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Domestic Policy Council 1987 Review & 1988 Plans [binder] [2]
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Domestic Policy Council 1987 Review & 1988 Plans [binder] [2]
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Records of the White House Office of Cabinet Affairs (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Richard W. Porter Subject Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2021-0094-F
2021-0094-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Cabinet Affairs, White House Office of
Series:
Porter, Richard, Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
07137
Folder ID Number:
07137-004
Folder Title:
Domestic Policy Council 1987 Review & 1988 Plans [binder] [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
16
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
February 8, 1987
Bob,
I've attached copies of some previous
papers discussing the Domestic Policy
Process. Some of the relationships
may have changed, but I suspect that
the roles and process are basically
unchanged - or at least they are supposed
to still work as previously discussed.
Since the DPC and EPC were created by
a press release, it would seem that any
changes C ould be handled just as informally.
Whether a press release or a memo were
used, any changes could be reflected in
a presidental statement reaffirming his
commitment to an aggressive economic
and domestic agenda as represented in
his legislative message.
I would be happy to discuss this further
or make necessary changes to my diagrams
reflect the current situation. Just
Ave me a call. (I will try to come to
the Mgmt and Admin Working Group Meeting
on Friday at 11:00.)
Cluck
THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT
THE WHITE HOUSE
To AOD MORE
WASHINGTON
FORMALITY TO OUR
24 September 1985
DPC PLNG PROCESS.
ACTHOUGH NEVER
FORMALIZED, THE PROCESS
MEMORANDUM FOR DPC EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
EVOLUED ACONG THESE
FROM: RALPH C. BLEDSOE Rolf Bledne
LINES.
SUBJECT: PLANNING AND MANAGING THE DOMESTIC AGENDA
1. During our recent Secretariat meetings, we have discussed the
need for long and short term planning of the President's domestic
agenda. Additionally, we have stressed the importance of
actively managing each issue from its inception, through policy
development, to implementation and follow-up of required action.
The DPC calendar will serve as our basic planning and management
document. However, effective results will require active input
and follow-up by all members of the Executive Secretariat.
2. Conceptually, the planning process should begin within each
agency, and should focus on issues which will require DPC and/or
Presidential involvement within the next 3-5 months. Some issues
may be self-generated by outside forces - others may be important
items on the President's long term domestic agenda which have not
been very actively pursued, to date. Potential issues should be
defined in general terms using the DPC issue format previously
provided (copy attached). Each issue should include appropriate
management steps and an associated time table for successful
policy implementation. Typical steps could be:
a. Issue identified and described (Issue format/paper)
b. Working group or agency meeting/report/briefing
C. Secretariat discussion
d. DPC discussion/recommendation
e. DPC meeting with the President
f. Initiation of legislative proposal or other action
g. Enactment of legislation or completion of required action
3. The DPC planning calendar will include weekly schedules over
a 3 month period, monthly listings for the following 2 months,
and a general listing for future events. Events will be grouped
into categories which represent the major themes included in the
domestic agenda for which the DPC is responsible. Key speeches,
hearings, and other calendar events will also be integrated into
the calendar. Appropriate events of this nature should be
proposed by each agency. Prioritization and scheduling will be
an important part of each DPC Secretariat meeting, and an updated
calendar will be produced on a weekly basis or more frequently as
required.
Option 1. (Re-state the option)
Pros:
O (Use "bullet" sentences to succinctly summarize pros and
cons of Option 1.)
O (E.g.: Consistent with the President's position on ABC.)
Cons:
O etc.
O etc.
Option 2. (Repeat as above for all options)
Recommendation (optional)
(Specify recommendation if consensus exists, or list differing
recommendations by departments or agency, as desired by them.)
DPC ISSUE PAPER FORMAT
(The following format is preferred for Issue Papers prepared for
Domestic Policy Council consideration. In general, Issue Papers
should be brief (no more than 4-5 pages), concisely worded, and
present all contending viewpoints in a fair and forthright
manner. Attachments may be used as necessary for further detail
or tabular information.)
(Agency Letterhead)
(Date)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
FROM:
ISSUE:
(Place in question form; e.g., What should be the
Administration's Position on XYZ?)
Introduction
(Describe the nature of the issue, its current status, and events
making action or attention by the Domestic Policy Council
desirable at this time, including any congressional implications.
Emphasize important time-frames or deadlines.)
Background
(Summarize past events and actions bearing on the issue,
including any previous involvement and decisons of the President,
Domestic Policy Council, Congress, Department and agency heads,
etc.
Discussion
(Describe the positions of the key players or contenders.
Carefully include all key arguments in summary form.)
Options
(List in 1-2-3 fashion the options for resolving the issue.
Strive for the minimal number of viable options; more than three
tends to be unwieldy. State options in the "Imperative," e.g.:
1. Support legislation that would
....
2. Take a neutral position on
....
3. etc.
DPC ISSUE FORMAT
(The following format should be used for describing an issue or
topic, and requesting that it be placed on the agenda of the
Domestic Policy Council.
Send to Dr. Ralph C. Bledsoe, Executive Secretary, Domestic
Policy Council, The White House, Washington, D.C., 20500.)
PROPOSED ISSUE (or TOPIC) for DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
TITLE: (State the short title of the issue or topic; e.g.,
Management Improvement Legislation, or Fair Housing.)
DESCRIPTION
(In one paragraph, concisely describe the issue to be resolved or
topic to be addressed. Issues should be phrased as questions,
e.g., What should the Administration's position and Congressional
strategy be on XYZ? When possible, specify major options to be
considered for resolution.)
BACKGROUND
(Summarize pertinent history and current status of the issue or
topic, including any previous actions by DPC, decisions of the
President, congressional action, etc.)
ACTION-FORCING EVENTS
(Explain current activities requiring resolution or attention by
the DPC. Include names of key individuals, groups, committees,
etc. Emphasize important time-frames and deadlines.)
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION NEEDED
(Explain the type of action to be requested of the President;
e.g., approval only, issuance of an Executive Order, legislative
veto, discussion only/no decision, etc.)
LEAD AGENCY AND CONTACT
(List the agency, official, title, and telephone of the
individual who will working with the DPC Executive Secretary.)
REQUESTING OFFICIAL
(If different from above individual, identify the source of the
issue or topic proposal.)
-2-
4. We will never eliminate the unplanned, critical issues which
"hit" at the last minute. However, I hope we can strengthen our
overall approach to formulating and implementing Domestic Policy
by focusing our collective efforts on long range planning on a
continuing basis.
5. As previously stated, Chuck Kubic will be the contact for DPC
planning. He can be reached at 456-6520 (OEOB Room 235) if you
have any questions on the planning process, or if you wish to
input DPC issues into the planning calendar.
6. Thanks for your continued support.
Copy to: Mr. Meese
Mr. Kingon
THIS WAS AN
ATTEMPT TO
DEFINE PROCESS AND
29 November 1985
ROLES
NEVER FORMALIZED,
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BLEDSOE
BUT ccosay DESCRIMES
FROM: CHUCK KUBIO CRK
THE "STANDARD"
PROCESS
SUBJ: THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC POLICY PROCESS
I am a firm supporter of the President's cabinet government
system. In an attempt to diagram the current process for
developing domestic policy, I created a model and a flow chart
which I previously forwarded to you. My initial analysis
overlooked the role of the Office of Cabinet Affairs. My revised
charts are a little more "cluttered", but more accurately depict
all of the "players". The new charts are attached for your
review.
The strength of cabinet government lies in the full involvement
of department/agency staffs in proposing, developing, and
implementing the President's policy. Drawbacks, such as
additional coordination and time delays, can be minimized by an
effective organizational structure and an efficient decision
process which is known and understood by all "players". These
points are probably intuitively obvious to those who have
operated within the Cabinet Council system since 1981.
However, given the fairly recent reorganization of the Cabinet
Councils, the current involvement of new principals and staffs,
and the completion of White House staff transitions, it may be
time to examine the following:
How can both the White House and Department/Agency
staffs become most productively involved in shaping and
executing the President's domestic agenda over the next
three years?
How is the Domestic Policy process supposed to function?
What are the proper roles for all participants?
What actions should be taken to ensure that the Domestic
Policy Council provides a useful forum to both Cabinet
Officers/Agency Heads and Senior White House Staff?
I have reviewed the Jan 85 draft proposal which attempts to
formally define the Domestic Policy process and which
proposes organizational changes which ultimately developed into
our current system. At this time, however, it would seem that
such a formal document is neither necessary nor desireable.
However, a simple memo with an organizational model and brief
functional statements would serve as a helpful catalyst towards
anwsering the questions posed above. Such a memo to DPC members
would also emphasize their role in both policy development and
implementation, and could strenghten the participation of their
staffs in Working Groups and in the Executive Secretariat. It
could also clarify the roles of the DPC supporting structure
(OCA, the DPC staff, and OPD) without need for a more formal
document.
If you desire, I will further develop and staff these ideas, and
prepare a short, simple memo to the DPC members. This memo could
be followed by discussions within each of the organizational
elements.
THE PRESIDENT'S
ESTIC POLICY PROCESS
CABINET GOVERNMENT PROVIDES
A MEANS FOR DELIBERATE CONSIDERATION OF MAJOR POLICY
ISSUES WHICH AFFECT THE INTERESTS of MORE THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY."
- PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET
MARCH ", 1981
RR
SINCE THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARIAT IS
DOMESTIC
POLICY COUNCIL
"INACTIVE", THE DPC
(DPC)
PLNG GROUP WITH SUPPORT
DPC EXECUTIVE
FROM THE DPC STAFF
SECRETARIAT
Now FILLS THIS Beock.
DPC WORKING GROUPS
DEPARTMENT & AGENCY STAFFS
OFFICE OF
DPC PLNG GROUP
OFFICE OF
CABINET AFFAIRS
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
(OCA)
DPC STARF
(OPD)
THIS is THE
SMOOTH INTO SHEET
WHICH H PREPARED
AND INFORMALLY DISTRIBUTED.
December 1985
ALTHOUGH THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARIAT IS "INACTIVE",
INFORMATION SHEET: The President's Domestic Pc
THE DPC STAFF Aeracy
FULFICES THIS FUNCTION!
Philosophy
The Domestic Policy process is structured to support
Cabinet Government
White House and Department/Agency staffs are jointly
involved in the policy development process
-Issues which develop from a wide range of sources are
properly analyzed, developed, and refined; divergent
viewpoints are expressed in decision options
Policy is set by formal decision and action is
initiated by Department/Agency personnel who were
directly involved in policy development
Structure
The Domestic Policy Council - Current Policy Development
(Focus is within 90 day window)
--DPC Senior Planning Group
DPC Executive Secretariat
--DPC Working Groups
-Department/Agency Staffs
The Office of Cabinet Affairs - Coordinates formal
communications between the Departments/Agencies and the
White House
The Office of Policy Development - Strategic Policy
Development (Focus is greater than 90 days)
Responsibilities
The Domestic Policy Council
Defines the Domestic Agenda
Formulates National Policy
DPC Senior Planning Group
Plans the Domestic Agenda
Monitors issue development
-
Manages the Policy decision process
DPC Executive Secretariat
Coordinates Policy proposals
Monitors Policy implementation
DPC Working Groups
Frame Policy issues
Analyze supporting information
Develop Policy proposals and decision options
Department/Agency Staffs
Propose Policy issues
Staff and support Working Groups
Implement Presidential Policy decisions
The Office of Cabinet Affairs
Represents White House Senior Staff
Coordinates formal communications
Monitors Policy Development
The Office of Policy Development
Articulates the Strategic Domestic Agenda
Provides Strategic Policy Development
Participates in DPC decision process
DOMESTIC POLICY ELOPMENT PROCESS
POLICY DECISION
R.R.
GUIDANCE
CABINET
DIRECTION
WH SENIOR
DECISION
OFFICER
STAFF
MGMT
DISCUSSION
DECISION
WH
WH
DOMESTIC POLICY
OCA
OPD
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
COUNCIL
COORDINATION
r
STRATEGIC
POLICY
5 83110
DPC SENIOR
PLANNING
SCHEDULING
GROUP
A
DEVELOPMENT
ISSUE
IDENTIFICATION
INPUT
Paicy
DEPT/AGENCY
LEAD AGENCY
DPC
R.R's
OR
ISSUE
AGENDA
STAFFS
EXECUTIVE
WORKING GROUP
DEVELOPMENT
SECRETARIAT
PLANNING &
SUPPORT
DPC
COMMUNICATION & SUPPORT
STAFF
DOMESTIC POLICY REVIEW
January 1986
I. Executive Secretariat Review
The Domestic Policy Development Process
Recap of 1985 accomplishments
OMB presentation of budget-driven policy issues
1986
1987
1988-1991
OPD Strategic Policy Initiatives
Currently active issues
Decision implementation status
Working Group reports
Potential future issues
Agency reports
II. Domestic Policy Council Review
Recap of 1985 actions and accomplishments
Review of 1986 agenda
Presentation and discussion of long range initiatives
III. Presidential Review of Domestic Policy
BoB,
THIS WAS A PROPOSAL
FOR A SERIES OF
REVIEW AND PLANNING
MEETINGS. IT NEWR
MATERIALIZED - WE DID
OUR WRITTEN ANNUAL
REPORT INSTEAD.
CRa.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
February 26, 1981
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
The membership of each Cabinet Council has been finalized.
The Cabinet Councils are designed to operate as subgroups of
the full Cabinet, with the President presiding. Full Cabinet
meetings will continue to focus on broad issues affecting
the entire government and on overall budgetary and fiscal
matters.
Cabinet Council procedures have been developed and endorsed
by the President. The procedures are intended to create an
orderly process for reviewing issues requiring a decision by
the President.
The Cabinet Council procedures are:
Each Cabinet Council will be chaired by the President.
*
Each Cabinet Council has a designated chairman prc
tempore who will guide the direction of the Council
and will serve as the chairman of working sessions
in which the President is not in attendance.
*
An executive secretary will be appointed for each
Cabinet Council from the Office of Policy Development.
This individual, working with the Office of Cabinet
Administration, will coordinate the activities of
each Cabinet Council including the preparation and
distribution of agendas and meeting summaries. This
activity will be supplemented by a secretariat for
each Cabinet Council, composed of the executive
secretary, representatives of the member departments,
and other personnel as needed, to prepare background
materials, refine policy options and recommendations,
and otherwise assist the Cabinet Council.
*
Issues will be sent to Cabinet Councils by the Office
of Cabinet Administration. Notification of such
assignments will be communicated immediately to all
Cabinet members to assure full opportunity to parti-
cipate in consideration of each issue.
*
Presidential decisions, made in or after Cabinet Council
meetings, will follow full discussion by any Cabinet
member who wishes to participate. Council meetings
are open to any member of the Cabinet. Decisions will
be reported to the full Cabinet as they occur. When
full Cabinet review is required, the matter will be
set for a meeting of the full Cabinet.
#
CABINET COUNCIL ON COMMERCE AND TRADE
Secretary of Commerce, Chairman Pro Tempore
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Attorney General
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Transportation
U.S. Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
* The Vice President
* Counsellor to the President
* Chief of Staff
CABINET COUNCIL ON HUMAN RESOURCES
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Chairman Pro Tempore
Attorney General
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of Education
* The Vice President
* Counsellor to the President
* Chief of Staff
CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman Pro Tempore
Secretary of State
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Transportation
Director, Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
* The Vice President
*
Counsellor to the President
*
Chief of Staff
CABINET COUNCIL ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
Secretary of the Interior, Chairman Pro Tempore
Attorney General
Secreatry of Agriculture
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of Energy
* The Vice President
* Counsellor to the President
* Chief of Staff
CABINET COUNCIL ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
Secretary of Agriculture, Chairman Pro Tempore
Secretary of State
Secretary .of the Interior
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Transportation
U.S. Trade Representative
*
The Vice President
*
Counsellor to the President
*
Chief of Staff
* Ex officio member
#2
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)
For Immediate Release
April 11, 1985
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Today I am announcing the creation of two cabinet-level bodies --
the Economic Policy Council and the Domestic Policy Council -- to
assist me in the formulation and execution of domestic and economic
policy. I will chair both Councils, These two Councils will
replace the seven existing Cabinet Councils and the Senior
Interagency Group-International Economic Policy. The new entities
will streamline policy development and decision making. Together
with the National Security Council, they will serve as the primary
channels for advising me on policy matters.
The Economic Policy Council will be composed of the Secretaries of
State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, the Director of
Office of Management and Budget, the United States Trade
Representative and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.
It will provide advice to me concerning all aspects of national and
international economic policy. The heads of the national security
community departments and agencies and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs will participate in Council
meetings whenever international policy or budget matters are
discussed. In my absence, the Secretary of the Treasury will serve
as Chairman Pro-Tempore.
The Domestic Policy Council will be composed of the Attorney
General, the Secretaries of the Interior, Health and Human Services,
Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy and Education,
and-the Director of Office of Management and Budget. It will
provide advice to me on domestic and social policy. In my absence
the Attorney General will serve as Chairman Pro Tempore.
The heads of non-member departments and agencies will be invited to
participate in either Council's deliberations whenever matters
affecting their organizations are on the agenda. The Vice President
and Chief of Staff will serve as ex-officio members of both
Councils.
The new, streamlined decision making process enhances my commitment
to cabinet government. It will provide for added accountability and
efficiency in formulating and implementing policy.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)
For Immediate Release
April 11, 1985
FACT SHEET
Economic Policy Council
Domestic Policy Council
In order to provide better policy coordination, formulation and
implementation, the President today announced the creation of two
new cabinet-level councils, the Economic Policy Council and the
Domestic Policy Council, to advise him on economic and domestic
policy issues.
The Economic Policy Council will consider those policy issues
that are primarily economic in nature; the Domestic Policy
Council will consider those policy issues that are not primarily
economic in nature.
These new councils build on the President's commitment to cabinet
government and to the inclusion of department and agency heads in
the Administration's decision-making process.
General Features
The streamlined, consolidated system will help clarify respon-
sibility and enhance accountability for formulating and imple-
menting economic and domestic policy.
O
The two new councils will replace the following:
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade
Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs
Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture
Cabinet Council on Human Resources
Cabinet Council on Legal Policy
Cabinet Council on Management and Administration
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the
Environment
Senior Interagency Group on International Economic
Policy
o
The Economic Policy Council, the Domestic Policy
Council and the National Security Council will serve as
the primary channels for advising the President on
policy.
O
The Vice President and the Chief of Staff will serve as
ex-officio members of both the Economic and Domestic
Policy Councils.
- 2 -
Economic Policy Council
The increasing interrelatedness of the U.S. and international
economies illustrates the importance of establishing a process
that will examine economic issues in a comprehensive integrated
way. The Economic Policy Council will provide the President with
a single entity to advise him on domestic and international
economic policy.
Membership
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
Heads of the national security community departments
and agencies and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs will participate in council
meetings when international policy or budget matters
are discussed.
Chairmanship
The President will chair meetings of the Economic Policy
Council. In his absence, the Secretary of the Treasury, who
will serve as Chairman Pro Tempore, will preside at meetings
of the Council.
Responsibilities
The Council will have the responsibility for advising the
President on all aspects of national and international
economic policy, and for overseeing the coordination and
implementation of the Administration's economic policies.
Staff
The staff of the Council shall be headed by an Executive
Secretary who will report to the Chief of Staff through the
Cabinet Secretary.
Like the current cabinet councils, the Economic Policy
Council will rely heavily on interagency subcabinet level
Working Groups. This will enable it to utilize fully the
expertise and resources of the departments and agencies, and
to provide a structure through which departmental initia-
tives can be considered fully.
Domestic Policy Council
The Domestic Policy Council will provide the President with a
single entity to advise him on domestic and social policy. By
focusing decision making and advice through a single channel for
domestic policy issues, this will enhance the prospects for
developing such policies in a comprehensive and integrated way.
- 3 -
Chairmanship
The President will chair meetings of the Domestic Policy
Council. In his absence, the Attorney General, who will
serve as Chairman Pro Tempore, will preside at meetings of
the Council.
Responsibilities
The Council will have responsibility for advising the
President on all aspects of domestic policy issues, and for
overseeing the coordination and implementation of the
Administration's domestic policies.
Staff
The staff of the Council shall be headed by an Executive
Secretary who will report to the Chief of Staff through the
Cabinet Secretary.
Like the current cabinet councils, the Domestic Policy
Council will rely heavily on interagency subcabinet level
Working Groups. This will enable it to fully utilize the
expertise and resources of the departments and agencies, and
to provide a structure through which departmental initia-
tives can be considered fully.
Overall Coordination
The White House Chief of Staff will have responsibility for
ensuring that the activities of the National Security Council,
the Economic Policy Council, and the Domestic Policy Council are
fully coordinated. He will also have the responsibility for
assigning topics to a particular Council.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)
For Immediate Release
April 11, 1985
FACT SHEET
Economic Policy Council
Domestic Policy Council
In order to provide better policy coordination, formulation and
implementation, the President today announced the creation of two
new cabinet-level councils, the Economic Policy Council and the
Domestic Policy Council, to advise him on economic and domestic
policy issues.
The Economic Policy Council will consider those policy issues
that are primarily economic in nature; the Domestic Policy
Council will consider those policy issues that are not primarily
economic in nature.
These new councils build on the President's commitment to cabinet
government and to the inclusion of department and agency heads in
the Administration's decision-making process.
General Features
The streamlined, consolidated system will help clarify respon-
sibility and enhance accountability for formulating and imple-
menting economic and domestic policy.
The two new councils will replace the following:
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade
Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs
Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture
Cabinet Council on Human Resources
Cabinet Council on Legal Policy
Cabinet Council on Management and Administration
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the
Environment
Senior Interagency Group on International Economic
Policy
The Economic Policy Council, the Domestic Policy
Council and the National Security Council will serve as
the primary channels for advising the President on
policy.
The Vice President and the Chief of Staff will serve as
ex-officio members of both the Economic and Domestic
Policy Councils.
Executive department and здерам heads who are not
- 2 -
Economic Policy Council
The increasing interrelatedness of the U.S. and international
economies illustrates the importance of establishing a process
that will examine economic issues in a comprehensive integrated
way. The Economic Policy Council will provide the President with
a single entity to advise him on domestic and international
economic policy.
Membership
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
Heads of the national security community departments and
agencies and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs will participate in council meetings when
international policy or budget matters are discussed.
Chairmanship
The President will chair meetings of the Economic Policy
Council. In his absence, the Secretary of the Treasury, who
will serve as Chairman Pro Tempore, will preside at meetings
of the Council.
Responsibilities
The Council will have the responsibility for advising the
President on all aspects of national and international
economic policy, and for overseeing the coordination and
implementation of the Administration's economic policies.
Staff
The staff of the Council shall be headed by an Executive
Secretary who will report to the Chief of Staff through the
Cabinet Secretary.
Like the current cabinet councils, the Economic Policy
Council will rely heavily on interagency subcabinet level
Working Groups. This will enable it to utilize fully the
expertise and resources of the departments and agencies, and
to provide a structure through which departmental initia-
tives can be considered fully.
Domestic Policy Council
The Domestic Policy Council will provide the President with a
single entity to advise him on domestic and social policy. By
focusing decision making and advice through a single channel for
domestic policy issues, this will enhance the prospects for
developing such policies in a comprehensive and integrated way.
Membership
- 3 -
Chairmanship
The President will chair meetings of the Domestic Policy
Council. In his absence, the Attorney General, who will
serve as Chairman Pro Tempore, will preside at meetings of
the Council.
Responsibilities
The Council will have responsibility for advising the
President on all aspects of domestic policy issues, and for
overseeing the coordination and implementation of the
Administration's domestic policies.
Staff
The staff of the Council shall be headed by an Executive
Secretary who will report to the Chief of Staff through the
Cabinet Secretary.
Like the current cabinet councils, the Domestic Policy
Council will rely heavily on interagency subcabinet level
Working Groups. This will enable it to fully utilize the
expertise and resources of the departments and agencies, and
to provide a structure through which departmental initia-
tives can be considered fully.
Overall Coordination
The White House Chief of Staff will have responsibility for
ensuring that the activities of the National Security Council,
the Economic Policy Council, and the Domestic Policy Council are
fully coordinated. He will also have the responsibility for
assigning topics to a particular Council.
# # #
THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
A Presentation to the
OPM "Administration of Public Policy" Seminar
Denver, Colorado
March 24, 1986
INTRODUCTION
Good Morning! I trust that everyone had a boring weekend and
that your' re all happy to be "back in school" on Monday morning!
As I looked over the many interesting topics in your program in
preparation for this presentation, I thought that maybe I should
be on the "listening side" rather than than the "talking side" at
this seminar. And now, as I look out over this room and see the
wealth of experience assembled here, I'm even more convinced that
I may be able to learn more today than I could hope to teach.
I'm sure that many of you have a great interest in our Domestic
Policy. This morning I hope to pass along some information on
Presidential decision making and to stimulate group discussion on
the policy process as well as several domestic issues.
My presentation will be organized into three main parts:
Government; Presidential Decision Making and the Philosophy of Cabinet
Developing Domestic Policy; and,
An Overview of current Domestic Issues.
If we have time, I would also like to focus on one specific
domestic issue which should be of interest to all of you:
Management and the FY87 Budget.
I encourage you to ask questions during the presentation,
topic. and I will set aside time for discussion at the end of each
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING AND CABINET GOVERNMENT
Background
Congressional decision making is often called translucent because
of its open nature. (Of course, that's if and when decisions are
actually made!) After a few days on the hill, an observer can
easily begin to recognize the Congressional system and understand
their decision making process. Presidential decision making, on
z
ther hand, is sometimes viewed much more "mysteriously" -
in large part, to the "closed door" nature of most
dential meetings. But I also think that this impression is
the significantly different approaches which recent
dents have taken towards policy development. I hope to
1 some of the "mystery" this morning.
importance of Presidential decision making is probably
itively obvious to most of you. But it takes on an even
ater significance when the President's "center stage" role is
sidered within our democratic system which is solidly based in
principle of division of power. Although many have said that
President only has the power to persuade, it is essential
he and his advisors recognize the true weight of their
fluence, understand the factors which impact their decisions,
proceed in a thoughtful, preplanned manner I'm reminded of
newly assigned Captain of a battleship.
(insert battleship joke)
In all seriousness, Presidents also have to watch for reefs and
lighthouses. Their decisions cannot usually be made by starting
with a clean slate and a free hand. Decisions are often
influenced by:
Campaign promises;
The decisions of previous Presidents; or,
Unforeseen external events.
Decisions must also be made recognizing implementation
constraints directly impacting the executive branch such as:
Congressional use of budget and oversight powers to
directly influence the actions of Cabinet Officers;
The influence of constituencies who feel that they should
be represented by Cabinet Departments and major Agencies;
and,
The large, complex executive branch supporting structure
which must be called upon to implement policy decisions,
i.e. all of us!
In his book Presidential Decision Making, Roger Porter discusses
three basic strategies which recent president's have followed to
organize the pattern of advice which they receive from their
immediate staff and from executive departments and agencies.
(Roger served on the Economic Policy Council during the Ford
Administration and until last year was the Director of the Office
of Policy Development for President Reagan I think his book
is
available in the Center library for those of you who want to
pursue this topic a little further.)
Executive Secretary of the
Cahined
Although the three basic decision making strategies are not
ally exclusive, they can be categorized as: Adhocracy,
ralized Management, and Multiple Advocacy. Let's briefly
at the characteristics of each of these approaches:
Adhocracy, there are very few regular or systematic
nnels to provide advice to the President. Instead, the
President often distributes assignments and selects whom he
tens to and when. Different advisors may be given competing
gnments to develop an initiative. Random distribution of
assignments and responsibilities can often result in "turf"
fattles. (FDR created considerable internal chaos using this
approach; LBJ tried this strategy with mixed results.) Adhocracy
ften emerges in the early weeks and months of a new
alministration as the principle officials learn about each other
and begin to govern after months of campaigning. As its name
implies, Adhocracy relies on ad hoc groups and arrangements, and
usually operates under the direction of advocates. The degree of
departmental participation depends upon the individual who
organizes the information for the President and will vary
considerably from issue to issue. Recent examples of policies
developed by advocates using this approach are: the Carter energy
program developed by James Schlesinger; the welfare reform
proposals which Joseph Califano also developed for President
Carter; and the Carter tax reform proposals developed by Michael
Blumenthal.
Centralized Management emphasizes heavy reliance on the White
House staff and the Executive Office of the President. Ideas,
proposals, and department recommendations are filtered by these
staffs before they are presented to the President. This approach
usually grows from a desire for analysis and recommendations from
individuals who share the President's perspective. In this
system, the President's staff not only closely manages the flow
of communications between the departments and the President, but,
"in theory", it also provides neutral, objective analysis, and
structures policy alternatives to transcend departmental
parochialism. This approach began to dominate the Nixon White
House, and resulted in reduced reliance upon the Cabinet and
considerable staff growth as the President's advisors attempted
to duplicate and compete with the analytical depth of the various
departments and agencies.
By contrast, Multiple Advocacy is an open system designed to
systematically expose the President to competing arguments and
viewpoints with well defined policy options. Positions are
personnally presented by the advocates themselves. However,
chaos is avoided by a well defined process which is managed by an
"honest broker" who ensures that all interested parties are
represented and that the debate is structured and balanced. This
approach emphasizes careful weighing of views, and is based on
the philosophy that the best method for developing policy is an
orderly, systematic and balanced competition of ideas. The
st broker and his staff do not serve as biased intermediaries
ween departmental advocates and the President; but, they are
more than just gatekeepers. They seek to promote a genuine
etition of ideas, to broaden the range of options or
ngthen inadequately represented viewpoints, and, in short,
work to ensure due process and quality control.
decision-making approaches have certain advantages and
itations and Presidents have made versitile use of all three
time to time. However, given proper staff behavior and
inuity (and sometimes that's asking a lot!), multiple
pcacy presents several significant advantages:
All points of view are represented and alternative courses
of action are fully explored;
Policy is developed within the context of the political
forces which will later impact its successful
implementation; and,
The President's influence is strengthened throughout the
executive branch by a process that mobilizes resources more
systematically than does adhocracy and more completely than
does centralized management.
There's no doubt it - Multiple Advocacy requires teamwork! It
relies heavily upon a stable core of senior advisors and
principle advocates who are willing to share responsibility for
collectively providing the President with:
breadth and depth in his decision making
over an entire range of issues
in broad policy areas.
But Multiple Advocacy works! The President's success to date is
in no small part due to his basic decision-making philosophy and
its supporting structure.
Philosphy
The President's Domestic Policy process was developed around the
principles of multiple advocacy and is structured to support
Cabinet Government.
The White House and the Department and Agency staffs are
jointly involved in the policy development process;
Issues which surface from a wide range of sources are
properly analyzed, developed, and refined on an interagency
basis;
5
Divergent viewpoints are expressed and debated internally
and issue papers are prepared with competing decision
options;
Policy is set by formal decision after cabinet level
discussion; and,
Policy is implemented by Department and Agency officials who
were directly involved in policy development.
The First Term - The Cabinet Council System
(Use viewgraphs to describe the President's previous cabinet
council system.)
The Cabinet Council system, which was utilized during the
first term, can be described by the following key points:
It was a high-level management tool to provide, as the
President stated,
"
a means for deliberate consideration
of major policy issues which affect the interests of more
"
than one department or agency.
The full Cabinet was consulted for government-wide issues.
However, seven Cabinet Councils were established in the key
policy areas of: Commerce and Trade; Economic Affairs; Food
and Agriculture; Human Resources; Natural Resources and
Environment; Legal Policy; and Management and
Administration.
Each Cabinet Council was chaired by the President, had a
Chairman Pro Tempore of Cabinet Rank, and included selected
Agency Heads and White House Officials.
The Councils included the Vice President, the Assistant to
the President for Policy Development, and the Chief of Staff
as Ex Officio members.
Each Council had an Executive Secretary to manage the
process and serve as an "honest broker".
The Councils allowed the President to function as the "Chief
Executive Officer" of a "corporate styled" government.
Chund Boad
New issues and problems were anticipated and "crisis" issues
were handled within an established framework with White
House and Agency officials operating as a team.
Second Term - The Domestic Policy Council
On April 11, 1985, the President announced the creation of
two cabinet-level bodies to assist him in the formulation
and execution of domestic and economic policy.
The Domestic and Economic Policy Councils replaced the seven
Cabinet Councils with the intent of streamlining policy
development and decision making.
The two new councils together with the National Security
Council constitute the primary channels for advising the
President on policy matters. The budget system also
provides a parallel process for addressing issues which are
primarily budget driven.
From the President's perspective, however, the shift did not
represent a major change since policy decisions were
presented to him in substantially the same manner as under
the Cabinet Council system.
The Domestic Policy Council is chaired by the President and
provides him with a single advisory group on domestic and
social policy. The Attorney General serves as the Chairman
Pro Tempore. Other members are:
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Energy
The Secretary of Education
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
The Vice President, the Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to
the President for Policy Development serve as Ex Officio
members of the DPC. Other interested Cabinet Officers and
Agency Heads attend DPC meetings when they have an interest
in specific issues.
The Council staff is headed by an Executive Secretary who
fulfills the role of "honest broker" and reports to the
Chief of Staff through the Cabinet Secretary.
The DPC relies heavily on interagency subcabinet level
Working Groups to fully utilize the expertise and resources
of the departments and agencies, and to provide a structure
through which department initiatives can be fully
considered.
DOMESTIC POLICY PROCESS
bach
The strength of cabinet government lies in the full
involvement of departments and major agencies in proposing,
developing, and implementing the President's policy.
Drawbacks, such as additional coordination and time delays,
can be minimized by an effective organizational structure
and an efficient decision process which is known and
understood by all "players".
The President is very sensitive to the contributions which
line officials from the departments and agencies can make in
the decision-making process.
He wants to get advice directly from the people who have a
stake in the issue without filtering by White House
intermediaries - even if this approach requires competing
Key ISSUR
views to be debated in front of him at council meetings.
In addition to council discussions, the President also likes
to review issue papers which outline options and their
associated advantages and disadvantages before making a
decision.
A primary objective of the decision making process is to
array before the President, in a simple and direct manner,
all of the information he needs to make an informed
decision. The process ensures that everyone gets his day in
court.
Once the decision-making process is completed and policy is
established, the President then expects all officials in his
Administration to fully support his final decision.
Structure
Three principle groups within the White House staff are
actively involved in the Domestic Policy Process.
(Use viewgraph showing organizational elements)
The Office of Policy Development is a small group of senior
analysts and advisors who report to the Assistant to the
President for Policy Development. They focus on strategic
policy development and generally work on issues or
initiatives which will surface several months in the future.
Once they have developed a specific proposal, it is input
into the Domestic Policy Council process in much the same
way as a proposal from a department or agency. Similiarly,
OPD staffers participate in analyzing and shaping department
and agency proposals as they proceed through the DPC
process.
8
The Domestic Policy Council generally focuses on current
policy development and manages issues which will be ready
for discussion and decision within a 90 day planning window.
The council staff is headed by an Executive Secretary (my
boss - Dr. Ralph Bledsoe) who manages the council process.
Most of the information gathering, issue analysis, and
development of options is performed within interagency
working groups which generally include Assistant Secretaries
supported by their respective staffs. Issue papers are
physically prepared by the Working Groups and are presented
to the DPC for review, discussion and decision.
The Office of Cabinet Affairs focuses on day-to-day issues
and decisions and coordinates all formal communications
between the Departments and Agencies and the White House.
They provide a single formal point of contact between the
White House and Cabinet Staffs.
Summary of Responsibilities
The Office of Policy Development
Articulates the strategic domestic agenda
Provides strategic policy development
Participates in the DPC decision process
The Office of Cabinet Affairs
Represents the White House Senior Staff
Coordinates formal communications
Monitors policy development
The Domestic Policy Council
Defines the domestic agenda
Formulates national policy
Directs issue-oriented Working Groups which:
Frame policy issues
- Analyze supporting information
Develop policy proposals and decision options
- - Works with Department and Agency Staffs which:
Propose policy issues
Staff and support Working Groups
-- Implement Presidential decisions
Policy Development and Implementation
Once issues are identified as appropriate agenda items for
consideration by the DPC, they are usually channeled into
one of the topic-oriented standing Working Groups, or a
special short-term Working Group may be established to
handle an issue in a more specific topic area that requires
specialized inter-agency analysis.
Working Groups will generally meet several times a month,
depending upon the urgency of the issue, and will report
back to the Council once they have developed specific
options and, hopefully, a consensus recommendation.
Sometimes Working Groups which are handling more complex
issues, schedule a series of presentations to the DPC over
the course of several months. Other issues are "finalized"
more quickly and Council decisions are obtained within a
matter of weeks (or even days in extremely urgent cases).
In most cases the Chairman Pro Tempore will convene the
Council without the President for the initial discussion of
an issue. In some cases, where a general consensus exists
for a particular course of action, policy can be set by the
Council without meeting with the President. This approach
is consistent with the Administration's philosophy of making
decisions at the lowest responsible level within government.
If differences exist after thorough analysis and discussion,
competing options are framed by the interested parties with
their respective pros and cons and presented to the
President personally and in a written issue paper. In many
cases, alternative implementation strategies and the
politics associated with a particular issue are also weighed
in the Council before a final decision is made.
The President's time is a valuable commodity. But, as
Chairman of the Council, he is an active participant in DPC
decisions. As I indicated earlier, true cabinet government
facilitates unconstrained debate between alternative points
of view before the final decision is made by the Chief
Executive.
But, the best policy decision in the world is worthless if
it cannot be effectively implemented. Once a DPC decision
is made, the charge to implement it is handed back to the
lead agency which originated the proposal. If they "did
their homework", the Council probably supported their
position and they should have a "head of steam" to sustain
them in initiating the required action. If their proposal
was modified, they can feel satisfied that they were active
participants in the policy development process, and that
they are now charged to implement the sense of the Council
and the decision of the President.
Whether administrative or legislative action is required,
the President's decision-making process allows objections
within the Executive Branch to be made and hopefully
resolved before a decision is made and action is initiated.
Although the upfront work may take time and sometimes prove
difficult, experience has proven that it is better to work
out the problems first, and to then approach implementation
with a unified Administration position and the full support
of the President.
DOMESTIC ISSUES
America's Agenda for the Future
The President's message to the Congress following the State
of the Union address outlined the key domestic issues facing
our government in the months and years ahead.
(Refer to the fact sheet for any discussion or questions)
The message had four broad themes:
Preparing for a decade of economic growth;
Defining our values for a modern age;
Advancing the technological era; and,
Expanding the family of free nations.
The major topics included under the two domestic themes
were:
-Education
- -Welfare
- - -Health
Justice and Public Safety
- Personal Freedom
Environment
Federalism
-Technology
At this point, I'd like to focus on those issues which are
of greatest interest to the group. Perhaps we could start
with a few questions and stimulate a more general group
discussion. I'll try to focus on facts and process and
leave the political debates for those who are "diligently
toiling" in Washington.
AGEMENT AND THE FY 87 BUDGET
roduction
We have some time left, and as I mentioned earlier, I think
it would be interesting to talk a little bit about an issue
in which the DPC is deeply involved - improving government
management.
President Reagan may be unique among recent Presidents in
his personal interest in making government work.
You may be familiar with his Management Improvement Program
- Reform 88 - which was launched four years ago. This
management effort continues and is now being expanded.
Budget Decisions
This year, OMB has taken another major step forward in
management improvement by developing the FY 87 budget as an
integral part of a government-wide management
decision making process. This process is designed to focus
on our Federal bottom line - effective government within a
balanced budget - in a manner similar to every major
corporation in America.
Management decision rules we.re used to structure a theme
oriented FY 1987 budget which cuts across agency lines.
These decision rules can be simply stated by a series of
questions:
"Is this a function that the Federal government should be
performing?"
"If not, by whom should it be accomplished?"
By another level of government through devolution or
Federalism?'
'By the private sector through asset sales, privatization,
or contracting out?"
Or maybe it shouldn't be performed at all - should it be
just merely terminated?"
"If, on the other hand, this function should be accomplished
by the Federal government:"
Is it presently being performed at the right level, or
should it be expanded, contracted, or frozen?"
"Also, can it be accomplished more cost-effectively as a
result of reducing waste, fraud, and abuse; productivity
improvements; efficiency enhancements; or changes in program
delivery?"
These rules were used to shape this year's budget and they
will also be used to develop the FY 88 budget next year.
I'm sure that this approach wiil become the subject of many
discussions and political debates in the months ahead.
)rm 88
An expanded Reform 88 effort will also be undertaken in the
months ahead to support management's ability to make budget
decisions based upon better information and improved
teamwork throughout the departments and agencies.
But looking back, Reform 88 achievements to date are truly
noteworthy:
$63 billion in cost avoidance was realized by stopping
waste, fraud, and abuse.
125 million copies/year of publications have been
eliminated.
Streamlined regulatory processes have saved 500 million
hours/year.
Cash flow management reforms have reduced costs by $3.2
billion over 6 years.
332 accounting systems will be reduced to one per agency
by 1990.
134 payroll/personnel systems will be reduced to 12 by
1992.
And these are just a few examples. There are also many
more past and soon to be realized accomplishments.
The Reform 88 expansion will focus on total management
rather than administrative systems. There are thousands of
individual projects included in the expanded program.
However, three key priorities are: budget/financial
accounting reform, credit management, and productivity.
Budget/financial system reform:
Despite the use of "decision rules" and this year's "theme
oriented" approach to budget development, the budget still
does not adequately reflect program plans across agency
lines.
Our Federal government needs a real financial management
system which ties the budget process into the financial
accounting system to facilitate programmatic follow-up.
We also need to introduce a capital budget within our
current budget to improve management of our capital
investment decisions.
- - OMB will be working with the agencies to correct these
problems.
Credit Management:
The Federal government is the largest financial
intermediary in the United States. It is allocating credit,
directly or indirectly, worth around a trillion dollars.
The major needs to be addressed in this area are:
Stressing credit management rather than just getting the
loans out;
Developing an overall credit policy; and
Getting proven private sector tools into the hands of
agency managers.
(Refer to OMB briefing for questions on specific
initiatives)
The President's Productivity Improvement Program:
In a July 31, 1985 message to Congress, the President
announced a new government-wide program to improve
productivity 20% by 1992 in selected high-priority
functions. More recently, on February 25th, he signed an
Executive Order directing agencies to develop productivity
improvement programs.
The purpose of this initiative is to improve the quality,
timeliness and efficiency with which Federal services are
delivered to the public by becoming more productive, more
cost-conscious and more quality-conscious at all levels of
government service.
Agencies will set their own goals and will focus on
results - not process.
Agencies will be required to establish policies which make
it clear that productivity improvement is everyone's job,
and that those who contribute and participate in
problem-solving will be rewarded.
--Achieving the President's goal will make a substantial
contribution to deficit reduction. But, properly achieving
this goal will also demonstrate to the American public that
while the Federal government is serious about cost cutting
and efficiency, we will also maintain high-quality and
timely services.
The Domestic Policy Council will be deeply involved in the
numerous policy decisions supporting this program. But, the
President's challenge is clear - he is asking all of you,
the leaders and managers of our government, to work with him
and his top managers to achieve better government.
--As the President said in his first inaugural address: "It
is not my intention to do away with Government, it is rather
to make it work.
And with that inspiring quote, it's time for me to stop.
I think that we still have time for a few more questions.
I would like to close by thanking all of you for your
attention and participation. I would also like to express
my appreciation to OPM and the Western Executive Seminar
Center for inviting me here to speak today. Good luck to
all of you and enjoy the rest of the week.
PLANNING PROCESS
RELIEVEN
POLICY
FURTHER
POLICY
DEVELOPMENT
REVIEW
POLICY
DECISIONS
PRESENTATION
IMPLEMENTA-
DEVELOPMENT
TION
. Basic
Overview
Specific
. Approve/
+ Imagural
, Legislative
Concepts
Propossis
Goals
Modify
Address
Activity
Legislative
, Set Priorities
. State of the
. Administrative
Assessment
Union
Action
Schedule
I
. "Markating"
. Budget
. Presidential
I
Twour
.T....
2D TERM
TRATION
}
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
ENVIRONMENT
2
COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)
For Immediate Release
April 11, 1985
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Today I am announcing the creation of two cabinet-level bodies --
the Economic Policy Council and the Domestic Policy Council -- to
assist me in the formulation and execution of domestic and
economic policy. I will chair both Councils. These two Councils
will replace the seven existing Cabinet Councils and the Senior
Interagency Group-International Economic Policy. The new
entities will streamline policy development and decision making.
Together with the National Security Council, they will serve as
the primary channels for advising me on policy matters.
The Economic Policy Council will be composed of the Secretaries
of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, the Director
of Office of Management and Budget, the United States Trade
Representative and the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors. It will provide advice to me concerning all aspects of
national and international economic policy. The heads of the
national security community departments and agencies and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will
participate in Council meetings whenever international policy or
budget matters are discussed. In my absence, the Secretary of
the Treasury will serve as Chairman Pro-Tempore.
The Domestic Policy Council will be composed of the Attorney
General, the Secretaries of the Interior, Health and Human
Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy
and Education, and the Director of Office of Management and
Budget. It will provide advice to me on domestic and social
policy. In my absence the Attorney General will serve as
Chairman Pro Tempore.
The heads of non-member departments and agencies will be invited
to participate in either Council's deliberations whenever matters
affecting their organizations are on the agenda. The Vice
President and Chief of Staff will serve as ex-officio members of
both Councils.
The new, streamlined decision making process enhances my
commitment to cabinet government. It will provide for added
accountability and efficiency in formulating and implementing
policy.
# # #
December 1985
NFORMATION SHEET: The President's Domestic Policy Process
Philosophy
The Domestic Policy process is structured to support
Cabinet Government
- White House and Department/Agency staffs are jointly
involved in the policy development process
Issues which develop from a wide range of sources are
properly analyzed, developed, and refined; divergent
viewpoints are expressed in decision options
Policy is set by formal decision and action is
initiated by Department/Agency personnel who were
directly involved in policy development
Structure
The Domestic Policy Council - Current Policy Development
( Focus is within 96 day window)
DPC Senior Planning Group
DPC Executive Secretariat
- DPC Working Groups
-- Department/Agency Staffs
The Office of Cabinet Affairs - Coordinates formal
communications between the Departments/Agencies and the
White House
The Office of Policy Development - Strategic Policy
Development (Focus is greater than 90 days)
Responsibilities
The Domestic Policy Council
-- Defines the Domestic Agenda
--
Formulates National Policy
DPC Senior Planning Group
-- Plans the Domestic Agenda
--
Monitors issue development
- - Manages the Policy decision process
DPC Executive Secretariat
-
- Coordinates Policy proposals
-
- Monitors Policy implementation
DPC Working Groups
-- Frame Policy issues
-
- Analyze supporting information
-- Develop Policy proposals and decision options
Department/Agency Staffs
-- Propose Policy issues
-
- Staff and support Working Groups
-- Implement Presidential Policy decisions
C
The Office of Cabinet Affairs
- Represents White House Senior Staff
Coordinates formal communications
Monitors Policy Development
The Office of Policy Development
Articulates the Strategic Domestic Agenda
--
Provides Strategic Policy Development
Participates in DPC decision process
DOMESTIC POLICY ELOPMENT PROCESS
R.R
CABINET
WH SENIOR
OFFICER
STAFF
WH
WH
DOMESTIC POLICY
OCA
OPD
COUNCIL
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COORDINATION
DPC SENIOR
PLANNING
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STATE
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January 15, 1985
DRAFT
ORGANIZATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DOMESTIC POLICY
BACKGROUND
For the President's second term, we must improve the White House
domestic policy-making processes and mechanisms.
The President should receive the best possible support and advice
from the White House staff. And, domestic policies, once
decided, should set in motion actions to achieve the President's
policy agenda.
Follow-through at the White House level is heavily dependent on
two factors -- accountability and adequate staff resources.
O Focused accountability is vital for providing the President
with well-developed domestic policy options, and for ensuring
follow-through.
Currently, accountability is diffused and shared among
several White House officials and offices, including:
-
The Counsellor to the President
-
Assistant to the President for Policy Development
-
Director, Office of Cabinet Affairs (OCA)
- Director, Office of Policy Development (OPD)
- Director, Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE)
- Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Several offices under the Chief of Staff
O
As with national security policy development, sufficient
staff resources and structure are needed to support domestic
policy development with the quality, depth, and continuity of
staff necessary to assist the officer accountable.
White House staff resources for domestic policy development
are not sufficient or sufficiently focused organizationally.
OPD's FY 1985 appropriation is for 45 full-time permanent and
5 temporary employees, for a total of 50 full-time equivalent
(FTE) employees. (The OMB FY 1986 proposal is for 42 FTP and
2 temps, for a total of 44 FTE slots.) Of the 50 FTE
positions, 34 FTP and 4 temporaries are currently on board.
The vast majority of these are allocated to other activities
within the White House.
-
2 to the Office of the Counsellor
-
4 to the Office of Planning and Evaluation
-
4 to the Office of Cabinet Affairs
-
3 to the Drug Policy Office
-
2 to the Office of Policy Information
-
1 to the Public Liaison Office
-
4 to special OPD projects
2-2
DRAFT
Of the remainder, 4 are in OPD administration and 14, including
secretarial personnel support the seven Cabinet Council areas
(economic policy, commerce and trade, natural resources and
environment, human resources, legal policy, food and agriculture,
and management and administration.)
Thin staffing cannot provide the "critical mass" necessary for
across-the-board domestic policy formulation in support of the
President.
O Cabinet Secretaries must be involved in recognition of their
legitimate roles as principal policy advisors to the President.
Multi-agency interests are involved in practically all major
issues.
Cabinet Councils currently assure top-level agency participation
and multi-agency coordination. However, some officials take
their Cabinet Council roles more seriously than others, with the
result being uneven performance among the seven Cabinet Councils.
PROPOSAL FOR MANAGING PRESIDENTIAL DOMESTIC POLICY
It is strongly urged that a White House structure for domestic
policy be formed as originally intended by the statutory
authority that created the Domestic Council (now the Office of
Policy Development). For more on the Domestic Council system,
see the attached description of the Nixon-Ford Cabinet Level
Structures.
The proposed domestic policy structure would be comparable to and
organizationally parallel with the NSC. In the NSC model,
accountability for White House policy development, coordination,
and follow-through is focused in the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs. Sufficient staff resources are
provided to assist him, along with effective linkages to
responsible Cabinet officials without necessarily impinging on
their other organizational relationships to the President. (For
more information, see the attached description of the Assisant
for National Security Affairs.)
1. Assistant for Domestic Policy Affairs
It is recommended that a position, Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy Affairs, be established, to replace the
Assistant for Policy Development. The duties and resources of
the following offices would be transferred to him:
Policy functions of the Counsellor to the President
Office of Policy Development
Office of Cabinet Affairs
Office Planning and Evaluation
Office of Policy Information
Policy functions of other appropriate offices
2-3
The duties of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy
Affairs would be to:
Develop, coordinate, and implement domestic policy as
approved by the President.
Staff and administer a new Office of Policy and Cabinet
Affairs.
Manage the Cabinet and Cabinet Councils support system.
Ensure that policy discussion papers are prepared and
distributed in advance to Cabinet and Cabinet
Councilparticipants.
Disseminate Presidentially approved documents through a
Domestic Policy Decision Directive System.
Domestic Cabinet Secretaries under this arrangement will continue
to serve as the President's principal policy advisors in their
respective areas, and thus be collectively and individually
responsible for the formulation, and execution of approved
policy.
Selected Cabinet Secretaries will continue to serve as Chairmen
Pro Tempore of Cabinet Councils, working closely with the
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and with OPCA.
Cabinet Council Working Groups will continue to provide
working-level expertise and executive secretariat support. The
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy Affairs will be an
ex officio member of each Cabinet Council. Cabinet Council
outcomes will continue to be selectively channeled into Cabinet
deliberations.
Duties and responsibilities above should be formally assigned by
the President in a Domestic Policy Decision Directive.
2. Office of Policy and Cabinet Affairs (OPCA)
It is proposed that a new White House Office of Policy and
Cabinet Affairs (OPCA), be formed by combining OPD, OCA, OPE,
OPI, and Drug Policy. OPCA should manage the policy decision
process for the President, and maintain a Domestic Policy
Directive System for follow-up.
OPCA should be composed of 50-75 FTE's exclusively devoted to the
support of the Assistant to the President and for the operation
and management of the Cabinet Councils.
3. Cabinet Council Restructuring
It is proposed that the Cabinet Council system be streamlined
by creating fewer, but stronger Cabinet Councils. Slightly
2-4
larger secretariats should exist in OPCA, along with dedicated
agency-level secretariats for improved responsiveness and
support. The suggested configuration would reduce Cabinet
Councils from seven to four, as follows:
Economic and Trade Affairs (CCET), includes CCCT's
responsibilities, and anticipates creation of a Department of
International Trade and Industry.
Natural Resources and Environment (CCNRE), includes CCFA's
responsibilities.
Human Resources and Entitlements (CCHRE), emphasizes
importance of entitlement structural reform in all agencies).
Management and Legal Policy (CCMLP), emphasizes policy
aspects of management; provides continuity with Ed Meese as
logical Chairman Pro Tempore).
A streamlined, active Cabinet Council system will further
strengthen OPCA and top-level agency support in the Presidential
decisionmaking process.
4. Domestic Policy Directives and Follow-Up Systems.
The current domestic policy process produces a large number of
Presidential decisions. Some are made in meetings of the Cabinet
or Cabinet Councils, others in White House Senior Staff meetings,
and other forums.
Systematic procedures are needed to clearly communicate
Presidential decisions, designate officials responsible for
carrying them out, provide additional guidance as necessary, and
follow up to ensure action on the President's directives.
The attached Chart depicts a proposed program decision process
that will produce Presidential decision Directives and required
follow-up actions to ensure that Presidential policies are being
implemented.
The proposed Presidential Directives would be brief, numbered,
signed by the President, addressed to the official (s) responsible
for action, and be managed by the proposed Office of Policy and
Cabinet Affairs (OPCA). OPCA would also establish appropriate
monitoring systems for evaluation of implementation of the
Directives.
2-5
NIXON-FORD CABINET LEVEL COUNCILS
Nixon Cabinet-Level Councils
Significant changes regarding the Cabinet's role in managing
domestic affairs occurred in Richard Nixon's presidency. Early
in his term, he formed five major Cabinet-level bodies:
the Council for Urban Affairs
the Council for Rural Affairs
the Environmental Quality Council
the Cabinet Committee for Economic Policy
the Council on International Economic Policy
These were later dismantled.
A Domestic Council consisting of Secretaries other than State and
Defense, was established by statutory reorganization plan in 1970
to integrate the Cabinet groups and, in Nixon's words, to serve
as a "domestic counterpart" of the NSC. The Domestic Council
staff was to provide support for Cabinet-level groups in major
policy areas. Ultimately, the Domestic Council evolved into a
mechanism which shifted the balance of power to the White House
staff and away from Cabinet departments. The Domestic Council
staff began to work with interagency task forces, bypassing
Cabinet officers, and became increasingly involved in routine
departmental operations.
In 1971, Nixon proposed an Executive Branch structure to merge
eight departments in four "super-cabinet" departments: Natural
Resources, Community Development, Human Resources, and Economic
Affairs. Congressional pressure made him promise to maintain the
autonomy of the Agriculture Department. Congressional opposition
and the distraction of Watergate killed the entire proposal.
Ford Cabinet+Level Entities
Gerald Ford retained the Domestic Council, but established new
Cabinet-level entities: the Economic Policy Board (EPB) and the
Energy Resources Council. The EPB was responsible for a broad
range of domestic and foreign economic policy issues, and met
more than 500 times in just over two years. Ford used the EPB
for economic policy making and attended a significant number of
its meetings. President Ford considered the EPB to be an
effective policy council, and a sustained, comprehensive, and
successful collegial attempt at advising him on economic policy
matters.
2-6
THE ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
In considering the establishment of an Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy Affairs, it is useful to examine the role and
duties of the Assistant for National Security Affairs and the
National Security Council.
The NSC includes as statutory members the President (Chairman),
the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense.
Advisers are the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other offcials as appropriate.
The function of the Council is to advise the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to national security.
The duties of the Assistant for National Security Affairs are
defined in a Statement By The President, issued January 12, 1982.
In consultation with the regular members of the NSC, he shall:
Develop, coordinate and implement national security policy as
approved by the President.
Determine and publish the agenda of NSC meetings.
Ensure that the necessary papers are prepared and -- except
in unusual circumstances -- distributed in advance to Council
members.
Staff and administer the National Security Council.
Prepare and, after approval by the President, disseminate
decision documents.
The Statement designates the Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence as the President's
principal advisors on foreign policy, defense policy, and
intelligence. policy, respectively. As such, they are responsible
for the formulation of policy, and for the execution of approved
policy in their respective areas.
The Statement also establishes "Senior Interdepartmental Groups,"
or SIGs, in each area, chaired by the Deputy Secretaries and
Director of Intelligence, respectively, to provide working-level
capability and permanent secretariat support. The Assistant for
National Security is a member of each SIG whose products are
channeled by him into the deliberations of the NSC. SIGs are
provided with additional support through specialized regional and
functional interagency groups.
The NSC staff is composed of some 70 FTE's, and provides
continuing support to the activities of the NSC.
PROGRAM DECISION PROCESS
POLICY
PROGRAM
DIRECTIVE
DECISION
PRESIDENT
DIRECTIVE
CABINET
OR
CABINET
DISCUSSION
COUNCIL
POLICY
POLICY
PROGRAM
PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS
RESTRUCTURING
DECISION
CONCEPTS
MEMO
2-7
2
1
PROGRAM
WORKING
DECISION
OPTIONS
GROUP
DEPARTMENTS,
OMB
RESULTS/
PROGRESS
REPORTING
Six Who Also Serve, Albeit Invisibly
General Edwin Meese III, in the area
retary Hodel is seen infrequently in
By Dick Kirschten
of domestic legal and social issues.
Washington because of extensive
The Iran-contra scandal may have
"The others tend to be what I guess
travel West of the Mississippi, where
dropped the poll ratings of President
you'd call supporting cast." Kingon
most of his agency's business is done.
Reagan and Vice President George
explained. "They have their own agen-
The programs overseen by Pierce at
Bush, but at least it has kept their
cies and they surely run them. But
the Housing and Urban Development
names and those of the Administra-
because they don't interact here very
Department are not matters of high
tion's top national security policy
much. they are not exposed to the
priority to the White House, and he
makers in the headlines.
White House press corps. And [as far
has not been aggressive about trying
But it has meant a virtual news
as celebrity is concerned] that makes
to alter that situation.
blackout for other agency heads.
the difference."
Behind his "country doctor" fa-
many of whom had already been fight-
Three second-tier Cabinet Secretar-
cade, Health and Human Services
ing a losing battle against anonymity.
ies. William J. Bennett at Education.
Secretary Bowen is seen as a shrewd
If public exposure is a politician's life-
Bill Brock at Labor and Elizabeth H.
operator committed to a pet project
blood, the Reagan Cabinet as a whole
Dole at Transportation. have managed
providing a solution to the problem of
is badly in need of a transfusion.
to avoid anonymity-Bennett because
catastrophic health care costs.
Even before the Iranian arms affair
he aggressively pursues publicity:
Commerce Secretary Baldrige. re-
began to unfold in November, the
Brock and Dole, largely because they
signed to a lesser role than he once
names of Otis R. Bowen, John S.
envisioned, remains an important
Herrington, Donald P. Hodel,
player on trade. "There's just no
Richard E. Lyng, Samuel R.
way the Secretary of Commerce
Pierce Jr. and even Malcolm
is going to be the lead negotiator
Baldrige had scarcely become
or the lead architect of trade pol-
household words. Those individ-
icy," Kingon said. "Mac IS an
uals, of course, are all Cabinet
executor of trade policy. His re-
Secretaries. But despite their
organization plan had some
prestigious titles, chauffeur-
merit, but it just was not destined
driven cars, $88,000-a-year sala-
to be in this Administration."
ries and other privileges, they
Energy Secretary Herrington
have all but disappeared into the
and Agriculture Secretary Lyng
depths of their plush and cavern-
similarly have been consigned to
ous offices.
supporting roles, little known out-
The low visibility of these "sec-
side the constituency groups with
ond-tier" officials stems in part
which they work.
from their personalities, but to a
Celebrity, of course, can be a
much larger degree, it has to do
relative thing. A poll conducted
with the nature of their jobs. The
for the President last fall in-
Cabinet, having grown large and
cluded a question designed to as-
cumbersome over the years, no
certain the relative popularity of
longer fits an earlier era's defini-
tion of being a small circle of
Richard A Bloom
individual Cabinet members The
winner. by a wide margin. was
presidential confidantes.
Treasury Secretary Baker
With 13 Cabinet-level depart-
Like most Republican political
ments-7 of them added since
Agriculture Secretary Richard E. Lyng
surveys these days. the poll sam-
1900-plus a half-dozen or more
He's part of the "invisible" Cabinet.
pling included a goodly share of
other officials accorded Cabinet
religious fundamentalists. and 1
rank by the President, it requires more
were well known to the press before
follow-up survey deduced that the
than 20 chairs to seat a full-fledged
taking posts in the Cabinet.
Treasury Secretary had been mis-
Reagan Cabinet meeting.
Kingon said that Bennett and Dole
taken for television evangelist Em
As a result, said senior hite
in particular are adept "outside
Bakker. who pronounces his name the
House aide Alfred H. Kingon. only a
marketeers and salesmen of their posi-
same way
small subgroup of "first-tier" Cabinet
tions." while relying heavily on strong
The most compelling reason
officers commands real influence with
deputies and inside staff organizations
Cabinet obscurity. however.
the President. The dominant players
to tend to the day-to-day management
that is usually the way the
are Secretary of State George P
of their departments. "Bennett is an
House wants it. In 1979. President
Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar W
ideologue and a good one. and Eliza-
Carter purged his Cabinet of
Weinberger and, until his illness. CIA
beth has a wonderful public relations
known figures. When he left office
director William J. Casey, in the
sense." Kingon said.
team included such names as Duncan
realm of national security policy:
Observers offer a variety of ex-
Goldschmidt. Hufstedler. Klutzni
Treasury Secretary James A. Baker
planations for the "disappearance" of
Landrieu and Marshall. Reagan
III, in economic affairs; and Attorney
other Cabinet members. Interior Sec-
lineup is every bit as famous.
276 NATIONAL JOURNAL 1/31/87
WHITE hot SF RH PORT
Cabinet Power
The Reagan Administration is evolving a form of Cabinet government in which great
authority is given to the few Cabinet Secretaries with their own activist agendas.
BY RONALD BROWNSTEIN
flow neatly through the carefully cut
else [outside of your department] under-
AND DICK KIRSCHTEN
channels of debate. The Cabinet councils
stood or cared about, you were better off
are a system for making domestic policy,
clearing it with one or two people at the
I
t's a conceit of every incoming Presi-
but not the only one or even always the
Office of Management and Budget
dent that he will be the first to use his
most important one, particularly in the
(OMB)."
Cabinet for something other than cere-
first term.
This Administration has never estab-
monial photographs. That sort of vague
"Every Cabinet member dealt with the
lished Cabinet government in the text-
good intention is usually discarded at
Cabinet council differently," said former
book sense, where Cabinet members col-
about the time that the first Cabinet
Agriculture Secretary John R. Block,
lectively mull and influence important
member blunders before a congressional
now president of the National American
decisions. But in its second term, many
committee and stumbles onto the evening
Wholesale Grocers' Association. "I used
observers say, the Administration is
news.
it when I thought it would help me. But
evolving another form of Cabinet govern-
President Reagan has stuck with at
when you got into trying to decide spe-
ment in which the White House's role in
least the structures of Cabinet govern-
cific policy on the council that nobody
shaping policy and setting an agenda is
ment much more diligently than virtu-
receding and in which greater author-
ally any of his predecessors. In the
ity is being given to a few Cabinet
first term, Edwin Meese III, then
Secretaries with activist agendas of
Reagan's counselor, erected an inele-
their own.
gant structure of seven domestic pol-
"The Administration has moved
icy Cabinet councils that eventually
heavily from being a presidentially
collapsed under its own weight.
controlled government to being more
But last spring, when White House
of a Cabinet government in that
chief of staff Donald T. Regan rebuilt
sense," said a Republican political
the system into two new and stream-
consultant with close ties to the Ad-
lined councils-one for economic pol-
ministration. "Now the idea is, 'Let's
icy, the other for all other domestic
get all of the Cabinet members to
policy-to join the National Security
control those agencies.'
Council, the wheels started turning
What's missing in this arrangement,
again. And now, in the sixth year of
critics inside and outside the Adminis-
the Reagan presidency, groups of
tration maintain, is a creative ap-
Cabinet members are still taking
proach for adding specific new propos-
agency cars over to the White House
als to the highly generalized "Reagan
about once a week, holding meetings,
agenda." White House officials say
signing off on papers, debating issues
the agenda flows naturally from Rea-
before the President and handling
gan's evident and long-standing inter-
some of the government's routine busi-
ests-reducing government domestic
ness.
spending, rolling back regulation,
"The system works because this
spending more on national defense.
President likes to delegate, likes to
"There is only one guy here who was
both read papers and hear the issues
elected, and that's Ronald Reagan,"
debated in front of him," said a White
said a top White House official.
House official. "He prefers a fair
Richard A. Bloom
But to many conservative critics
who want the Adminstration to push
amount of deliberation in the process
and to have things work up to him.
more aggressively during its final
That's his style of handling policy."
years, that's not enough. Thus many of
But power in the Reagan Adminis-
Attorney General Edwin Meese III
the same people who railed against the
tration, like those before it, does not
He heads the Domestic Policy Council.
pragmatists in the first term are now
1582 NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86
moaning, in the words of a critic,
much sharper cuts in federal commod-
about the "mice" holed up around
ity price supports.
chief of staff Regan "who don't have
"Then the Cabinet council system
an agenda and are suspicious of any-
broke down," said agricultural consul-
body who does."
tant William G. Lesher, who was as-
sistant Agriculture secretary for eco-
THE FIRST SYSTEM
nomics at the time. "Stockman and
When Reagan took office on Jan.
others had their ideas of what should
20, 1981, he promised to use the Cabi-
be a farm bill versus the working
net agencies to make decisions, and in
group's idea. Much to our chagrin,
Meese he had a lieutenant with the
that persuasion won out."
flow chart frame of mind needed to
flesh out those impulses. Based on
THE NEW SYSTEM
Meese's proposal, Reagan in February
Meese's somewhat tangled system
established five Cabinet councils: on
didn't fit into any of the management
economic affairs; commerce and
theories Donald Regan brought to the
trade; human resources; natural re-
White House. In April 1985, Regan
sources and the environment; and food
rolled the seven councils into two with
and agriculture. The next year, he
cleaner lines of authority: an Eco-
added councils on legal affairs and
nomic Policy Council, chaired by
government management.
Baker (who had become Treasury
Meese's conception was that policy
Secretary) to handle all economic pol-
would bubble up from the councils,
icy, and a Domestic Policy Council,
through the full Cabinet, if necessary,
chaired by Meese (who had become
and to the President for final decision.
Attorney General) to handle all other
In Meese's view, the wing of the
White House under then-chief of staff
Richard A. Bloom
domestic policy.
In the Regan command structure,
James A. Baker III would be responsi-
these councils are seen as playing sev-
ble for implementing the policy by
eral valuable functions. The system
dealing with the press, Congress and
modulates the pace of routine issues
constituency groups.
Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III
coming into the White House and al-
Several of the Cabinet councils,
He chairs the Economic Policy Council.
lows aides to keep a handle on issues
though, never really got off the
that are coming up, even as they keep
ground. Only the economic affairs coun-
many instances where the Cabinet coun-
their distance from most of them.
cil met very frequently, and critics in the
cils were sitting around discussing things
White House officials also see the Cab-
White House liked to gibe that the coun-
and Stockman couldn't make the meeting
inet council meetings as sessions that
cil held hundreds of meetings to reach
because he was on the Hill negotiating a
boost morale, let Cabinet officers get to
only a handful of important decisions.
settlement of the exact same issue they
know the President's staff and make ev-
On Meese's flow chart, it all looked
were discussing," said a former White
eryone feel that they are on the same
logical. In practice, the system became
House official.
team-the way President Eisenhower
very complex for the officials trying to
It was clear to many participants that
used Cabinet meetings.
navigate through it. Trade issues swirled
the councils lacked decision-making
The Cabinet councils also serve as a
through the economic affairs council,
power. "We were aware that neither the
convenient forum for handling normal
chaired by then-Treasury Secretary
Cabinet council nor the Cabinet itself
interagency conflict. Trade disputes,
Regan; the commerce and trade council,
could actually make the decision," said
which occur within the Administration as
headed by Commerce Secretary Mal-
William A. Niskanen Jr., a member of
frequently as between nations, come
colm Baldrige; a statutory Trade Policy
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
through the Economic Policy Council,
Committee, chaired by then-U.S. Trade
from 1981 and its acting chairman from
pitting the more protectionist forces at
Representative Bill Brock; and a Na-
July 1984 until he left the Administration
Commerce and the Trade Represen-
tional Security Council (NSC) senior in-
the following March. "And at most, when
tative's office against the free traders at
terdepartmental group that Regan also
there were votes taken, that was just to
the State and Treasury Departments.
headed. "There were just too many
represent the views at that particular
Several trade issues have come to the
groups involved in trade issues," Baldrige
level.
After the social security fiasco
President for his decision, however, after
said in an interview.
in 1981 [when cuts in benefits were pro-
the council was deadlocked on split votes.
Not only was the system cumbersome,
posed], Baker's distrust of the policy peo-
And the system has been used to pre-
but over time, many participants came to
ple on both substantive and political
vent things from happening; it's a tool for
see it also as irrelevant. In the first re-
grounds grew enormously. That led
bottling up issues in interagency study.
gime, the Baker wing of the White House
Baker to assert a much larger role."
"It is a funnel to keep to a minimum the
considered the Cabinet council system a
First-term officials say it was not un-
decisions coming out of the executive
sideshow, uninvolved in the actual cre-
usual for Baker and Darman, together
branch," said Paul Light, director of
ation of policy.
with Stockman, to ignore or overturn
studies for the National Academy of Pub-
In the view of Baker and his deputy,
Cabinet council decisions. Agriculture
lic Administration.
Richard G. Darman, implementation was
Department officials learned that the
Government officials can find it as
policy. And in practice, Baker's White
hard way on the 1985 farm bill. The
difficult as outsiders to locate issues once
House Legislative Strategy Group, to-
department had worked through 1984 in
they have disappeared into the process.
gether with OMB director Dave Stock-
the food and agriculture council, building
At an early June hearing before the
man, set virtually all significant domestic
a case for its idea of the right bill. Then in
House Science and Technology Sub-
policy in the first term. "There were
December, OMB came up a bill imposing
(continued on p. 1588)
NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86 1583
(continued from p. 1583)
their side. But the White House staff
committee on Natural Resources, Ag-
decided not to send the President a
ricultural Research and Environment,
decision memo. Instead, Regan or-
David T. Kingsbury, an assistant di-
dered up a series of private meetings
rector of the National Science Foun-
between Meese and Brock, with him-
dation, was asked how soon the Do-
self as referee, to try to narrow the
mestic Policy Council would approve
gap. Now, a White House official
regulations for testing and licensing
said, the issue is "on hold" while the
genetically engineered products.
Administration awaits the Supreme
Kingsbury, who headed the council
Court's decisions in two major affir-
working group that developed the pro-
mative action cases.
posal, responded: "Unfortunately, to,
"At some point, either these fellows
I think, the frustration of all of us, we
are going to make enough progress to
are not members of the Domestic Pol-
make a modification of views, or there
icy Council, and we don't know what
will remain a divergence and we will
that process is And so we're as
just have to hand the paper to the
frustrated as you are in terms of ex-
President and let him decide," the
pecting its release. We had antici-
official said.
pated its release prior to this hearing."
White House officials say that han-
(Reagan approved the new policy two
dling of both affirmative action and
weeks after Kingsbury's testimony.)
the Baker initiatives are unusual ex-
But just as in the first term, the
ceptions to the normal process. But
system is not always the forum for
the exceptions may be as important as
making policy; it remains very much
the rule. What they suggest is that the
open to short-circuiting. The issues
Administration's skillful bureaucratic
that come into the process for deci-
quire interagency cooperation or are
Richard A. Bloom
players thrive in whatever system is
sions are supposed to be those that the
created, using them to achieve goals
White House staff believes either re-
they would have figured out some
other way to reach in a different sys-
important enough to merit the Presi-
tem. Baker has been able to keep his
dent's attention.
Cabinet affairs chief Alfred H. Kingon
prize projects out of the hands of po-
But some of the second term's most
He can influence the councils' agendas.
tential adversaries, such as Shultz and
important projects have developed
Council of Economic Advisers chair-
outside of the Cabinet councils. Baker
also spilled outside of the orderly Cabinet
man Beryl W. Sprinkel. Brock has been
has successfully resisted any council in-
council system. Originally, Meese tried
able to fend off Meese on the affirmative
volvement with his pet initiatives: the
last summer to sell the President directly
action hiring guidelines. (For a report on
plan to realign international currency ex-
on his proposal to eliminate numerical
how the Administration developed a pol-
change rates, his initiative on interna-
requirements, setting off complaints that
icy on liability insurance, see box, pp.
tional debt and the push for tax reform,
he had attempted what a White House
1586-87.)
which he took over in 1985 from Regan.
aide termed an "unconscionable" end run
"No matter how the system is physi-
Baker has consulted with Secretary of
of the process. Then Meese's proposal,
cally organized, the facts an individual
State George P. Shultz (who in the Nixon
staunchly resisted by Brock, the current
Cabinet officer or his or her organization
Administration helped to build the cur-
Labor Secretary, was pushed back into
can muster and their clarity and persis-
rency regime Baker is trying to disman-
the system and was heatedly debated at a
tence have more of an effect on the out-
tle) and with Regan on the international
Domestic Policy Council meeting last
come than the organization itself,"
initiatives. When necessary, Regan has
October that reached no consensus.
Baldrige said.
set up meetings for Baker and deputy
The usual process after a Cabinet
Treasury secretary Darman to brief the
council meeting is for the staff under
THE POWER SHIFT
President. But Baker has made it clear to
Cabinet affairs director Alfred H.
When Baker and Meese were given
others who have expressed interest in
Kingon to prepare a decision memoran-
control of the new Cabinet councils, it
discussing the issues in the Economic
dum to the President. This short memo
was widely expected to elevate them to a
Policy Council that Treasury doesn't
(usually only two or three pages) briefly
"Super Cabinet" status. To some extent,
want any help.
summarizes the major arguments for and
that has happened.
That attitude has occasioned "some
against a proposal, includes the views of
Baker has used his control of the Eco-
grumbling," a White House official said.
relevant White House offices-such as
nomic Policy Council to increase his say
But no one has successfully forced Baker
legislative or political affairs-and
on trade issues and to play a role in
and Darman to loosen their secretive
presents the President with all of the
agricultural issues, such as last year's
style of operation. "These guys had a
options discussed at the meeting. Once he
legislation to restructure the ailing Farm
system in the White House that worked,"
gets the memo, Reagan can either make
Credit System. Meese, who at first was
said a Republican consultant close to
the decision based on the paper, ask for
prone to using his Domestic Policy Coun-
Baker. "They kept things to themselves,
more written information (which happens
cil for more philosophical discussions, has
they didn't let a lot of people know what's
rarely) or call a Cabinet council meeting
gotten a shot at the remarkably diverse
going on. They figured if they could get
to hear more debate before deciding.
issues that come through that council,
to the President, wire the Hill, that's
For months, the Justice Department
ranging from acid rain to organ trans-
enough. At Treasury, they operate the
has been eager to see the affirmative
plants. But both Baker and Meese have
same way."
action issue presented to Reagan, confi-
focused most of their energy on running
The debate over affirmative action re-
dent that his basic opposition to employ-
their own departments.
quirements for federal contractors has
ment quotas would bring him down on
The simplified system was also ex-
1588
NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86
pected to strengthen Regan's direct con-
successors, Edwin L. Harper, and the
tration at Harvard University's John F.
trol over policy, establishing him as a
job's current occupant, John A. Svahn,
Kennedy School of Government.
choke point for issues going to the Presi-
have played even smaller roles.
In practice, Presidents have invariably
dent. White House officials can use sev-
"There is really very little domestic
found that the White House staff is the
eral steps in the Cabinet council process
policy in this Administration that is not
only central force that can set an agenda
to get a handle on issues. Regan and
budget-driven," said Stuart E. Eizenstat,
for an Administration. The current White
Kingon can pull issues in for Cabinet
who held the policy job in the Carter
House staff is starting to get cuffed
consideration, control the schedule and
Administration. "OMB has really taken
around the ears for allegedy failing to do
ask agencies for more information before
over the [policy adviser's] function."
so. "There is nobody around Regan to set
sending options on to Reagan. "Don
Until he left government, Stockman
an agenda," said former CEA chairman
Regan, more than anyone else, has the
was a prodigious force on domestic pol-
Niskanen, now chairman of the Cato In-
authority to say this issue has to be dealt
icy. But his successor, James C. Miller
stitute, a libertarian think tank in Wash-
with by the Cabinet council," said Becky
III, has had difficulty establishing his
ington.
Norton Dunlop, senior special assistant to
credibility, particularly on Capitol Hill
Pointing to the White House-ordered
Meese for Cabinet affairs. "And he does
but elsewhere in the Administration as
welfare reform studies percolating
that on a regular basis."
well. A White House official defended
through working groups of the Domestic
Most significantly, he also gets in an
Miller, saying that "OMB has a role, a
Policy Council and to the catastrophic
informal last word on policy with Reagan
big role. Jim is different than Stockman;
health insurance plan being studied at the
when he chooses to. "Regan often sits
Stockman has this incredible knowledge
Health and Human Services Depart-
alone with the President and talks quite a
of the minutiae in the budget. But Jim is
ment, White House officials reject those
bit," a White House official said. "No
much friendlier, much less cantanker-
characterizations. What they are trying
one knows what he says."
ous." Some key Administration officials,
to do, they argue, is to keep the focus on
Still, there is a widespread view among
though, believe that because of OMB's
Reagan's basic goals. "What we've got to
those who watch the Administration
perceived weakness, the initiative on the
do is generate ways to implement the
closely that the White House's direct
budget has passed to Congress.
policy goals and directions of Ronald
influence on policy has declined since the
Many conservative critics complain
Reagan," said an official. "The problem
first term. The organizational vocabulary
that initiative is something noticeably
with Jimmy Carter was that he was direc-
assigns White House officials the same
lacking in Reagan's second term. On pa-
tional; he wasn't guided by any underly-
role as in the first four years: Regan's
per, the Administration's issue agenda is
ing principle. He would start one way,
aides still distinguish policy from imple-
supposed to rise through the Cabinet
then go another way, then yet another."
mentation, and still reserve the latter for
council system to the White House. But
But another White House official ac-
themselves through the Legislative Strat-
"the reality is that policy doesn't natu-
knowledged, "The only weak link in the
egy Group headed by Regan.
rally well up through committees," said
system is generating new ideas here."
But in the Regan regime, White House
presidential scholar Richard E.
To some extent, this was inevitable,
officials insist-and other government of-
Neustadt, a professor of public adminis-
given Reagan's predisposition to undoing
ficials agree-the West Wing staff is
existing programs rather than launch-
less likely to reshuffle policy decisions
ing new ones. After almost six years of
proposed by the agencies or the Cabi-
struggle with Congress on the budget,
net. That does occur-Regan recently
and after battles in the regulatory
rejected as inadequately justified the
agencies with environmentalists and
recommendation of an NSC group to
labor groups, the Administration has
build a fourth space shuttle. (See box,
probably undone just about every-
pp. 1584-85.) But that is rare; this
thing it can expect to undo.
White House, which is noticeably
With the White House less aggres-
light on aides with a strong back-
sive in setting the Administration's
ground or even a keen interest in sub-
policy tone, many observers say, au-
stantive policy formulation, is more
thority has passed to the few Cabinet
circumspect than its first-term prede-
Secretaries with aggressive programs
cessors.
of their own. To those observers, Rea-
"I think there has been a Cabinet
gan's second term is characterized by
reincarnation," said a top White
a few isolated areas of intense activ-
House official. "And I think it's good.
ity-Baker on international econom-
You've got some of your greatest re-
ics, Shultz on foreign policy, Meese on
sources [in your Cabinet officers].
some social and legal issues-sur-
Why replicate it?"
rounded by vistas of uninspiring
More than respect for the Cabinet
steady-state management.
is involved: The White House has rela-
The result of this subtle power shift
tively little firepower available on is-
is a form of Cabinet government. It is
sues. From the time Reagan moved
not the kind of Cabinet government
into the Oval Office, no one has ever
Shepard Sherbell/Picture Group
usually associated with that term-a
bothered to turn on the lights at the
regime of interactive discussion, col-
White House's Office of Policy Devel-
lective influence on major decisions.
opment. Martin Anderson, the first
But it is a style of running the country
domestic policy adviser, had personal
that for better or worse, gives the
influence with the President but only a
Cabinet officers greater leeway to pur-
weak organization to support him and
sue their own agendas, with less ag-
was temperamentally unsuited for bu-
Meese assistant Becky Norton Dunlop
gressive interference by the White
reaucratic infighting. His immediate
She works with him on Cabinet affairs.
House staff.
NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86 1589
/oT.
MR. POWER
Attorney General
Meese is Reagan's man to lead
the conservative charge.
By John A. Jenkins
acceptance he receives. That combination of loy-
alty, availability and ambition are essential ele-
ments in the rise of Meese, giving him power and
N HIS CORNER OFFICE AT THE JUS-
access unequaled in the Reagan Administration.
tice Department, a private sanctum
Meese frequently sees the President a couple of
guarded by Federal Bureau of Investiga-
times a day, offering counsel on matters ranging
tion agents, Edwin Meese 3d, the 75th At-
far beyond his duties at Justice. "Often, just pri-
torney General of the United States, has
vately, I'll see him for a few minutes here, or a
surrounded himself with symbols of the
few minutes there," says Meese. "Sometimes I'll
power he wields: a Border Patrol pistol; a
ride in the car with him to someplace."
United States marshal's badge; miniature
Besides serving as Attorney General, Meese is
police cars and helicopters. The office
chairman pro tem of the President's Domestic
says much about the way Meese sees him-
Policy Council, comprising the director of the Of-
self, for its motif reflects not so much the
fice of Management and Budget, the chairman of
lawyer in Meese as it does the hard-nosed
the Council of Economic Advisers and five Cabi-
lawman: America's top cop.
net officers in addition to Meese. He also attends
Just outside his door hang two Herblock draw-
meetings of the National Security Planning
ings, portrayals of Meese as the beady-eyed
Group, the handful of top foreign policy and na-
zealot. "Oh, they're just a couple of funny car-
tional security advisers that devised last sum-
toons," Meese says. Yet it is clear that these two
mer's "disinformation" campaign against Libya.
caricatures, and some others like them on the
But it is what he has done at the Justice Depart-
walls of his outer office, mean much more to him
ment that will be his legacy, for Meese has re-
- they are a symbol of how he has made his pres-
turned the department to a political role it has not
ence felt in 19 months as Attorney General.
played since the Nixon Administration. Prior to
If the next two years produce the conservative
him, the post-Watergate Attorneys General -
transformation in judicial precedent that the
men with names such as Saxbe, Levi, Bell, Civi-
Ronald Reagan Presidency has promised but so
letti and Smith - offered a subdued leadership.
far not delivered, much of the credit must go to
But Meese has quickly steered the department
the 54-year-old Meese. The most prominent loyal-
back to the political arena, shaping it into a reflec-
ist from the Reagan California days still in the
tion of how he sees himself boldly, morally con-
Administration, Meese has taken center stage in
servative. In the process he has become its most
an ideological debate that previously lacked a
forceful leader since Robert F. Kennedy.
credible point man within the Government. Now
"This department will be fiercely independent
it has one: pornography or drug smuggling, abor-
in
upholding the law," Meese promised at his
tion or school prayer, the Attorney General's
ceremonial swearing-in in March 1985. "But this
legal agenda is the President's political agenda.
is not inconsistent with conscientiously and vigor-
"His instincts are Ronald Reagan's instincts,"
ously implementing the President's philosophy,
Fred F. Fielding, the White House counsel during
which is in the mainstream of today's American
the President's first term, says of Meese.
political thinking."
For Meese, the path has been a tortuous one,
Since then, Meese has played a key role in judi-
muddied by infighting at the White House and
cial nominations and has publicly chided the Su-
nearly broken up altogether during his long con-
preme Court for decisions he disagrees with. In
firmation hearings by allegations of earlier
turn, he has experienced the unprecedented pub-
wrongdoing. But the strength of Ed Meese is per-
lic rebuke of two sitting Justices, William J. Bren-
severance. An iron-willed partisan with a po-
nan Jr. and John Paul Stevens.
lemical, confrontational style, he is also the quin-
While conceding that Meese "has every right to
tessential available man, an ambitious loyalist
assert his own perception of what justice is," Burt
who defines himself through the approbation and
Neuborne, professor of law at New York Univer-
sity, who until recently was the legal director of
John A. Jenkins lives in Washington and has fre-
the American Civil Liberties Union, calls the At-
quently written on legal matters for The New
torney General's views "disastrous."
York Times Magazine. His article on Supreme
"He is genuinely committed to the proposition
Court Justice William H. Rehnquist appeared in
that if a majority of the electorate expresses 11-
March 1985.
self on a particular sub- (Continued on Page 89)
DAVID BURNETT/CONTACT
Meese says: "We've tried to
MEESE
find the kinds of judges that
should be acceptable to any
group. If you look at the
Snow
Continued from Page 19
judges who have had difficul-
ties, I mean, how can you do
ject, that majority should not
just as strongly as I do. But
better, or get a more accept-
be held in check by the
when you're the President,
able person, than a man who
courts," says Neuborne of
you're not as vulnerable to at-
has got 15 years of distin-
Meese. "By crippling the
tack."
guished service on the Su-
courts, he would sacrifice ef-
Yet Ed Meese rarely
preme Court to be appointed
iece
fective protections of individ-
misses an opportunity to
Chief Justice? How can you
ture.
ual rights and radically
tackle head-on those who dis-
get a better person, or a more
If baths.
transform society into a ma-
agree with him. "To with-
acceptable person, than a
lexibility.
joritarian tyranny.
draw because there's opposi-
man like Nino Scalia, who has
Reproduced For You.
"The only bright spot in all
tion on the other side," he
got an impeccable record in a
of this, is that so far he has
says, "to back down in the
variety of ways: as a practic-
Quarter Inch
been able to achieve so little.
face of that would be coward-
ing lawyer, as a teacher, on
g: S10
His rhetoric has far out-
ice."
the appellate court? I think
able to:
stripped his effectiveness."
When he works hard to see
you can't find two more quali-
Over the last several
that judges nominated to the
fied people in the history of
c.
months, I had five interviews
Federal bench will share the
Supreme Court appoint-
< Bldg.
with Meese, in which he
Administration's philosophy
ments."
d
talked about the Supreme
about such matters as abor-
1
888
Court, about his perception of
tion, school prayer and feder-
EESE
TAKES
the roles of judges and the po-
alism, Meese calls it "getting
the best people." When some-
M
from a folder on his
All 100% imported Cambric cot
lice, and about his efforts to
desk several sheets
covers. 226-230 threads per sq
change the Justice Depart-
one criticizes an appointee,
of paper that together consti-
The ultimate in quality craftsma
ment. He also discussed his
that is "partisan politics."
our True Karo Step comforter has
tute his blueprint for change
confirmation ordeal, his close
baffled wall construction to elimi
"That's the combination of
at the Justice Department.
ic
cold spots while allowing maximu
Facility
friendship with Ronald Rea-
a party being out of power
He has drawn up these docu-
ability of the Snow White Down if
gan, and the death of his son
and being enraged by the fact
ments so that he can clearly
Nom
- all of which have pro-
Dimensions Down Fill Ret
lew York City's
that Ronald Reagan will be
focus on the task at hand.
Twin
60"
86"
32
oz.
$24
foundly affected him.
Queen/Full
88"
on six beautifully
selecting as high a percent-
In a two-page outline enti-
46 oz.
S32
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102°
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$42
cute facility for
Because of his blunt, feisty
age of the judiciary as he is,"
tled "Policy Goals," he has
Colors: Light Blue. White. Pink. Creme, Ligh
outspokenness, the public
the Attorney General says.
neatly encapsulated his agen-
e optimum com-
perception of the Attorney
"The fact that it's an election
da. There are the usual pri-
al, and rehabilita-
General is often devoid of the
year, and the fact that you
orities that any Attorney
humanizing nuances. But
just have some people who
General would have - con-
SCENT
Meese says he is baffled by
like to politicize things."
trolling narcotics trafficking,
IAT"
that image. "I would ask you
Meese calls Jefferson B.
terrorism and public corrup-
DIA
to go through all the press
Sessions Jr., whose nomina-
tion - and there are others
atrid
and
conferences I've had since
tion for an appeals-court
ve
s)
which are innocent-sounding
I've become Attorney Gen-
Judgeship was rejected in
euphemisms for the conser-
HC
AL
eral, and all the interviews
June by the Senate Judiciary
vative political course that
swood, NY 11423
I've given," he says. "I would
Committee, "a very coura-
the Attorney General has em-
31
defy you to find statements or
geous prosecutor." There
barked on.
collections of statements that
was a fierce debate over the
"Total nondiscrimination
would give rise to the kind of
attitudes of Sessions, a
policy," for instance, stands,
caricature that too often is
United States Attorney from
among other things, for an
created of me."
arns
Mobile, Ala., toward blacks;
end to racial quotas benefit-
Our plush Classic Channel featur
In person, the Attorney
Meese says it was "a cam-
ing minority groups, an Ad-
European-style hand-sewn channel:
by 32 color pages of
General exudes genuine
d-dyed yarns, luxurious
paign of ideologues."
ministration goal that was di-
with almost 3 OZ. of Snow White D
warmth. His suite of offices is
r. linen, cotton. cashmere,
Meese believes that Daniel
rectly repudiated by the Su-
Designed to prevent shifting; doublc
energized by those waiting to
stitched edges add durability.
ons and natural Maine
A. Manion, who narrowly won
preme Court in its last term.
Norm
Dimensions Down Fill Reta
see him - F.B.I. Director
ver special books, baskets,
Senate confirmation in July
Meese, however, has not
Twin
60° 88°
26 oz.
$16
totes. Browse with your
William H. Webster leaves as
as an appeals-court judge,
given up on it.
Queen/F
is
36"
36 oz.
$22
an interviewer enters; a
King
102°
66°
42 oz.
$28
Set and enjoy choosing
was also unfairly singled out.
"Preservation of constitu-
Colors Light Blue. White Creme.
sy-to-knit project with
group of law-student interns
"If his name had been Smith
tional values" encompasses
ALL yarns.
mill about, photographer in
or Jones," Meese contends,
some of the most important
SUPERWASHI
tow, to memorialize their mo-
Manion wouldn't have been
issues on the Reagan Admin-
ment with Meese; trusted
opposed. "But he was a light-
istration's social-policy agen-
aide William Bradford Reyn-
ning rod for these ultralib-
da, including leaving to the
olds is in the anteroom. But
Tals, because his father had
states the issues of abortion
ge color catalog.
Meese is not preoccupied. He
di Yarn Sample Set of over 250
Been connected in some way
reform and prayer in the
clearly relishes the inter-
bonus Gift Certificate.
with the John Birch Society.
schools. "Religious liberty"
erican Express Accepted
change with his questioner.
Anything in which the John
means going to court, as the
His gaze is direct and he
Birch Society was involved in
department did this summer,
L
speaks with certitude.
was seized upon by the ultra-
to defend the Roman Catholic
This 100% Merino Wool Mattre
ne 04096
iberal groups to be a basis
Church against the loss of its
thick. Serving as a natural inst
I
AM NOT BY NATURE
for politicization."
tax-exempt status when an-
keeps you warm in winter; cool in
an unduly combative per-
And it's machine washable, retain
But at the suggestion that
other church-related group
son," Meese says. "I be-
softness and curability. Fitted she
is has politicized the Justice
contended it was engaging in
lieve in persuasion rather
Normal
Retail
Our
partment, or that he has
political lobbying and cam-
than mortal combat. And to
Crib
$ 80
$
avored conservative inter-
paigning in opposition to legal
Twin
$120
$
the extent that people are
Full
$150
eats over any others, Meese
abortion activities the tax
Queen
$200
S
trying to use me as a target
Wistles. "That's an exaggera-
for attack, possibly the rea-
exemption does not permit.
King
$230
$
ion," he says. "I've spoken
Meese believes that even in
ASK FOR OUR FREE CATALOG.
son is that I have stood very
wit on some issues which I
defeat there is still glory in
comforter covers billows, merino
strongly for the objectives
hink need to be aired. But I
losing for a good cause. That
Times
and the priorities and the
un't think that there's any-
is why he was willing last
principles and the philosophy
hing partisan about my com-
spring to use a relatively triv-
Dow
of the President. He stands
ection
Ments on the Constitution."
(Continued on Page 92)
635 Evergreen
Meese is centralizing policy
MEESE
planning and budgeting
under the control of a few
trusted deputies. To imple-
Continued from Page 89
ment his policy goals, he has
organized key executives into
ial case to ask the Supreme
"Obviously, in taking public
small teams whose job it is to
Court to overturn its 1973 Roe
positions, I don't have the
focus on Administration pri-
V. Wade decision legalizing
time, or the audience, to go
orities. Meese and six top
abortion - even though the
into legal subtleties. But I
aides, including F.B.I. Direc-
constitutionality of Roe had-
think the average man in the
tor Webster and Assistant At-
n't been an issue in the case
street understands what it
torney General Reynolds,
and even though the High
means if the truth about
comprise the "command
Court had specifically reaf-
criminals is excluded from
group" that meets every
firmed the Roe decision three
the courtroom. And when the
morning at 8:10 to map strat-
years earlier. The depart-
Mapp and Miranda cases are
ment lost its case, 5 to 4, but
egy. Another group, chaired
explained to most people,
then-Chief Justice Warren E.
by Meese's new Deputy At-
they understand that they are
Burger switched camps,
torney General, Arnold I.
less safe from criminals.
questioning for the first time
That's not hard to figure out."
Burns, matches the depart-
the wisdom of the Roe deci-
According to Meese, "there
ment's budgetary resources
sion. "We got one step
are better ways" to avoid the
to its priorities. A third
closer," Meese says.
police abuses that the two
group, headed by Reynolds,
More Than 50% On Non-Shifting
Similarly, he sees the Jus-
decisions were meant to
does strategic planning be-
/HITE GOOSE DOWN
tice Department's defeat
counteract. One, he says, is,
cause, Meese explains, "I
earlier this year in three af-
"videotaped confessions, so'
wanted a group of people who
firmative action cases as
there will be no possible way
were not involved with the
MFORTERS & PILLOWS
hinging on a mere technical-
that you could have coercion
day-to-day issues to look to
ity. Though conceding that
or any intimidation by the po-
see where the justice system
By Nancy Fleming!
the Court directly repudiated
lice." But he adds, "The best
and the department ought to
his contention that quotas can
way, frankly, is with well-
be five years from now."
be used only to aid specific,
Of Meese's aides, the 44-
e-for-ounce, absolutely the warmest
trained, well-disciplined,
identifiable victims of dis-
well-supervised policemen."
year-old Reynolds is prob-
mforter you can buy anywhere!
crimination, Meese says that
Since his youth when his
ably the best known. Reyn-
"even in losing, there was ac-
father, a clerk at the Oakland
olds retained his position as
ble
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quiescence by the Court that
police court, would come
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should be the end result,
stories about the cases he'd
Division after the Senate Ju-
someday. They just said
heard that day - Meese has
diciary Committee last year
Nancy Fleming Down Shop fashions our comforters of the
we're not ready to do that
had a fascination with police
refused to confirm him as
St lui
down-proof 230 thread count Cambric cotton
yet."
The
work. His sympathies are
Meese's new Associate Attor-
mply fill them with premium European white
OOV
Y (a minimum of 550 cu. in. per oz. fill-
The biggest victory of the
with the cop on the beat who
ney General. Reynolds has
1 far
in size has more goose down than many king-
term, Meese says, was the
wants to nab the culprit, and
been the Justice Depart-
ort
:h means they'll keep you cozy even when it's
Supreme Court's upholding of
he seems genuinely per-
ment's most uncompromis-
uts
each is sewn with an end-to-end box pattern
the Georgia antisodomy law
plexed by the judicial con-
ing foe of racial quotas, and
nts
_own from shifting. Machine wash or dry clean.
- a case the Justice Depart-
cern about police miscon-
he continues to play a key
COMFORTER COLORS
ment wasn't even involved in.
duct. "Most of the time," he
ht blue, camel, burgundy or cream.
policy-making role within
"We don't have to be in a case
says, "the officer is not acting
s: light blue/cream, camel/cream, burgundy/cream or
Meese's inner circle. He has
to get our view across,"
'medium grey.
illegally."
also kept up the attack on the
Itimate comfort, take advantage of similar savings on our
Meese says. "The point of
To Meese, lawyers and
Supreme Court, last month
se down or white goose down and feather pillows. They
view that we've been making
judges are the ones who
lat, even after repeated washings.
- that the Court should not
accusing Justice Brennan of
argue the technicalities. "I
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Another of the Attorney
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him. "That's the one thing
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General's innocuous-sound-
I've absolutely ruled out. For
read the speech in which
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on whatever bench, would be
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But what Meese really wants
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is the total repeal of the Su-
thing I would really enjoy."
should particularly read it,"
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preme Court's 1966 Miranda
Meese is proud of the stand
he said. "People give
V. Arizona decision, which re-
OSE DOWN PILLOWS, White on white fill wt. in ozs.
he has taken against judicial
speeches all the time in the
SOFT
quires the police to inform
FIRM
activism. A judge's job, he in-
department here."
MEDIUM
joose down
50% goose down.
10% goose down,
QTY.
TOTAL PRICE
suspects of their constitu-
sists, isn't "to decide how the
T. Kenneth Cribb Jr., 38, is
50% goose leathers
90% goose feathers
tional rights, and its 1961
]S50 (20 oz)
IS35 (26 oz)
police officer's going to act -
the Attorney General's clos-
$20 (34 oz)
Mapp V. Ohio decision prohib-
his function is to find the
est aide, and probably the
$65 (24 oz)
$45 (32 oz)
$25 (42 oz)
iting the introduction of evi-
facts.
least-known outside of the de-
IS80 (28 oz)
$55 (36 oz)
$30 (48 oz)
dence obtained without a
"You may want to argue on
partment. A one-time na-
TOTAL Of All Items
valid search warrant.
E. If not completely
what should be the niceties,"
tional director of the Intercol-
Add S5. per comforter and S3.
These two rulings have, ac-
anytime, we will
per pulow for shipping & handling.
he says. "But if you take my
legiate Studies Institute, the
product or refund
NJ residents add 6% sales tax.
cording to Meese, "inhibited
approach, and the approach
oldest conservative student
ase price in full.
truth in the courtroom." He
GRAND TOTAL
of most people in law enforce-
organization in the country,
maintains: "They have cast
immediate shipment.
ment, the more evidence you
and a consultant to the Herit-
aside probative evidence for
get in, the more likely you're
age Foundation, Cribb served
ders
non-truth-finding reasons.
going to find the truth, which
on Meese's staff at the White
n
Neither Mapp nor Miranda
ultimately should be the end
House and followed him to
Street Address
in
helps any innocent person.
result of the courtroom pro-
the Justice Department.
IOF,
City
They only help guilty people.
State
cess."
Zip
Now, as the Attorney Gen-
I think if you look at all the
6F.
Check
MasterCharge
Visa
eral's counselor, Cribb stays
American Express
je Rd.,
cases, the only evidence that
TO "IMPROVE THE MAN-
in the background and re-
1, NJ
ever's been excluded is evi-
Acct. No.
agement" of the 62,500-em-
Exp. Date
ceives almost no publicity,
dence of guilt.
ployee Justice Department,
(Continued on Page 96)
Card Member's Signature
"It helps the department
other to get into a Yale soci-
together closely for almost 20
when we come in as an ami-
ety.
years," Meese says of Ronald
MEESE
cus curiae taking a more ex-
"He was naive," recalls
Reagan. "We are good
treme viewpoint," Kamenar
Maxwell K. Dickinson, a for-
friends. And we are people
says. "That way they can't be
mer roommate of Meese's
who, by and large, without
Co
from Page 92
called extremist."
and now a Florida stockbro-
any real effort on my part to
erves as a link be-
thing had been decided, and
ker. "He didn't look under
do this, come up with the
ye'
:ese and conserva-
then absolutely nothing
D MEESE WAS
rocks to see what was bad
same viewpoint on most
tw
tive
.est groups.
would happen. The uncer-
E
born and raised in
about everything. He wasn't
issues, pretty much totally in-
tainty led to internecine
Oakland, Calif. "I was
jaundiced. He never had bit-
dependent of each other."
"I am a source of informa-
tion for the Attorney General
fights, and ultimately the
born in 1931, in the Depres-
ter things to say. I don't
Privately, White House
about people who want him to
policy development got done
sion," Meese says. "Our
remember anything ever dis-
chief of staff Donald T. Regan
entertain their views," Cribb
elsewhere."
family never had a lot of
appointing him."
has bridled at Meese's easy
says. "I am sometimes asked
Meese now strongly de-
money. This was never a big
After graduation, Meese
access to the President. But
to attend meetings to make
fends his record at the White
thing to my folks, and never a
returned to California and
anyone who has ever at-
his views known, and to re-
House, saying that he "estab-
big thing to us." At the age of
started law school at Berke-
tempted to cut Meese off has
port back to him."
lished what is generally
10, he and his three younger
ley, finishing in 1958, after a
ended up the loser. Always,
During Meese's long confir-
looked upon as the strongest
brothers published their own
two-year interruption to
the President stands by him.
mation battle, Cribb sat be-
Cabinet system of any Presi-
weekly neighborhood news-
serve as an artillery officer
The two first met in Sacra-
hind Meese every day that he
dent in modern time."
paper and put the $6.40 they
in the Army. He joined the
mento. Reagan was the newly
testified. One Senate staff
He was, however, out-
earned from it toward war
Oakland District Attorney's
elected Governor of Califor-
member swears they even
flanked by Baker, who took
bonds. He was valedictorian
office just out of law school,
nia, and Meese was a young
dressed alike, so that "from
the White House policy-mak-
of his public high school class
and was still there a few
deputy district attorney from
behind the dais they just sort
ing role for himself. But
and the winner of a Lions
years later, when Sanford H.
Oakland with a penchant for
of melded together." At the
Baker's credentials were sus-
Club speakers' contest. He
Kadish, a Berkeley law pro-
publicity. Campus turbulence
White House, a "principals
pect among conservative fac-
notes with pride that all four
fessor, recruited him to help
in the 1960's had already
only" rule was imposed to
tions. Baker had been George
of the Meese boys went to col-
teach a clinical law program.
given Meese his first big
keep Meese from bringing
Bush's Presidential cam-
lege. "My folks made a lot of
"I needed someone who
break: he had directed the ar-
Cribb into the weekly meet-
paign manager. He hadn't
sacrifices so that we could,"
was actually working in the
rest in 1964 of 761 protesters
ings at which judicial nomi-
even registered as a Republi-
he says.
field," Kadish remembers.
at the University of Califor-
nees were chosen.
can until 1970. This closet
He traveled East for the
"Ed was willing. He was very
nia at Berkeley. In 1966, he
"Ken Cribb is kind of my
moderate couldn't be the con-
first time in 1949, to attend
reliable. Always did what he
testified before the House Un-
principal personal assistant,"
servatives' friend in the
Yale, where 60 percent of his
was supposed to do. Genial.
American Activities Com-
says Meese. "He's an addi-
White House. But Meese
1,123 classmates had gradu-
Likable. There was a softness
mittee that the Berkeley or-
tional set of arms, legs and,
could.
ated from elite Eastern
and a gentleness to him, no
ganizers of an early antiwar
particularly, brains."
"It turned out that Baker
preparatory schools. Meese,
sharp edges to his personal-
group were giving "aid and
In Cribb's view, the debate
was the pragmatist, the
having been awarded a last-
ity.
comfort to the enemy" and
ov
icial activism still
doer," says a former Reagan
minute scholarship that he
"Ed didn't have profound
that penalties of $20,000 and
ha
years to run: "The
Administration official. "But
now calls "a fluke," was vir-
political convictions. He was
20 years in prison wouldn't be
pu
iscussion has been
he was also the one the con-
tually the antithesis of the
your average, diligent young
inappropriate if the group
S
y this Attorney Gen-
servatives tended to scream
typical Yale student, but he
fellow from an average Re-
carried through with plans tc
e
it takes a generation
about. They thought he was
found a niche for himself with
publican background, and he
march on an Army induction
for uay-to-day politics to
breaking the faith. And
a slew of extracurricular ac-
might have continued in just
center.
catch up with ideas that are
Meese became the person
tivities: debate team; Politi-
that way, except that his at-
Meese signed on as the
first expressed in a philo-
who conservatives turned to.
cal Union; a religious club;
tractiveness led to opportuni-
Governor's extradition ano
sophical context. For exam-
He filled a vacuum. He be-
freshman crew; manager of
ties. He became an ally of
clemency secretary but soor
ple, the politics of the 1960's
came, in essence, what other
the track team; librarian at
people who had very pro-
transformed the job into tha
were the result of philosophi-
conservatives thought he was
his residential college.
found political beliefs, and he
of Reagan's legal-affairs ad
cal ideas first expressed in
- what they made him into.
Among his notable qualities
assimilated those beliefs."
viser, and within two years
the 1930's. So what we're say-
He became the darling of the
were an abiding loyalty to
There is a disarming sim-
was his executive secretary,
ing now will be important for
conservatives."
even casual acquaintances,
plicity to the way Meese
the highest staff job. He was
generations to come."
Paul D. Kamenar, execu-
and his energy and enthu-
characterizes his relation-
the capable, loyal aide who
An inveterate note-taker
tive legal director of the con-
siasm for almost any task.
ship with the man who has
reduced complex problems to
and maker of charts and dia-
servative Washington Legal
Two of Meese's younger
given him, or helped him get,
a few clear choices for his
grams, Meese likens his role
Foundation, describes the
roommates at Yale recalled
just about every important
boss to choose from.
at Justice to being atop a
relationship between the Jus-
recently how he took an al-
job he has had during the last
When Reagan left office is
well-regimented corporate
tice Department and conser-
most parental interest in
two decades.
1974, Meese moved to the Sa:
structure. During his tenure
vative interest groups as
them, patiently teaching one
"Well, I guess the way I'd
Diego suburb of La Mesa
at the White House, however,
"conscious parallelism."
to play bridge and helping an-
describe it, we have worked
After a year with Rohr Indus
where his Cabinet-level staff
tries Inc., a manufacturer C
job of counselor to the Presi-
aerospace components, h
dent gave him responsibility
started a law practice; hi
for seeing to it that each de-
main clients were the Rea
partment hewed closely to
gan precampaign committee
the President's policies,
called Citizens for the Repub
Meese found himself part of
lic, and the state Chamber c
an organization beset by jeal-
Commerce.
ousies and infighting. The
In 1977, Meese began teach
battle among the President's
ing at the law school of th
top advisers was frequently
University of San Diego,
waged through the press, and
small private school. He als
it
Meese's reputation
became director of the la
t
red the most.
school's Center for Crimina
as supposed to for-
Justice Policy and Manage
policy and James
ment. During his three-yea
the chief of staff, was
tenure with the center, whic
supposed to make the trains
was financed by conservativ
run on time," one White
groups, Meese publishe
House aide recalls. "But he
three papers, two dealin
never really got the policy-
with police-press relation
development syndrome.
and a third on child abuse.
1
The Attorney General no
CAMPS
MEESE
ADVISORY SERVICES
Continued from Page 96
FREE
looks upon his days in San Diego wist-
want to proceed. He insisted just ab-
Camp Referral
fully. "We had a beautiful home," he
solutely the opposite. He wanted me
Service
says. "I had a good job. I had the abil-
to go through with the thing. It was
ity to do three things: teach, direct the
that kind of support. I felt a commit-
American Camping
criminal justice center, and practice
Association
ment to him. I wanted to carry out
law on the side. And, economically,
what the President wanted me to do."
Personalized Guidance to
we were doing very well. So it was an
match your needs with the
In the summer of 1982, Meese's 19-
Bill Roch
right program, location and
ideal situation. I would have been
year-old son Scott, the middle of three
cost
very happy to stay there."
children and a sophomore at Prince-
Only ACA accredited camps
Send for Parents' Guide to
It is easy to understand how Meese
ton, was killed in an automobile acci-
Accredited Camps
8 time Nat'l X-C
could romanticize his time in San
dent. Meese and his wife, Ursula,
We non-profit-
Ski Champion
commission free
Olympic Silver Medalist
Diego. It had been a charmed exist-
were devastated by the tragedy. "It's
World Cup Winner
ence compared to what awaited him
the worst thing, obviously, that's ever
43 W. 23rd Street
in Washington.
happened to us," he says now, his
ACCREDITED
NYC 10010
CAMP
Nordic Track Pro
Besides the infighting at the White
eyes welling up. "And I think I was
212-645-6620
With Adjustable
House, there were financial problems
just fortunate to have a lot of very
Elevated Legs
brought on by carrying two big mort-
good friends who were helpful at that
gages. Unable to sell his home in La
time, including the President, who
Mesa for 20 months, Meese had none-
was extremely helpful and support-
SCHOOLS
theless purchased a new house in
ive. The President and Nancy Rea-
McLean, Va. He fell 15 months behind
gan."
in his payments on the California
Meese holds dear the traditional
residence, but two savings and loan
values that his relationship with the
e. Call
officials who oversaw Meese's ac-
SPECIAL
Reagans embodies. In his own mind,
5888
count looked the other way. Both
the Justice Department is an exten-
48-6987
later got Federal jobs, as did a La
sion of those values, providing law en-
Mesa businessman who arranged a
forcement that is not just vigorous
the
HICTRACK © PSI 1986
$70,000 loan - later forgiven - to a
but, he says, "compassionate" as
Academy
buyer to facilitate the purchase of
well. As Meese sees it, that means
Horizons
Meese's house. Questions were also
d. N., Chaska, MN 55318
protecting the average man from
raised, among other things, about
Pioneering the process
crime, from pornography or even his
of total education
Meese's stock trading and whether he
own Government. And he has no
A structured academic and social
Grades thru
obtained special treatment from Gov-
doubt that the people who really mat-
environment for students with
Small Class
learning. interpersonal and
ernment agencies for businesses in
Academic and
ter are behind him.
adjustment difficulties
OUTSTANDING
which he had an interest.
"The law enforcement community
RD Hart Rd St Johnsville NY 13452
Lakeside Cam
It was such goings-on that led his
has labored for many years being the
518-762-4690
S
BY PHONE
predecessor at Justice, William
scapegoat for the increase in crime,
Write Jan
French Smith, to appoint a special
85
while having to take a lot of court
CO-ED BOARDING
AVINGS
prosecutor to investigate Meese.
decisions which have been inimical to
ics for draperies,
When Meese has occasion to mention
effective law enforcement," he says.
oom ensembles.
Smith now, it is almost never by
"I have gotten a tremendous re-
SCHUYLER ACADEMY
Anju, Bloomcraft,
name. He is "my predecessor" the
sponse from the law enforcement
CO-ED COLLEGE PREP GRADES 5-12
same way a candidate might refer to
Individual programs to meet each
Clark. Jacquards,
community because I am willing to
student's needs. Ratio one to four
"my opponent." The investigation
Satins, In Stock.
speak out on issues which are key to
Sports. cultural and entertainment ac-
was an election-year liability for Ron-
tivities SUMMER SESSION
protecting the public."
À PREPARATORY SC
ples
ald Reagan, but he stuck by his friend
518 695-3218 518 695-5357
vironment conducive
or write SCHUYLER ACADEMY Box 25
as he always had before, and Meese
strong citizenship qu
Schuylerville, N.Y. 12871
enjoying extensive va
- who denied any wrongdoing - was
Solutions to
flying. Computer inst
eventually cleared. In March 1985, 13
Band Scholarships.
7345
vailable
monthsafter he was first nominated,
Last Week's Puzzles
Students welcome.
ic. U.S.A. Ret.. Sup
he was sworn in as Attorney General.
Ave. Cornwall-On-r
MC/VISA
ALTER
SGT
AMY
PLACE
One of his lieutenants remembers
TOUTER
ACADEMIA
ROTOR
Now is
how his boss tried to laugh off the ig-
BALATA
FAREWELLTOARMS
nominy during one of his first staff
ATL
ADSORB
ANNIE
DIET
THESKINOFOURTEETH
meetings. "Not such a bad record,"
agood
LICIT
RTS
AMIEL
OPERA POSTERS
Meese had quipped, "nominated in
CABINET
SHE
CAULICLE
February, confirmed in March."
PRONGS
WAYOFALLFLESH
time to
Free Brochure available of the
AMOK
WAAL
BINGE
DER
famous "Ricordi-La Scala"
Meese does not like to discuss the
SETIN
PIT
RISK
MES
Opera Poster collection. Re-
year he spent in limbo, a period when
THEHEARTOFTHEMATTER
buy a
Magnificent thous
scholarship. won
business. as wel.
produced in full color from
Justice Department morale sank per-
RIN
GIRD
IRE
CALEB
desirable tradition
AIPIE
OSUNA
PEST
NONO
house.
on when needed
originals in archives. Puccini,
ceptibly. But it is clear he was deeply
DADDYLONGL EGS ODDITY
5 horses and inc
Verdi's most famous Opera's!
ion academics/re
affected by it. He calls the confirma-
ICEBOATS
LAT
SPOONED
Size 20"x28" limited printing.
tion battle "an unfortunate byproduct
TALES
PGS
SHELF
T. Ingham, Ve
You're sure to
Fiesta Arts, Inc.
THEGREATSTONEFACE
P.O. Box 211, Northern Blvd.
of the ultrapartisan politics that's
STOA
APRIL
ELUDES
GOV
find the right
Greenvale, N.Y. 11548
practiced by some people here. But I
LAMBINHISBOSOM
NOTIME
don't think you're ever going to
ATALL
APOSTLES
DUELER
one at the right
BERYL
HEN
OAS
TRETS
price in the right
change people. There are just some
people who believe in political char-
ELLEN GOODMAN: KEEPING
place
from
you sell by mail?
acter assassination, and it's unfortu-
IN TOUCH Today's self-im-
the great
vestigate the sales-
nate that they get elected. It's one of
provement tack is physical.
selection
making qualifications of
the sad parts about any political sys-
Like medieval flagellants, we are
advertised seven
Maj
tem."
supposed to whip our muscles into
THE NEW YORK TIMES
days a week in
line and beat our cellulite into
A private school
SHOPPING MART
Of this time, Meese now says: "You
always have days when you wake up
The
are learning C
shape. It is no longer enough to
provides an un
Write The New York Times
and say, 'Why are you doing this?' I
walk in the path of righteousness,
programs and
we have to run in it.
New York
and caring hor
Wr
WHITE HOUSE REPORT
Decision Making in the White House:
How Well Does It Serve the President?
Quite well, according to Reagan aides who say their system is designed so that
Cabinet advisers "feel closer to him than they do to their departments."
BY DICK KIRSCHTEN
affairs council was well attended. As the
council or full Cabinet meeting to hear
Treasury Secretary called the group to
the views of his advisers. During his first
I
n an efficiently run corporation, board
order, the cluster around the coffee urn in
year in office, he led three-dozen Cabi-
meetings begin and end on time. So it
the southwest corner of the Roosevelt
net-level policy meetings.
is in the businesslike Reagan White
Room quickly dispersed. Sitting at the
In the case of the concerns raised at the
House, where the President's senior aides
center of the'table, Regan was flanked by
Treasury Secretary's recent working ses-
start their daily routine at 7:30 a.m. with
Agriculture Secretary John R. Block and
sion, a different avenue was pursued.
the first of five meetings, tightly sched-
U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock.
Regan, in a subsequent interview, said he
uled at half-hour intervals.
Facing him across the table were Office
returned to the White House the next
On a recent Thursday morning, Edwin
of Management and Budget (OMB) di-
afternoon and, "for half an hour, with
L. Harper and Roger B. Porter, the newly
rector Dave Stockman, Commerce Sec-
graphs and charts and the like, I gave the
named top executives of the White House
retary Malcolm Baldrige and Council of
President a briefing on the condition of
Office of Policy Development, broke
Economic Advisers chairman Murray L.
the economy." Among those present were
away from the 8:30 management meeting
Weidenbaum. They were soon joined by
Meese, Stockman, Weidenbaum and
in the office of presidential counselor
Vice President George Bush.
James A. Baker III, the White House
Edwin Meese III and hurried through the
To Regan's right, around the end of the
chief of staff.
corridors of the West Wing to take their
table, sat White House communications
seats at the big mahogany conference
director David R. Gergen (on hand be-
EVOLVING ROLES
table in the Roosevelt Room.
cause a reporter was present), Harper
Significantly, the advisers who joined
There, promptly at 8:45, Treasury Sec-
and Porter. Also at the table was deputy
the Treasury Secretary in the Oval Office
retary Donald T. Regan convened the
Energy secretary Willard Keith Davis,
for the most part have been active not
82nd meeting of the Cabinet council on
filling in for his boss, James B. Edwards.
only in shaping policy but also in lobbying
economic affairs, by far the busiest of the
Lining the walls of the room, beneath oil
for public and congressional support for
policy forums in President Reagan's
portraits of Theodore Roosevelt, on and
the President's economic program. Re-
collegial advisory system. The agenda,
off horseback, and of Franklin D. Roose-
gan, for example, participated several
as characterized by Regan afterward,
velt, were a dozen or more lesser officials,
weeks ago in the presidential discussions
ranged from "macroeconomics to minu-
who with but one exception, were all
with congressional leaders about the
tiae." The discussion, he said with some
male.
problem of the Administration's proposed
understatement, was "pretty lively" and
Regan moved crisply through his
budget deficits.
reflected sharp concern about "what's
agenda, occasionally interjecting brief
As the Administration faces up to the
going on out there" in the economy. The
quips or questions. At one point, he de-
challenges of a tough second year-most
meeting ended punctually after an hour.
ferred to Porter, who also serves as the
notably the economy's failure thus far to
The economic affairs group is one of
executive secretary of the economic af-
respond to its medicine-there is increas-
six Cabinet councils, in addition to the
fairs council, to bring out a point that had
ing recognition in the White House that
statutory National Security Council,
been bypassed in the presentation of one
policy cannot be shaped in a political
through which policy options flow to the
of the working papers.
vacuum.
Oval Office. For non-security issues, the
The council members were outspoken
At the outset, although it may have
recently reorganized Office of Policy De-
and openly disagreed with some of the
been overstated in press accounts, Meese
velopment manages the meetings, agen-
conclusions put forward. During one pre-
and Baker appeared to divide the White
das and papers that lead to presidential
sentation, life appeared to be imitating
House neatly into a "policy side" and an
decisions. Under Harper and Porter, the
art as several Cabinet officers took sharp
"implementation side." Meese was to be
office is expected to be more mindful of
issue with a speaker who happened to be
in charge of both foreign and domestic
strategic considerations involved in im-
standing in front of a bronze statue, Our
policy development, with the emphasis on
plementing policies.
Vanishing Wildlife, which depicts a bison
Cabinet involvement rather than strong
The Cabinet, however, remains a cen-
being attacked by wolves.
White House issues staffs. Baker, a more
tral part of the policy machinery, and the
When issues are deemed ripe for presi-
experienced Washington hand, was to be
recent working session of the economic
dential attentión, Reagan will chair a
responsible for the political and public
584
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82
relations strategies needed to enact the
going to achieve change," he said.
Development, Harper has made several
President's programs.
In recent months, Meese has indeed
modest structural changes. He has
In fairness, both Meese and Baker
spent increasing time on the speech-mak-
named Porter to be his deputy with the
have always acknowledged that their mis-
ing circuit, articulating the principles
title of office director. Edwin J. Gray, the
sions are closely interrelated. In fact,
upon which Reagan's initiatives are
former director, has been placed in
along with deputy chief of staff Michael
based and taking issue with the Presi-
charge of a new entity, the office of policy
K. Deaver, Meese and Baker have
dent's critics, including the press for its
information, and will report directly to
worked closely together and kept ap-
coverage of his economic program.
Harper. The new assistant to the Presi-
prised of one another's daily activities.
Even among White House aides who
dent for policy development has also stan-
The first year did not produce rave
have been most critical of Meese's at-
dardized the titles of four senior staff
notices for the policy side of the White
tempts to organize the presidential
members who serve as executive secretar-
House. Meese's top lieutenant for na-
policy-making process, there is respect
ies of the Cabinet councils; each of the
tional security affairs, Richard V. Allen,
for his role as a personal adviser to Rea-
four has become an assistant director of
failed to achieve a dominant role, became
gan. "Meese is sharp and quite capable of
the White House policy office. One of the
the subject of an embarrassing investiga-
good analytical reasoning," an associate
four is assigned to two of the councils,
tion and finally was let go. In the process,
said. "He understands the Ronald Rea-
and Porter continues to head the staff of
Meese was bypassed in the national secu-
gan philosophy in the abstract, but unlike
the economic affairs council.
rity chain of com-
Both Harper and
mand. Allen's suc-
Porter have worked
cessor, William P.
in the White House
Clark, reports di-
before. Harper
rectly to the Presi-
served in the first
dent rather than
Nixon Administra-
through Meese.
tion as assistant di-
On the domestic
rector of the Domes-
side, policy develop-
tic Council under
ment assistant Mar-
John D. Ehrlich-
tin Anderson, who
man. He shared an
also
reported
office suite with An-
through Meese, re-
derson, who 10 years
signed to return to
later recruited him
academic pursuits.
from an executive
Anderson had been
post in private indus-
admired by senior
try in his hometown
White House staff-
of St. Louis to serve
ers for his straight-
on a policy task
forwardness and de-
The Cabinet council on economic affairs is by far the busiest of the policy
force for Reagan's
votion to philosophi-
forums in President Reagan's collegial advisory system. It has held nearly 100
1980 campaign.
cal principles, but a
meetings since the beginning of the Reagan Administration.
Porter served dur-
highly placed aide
ing the Ford Admin-
described him as "the most ineffectual
some conservatives, Meese knows how to
istration, first as a White House fellow
domestic policy adviser ever in the White
translate it into programmatic terms. He
and then as the executive secretary of the
House."
relates well with Reagan personally and is
Economic Policy Board, headed by Trea-
The rap against Anderson was that he
an exceptionally able counselor at the
sury Secretary William E. Simon. He is
lacked both the instinct and the inclina-
conference table."
the author of a 1980 book on presidential
tion to play the pragmatic bureaucratic
By choosing Harper to replace Ander-
decision making, based on the experi-
game. "Marty had the comfort of never
son, Meese not only has opted for a more
ences of the Ford policy board, and he
having to compromise, but he paid the
experienced manager but also has chosen
quickly applied those skills in organizing
price of never getting anything done," a
a key member of the OMB inner circle
the Cabinet council on economic affairs
colleague said. "If he'd chosen to be a bit
that, to date, has been a driving force in
in the Reagan Administration. He also
more forceful, he could have been influ-
developing Reagan's domestic policy. In
holds a Treasury Department appoint-
ential."
addition to his service as Stockman's dep-
ment as counselor to Regan.
uty at OMB, Harper has been a regular
In an interview, Harper, taking care
MORE FOR MEESE?
at the 8 a.m. White House senior staff
not to disparage the efforts of his prede-
With the departure of Anderson, who
meetings, thanks to his dual appointment
cessor and good friend Martin Anderson,
long has been regarded as a guiding intel-
as assistant to the President.
predicted a more assertive regime in the
lectual force behind Reagan's philosophy
In shifting full time to the policy devel-
new White House policy office. "I think
of government, many Administration in-
opment office, Harper significantly has
you will see differences in personality as
siders see an enlarging-or at least a
been included as a member of the legisla-
well as differences in the times and the
more visible-ideological role for Meese.
tive strategy group, headed by Baker,
kinds of policies that will come up," he
"My role has been reduced," Meese told
which plays a vital role in shaping and
said. "So I think the shop will definitely
The Washington Post, "to what it was
adapting policies in response to legislative
have a different cast to it. I'd character-
intended to be in the first place."
and other political pressures. Anderson
ize it as being active in response to what's
"Ed helps remind the President of who
was an infrequent participant in the strat-
here today and in anticipation of things
he is and why he was elected," a well-
egy group's sessions, a factor that dimin-
we can see coming up in the next couple
placed Reaganite said. "With Marty
ished the importance of the policy office
of years."
gone, Ed's role becomes all the more
in the eyes of many observers.
While his staff will continue to support
critical if this Administration is really
In taking control of the Office of Policy
the Cabinet council system, Harper
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82 585
Reagan Turns to Experienced Mechanics.
President Reagan is discovering that dismantling a mecha-
replacing Edwin J. Gray, a California journalist who was a
nism as complex as the federal bureaucracy requires the skills
press secretary for Reagan in Sacramento.
of experts who are well versed in the ways that the govern-
Harper, 40, grew up in St. Louis and attended Principia
ment's parts are interconnected.
College just across the Mississippi River in Elsah, III. As he
In his second year in office, the President is relying less on
puts it, he qualified for his "academic union card"-a
the California crowd that advised him on the campaign trail
doctorate in political science from the University of Vir-
and more on some pragmatic mechanics who know the nuts
ginia-in 1968. While earning that degree, he lectured on
and bolts of federal policy making.
government and the presidency at Rutgers University and at
The leadership of Reagan's White House domestic policy
the Brookings Institution.
staff has been shifted to a pair of quiet, hard-working stu-
His campus theories were quickly put to the practical test.
dents of government with ties to the Midwest who wasted little
He took a job with the old Bureau of the Budget in 1968 and
time finding their way into the power circles of Washington
the following year was named a special assistant to President
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
Nixon and assistant director of the Domestic Council.
St. Louisan Edwin L.
Reflecting on his experi-
Harper, Reagan's new as-
ences in the Nixon White
sistant for policy develop-
House, Harper said the Do-
ment, replaces Martin An-
mestic Council, directed by
derson, one of Reagan's
John D. Ehrlichman, did not
principal philosophical
serve to broaden the base of
mentors who has returned
presidential decisions. "Issues
to his academic post at
would come up through one
Stanford University. Rog-
decision-making path. It was
er B. Porter, who spent his
basically one Cabinet member
early boyhood in Iowa, is
dealing with the White House
the new director of the
staff and the President, with
White House policy office,
the President not always feel-
stressed that that role would
place during a week in which
be secondary to their work in
many Cabinet members were
the policy development office.
beginning to come unglued
He noted that many issues af-
over the soaring deficits pro-
fecting only a single agency do
jected in Reagan's fiscal 1983
not logically come before the
budget and their feared effect
Cabinet councils. "Yet it
on an already sick economy. It
would be appropriate to have
Roger B. Porter
was a week in which press
some outside analysis, and
reports questioned whether
that would be done by this shop," he said.
The man who still has the most to say
the President was listening to his top
Both Harper and Porter said they ex-
about the evolving role of the presidential
advisers.
pect to make better use of the White
policy staff is Ed Meese, the outwardly
House planning and evaluation office,
unflappable chief constable of the Rea-
NO REGRETS
from which little has been heard thus far.
gan White House. Meese stands between
The interview began with Meese's ob-
The planning office is headed by Richard
Harper and the President in the official
servation that Cabinet government is
S. Beal, a close associate of Reagan's
pecking order and thus has the last word
working well, "as a matter of fact, better
political pollster, Richard B. Wirthlin. It
about the office's operations.
than a lot of people had anticipated." It
is hoped that intelligence from Beal's
Among professional staffers who have
ended with his being asked if there was
operation can help the policy staff assess
labored in the presidential chain of com-
anything he wished he had done differ-
the implications of developing issues for
mand for more than a year, Meese re-
ently during the first year. "I can't think
the Administration's evolving political
mains a distant and puzzling figure. One
of anything, quite frankly," he replied.
strategy.
staffer labels him an "enigma." Another,
In between, Meese acknowledged that
In addition to meetings of the White
John T. McClaughry, who has quit the
press reports have been critical of his
House legislative planning group, Harper
policy staff to consider running for the
management of White House policy de-
will also be a regular participant at the
Senate in Vermont, declared, "Ed Meese
velopment. "I've never quite understood
Monday update luncheons with the Presi-
was more a rumor around here than a
them because I've never seen any basis
dent that are designed to apprise him of
reality."
for them," he said. "I think that most of
coming developments and help keep him
McClaughry said the policy office has
the things that have happened here have
up to speed on subjects he is likely to be
suffered from incompetent management,
been a result of the policy side of the
asked about during press conferences and
poor use of personnel and lagging morale.
house."
other public appearances.
Resorting to hyperbole to make his point,
Much more than in earlier talks, how-
The policy office, however, is not likely
he said, "They've got special assistants to
ever, Meese underscored the overlapping
to increase in size. It will continue for the
the President loading Coke machines
of White House functions and the need to
foreseeable future with a complement of
around here."
integrate staff activities. "People have to
about two dozen professionals, less than
In a recent interview, however, Meese
understand that you really have three
half the size of the Domestic Policy Staff
projected his finest, most jovial "all's
phases; one is the development of the
in the Carter Administration.
well" manner. The conversation took
issue
then you have the decision pro-
586 NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82
To Tune Up the White House Policy Engine
ing that he needed a meeting with the Cabinet officer.
A
format of high-level policy discussions. He has acquired a
lot of people didn't feel that they got their day in court, their
reputation for enforcing deadlines and for insisting on the staff
opportunity to try to persuade the President."
work necessary to produce the crisp position papers vital to
Harper left the White House in January 1973, moving to
policy deliberations. Porter is known for getting papers done
the Philadelphia area, where he held high executive posts with
on time and circulated in advance of meetings. If he thinks the
the INA Corp. and with Certain Teed Corp. Five years later,
quality of a paper is subpar, as often as not he'll take charge of
he returned to St. Louis to become a vice president of Emerson
the rewriting.
Electric Co.
The son of a college professor, Porter was born in Provo,
In President Reagan's Administration, Harper's first assign-
Utah, and attended Brigham Young University, where he was
ment was as deputy director of the Office of Management and
a varsity tennis player and graduated summa cum laude. He was
Budget, where he was placed in charge of the President's
a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, a teaching fellow at
Council on Integrity and Efficiency with the mission of rooting
Harvard and in 1974 was appointed as a White House fellow.
out waste, fraud and abuse in the government.
In the Ford Administration, Porter served as executive
On Feb. 5, Harper
secretary of the
was named to suc-
influential Eco-
ceed Anderson as
nomic Policy
Reagan's adviser for
Board.
policy development.
With the elec-
Porter, 35, is an
tion of Jimmy
academic super-
Carter, he re-
achiever who has
turned to Har-
mastered the be-
vard to earn his
hind-the-scenes gov-
doctorate and
ernmental processes
teach at the
that do much to con-
Kennedy School
trol the timing and
of Government.
cess
and then
The case can be
you have implemen-
made, and Meese is
tation."
quick to make it,
Meese insisted
that "the legislative
that the decision
strategy group is
phase-the new one
dominated by policy
in his explanation,
people." Just to
where policy making
Edwin L. Harper
make sure that the
and strategy over-
policy people see it
lap-is essentially a "Cabinet process" in
example of something that was developed
that way too, Meese has asked his deputy,
which the President listens to competing
through the Cabinet system to a certain
James E. Jenkins, to conduct a "manage-
arguments before making up his mind.
point," Meese explained. "And then, as it
ment review" of the process. Jenkins, who
He conceded, though, that "once he's
became more bound up in the budget
is a former colleague of Meese in Rea-
indicated a tentative decision, there often
process here and in the legislative strat-
gan's California administration, has con-
may have to be consultations with Con-
egy aspect," further big decisions were
ducted interviews with Cabinet members
gress or he may call for additional infor-
made.
and senior policy development staffers in
mation." He said that Reagan on rare
The presidential counselor conceded
the White House.
occasions calls in individual advisers for
that "the packaging and tailoring
Meese said he intends to analyze Jen-
further talks before arriving at a final
were done in the legislative strategy
kins's findings to see if further mid-course
decision.
group." Not all Cabinet members or, for
corrections are called for. But he cau-
These additional steps may well in-
that matter, members of the White
tioned, "Don't expect any major changes;
volve non-policy aides, said Meese, "but
House policy staff were overjoyed with
there has been nothing so far to indicate
you don't have a rump session of White
all aspects of the complex federalism
that."
House staffers that sit around the Presi-
proposal that finally emerged. The plan is
dent's desk when he makes that deci-
undergoing revision and some unraveling
A POLITICIZED OMB?
sion." He added that "the basic thing"
as the White House negotiates with state
There may be some changes, however,
that sets the Reagan Administration
and local officials. (See NJ, 2/27/82, p.
in the extent to which OMB dominates
apart from many prior ones is the oppor-
356.)
the policy process in the months ahead.
tunity afforded Cabinet members to
It should be pointed out that appropri-
The budget remains a conspicuous topic,
make their views known before a decision
ate Cabinet officials are usually included
but it no longer is the issue the Adminis-
is made in White House channels.
in the legislative strategy maneuvers or-
tration is most comfortable talking about.
Meese agreed that policy initiatives
chestrated by Baker and his top aides.
Attention-grabbing initiatives in the
ultimately announced by the White
When budget and tax policy are at issue,
areas of civil rights, federalism and for-
House often include drastic 11th-hour
as in the New Federalism, Stockman and
eign affairs are beginning to bring other
alterations. Reagan's New Federalism
Regan are key figures in the legislative
agencies to the fore.
proposal in this year's State of the Union
group. Meese and now Harper are in-
The start-up of the Reagan presidency
message is a case in point. "That's an
cluded, too.
was a heady time for OMB. With the
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82 587
economic program at center stage, the
Writing in The Washington Post,
fight in trying to persuade Reagan to
professional staff basked in the immense
Schlesinger railed against budget projec-
keep the budget more nearly in balance.
clout wielded by its new director. Stock-
tions that he described as "preposterous."
man was a hard taskmaster, and as a
He added: "The OMB, unloved but
NOT 'GOING NATIVE'
former Carter budget aide put it, "OMB
broadly respected for its integrity, has
If "politicization" is taken to mean the
was running the government as never
long been a government pillar. It's de-
imposition of Reagan's philosophical val-
before." Budget examiners shed their
bauchment represents the needless wast-
ues throughout the federal government,
anonymity and fought in the front lines
age of social capital."
his aides have no quarrel with the term. A
on Capitol Hill, leaving their personal
Dale R. McOmber, a veteran budget
highly placed Administration official put
imprints-on the budget-cutting reconcili-
official who retired last year after work-
it this way: "This is not a benign Presi-
ation bill.
ing on the initial Reagan budget revi-
dent who lets a Dave Stockman run free.
Now, however, both the budget agency
sions, cautioned that such criticisms
This President should not be misunder-
and its director are under fire. The 1983
should be taken with a grain of salt.
stood; he is tough enough to do what's
budget estimates are ridiculed as lacking
"There is a bit of that, but I would not go
necessary to bring about change."
credibility. The deficit projections—
as far as Schlesinger went," McOmber
Meese notes that the Cabinet council
$98.6 billion in 1982, $91.5 billion in
said in an interview. "He made some
system, which he devised, is intended to
1983-are shocking enough, even if they
mistakes in his facts, and he always leaps
keep agency heads within the White
are not underestimated. While
House orbit. "The difference
Stockman remains a driving
in this presidency," Meese
intellectual force in the Rea-
said, "is that Reagan has used
gan command structure, he is
his system so that the Cabinet
left with the thankless task of
members all feel closer to him
arguing within the Adminis-
than they do to their depart-
tration for tax increases and
ments. And he gives them a
defense cuts that the Presi-
lot of opportunity to remem-
dent opposes. The travails of
ber that."
Stockman, as recounted last
The presidential counselor
winter in The Atlantic
said that thus far the plan
Monthly, have not abated.
seems to be working. He said
Moreover, some within the
he sees no signs of the Reagan
Administration believe he is
Cabinet "going native," the
too intensely preoccupied with
term used to describe officials
the budget and not suffi-
who become captive to the
ciently concerned about the
concerns of their depart-
need to spur private-sector re-
mental constituencies and be-
covery.
gin to balk at marching orders
Within OMB, by almost all
Presidential counselor Edwin Meese III still has the most to
from the White House.
accounts, support for Stock-
say about the evolving role of the White House Office of
In theory, the Cabinet
man remains high. He is re-
Policy Development.
council system avoids duplica-
spected for his quick mind, his
tive efforts and turf battles by,
grasp of budget details and his long
to the conclusion that OMB is being
in Meese's words, "trying not to have a
hours. The professional staff, which
politicized."
big White House staff." He said the
prides itself on loyalty to the Administra-
McOmber added, however, that Stock-
Office of Policy Development's main task
tion it serves, enjoys freedom from the
man, because he is intelligent and sure of
is "to provide additional information
non-intrusive, scaled-down policy staff in
himself, is less affected than other direc-
when it is needed and to develop policy
the Reagan White House.
tors by arguments made by the profes-
that isn't going to come out of some other
Anderson was personally involved in
sional staff. "He will direct what estimate
source." He stressed, however, that pri-
the first year's budget considerations, but
is to be used," McOmber said. "I do
mary reliance is on the resources in the
neither he nor his staff played a strong
know that the staff feels directed and
agencies. "We're not going to build up a
role in the decision process. By contrast,
plays a lesser role in providing ideas.
mini-Labor Department in the policy of-
W. Bowman Cutter, executive associate
Stockman dominates the ideas that come
fice to study manpower training, nor are
OMB director in the Carter Administra-
out of OMB."
we going to have our National Security
tion, recalled that during his tenure,
For brainstorming purposes, Stockman
Council staff pattern themselves after a
"OMB felt that the Domestic Policy
reportedly has relied upon a small group
little State Department."
Staff was too pervasive, too concerned
of personal aides that includes executive
There are now six Cabinet councils:
with short-term political considerations
associate director Donald W. Moran, spe-
commerce and trade, economic affairs,
and that some of its junior people were
cial counsel Michael Horowitz and econ-
energy and natural resources, food and
not too capable."
omist Lawrence A. Kudlow as well as
agriculture, human resources and legal
In the absence of a White House policy
Harper until he left for the Office of
policy. Each is chaired by the President,
staff to interject political or strategic con-
Policy Development. Joseph R. Wright
but when meeting for working sessions,
siderations, some observers feel that
Jr. has moved from the Commerce De-
they are led by their chairmen pro tem:
Stockman and his inner circle of advisers
partment, where he was deputy secretary,
the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury,
may have damaged OMB's institutional
to fill the deputy's post vacated by Har-
Interior, Agriculture and Health and Hu-
credibility by politicizing the budget pro-
per. Senior career officials, if consulted
man Services and the Attorney General.
cess. James R. Schlesinger, who served as
less, have nonetheless generally sup-
(See NJ, 7/11/81, p. 1242.)
acting budget director under Nixon, has
ported most of Stockman's budget-slash-
The chairmen pro tem, working with
charged that a "serious blow" has been
ing initiatives, in McOmber's estimation,
the White House Cabinet affairs office
struck against OMB.
and also feel that he has fought the good
and senior aides on the policy develop-
588
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82
ment staff, set the agendas for the council
policy process over the past few weeks
counselor's confidence in Harper involves
meetings and supervise the preparation of
and the emergence of new personalities
stepping away from reliance on people
the working papers that form the basis for
could go a long way to smoothing some of
closely involved with Reagan in Califor-
council discussions. As many as 10 Cabi-
the frictions that had developed between
nia and moving in the direction of Wash-
net members, plus the Vice President and
the Meese and Baker operations-includ-
ington experience.
top White House staff personnel, sit on
ing, at one point, a spate of rumors that
Harper's subsequent selection of Por-
each council. However, all meetings are
Meese's days in the White House were
ter as his deputy, rather than Gray, a
open to the entire Cabinet, all of whom
numbered.
longtime California Reagan aide, clearly
receive advance notice of meetings and
was a step in the same direction. Porter
attend freely when they have an interest
LOOKING AHEAD
has worked closely with Stockman, one of
in an item on the agenda.
Harper is regarded by Administration
the key members of the Regan Cabinet
The Treasury Secretary's economic af-
insiders as a Meese loyalist, despite the
council, and has been one of the most
fairs council, which has held more than
fact that he served first as a deputy to
active members of the policy develop-
90 sessions since the President took of-
Stockman, who is closely associated with
ment staff.
fice, meets the most often, averaging two
the initiatives undertaken by the Baker
If Harper, as expected, becomes a
to three sessions a week when Congress
legislative strategy group.
member of the so-called core group of
and the President are in Washington.
In point of fact, however, Harper came
legislative strategists, the Meese and Ba-
In an interview, Regan
ker sides of the White House
noted that there is an eco-
will have been much more
nomic component to just
successfully integrated than
about every issue. A represen-
before. Besides Baker, Meese
tative list of some 60 agenda
and Harper, that group will
items ranges from foreign
include presidential assistants
trade and the problem of the
Richard G. Darman and
Polish debt to a myriad of
Craig L. Fuller and legislative
internal issues. Technical
affairs chief Kenneth M. Du-
questions involving labor,
berstein.
management and just about
Harper and Porter, who was
every sector of the economy
formerly a fellow faculty
appear on the list. So do the
member with Darman at Har-
big-picture items such as how
vard's Kennedy School of
the Administration's tax and
Government, expect to be
budget policies influence pros-
able to work harmoniously
pects for recovery from the
with Baker and his aides while
recession.
at the same time upgrading
"It was good for you to see
the professional performance
the shades of opinion that are
Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan, head of the Cabinet
of the Office of Policy Devel-
expressed within the Cabinet
council on economic affairs, says the council's busy schedule
opment. The role of the office,
council for economics,"
"keeps people from becoming too parochial."
as seen by Porter, is twofold:
Regan told a visitor to one of
"to serve as an honest broker
the meetings. "We go over the whole
into the Administration with few ties to
in assuring that all views are fairly pre-
thing. There are many who think that this
either Meese or Stockman. Prior to the
sented to the President, but also to control
[Administration] is a closed society, that
1980 Reagan campaign, Harper had
the quality of the analysis" of options
[differing] points of view are never ex-
never met Stockman, and his acquaint-
available to Reagan.
pressed, that people don't really tell Ron-
ance with Meese amounted to "shaking
As Regan put it: "The President is a
ald Reagan stuff. Well, they do."
hands with him once at the 1976 Republi-
busy guy, and we don't want to impose
The Treasury Secretary added that the
can convention," where Harper was dep-
upon his time. We want to make sure he
council's busy schedule of meetings, al-
uty director of the platform committee.
gets enough information, but we don't
ways held in the White House, "keeps
During the campaign, Harper's activ-
want to involve him in too much minu-
people from becoming too parochial."
ity consisted mainly of participation in a
tiae. There are some things we can re-
Among the advantages of "having them
task force on spending control headed by
solve ourselves."
come to council two or three times a week
Caspar W. Weinberger, now Defense
Meese, who remains at the top of the
is as much to inform as to discuss," he
Secretary. After the election, Harper
domestic policy hierarchy, agreed that
said, adding that the meetings help other
took a two-month leave of absence as a
there are limits to the President's time
Cabinet officers to see how their prob-
vice president of the Emerson Electric
and the amount of detail that he can deal
lems fit in with other viewpoints and the
Co. to work with Anderson in the policy
with. The Cabinet, working with the re-
larger set of concerns facing the Adminis-
development office of the transition
structured White House staff, still has a
tration as a whole.
team. It was during that period that he
lot to chew on in an election year in which
The council system also draws the Cab-
met Stockman and that the idea of be-
Reagan is presiding over an extremely
inet into the consideration of strategy for
coming the OMB director's deputy was
dyspeptic economy.
dealing with Congress. Regan's group,
explored.
Nevertheless, Meese said, "the Presi-
for example, has recently been debating
Meese said he chose Harper to succeed
dent does not want his aides to rationalize
options for an Administration position on
Anderson in part "because he knows
competing views by diluting them to the
a proposal currently gaining favor on
OMB and knows how we can tap their
lowest common denominator. That's not
Capitol Hill to amend the Constitution to
resources" and also because of "his skills
always good. This is a President who likes
require that the federal budget be bal-
and experience in management, his
basic information and then makes his
anced.
knowledge of policy and his obvious com-
decision rather than having everything
The sorting out of the White House
mitment to the Reagan philosophy." The
predigested for him."
NATIONAL JOURNAL 4/3/82 589
National
Journal
IIII WEEKLY on POLITICS , AND GOVERNMENT
JUN 28. 1986 NO 26
Cabinet Power
Domestic Policy Council Sprints
Last October, with the insurance
pebble skipping over a lake. The
industry hollering about an incipi-
interagency working group's role
ent liability insurance crisis and
was essentially to ratify their deci-
Congress responding in ways that
sions, and the Cabinet council was
dismayed his aides, Attorney Gen-
used to put an Administration im-
eral Edwin Meese III did what
primatur on what the working
government officials confronted
group had accepted.
with situations of complexity and
The concentration of decision-
adversity usually do: He created a
making power in a few hands
working group to study the prob-
helped the Administration not only
lem.
to move quickly but also to issue a
Because several agencies have at
precisely focused policy. Com-
least a nominal claim on the liabil-
pared with the product liability
ity issue, Meese formed a Tort Pol-
legislation sponsored by Sen. Rob-
icy Working Group under the Do-
ert W. Kasten Jr., R-Wis., that
mestic Policy Council, the
Congress has been considering for
Cabinet-level body he chairs that
the past several years, the Admin-
was set up to formulate noneco-
istration proposal "has a crisper
nomic domestic policy. Consulting
purpose: to retrench the law and
with White House aides, he as-
save defendants money," said Vic-
signed representatives of 10 agen-
tor E. Schwartz, counsel to the
cies and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to the working
group. Officially, the group's
responsibility was clear: to propose
Shepard Sherbell/Picture Group
Product Liability Alliance, a man-
ufacturers' and insurance industry
group.
charge was broad, but its essential
Kasten's earnest attempts to
write federal answers to dozens of
ways to ease the crunch in the
intricate liability law questions
availability of liability insurance.
smothered his bill in complexity,
Just short of five months later, at
Justice Department's Robert L. Willmore
Administration officials felt. Early
a Domestic Policy Council meet-
He was tort group's executive secretary.
on, they decided to take a broader
ing, President Reagan approved
approach.
the working group's proposals to establish a federal product
The working group issued eight proposed changes in
liability law. The proposals were far more dramatic and
product liability law that were generally welcomed by manu-
fundamental than anything that either the Reagan Adminis-
facturers and insurance industry officials and roundly con-
tration or Congress had proposed in four previous years of
demned by consumer groups and trial attorneys. Among the
intermittent grappling with the issue.
most controversial were proposals to eliminate the doctrine
As bureaucracies move, that sprint to decision was the
of joint and several liability, limit punitive damages in
equivalent of a four-minute mile. In that sense, the Cabinet
liability cases to $100,000, cap fees to plaintiffs' attorneys
council did what it was supposed to-quickly funnel options
and make it more difficult for people claiming injury from a
on a fast-moving issue from an interagency group to senior
product to prove that the manufacturer was legally at fault.
officials and the President for their approval.
In part, the working group was able to move so briskly to
"It was not a study group," said Robert L. Willmore, a
such a sharply defined position because it was building on
deputy assistant attorney general in the Justice Depart-
several basic decisions that were made in the first Reagan
ment's Civil Division and executive secretary of the Tort
term after considerable internal squabbling.
Policy Working Group. "Its role was to be a policy-making
The Administration was not forced to focus on the issue
organ of the Cabinet council."
until the spring of 1982, when Kasten began to move toward
But neither the Cabinet council nor the working group was
introducing his legislation. Kasten invited Commerce Secre-
really the key policy-making instrument. In its operation, the
tary Malcolm Baldrige to testify that March, and Baldrige,
working group demonstrated a basic rule of government: "In
who had spoken sympathetically of a federal effort before,
any Administration, no matter who is the President, some-
was widely expected to endorse Kasten's efforts.
body who knows what they want is going to do better than
"However, at the 11th hour, concerns arose within the
people who have only a vague idea," as an Administration
Administration that such testimony was premature,"
official dissatisfied with the working group's report put it.
Baldrige recounted in an internal memo that summer to
The product liability policy was not, in fact, written by the
Meese, who was then counselor to the President. "As a result,
interagency group but instead by the few key players most
I limited my testimony to an endorsement of the congres-
interested in it: Willmore; his boss Richard K. Willard,
sional inquiry itself." The Administration decided to look at
assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Division; and
the issue more thoroughly before committing itself, and in
Douglas A. Riggs, general counsel at the Commerce Depart-
April of that year, the old Cabinet Council on Commerce
ment. They were the people who knew what they wanted to
and Trade, which Baldrige chaired, established a working
do about product liability law. The policy they drew up
group to study Kasten's legislation.
traversed the Cabinet council process, but lightly, like a
As a matter of philosophy, many Administration officials
1586 NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86
To Liability Insurance Decision
were uncomfortable with the large sums that juries were
discussed. "There was no notice, no real opportunity to
awarding against corporations in product liability cases. But
discuss it, though certain very preliminary observations were
such cases have historically been decided under state law.
made," the official said. "The report wasn't really altered in
Imposing federally legislated changes on state tort law
any way. Wherever the issues had been sorted out, it had
seemed to many officials "inconsistent with the Administra-
been sorted out before we got there. It became pretty clear
tion's policy of 'new federalism,' Baldrige wrote to Meese.
that our views weren't really being solicited."
The pressures arising from this fissure forced intense
Riggs acknowledged that "some people did complain"
debate throughout 1982. Eventually, most Administration
about the process. But, he said, "some of the people who
officials came around to the view of Kasten and the insur-
complained were distracted by other business. There was no
ance industry that federal intervention was warranted. That
reason at all why other people would not have had knowledge
fall, the Administration endorsed Kasten's bill.
of the document and the concepts in it."
But Kasten was unable to get his bill through Congress-
The working group sent the recommendations on to the
in 1982 or in the years that followed. Though he revised the
Domestic Policy Council, which held two meetings before
legislation several times, he could not overcome implacable
bringing in Reagan on March 17. At each stage, dissenting
opposition from trial lawyers and consumer groups, who
officials raised the same objections. Skeptics questioned the
maintained that the legislation unfairly benefited companies
cap on punitive damages ("The fact is the number was just
that had injured consumers by selling them defective prod-
pulled out of the air. There was no empirical data to support
ucts. In 1982 and 1984, Kasten's legislation
was cleared by the Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee but did not make it
to the Senate floor. Last year, Kasten hit the
end of the road when the committee, on an 8-8
vote, rejected his latest version of the bill.
It was the failure of Kasten's bill that
brought the Administration back into the
game. Kasten's continual efforts to attract
moderate support for his legislation distressed
some Administration officials, who considered
each revision of his bill to be less of an im-
provement on existing law.
After Kasten's bill was defeated, the Ad-
ministration was left with alternatives it liked
even less. Throughout 1985, as the difficulty
in obtaining liability insurance mushroomed
into a "crisis," the only legislative alternative
Shepard Sherbell/Picture Group
drawing any breath was the proposal by Sen.
John C. Danforth, R-Mo., to create a no-fault
administrative compensation system as an al-
Commerce Department general counsel Douglas A. Riggs
ternative to litigation for people who con-
Some people complained about the working group process.
tended that they were harmed by hazardous
products. Such a system was anathema to several Adminis-
it," said an official), the limits on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
tration officials, who believed that only parties proven at
(which the Council of Economic Advisers and some White
fault should be required to pay compensation.
House officials considered to be price fixing) and whether
Administration officials assumed they had to work
federal legislation preempting state tort law was consistent
quickly. "We knew Danforth was moving, and if we wanted
with the Administration's oft-stated belief in federalism.
to play, we had to hurry," Riggs said. The working group
But the Justice and Commerce Departments were staunch
split into eight task forces, but two handled the bulk of the
in their support of the working group's proposals, and there
work; Riggs chaired one that examined product liability law,
was no one in the Administration committed to seriously
and Willmore chaired one that studied the problems firms
fighting them. Reagan approved the council's request to
and localities were having obtaining insurance.
send Congress legislation embodying the working group's
The process moved swiftly and was tightly held. The task
proposal, and on April 30, Kasten introduced the Adminis-
forces did not consult with outside groups or try to assess the
tration's product liability bill (S 100). Consumer groups and
climate in Congress. Most of the work was divided between
trial lawyers immediately dismissed the bill as a bailout for
Commerce, which analyzed the insurance industry's health,
the insurance industry.
and Justice, which examined the state of tort law. Together,
Six weeks later, the Senate Commerce Committee began
principals from both agencies hammered out the reforms in a
marking up a bill that did not at the outset embrace the
report that Willmore's working group issued.
Administration's proposals for fundamental reform. The
This centralized system left some of the other working
unambiguous statement the Administration had produced
group members feeling left out. An Administration official
by bringing only a few voices to the table was fading into the
said that the draft proposal was distributed to the working
din as Congress let the rest of the players into the room.
group only at the start of the meeting at which it was to be
-Ronald Brownstein
NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86 1587
Rescuing White House from Clutches
When the space shuttle Challenger exploded on
Jan. 28, killing its seven-member crew, a carefully
organized and well-oiled policy-making mechanism
was ready and waiting to develop a Reagan Admin-
istration response.
Interagency responsibilities and relationships
had been carefully detailed in a pair of lengthy
presidential decision directives. Less than 18
months before the Challenger disaster, President
Reagan had approved a national space strategy
blueprint to implement the space policy that he
had spelled out in a far-ranging paper promulgated
two years earlier. Cabinet-level guidance for the
process was provided through the National Secu-
rity Council (NSC); questions on commercial uses
of space were assigned under a separate directive to
the Economic Policy Council.
Ultimately, however, the future of the nation's
space program may be most affected by the spur-
of-the-moment decision of four White House aides
during the flight back from the President's appear-
ance at a Jan. 31 memorial service in Houston for
the Challenger victims.
Huddling aboard Air Force One, chief of staff
Donald T. Regan, national security adviser John
M. Poindexter, director of Cabinet affairs Alfred
H. Kingon and presidential assistant W. Dennis
Thomas essentially rescued the White House from
the clutches of its own policy apparatus. Resisting
pressures from their own bureaucracy for an inter-
nal review of the shuttle disaster, they advised the
President to appoint an independent investigative
NASA
commission.
The difficulties that have since beset the White House in
Regan also held a powerful trump card at that meeting.
deciding whether to build a replacement shuttle demonstrate
The findings of the independent Challenger study commis-
both the strengths and the weaknesses of the interagency
sion, headed by former Secretary of State William P. Rog-
policy networks that constitute the heart of Cabinet govern-
ers, were not to be formally presented to Reagan until June 9.
ment. The space shuttle experience suggests that policy
So it was understood at the May 15 NSC session that any
making by bureaucratic committee is more suited to defend-
decisions would be contingent upon a later assessment of the
ing the status quo than to dictating a change of direction.
Rogers panel's conclusions.
After more than three months of percolation in the laby-
From virtually the moment the shuttle exploded, the
rinthine, multitiered NSC study process, a "consensus"
White House had been subject to emotionally charged
bubbled up for presentation to the President on May 15. At a
appeals from within the Administration for a crash program
full-dress NSC meeting that day, Reagan was advised to
to get the space mission back on track. Those who took that
replace the Challenger at a then-estimated cost of $3.5
position had little enthusiasm for an outside investigation.
billion and thus restore the space fleet to four shuttles.
"There was pressure to follow the Apollo 1 precedent,"
The recommendation came from an NSC senior interde-
recalled an aide involved in the Jan. 31 decision to appoint
partmental group on space (SIG-Space, with eight members
the Rogers commission, alluding to the review panel that the
and two observers), chaired by Poindexter, after having
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
worked its way through a lower-level interdepartmental group
appointed after three astronauts died in a 1967 fire.
known as an IG, which initially had assigned the problem to a
"Frankly, some of the lesser NSC people were pushing for
working group, referred to by some as an IGLET.
that, as was the NASA bureaucracy," the aide said.
"A working group was constituted to do the technical work
The emotional climate was such that a veteran of Adminis-
on the orbiter replacement issue," a mid-level official in-
tration space councils speculated that the entire interagency
volved in the process explained. "It submitted a paper to the
decision-making process on replacing the orbiter might have
IG, which polished it and reported it to the SIG, which in
been bypassed if NASA's leadership had not been in disar-
turn met and made the recommendations to the NSC."
ray at the time of the explosion. Administrator James M.
At the May 15 meeting, however, the President sent the
Beggs was on leave of absence to defend himself against
issue back for further study after Regan and others posed a
fraud charges related to his previous employment.
withering series of questions about the justification for
"If Jim Beggs had been over there, I imagine he would
rushing ahead to build a replacement shuttle.
have gotten the President to put in the State of Union
1584 NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86
Of Its Own Space Policy Apparatus
message [delivered a week after the accident] that he not
decision to buy another orbiter right away. "They wanted a
only wanted the program to go forward again but that he was
decision by Feb. 1. Bang, just like that," a participant said.
giving an order today to start building another orbiter," the
Skeptics were reportedly reluctant to raise tough questions
official said. "That's the way that you preempt interagency
lest their patriotism be called into question. But the Rogers
involvement."
commission peeled away the emotional layers and revealed
But even the NSC's interagency process focused on the
the issue to be a more commonplace matter of management
narrow question of how to replace the lost Challenger rather
mistakes and individual misjudgments.
than on a broader reevaluation of the accident's impact on
It took four or five weeks before participants in the NSC
national space goals. NASA was committed to making the
process began to recognize that they weren't dealing with a
manned shuttle the nation's primary space transportation
simple procurement issue; even then, there was a delay in
system, and most of the other players at the table had vital
identifying the questions and policies that demanded review.
interests in the shuttle payload schedule.
The momentum of the process carried it forward despite
The military establishment and the intelligence commu-
the fact that answers to the larger questions had not been
nity regarded the shuttle as a primary tool for achieving their
formulated. That became evident at the May 15 NSC
national security missions. Civil agencies such as the Com-
meeting, when Regan and others demanded to know the
merce and Agriculture Departments depended on it to
alternatives to a four-orbiter fleet. Among those at the table,
launch weather and data collection satellites.
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige chimed in with
Consequently, said a participant, "the way the original IG
criticism of NASA's pitch for commercial business.
discussions began was that this is simply a hardware procure-
What about greater reliance on unmanned launches?
ment exercise. From a policy formulation standpoint, that is
Would a large expendable launch vehicle accommodate the
a fascinating approach for the NSC to take, because that
same payload as a shuttle? What about lightening the
means all [existing] policies remain in place. We are just
manifest of future shuttles by spinning off commercial
looking at hardware."
payloads to the private sector? Does NASA really need four
The odd party out in this approach, however, was the
shuttles, and what will it cost to get the remaining three
Economic Policy Council's working group on a commercial
flying again? Is newer and better technology available?
space program. It was mandated by Reagan's 1984 national
"There were a lot of questions that it was felt were not
space strategy directive to encourage development of a
answered satisfactorily," explained the White House's
"robust" private space industry using unmanned rockets—
Kingon. "The President has to make some hard decisions,
so-called expendable launch vehicles.
but he wants better information before he does."
Because NASA jumped into the commercial space pic-
With those marching orders, the NSC-led space policy
ture first, offering attractive rates for private shuttle pay-
process immediately went back to work to produce a broader
loads, the Economic Policy Council's space working group
set of proposals, among them an expected mandate for the
had not made much progress. NASA's emphasis on the
Economic Policy Council's commercialization group to chart
shuttle also diminished rather than stimulated private-sector
a plan to stimulate entrepreneurship.
production of unmanned rockets.
Presidential assistant Thomas, rejecting the notion that
If the Economic Policy Council's proponents of space
the interagency process initially failed, said: "I'd argue that
privatization, led by Commerce Department officials, hoped
that is where the system works rather than not. There may be
that the Administration's response to the shuttle disaster
every argument for doing something from one perspective.
would lead to a broad reappraisal of NASA's policies, they
But what you need is a variety of perspectives."
were initially disappointed. Even fellow Commerce officials
The shuttle saga, however, does not make a compelling
at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
case for relying on Cabinet bodies to develop policy guid-
had joined forces with those who reportedly "worked very
ance. In this instance, the perspective most useful to Reagan
hard to keep it a shuttle hardware procurement issue."
came from outside his Administration.-Dick Kirschten
While the bureaucratic policy process
drove inexorably toward the May 15 rec-
ommendation that the President approve
a replacement orbiter, the Rogers com-
mission simultaneously was conducting
public hearings that cast doubt on
NASA's ability to operate its remaining
three space shuttles safely without major
safety modifications.
The openness of the commission's in-
vestigation also helped to pierce the veil
of emotional hyperbole that initially por-
trayed the Challenger as a major national
emergency symbolizing a collective fail-
ure of U.S. technological know-how. At
an early meeting of the NSC's mid-level
space group, the IG, a few members
reportedly made histrionic appeals for a
NATIONAL JOURNAL 6/28/86 1585
Managing the Executive Branch
Cabinet Councils
of Government:
Effectively Running
the Federal Machine
HIGHLIGHTS
The function of the modern President is to develop strategies
and approve overall policies on almost everything.
Thus an organization designed for full access and total
Meese: "Maximize management communi-
cations."
responsiveness must exist to expose all options.
Every modern President has recognized the need for an ad-
justable in-place system about a week after they take office.
people keeping their work to themselves
And everything past Presidents have evolved, If effective, has
until after the President has the final
been folded into the Cabinet Council process.
policy proposal.
Over the past two years, says Meese,
"Once the President has made a decision,
the longest lapsed time before the White
On
Item: last November, headlines
House Press corps demanded details has
a cabinet just inside the entrance to
strumpeted that, "under pressure from
been 40 minutes; the shortest lapsed
the White House office of Ed Harper,
assistant to the President for policy
Democrats and organized labor," the
time, nine minutes."
development, sits a Rubik Cube. Joe
White House "has abandoned a plan to
Item: un-named "Administration
tax unemployment benefits." Actually, in
officials" were cited in Media coverage
Chacon, a messenger who claims "only
average" intelligence and, according to
keeping with a dictate of Counsellor to
of President Reagan's Latin American
one Harper assistant, brings mail around
the President Edwin Meese III (principal
trip last December "downplaying the sig-
to Harper's office "about 800 times a
architect of the Council system) that the
nificance of it." Fact is, though the deci-
day," has been timed "doing" the cube
Councils' job is to give the President as
sion to go was not the result of a formal
in less than 70 seconds; lately has taken
wide a range of ideas as possible, this par-
foreign policy analysis, the evident belief
to doing it with "snake eyes" (a square
ticular tax notion was only one of some
of some "Administration officials" about
of a different color in the center of each
16 options on a list which hadn't even
the trip points up, by implication, the
cleared a Council working group yet; let
need for continued communication among
of the otherwise single-color sides).
Harper's office also is management
alone become a Council agenda item.
top Administration individuals-a chief
focal point for a somewhat more impor-
In short, the President was unaware of
potential benefit, as Meese sees it, of the
tant White House activity: running the
it until he read about it in the news-
Council system.
President's Cabinet Councils of Govern-
papers. Noted Meese in a Government
Reason: The trip reflected, as did Presi-
ment. And a considerable case can be
Executive interview, "The President
dent Reagan's meeting with the Presi-
made that, even after two years of
doesn't like to make decisions based on
dent of Mexico in early 1981, what was
Ronald Reagan's administration, a lot of
memoranda. He always reads the back-
probably Ronald Reagan's first foreign
people within Government and among
ground papers, the working-group
policy pronouncement. He told Meese
those who judge the Council's principal
report, before the final Cabinet Council
even before the Presidential Inauguration
product (policy recommendations to the
meeting (on a given issue). Then, at that
that he wanted his first overseas trip to
President) have no more grasp of how the
meeting (which President Reagan always
be to Central and South America because
Councils function-or at least are sup-
chairs, himself, for every Council) he
"improving relations with our closest
posed to-than they do of how a Rubik
listens to the arguments and opinions
neighbors" had his highest foreign policy
Cube works.
right in front of him; knows what is
priority. (Pursuing that goal was delayed
Item: last October, when the Ad-
behind the final policy recommendation
more than a year by a plethora of
ministration announced an expanded pro-
when it reaches the Oval Office. He feels
budget/tax-cut problems at home and
gram to combat illicit drug trafficking
that face-to-face exchange is the way to
already-scheduled mandatory Summit
and drug-related crime, much of the fault-
make clear which alternative recommen-
meetings abroad.)
finding White House Press corps labelled
dations are likely to be the best."
Item: a national newsmagazine, in
it, as one of them reported, "an example
Thus, says Meese, "Loyalty requires
a cover story on "How Reagan Decides,"
of the sometimes almost haphazard way
that these matters remain confidential"
last month claimed, again quoting un-
in which decisions are made in this par-
until that decision-making trip has been
named "high-level officials" and "a
ticular Administration." Actually, the
completed. "The one possible vice in the
former aide," that, in effect, when he
program was merely an expansion on a
(Council) system is premature release of
hears opinions stated on major issues at
policy that had been set more than a year
the range of proposed options." Nor does
Council meetings which do not agree with
earlier and, based largely on successes in
Meese think the Public's "right to know"
his own, he attacks the speaker so strong-
the ensuing months, implementing it.
is thwarted at all by staff and Cabinet
ly that advisers now tend to tell him only
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
20
Jan. 1983
The Cabinet Council Line-up
In addition to the National Security Council, established by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947,
here is the current set of Presidential Cabinet Councils and their specifically designated members (whose job
titles help explain what issues each addresses).
CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
CABINET COUNCIL ON NATURAL RESOURCES
Secretary of the Treasury, chairman pro tempore
AND ENVIRONMENT
Secretary of State
Secretary the Interior, chairman pro tempore
Secretary of Commerce
Attorney General
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Transportation
Director, Office of Management & Budget
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
U.S. Trade Representative
Secretary of Energy
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Chairman, Council of Environmental Quality
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
President, White House Chief of Staff, Assistant to the Presi-
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
dent for Policy Development.)
President, Chief of Staff, Assistant to the President for Policy
Development.)
CABINET COUNCIL ON HUMAN RESOURCES
Secretary of Health & Human Services, chairman pro
CABINET COUNCIL ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
tempore
Secretary of Agriculture, chairman pro tempore
Attorney General
Secretary of State
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Education
U.S. Trade Representative
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
President, Chief of Staff, Assistant to the President for Policy
President, Chief of Staff, Assistant to the President for Policy
Development.)
Development.)
CABINET COUNCIL ON LEGAL POLICY
Attorney General, chairman pro tempore
CABINET COUNCIL FOR MANAGEMENT
Secretary of State
AND ADMINISTRATION
Secretary of Treasury
Counsellor to the President, chairman pro tempore
Secretary of Interior
Secretary of Treasury
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Energy
Director of Office of Management & Budget
Director of Office of Management & Budget
White House Counsel
Administrator of General Services Administration
Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the U.S.
Director of the Office of Personnel Management
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Chief of Staff,
President, Chief of Staff, Assistant for Policy Development.)
Assistant for Policy Development.)
CABINET COUNCIL ON COMMERCE AND TRADE
Secretary of Commerce, chairman.pro tempore
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Attorney General
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Energy
U.S. Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
(Ex officio members-The Vice President, Counsellor to the
President, Chief of Staff, Assistant to the President for Policy
Development.)
JANUARY 1983
21
Streamlining Defense Will
Take a Dramatic Policy Change
Five major consequences he sees in
management personnel turnover dur-
today's long lead times:
ing the 13-year cycle.
I-Each year of delay adds roughly
The so-called "Carlucci Initiatives"
30% to the original cost estimate on
and other DoD efforts focus, he
buying a proposed new system; and,
argues, only on regulations, proced-
"according to Paul Thayer, 40% of
ures and the multi-year contract-
every Defense procurement dollar
ing/program instability elements of
now goes to bureaucratic overload."
the above-listed collection of acquisi-
II-Permanent U.S. inferiority in
tion problems.
the performance of "cutting-edge-of-
Only "decisive Presidential orders,"
with, in several cases, Congressional
technology" new weapons because the
Soviets currently have plenty of time
support, can correct the rest.
"to see what we plan, steal our tech-
As reported in a recent issue of the
nology, copy and deploy equal or bet-
Government Purchasing Outlook
Harper: "Generically relate the issues."
ter systems before we do."
newsletter, "A move is afoot, and
events-including the recent establish-
III-No President can introduce any
what they think he wants to hear rather
ment of the President's Cabinet Coun-
new strategy, or meet any new threat,
than what they think he ought to hear.
cil on Management and Administra-
"on his watch" (a presumed maximum
If true, of course, then the whole point
tion plus naming of Paul Thayer as
eight years-and remember who was
of the Council system of management is
Deputy Secretary of Defense-make
the last full two-term President) if and
blunted. To Meese, the claim is nonsense.
it likely the notion will at least receive
where this calls for new hardware.
"In the 16 years I've worked for him-
careful study, to alter dramatically the
and I've probably been in a position of
IV-The only-chance the President
way the Pentagon buys major weap-
giving him more bad news and unpopular
has to deliver on his election commit-
ons systems."
information than anybody else has-I've
ment to establish a "margin of safety"
Two of the proponents, E.D.
never, in all that time, heard, or heard of,
is to change U.S. strategy and the
Milauckas and Bob Richardson, (see
his chewing somebody out for giving him
third point above precludes this. Thus,
December Government Executive,
views, opinions, information contrary to
"given present lead times, we likely
page 46) worked with, and for, retired
his own."
will enter '84 and '85 even more inferi-
Air Force General Bernard Schriever
The "chewing out" Meese has seen has
or than were in '81 unless he can cope
(who also is a strong backer of the con-
en of someone for not giving him an un-
with this acquisition problem".
cept) during the heated missile/space
opular view when they could have. The
V-Congressional and/or Adminis-
race era of the late 1950's and early
only other times, during his current
tration support for any new system
'60's.
White House tenure, when Reagan's
cannot be sustained over 13 years.
Sums up Richardson, in part, "After
anger has been roused has been when one
Programs like Stealth, for instance,
shopping High Frontier (a proposal
of his appointee-advisers has taken a case
enthusiastically supported today, are
for deploying a series of space systems
public without bringing it to him first. (It
not likely to be viewed in the same
to establish "assured defense" against
has happened a couple of times, to a
light 10 years from now when mega-
Soviet strategic nuclear attack-see
greater or lesser degree, since he took of-
buck production money is sought-es-
June, 1982,. Government Executive) in
fice and the message behind the resultant
pecially if Point II, occurs, as it will.
and out of Government, I have come
dressing down, "Argue with me, not to
Richardson's "culprits:" A "Parkin-
to the conclusion that today's (Pen-
the Media," seems finally to have sunk
son build-up of regulations and pro-
tagon) acquisition process not only is
in, at least with most of the Executive
cedures (84,000 pages) designed more
the Achilles heel of HF but probably
branch.)
to protect decision-makers than to
of our ability ever to achieve an accep-
Item: late last year, when Meese
achieve results; over-layerization of
table U.S. security posture. Unfor-
announced creation of the Cabinet Coun-
authority and excessive participation
tunately, the acquisition problem is
cil on Management and Administration,
in the decision progress by staffs and
generally considered a relatively
Press coverage dubbed it "a task force
echelons that need not and should not
minor DoD (Department of Defense)
set up to oversee the other task forces;"
be involved; a front-end decision pro-
technical and managerial matter,
said, "Among other things, it also would
cess that has stretched from six
unglamorous, hard to explain-and
oversee the Reform 88 program." In fact,
months to, now, six years; perpetua-
thus fails to get the attention it should
each of the separate Councils "oversee"
tion of the McNamara-induced (he was
at top levels."
themselves and Reform 88 (see story, this
Defense Secretary in the 1960's) low-
In one sentence, he says, "The prob-
issue) is pretty much the whole point of
risk, building-block policies, adding
lem is time." In the 1950's, he points
the newest of the Councils.
four years to the development cycle,
out, the cycle from deciding to field a
In short, a lot of erroneous perceptions
all but precluding "concurrency" in
new system through the development
and misinformation is floating around
system-component developments and
and procurement of it to "full up"
Washington and across the country. One
requiring all technology be in hand
operational capability averaged six
reason for the criticism of Reagan's
before going for the system; inade-
years with urgent programs such as
White House management, thinks Meese,
quate or no commitment at all levels,
Polaris fielded in four years. Today,
is simply that "Some people don't like the
from the outset, to end product; adver-
the average is 11-13 years "with some
nal decision" and one way the losers use
sarial rather than team effort in
programs up to 20 years in the pipe-
0 contest it is to contend, "The guy just
contractor-Government relations and
line!"
doesn't understand the problem." The
other reason, he thinks, is that some of
JANUARY 1983
23
the critics don't understand how Govern-
structure is simplicity itself. At the pin-
the President an issue is), even if he//she
ment should work under this Cabinet
nacle, just below the President-who, as
is not formally assigned to that particular
Council system.
noted above, always chairs the final meet-
Council. Says Harper, "The National
Basically, the structure in place today
ing on an issue before one of the Coun-
Security Council obviously has a strong
was started as the Reagan "transition
cils is due to send a policy recommenda-
interest in much of what's being dis-
team" came to Washington in November-
tion up to him-are the Councils, of
cussed in the Cabinet Council on Natural
December, 1980 when Meese was look-
course (see box). Each has a formal
Resources, for instance; two groups in-
ing to apply in the Federal Government
membership list and an Executive Sec-
terested in the same topic. So we have
the cabinet system he created in
retary to give their deliberations ad-
overlapping attendance and member-
Sacramento when Reagan was California
ministrative support, the latter doing
ships."
Governor, "recognizing that at State
more than merely paperwork but also,
Further, points out Meese, "To extend
level there are no national security or
from time to time, providing a Council
management communications even fur-
foreign policy (except for trade) con-
with, for instance, "timing" advice-after
ther, senior White House staff people can
cerns." (The Council to cover those lat-
deliberations with Meese and Harper-
attend any meeting they choose." Those
ter fields already exists, anyway, in the
on when to bring an issue up to the Presi-
dialogues are important to Meese as well
National Security Council, created by law
dent at a final meeting.
because of his three-fold responsibility.
in 1947 and designed to coordinate
Notes Harper, "Every week, I meet
The three: Planning and Evaluation, i.e.
separate-Department national security
with all the Executive Secretaries of the
looking strategically out into the future
programs since, as its chief proponent at
Cabinet Councils; go through the agen-
"at what we should be looking at,"
the time, the late James Forrestal, said,
da of what they have scheduled for the
reflecting Presidential goals; Policy
"Communism will attack us on all fronts,
next 60 days." Those meetings also give
Development which takes generalized
military, economic, and political.")
him a visibility on the whole effort, make
guidance from Planning and Evaluation,
sure "the left hand knows what the right
deals in the much more immediate time
One Meese objective: "Maximize man-
agement communications" on problems
hand is doing." For instance, at this
frame of "this year;" and Cabinet Affairs,
and issues. A second one: as he told the
writing, he says "Human Resources,
i.e. getting input from the Departments
editor of First Monday, the Republican
Economic Affairs, and the Commerce &
on policy problems and monitoring policy
Party's magazine, "We'd come to the
Trade (meeting) agenda's all will be ad-
implementation.
point, in previous Administrations where
dressed in the next three weeks because
The Executive Secretariate to each
Presidents literally exhausted their
they're all studying some generically
Council is made up, usually, of the Assis-
energies, doing pick-and-shoveł-work, for
related issues."
tant Secretary for Management of the
which we have very competent people on
For that same issue-overlap reason,
Agencies that belong to a Council. Below
the front line. The real Presidential duties
Council memberships are not rigid. Any
that, as issues arise, working groups are
are to develop strategies and approve
Cabinet Secretary can attend somebody
set up to do studies, make recommenda-
overall policies."
else's meeting, or send a representative
tions to a particular Council. In short,
The Cabinet Councils' organizational
(depending on how close to meeting with
says Meese, "It is a clear-cut process for
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GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
24
decision making so everybody gets a
fice; a tendency at top levels to start pro-
chance to get input to the President. He
grams and go on to other
demands full information and our job is
without having either the resources or the
not to censor ideas but to give him as
time to go back. say two years later. to
wide a range of ideas as possible."
find out if the old ones ever were done.
How do "issues" crop up? "I'm not sure
What we're going to do this time,"
akec a lot for an issue to get visibili-
says Bledsoe, "is to create a monitoring
says Harper. "My staff and I gather,
system to ask, 'Why hasn't it been
1 pour through, a tremendous amount
done?' Much of that data flow will be
of material every day-though, and it
automated. "We're using some automat-
may sound self-serving-I'll spend more
ed tracking systems right now. Each
time reading Government Executive than,
Council has one. And the Office of Ad-
for instance, watching the network news
ministration has computers which sup-
because I can get what the latter are say-
port OMB (Office of Management and
ing out of the 'Current News' summary."
Budget) and most of the rest of us around
Adds Ralph Bledsoe, who has an arm-
here."
long list of White House job titles, e.g.
Even so, he suspects, "We're always
Special Assistant to the President, Ex-
going to have some information flow in
ecutive Secretary to the Council on
here, Agencies telling you what they
Management and Administration, Asso-
want to tell you, that could be suspect.'
ciate Director (to Meese) of the Planning
Adds Harper, "We operate on a process
and Evaluation Office, "Maybe the jury
basis (in developing policy), not a project
is still out on whether (the Cabinet Coun-
basis. The Cabinet Departments are re-
cil structure) has made a difference."
sponsible for carrying out the policy."
Bledsoe: "Maybe the jury is still out."
Some issues are still going up to the
Sums up Meese, "When the President
Oval Office the old way, he points out, i.e.
makes a decision, everybody is then re-
exercise a monopoly influence with the
a direct visit by a Cabinet official, or so-
quired to support it and the Agencies are
gas pipeline than on these other things."
meone else, to the President "and there
held accountable for implementation."
In sum, while the President felt he had
will always be some that just don't neat-
And therein may lie the rub: it's not the
to do something in retaliation for the
ly fit one of the Councils." Still he sees
management scheme that's flawed; it's
Soviet aggression, he was left with a poor
a lot of merit in the management sys-
the way people inside Government
package-and the Europeans refused to
tem-and notes, to back that up, that the
work-or don't work-with it and people
go along with that one, too. Point is, it
number of issues going up through the
outside Government criticize it.
was not the system for surfacing issues
new channel "is impressive."
Of the latter, says Meese, "Most of the
that was flawed, but the actions of some
Prior to the present set-up, he says,
Press just doesn't understand our ap-
of the people and groups who were to
"Managers of various Agencies, Admin-
proach because very few ever have had
carry the policy out.
trators, and so on often just never could
any management experience running a
Late last Fall, three separate Cabi-
rk their way to the President with
business." Of the former, the examples
net Departments were looking separate-
sues important to them. Now, they can
already make a long list. To name a few:
ly at (a) job training; (b) assisting auto
get to the President, or at least one of us,
State Department staff failing to
and steel workers; (c) employment com-
direct."
"hang tough" with Congress, among
pensation programs-until Harper
Also, he notes, when a Cabinet-level
others, on President Reagan's Middle
brought them together via the Cabinet
Secretary did reach the President in the
East peace plan; and "Reagan's failure,"
Council system because all three issues
past, he usually took up issues central to
according to columnists Novak and
were generically inter-related to a single
individual Department problems. Con-
Evans, making him "a laughing stock in
issue: unemployment.
versely, full Cabinet meetings (which the
the world and the U.S. Senate."
General Services Administration
current President convenes a great many
The much-maligned White House
(GSA) late last year was doing an office-
less of because of the Council system) had
plan of last year to sell grain to the
space reduction study, the kind they do
long agenda's and wasted the time of
Soviets but embargo sale of natural-gas-
almost annually, from the perspective of
many attendees who simply had no in-
pipeline technology, in retaliation for
cost-cutting-until they were sent back to
terest in what was on most of the list. "In
Polish crushing of "Solidarity" (which
the drawing board by Council delibera-
some ways," he sums up, "by decentraliz-
may not be all that "crushed" for that
tions which pointed out that the basic
ing and delegating, we're getting more
matter) and imposing martial law, gen-
challenge was, "Are we adding programs
work through the system than the once-
erally has blamed "ineptness" for the
or cutting programs" and, as a result,
huge Cabinet meetings did."
White House decision.
"How many people are we going to have
"The whole Cabinet Council effort is
That story deserves more detailed at-
and where?"
unique," he says, "it is the one thing
tention than is available here. But the bot-
Office of Personnel Management
that's been missing from a whole series
tom line was, even before Reagan made
(OPM) presented a proposal, late last
of recommendations," e.g. the Hoover
the grain/pipeline announcements, the
year, to the Council on Management and
Commission, the Brownlow Commission,
Administration-preferred bank embargo
Administration on re-writing job descrip-
etc., "on how to improve Federal deci-
of credit against the Soviets as the most
tions of Federal contracting personnel to
sion-making machinery. Just creation of
likely tactic that would succeed-and U.S.
combat "grade creep;" then heard a
the Cabinet Council arrangement solves
European allies refused to go along. All
rebuttal from the Office of Federal Pro-
a lot of problems."
of that surfaced in Council meetings as
curement Policy (OFPP) which insisted
His underlying point: "In the past,
well as the fact that: (a) the grain deal
there had been no grade creep in that job
we've put our chief executive officer
would mean a cash drain on Soviet
category and, under the circumstances,
(CEO), with no prior experience, in
treasuries (provided commercial banks
to appear to criticize very importart,
harge of a vast organization with no
didn't undercut White House policy) and,
"guiltless" people "responsible for
usiness-like machinery for running it."
besides, the U.S. has never used food for
megabucks of Federal dollars would be
Results were, among other things, a lot
political blackmail; (b) unlike grain and
demoralizing."
of biased and/or misinformation and
other commercial-commodity items, says
OPM's "working group" was sent back
unbalanced opinion reaching the Oval Of-
Harper, "We were closer to being able to
with instructions to talk to Agency ex-
JANUARY 1983
29
ecutives at higher levels than they had to
sometimes Congress decides we ought to
In any case, while Harper points out,
this point; see if they couldn't come back
abrogate our responsibility to the tax-
"We deal in processes, not projects," the
with a consensus view. In short, they
payer merely to take care of the political
clear White House determination to
were told politely, "You haven't done
concerns of a handful of their colleagues."
follow-up policy pronouncements with
your homework properly."
To combat that kind of thing, says
management machinery (such as com-
Attempts in Congress, and among
Meese, "We (notably Jim Baker among
puters and the various Inspectors General
xecutive Agencies, to circumvent a
many others) promote our views on Capi-
committees already in place) to assure
ng-established policy that the Federal
tol Hill; line up outside groups to support
policy implementation. In other words,
Government should contract out for
our policies. A lot of times, the reason
more and more Executive personnel in
goods and services, except under unusual
one-issue activists are able to get a law
the Departments are going to be getting
circumstances. "We're not going to give
passed is it is such a narrow issue that no-
notes like the one Harper sent the Pen-
up any more ground on A-76; let Govern-
body else is interested-but a lot of times,
tagon recently.
ment willy nilly take as its own what
if we can mobilize those otherwise disin-
Said it, pointing out an established, new
ought to be contracted out. It's very un-
terested parties, they can neutralize the
Defense procurement policy, "What's the
fortunate, and a little puzzling really, how
special-interest move."
hold-up?"
"Reform 88"-How the
White House Intends to
Streamline Operations
HIGHLIGHTS
OMB's Wright: on Information reporting,
-As every new President since Hector was a pup also has
"timeliness in reaching the President is
terrible."
claimed, this Administration, under the slogan "Reform 88," has
called management efficiency and "streamlining Government
operations" one of its "highest priorities."
This time, however, what it starts it actually may finish, in
deed, the Inspectors General/auditor
teams who will do a lot of that tracking
part because that's the Reagan management style and in part
were set up as a coordinated structure
because teams have been tasked through the Cabinet Council on
among Federal Agencies and Cabinet-
Management and Administration to audit Implementation
level Departments even before the
progress.
Management Council was (and uncovered
What is, and will be, flowing out of that Council will affect
$5.8 billion in fraud and waste in their
employee job ratings, procurement procedures, cash management,
first six months at work, hinting at just
program administration, much more.
how organizationally antiquated and red-
tape laden the Executive branch has
become in recent years.)
Looking back on his service as Secre-
President Ed Meese-when he an-
The planned follow-up thesis is
tary of Defense, Robert Lovett noted,
nounced it and the setting up of the
analogous to President Reagan's strategy
"One of the toughest parts of that job was
Management and Administration Coun-
for working with Congress-as he also
you just knew there was some guy, pro-
cil last September-called it "one of the
dealt with the State legislature when he
bably down in a nondescript office on the
highest priorities of this Administration."
was Governor of California. In simplest
first floor, A ring, who knew more about
Every new arrival to the White House
terms, he sets major policy goals early,
a particular problem you were facing than
in recent memory has made that commit-
takes what he can get from the Congress
anybody else in the world-and you had
ment, and, at the end of their various
in implementing legislation the first year,
no way to get to him."
tenures, not much had happened except
keeps coming back until he has his entire
Presidents have the same difficulty,
that Government had grown larger, more
package-or events, themselves, have
and one of the objectives of the Cabinet
complex, more costly and was taking
made it, in his judgment, no longer
Councils of Government is to chop
longer and longer to get things done. The
necessary to push for the whole package.
through that essentially red-tape obstacle
present Administration is well aware of
(One clue to Reagan's "take what you can
to the flow of information and opinion up
this. Notes Ralph Bledsoe, Executive
get-for now" philosophy: he's been, so
and of decisions back down quickly to the
Secretary to the above-named Council,
far, the least veto-prone President since
"grass roots" people charged with im-
"Go back in history and you'll find Ad-
Roosevelt.)
plementing them. In essence, one of the
ministrations like to start things and go
In short, the often carping and some-
central goals of "Reform 88," is an am-
on to something else."
times gleeful criticism that "we made him
bitious six-year effort to make the
This one, he says, intends to follow up
renege" on this program and/or "he's
Federal Government operate in a more
policy pronouncements and track the
given up" on that one not only misses the
businesslike manner. Counsellor to the
Agencies to assure implementation. In-
point of his long-term intent but has a lot
30
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES OUARTERLY
Vol. 8, No. 1 Winter 1978
ANALY
OBLEMS IN
HE
PRESIDENTIAL ADVICE
THE
DOMESTIC
COUNCIL
STAF
by
HELMER
The Georgs Washington University
College
Introduction to
Were a Pre ident starting out anew, it is
power has grown in the same period just
unlikely he would choose the particular con-
from over 1,100 to ever 1,700-an increase
figuration of staffs and assist and
of more than percent.
advise him which exists lode) the Execu-
Prodictably. the expansion of staff num-
tive Office of the President (BOP).
bers, the creation of more EOP units and
He is bound to insist on a large be dget
more units, the delegation of decision-
office. He would almost certainly require a
making authority. even the effect of periodic
staff 0 help manage the day-to-day decision
backs have resulted in changes of both
process in foreign and domestic policy. He
Organizational shape and dise. These factors
would need a White House Office containing
have increased the amount of reporting
a number of personal aides close at, hand.
upwards and sideways that is required in the
staffs for press and Congressional relations.
preparation of papers for executive review.
and 2 range of operational support. He would
They have widened the networks of contacts
probably Kant an economic policy adviser
that to into presidential staff work: they
but not necessarily a Council of them.
have exaceibated problems of role definition.
Beyond these. his choices for staffing would
boundaries of responsibility. and general
reflect his one particular substantive and-
coordination of advice
operational priorides, as well as his organiza-
These are widely acknowledged as general
tional philosophy concerning what his
problems of the policy process in the Execue
Executive Office should shoul con-
tive Office. What is POP well understood is
tain.
whether there is ? cause-snd-effer/ relation-
Of course, the President doesn't start
ship between suscific organizational patterns
with a clean slate. He inherits the Executive
in the Executive Office and the outcomes of
Office structure from his predecessors and
the policy process which the EOP is respon-
his immediate needs for staff support gen-
sible for producing. And if there is such 3
erally bring him to fill most senior EOP
relationship, the literature or the presidency
positions before he has had an opportunity
is a mass of contradictions and doubts
io review how much of the institutional
what that might be. Consider these examples.
vestige he wishes to retain.
This much is well-known: so too is the
1. Bureaucratic expansion increases the
cumulative result- an almost unbroken pro-
complexity of decisions md disposes is
cess of adding new advisory units, layers
the power to make them.
of staff to man them. and new roles and
One thing already noted (2) the EOP is the
sibilities for each of the President's
proliferation of policy units. each with its
advisors to perform. Analysis of the history
own circumscribed area of responsibility for
of the EOP over the past three decades shows
policy advice. The effect has been an increase
a consistent pattern of expansion. In bud
in the number of people whose role poten-
getary terms the Executive Office has
tially involves them in the review of policy
to over eight times its size in 1950. Man.
papers. The more numerous papers for review
45
become; the more issues for decision are
All staff like to be where the action is, even
presented, and the more complex the deci-
if only on the margins, and once there, they
sion process inevitably must be. It is a truism
prove difficult to silence or remove. The
of modern organizational studies to say that
result is that as new issues gain presidential
the more complex this process becomes, the
priority, all units try to gain new resources
greater the uncertainty in predicting its out-
to throw more staff into the policy process.
comes, and the more variables that are re-
Staff output increases exponentially and
quired, analytically speaking. to plot and
more staff time is consumed in processing
explain what the outcomes are. As Stein-
and "coordinating" the flow of paper and
bruner (1973) noted in a recent study of
inter-agency committee meetings that results.
national security policy-making. in these
circumstances the effective power to make
3. Shortened tenure shortens organiza-
policy decisions to dispersed. the President's
tional memory and narrows policy
power not least of all. The measure of the
focus.
President's power in decision-making is thus
arguably the reciprocal of the complexity of
Senior staff tenure in the White House
the process.
averages less than two years on the whole, it
is longer in other EOP units but over time
2. Increasing delegation of presidential
the trend has been for this to shorten in all
powers adds to the need for staff co-
units. Contrasting only the domestic policy
ordinating mechanisms.
staffs of the past three Administrations, and
excluding staff unit heads, the following
The history of the Executive Office is in
figures indicate average tenure:
important part a process of increasing delega-
tion of policy review and of decision-making
Califano staff
24.4 months
powers from the President to his assistants
Ehrlichman staff
34.5
-
in special policy areas or fields of responsi-
Cannon staff
24.1
-
bility. Each of these assistants or staff has in
Short tenure means that organizational
turn delegated more of his functions to sub-
memory is short and staff contacts in govern-
ordinates.
ment narrow. The lessons of experience are
Presidents have differed in the value they
learned too late in the individual's tenure to
placed on delegation within their own office.
benefit the decision-making process (cf. Heclo
Delega n has the advantage of increasing
1977; et seq.). For staff with little experi-
the span of control the Chief Executive can
ence, there is marginally greater effective-
exercise over both people and policy issues,
ness and influence to be gained in specializa-
and this enhances the coverage of expertise,
tion of advisory roles and in concentration
the adequacy or representation. and the
on short-term policy problems. Little insight
range of feedback that are available for presi-
dential decision-making. Studies of executive
and few resources are available for longer
term policy work and staff planning.
decision-making in business have suggested
also that the influence of the chief executive
is greater and more effective, the more he
4. The Ear versus the Eye of the President.
delegates functions to his subordinates
Presidents have differed in the extent to
(Leiberson and O'Connor 1972).
which they preferred oral briefings on issues
On the other hand, the more a chief
rather than written memoranda. This is
executive delegates his authority, with a
partly a matter of personality, partly of back-
greater number of units and sub-units report-
ground, and partly of managerial style. There
ing back. the more difficult it becomes to
is a simple but important implication for the
coordinate his policy-making process (Rose
structure of the Executive Office: the size
1977). Studies by Helmer of the evolution
of the advisory staff will be roughly propor-
of the Executive Office (1977) illustrate that
tional to the volume of paper the President
an increase in staffing an issue in one section
demands, and to the ratio of paper to talk
of the EOP or within an Administration in
at the Oval Office stage of policy decision.
general. is usually not balanced by decline
In order for the President to cut staff signifi-
in staffing the same issue in other sections.
cantly, for example, he needs to consume
46
less paper; but consuming less paper is bound
garded as healthy in the sense that it neither
to require more time for talk. This is the
shifted the balance of presidential attention
marginal advantage of paper-that it com-
for too long from one policy area to another,
mits less time and thereby leaves the Presi-
nor diminished the range of his choice with-
dent freer than otherwise to set his own
in each area.
deadlines and keep his own policy counsel.
In the much larger and more complex
Executive Office of today, competiveness
5. Increasing hierarchy of staff reduces
among advisers can have several less bene-
the options delivered to the top.
ficial effects. For in the process of decision-
Another problem of the effect of organi-
making, the larger and more specialized
zational structure upon the executive policy-
units can and do drive the smaller ones, not
making process flows from the sizeable
to mention the Cabinet agencies, out of the
change in shape of the executive bureaucracy
market in presidential attention. In the case
over the last two decades. In this instance,
of the last three presidents, attention has
shape refers to the number of levels (civil
tended to be fixed almost exclusively and
service or General Schedule grades) at which
for long periods in single areas of policy.
staff are appointed, the average grade of
EOP units can have these effects by gen-
different EOP units, and the span of control
erating more issues for decision, more detailed
of supergrade staff over middle and low-grade
options, and a greater volume of paper than
subordinates in each executive unit.
the President of the day can fairly absorb if
To the extent that EOP units now have
each advisory unit had a nominally equal
relatively more senior staff and more layers
share of the President's time and stood in
of aff than they used to have, policy papers
line to wait for it. With advantages of size
are required to travel through more clearance
and resources and using a variety of staffing
points on their way upwards. What hierarchy
tactics, some units can manipulate the rules
of this kind can do is to reduce the detail of
of the game in executive decision-making
information, and the number of individual
and exercise disproportionate influence over
options or issues for decision that are trans-
the process as a result.
mitted to higher authority (Helmer 1975).
In the Ehrlichman period this was the
What studies of EOP decision-making
case with the ascendancy of the Domestic
reveal is that as the process becomes more
Council staff in domestic policy as against
complex for the President in the aggregate,
the Cabinet agencies. In the Ford Administra-
each decision file itself becomes less complex
tion it was true of the Economic Policy Board
as it heads towards the Oval Office. What the
as against both domestic and foreign policy
layers of staff do in short is to reduce argu-
advisory units in many key policy areas.
ment of pros and cons, detail of agency sub-
Increases in scale have thus fundamentally
missions, and range of inter-agency options
changed the consequences of staff competive-
down to that limited number on which no
ness from what they were in Roosevelt's
further agency or staff agreement can be
time.
secured in ad.ance. Perhaps this is what staff
should do, but in acting thus they also create
Methodological Problems
problems of isolation of the President which
Identifying a range of hypotheses like
in the past have been serious in their implica-
these is one thing; finding reliable tests for
tions.
them is quite another.
At any selected point of time, for instance,
6. Organizational Scale and the Effects
it is difficult to gauge how far the decision-
of Competitiveness Among Advisers.
making process employed by a particular
The competitiveness by means of which
President follows the formal rules and divi-
Presidents like Rooseveit and Truman sought
sion of responsibilities of the executive
to invigorate the advice they got and multiply
bureaucracy as this has been legislated or
their options, took place in an Executive
otherwise chartered to operate; how far this
Office which was a fraction of the present
process deviates in order to follow the
size and leaner (less top-heavy) in shape. In
dictates, style or plans of an incumbent
that context competitiveness might be re-
President prepared to improvize within the
47
existing structure: or alternatively, how far
advisory unit over time, identifying the rela-
the process responds to the improvizations
tionships between organizational structure
of many members of the Executive Office
and policy-making or advisory roles, as these
with the effect that no one, certainly not the
evolved through one presidential term and
President, is responsible for the shape it
from one administration to another. Earlier
takes, nor is anyone especially competent
papers by Helmer (1975) and Maisel and
at predicting or controlling its outcomes.
Helmer (1976) have outlined a comparative
These difficulties are compounded over
study of domestic policy staffs in three
time, for no President uses the same staff
quite different administrative frameworks-
units in the same way, and each of the
the United States (Domestic Council), Aus-
modern Presidents since Roosevelt has made
tralia (Priorities Review Staff), and England
at least one, some more than one effort at
(Central Policy Review Staff). The focus
formally reconstructing and reorganizing the
of the present paper is on the Domestic
Executive Office to suit his particular leader-
Council, and on what can be learned about
ship or policy needs. The number of informal
presidential policy-making in general from
efforts to tinker with or fine tune the EOP
the career-and a relatively short-lived one
are legion.
at that² -of a single staff advisory unit. What
And yet the rhetoric of Executive Office
is likely to be learned depends of course on
reorganization has remained much the same
the types of data which are available and the
over the years. and veteran White House
perspective from which they are viewed.
advisors and staff write or talk of much the
What the paper aims therefore to do is to
same problems of the policy-making process.
contrast the interpretations of the Domestic
A recent review of Executive Office reorgan-
Council and its performance in the executive
ization plans since 1936 concluded that
advisory system which can be provided by
"there are no new ideas which today's re-
two quite independent approaches (method-
organization teams have uncovered which
ologically speaking) to the evidence.
those of the past have not clearly identified
In the first instance, the approach is
or experimented with."
primarily historical and the sources of data
In contrasting the policy processes of dif-
are the official documents of presidential
ferent presidents, this kind of conclusion
administration, including some publicly re-
creates something of a paradox. Either the
leased reports of the Domestic Council
dynamics of the executive bureaucracy and
itself,³ comments of officials reported in the
policy process have remained constant, while
press, and material opinions obtained from
the outcomes have varied-a position which
a series of personal interviews which the
belies the evident expansion of the EOP
authors conducted with members of the
and which in principle few students of bureau-
Ford Domestic Council staff and a number
cracy would find credible. Or else neither
of their predecessors during 1976.
policy process nor outcome has varied much
These interviews were structured in such
from one Administration to the next-a view
a way as to provide in addition to personal
with which few observers of the modern
judgements about staff roles, data on the
presidency would agree.
pattern of staff interactions within the
In another study Helmer (1977) has
Domestic Council and between it and other
analyzed the dynamics of the executive
units of the Executive Office and the Cabinet
bureaucracy since 1950. This has identified
agencies: as well as information on the use
the principal sources of growth and attempted
of time by staff members. specialization and
to measure competitiveness and illustrate
the degree of coordination of their own with
the rise and fall of staff units with the EOP.
other advisory work in the EOP. These data
Related but classified studies by Helmer¹ of
lend support to significantly different inter-
presidential decision-making have sought in
pretations of the function and performance
part to assess the impact of bureaucratic
of this staff unit. Combined with other little-
structure on policy processes and outcomes
used measures of Executive Office organiza-
as such.
tion, influence and power, the paper presents
An alternative approach to these problems
an alternative set of results that go some way
is to monitor and analyze a single presidential
to testing the hypotheses which have already
48
been mentioned, but at the same time cast
accomplish some of their ends without Con-
some doubt on the reliability of the first set
gressional action, by creating the essence of
and the perspective from which it was derived.
8 Super Cabinet among his top advisors, but
this plan too was short-lived. its demise
The Evolution of the Domestic Council-
hastened by the Watergate scandal.
One Perspective
The Ash Council was more successful,
The history of the Domestic Council needs
however in having its plans for the Executive
to be viewed within a broader context of the
Office of the President instituted. The Coun-
growth of formalized Presidential advisory
cil's plan called for adding management
units.
functions to the Bureau of the Budget, re-
As Richard Neustadt (1977). Patrick
naming it the Office of Management and
Anderson (1972), and many others have
Budget. and creating a domestic policy
shown, Franklin Roosevelt and each of his
coordinating unit within the White House,
successors have adapted the use of their White
the Domestic Council.
House staff assistants to suit their own
The Domestic Council was to be chaired
decision-making styles. Roosevelt's "competi-
by the President and to have as its other
tive" style of staff use contrasted markedly
members the Vice President and the Cabinet
with Eisenhower's hierarchical style. Tru-
Secretaries with responsibility for domestic
man's staff worked in a manner somewhere
programs. In theory, the Cabinet officers
between the two. Kennedy seems to have
were to play a major role. According to
patterned his use of the White House Staff
Murray Comarow, the Executive Director of
on the Roosevelt model. And nothing could
the Ash Council:
have been more unstructured or more per-
We also concurred with the accurate
sonal than the way in which Lyndon Johnson
treated his White House staff (on Johnson
charges that the Cabinet was being cut
out. What do you do? Create something
see also Kearns 1976; Wayne, forthcoming;
which employs the Cabinet members
Maisel and Helmer, 1976).
more than they have been and give the
None of these Presidents developed a
people making the decisions some institu-
coordinating mechanism for domestic policy
tional basis from which to work We
to parallel the National Security Council for
wanted the staff of the Domestic Council
foreign policy. That step was left to Richard
to be very small.⁵
Nixon and the Ash Council.4
As Kessel (1975:20) points out, however.
1. The Ash Council and the Establishment
President Nixon gave the Domestic Council
of the Domestic Council
very broad responsibilities and the formal
Soon after taking office, Richard Nixon
members were already busy men: "When
asked Roy L. Ash, President of Litton In-
busy men are given new responsibilities, it is
dustries, to chair a Presidential Advisory
well to inquire about the staff that is going
Council on Executive Organization. The
to carry out these tasks." In point of fact,
Council, which was commonly known by its
the Council itself met infrequently from the
chairman's name, met for slightly over a year,
start, so that in most cases references to the
with the six members convening approxi-
Domestic Council are in fact references to
mately once a month to work on the basis
the staff unit set up under the Council to
of papers prepared by the Council's staff.
serve the President directly.
Eventually the Council produced thirteen
Almost from the beginning. John Ehrlich-
memoranda, three of which have been pub-
man was sensitive to the problems of the
licly released.
decision-making process in the Nixon White
The Council's recommendations led to
House. During the early days of 1969, when
Nixon's major effort to reorganize the govern-
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Arthur Burns
ment, abolishing seven departments, creating
were the President's principal domestic
four new departments, reducing the power
advisors and frequently presented him with
of many independent agencies. These
conflicting views, Ehrlichman was a fairly
proposals were never given serious considera-
minor staff man. By the time the Ash Coun-
tion by the Congress. Nixon attempted to
cil was in full operation, late in 1969, Ehrlich-
49
man saw its importance, both for the Presi-
him with order and options insteads of the
dent and for himself:
more indeterminate situation in which the
President received advice from two domestic
The Ash Council became our great
counselors of fundamentally different ideo-
white hope for solving all of the admin-
istrative problems we were having. I had a
logical persuasions, one purportedly liberal,
the other conservative. The President relied
number of sessions with Comarow and
on Ehrlichman because he needed and wanted
with Rouse and with the whole group. I
was lobhying the President at the same
to delegate responsibility for domestic policy
decisions. Nixon felt more concerned with
time I was lobbying the Ash Council and
foreign policy and concentrated his own
I would say I had a fairly high level of
efforts in that. area. Ehrlichman noted in
success. I was not trying to tailor a suit
interview that there were periods of the
of clothes to fit me, but it certainly was
Vietnam War when he hardly saw the Presi-
something I was comfortable with.⁵
dent at all. In this situation, Nixon preferred
a domestic advisor who would give him
2. The Nixon Council
one viewpoint on which to act, not two
Ehrlichman was appointed the Domestic
which required further study and staff re-
Council's first Executive Director. He chose
view before action was possible.
Kenneth Cole as his deputy and they even-
Kenneth Cole summarized the role of the
tually appointed six assistants, each of
Ehrlichman Domestic Council in this way:
whom, in turn, had a small staff. This model
fitted Ehrlichman's style, but it was not
Nixon needed not only a domestic ad-
what the Ash Council had in mind. Comarow
viser but also a formal organization with
commented:
formal procedures with a good idea of
where it was going. I don't think that in
The Domestic Council was working to
the years 1971-1973 any better organiza-
a degree under John Ehrlichman, but
tion could have been put together and
from its earliest days it took off in a direc-
could have functioned. The people were
tion I did not intend. It was not 180
superb. The work got done, notwithstand-
degrees off, but 45 degrees. We saw
ing the barbs about the "faceless assistants
emphasis on the Domestic Council as a
telling Cabinet officers what to do," and
mechanism within which the fragmented
the ultimate test is the legislation which
Cabinet system could function on prob-
got passed.
lems which cut across departmental lines.
We knew what was going on. The Presi-
Even under Ehrlichman it took the form
dent knew. Legislation got drafted and
of John Smith in charge of these areas.
passed. Everyone knew what the President
Jim Jones in charge of those.⁵
stood for. I think relying on a powerful
John Smith, Jim Jones, "faceless assistants
staff within the White House is the only
ordering Cabinet Secretaries around"-Kessel
good way to do it in a government organ-
(1975) and especially Richard Nathan (1975:
ized as poorly as it is, even if it is some-
Ch. 3) point out that Nixon lost faith in his
what insulting to the intelligence of the
Cabinet.⁵
Cabinet early in the first term. As a result,
they have argued, power soon flowed from
The heady days did not last long. The
the Cabinet Secretaries to the White House,
series of events collectively known as Water-
even more so that it had in the days when
gate first slowed down and eventually
Joseph Califano dominated Cabinet members
brought an end to any semblance of normal
in the name of Lyndon Johnson. Ehrlichman
decision-making. Top presidential advisors,
and his Domestic Council staff became the
John Ehrlichman among them, focused
instrument exercising much of this power.
principally on the defence of Richard Nixon
According to both observers (Bonafede 1975)
and then on their own defence. Ehrlichman
and former officials (Ehrlichman 1975;
gave up formal control of the Domestic
Ehrlichman and Moynihan in interviews),
Council as the second term began, four
Nixon came to rely on Ehrlichman for
months before his resignation. As an effective
domestic policy advice because he provided
staff institution the Council's reputation
50
was irretrievably lost as Ebrlichman and two
ship with the President. When interviewed
assistant directors of the Council, Morgan
on this topic, Kenneth Cole commented on
and Krogh, were indicated for Watergate-
the differences between his relationship with
related offenses.
Nixon and Ehrlichman's.
The last year of the Nixon Administra-
The whole organization was strongest
tion was not a time for legislative initiatives.
when John Ehrlichman was running it, as
After Ehrlichman's resignation, first Melvin
he was closest to the President. During
Laird and then Kenneth Cole served as the
my tenure I didn't have the relationship
President's key domestic advisor and as
with the President that John did
that
Executive Director of the Council, and in-
stead of directing the domestic policy of the
made a big difference.$
Administration, the Domestic Council "be-
Access to the President is not guarantee
came just another service unit in the presi-
of influence. Ehrlichman had both; Cannon
dential establishment" (Bonafede, 1975:
had the first but not the second. in fact,
1689).
because he travelled so much with Ford,
Cannon had constant access to the President,
3. The Ford Council
but unlike Ehrlichman, he shared it more
Cole stayed on to help with the Ford
and he could not count on the same staff
transition, but within a few months he too
loyalties below him. What confronted him
resigned. James M. Cannon, whose career in
instead was an overlap or conflict of loyalties
government service had been closely con-
among staff picked up over at least three
nected with Vice President Rockefeller,
changes of the Council leadership.
succeeded Cole. Richard J. Dunham, state
To observers the loss of influence was
budget director in New York when Rockefel-
Cannon's fault. To one, a fault that stemmed
ler was Governor, and James Cavanaugh. a
from a weakness of will and personality:
holdover from the Nixon staff, was each
named Deputy Director of the Council staff.
Cannon is recognized as hardworking.
The appointments of Cannon and Dunham
competent executive. Yet after almost a
followed a widely publicized power struggle
year, there is little evidence that he has
within the White House (Bonafede 1975;
taken firm control of the Domestic Coun-
Leamer 1977; Osborne 1975). Chief of staff
cil or given it a special institutional
Donald Rumsfeld had wanted President Ford
identity. Nor is his personal input visible
to name Phillip E. Areeda, then serving as a
(Bonafede 1975:1691).
Counsel to the President, as head of the
To another, Kenneth Cole again, this was
domestic advisory unit. The President
decided, however, that he would give the
an example of poor bureaucratic strategy.
Vice President primary responsibility for
The process and the organization are
running it. In doing so, Ford is said to have
different (now). Basically we tried to plot
intended to revitalize the Domestic Council
a year ahead. What was the situation with
and to broaden the substantive authority
crops? How do you get prepared for the
of Rockefeller. As a consequence, President
worst alternative? What laws are about to
Ford felt it appropriate that the Council's
expire? What substantive things are hap-
leadership be comprised of people in whom
pening and what should be done about
the Vice President had confidence.
them? We held daily meetings to assure
The decision to involve Rockefeller direct-
that everyone knew what everyone else
ly in the day-to-day running of the Domestic
was doing. Was there any overlap? You
Council had important consequences for the
could get more objective views that way.
influence of that unit throughout the Ford
We tried to give a team feeling and you
Presidency (Moe 1976). For a variety of
cannot be part of a team unless you know
reasons this decision insured that the Coun-
what the other players are doing. Cannon
cil would not approach the position of influ-
has stripped the organization of organiza-
ence it held under Nixon and Ehrlichman.
tion. We had four to five key players and
First, there is the important question of
then staff under them. Cannon has made
presidential access and an advisor's relation-
everyone equal with specific and narrow
51
portfolios. We tried to stay on top of
low as it was "an organization without influ-
what was going on, to stay ahead of the
ence." In an effort to revive morale and pro-
Cabinet, etc. They don't try to do that as
mote staff unity, Quern decided to retain
much either.⁵
his office in the Old Executive Office Build-
ing where the staff could have constant
This points up the importance of staff
access to him, rather than moving to the
cohesion. The staff of the Council wasshaped
office in the West Wing to which he was
by the decision to name Rockefeller as the
entitled but where he was more inaccessible.
Council's leader. As reported in an earlier
Others on the Council staff left for appointive
paper (Maisel and Helmer. 1976:9-10), the
positions elsewhere. in the Executive Branch:
Ford staff was comprised of three distinct
in the case of Todd Hullin, as an Assistant
groups by origin of recruitment. Cannon and
Secretary of Defense: Fairly rapid turnover
Dunham brought with them a group of five
and shuffling of positions-producing an
others whose political experience had been
average tenure for Council staff by Decem-
in association with Rockefeller. Cavanaugh
ber 1976 of just over two years-might very
was one of five holdovers from the Nixon
well account for the inexperience by which
Administration. Others could be deemed
observers have characterized both the Coun-
more clearly Ford appointments, though
cil staff and its leadership (Moe 1976:266).
none of them had any prior political con-
According to one official quoted by Wayne
nection with the President. While there
(forthcoming:
were no open conflicts among these groups,
cohesion of the kind reported by the Ehrlich-
Once it's clear that the guy who runs
man staff (Gilson 1976: Kessel 1975: Wald-
the Domestic Council doesn't have the
mann 1976) was not evident either.
clout or doesn't know how to use it, it
Even this tripartite staff never really sta-
filters down. Everybody understands it.
bilized with personnel turnover and short
So decisions get made and associate direc-
lenures producing an instability that has been
tors of the Domestic Council are not con-
cited as another factor leading to a weaken-
sulted: meetings are set up and they are
ing of the Council's position. A number of
not included.
changes during the Ford Administration are
worthy of nute in this respect. By late 1975
To another, a subordinate of Cannon's, it
Rockefeller asked to be relieved of day-to-
was clear that "Jim Cannon did not become
day responsibility for the Council. This
the key figure on domestic policy because
followed his decision not to run for Vice
he was either disinclined to use the resources
President in 1976. Even before that time,
available, or unable to. or both." To a third,
Dunham had resigned to accept an appoint-
also a Council staff member, Cannon's fail-
ment to the Federal Power Commission.
ings were mostly personal-he was too timid,
According to one staff member at the time,
he spent too much of his and the staits time
Rockefeller's withdrawal "cut the legs off
editing and redrafting memoranda. he lost
Cannon." Cavanaugh appeared to fare much
his temper too easily and lost track of the
better. staying on as a Deputy Director of
paper flow in and out of his own office.
the Council although he 100 moved responsi-
bilities away from the Council somewhat,
4. Evolution of Formal Roles
assisting Kichard Cheney, the President's
Before the staff unit was established in
Chief of staff during the campaign for reelec-
tion.
mid-1970, according to Patrick Moynihan,
there had been a very active system of work-
In the spring of 1976 Arthur Quern. who
played a key role in coordinating Domestic
ing groups at the Cabinet officer-level, gen-
Council input to the 1976 State of the Union
erally focussed on areas of special concern or
program initiative, in which the President
Address. was named to succeed Dunham as
Deputy Director. He was placed in charge of
himself was an active participant. Supporting
Planning and Policy. According to his own
these committees was Moynihan's staff,
known as the Urban Affairs Council staff
testimony, Quern felt that by that time
and the National Goals Research Staff, which
morale on the Domestic Council staff was
together numbered less than twenty.
52
The operation of Cabinet working groups
of Domestic Council direction varied from
did not immediately change with the forms-
issue to issue, and there was no set rule about
tion of the Domestic Council. The formal
inclusion or exclusion of participants in the
members met as a Council thirteen times in
working groups:
1970, and in smaller ad-hoc groups more
frequently. The focus was on a set of some
On the energy thing. for example, the
fifteen priority issues which had "evolved
guy from the CIA was a spy, but he knew
during the summer of 1970 through informal
more about the realities of the thing than
analysis and through canvassing of the staff,
any Ambassador, and we pulled a guy out
the cabinet members, and a few outside
of Texas who was a geologist and then
advisers. and were finally given presidential
there was an Assistant Secretary and even
approval in a meeting at Camp David" (Wald-
(sic) a Cabinet Secretary. Richardson was
man 1976:263). The issues included environ-
personally at every meeting on F(amily)
ment, law enforcement, urban development,
A(ssistant) P(lan)
welfare reform and revenue sharing.
A great many of these groups were set
The original assignment of roles and
up on open questions and it was the Assis-
responsibilities among the staff followed
tant Director's job to get what there was
these priorities: work by the staff on the
to get from the people at the meeting.
But there were times when Nixon wanted
1971 State of the Union address aimed at
formulating administration programs in these
to go in some direction and ramrodded
these. Most of the Assistant Directors
terms.
could ramrod in that situation as well.s
According to one of the participants, the
staff structure had three basic "components"
In these respects, the Nixon Domestic
-a "front office" consisting of Ehrlichman,
Council was not the innovation that many
his deputy and a staff assistant; the assistant
thought of it. Special task forces for pro-
directors, each of whom was responsible for
gram development had characterized the
a priority issue and was designated as a "proj-
operation of the domestic policy staff under
ect manager" for program development in
Califano, during the Johnson Administration.
that and related areas; and thirdly, a "plan-
Nor was the successor group under Cannon
ning staff" which had "general duties with
too different in the same respect. A number
presidential messages, the budget, and other
of task forces were set up within the Ford
issues which did not fit the project manager
Domestic Council. Of these, one of the most
style" (Waldmann 1976:263).
visible (Moe 1976:267) was the Domestic
The development of the Nixon administra-
tion's legislative program remained formally
Council Review Group on Regulatory Re-
the job of Cabinet committees but practically
form, an inter-agency group of about a dozen
which functioned as "catalyst, coordinator,
speaking the work of developing (as well as
and monitor of the various aspects of the
excluding) options was done by working
executive branch's efforts to review all
groups consisting of Assistant Secretary level
staff, OMB officials and the assistant direc-
regulatory policies" (lbid., 268). Other task
tors of the Domestic Council.
forces focussed on drug abuse policy. illegal
aliens. and welfare reform.
The last of these played the pivotal role,
At the outset, the Cannon unit was organ-
coordinating the meetings and finalizing the
ized in two parts. reflecting the division be-
decision memoranda. According to Nathan,
tween longer-term planning of priorities and
the staff working on revenue sharing plans
administration initiatives ("legislation pack-
in 1971 deliberately excluded close Cabinet-
ages") on the one hand. and short-term
level involvement until after the plans were
operations or daily presidential support on
fully formed (Nathan 1975:48). According
the other. According to Cannon,
to Epstein, the role of Egil Krogh, the assis-
tant director in charge of drug abuse policy,
We took a group of outsiders with con-
was to screen out conflicting viewpoints and
sultant money to deal with long-range
facts which deserved (as Epstein saw it) fuller
issues. As you might imagine, the im-
consideration (Epstein 1975:99). In inter-
mediate problems tend to drive out the
view Ehrlichman has said that the amount
long-range. There have to be places to do
53
both. They interact. We consciously set
There was a difference in emphasis here
up a structure to provide for both im-
from the Johnson Administration's use of
mediate and long-term. As an illustration.
task forces. For one thing. Johnson regularly
look at the question of the future status
geared them into the Fall drafting of the
of Puerto Rico. We've had a group work.
annual legislative program, so that the reports
ing on that since last October.
became the basis for White House, Bureau of
the Budget, and agency work on specific
For both the planning and operations divi-
program proposals and the State of the Union
sions. the staff of the Council were assigned
package. In the second. place, Johnson used
special areas. which were broad and issue-
the task forces to engineer legislative support
oriented to start off. with but became fixed
by coopting key congressional leaders in the
in terms of departmental assignments as time
task force deliberations. Certainly outsiders
progressed. When Dunham, who had been
were invited to participate in post-Johnson.
the Deputy Director in charge of the long-
task forces but the congressional involve-
range division. left the White House, the
ment ended with Nixon. Ehrlichman. for
bifurcated structure was abandoned, and the
example, expressly ordered his staff to avoid
planning rule taken over by Quern as Il e
contact with Congressional Democrats and
associate director in charge of preparing the
to maintain it only with the Republican
State of the Union address.
minority. Neither they nor their staff. how-
In terms of roles and responsibilities it is
ever, were involved in the working groups.
difficult to see the difference between the
The difference between the Ehrlichman
Domestic Council under Ehrlichman and
working groups and the Cannon review
that under its successors. To be sure. the
groups which succeeded them was in the
policy initiatives which were proposed be-
first place that the sources of policy initiative
tween 1970 and 1972 were somewhat dif-
were more firmly located in the agencies
ferent from those developed during the
with the result that inter-agency review at
Ford term, but they scarcely justify the sharp
the Domestic Council level carried tactically
contrasts already reported in the assessments
less weight. Cabinet secretaries could afford
of the IWU staff groups.
setbacks and even defeats at the review group
5. Task Forces
stage and still win on appeal to the President.
Consensus was much harder to achieve than
Originally as we have said. one of the con-
under Ehrlichman because the sanctions
ceptions behind the Domestic Council plan
against holdouts which he exercised were
was that it would be an umbrella organiza-
no longer in force.
tion for several inter-agency policy groups
operating at the Cabinet level. Task forces
Secondly. Cannon initiated fewer review
would arise as there was need for them and
groups, which ran for much longer periods.
then self-destruct.
Early in 1976 there had been four-on
According to Comarow, the executive
social assistance programs, regulatory reform,
director of the Ash Council,
drug abuse, and environmental problems,
plus the special consulting group on the
We wanted the agencies with the biggest
status of Puerto Rico. Of these only one,
interest to head up the task force. The
the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task
head of the agency was to be head of the
Force, had completed its work and released
task force. Other agency people would be
a report by 1976. This one is a useful indi-
members. We would have an independent
cator of the administrative style and the
staff from the White House working with
achievement of the Cannon staff.
the task forces. They were not there
In style the White Paper on Drug Abuse,
because they were smarter, but they
as the report was titled, was a notable suc-
weren't advocates either. They were there
cess. The review group was headed by Richard
to give it their best shot. The danger was
Parsons, a 27-year old attorney and former
that the system could be perverted and
aide to Rockefeller in New York. He chaired
become too political
We were after
a committee of 19 agency. representatives
systematic objective consideration of
which included Raymond Shafer, a counsel-
social issues.'
lor 1. the Vice President who had previously
54
headed the abortive National Commission on
the number of offenders released on proba-
Marijuana which had been totally ignored by
tion increased after the legislation came into
the Nixon Administration. This group of
effect, instead of falling as it was supposed
officials in turn led 87 lesser officials, who
to do.
divided into 2 sub-groups, who in turn called
In May 1976 when the President finally
in 34 outside advisers and 7 organized lobbies.
sent his legislative proposal on drug policy
Altogether this was something of a record in
to Congress, there were no additional indi-
bureaucratic size, representing more people
cations that the New York lessons had been
in total than the White Paper has pages. To
absorbed, and few signs that the Domestic
have produced a- document then that would
Council report had in the end been persua-
be acceptable in that bureaucratic zoo was a
sive. Ford's rhetorical emphasis was on bigger
virtuoso achievement for which the unknown
and better enforcement, tougher sentenc-
and relatively inexperienced DC staff member
ing provisions on the New York model, and
should have been recognized. In a sense he
no sign of weakening on marijuana. On the
was. Released in October, the report was
key bureaucratic issue of centralized control
endorsed by President Ford after Christmas
versus every agency for itself, Ford had a
in terms that promised to put the recom-
Cabinet committee to propose for the cen-
mendations into effect. Exactly which of
tralizers, and a major expansion of powers
these and how was never specified.
of search and seizure for the Customs Ser-
In substance the White Paper was opaque.
vice.
On the one hand, it broke new ground in
To be sure, this is not the first piece of
bureaucratic procedure by admitting that
White House staff work to have been ignored,
there were no known means by which
but it almost certainly has been one of the
government could hope to make prohibition
most expensive Domestic Council operations
effective by eliminating illegal drug use. It
in its history. Like the Interim Report on
also urged a shift in enforcement priorities
Illegal Aliens, which was released at the very
towards greater effort on narcutic drugs and
end of 1976-too late for the Ford Admin-
less on marijuana. On the other hand, in
istration to implement its proposals-both
spite of emphasis on "liaison," "coordina-
have been followed by equally extensive
tion," and "integration"-the White Paper
staff work in the new Administration-drug
recommended setting up more than a dozen
abuse policy work by the Office of Drug
new bureaucratic committees for these pur-
Abuse Policy under Carter assistant, Peter
poses-the review group was unable to heal
Bourne, and the aliens issue by a new
the long-standing split between the US Cus-
Cabinet Committee and Ann Gutierrez of
toms Service (Treasury) and other federal
the Carter Domestic Council staff.
agencies over control of intelligence opera-
What then can be said about the effective-
tions and responsibilities for border enforce-
ness of the Domestic Council review group
ment and smuggling. The Customs officials
under Cannon as compared with those under
insisted on adding their own rider to the
Cole or Ehrlichman. or for that matter,
report.
Califano before them? Cole said, it will be
Oddly enough, as the task force was so
recalled from an earlier quotation, that in his
closely connected with the Vice President,
administration the Council was better organ-
it failed to take any account of the impact
ized "to plot a year ahead" and that Cannon
of the tough legal measures enacted in New
had "stripped the organization of organiza-
York by Rockefeller as governor in 1973.
tion." His staff failed to "stay on top of
Other studies for the Department of Justice
what was going on, to stay ahead of the
were showing by mid-1975 that the Rocke-
Cabinet."
feller approach was failing badly in most
On the other hand, observers of the Cole
respects, except to make more work for the
staff have noted that at that time the formal,
courts. Indices of heroin use had failed to
Cabinet-level members of the Council became
respond to the deterrent effect of the new
more active, albeit in ad hoc working groups,
laws and began in fact to edge up after a
and that at the staff level, the agencies were
relatively stable period in 1972-74. Also
more influential on task forces, and the
notwithstanding the new sentencing rules.
Office of Management and Budget more
55
powerful in handling the central clearance of
and agency lines in important priority
legislation (Moe 1975:7). If the reorganiza-
issue areas (Waldmann 1976:266).
tion announced by the President in January
But neither the second nor the third of
1973 was designed to enhance the policy
rule of the "super Cabinet"-the Secretaries
these achievements represents any innova-
of Agriculture. HEW and HUD. who, 10-
tion in Executive office politics, and without
the evidence of the Council staff memoranda,
gether with Ehrlichman, were promoted to
there is no reason for thinking that the staff
the rank of Counsellor-it also statedly
was any more effective in its advice to the
aimed at reducing the rule of the Domestic
President than those which preceded or those
Council in program oversight and the co-
which have followed it.
ordination of interdepartmental initiatives.
What can be said to sum up the historical
As Nixon announced:
record is relatively. simple. Once effective
Counsellors Butz. Weinberger and
policy initiative is delegated to the agencies.
Lynn, with the support of the committees
then inter-agency review committees at the
they will head. will be able to provide
Council level are an expensive waste of time
much of the advice and supervision for
and money. They are opportunities for the
which the Presidents in the past (sic) have
bureaucrats to stall, snow or intimidate the
had to turn to domestic policy establish-
White House. If on the other hand the White
ments within the White House. The
House retains the initiative and sanctions to
Counsellors will also be able to resolve
keep it up, then task forces can be an effec-
with their colleagues at the Secretarial
tive way of identifying the potential opposi-
level many interdepartmental issues which
tion and mobilizing coalitions of forces
have heretofore required arbitration by
against.
the President or his staff (US President
In the final analysis, the record of partic-
1973).
ipants and observers comes down to a state-
ment that the Domestic Council (staff) was
This hardly squares with Cole's more expan-
more powerful between 1970 and 1973
sive opinion of the Council's role. and it
than since because John Ehrlichman was
suggests that. whatever his successor's weak-
powerful, and that power was based on the
nesses might have been as already discussed.
President's willingness to listen to him and
the formal charter within which Cannon's
give him the power (with H.R. Haldeman)
Council and staff had to operate was already
to decide who else would be listened to. This
initiated by administrative and procedural
was a power Ehrlichman passed on to his
changes introduced before Nixon left office.
staff-they controlled access to the President
Could Cannon have done any better? And
and no one, not Cabinet officers even, could
what in this instance would "better" have
avoid that.
consisted of?
Does this, however, represent a successful
The consensus of historical judgment so
attempt "at gaining centralized political con-
far is that under Ehrlichman the Domestic
trol over the Executive Branch of the Presi-
Council was more powerful than it has be-
dent," as Waldmann suggests? Conversely,
come since. Waldmann, who worked for
does the Domestic Council staff under Can-
Ehrlichman, tried to explain this in more
non which had no such power and competed
detail by saying that the staff,
for access to the President along with a num-
ber of other White House and Cabinet
Succeeded to a degree never before at-
agencies, represent a weakness in the advisory
tempted in gaining centralized political
system, or even a failure of political control?
control over the Executive Branch of the
From what perspective can weakness and
President. It experimented with a variety
strength, power or the lack of it, success and
of techniques in developing policy, in-
failure of the advisory system be judged?
cluding top-level consultants. presidential
The President's? The advisors"? The Cabinet
commissions. inter-agency working groups
heads?
and task forces. It attempted to maintain
It is the value of these questions, rather
a consistency in policy across department
than of the answers that have so far been
56
suggested to them that this paper is intended
Table I shows the results of a survey of
to emphasize. But if the evidence adduced to
1972 and of our own survey in January,
date is as opaque and contradictory as it
1976.
appears, what alternative is there?
Both staffs clearly had clarification of
options as their top priority, but the Cannon
A Quantitative Perspective on the
group spent less time on this than the Ehrlich-
Advisory System
man group. Overall, the Cannon staff have
1. Traffic analysis
distributed their time more evenly across all
Neat organization charts, lists of functions
five functions while the Nixon staff concen-
and efficiency audits can be misleading: so
trated more of their effort on options,
can the impression of officials themselves as
priorities and backstopping. and less than
to what exactly they are doing.
Ford's staff on information-gathering and
Staff performance is limited by the net-
agency monitoring.
works they maintain each day in their jobs.
Backstopping the President took more
Networks develop in part according to the
staff time in 1976 than in 1972, although
allocation of functions and the formal
this function had been delegated to the
hierarchy within the Executive Office and
second-string staff. This may reflect subtle
White House. In part they combine, dissolve
differences in the nature of the activity.
and recombine in response to the pressure of
Under Ehrlichman backstopping meant pass-
events and external demands for Administra-
ing directives to agency officials and report-
tion action. In part they are based on pat-
ing presidential views on policy points. It
terns of patronage, alliance and protection
ultimately also meant trying to clear the
and in part on where people are located,
communication channels and paper backlog
from the West Wing to the Old Executive
which accumulated as the system became
Office Building, and across Lafayette Square
overloaded.
to the New Executive Office Building. where
Under Cannon however, backstopping
they eat lunch, whom they are married to,
was much less policy-directed, but also more
and so on. These things can be either arbitrary
trivial. At its most serious it involved draft-
or carefully planned, and White House staff
ing veto messages, but more often than this
will compete for network advantage in what-
according to interviews with staff, it has
ever way they can.
included catering arrangements for presiden-
One method of assessing the Ford/Cannon
tial functions, advance work, protocol and
operations is to compare the amounts of
the like.
time spent by Council staff on parallel func-
It should be noted that monitoring agen-
tions under Ehrlichman and then under
cies was a more significant activity under
Cannon.
Ford/Cannon than before. Ford delegated
Table 1
Mean Time Allocations of Domestic Council Staff Members
Time Use
Nixon-Ehrlichman
Ford-Cannon
Activity
Leaders
Aides
Leaders
Aides
Clarifying options
4.00
3.31
3.45
3.25
Determining priorities
3.33
2.67
3.00
2.50
Backstopping the president
3.33
2.71
3.27
3.75
Collecting information
2.33
2.67
2.64
2.75
Monitoring agencies
2.00
2.75
3.09
2.75
KEY: Staff members were asked how much of their time was spent on each type of assignment. Scores
were assigned as follows: 4 - "a great deal of time", 3 = "a fair amount", 2 = "not too much time",
and I = "no time at all". Thus, the higher the score, the more mean time is spent on each function.
Data from Kessell 1975.
57
more policy initiative to the agencies but
Table 2
watched them closer; Nixon ordered more
Mean Time Allocations of Domestic Council
but followed up less. This new monitoring
Staff Members by Issue Area
was not perceived by the agencies to be as
threatening as the Ehrlichman regime had
Time Use
been. Partly this reflected a certain amount
Issue
Ehrlichman
Cannon
of exaggeration by the agencies about the
Economic management
2.89
2.63
extent of the earlier Ehrlichman threat;
Social welfare
3.32
2.81
partly also it reflected the agency view that
Civil liberties
2.16
2.19
Domestic Council monitoring was unlikely
Natural resources
1.89
2.13
to carry more weight with the President in a
Agriculture
1.58
1.75
policy conflict than the agency itself. Still. it
Labor relations
no data
1.56
is arguable that more active menitoring
Urban policy
no data
2.44
evident here by the Ford staff was at least as
International pulicy
1.63
1.50
effective in achieving the political control or
KEY: Staff members were asked how much of
integration of Administration's policy posi-
their time was spent on each type of assignment.
tions as the Ehrlichman methods, referred
Scores were assigned as follows: 4 s "a great deal
to in the earlier section.
of time", 3 = "a fair amount", 2 = "not too much
The way in which White House staff
time", and 1 = "no time at all". Thus, the higher
spend their time and whom they spend it
the score, the more mean time is spent on each
with will naturally depend on presidential
function.
priorities for problem-solving and the politics
of the problems themselves.
on natural resources policy and 11 percent
The deterioration of the economic condi-
increase on agriculture-the first of these
tion of the country after Nixon left office
notwithstanding the creation of the new
and the demonstrable difference rates of
Energy Resources Council and lower-level
unemployment and inflation make to presi-
EOP energy units.
dential electoral popularity made certain
If it were possible to use these data in an
that economic management and social wel-
input-output analysis of bureaucratic expan-
fare would preoccupy President Ford's
sion and productivity, what they suggest is
attention. But never before in American
that an increase in staffing an issue in one
experience had decision-making on economic
section of the Executive Office is usually not
policy been allocated to so many different
balanced by a decline in staffing the same
EOP staff, and no where in modern govern-
issue in other sections. The result is that
ment at large, not even in the communist
staff output goes on increasing expotentially
states, have there been as many different
and more staff time is consumed in processing
agencies of central economic management
and "coordinating" the flow of paper and
as there were at the time in Washington.
committee meetings. But then the role of
To compare the amounts of time spent
the Domestic Council staff was inter alia, as
by the Ehrlichman and Cannon staffs on
President Ford announced in February 1975,
different issues will first of all indicate the
to do just this-"to coordinate the formula-
way in which the priorities have been assigned
tion of policy options in the domestic area
from one Administration to the next.
for my consideration." The data thus appear
What the table shows is that both eco-
to support the very broad hypothesis about
nomic management and social welfare have
the effect of delegation, mentioned in the
been the two most important areas of staff
Introduction, but do they support the inter-
work, but predictably with the expansion of
pretation that Cannon's unit was a success
other economic policy staff in the White
at coordination, or the interpretation it was
House. less of the Cannon staffs time has
a failure at formulation?
gune on this area than was the case under
If unit members of the EOP can be as-
Ehrlichman. The drop in time spent on social
sessed in terms of how much time they spend
welfare issues has been even greater.
on what sort of problems with what other
On the other hand these declines were
officials inside and outside the EOP, it
balanced by a 13 percent increase in effort
becomes clear that the communication or
58
Table 3
Centact Networks of Cannon DC Staff with EOP
EOP UNIT
Frequency of
contact with
OMB
CEA
ERC
EPB
NSC
CIEP
% Daily
75
13
6
6
0
0
% Weekly
7
20
7
33
20
13
% Monthly
8
17
8
42
8
17
% Infrequently
6
35
48
19
49
45
Data exclude Cannon and Cavanaugh.
Refers to face-to-face and telephone contacts.
traffic pattern of the EOP may be produci..g
work of Cabinet Secretary or Secretary's
unnecessary jams-that is to say, too many
staff contacts. and at about the same degree
functionally effective people converging on
of frequency (but not shown in the tables)
one location in the system. When this occurs,
contacts with the assistant-secretary level of
there may be no way of rating the relative
the agencies. Contact with the President
power or influence of advisors or advisory
personally was fairly uncommon, and with
units.
Cabinet Secretaries only slightly less so.
Look at the way in which contact actually
It is worth noting that 19 percent of daily
occurred between the Cannon staff and other
contacts and 53 percent of the weekly ones
units of the EOP, with the White House and
were with economic policy adviser, either in
with Cabinet Secretaries and their staffs, as
CEA or EPB. This is high when set beside
this can be measured from our survey of
the diminishing priority that economic policy
January, 1976.
had for the DC staff, but it serves to under-
In the first place, there is a significant
line the problem that overlapping roles create.
overlap between Domestic Council and OMB
We said before that traffic jams occur
and this absorbed far more of the daily con-
when too many functionally effective people
tacts Council staff had than any other unit.
converge on one location at the same level in
Two main networks were operating daily-
the system. Economic policy appears to be
sideways, between DC staff and OMB staff
one of them and the overlap between DC
in particular policy areas, and upwards one
staff and OMB another. Natural resources
level, between DC staff and presidential
and energy policy was probably a third.
personal assistants.
It remains a problem to decide, however,
After these two in frequency was a net-
when overlap represents valuable coordina-
Table 4
Contact Networks of Cannon DC Staff with WH and Cabinet
UNIT
Pres.
Frequency of
Pers.
Counsel's
Press
Cong.
Cabinet
Secretaries'
contact with
President
Staff
office
office
Liaison
Secretaries
staff
% Daily
0
69
25
0
13
6
38
% Weekly
13
19
6
13
19
31
38
% Monthly
44
13
o
0
13
31
6
% Infrequently
44
0
$
87
56
31
19
Data exclude Cannon and Cavanaugh.
Refers to face-to-face and telephone contacts.
59
tion of effort and when it becomes a com-
It has been a commonplace of political
petitive tangle that has to be unsnarled. One
observation in recent years to note the failure
test for the Council staff may be whether it
of the White House in its relations with the
has been directly responsible for delivering
press and with Congress. The table merely
assessment of priorities, clarification of
points up where the channels of communica-
options or the results of program analysis to
tion did not exist.
the President himself. If not-and another
The last point is not so visible in the tables
unit has then either the Council staff or else
but is clear from the detailed interview
the other unit is ineffective in its role.
material provided by each staff member.
On this criterion, it is difficult to justify
This is that the Cannon structure spent little
a DC staff member spending. say. 50 percent
time coordinating and monitoring its own
of his time on economic policy in conjunc-
activities. The more time the staff member
tion with CEA or EPB when it is they and
spent on contacts outside the group, the
not the Council who will report directly to
harder it was for him/her to identify his/her
the President. It may have been tactically
interests with the group as such or with the
useful from the DC director's point of view
group's chartered role. The need for recogni-
to have his man watching the others and in
tion and promotion and the desire to feel
a position to brief him before the Assistant
effective were consequently expressed in an
for Economic Affairs or the Chairman of
individualistic rather than a collective frame-
the CEA had their say with the President,
work. Other data on recruitment help to
but it is precisely this type of bureaucractic
substantiate this point. Ehrlichman whose
situation which makes assessments of power
selection principle was quite clear-"good
and influence difficult to make.
brokers, seldom experts" -created a staff
If the Ford Administration over-bureau-
that was dominated by lawyers, but also by
cratized the formation of economic and
people who had know n each other or worked
energy policy with too many units interact-
together before (particularly in the 1968
ing too often together on the same issues,
campaign) (Waldmann 1976; Gilson 1976:4).
stalling and blocking each other rather than
Cannon's staff on the other hand was evenly
facilitating presidential decisions, then who
divided between lawyers and business ad-
can blame the tangle on the weaknesses of
ministration graduates, but split three ways
the Council. let alone the impotence of its
into Nixon holdovers, Rockefcller and Ford
director? What a simple quantification of
appointees: most of them were either from
time use can do is to pinpoint where situa-
Washington, D.C., or from New York, but
tions of this type occur: it isn't any more
they had little experience functioning to-
reliable than the opinions of the observers
gether. With the greater commitment of their
and participants reported earlier in deter-
time to monitoring programs and agencies,
mining whether the circumstances assisted
it is unremarkable that the staff developed
or hubbled the advisory system.
individual agency perspectives and identifica-
Some Presidents have wanted advice in
tions with the networks on whom they
this fashion. For example, there is evidence
depended for information and work.
to suggest that President Johnson used to
Fragmentation like this makes for the
huth overload his staff and deliberately
Lone Ranger Syndrome-each staffer pursu-
create the circumstances for jams, the more
ing a policy line or tactic that is calculated
to exercise his own hand at running things,
to put as much distance and visibility be-
and the better to exact personal loyalty
tween him/herself and the others involved
from each staff member. His was not the
in an issue as is worth risking; in the hope
first executive advisory system nor will it
thereby of attracting the attention and
be the last designed for maximising loyalty
reward of the DC Director and perhaps even
to the President above all else.
the President.
Two final points about the staff networks
Honest brokerage of sub-Cabinet level
that emerge from the tables. The first to be
policy conflicts is not encouraged in this
noted is the infrequency with which DC
kind of atmosphere, and once agency officials
staff make contact with either the White
realize it, they are bound to determine not
House Press Office or Congressional Liaison.
to negotiate on their positions until they
60
have by-passed the Domestic Council and
1972 (Ehrlichman) and January 1976 (Can-
reached the top. The only power to stop
non).
them doing that-and thus power of the
What is evident im both cases is the opera-
Domestic Council to enforce "coordination"
tion of an informal hierarchy beside the
or whatever viewpoint it had on issues-was
formal one. Now in practice they may com-
thus the power of direct access to the Presi-
plement each other or alternatively work at
dent. The Domestic Council staff lost that
cross-purposes and against each other. In
with the fall of Ehrlichman. as we have al-
the Cannon case. complicated as it was by
ready said.
the recruitment of staff from three different
political camps, the role of the second
2. Measures of the internal dynamics of
Deputy, Arthur Quern. a Rockefeller ap-
staff work.
pointee, was as crucial as Cavanaugh's, a
Two elements in particular are important
Nixon holdover. He not only served as arr
-how the hierarchy operates to direct staff
alternate point of clearance, but was a more
assignments and how staff relate to each
valued source of briefing and general job
other in performing them.
orientation to the staff than either Cavanaugh
On paper the Ehrlichman, the Cole and
or Cannon.
the Cannon operations look alike-the assign-
Now overlapping authority like this is a
ments came from the Director, and when
condition of executive staffing systems that
completed went back to him. According to
a number of observers of Democratic Admin-
Ehrlichman, however, he made little sub-
istrations have regarded as a prerequisite of
stantive change to the staff papers he received.
the President's need to know as much as he
In the Cannon case, the staff typically re-
can. Schlesinger on Roosevelt and Neustadt
ported that Cannon returned memoranda for
on Truman both emphasize the value to the
at least one rewrite, often more. This was a
President of an atmosphere of "creative
substantial waste of time and resources, and
feuding."
demoralizing for the staff.
Of course, their judgments are retrospec-
The principal reasons for it can be found
live ones and ones that cannot be separated
in the working relationships of the staff.
from their overall view of Roosevelt and Tru-
Cannon may have ordered assignments but
man as successful administrations. Nixon's
it was Cavanaugh's job (the Deputy Director)
initial judgement was not too different but
to see that they were carried out. A telephone
subsequently the experiment with Moynihan
log of staff calls in January, 1976 shows that
and Burns in what was called "adverse
Cavanaugh received three times more calls
advocacy" changed his mind. As there is
from the DC staff in a day than Cannon or
much difference of opinion about the success
anyone else on the staff. Cannon himself was
or otherwise of the Johnson Administration,
often away travelling with the President and
so there are those who regard the factionalism
unavailable for staff discussions. He put
of the staff as responsible for the good and
distance between himself and the associate
those who blame it for the bad.
directors in other ways too.
In design terms of course, it is not as if a
Whereas Ehrlichman used to include at
president has much choice-there will always
least one of his staff at a planning meeting
be competitiveness among the staff. and this
each morning at 7 am, and then several of
can harden into factions or cliques. This is
the staff at the 7:30 meeting with the senior
going to appear quantitatively in the com-
White House staff, Cannon typically only
munication patterns and influence matrices,
had Cavanaugh to the first meeting (at 7:30
but is not necessarily thereby an indicator of
-the Ford White House was slower to wake
poor performance.
up than the Nixon one used to be). and went
So what is poor performance? For this
alone to the senior staff conference at 8.
two criteria can be suggested: one is that the
Cavanaugh. the Deputy Director, was not
dynamics of staff work should reflect a spread
the only person other staff consulted while
of contact and cross-reference within the
working on assignments. Tables 5 and 6
group that indicates widespread respect and
illustrate how communication and influence
an absence of pockets of isolation. Secondly,
was channelled among the staff in November
influence patterns should complement the
61
Table 5
Influence Matrix for Domestic Council Staff November 1972
Total
Are
Bri
Com
Dan
Fill
Fre
Ful
Ges
Gru
Ham
Jen
Leg
Mil
Nor
E
Red
Sch
Tut
Web
Sent
Archer
-
1.
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Bailey
I
-
0
I
I
I
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
5
Compton
0
0
i
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Daniels
0
0
0
-
I
I
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
5
Flint
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
I
Frederick
I
0
0
I
I
-
0
0
I
0
0
0
o
0
0
.0
0
0
0
4
Fuller
0
0
0
I
0
I
-
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Gearert
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
-
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
a
0
0
0
2
Gruer
I
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
-
I
I
I
0
0
I
0
I
0
o
9
Hampton
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
Jensen
0
0
0
0
I
U
0
0
I
U
-
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
Leggett
0
0
0
n
0
0
0
0
I
0
I
-
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Milker
0
0
0
U
0
n
0
0
0
0
I
I
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Norris
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
-
I
0
0
0
0
3
Phillips
0
n
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
o
I
Redren
0
0
0
0
U
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
-
0
0
0
2
Schmidt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
I
Tuttle
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
"
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
2
Weber
0
0
0
0
U
0
U
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
Total
Received
3
I
0
3
8
3
1
2
12
I
3
3
2
I
3
0
2
0
0
Note: Data are from responses to the question, "Which persons do you spend most time with getting
your work done?"
Row entries denote channels through which messages are sent; column entries denote channels
through which messages are received.
The names are pseudonyms for the Ehrlichman staff and exclude both Ehrlichman and Cole.
Table published in John N. Kessel, The Domestic Presidency (Duxbury Press 1975), P. 37.
formal assignment of power and responsibil-
staff with both Ehrlichman and his deputy
ity, and reinforce it. It will be recalled from
at the time, Cole, has not been recorded.
the last section that according to the testi-
Notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that in
mony of the participants and of observers.
the Ehrlichman group there were four staff
the Cannon staff was much less cohesive
members (21 percent) who received no com-
than the Ehrlichman and Cole units, and if
munication from the rest of the group, in-
common recruitment, common backgrounds,
cluding two who neither received nor initiated
turnover rates and regular intragroup meet-
any contact within the group. One additional
ings are the evidence we have to go on, then
staffer, "Hampton," reported only one con-
indeed this judgment appears correct.
tact sent and one received. The findings for
On the other hand, considering the data
the Cannon staff reveal no staff without any
of Tables 5 and 6, it is not apparently evident
contact, and only two (14 percent)-Hullin
that in their daily operations there was a
(who left the Council twelve weeks after the
great deal of difference in communication
measurement was taken) and Humphreys-
pattern between the Ehrlichman (1972)
whose contact within the group was minimal.
group studied by Kessel and the Cannon
On the first criterion then the comparison
group studied by us.
between the two staffs fail to justify some of
To be sure, the data are not exactly com-
the conclusions we have already reported.
parable. The questions asked, from which
On the second criterion-the issue of com-
the matrices have been assembled, are not
plementarity between formal power within
identical: the time of the year and hence
the unit and informal influence-it is possible
the nature of the staff work were not the
to confirm the earlier finding that Cannon's
same; and in Kessel's case, interaction of the
subordinates initiated little contact with
62
Table 6
Influence Matrix for Domestic Council Staff January 1976
Total
Can Cav Job Par Les May Del Lis Que McC Men Hul Sch Hop Hum Mas Rya Mye Sent
Cannon
-
Cavanaugh
Johnston
Parsons
I
0
1
-
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
L
0
0
5
Leach
0
100-11011000000005
May
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Delaney
0
0
0
1
0
0
-
1
0
1
I
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
6
Lissy
0
0
o
I
0
0
0
-
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
s
Quem
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
McConahey
I
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Hendricks
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Hullin
0
1000000000-000
0
0
0
I
Schleede
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
I
0
2
Hope*
-
Humphreys
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
o
0
I
Massengals
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
I
0
-
0
0
3
Ryan
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
Myer
0
1
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
-
3
Total
Received
2
7
2
3
0
2
2
I
4
3
2
0
1
2
0
2
2
1
Note: Data are from responses to the question, "With whom did you speak personally on work you're
involved in (yesterday)?"
Row entries denote channels through which messages are sent; column entries denote channels
through which messages are received.
The asterisk (*) signifies that no details were provided on this question.
him in the course of their work, but turned
3. Competition Within the Executive
instead to Cavanaugh (19 percent of all
uffice
contacts sent by staff) and to Quern (11 per-
The participants and observers may differ
cent).
on their interpretation of the internal
Without the inclusion of Ehrlichman and
dynamics of Council staff work, but what of
Cole in Table 5, it is impossible to make a
the almost unanimous finding by observers
comparison on this measure; however, with-
that the Council steadily declined in power
in what remains of the 1972 staff two indi-
and influence within the broader presidential
viduals stand out as the focus of a good deal
advisory system?
of informal interaction, "Gruber" (25 per-
In order to assess the process of competi-
ce1..) and "Flint" (17 percent).
non as such, and to isolate the points in time
For all the incompleteness of these data,
at which EOP units achieved a marked accel-
they illustrate nevertheless the potential
eration in their rate of growth or just the
which exists for quantitative measurement
opposite, a simple measure has been devel-
of the performance of the presidential ad-
oped. called the Prosperity Score (or P index
visory system. More specifically the data
for short, Helmer 1976).
support the general point we made at the
This is an index which illustrates the ex-
outset. This was that by varying the perspec-
tent to which each unit's budgetary outlay
tive and the methodology of the analysis of
for each year is more prosperous (greater)
the Executive Office, we would generate
than or less prosperous (smaller) than its
different and contradictory interpretations
average level throughout the period. At 100
of what goes on and why.
the index illustrates that for the year a unit's
63
Figure 1
Change in the Prosperity of EOP Unit Budgets (constant 1972 dollars)
1971-1978
300
OSTP
OSTP
200
XBONI
VPO
OTP
STR
CIEP
CIEP
CEA
CEOMHO
NSC
OMB
ER
100
DC STAFF
OMB
WHO
MSC
COMPS
CEO
OT
STR
VPO
ODAP
CORPS
SAODAP-
ODAP
.
1971
72
"
74
73
76
77
78
annual outlay is equal to its average budgetary
President Nixon's commitment to initiatives
level over the whole period. Below 100, the
in the drug policy field. The greater part of
index shows that unit outlays have fallen
the SAODAP program was in the form of
below the average: above 100. a rise above
grants, both to other executive agencies for
the average. By comparing the indices of
research and program development in their
several EOP units taken together, as shown
special areas of drug abuse control, and also
in Figure 1, a simple comparison can be made
to agencies, contractors and researchers out-
of how units managed to become more or
side the Federal Government. The P Index
less propserous at any selected point of time.
in this case being sensitive only to dollar
To put the results in another light, the mea-
outlays, can scarcely be said to measure the
sure identifies the key points when units
influence of SAODAP as a presidential ad-
experienced sharp changes either up or down
visor; in other cases it does.
in their outlays.
A second case of dramatic rise and fall-
Among the most stable of EOP units,
although in reverse order to SAODAP-in-
there are also some of the oldest-the White
volves the Office of Science and Technology
House Office. OMB, NSC and CEA. These all
Policy (OSTP). Because the Nixon Admin-
have. cluse to the 100 mark throughout the
istration decided to abolish the operation of
period, which indicates little change in
the science advisor at the EOP level and
strength or power. for these organizations, at
delegate the unit's functions to the National
least as measured in budgetary terms, from
Science Foundation, there was a marked
year to year, through two Administrations
decline after 1972. With the Ford and then
and into a third, and relative to one another.
the Carter Administration's commitment to
The most visible indication from Figure I
reinstate the unit, the Figure reflects the
points to the rise and fall of the Special Ac-
rapid take off that has resulted.
tion Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and
A third case of broad rise and fall is the
64
Council on International Economic Policy,
this was parallel to budgetary declines for a
which experienced a fairly dramatic rise in
large number of other Executive Office units
budgetary prosperity until 1975, and has
as well.
since then had a precarious existence.
In examining the Figure for evidence of
The figure also illustrates several instances
points of change, it is clear that the period
of more modest prosperity so far unaffected
of major Nixon initiatives-the expansion of
by reversals or declines in budgetary fortune.
the drug abuse program in SAODAP and of
The Vice President's Office is one of the
the wage and price control program under
few units to have maintained almost un-
CLC-also saw a marked narrowing of bud-
broken increasing prosperity from its take-
getary prosperity for the remainder of the
off in 1972-73. The Council on Wage and
EOP units. Fiscal 1974 and 1975, as the
Price Stability (COWPS) is more short-lived
Watergate investigations intensified and as
(created in 1974) but has also improved its
Congressional opposition to the activities of
position steadily. In the second case, how.
White House staff reached their peak, were
ever, the picture can be misleading. For
the two years in which the budgetary out-
COWPS, which began in 1974 with a small
comes for almost all EOP units reflect a gen-
$1.0M budget, was the successor to the very
eral downward trend-the exceptions were
much more expensive and powerful wage
CEQ, which was a Congressional initiative
and price control agency called the Cost of
forced on the President, OMB, CIEP and
Living Counci! (CLC). The original CLC was
SAODAP. The convergence of lines also
established as a Cabinet-level committee on
reflects the fact that relative to one another
August 15, 1971, with the Secretary of the
EOP units received less support or preference
Treasury as chairman, to supervise President
from the President.
Nixon's 90-day wage and price freeze. It
Relative position by the last of the Ford
changed as the Nixon policy changed through
budgets (1976) is the key-and at that time
Phases I to III, becoming by 1973 a unit of
it is clear that the DC had sunk to the bottom
over 900 people with outlays of over $26M.
of the rank order. This is notwithstanding
Although in most respects comparable to
the fact that in personnel terms its size had
other EOP units, the CLC was never shown
grown with the Ford takeover and then
in the EOP budget, but was included instead
stabilized at around 40 full-time permanent
as among the Funds Appropriated to the
personnel-less than it had been in 1971
President-Economic Stabilization Activities.
under Ehrlichman but more than when Cole
Contrasting the patterns over time of
was in command.
each of the units, it is worth observing the
What had eclipsed the Council was almost
reversals that have occurred in the relative
the full range of economic policy units-
positions of the NSC, DC, CEA and the
CEA, COWPS, CIEP, and STR-as well as the
Office of Special Representative on Trade
Vice-President's Office itself, which under
Negotiations. In the case of the NSC, it is
Rockefeller reached an all-time high in staff-
evident that during Nixon-Kissinger period
ing and executive appropriations.
the unit was more prosperous than it would
In broad outline then we are able to con-
become in the Ford-Kissinger period or the
firm the decline in influence that has been
first year of Brzezinski's leadership; relative
reported already. But far from supporting
to the other advisory units, it was also ahead
the personality-oriented accounts that pin
of its own average outlay. The course of the
the explanation to Jim Cannon, these data
Domestic Council runs somewhat parallel to
suggest a more far-reaching structural change
the NSC, although its prosperity is more
was responsible, which shifted the focus of
variable over the length of the period. There
policy advice within the Executive Office to
is no mistaking the decline which has been
economic issues.
pointed to by others, but it is important to
This phenomenon showed up before in
notice that in the first place this begins with
our analysis of time distributions (Table 2),
the 1977 budget, a full year before the staff
but as then the evidence shows not the sharp
cuts and reorganization were announced in
change in Council staff performance that has
January 1973, and before Ehrlichman left
been alleged, but rather a new climate of
office. The decline continued after that, but
competition in which its recommendations
65
to the President competed with those of
on these issues; the Nixon documents referred
to were not of this kind. They were drafted
others on a more equal basis. From the per-
primarily to explain and defend policies or
spective of the President at the time, this
objectives already decided on by the Administra-
development may have actually enhanced
tion.
4. It should be noted that others had suggested
the effectiveness of the advisory system
such a coordinating unit before the Ash Council.
rather than detracted from it. As to how the
Then Governor Neison Rockefeller aired the
Cannon staff performed on economic policy,
idea as early as 1958 and Vice President Hum-
phrey used this idea as a campaign theme in
as compared, say, with the Cole or Ehrlich-
1968.
man staffs, this is a topic which cannot be
5. This and similarly footnoted quotations are
treated without a more extensive outline of
from interviews conducted by one or both of
the authors during the winter and spring of
changes in the policy environment within
1975.
which the EOP advisors had to operate and
to which they had perforce to respond, both
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