Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill

DECLASSIFIED By Authority of 7 JCS 927/495-1 22Flb197 Date MAR 1.197 7 March 1942 TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON: No. 113 1. We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4th to insure that nothing is left unexplored which can in any way improve our present prospects. We recognize fully the magnitude of the problems confronting you in the Indian Ocean and are equally concerned over those which confront us in the Pacific, particularly since the United States assumes a heavy re- sponsibility regarding measures for the defense of Austral ia, New Zealand, and the guarding of their sea approaches. You, on the other hand, will recognize the difficulties under which we labor in de- ploying and maintaining, in unprepared and distant positions, the considerable forces which will be required to meet this critical situation. I know that you will also appreciate that success in holding this region depends largely upon the adequacy of shipping, and the availability of munitions and aircraft for arming Dominion forces. The magnitude of the effort which may be put forth by the U.S. in the Southwest Pacific has a direct relation to the magnitude of the air offensive which the U.S. will be able to undertake from United Kingdom Bases. 2. The U.S. is now operating a large part of the Pacific Fleet in the Anzac region, for the defense of Australia and New Zealand, for preserving a base area for a future decisive offen- sive against Japan, and for containing Japanese naval and air forces in the Pacific. Provided their bases in the west of Australia can be kept secure, U.S. submarines will continue to operate in the ABDA Area against Japanese supply lines and against naval forces that exit to the Indian Ocean 3. While Japan is indeed extending herself over a large area, it must be admitted that the deployment has been skilfully executed and continues to be effective. The energy of the Japa- nose attack is still very powerful. It is only through a greater energy, skill, and determination, that Japan can be halted before -1- 113