
Schleswig-Holstein, Homburg, Bremen, Hanover, Schaumburg-Lippe, Oldenburg, Brunswick
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
o
o
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON-COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
Regional Perspective
GREATER BERLIN
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
o
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON-COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
5. GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
ONFICENTIAL
Regional Perspective
WEST
Westpholio, Rhineland, Hesse Nassau, Hesse, Soor and Ruhr
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
26
15
15
IO
10
5
5
o
0
SEPT
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUNE
JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON-COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
COMMENTIAL
6. GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
Regional Perspective
CENTRAL
Saxony, Province Soxony, Thuringia and Anhalt
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
o
o
SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON-COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
AL
7.
GERMAN MORALE TRENDS
Regional Perspective
SOUTH
Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hohenzollern
SEPT
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUNE
JULY
PERCENT
PERCENT
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
o
0
SEPT
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUNE
JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
CAUTIOUS OR NON-COMMITTAL
POOR MORALE
GOOD MORALE
GONEARENTIAL
8. TRENDS OF MAJOR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR
All Germany
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
PERCENT
JUNE
JULY
50
PERCENT
50
45
45
40,
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY
1943
1944
LEGEND
Per cent of writers who:
Mention end of war (total)
Hope or believe the war will end soon (no indication of outcome)
Hope for an end of the wor someday (no indication of outcome)
Expect or hope for o German victory
Express doubt of outcome for Germany
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
TOP SECRET
o.s.s.folder 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PSF
27 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe that you will be interested in knowing
about the following report which I have received from
our representative in SEAC:
"During the past few weeks, we have been able to
get a clearer view than previously of the political
situation as it is shaping up in this theater. The
pattern is pretty much the same as it is in other parts
of the world.
"There can be little doubt that the British and
Dutch have arrived at an agreement with regard to the
future of Southeast Asia, and now it would appear that
the French are being brought into the picture. Recently,
it became known that a French Military Mission will
By
arrive at SEAC shortly. At first, they are to have a
007622
Date JUN 11 1973
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
strictly unofficial status and will be quartered at
hotels. Gradually, their mission will be transformed
into an official one, and suitable headquarters and
living quarters will be found for them. Meanwhile,
this mission will participate in secret discussions and
TOP SECRET
TOP PRODET
SLORET
- 2 -
will have made available to them all of the data on
hand.
"It would appear that the strategy of the British,
Dutch and French is to win back and control Southeast
Asia, making the fullest use possible of American
resources, but foreclosing the Americans from any
voice in policy matters."
Donoran
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of CIA
007622
By DBS Date JUN 1 1 1973
TOP SECRET. TOD SECDE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it
reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bue
William J. Donovan
Director
PSF: O.A.S.folder 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I think you will be interested in the following
report on two articles which appeared on 10 October
1944 in an American Slovak newspaper. In the first
of these, the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact was held to be
the key to the Polish-Russian dispute; in the second,
"American Relief for Czechoslovakia" was assailed.
I.
SLOVENSKA OBRANA, a paper which speaks for American
Slovak separatists organized in the Slovak League,
assigned responsibility for present Polish-Russian
difficulties to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact, which,
the paper said, broke up plans for Central European
federation. The editorial which appeared 10 October
insisted that federation alone could have given the
Central European nations freedom and security against
not only the Germans but against 'other types of
imperialism'. A summary follows:
- 2 -
Russian diplomacy needed Tito in the Balkans and Benes
in Czecho-Slovakia to break up plans for federation in Central
Europe. The Polish nation today finds itself in great danger,
due principally to Benes' muddling. The Polish Government-
in-Exile has yielded to Moscow's demands as far as the Rubicon.
It has dismissed one of its most popular ministers, General
Sosnkowski, whom the Communists hated.
The plan of the Soviets is clear -- to occupy all of
Central Europe from the Baltic to the Aegean sea, with the
exception of Greece. Moscow demands 'unconditional surrender'
and such terms will not be acceptable to the Polish Government.
Benes was recognized (for the duration) as president of
the exiled government and had no right to conclude pacts with
foreign powers which bound the nations of Czecho-Slovakia
without their consent.
The Polish problem is also a religious problem. Poland
is a Catholic country. For Communists to rule this country
either directly or indirectly would be to deliver a severe
blow to the Catholic world and Christianity. Poland, because
I
- 3 -
of its geographical position and its religious character,
is the strongest bastion of Christianity in Europe. Chris-
tianity, therefore, cannot ignore the Polish problem. The
Vatican is well aware of this. Communist promises of toler-
ance toward Christianity will in the end result in an open
ideological struggle.
The world can thank Mr. Benes for all of this.
II.
In the same issue Slovenska Obrana attacked the newly or-
ganized American Relief for Czechoslovakia, sole Czechoslo-
vak group registered with the President's War Relief Control
Board, for selecting as representatives of the Slovaks only
members of the pro-Benes Slovak National Alliance. A digest
of the article follows:
An American Relief for Czechoslovakia with offices in
New York has been formed for Czecho-Slovakia. The director's
committee consists of six Slovaks, ten Czechs, and two Car-
patho-Russians. How this directorate was elected nobody
knows. The Reverend Florian Billy, secretary of the Alliance
of Slovak Catholics, incuired of Mr. C. W. Riley, executive
- 4 -
director of American Relief for Czechoslovakia, what con-
nection his organization had made with Slovak Catholic so-
cieties, which represent a majority of Slovaks in America.
Mr. Riley said that the Slovak National Alliance was asked
to choose two representatives. It nominated four and all
were accepted. Here we have it -- the Slovaks are represented
by the SNA which was formed to consolidate Benes' second re-
volt.
Once help comes from America to Prague it will remain
in Bohemia. we had experience with this during the last
war. Today Slovaks in Slovakia are revolting against the
Germans. Why is there no uprising in Bohemia? Why haven't
they blown up the Skoda works and other factories which turn
out weapons for the Germans? When it comes to taking relief,
the Czechs will be right on the spot.
But we don't want Benes' vagabonds speaking in our name.
When we pay taxes we should have something to say about them.
If relief is to go to Czecho-Slovakia we must see to it that
a proportionate amount goes to Slovakia.
- 5 -
The approaching congress of the Slovak League should
discuss this question and see to it that Slovaks are repre-
sented by something more than the SNA which has only about
500 members. Our leaders should demand representation in
the relief organization.
The next day Katolicky Sokol of Passaic, New Jersey, carried
an announcement that the executive committee of the Alliance
of Slovak Catholics had agreed to form an American Slovak
Catholic Relief to be headed by the Reverend Florian C. Billy.
Drinan
William J. Donovan
Director
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
PSF: O.S.S. folder 5-44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in the
enclosed report from our representative in
Bern describing the recent German coup in
Hungary.
Imman
William J. Donovan
Director
Attachment
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE 24 October 1944
#230
FROM
Berne
HBG
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION
(FOR INFORMATION)
GPO 10-40000-L
RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT
HUNGARY
Information is beginning to leak out from insiders regarding the
events which lod up to the overthrow of the cabinet of General Lakatos
in Hungary and his rop&acement by Szalasy. The latter, by the way, is a
Transylvanian Armenian, the most extreme of the Hungarian Nazis. Lakatos,
who, like his Foreign Minister, Hennyey, 1s a Hungarian and was trusted
by Horthy. Lakatos, however, found out from police sources in the first
week of October that a putsch was being prepared by Szalasy's men. The
latter, presumably, could count on 3S support. Attempts were being made
at that time by Lakatos, with Northy's approval, to concludo an arnistico,
The Germans got wind of this. The tactics of Lakatos, according to his
intimate friends, were to put the Germans off the scent by causing con-
fidontial information to reach then to the effect that the negotiations
had broken down. The Nazi partisans in the Hungarian cabinet, such as
Juressk, lost no opportunity of Grilling Lakatos to get him to give them
binding assurances that he would not attempt to break loose from Germany,
without previous consultation with the government and parliamont. Their
object was, of courso, to make sure that the Germans would get notice of
any such move and have time to sweep Dakatos aside before it succeeded.
Finally, on October 11, they smoked Lakatos out into the open and forced
him to declare at a cabinet meeting that circumstances might arise in
which he would be constrained in the country's interest to malce a separate
peace without letting either cabinet or parliament know in advance.
From that moment, the fate of Lakatos was sealed and the Germans,
who were no doubt at once informed of the Prime Minister's attitude in
the cabinet, decided to play the last so-called Hungarian card in their
hand; namely, to put Szalasy in power, either intimidating the Regent into
entrusting him with the formation of & Government, or dispensing with
that formality and just announcing that the Regent had asked Szalasy to
become Prime Minister.
It is not clear, from my information, exactly what happened on or
about October 15, when the Regent made his proclamation to the country,
stating that he was asking for an armistice, and on the following day.
when another doclaration was read over the Hungarian radio, but not in
Sem 69a
PAGE
C2
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
REF. No.
230
FROM
Berne
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
10-09901-1 are
RECEIVED
Horthy's voice, withdrawing the provious ono. There can be little doubt,
however, that the Gorman action in throwing out Lakatos at last made
Horthy turn, and that the October 15 declaration was Horthy's last auth-
entic message to the nation.
Horthy has now, like his counterpart, Petain, become the "guest"
of the Germans.
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
TOP-SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
28 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I am attaching a memorandum which will be
of interest to the President. Could you see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bue
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
TOP SECRET
TOD
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES free
WASHINGTON, D.C.
28 October 1944
PSF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
OSS
We have just received from our representative Mr. Bernard
Yarrow the following cabled report, dated 28 October 1944,
on a conference recently held between King Peter and Mr.
Churchill:
"King Peter saw Churchill this afternoon. Herewith
report as given me by King. Stalin and Churchill discussed
general Balkan situation. It was agreed that Greece will
be under British only. Yugoslavia military operations and
administration upon liberation will be under joint British-
Russian control.
"Question of Monarchies in Balkans as a whole was dis-
cussed. Stalin was not in principle against re-establishment
of Monarchies in Balkans. He said, 'If a King can be more
useful in waging war against enemy and maintaining stability
after victory, he would prefer him to a makeshift Republic.'
Specifically as to Peter Stalin said, 'He seems to be a young
man who is close to his people. But insisted that question
of King's return be postponed until people express will by
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007622
SECRET
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
TOP-SECRET
- 2 -
plebescite. Churchill added, 'When time comes I shall see
to it that plebescite is conducted under British, Russian
and American supervision.' Churchill smilingly said, 'I
shall manage your campaign when time comes.
"King informed Churchill that he learned from Sutej,
Minister of Finance, that Subasic before departure harbored
plan to create Regency commission and appointing himself
as member of same. King expressed anxiety that Subasic
will attempt to perpetuate own political power and is not
person upon whom King can rely to fight for his return.
Churchill said that this regency idea was news to him and
that it is despicable that Subasic promoted it. He assured
King that if regency is suggested to him by Subasic or any-
one, he will rudely reject it. He said, 'You are neither
minor nor at your death bed or mentally deficient, therefore
there can be no question of appointing regent. Churchill
amplified that if regent were appointed his acts of mal-
feasance would be charged against King hence unacceptable.
Churchill made a note to send word immediately to British
representative participating Tito-Subasic conferences and
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA CIA
007622
By WBS Date
TOP SECRET
JUN 11 1973
SEORLI
- 3 -
warn him of Subasic's regency scheme. King learned that
Philip Broad, former secretary British Legation Belgrade,
is British representative at conference. Churchill said that
when he met with Tito and Subasic in Italy it was he who
fought the battle of the Monarchy with Tito and not Subasic.
Churchill said that Tito is only a Communist and will try
to put one of his followers as Prime Minister who will ex-
ercise very little power. Tito retaining same.
"King asked Churchill to arrange conference between
him and Tito in Churchill's presence. Churchill said, 'It
is premature now but I will seek the President's opinion as
to the advisability of such a meeting.'
"Churchill expressed view that King should not under
any circumstances be on Yugoslav soil at present. First
because he does not wish by King's presence to legalize
some of the misdeeds perpetrated by Tito against some of
Yugoslav people. Second that it would be easy to assassinate
him and then claim that he was murdered by German agent or
Michailovic henchmen. Churchill expressed annoyance at
General Ristic's Minister of Defence, placing Royal Yugoslav
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By NBS Date JUN 11 1973
SECRET
TOD_SECRET
OLORET
- 4 -
Air Force and Navy under Tito's command. He said that he
received word from his Admiral commanding Mediterranean that
he will not tolerate same.
"Finally Churchill reassured King that he need not worry
about Subasic-Tito conference for any agreement will have
to get his sanction. He said that Stalin was not unreasonable
about general Balkan situation but that of course Stalin is
a very shrewd man and situation will have to be watched.
"King requests you to keep this report confidential.
He is concerned that Churchill may be annoyed if he suspects
that King is talking."
Donnan
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
JOD SECRET
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
28 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I think the President will be interested
in the attached letter with inclosure.
Will you please see that it reaches his desk.
Sincerely,
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
28 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I attach copy of a letter from the head of
our Morale-Operational Branch -- dealing with black
and subversive operations in Italy.
I hope you will find it of interest.
Donorne
William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
TOT SEVILT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
30 October 1944
file
PSF
OSS
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I am attaching a memorandum for the President
which I think will be of interest to him. Will you
please see that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
PSF
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OSS
30 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I have just received a priority message from
our representative in Stockholm concerning present
Russo-Finnish relations. I believe this message will
be of interest to you and inclose herewith a copy for
your information.
Donnars
William J. Donovan
Director
Incl: Copy No. 7 Top Secret Cable In 24178, 29 Oct 1944
(Revised)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE OCTOB R 20 1044
FROM
XX
PRIORITY
STOCKHOLM
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
IN 24178
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION)
(FOR INFORMATION)
u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-37883-1
RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007622
By WBS Date JUN 1973
1. Some ominous arpocts are currently developing in Finnish-
Russian situation. When armistice was signed, Finns began action
oither to force Germans out of l'inland or cause their surrender and
turn over to Russians. At same time, in accordance with armistice
terms, Pinns began partial demobili-ation of their army. Russians
registered dissatisfaction with Finnish' efforts against Gorman troops,
taking the attitude that Finns were not, sufficiontly agressive.
Finns moved more military units to northern front and continued de-
mobilization of units InFinland proper only. Russians thereupon
raised pointed inquiry vay Finns were not demobilizing in north Fin-
land also and advised Pinns thoy must demobilizo all military forces
to pre-war 1930 sizc by December 5th. Finns then ordered demobili-
sation initiated up north also. Thereupon Russians reiterated
clause in armistico agreement decrooing that all Gorman forces on
Finn torritory must be olther expelled or interned by December 5th.
This action on part of Russians has created feeling of panic in
Finn general staff circlos, In addition to abovo, Finn intelligence
reports that Russians now have assembled 40 divisions on lino ex-
tonding from Gulf of Finland to Arctic. Add to this, fact that with
speeded demobilization et' Finn Army, changeover timo-tuble to poace-
time economy wrecked because soveral war industry factorios stopped
and demobilized soldiors cannot immodiately be found jobs, as former
war workers n'so out of jobs. Add to this the fear and uncortainty
created by "war criminal" list.. First list contains 64 persons,
including 6 generals; among these, General Pajari, conquoror of
Tornea. This list specified by Russians as first list. Query
among Fina: How mony more lists and who will be on them? Furthor
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRET
TOP SECRET
INJ . 22994
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
2
PAGE
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
III
FROM
STOCKHOLM TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Na170
RECEIVED T
query: What will thoy be tried for and who will try thom? Above
information comes from FMA, who returned from trip to Finland a few
days ago.
U. Result of above below-surface tense and confused feeling
is that loaders, both Army and civilian, losing spirit and fool "play
has been Cinishod." One of our long-time agents arrived Stockholm
yesterday from Pinland cited 2 specific reactions among demobilized
Army offibers. Both mon, speaking on differont occasions, expressed
in confidence to our agent that they expected to be recalled to the
colors shortly and on being quizzed as to reason for such belief,
said they expect shortly to see Russia collide with Britain and U.S.A.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
By DRS Date JUN 11 1973
Copy #7
REGRET
OLONE
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SZORE!
30 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bie
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
fites
PSF
30 October 1944
OSS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in the following
report which we have received from our representative
in Caserta:
"1. Casimiro Papee, Polish Ambassador to Holy S ee
has told Piorosmzzni, special secretary to Pope, that
Churchill hint on Polish frontier question indicates
Allied policy veering toward Soviet viewpoints. Papee
declared that it was necessary that the Pope intervene
since Vatican has special interest in Poland.
"2. Socialists and Communists are reported to have
agreed to launch press campaign against Allies.
"3. The Vatican has been informed by Bishop Fulman
of Lublin that relations between the Catholic Church and
Russia are excellent in liberated Poland. Fulman stated
that Polish people favor Communism and opinion is that
Polish ruling classes must undergo radical change.
Russia, he feels, is counting on United States support
ECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
By
DBS
Date,
MAY
1
1974
DECRASSIMENT
DE ASSIDED
- 2 -
to influence England on doubtful issues."
Donnan
William J. Donovan
Director
DE PEODLED
-
PSF: OSS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
30 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I think the President will be interested
in the attached reports which we have received from
our representative in Berne. Will you kindly see
that they reach his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Birl
William J. Donovan
Director
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
confident
file
DATE
26 October 1944
#231
FROM
Borne
HBG
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION
(FOR INFORMATION)
GFO 10-40000-1
RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT
GERMANY
From the city of Basel it is possible to observe the preparations
for military operations near the Swiss border across the Rhine in the
southwestern tip of Baden, right near the city of Basel, Air fights can
frequently be seen by the Swiss on the outskirts of their city. Recently
the Huningue pontoon bridge, a few hundred yards away from the Swiss
frontier, was bombed by Allied squadrons. Many phosphorus bombs were
dropped upon the bridge, but the bursting incendiaries were caught and
extinguished by German soldiers along the bridge, and no particular dam-
age was done to the pontoons or the bridge structure, all wooden parts of
the bridge boing impregnated against fire. Since then, the bridge guard
has been doubled, as this bridge 1s an important line of compunication
which the Germans wish to keep clear. It is a structure which, if dostroyed,
can probably be duplicated in a short time, but time might be precious
when the crisis comes.
Recently persons at Basel have noticed workers digging a double
line of trenches north and cast of the Swass frontier, east of the Rhine,
and facing the river. The diggers on these trenches, which are at present
waist high and two yards wide, are mostly women wearing overalls and pants
and schoolboys. Only a few men, apparently prisonors, can be seon doing
this work a few stone's-throw away from the Swiss frontier.
Basel will be near the line of fire when the Americans and French
approach this hot corner.
Here is an excerpt from the Youe Zuercher Zeitung of October 25
with regard to the organization of the German Volkssturn. "The Volkssturn
is boing rapidly organized in Berlin. The first muster of volunteers
took place last Sunday. The mobilization in East Prussia started weeks
before the official announcement. The first battalions have already been
ordered to duty protecting the rear of the positions established during
the Summer acainst possible Russian surprise attacks. The Volkssturm is
already in action at the Memel bridgehead. In Bavaria, the first battalions
have also been organized. Last Saturday Reichsleiter Schwartz, the leader
of the Oberbayern Volkssturm made a spooch before a public gathering in
Munich in which he strongly criticized the internal opposition in Germany.
m 69a
PAGE 2
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
REF. No. 231
FROM
Berne
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
16-00201-1 GPO
RECEIVED
He said: 'Those who do not fight will be destroyed. Let no one believe
that he can crawl away from the imperative nocessity of this struggle.
He cannot escape his fate. The time of evasion and arguing 1a past. We
no longer have any space at our disposal. We can only resort to a Ger-
man village or a German town. The time is past also for cowardly mental
evasion or retreat without orders. There 18 no room for discussion of
how it all happened. We must accept the hard facts and act accordingly,
While the enemy plans our destruction, we must put an end to the silly
talk of National Socialism having provoked this battle for our lives.
Let no one believe he could escape his fate if the enemy gained the upper
hand. Lot no one tell us that only the Nazis would be hanged, that the
Germans would be spared. The German worker is the very objective of our
enemy. There would be no exceptions or disoriminations. If the enemy were
victorious, all that we love and cherish would be lost. Abject misory
would be our irrevocable fate. The ruins of German cities would always
stare us in the face. It is worth the price of a total and maximum effort
to escape slavery to the end of our days.
"We want to be free German men and give all that we have for the
beloved Fatherland. Whoever fails to march with us or tries to sabotage
our national uprising will suffer the most severe punishment our community
can mete out. Whosoever is not with us 18 against us and is a traitor who
deserves the hangman's noose.''
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE
27 October 1944
#232
FROM
Berne
HBG
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
TO
DEFERRED
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
(FOR ACTION
(FOR INFORMATION)
GPO
10-40000-1
RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT
R
GERMANY
Upon returning here to Switzerland, Iffound no particularly new
ideas as to the approximate dubation of the war. More, I believe that
people here are now reconciled to another winter of war. They expect the
end to come next Spring, when weather conditions permit the full weight
of the Allied armies to be brought to boar from West, East, and South,
and from tho air. The people here are naturally consorvative in their
judgment as to the end of the war, as they must husband their reserves of
food and fuel and desire to discourage any ideas that they can now safely
begin to use up emergency stores. While this Swiss judgment may well be
correct, there are some signs that the collapse may come sooner.
The stories we get here from Germany indicate that the internal
situation 1a approciably worse than it was seven weeks ago when I left.
In particular, transportation is becoming more and more difficult. The
Volkdsturm effort of Himmler appears as & last measure of desperation.
Hitler is the only one who could really rouse the German people, and he
is strangely silent. Events in Hungary, the fall of Aschen, the invasion
of East Prussia, while they do not greatly affect morale, because there is
no morale, at least are noted in Germany as evidence of the progress of
the slow strangulation process which has been going on relentlessly for
two years since Stalingrad and El Alamoin.
The only question is whether the whole German people are Coing to
lend themselves to national self-destruction, and how long it will take
for them to have this ambition satisfied. The German propaganda machine is
doing a good job in persuading the German people that self-dostruction is
the bost policy. The genoral catch-word is "enjoy the war whilo you can,
because the peace will be unspeakable misery." The Cormans are told that
they will be reduced to slave laborers all of thom, not only the SS
and the Nazis, that millions ære to be deported to Russia, that the soldiers
will never return to their homes if they want to surrender, that conditions
in the liborated countries are far worse than conditons in Germany. The
publicity civen to the so-called Morgenthau plan came just in time to
give this line of propaganda a great boost. The Presidont's last speech
should help to counteract this trend, 1f it can be Got over to the German
6rm 69a
PAGE 2
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
REF. No.
232
FROM
Berne
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
GPO
RECEIVED
people, but at this late stage it will be difficult to do this. All in
all, it seems that the German people are all set for a kind of national
hara-kiri, but this may not take as long as some people here believe. We
cannot rightly expect an open revolt from the people. It might come
from the Reichswehr, but this is not very likely. About the best we can
now hope for 18 a sort of national sit-down strike against Hirmler & Co.
The workers could feign illness, the soldiers might desert in increasing
numbers, the train services might be disrupted by a combinations of causes,
and then suddenly the machine might stop functioning and the war would
then be over except for Cuerrilla action here and there. We may be several
months away from this point, it might come almost any time, or, as generally
believed here, it might only come when Spring permits the final military
push to topplo over the alroady badly undermined German structure.
RECTRICTION
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
30 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I would appreciate it very much if you would
bring the attached memorandum to the attention of the
President as soon as possible.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bul
William J. Donovan
Director
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of CIA
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
TO
PSF
OFF
VICES
oss
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECLASSIFIED
30 October 1944
By Authority of CIA
007622
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
By DBS Date JUN 1 1 1973
An incident has arisen in China of which I believe
you should be informed.
Brigadier General Lyle H. Miller, USMC, who was
assigned to OSS by the Marine Corps, made statements at a
dinner attended by Tai Li and other Chinese in Chungking
which Tai Li considered insulting to the Chinese and the
Generalissimo personally. I enclose message received from our
senior office in Chungking concerning this matter, the answer
I sent after talking with General Vandergrift and a message
just received from General Miller giving his views. On 27
October I sent copies of the first two of these cables to
General Marshall, Admiral Edwards, General Vandergrift and
Dr. Hornbeck of the State Department.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked the Theater
Commander to investigate and report to them.
William Imman J. Donovan
Director
Incl.
1 - Copy No. 8 of OSS in-23895, 26 October 1944
2 - Copy No. 8 of OSS out-21418, 26 October 1944
3 - Copy No
October 1944
(Revised)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE October 26, 1944
FROM
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
MAWOI, CHUNGHING
TO
DEFERRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
IN: 23895
DISTRIBUTION
DECLASSIF
(FOR ACTION)
(FOR INFORMATION)
By Authority of CIA
007622
By
aBS
Date
SUN
11
1973
M. a. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-1
RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER
#2439. To Donovan from Dow. Information: Coughlin.
The information which follows is in reference to my Top Secret
priority message to Coughlin, #100, and is intended for the Director
alone:
Very grave diplomatic relations have arisen. A full report is
herewith submitted. General L.H. Miller was tended a conference and a
dinner on the afternoon and evening of the 22nd of this month by TL.
During the dinner liquor was served and General Miller, both in speech
and conversation, spoke most disparagingly of Madame Chiang Kai Shek,
her husband, the Chinese people and the country itself. Listed below
are the statements made by the General: (1) Again and again Miller de-
manded that TL afford t.s the opportunity of being entertained by Sing-
song girls. He requested that TL produce such maidens. TL attempted to
switch the conversation into other channels but Miller was adamant.
(2) Miller asked TL about Chiang Kai Shek's new women and wanted to
know if this was the reason for his wife's long absence. (3) The Gen-
eral denied that China is a front rank power. He stated that the coun-
try could not even be considered a 5th or ith rank power and that they
were Just about a 12th. (4) He stated that China was guilty of "God
damn obstructionism", (c) Miller asserted that China would now be un=
der Japanese domination if it had not been for the United States. Amer-
ica guarantees that China is a front rank power and also guarantees
China's territorial integrity. According to Miller, 40-50 years will be
required for China to assume a leading position. (6) In order to pro-
tect China from the USSR, it is necessary for China to have our support.
(7) Throughout the evening Miller time and again called the Chinese,
"Chinamer", (R) The General said "You Chinamen must open your eyes
and stop sleeping like that 1diot over there." Miller designated one of
the Chinese guests as an example of "hat he meant. (9) Miller said
that in the Philippines he would get Japanese genitalia and ask the
Chinese to a dinner at which they would be served. The General's ti-
rade went on for more than 2 hours, punctuated with a good deal of
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
0-43 . 22996
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
2
PAGE
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
FROM CHUNGKING
TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
REF. NO.
2439
TOP SECDET
RECEIVED
table pounding and swearing. Both myself and Colonel Tolstoy attempted
to break it up but were ordered to remain quiet by both TL and Miller.
TL brought all the charges to Miles; TL saw me today. Within the next
day or so TL is going to inform Chiang Kai Shek of the entire incident.
Miller 1s regarded by TL as apersonal representative of you, the United
States and ass. He holds that the tirade was conducted in public and
that it is indicative of Unites States opinion and also the opinion of
OSS, TL refuses to permit the slanderous accusations against his
countrymen, China, Madame Chiang Kai Shek and her husband. TL stated
that in all probability Chiang Kai Shek will order the withdrawal of
the entire SACO from China and will assuredly demand that our entire
Organization be recalled. Miles is wiring Admiral King at once to with-
draw OSS from SACO and all China CB (sic) with the exception of the
current productive RAVG (sic) operation and to confer with the Presi-
dent at once. General Hurley and Miles are conferring today. Miles will
hold out for a General Courts Martial for Miller and there is a possi-
bility he will depart for America at once, TL does not think that
Miller was very intoxicated at the dinner. I ask that you believe me
that this situation is very grave and extremely urgent. I concur with
Miles that it will reflect on all Americans, complete SACO, Dixie
mission as well as General Hurley's status. On the 27th of this month,
Major Wilkinson will depart for Washington to confer with you in per-
son, The individuals noted below were guests at the affair: 8 promin-
ent SACO Chinese, exclusive of General TaiL1, Lieutenant Colonel Tol-
stoy, Lieutenant (senior grade) H.J. Wiens, Lieutenant Colonel Dow,
Captain L.A. Lovegren, Captain C.N. Weems and Major Wilkinson.
TOR: 10/26/44 5:33 PM
Copy # 8
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By
DBS
Date JUN 111973
TOD
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
Revised)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DATE
October 26, 1944
REC'D
10/26/44 7:41 pomo
TO
PRIORITY
TEKHI. NEW DELHI
ROUTINE
FROM
DEFERRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
OUT-21418
(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)
FOR INFORMATION)
c. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-07850-1
TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER
#16279. To Coughlin from 109. Referring to your
#11329.
The situation mentioned in the above cable should be taken
up immediately with General Stilwell and his Judge Advocate. You
should take General Stilwoll's advice concerning the nocessary
action to be taken. You should also obtain statements from all
these who attended the dinner.
The way the matter should be handled will, naturally, be
General Stilwell's responsibility, as ho 1s the senior American
officer in the Theater.
With regard to Dow, I do not find that he has been accus-
ed of making any objectionable remarks, and until I am able to
ascertain the reason for his return, I cannot order him to do BO.
The material contained in your message has been made
known to General Vandergrift. He will be sent a copy of this com-
munication. Kindly convey my sincerest regrets to General Tai Li
for this serious breach of civility, which 1s not lessened by the in->
capacity of the officer to conform to the generous hospitality of
the country.
I wish you would get in touch with General Hurley, and
make known to him the circumstances of the situation.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of CIA
TOD: 10/26/44 11:11 p.m. By 007622 DBS Date JUN 11 1973 WJD
INITIALS OF
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
Copy 8
,STAQ
(Revised)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
DECLASSIFIED
DATE October 29, 1944
By Authority of CIA
FROM
OP
PRIORITY
CHAFX, KUNMING
007622
ROUTINE
TO
By DBS Date JUN
11
973
DEFERRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION
IN 24130
(FOR ACTION)
(FOR INFORMATION)
M. a. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-1
RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER
#
To Coughlin for Donovan from General Millor.
1. I returned today from Liuchow. It was at General Chen-
nault's suggestion that I made the trip. When I got back here,
I was given a note from Wilkinson which advised me that Miles and
perhaps Tai L1 were informing Washington of the incident at Chung-
king. The note recommended that I should get in touch with you.
The following are the highlights of the matter: Tai L1 held the
dinner at Happy Valley on Sunday evening. It was not until Tues-
day afternoon, when Dow informed me about it, that I had any knowl-
edge that the Chinese had objected to anything I had said. I got in
touch with Miles at once and informed him that I would remain and
personally apologize to Tai L1 if he believed it desirable. He ans-
wered that he believed it would be preferable to present an apology
in writing. He also stated that 8.8 far as Tai Li was concerned, he
was not going to take any action on the matter. Dow, too, consider-
ed the ratter a tempost in & teapot, which would be smoothed over
by the presentation of an apology. On this understanding, I gave
Dow an apology in writing which he was to deliver. I then left on
the plane on which I was scheduled to make my return to Kunming.
2. These are the facts: We were undoubtedly more gambeiss
drunk than we should have been. Since we had accepted one drink,
it was impossible for us to decline to drink without insulting the
Chinese. Tai Li insisted on our having 3 drinks, one after the
other quickly, and this was the last straw. The Chinese have seem-
ingly been insulted by 3 matters: (1). I inquired of Tai L1, who
represented himself as a close friend, whether General Chiang Kai
Shek intended to marry another woman. (2). I said that "sing-
song girls" should be present at the party. I meant this as a
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
8-43 . 22990
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
PAGE 2
OFFICIAL DISPATCH
IN
FROM CHAFK KUNMING TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES REF. NO. 24130
RECEIVED
joke at E. bachelor party. (3). I cursed the Chinese and character-
ized them as "fools". This charge, to the best of my belief and
knowledge, is not true. I did employ the word "foolish" and the
phrase "camn it", but in a wholly impersonal sense. I spoke these
words in an exhortation intended to secure more active cooperation
for our joint activities.
3, of course 1 wished to let you know about the foregoing
at the first chance but I did not use wires to do so since I
believed I would meot you at Ceylon prior to my return. I am,
of course, sorry about the matter if it created any embarrassment
to our country's war effort or to OSS. As I view the matter, it
is my personal official record which will suffor the greatest in-
jury as EL result. It 18 still my opinion that the Chinese inter-
preters, who failed to translate accurately, were the actual
cause of the misunderstanding. I think it would be advisable for
a copy of this wire to be furnished to General Vandergrift.
# Number garbled.
H Please consult plain text,
TOR: 10/22/44 7:51 a.m.
COPY // 7
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 11 1973
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
31 October 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bure
William J. Donovan
Director
SECRET
alrawer
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
D'SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
31 October 1944
file
PSF
OSS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I believe you will be interested in three reports
which we have just received from our representative
in Caserta.
The first of these reports contains the views of
Nenni, Socialist Party leader, as stated in a private
conference with our representative.
"1. Socialist Party must give people at least a
republic. Monarchial institution must go.
"2. As long as Communist party stands for Socialist
doctrines and represents Italian form of Communism pact
will hold.
"3. Socialist party will never be part directly or
indirectly of Comintern.
"4. Sturzo, possibly Sforza, if here would help
bring Christian Democrats to side of Socialists. Their
leaders here are too close to Vatican. Christian
Democrats are for effective republican bloc. Not likely
at present.
BECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By C/A ABS 007622 Date MAY 1.1974
DECL SECRET
SECRET
- 2 -
"5. There can be no Fascist house cleaning
while present government exists."
The second of these reports deals primarily with
the position of Sforza.
"1. Sforza's opinion is that government crisis
is very probable. He stated that Socialist, Action
Party and Communist leaders have approached him to be
available for Premiership.
"2. He admitted that it was difficult for him to
back out of U. S. post. He may go for temporary period
only. He is hesitating because he fears a change in
the government during his absence.
"3. Sforza said his presence here may hasten
removal of Bonomi. He would like to go to U. S. as
Foreign Minister for a brief period.
"4. Meanwhile Socialists are planning attack on
Carandini for London post because appointment was made
without cabinet approval. Appointments all on right
wing."
The third report reads as follows:
"1. War Minister Casati in accord with Bonomi
DE
SEODET
SEOKER
DE SEGRET
- 3 -
that Italian Government should be permitted to communicate
authorization to Milano to act on behalf of government
for military purposes only. General Alexander has refused
to grant this.
"2. Italian Government ready to set up funds for
patriot bands if permitted and wants to know methods of
transmittal.
"3. Also planning to pass law extending rights and
privileges of veterans to patriots."
Donnar
William J. Donovan
Director
DI
SECRET
TOP SEGRE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OF
WASHINGTON, D.C.
fift oot 31 October 1944
PSF
Miss Grace Tully
OSS
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Grace:
I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007622
DBS Date HIM 1973
TOP SECRET
BEURET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE
TOP-SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C.
31 October 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Knowing of your concern that Nazism should not survive
this war by going underground, I believe you may want to
see the attached memorandum on the anti-Nazi activities of
the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany. This
memorandum was prepared early in September 1944 by Dr. H.
Schoenfeld, an outstanding figure in the Evangelical Church
who left Germany in June of this year and now maintains his
German contacts from a residence taken up in Switzerland.
Already the anti-Nazi church elements, organized in
cells and "leading groups" of both the clergy and the laity,
have saved thousands of Jews, hostages, prisoners of war,
foreign churchmen and labor draftees from extermination,
deportation and other Nazi control measures. This was
JUN 11 1973
accomplished not only through intercession with government
officials but also by clandestine action undertaken at great
By Authority DECLASSIFIED of CIA
0.07622
personal risk. Dr. Schoenfeld's memorandum, which emphasizes
the collaboration between the Catholic and Protestant clergy,
provides a list of prominent personalities and an outline of
By
their activities in this movement.
TOP SECRET
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TOP-SECRET-
Foreseeing the collapse of Nazi Germany, this movement
has formed a Self-Help ("Selbsthilfe") organization, headed
by central commissions responsible for maintenance of trans-
portation, distribution of food, protection of spiritual
welfare and reorganization of the German educational system.
In his memorandum Dr. Schoenfeld includes a proposal for
close liaison between the Self-Help organization and the
Allied forces of occupation.
William Donnan J. Donovan
Director
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007422
By DBS Date JUN 111973
TOP SECRET
THE SERVICE OF THE CHURCH THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESIGNARD
MOVEMENT AGAINST THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST REGIME IN CHEMEY.
I. In the dispute with the Nasi Regise during the past seven or eight yours
in general, and during the recent years in particular, the min decisive -
tribution of the German Evangelical Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, has
been the bitter, constantly renewed, successful battle of resistance of these
churches against the repeated attempts of the Party and heich devernment to
disrupt the unified structure of the church body as a whole, and be destroy
the administrative structure of the shurch in order to divide the surporate
Church into individual shurch communities. Such a division would thine
placed the individual shurch communities in a situation of possed
I
tempts have been made during the war to destroy the corporate
the churches. This destruction was only avoided through the
vention of the most courageous among leading Churchman, and through
forts of prominent Christian laymen in Government, Army, industry,
agriculture. At the same time, it was possible to DATE the church oddress
the Home Missions and other organisations, from seisure and expropriation;
thus preserving the basis for further development of the battle unged W
leading groups and community "cells".
II. This also made it possible to preserve the material basis for AT
collective spiritual orientation of the broad strate of the population is all
communities and churches. Through sermons and pastoral counsel, through
and evangelisation, foundations were laid among all classes of the people for
a determined struggle against those principles of national socialist ideology
which represent lust for power, the theory of the master rase, lawlesemess,
and the lust for revenge. Thus, the work in this domain, repoated week after
week, succeeded in sustaining broad strata of the population in their resist-
ance against hate. This was especially true at the time when hundreds of
thousands of evacuees found themselves in desperate circumstances and were ,
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
007622
By DBS Date JUN 1973
SECRET
Instional
Scotalist
propageds
Specific shurch forces is bringing
Sectruction
for teas of thousands of
a I I a I I
for of education, and providing a foundation upon
unders 14 dill be possible to build, - National Socialism has been abolished
m. Is to collective notion of the resistance assoment in Germany in behalf
of the non-Arynn population, end copecially of nen-Aryan Christians, the
leading charchene of the Frangelieal and Cathelic Charehes have often consti-
tacked the desiding, arystallizing moleum, by their ability to mobilise
(Miristian Lay forees in all districts of Germay. Around this muclous were
preminent members of the armed forees, industry and agriculture. In this way,
the stops taken with the Reich Government carried sufficient weight to become
& desiding fastor. Furthermore, through open, askell as secret collaboration
of the leading groups and the "cells", it was possible in many thousand indi-
vidual cases, to save non-Aryan members of the German population from deporta-
ties and extermination. It was possible to hide many thousand persons in the
large cities, although by this not clergymen and Christian laymen risked
their lives. Through cellaboration of the leading groups with the "cells",
it m possible to remove threatened persons to other districts, thereby
saving lives. There were thousands of cases where efforts to save the
threatened persons were not successful. Howevers the struggle was continued
without interruption until the last few months. The churches also contributed
in a decisive manner toward preventing the deportation of 400,000 non-Aryans
of mixed parentage.
IV. In the collective activity of the resistance forces to obtain humane
treatment for the millions of prisoners of war, the churches mobilised their
on forces within the Christian laity as extensively as possible. Furthermore,
through their defense of collective Christian care for prisoners of war, as
carried out by the organizations of the entire occumenical movement of the
Vationn, the shurches have lent direct support to resistance forces in key
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
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OLURE
By DBS
Date
JUN 111973
TOP SECRET
positions is the Any of Government. This proved copecially
effort to reseus - million Ensoiem prisence.
V. On the basis of their experience in the struggle against the Invienal
Sccialist Regise, the representatives and liaisen agents of the Brangelical
and Catholic Charches amoug the loading Christian elite in the occupied
countries have offered their constant and useful support. It was necessary to
acquaint the leading - of the Christian elite with particular resistance
methods over a wide area. Through close collaboration between the churches'
liaison agents and the political resistance forces in Germany and the occupied
countries, it TM possible to lend particular weight to the collective action
of the church in the occupied countries. This was particularly useful in the
struggle to bring about the preservation of the corporate organization of
the churches in Holland, France and Denmark. The struggle for the preserva-
tion of Christian schools in Holland was likewise supported in this manner.
Furthermore, it was often necessary to protect the safety of leading churchmen
in occupied countries through the efforts of the churches' liaison agents in
the resistance movement in Germany. Through this action it was possible to
liberate the two leading Dutch churchmen, Prof. Kramer and Dr. Gravemayer,
from the hostage camp where they were being held. This method alone made it
possible to protect the well-known leading French churchean, Dr. Maro Boegner,
and to obtain the liberation of many members of the French olergy from detention
by the Gestapo. Through the efforts of these liaison agents, it has also been
possible, so far, to protect Bishop Berggaw from further seisure and to min-
tain personal liaison with him.
VI. The central liaison agents of the Churches in Germany - in this case
particularly the German Evangelical Church - have interceded in favor of an
all-embracing support of the spiritual welfare and rallying of the 4,500,000
Dutch workers and clerks in Germany. At the risk of the agents' own lives,
this work was often carried out for the benefit of French, Norwegian and
Danish labor draftees. In all districts of Germany, comunity houses,
Churches, church homes, and rooms in the houses of the clergy, were placed
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of C/A
007622
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was
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)
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)
)
at the disposal of foreign workers, to collect them and provide for their
spiritual welfare. Collections taken up in German comunities often made it
possible to procure the services and provide for the support of Dutch and
French vicars. The functioning of Christian laymen was also made possible
through efforts of the church and its agents. This was accomplished only by
bitter struggles against both the Gestapo and Dr. Ley's Labor Front organi-
sation. A relationship of mutual trust vas created between the leading
church groups and the prominent church representatives of the German Evangeli-
cal Church, as well as the Catholic Church, a relationship which proved valuable
in the work of collaboration in matters pertaining to the "Self-Help" organisation
(Selbsthilfe).
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
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By DBS DateJUN 11 1973
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The Occumenical Contacts of Dr. H. Schonfeld which he has been able to mintain
in a large measure throughout the war.
I. Contact maintained since 1929-30 with Dr. Leiper and Dr. Cavert, U.S.A.
Contact maintained since 1937-39 with Rev. Roswell P. Barness and Mr.
John Foster Dulles.
The first three, named above, are secretariss-general of the American
Federation of Churches; collaboration embraces social-sthical,), economic
and international problems.
II. a. In contact ailes 1930 with Lord Bishop of Chichester for collaboration
in spiritual matters, aswell as for the support of the church's work
in assistance to non-Aryan Christians.
b. Since 1932-33 in contact with Dr. J. Oldham, the spiritual director
of the oscumenical preparatory work, preceding the World Church Con-
ference at Oxford on "Church, State and People". Through him many
contacts have been maintained with the representatives of the British
trade unions and industrialists, with leading men in the British edu-
cational field, as well as politicians. At present, contact has also
been established with Dr. Oldham's work as the author of "Christian
Youth Letter".
0. Since 1935-37, in contact with W. Tempel, then Archbishop of York,
now Archbishop of Canterbury, collaboration in the preparation of
the Oxford Conference, especially in the treatment of social and
economic problems.
III. a. Since 1936-37 in contact with Prof. Dr. Rs Kramer, the spiritual leader
of the eight Dutch Reformed Churchem.
JUN 111973
Since 1940-41 in contact with Dr. Gravemeyer, the Hague, in central
organizational management of the convention of the eight Dutch Reformed
Churches; collaboration during the war, especially in matters pertain-
RECLASSIFIED Authority of CIA
007622
ing to the mobilization of the church's resistance forces in Holland;
participation in the action which led to the liberation of Dr.
Kramer and Dr. Gravemayer, who had been arrested as hostages.
0.
Since 1931-32 contact has been maintained with the French church
By
By
leader, President Dr. Mark Boegner; participation in the action in-
TOD CEODE
- 6 -
suring Dr. Boegner's protection from the Gestapo.
d. Since 1931 in contact with Dr. Conrod, secretary-general of the
French Reformed Church; collaborative action during the war, parti-
cularly in intervention on behalf of French prisoners of mr, as well
as of French workers in Germany; participation in the protective
action on behalf of arrested French clergymen and non-Aryan
Christians.
.. Since 1936-37 in contact with Bishop Dr. Bergrav, Norway. Collabora-
tion during the war in matters pertaining to international questions
and the organization of occumenical collaboration between the leading
Scandinavian, British, French and other church leaders; in the oecu-
menical movement in behalf of a just and lasting peace, support of
the Norwegian resistance forces within the church; participation in
the protective action in behalf of Bishop Bergrav; support of the
action for the care of Norwegian workers and clerks in Germany.
f. Since 1936-37 in contact with Bishop Fugelsang-Damgaarg, Copenhagen,
the leading Bishop of the Danish Church; collaboration during the
war for the support and protection of the church resistance forces
in Denmark; support of the spiritual care of Danish workers in
Germany.
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
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)
NOMENOLATURN.
The fellowing lists the names, and gives a brief summary of the
activity, of vitally important personalities in the German "Self-
Help" organisation of the Church. (Selbsthilfewerk der Kirchen).
I. A close relationship was established between leading representatives
of the German Evangelical Church and the Roman Catholis Church in Germany for
the purpose of building up the "Self Help" organisation.
a. Bishop Dr. Wurn of Stuttgart, the speaker of the entire German Evangeli-
cal Church (compare further on with II, a), kept in continuous contact
with the Catholic Archbishop Grober of Freiburg (responsible for all of
Baden) on vital questions pertaining to the development of the organi-
sation. Archbishop Gröber is known, through his statements and
speeches, as come of the most courageous leaders in the Catholic Church,
a man who has played an outstanding part in rallying together the
Catholic forces of resistance.
b. Contact was maintained in Bavaria between the well-known Lutheran
Bishop Meiser and Cardinal Faulhaber in Munich, these two non and
their colleagues are responsible for the Bavarian leading group.
0. A corresponding collaboration came into existence for the Rhineland
and Westphalia between the leader of the Protestant shurch in West-
phalia, Dr. Kooh, and the well-known Catholic Bishop of Minster,
Count Galen.
d. The central collaboration directives emanating from Berlin were
shaped jointly by Dr. Bugen Gerstemmeier, leader of the occumenical
central office of the German Evangelical Church, and the Catholic
Bishop of Berlin, Count Preysing, who is also well-known for his
comrageous participation in joint shurch action against the Party
and the Government of the Reich.
". Collaboration between Protestant and Catholic representatives of the
leading groups in the various districts, who are responsible for the
development of the German "Self Help" organization, is accomplished in
a similar fashion.
DECLASSIFIED*
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II. The participation of the German Evangelical Church in the
entire "Self-Help" organisation is led by:
a. Bishop Mura of Stuttgart who, together with the heads of the
secret Reich Advisory Council of the German Evangelical Church,
has succeeded in rallying to the cause an overwhelming majority
(85-90%) of the established Protestant churches and parishes in
Germany, and has recruited and guided the application of Christian
principles in the resistance movement. In the battle against
outhanasia he became well-known, carrying out a joint action
for the protection of thousands of medical cases from destruction,
as well as for protection of thousands of Non-Aryan Christians.
Be is also noted for the protection of oppressed populations in
occupied territories and for the protection of foreign workers.
Evidence of this activity can be found in statements made by him,
which are known to the British and American public.
b. Dr. Eugen Gerstonmaier, Berlin, who is the head of the oecumenical
central office of the German Evangelical Church, which is also
the central office for the direction of Group A II. Dr.
Gerstenmaier is known for his unusually capable and energetic
leadership in the mobilisation of the church's resistance forces,
and for the development of the entire network of leading groups
in the struggle against the Gestapo on behalf of foreign workers,
as well as for his participation in liberating and protecting
clergymen made leading laymen in the resistance forces of the
occupied territories. He maintains extensive contacts with
representatives of Christian and socialist labor in the develop-
ment of the "oell" system. He also maintains close contact with
Christian groups in the armed foroes and, obtaide of Germany, with
Barness, Leiper, Temple, Chichester and Oldham.
0. Rector Grüber, Berlin, known in Germany, the United States, Grest
Britain, France, Holland and Norway for his extraordinaryly
courageous intervention in behalf of Non-Aryan Christians. Be
has outstanding organisational capacities for large scale relief
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
TOP PRODET
007622
TUI Whome:
NN
JUN 1973
9
action. For almost two years he maintained contact to the
concentration camps at Oranienburg and Dachay with captive
French, Polish, Csechoslovakian and Dutch olergymen. Above
all, he has contadts among the workers, as well as representatives
of the "Red A16" (Rote Hilfe). At present be has emerged as one
of the leading spirite representing the church's attitude in the
struggle waged by the church resistance forces. On the basis of
this to is especially well qualified to handle the central organ-
-isation of the work to be done by the Central Commission for the
provision of material care.
d. Rector (licentiate) W. Menn, Andernach (Rhineland) is particularly
qualified as liaison agent of the Central Commission A, by reason
of his extensive contacts with industrial and labor representatives
throughout the entire Rhineland and Westphalia, He was formerly
the head of the Church Office for Social Work of the Rhenish
Protestant Church and was responsible, at the same time, for the
occumenical work and organization within the association of
-clergymen (Pfarrer-Bruderschart)., of the Rhineland and Westphalia.
Since 1929-30 he has been in close contact with all oscumenical
activity and especially with Barness, John Poster Dulles, Leiper
and Cavert in the U.S.A., as well as with the Archbishop of
Canterbury, the Lord Bishop of Chichester, Dr. Oldham in Great
Britain and Prof. Dr. Kramer in Holland.
II.
The following are some of the leading personalities in the Central
Commission B, for wpiritual care within the framework of the German "Self-
Help" organization.
a. Dr. Otto Dibelius, Berlin, is well-known in Germany, as well as on
the European Continent and in the Anglo-Saxon Churches, for the
By
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of
- extensive services he has rendered in the sgruggle against the
National Socialist regime and its intrusion into the domain of
the church, as well as for his close collaboration with leading
forces in the resistance movement. On the basis of the distin-
3973 NOS and
guished organizational capacities he has shown in rallying the
can CERDET
1434
DEVIDE
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'best evangelising forces to the cause, to was entrusted with
the management of Gentral Commission 3. - mintains linison
with other churches, notably with the Lord Bishop of Chichester.
b. Dr. W. Bachmann, Berlin. As hoad of the service for the spiritual
welfare of prisomers of war and internets, be has shown outstanding
abilities in mobilising the forces of the church is spiritual
matters and under difficult circumstances. B is known for his
courageous intervention in behalf of American, Angle-Sexon, French,
Dutch, Serbian and Russian prisoners of war. b holds a my posi-
tion in the defense of an all-embrasing Christian service w other
organisations and churches is Germany for the spiritual velifare of
prisoners of war and internes. b has also intervened for -
spiritual welfare of foreign workers.
0. Dr. Thielisks, Stuttgart, is entrusted with the spiritual chun
tion of the leading groups in and beyond. b the
developed a distinguished literary activity in the emalyantion of
National Socialist ideology and has apposed 10
b has done outstanding work for spiritual welfare in the younger
generation, especially among the laboring classes. Income of
this and because of his may years of ovengelising activity in
all parts of Germany, and the contrate be has thereby ostablished
with leading groups in may districts, to has also been choose of
a liaison agent in the Gentral Commission 3.
d. Dr. Hutton, Stuttgart, has been a linison for may years between
the central leading groups and the resistance movement of the
He has been extremely valuable in the shaping of a Christian point
of view in the public, a point of view which has to all
districts and communities. For this reason he has been entrusted
with work of this nature in the Central Commission 2.
.. Dr. H. Lilie, Berlin, is one of the most distinguished Brangelists
and speakers of the German Evangelical Church. the has done exten-
sive work in the unsompromising opposition to the attacks of
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A
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007622
MM
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)
National Socialists on Christian thought and life in all districts
of Germany. He maintains excellent relations with all commenical
activities, especially with X. Oldham and the Lord Bishop of
Chichester, and with the leading younger generation of Christians
in Great Britain. be is also in contact with leading men in the
Lutheren Churches of Europe and the U.S.A.
III. The following are included in leading Wirttemberg and Baden groups.
a. Dr. W. Collmer, Stuttgart, holds a leading position in the struggle
for the settlement of great questions of social import in
Württemberg and Baden. Therefore, be is in close collaboration
with the representatives of labor and their liaison men in the
development of the "oell" system. At present, be also has special
contacts with the resistance forces in concentration camps, and the
labor liaison agents who are active in this connection. Be formerly
participated in the collaboration with leading resistance forces of
the church and the political world in Holland. He has outstanding
organisational and administrative abilities.
b. Dr. Plappart, industrial representative in Württemberg and Baden.
He has done distinguished work in organisation and the instruction
of leading groups and "cells" in these districts. He enjoys the
special confidence of labor.
0. Oberbahnrat I, (high official in the transport system), Stuttgart.
Holds a central position in the entire transport system of
Württemberg, Baden and Bavaria.
d. Dr. W. Hoffmann, Stuttgart. He has performed leading functions in
the schooling of correlated leading groups and in the struggle
against National Socialist ideology. He is the central representa-
tive for the re-formation of the educational system.
0. Prof. Erik Wolf, Freyburg (Baden). Holds a central position in
judicial affairs and government administration. He is noted for
his courageous stand as legal counsel of the militant churches,
as well as educator of a younger generation of jurists and
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
C/A
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OF
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administrative officials who have adopted an uncompromising
attitude toward the National Socialist regime, and who have
joined the leading groups and "oells" under the direction of
the churches. He is in very close contact with President Max
Huber of Geneva and Prof. E. Brunner of Zurich.
IV.
The following are included in leading groups in north Germany,
especially Hamburg, Bremen, Sleswick-Holstein and Lower Saxony.
a. Dr. Asmussen, outstanding Hamburg churchman, has a leading posi-
tion in the management of the collective church initiative
undertaken by the German Evangelical Church. He is known for
his courageous stand in the opposition to the National Socialist
State. He mintains extremely close relations with leading
Catholic circles.
b. (Licentiate) Herntrich, Hamburg, has shown outstanding ability
and leadership in organising matters pertaining to spiritual
welfare, particularly in the case of hundreds of thousands of
'evacuses who have been indoctrinated with an uncompromising col-
lective policy of resistance against a spirit of hatred or a. lust
for revenge.
0. Dr. Steltzer, Sleswick-Holstoin, is 8. distinguished expert on the
entire transport system. He holds a central position in the
schooling of experts in the administration of leading groups and
"cells". He participated in the protective action undertaken in
behalf of Bishop Bergrav.
d. Rudolf Petersen, Hamburg, is a representative of the leading com-
mercial circles. He has confidential contacts in Anglo-Saxon
countries.
0. Police-president Schrors, Bremen, holds a key position in the entire
administrative and transport system. Se has confidential contacts
with all circles in the population, including labor.
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA
00.7622
By DBS Date JUN 1.1.1973
SEGNET
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Among others, the two following central circles have been formed in
Germany since 1938 for the purpose of combating the National Socialist
regime. These circles have undertaken the task of organising the
totality of resistance forces in Germany.
I.
The Circle around Count Helmut Moltke and Count Peter York von
Wartenburg . (Circle A I)
a. Political attitude toward the outside: Germany can only be
capable of existing as part of a unified federative Europe, de-
veloped along Christian-social lines. Political attitude toward
the interior: after the fall of centralization, a political
structure corresponding to the above must be built.
b. Composition: Officials and workers from Christian and socialist
unions, industrialists, agriculturalists, and officers, all of
whom are in key positions in the social and economic life of the
army, and the governmental and comminal administrative machine.
0. Aim: Preparation of a democratic self-governing administrative
body in Germany, which, after the collapse of the National
Socialist regime, will be capable of taking over the administra-
tion of the country even to the village communities.
II.
The circle around Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier (Cirole & II)
a. Political attitude: the same as in Circle A I.
b. Composition: Church leaders, members of the clergy, and laymen of
the German Evangelical Church including every class of the popula-
tion, especially the laboring classes who, until recently, had not
evidenced any interest in the church. This central group is in
E/GLINOP NOP ":00 III. 4g
close contact with representatives and laity of the Catholic Church
(and the Catholic population) correspondingly engaged in activities
in the same field.
By of
Discount
0. Aim: orientation, within the framework of the church revival, of
the entire public and civil life according to Christian principles.
Since 1940 there has been a growing fusion of the two central groups
of Circle A I and Circle A. II. This was brought about especial ly by the fact
.
As A result of the events on July 20, Count Peter York von Wartenburg was executed.
- 14 -
that leaders of A II were in a position to bring to the cause results of
their extensive mobilisation of broad strata of the population against
National Socialism in all districts of Germany and particularly the bene-
fits of their extensive relations with labor.
This resulted in a close collaboration for the following purpose:
penetration of Germany and Austria by reliable liaison men; formation of
leading groups and subordinated "oell" systems in all districts.
or value in this collaboration was the fact that in the struggle
against party and Reich Government, the Evangelical Church, as well as
the Catholic Church in Germany had preserved the corporate organisation
of the church communities in every part of Germany and Austria. On the
basis of the preservation of this organisation, it has been possible to
develop the system of small groups in all districts, even down to indi-
vidual communities. This system of leading groups and "cells" was or-
ganised to provide the services of experts in every domain, such as, the
church, government, self-government, educational system, industry and
agriculture. These leading groups and "cells" educated broad masses of
the people for a realistic opposition to Nazi propaganda. The collabora-
tion of both Circles (A I and A II) and the support of the resistance move-
ment embracing the entire German territory, proved valuable for the execu-
tion of large unified actions. For example, the constantly renewed success
in obtaining humane treatment for prisoners of war and especially in the
action undertaken to save about one million Russian prisoners from ex-
termination during the winter of 1941/42.
Such action saved about 400,000 Non-Aryans of mixed parentage from
deportation and saved thousands of hostages and Jews in the occupied
territories. It also provided care and support for hundreds of thousands
of Dutch, French, Norwegian, Danish and Ukranian workers.
The particular role played by the churches in this joint action by
both Circles is presented in a special report.
IV.
With a constant view toward the possible collapse of the Nasi system
and the subsequent occupation of the Reich territory, a. "Self-Help"
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of C/A
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organization of the German Evangelical Church and the Catholic Church
in Germany was prepared in conformity with the aims of Circle A I. It
is to be expected that the collapse of the National Socialist system
will result in the complete discontinuation of the functions of the
central and local Easi food and transport authorities, for all leading
offices of the administrative machine are held by Nasi officials. After
the collapse, these officials will, in all probability, no longer be
tolerated by the workers, and it must be expected that they will be in-
mediately eliminated. In such a situation the churches will have the
only organisation embracing the entire German territory and reaching into
the most isolated communities of the country. At that moment they alone
will be in & position to handle the entire food and food distribution
system.
Therefore, a Central Labor Commission (Central Commission A) was
formed in the German Evangelical Church under the direction of Bishop
Rura of Stuttgart. Central Commission A is managed by Friedrich Y.
Bodelschwingh, Bethel, and Rector Orüber, Berlin, for the assumption of
the supply system. Central Commission A is supported by the leading groups
(mentioned in paragraph 2), who are responsible for the individual districts
and who, in turn, will call upon the services of the subordinate "oells" in
the communities. As mentioned, these leading groups are composed of espe-
cially energetic members of the clergy and of experts among industrialists,
workers, officials and professional mon. The assumption of the transport
system has been prepared with special care. The elements constituting
Central Commission A also insure close contact with the secret organisation
"Red Aid" (Rote Hilfe).
V.
Beside Central Commission A for food supply, a further Central Com-
mission to safeguard spiritual welfare and the reorganization of the educa-
tional system was organized in close collaboration with the Catholic Church.
This is Central Commission B and is managed by Dr. 0. Dibelius and Dr. W.
Bachmann. Parallel with Central Commission A, Central Commission B has
worked in close collaboration with leading groups and "oells" and has
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obtained full support from the established churches and parishes in 000
bating the spiritual disintegration and great mental void which will
befall the population
after the collapse of Germany. Together
with pastoral activities, this will include an all embracing spiritual
orientation of broad masses of the German population through sermons,
publications, radio broadeasts and all possible. personal efforts by
Christian forces for the accomplishment of this 0.30PMOUS task. Further-
more, based on the expert knowledge of the leading groups, the reorganise-
tion of the educational system will be initiated with a radioal purging
action which will eliminate all Nasi elements from the teaching body.
The work of both Central Commissions and their organs is undertaken
in behalf of all strata of the population, regardless of the church they
belong to, and especially in behalf of the millions of foreign workers.
Thanks to the churches' efforts, they have their own confidential linison
non among these workers. (see Memorandum on the churches)
VI. In consideration of the expected collapse of the National Socialist
regime, and the fact that the Allied military command must be strongly in-
terested in a rapid return to calm and order, and as smooth as possible
a resumption of work in German industry and agriculture, the following is
hereby proposeds
The establishment of an advisory group attached to the general staff of
the Allied occupying forces in Germany. This advisory organ would represent
the liaicon with the German "Self-Help" organisation described in paragraphs
3 and 4. Upon the withdrawal of combat troops, this advisory group would
be taken over by the highest echelon of the occupying authorities (Inter-
Allied Commission).
The first concern of this mediator board would be to regulate collab-
oration between the highest Allied occupation authorities and the "Self-Help"
organization (as described in I) and its subsequent development, German
self-government.
Under no circumstances should the leading organs of the German
"Self-Help" organization be regarded by the German population as "Quislings"
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of CIA
007622
By WBS Date JUN 11 1973
- 17 -
as & result of their close contact with the victorious powers. Therefore,
the above-mentioned advisory organ should immediately be represented as a
liaison agency between the occumenical aid society of the World Council
of Churches, the "Self-Help" organisation of the Roman Catholic Church and,
above all, the corresponding American and British aid eccieties and the
German "Self Help" organization. In this manner, immediate collaborative
work will be freed from a considerable danger which it would be impossible
to overlook. Thus, the work of collaboration will be raised from a purely
political form of contact to that of & solitary aid organisation composed
of the Christian elements recruited by the large churches, elements who
have stood together throughout the entire war despite any political dif-
ferences of opinion.
It may be advisable to include men from the occumenical aid society
of the World Council of Churches and the collective aid society of the
Roman Catholic Church in the above-mentioned advisory group. These non
could not as advisory liaison men, as their long-standing collaboration
with the personalities in the German "Self-Help" organisation (I) have
made them thoroughly acquainted with the personalities in question.
The "Self-Help" organization, embracing the entire Reich territory
and described under I, is the only remaining organisation capable of
functioning immediately in post-Masi Germany. Only establishing a 001-
laboration devoid of friction between the provisional occupation author-
ities and the "Self-Help" organisation can chaos be avoided in Germany.
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
By 007622 DBS Date JUN 1 14973
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