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Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][2]
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Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][2]
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These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
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Richard L. Schmalensee Files
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2017-0310-F
2017-0310-F
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George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Economic Advisers, Council of
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Schmalensee, Richard, Files
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03679-010
Folder Title:
Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and
Other Information][2]
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RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
of the
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Fur
FIRST MEETING
Climb
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
INF/1
1/16/89
GENERAL INFORMATION
The United States Government will host the First Meeting of
the Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) in Washington
from January 30, 1989 to February 1, 1989.
At its first session, November 9-11, 1988, the IPCC
established working groups to carry out three main tasks.
(i) Assessment of available scientific information on
climate change;
(ii) Assessment of environmental and socio-economic impacts
of climate change; :
(iii) Formulation of response strategies.
The First Meeting of the Working Group III RSWG) will develop a
work plan for its activities.
Headquarters
The headquarters of the Meeting and the offices of the
Secretariat will be located in the International Conference
Suite on the first floor of the Department of State. Access to
the Conference Suite is through the Diplomatic Entrance at 2201
C Street, N.W.
Opening Session
The opening Session will convene at 09:30 a.m. on Monday,
January 30, in the Loy Henderson Conference Room. Sessions will
be limited to officially designated delegates and observers.
Registration
Registration of participants will begin at 8:30 a.m. on
Monday, January 30 at the Conference Information Center.
Arrangements will be made to admit participants into the
building for registration.
Each Delegate will be issued a conference pass which must be
shown for entrance into the State Department and which must be
worn at all times while in the building.
Documentation
The Documents Officer, Ms. Helen Longino, will be located in
Room 1207 and will be responsible for the processing and
distribution of all documents of the meeting.
At the time of registration each delegation will complete a
Request for Documents Form which will indicate the daily
document requirements of the delegation (i.e., number of copies
needed). Document distribution will be at the Conference
Information Center.
Information, Mail and Messages
Receptionists will be on duty at the Conference Information
Center during the period of the meeting to provide information
regarding conference arrangements and activities, and to assist
in the distribution of documents, mail and messages.
Participants are urged to check at the desk at least twice daily.
Local Transportation
Taxi service may be obtained by telephone. The larger taxi
companies are listed in the yellow pages of the telephone
directory under "taxicabs". Most are radio lispatched. The
driver should be requested to call at the Diplomatic Entrance of
the State Department, 2201 C Street, N.W., for pickups.
Hotels
Two hotels convenient to the conference site are:
Guest Quarters, 801 New Hampshire Avenue, and
2500 Pensylvania Avenue
Telephone: 800 424-2900
202 785-2000
Telex: 892346
River Inn, 924 25th Street, N.W.
Telephone: 800 424-2741
202 337-7600
Telex: 440546, answer Back Code: OWCH-VI
Hotel reservations and payment are to be made directly by
participants.
#236
***
MEMORANDUM
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
wm M N
November 1, 1989
sent
Clinte
TO:
FROM:
MICHAEL DICK Clief
Choge
SUBJECT: Global Warming
I am busily filling out our "economic costs" task force, and I
have encountered a small problem. Bruce Gardner is the logical
USDA person, and he is eager to participate. But, since he was
not the USDA person at the 10/20 meeting with Bromley (and, I
infer, has a sensible newcomer's reluctance walk near others'
toes), he would like us to ask Yeutter to name a representative -
ideally in such a way the he, Bruce, is the logical choice. What
follows is an attempt at a letter (to be faxed) that will do
this. Please revise as necessary, keeping in mind the non-zero
probability that we may need to try this same trick in one or two
other cases as well.
Dear Clayton:
The CEA has been asked by Dr. Allan Bromley, Chairman of the DPC
Working Group on Global Change, to chair a Task Force on the
economic costs of global climate change. He has described our
task as follows:
As you know, rational models of the economic cost of
either action or inaction are conspicuously missing
from the public and international debate on this
subject. Economic consequences must be understood
before sound policy can be developed and economically
and socially acceptable actions taken. We simply
cannot proceed without that understanding.
I would ask that your Task Force on Economics include
broad interagency representation and identify, review
and inventory similar work being done elsewhere -- at
universities, think-tanks, and by your counterparts in
other industrialized nations. I would ask you to
produce at least a preliminary report in three months.
I feel that it is very important that the Department of
Agriculture have a voice in these deliberations, and I would thus
ask you to designate a policy-level representative to the Task
Force. As our task will have a large analytical component, it
2
would be useful to all concerned if your representative were
conversant with economic analysis and modeling techniques and
could draw on staff support in these areas as necessary.
Please have your office notify Francine Obermiller (395-5036) of
your choice as soon as possible so that a meeting schedule can be
be set up quickly. Thank you for your help.
Sincerely,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Globalmate
September 28, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DELAND
BOB GRADY
JOHN SCHMITZ
DICK SCHMALENSEE
JUANITA DUGGAN
BARRY MCBEE
FROM:
KENNETH P. YALE Ky
SUBJECT:
Attached Papers on Response Strategies Working
Group
To follow up our meeting yesterday morning, I thought you
might find the attached materials on the Response Strategy
Working Group's Geneva Workshop useful. Additional materials may
be obtained through Fred Bernthal's office at the Department of
State.
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT OF G-7 SUMMIT
33) There is growing awareness throughout the world of the necessity to
preserve better the global ecological balance. This includes serious threats
to the atmosphere, which could lead to future climate changes. We note with
great concern the growing pollution of air, lakes, rivers, oceans and seas;
acid rain, dangerous substances; and the rapid desertification and
deforestation. Such environmental degradation endangers species and
undermines the well-being of individuals and societies.
Decisive action is urgently needed to understand and protect the earth's
ecological balance. We will work together to achieve the common goals of
preserving a healthy and balanced global environment in order to meet shared
economic and social objectives and to carry out obligations to future
generations.
34) We urge all countries to give further impetus to scientific research on
environmental issues, to develop necessary technologies and to make clear
evaluations of the economic costs and benefits of environmental policies.
The persisting uncertainty on some of these issues should not unduly delay our
action. In this connection, we ask all countries to combine their efforts in
order to improve observation and monitoring on a global scale.
35) We believe that international cooperation also needs to be enhanced in
the field of technology and technology transfer in order to reduce pollution
or provide alternative solutions.
36) We believe that industry has a crucial role in preventing pollution at
source, in waste minimization, in energy conservation, and in the design and
marketing of cost-effective clean technologies. The agricultural sector must
also contribute to tackling problems such as water pollution, soil erosion and
desertification.
37) Environmental protection is integral to issues such as trade,
development, energy, transport, agriculture and economic planning. Therefore,
environmental considerations must be taken into account in economic decision-
making. In fact good economic policies and good environmental policies are
mutually reinforcing.
In order to achieve sustainable development, we shall ensure the compatibility
of economic growth and development with the protection of the environment.
Environmental protection and related investment should contribute to economic
growth. In this respect, intensified efforts for technological breakthrough
are important to reconcile economic growth and environmental policies.
Clear assessments of the costs. benefits and resource implications of
environmental protection should help governments to take the necessary
decisions on the mix of price signals (e.g., taxes or expenditures) and
regulatory actions, reflecting where possible the full value of natural
resources.
We encourage the World Bank and regional development banks to integrate
environmental considerations into their activities. International
organizations such as the OECD and the United Nations and its affiliated
organizations, will be asked to develop further techniques of analysis which
would help governments assess appropriate economic measures to promote the
quality of the environment. We ask the OECD, within the context of its work
on integrating environment and economic decision-making, to examine how
selected environmental indicators could be developed. We expect the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development to give additional momentum to the
protection of the global environment.
38) To help developing countries deal with past damage and to encourage them
to take environmentally desirable action, economic incentives may include the
use of aid mechanisms and specific transfer of technology. In special cases,
ODA debt forgiveness and debt for nature swaps can play a useful role in
environmental protection.
We also emphasize the necessity to take into account the interests and needs
of developing countries in sustaining the growth of their economies and the
financial and technological requirements to meet environmental challenges.
39) The depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer is alarming and calls for
prompt action. We welcome the HELSINKI conclusions related, among other
issues, to the complete abandonment of the production and consumption of
chlorofluorocarbons covered by the MONTREAL protocol as soon as possible and
not later than the end of the century. Specific attention must also be given
to those ozone-depleting substances not covered by the Montreal protocol. We
shall promote the development and use of suitable substitute substances and
technologies. More emphasis should be placed on projects that provide
alternatives to chloro-fluorocarbons.
40) We strongly advocate common efforts to limit emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases, which threaten to induce climate change,
endangering the environment and ultimately the economy. We strongly support
the work undertaken by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, on
this issue.
We need to strengthen the worldwide network of observatories to: greenhouse
gases and support the World Meteorological Organization initiative to
establish a global climatological reference network to detect climate changes.
41) We agree that increasing energy efficiency could make a substantial
contribution to these goals. We urge international organizations concerned to
encourage measures, including economic measures, to improve energy
conservation and. more broadly, efficiency in the use of energy of all kinds
and to promote relevant techniques and technologies.
We are committed to maintaining the highest safety standards for nuclear power
plants and to strengthening international cooperation in safe operation of
power plants and waste management, and we recognize that nuclear power also
plays an important role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.
42) Deforestation also damages the atmosphere and must be reversed. We call
for the adoption of sustainable forest management practices, with a view to
preserving the scale of world forests. The relevant international
organizations will be asked to complete reports on the state of the world's
forests by 1990.
43) Preserving the tropical forests is an urgent need for the world as a
whole. While recognizing the sovereign rights of developing countries to make
use of their natural resources, we encourage, through a sustainable use of
tropical forests, the protection of all the species therein and the
traditional rights to land and other resources of local communities. We
welcome the German initiative in this field as a basis for progress.
To this end, we give strong support to rapid implementation of the Tropical
Forest Action Plan which was adopted in 1986 in the framework of the Food and
Agricultural Organization. We appeal to both consumer and producer countries,
which are united in the International Tropical Timber Organization, to join
their efforts to ensure better conservation of the forests. We express our
readiness to assist the efforts of nations with tropical forests through
financial and technical cooperation, and in international organizations.
44) Temperate forests, lakes and rivers must be protected against the
effects of acid pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. It is
necessary to pursue actively the bilateral and multilateral efforts to this
end.
45) The increasing complexity of the issues related to the protection of the
atmosphere calls for innovative solutions. New instruments may be
contemplated. We believe that the conclusion of a framework or umbrella
convention on climate change to set out general principles or guidelines is
urgently required to mobilize and rationalize the efforts made by the
international community. We welcome the work under way by the United Nations
Environment Program, in cooperation with the World Meteorological
Organization. drawing on the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and the results of other international meetings. Specific protocols
containing concrete commitments could be fitted into the framework as
scientific evidence requires and permits.
46) We condemn indiscriminate use of oceans as dumping grounds for polluting
waste. There is a particular problem with the deterioration of coastal
waters. To ensure the sustainable management of the marine environment, we
recognize the importance of international cooperation in preserving it and
conserving the living resources of the sea. We call for relevant bodies of
the United Nations to prepare a report on the state of the world's
oceans.
We express our concern that national, regional and global capabilities to
contain and alleviate the consequences of maritime oil spills be improved. We
urge all countries to make better use of the latest monitoring and clean-up
technologies. We ask all countries to adhere to and implement fully the
international conventions for the prevention of oil pollution of the oceans.
We also ask the International Maritime Organization to put forward proposals
for further preventive action.
47) We are committed to ensuring full implementation of existing rules for
the environment. In this respect, we note with interest the initiative of the
Italian government to host in 1990 a forum on international law for the
environment with scholars, scientific experts and officials, to consider the
need for a digest of existing rules and to give in-depth consideration
to the legal aspects of environment at the international level.
48) We advocate that existing environment institutions be strengthened
within the United Nations system. In particular, the United Nations
Environment Program urgently requires strengthening and increased financial
support. Some of us have agreed that the establishment within the United
Nations of a new institution may also be worth considering
49) We have taken note of the report of the sixth conference on bioethics
held in Brussels which examined the elaboration of a universal code of
environmental ethics based upon the concept of the "human stewardship of
nature".
50) It is a matter of international concern that Bangladesh, one of the
poorest and most densely populated countries in the world, is periodically
devasted by catastrophic floods.
We stress the urgent need for effective, coordinated action by the
international community, in support of the Government of Bangladesh, in order
to find solutions to this major problem which are technically, financially,
economically and environmentally sound. In that spirit, and taking account of
help already given, we take note of the different studies concerning flood
alleviation, initiated by France, Japan, the US and the United Nations
Development Program, which have been reviewed by experts from all our
countries. We welcome the World Bank's agreement, following those studies, to
coordinate the efforts of the international community so that a sound basis
for achieving a real improvement in alleviating the effects of flood can be
estalbished. We also welcome the agreement of the World Bank to chair, by the
end of the year, a meeting to be held in the United Kingdom by invitation of
the Bangladesh Government, of the countries willing to take an active part in
such a program.
51) We give political support to projects such as the joint project to set
up an observatory of the Saharan areas, which answers the need to monitor the
development of that rapidly deteriorating, fragile, arid region, in order to
protect it more effectively.
FOR RSWG OCT. WORKSHOP
DRAFT CONCLUSION DOCUMENT
Environmental considerations, including uncertainties and
impacts of global climate change, must be taken into account
in economic decision making. Countries need to work together
to achieve common goals of preserving a healthy and balanced
global environment in order to meet shared economic and social
objectives and to meet obligations to future generations.
Institutions and agreements to support common efforts to
limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
threatening to induce climate change need to be analyzed in
conjunction with the results of the IPCC 1990 report,
Although numerous uncertainties remain with regard to the
likelihood and potential extent of anthropogenically induced
climate change and its impacts, a consensus has emerged on
certain principles of how to implement any needed action.
Countries should give further impetus to scientific
research on environmental issues, to develop necessary
technologies and to make clear evaluations of the economic
costs and benefits of environmental policies. The persisting
uncertainty on some of these issues should not unduly delay
action.
Countries need to combine their efforts in order to
improve observation and monitoring on a global scale.
Worldwide cooperation in monitoring and research to identify
the mechanisms and impacts of climate change is imperative,
and will lay the groundwork for any needed follow-up response
measures.
International cooperation to improve the knowledge base
regarding the science and prediction of climate change will
require technology transfer. This will strengthen indigenous
capacity and infrastructure in LDCs, and will heighten the
awareness of decision makers and the public to the issues.
International cooperation also needs to be enhanced in the
field of technology and technology transfer in order to reduce
pollution or provide alternative solutions.
To be effective, governmental actions to address climate
change must be based on general intergovernmental concensus,
encompassing countries of all stages of economic development
and the entire spectrum of political-economic systems. If
predictions of global climate change are accurate, a
cooperative global effort is necessary to limit global climate
change rates.
Early agreement on concerted action and mechanisms to
develop concensus on appropriate responses is required, as few
countries are likely to unilaterally initiate extensive
action. In view of the uncertainties, priority should be
given to those measures warranted on grounds other than
climate change, promising measurable benefits independent of
their effect on climate.
Although the potential problem is global, remedies must be
tailored to the local context. The approach should be one
that considers pilot projects rather than crash programs.
This will allow experimentation with approaches and techniques
suited to different local circumstances.
Existing institutional mechanisms should be used rather
than seeking to develop new ones. The goal of sound resource
management applies to institutions as well as to natural
resources. Existing institutions represent an investment of
physical, technical, financial, and administrative resources,
time and experience. These can and should be tapped to meet
newly urgent concerns, thereby enhancing development
assistance activities. Existing structures, mechanisms, and
policies should be scrutinized to determine how they can
strengthened, including identifying and correcting inadvertent
adverse effects with regard to climate change.
The market system has proven itself an efficient agent of
technology development and transfer, and offers the best
prospects for timely development of technologies to mitigate
and adapt to climate change. Government-sponsored actions
should emphasize the removal of impediments to the rational
play of market forces, and activities strengthening the
working of the market should have priority. These actions
include:
International standardization -- to facilitate data
collection, informed choice of technologies, and
technology transfer, and to reduce trade barriers;
Information dissemination -- to enable decision
makers to make informed choices;
Facilitation of international trade and investment.
The steps taken in each of the five topic areas of the
workshop should further these broad principles and be mutually
reinforcing.
1. Public education and information must provide an accurate
foundation for discussions on global climate change. By
fostering the concept of the global public good, public
education can create the political will to implement
voluntary energy conservation and pollution prevention,
and accept and support appropriate government policies,
including regulatory interventions where warranted.
Public education and information can shape market forces,
catalyzing demand for new technologies, thus spurring
technology development and transfer and acceptance of
government policies. NGOs have had notable success in
heightening and sustaining public consciousness; private
industry can similarly stimulate consumer awareness and
demand.
2. Market economic incentives should make the deployment of
new technologies economically attractive and encourage
technology transfer and investment from abroad. Cost
effectiveness, calculated to include environmental
impacts, must be the guiding principle in technology
transfer to avoid constraining growth and economic
development.
3. The concept of sustainable development requires that
environmental and developmental policies be closely
linked. Foreign development assistance should be
structured to help train and equip local communities adapt
and implement suitable technologies and maintain necessary
infrastructure in a manner that fosters longterm
self-reliance.
Collaborative efforts offer substantial potential savings
for all countries. In this regard, regional consortia
could provide opportunities for collaborative R&D to
strengthen indigenous S&T capacity, improve the use of
trained S&T personnel, and accelerate technology
development and transfer. Such organizations could join
public and private sector institutions in networks for
research, information, technology development and
extension. Regional consortia could be attractive
candidates for partnership with private firms in
industrialized countries, a link forged through
investments and joint ventures.
4. In the international arena, risk insurance, credit
guarantees and other devices controlled by industrialized
countries can help create a favorable environment for
technology transfer and technology development in LDCs.
The recipient countries would have a corresponding
responsibility to ensure adequate return on investment to
the originators of the technology.
5. Governmental entities, including the multilateral
development banks, can draw on the resources and expertise
of the private sector and nongovernmental organizations to
speed the deployment of new technologies. NGOs and PVOs
have compiled an impressive record in heightening public
consciousness, mobilizing voluntary action, and developing
and transferring environmentally benign technologies.
Private industry is skilled in stimulating consumer
awareness and demand, and promoting technology transfer,
adaptation and extension.
6. By establishing a process for ongoing review and
assessment, a framework convention could stimulate
individual countries and international organizations to
carry out national and regional programs more
expeditiously and effectively than they would otherwise.
DRAFT
Policy Guidelines for RSWG October Workshop
on Implementation Measures
The primary objective of the RSWG workshop on
implementation measures schaduled for October 2-6 in Geneva
will be to produce a report covering the five topics on which
participants have been invited to submit papers. The U.S. has
submitted papers on all five topics after completing a lengthy
interagency process. Although these papers will be important
inputs to the final report of the workshop, the report will of
necessity reflect a number of viewpointe different from our
own. Therefore, it is important that all members of the U.S.
delegation follow common policy guidelines as they participate
in the workshop discussions and drafting sessions in which the
report is prepared.
The U.S. delegation should be motivated fundamentally by
the clear desire of the President to lead the efforts of the
international community to protect and enhance the quality of
the global environment. The guidance and conclusions document
should emphasize positive objectives that can contribute
ultimately to the "decisive action. to understand and
protect the earth's ecological balance" called for by the
President and other leaders of the Paris Economic Summit.
The following are basic policy guldelines to which all
members of the delegation shall adhere:
Legal and Institutional Measures
(1) Framework Convention
-- The provisions suggested in the U.S. paper (attached)
should all be included.
-- The workshop report is to recommend a general framework
convention that includes immediate obligations for
research, monitoring and data exchange, and for periodic
assessments of science, impacts, technology and economics,
but does not include obligations to take any specific
response strategy.
-- The framework convention should follow the general
organization and scope of the 1985 Vienna Convention. The
Convention should take note of the elements of the Vienna
Convention and its protocols for controls on ozone
depleting substances.
-- A task for the IPCC (RSWG) and, subsequently, of the
Convention Parties 18 to compile and maintain an inventory
of existing legal and institutional mechanisms for
-2-
reference in implementing future research, assessment and
response strategy obligations. These mechanisms are to be
used in tandem with new mechanisms established by the
Convention and any aubsequent amendments and protocols.
-- While measures for providing future amendment OE the
convention and for appending protocols, the initial
Convention should not include specific response
strategies. The convention should include establishment
OE a working group to evaluate response strategies based
on them.
-- The Convention should include establishment of a working
group to evaluate mechanisms to provide financial and
related assistance for consideration of the Parties of the
Convention (after the Convention enters into force). The
Convention shall not include any mechanisms to provide
financial assistance in meeting obligations of the
Convention. Such mechanisms will be provided, as
appropriate, in subsequent protocols.
-- The Convention should provide for cooperation in the
development, assistance and transfer of technology and
management practices tc limit and adapt to climate
change. In this area, the Convention should call for
early establishment of a working group to provide
Convention. recommendations for consideration by the Parties to the
-- The Convention should provide a mechanism to inventory
current emissions of greenhouse gases and to forecast
future emissions. The Convention should call for early
purpose. establishment of a working group (or subgroup) for this
-- Any general objectives set forth in the convention should
be stated in terms of minimizing adverse environmental,
social and economic impacts of ruture Climate change.
Limitation OE emissions levels or atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases is not an objective per
se, but is recognized 8.8 a means of accomplishing the
objectives. Specific emission reduction targets or
timetables must be avoided in the Convention.
Additionally, an objective -- to stabilize or protect the
climate at current conditions, per se - is neither
feasible nor acceptable.
-- The institutional structure and procedures are provided
for in the framework convention should have the effect of
formalizing the existing three-track IPCC process:
Scientific monitoring and research; socioeconomic and
natural resources impacts research and assessments;
negotiations. response strategy identification, evaluation and (future)
-3-
-- There should be no specific provision of:
0
Emissions limitation reaponses such as taxes on CO2
or other greenhouse gas emissions, taxes placed on
specific fuel sources, or subsidies provided for use
of specific energy supply or demand technologies
0
Financial mechanisms such as an international climate
fund to assist developing countries to meet
convention or subsequent protocol obligations
0
A binding process to settle disputes among parties.
These matters may be referred to working groups of the
convention for further evaluation.
(2) Other Legal Measures
-- The report should refer to, [call for coordination with],
and encourage fuller use of, existing agreements, laws and
regulations. It should not propose a new "Law of the
Atmosphere" or other over-arching legal scheme similar to
the Law of the Sea.
-- The report may wish to address means of improving the
effectiveness and status of WMO, UNEP, and other
international organizations, It should not propose the
creation of new international institutions beyond the
Conference of the Parties or subgroups established under
the framework convention itself.
-- The U.S. delegation should consider the appropriate roles
of UNEP, WMO, IPCC, UN regional economic organizations, or
other UN organizations in support of Convention Parties in
their implementing of the Convention, once it enters into
force and for transitional activities between opening for
signature and entering into force.
Technology Assistance, Development and Transfer
-- The conclusions in the report of the meeting should call
for increased cooperation in development and transfer of
technologies and management practices to limit and adapt
to climate change. Establishment of a working group on
technology assistance, development and transfer can be
proposed as an essential subsidiary activity to support
the activities of the Parties to the Convention.
-- Intellectual property rights and other rights of firms and
individuals owning technology must be protected.
-4-
-- Maximum use of existing institutions and mechanisms,
governmental and nongovernmental, for technology transfer
should be encouraged.
-- Recipient countries should provide favorable political,
legal and economic conditions for technology transfer.
Some national case studies to determine existing barriers,
needs, and opportunities for conditions to facilitate
technology transfer need to be conducted.
-- The capabilities of some technologies and management
practices to limit and adapt to climate change that may
also assist a nation in meeting other national and
international goals, and the consideration of such
collateral benefits, should be noted.
-- The need for coordinated activities in areas of education,
training and information transfer, especially associated
with the use of modernized technologies and practices in
developing and less industrialized countries should be
noted in the technology related conclusions of the report.
Financial Measures
-- The report should describe existing bilateral and
multilateral financial assistance mechanisms,and call for
coordination with them, and encourage their fuller use.
-- A working group should be established to examine financial
mechanisms to provide assistance to LDCs to limit or adapt
to climate change. Among the options that might be
considered are creation of global climate funds or
imposition of mandatory fees or taxes to finance support
for developing countries. The report should not recommend
creation of such mechanisms at this time.
-- The report should stress the need to identify specific,
projects in individual countries before funding
commitments are made. Considerations for such projects
etc. should include country needs, barriers and opportunities,
-- Within existing assistance programs and development plans,
priority should be given to measures which are desirable
on both economic and environmental grounds.
-- Consideration of financial mechanisms must recognize both
global climate change issues and overall national goals
and needs of recipient countries.
-5-
Economic Measures
-- The report should stress the importance of market
mechanisms, including & price structure, in reference to
top-down command and control regulations in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Use of market mechanisms needs
to consider the special circumstances of each Party in
choosing specific implementation steps. The report should
note the advantages of giving individual sources maximum
flexibility to find the most economically efficient
approach to reducing emissions,
-- A working group should be established under the convention
to address economic implementation measures such as taxes,
Eees, performance standards or other methods for
reflecting environmental costs and benefits in economic
decision making.
The economics section of report conclusions should
emphasize the need for, and the role of, information and
educational processes t:0 increase effectiveness of
economic measures,
Education and Information Heasures:
-- The complementarity of education of the public and market
incentives or regulations should be stressed. Effective
assistance and transfer of technology and management
practices also depend on supporting education, training
and information processes.
-- The report should stress the need to present the science
of climate change and its impacts on natural resources and
socioeconomic conditions in a balanced and objective way
which reflects all of the areas of agreement and the
uncertainties.
-- An important element of education and information measures
is their supporting and complementary role to other
implementation measures, The implementation of
technology, economic or financial assistance measures in
many countries will require training and education.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Spokane, Washington)
For Immediate Release
September 18, 1989
FACT SHEET
ADMINISTRATION ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
CLEANING UP THE NATION'S AIR
Clean Air Act. On June 12, the President announced proposals to
reduce emissions which cause acid rain, urban ozone and toxic air
pollution. The proposals, the first major overall of the Clean
Air Act to be proposed by an Administration in over a decade,
calls for a 10 billion ton reduction in SO2 emissions by the year
2000, a 2 million ton reduction in NOx, and a 40 percent
reduction in emission of volatile organic compounds which cause
urban smog, and a reduction of 75 to 90 percent in air toxic
emissions. These reductions will also help to curb an increase
in global warming resulting from fossil fuel combustion. The
proposal also calls for use of alternative fuels in one million
vehicles by 1997. Alternative fuels, while reducing ozone
precursors, will also reduce the toxic aromatics which come from
conventional gasoline. The President submitted a comprehensive
clean air bill to the Congress on July 21 embodying the proposals
announced on June 12.
Clean Coal Technologies. The President proposed $710 million in
FY 1990 for the Clean Coal Technology Program to encourage
development of new technologies to reduce SO2 and NOx, while
still allowing coal to play a role in our energy future.
Fuel Efficiency. The Administration approved action to increase
Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards for
automobiles to 27.5 miles per gallon. This action will reduce
oil imports and reduce the contribution of automobile emissions
to global warming.
AIRBORNE TOXICS
Asbestos Ban. On July 7, EPA announced an almost total phaseout
of all uses of asbestos by 1997. The ban will prohibit
importation, manufacture and processing of asbestos, a carcinogen
linked to lung cancer and mesothelioma (lung and chest cancer).
EPA estimates asbestos is responsible for 3000 to 12,000 cancer
deaths each year. The action comes after over a decade of
proposed rulemaking and data analysis on effects of asbestos and
its uses.
- more -
- 2 -
Air Toxics Emissions Standards for Benzene. On August 31st, the
EPA Administrator announced standards to reduce public health
risks from benzene emissions. This air toxics standard has been
in litigation for years and this action represents an important
step toward reducing emissions of a major air toxic pollutant.
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEAN-UP
Medical Waste. EPA implemented a medical waste tracking program
on March 10 to track medical wastes to ensure proper disposal and
prevent ocean pollution. The pilot program applies to ten
states. EPA will report to Congress after two years on whether
nationwide application is needed. Violators can be charged up to
$25,000 for civil penalties and up to $50,000 for criminal
penalties. The program constitutes a first step in the
President's pledge to clean up medical wastes which have washed
up on beaches.
Superfund Clean-Up. The President's budget proposed $315 million
to pursue an aggressive clean-up schedule of toxic waste sites;
and the Administration has opposed Congressional efforts to cut
the Superfund budget to $150 million.
Superfund Management Review. The President proposed in February
a major strengthening of the Superfund program to beef up
enforcement. On June 14, under the President's direction,
Administrator Reilly concluded a Management Review of the
Superfund Program outlining initiatives for a more effective
program, including immediate control of acute threats; better
enforcement to induce private-party clean-ups; and expanded
research into better technologies for clean-up. Over five
hundred people will be added to EPA's enforcement staff to ensure
that sites are cleaned up.
Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Facilities. The President
has endorsed a major increase of almost a billion dollars in the
Federal government's effort to clean up the environmental effects
of federal nuclear weapons plants. Under the President's
direction, Secretary Watkins announced a five-year environmental
and safety clean-up for federal nuclear weapons facilities. The
Administration is aggressively investigating any possible
violations of applicable environmental laws that may have
occurred at federal facilities.
National Energy Strategy. The President announced the
development of a National Energy Strategy and the Department of
Energy has conducted five public hearings across the nation to
elicit public testimony. The Strategy will have as one component
a plan to reconcile the need for a secure, abundant energy supply
with environmental protection.
- more -
- 3 -
Ocean Pollution. The President proposed in his 1990 budget and
has sent to Congress legislation which will toughen penalties for
those who dump waste illigally in our oceans. The legislation
calls for criminal felony sanctions against illegal dumpers. The
Administration signed a consent agreement with New York providing
for phase-out of ocean dumping of sewage, sludge and industrial
wastes by 1991.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Global Climate Change. The President proposed an increase in
global environmental research for FY 1990 of 43 percent or $191.5
million. In addition to Clean Air Act initiatives and the Clean
Coal Technology Program, the United States will host the plenary
meeting next Frebruary of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The United States chairs the Response Strategies
Working Group which Secretary Baker addressed last January where
he stressed the importance of a coordinated effort to address
climate change. The United States has begun discussions on a
framework for a global convention to reduce emissions of gases
which may cause global warming.
Chlorofluorocarbons. On March 3, the President called for a
world wide phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons by year 2000, if
safe substitutes are available. Chlorofluorocarbons are
responsible for depletion of the ozone layer.
Hazardous Waste Exports. On March 10, the President called for a
ban on the export of hazardous waste unless the receiving country
agrees to its proper disposal through a bilateral agreement. A
small amount of hazardous waste generated in this country is
exported, some to developing countries whose lack of good
disposal practices could pose environmental problems.
Poland and Hungary. On July 9 and 10, the President announced
technical assistance to both Poland and Hungary to control air
pollution and improve water quality.
Driftnet Fishing Agreements. The Administration successfully
persuaded Japan, Taiwan and Korea to enter into driftnet fishing
agreements to monitor driftnet practices and enforce laws
prohibiting the take of U.S. origin salmon. The agreements will
allow the U.S. to quantify the incidental take of seabirds,
seals, whales and other marine mammals. Each year several
hundred billion dollars worth of illegal U.S. origin salmon is
traded on the international market. The agreements will protect
the U.S. fishing industry from such losses in the future, while
protecting the Marine environment at the same time.
- more -
- 4 -
Peace Corps Initiative. On September 18, the President announced
a joint Peace Corps/EPA initiative to begin in 1990 the training
of Peace Corps volunteers as part of their standard preparation
for duty, to deal with a full range of environmental challenges:
water pollution prevention, waste disposal, reforestation,
pesticide management.
ENDANGERED SPECIES AND HABITAT PROTECTION
Ban on African Elephant Ivory. On June 5, the Administration
announced a ban on importation of African elephant ivory into the
United States. Under the ban, importation of African elephant
ivory from any country is illegal and includes both commercial
and non-commercial shipments. Seized goods could subject a
traveller to $5000 fines. As a result, the value of ivory on the
world market has plummeted, reducing the incentive for illegal
poaching of elephants.
Desert Tortoise. The Department of the Interior issued an
emergency listing of the Desert Tortoise as an endangered species
Nevada. under the Endangered Species Act in Southern California, Utah,
Panthers. The Department of the Interior has acquired additional
habitat for endangered panthers in Florida.
Habitat Protection. The EPA has denied a permit for construction
of the controversial Two Forks Dam in Colorado because
construction would have destroyed thousands of acres of valuable
wildlife habitat.
Fishery Development. The President reversed a proposal to cap
the outlay of funds collected under the Wallop-Breaux Trust Fund
used for fisheries protection and development.
Offshore Oil Drilling. In his February address to the Joint
Session of the Congress, the President proposed to postpone lease
sales of offshore oil and gas development in environmentally
sensitive areas off the coasts of California and Florida. The
President set up a task force to examine environmental concerns
associated with these sales, and pledged to pursue development
only in areas where drilling can be accomplished in an
environmentally sound manner. The Administration published
proposed rules to prohibit oil and gas leasing in the
environmentally sensitive Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary
off the coast of California.
- more - - more -
- 5 -
RESOURCE RESTORATION AND PROTECTION
Wetlands. The President has called for a national goal of "no
net loss" of wetlands. Consistent with that pledge, an
interagency task force has been convened and is meeting to
develop recommendations to meet that goal. The President has
proposed special legislative authority to allow interest from
monies collected under the Pittman-Robinson Act to be used for
wetland purchases under the North American Waterfowl Management
Act.
Expanding Parks and Refuges. The President proposed in his FY
1990 budget new spending of $206 million to expand America's
national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. This was the
first proposed expansion in several years.
Reforestation. The President has long believed that the concept
of stewardship of our natural resources is the basis of a sound
approach to the environment. As part of this belief, the
President has long been an advocate of reforestation. His
personal commitment to planting trees is indicative of his
support for the ongoing efforts of federal, state, and local
programs, as well as reforestation projects undertaken by private
and voluntary organizations.
# # #
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT YALE
SIT CROMPTON
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS UNCLASSIFIED DTG 120056Z MAY 89
FM THE WHITE HOUSE / SITUATION ROOM
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
UNCLAS
Q000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO U.S MISSION GENEVA
FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BERNTHAL, HEAD OF U.S. DELEGATION TO THE STEERING GROUP
OF THE RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP. FROM CHIEF OF STAFF,
JOHN SUNUNU.
1. THE PRESIDENT APPRÈCIATES YOUR EFFORTS AND IS
ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORTS OF PROGRESS THUS FAR. WE CONSIDER THE
REPORTED EMERGING AGREEMENT ON AN ADVANCED PREPARATORY PROGRAM TO
ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE RESPONSE ISSUES COMPREHENSIVELY TO BE
EXTREMELY POSITIVE. TO FURTHER THIS PROCESS. PLEASE MAKE EVERY
EFFORT TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON A GLOBAL WARMING WORKSHOP THIS FALL,
HOSTED BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS WORKSHOP SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO
IDENTIFY THE SCIENTIFIC. LEGAL, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0102 UNCLAS
CRITICAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS ON BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS ON AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.
2. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE STRONGEST EFFORTS BY U.S. DELEGATION TO
ATTAIN APPROVAL OF THIS PREPARATORY PROGRAM. THE SCOPE AND
IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE ARE SO GREAT THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR
THE U.S. TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP ROLE. WE SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP
FULL INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON NECESSARY STEPS TO PREPARE FOR A
FORMAL TREATY NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE SIZE OF
THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM IS SO LARGE. IMPROPER OR ILL-ADVISED
UNCI ASSIFIED
MMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
ACTIONS COULD HAVE ENORMOUS UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT
THE INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN
CONSIDERING RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL 3 ANALYSIS WILL BE CRITICAL TO SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF ANY
GLOBAL CLIMATE CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION TO PROMPT
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0102 UNCLAS
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE ANALYSES. THE WORKSHOP. UNDER THE AUSPICES
OF THE RSWG. SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO HELP IDENTIFY THE ELEMENTS
THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE. AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING KEY DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC
POLICIES OF ALL COUNTRIES THAT MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY
COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS.
#0102
UNCLASSIFIED
Glchal cluate
DRAFT
Dich
fye
Winh
Policy Guidelines for RSWG October Workshop
on Implementation Measures
K
My
The primary objective of the RSWG workshop on
implementation measures schaduled for October 2-6 in Geneva
will be to produce a report covering the five topics on which
participants have been invited to submit papers. The U.S. has
interagency process. Although these papers will be important
submitted papers on all five topics after completing a lengthy
Indi
necessity reflect a number of viewpoints different from
inputs to the final report of the workshop, the report will of
own. Therefore, it is important that all members of the our
Plenours Next
delegation in the follow common policy guidelines as they participate U.S.
report is prepared.
workshop discussions and drafting sessions in which the
the desire of the President to lead the efforts of by
clear The U.S. delegation should be motivated fundamentally
the international community to protect and enhance the quality the
pc,
should emphasize positive objectives that can contribute
global environment. The guidance and conclusions document of
ultimately to the "decisive action to understand and
President and other leaders of the Paris Economic Summit.
protect the earth's ecological balance" called for by the
members of the delegation shall adhere:
The following are basic policy guldelines to which all
3.
*
?
Legal and Institutional Measures
(1) Framework Convention
-- The provisions suggested in the U.S. paper (attached)
should all be included.
-- The workshop report is to recommend a general framework
convention that includes immediate obligations for
prenature
response strategy.
but does not include obligations to take any specific
assessments of science, impacts, technology and economics
research, monitoring and data exchange, and for periodic
-- The framework convention should follow the general
Convention should take note of the elements of the Vienna
organization and scope of the 1985 Vienna Convention. The
depleting substances.
Convention and its protocols for controls on ozone
-- A task for the IPCC (RSWG) and, subsequently, of the
of Convention Parties is t:o compile and maintain an inventory
existing legal and institutional mechanisms for
-2-
reference in implementing future research, assessment and
response strategy obligations. These mechanisms are to be
used in tandem with new mechanisms established by the
Convention and any aubsequent amendments and protocols.
-- While measures for providing future amendment OE the
convention and for appending protocols, the initial
Convention should not include specific response
on them.
of a working group to evaluate response strategies based
strategies. The convention should include establishment
-- The Convention should include establishment of a working
group to evaluate mechanisms to provide financial and
Convention shall not include any mechanisms to provide
Convention (after the Convention enters into force). The
related assistance for consideration of the Parties of the
financial assistance in meeting obligations of the
Convention. Such mechanisms will be provided, as
appropriate, in subsequent protocols.
-- The Convention should provide for cooperation in the
change. In this area, the Convention should call for
management practices tc limit and adapt to climate
development, assistance and transfer of technology and
early establishment of a working group to provide
Convention. recommendations for consideration by the Parties to the
-- The Convention should provide a mechanism to inventory
current emissions of greenhouse gases and to forecast
purpose. establishment of a working group (or subgroup) for this
future emissions. The Convention should call for early
-- be Any general objectives set forth in the convention should
Limitation OE emissions levels or atmospheric
social and economic impacts of ruture Climate change.
stated in terms of minimizing adverse environmental,
se, concentrations but of greenhouse gases is not an objective per
objectives. Specific emission reduction targets or
is recognized a.8 a means of accomplishing the
timetables must be avoided in the Convention.
climate Additionally, an objective -- to stabilize or protect the
reasible ROE acceptable.
at current conditions, per se - is neither
-- The for institutional structure and procedures are
Formalizing the existing three-track IPCC
in the framework convention should have the provided effect of
natural resources impacts research and assessments;
Scientific monitoring and research; socioeconomic process: and
negotiations. response strategy identification, evaluation and (future)
-3-
-- There should be no specific provision of:
C
Emissions limitation reaponses such as taxes on CO2
or other greenhouse gas emissions, taxes placed on
specific fuel sources, or subsidies provided for use
of specific energy supply or demand technologies
0
Financial mechanisms such as an international climate
fund to assist developing countries to meet
convention or subsequent protocol obligations
0
A binding process to settle disputes among parties.
These matters may be referred to working groups of the
convention for further evaluation.
(2) Other Legal Measures
-- the report should refer to, [call for coordination with],
and encourage fuller use of, existing agreements, laws and
regulations. It should not propose a new "Law of the
Atmosphere" or other over-arching legal scheme similar to
the Law of the Sea.
-- The report may wish to address means of improving the
effectiveness and status of WMO, UNEP, and other
international organizations, It should not propose the
creation of new international institutions beyond the
Conference of the Parties or subgroups established under
the framework convention itself.
-- the U.S. delegation should consider the appropriate roles
of UNEP, WMO, IPCC, UN regional economic organizations, or
other UN organizations in support OE Convention Parties in
their implementing of the Convention, once it enters into
signature and entering into force.
force and for transitional activities between opening for
Technology Assistance, Development and Transfer
?
-- The conclusions in the report of the meeting should call
for increased cooperation in development and transfer of
Depense:
technology assistance, development and transfer can be
to climate change. Establishment of a working group on
technologies and management practices to limit and adapt
proposed as an essential subsidiary activity to support
the activities of the Parties to the Convention.
-- Intellectual property rights and other rights of firms and
individuals owning technology must be protected.
-4-
Maximum use of existing institutions and mechanisms,
governmental and nongovernmental, for technology transfer
should be encouraged.
Fher?
-- Recipient countries should provide favorable political.
legal and economic conditions for technology transfer.
Some national case studies to determine existing barriers,
does
needs, and opportunities for conditions to facilitate
technology transfer need to be conducted.
who
-- The capabilities of some technologies and management
practices to limit and adapt to climate change that may
also assist a nation in meeting other national and
international goals, and the consideration of such
lenes ?
collateral benefits, should be noted.
The need for coordinated activities in areas of education,
training and information transfer, especially associated
with the use of modernized technologies and practices in
developing and less industrialized countries should be
noted in the technology related conclusions of the report.
Financial Measures
-- The report should describe existing bilateral and
multilateral financial assistance mechanisms and call for
coordination with them, and encourage their fuller use.
-- A working group should be established to examine financial
mechanisms to provide assistance to LDCs to limit or adapt
to climate change. Among the options that might be
considered are creation of global climate funds or
imposition of mandatory fees or taxes to finance support
for developing countries. The report should not recommend
creation of such mechanisms at this time.
Belaysis
in
-- The report should stress the need to identify specific,
net
projects in individual countries before funding
working
commitments are made. Considerations for such projects
group?
etc. should include country needs, barriers and opportunities
-- Within existing assistance programs and development plans,
priority should be given to measures which are desirable
on both economic and environmental grounds.
-- Consideration of financial mechanisms must recognize both
and needs of recipient countries.
global climate change issues and overall national goals
-5-
Economic Measures
-- The report should stress the importance of market
mechanisms, including & price structure, in reference to
Word
top-down command and control regulations in reducing
better
greenhouse gas emissions. Use of market mechanisms needs
to consider the special circumstances of each Party in
choosing specific implementation steps. The report should
note the advantages of giving individual sources maximum
flexibility to find the most economically efficient
approach to reducing emissions.
Menting
-- A working group should be established under the convention
Eees, performance standards or other methods for
to address economic implementation measures such as taxes,
allownces
decision making.
reflecting environmental costs and benefits in economic
The economics section of report conclusions should
emphasize the need for, and the role of, information and
educational processes to increase effectiveness of
economic measures.
Education and Information Heasures:
-- The complementarity of education of the public and market
incentives or regulations should be stressed. Effoctive
assistance and transfer of technology and management
practices also depend on supporting education, training
and information processes.
5
-- The report should stress the need to present the science
of climate change and its impacts on natural resources and
which socioeconomic conditions in a balanced and objective way
uncertainties. reflects all of the areas of agreement and the
-- An is important element of education and information measures
implementation measures. The implementation of
their supporting and complementary role to other
technology, economic or financial assistance measures in
nany countries will require training and education.
Economics Measures in a Global Climate Change Policy - 7/21/89
Draft - Not for general circulation
Refer comments to Ken Richards, CEA, OEOB, Rm 330,
Office Phone 395-5104, Fax 456-2461
This paper does not necessarily represent the views of CEA
1. Summary: The market oriented framework is the most appropriate
way to view policies that attempt to alter producer and consumer
choices through 1) changing prices, 2) providing information and
3) regulatory action. Information can enhance the efficient use
of "consumer technologies", but it must work in conjunction with
the price structure. Regulatory action is appropriate when there
is a significant likelihood of market failure, particularly in the
case of socially counterproductive behavior by oligopolies, very
high risk investments, and basic research. In all cases regulation
and market intervention should stress the end results, not the
means, e.g. the total pollutant output rather than the particular
technology for pollution control.
2. In the relatively near future nations will have to decide how
to best confront the problems associated with potential global
climate change. One key challenge to those officials and decision
makers charged with developing national policy is to understand the
purpose and relative merits, weaknesses, and effectiveness of the
various policy options available. In this discussion we will
examine the role that economic policy measures can play in the
development of a larger climate change policy.
3. Although this discussion will concentrate on the microeconomic
aspects of policy development, there are two aspects of
macroeconomics that we could additionally consider. First, we
could consider the use macroeconomic measures, such as manipulation
of interest rates and inflation, to achieve desired changes in
consumption patterns. However, this is an indirect way of
addressing the problem and could have far reaching and
unanticipated effects on the economy. Second, it is often
suggested that development of climate change policy should
explicitly entail consideration of effects on economic growth and
GNP. However, it is likely that efficiency at the microeconomic
level will minimize negative effects on social welfare, and hence
on GNP to the extent that GNP represents social welfare.
Therefore, efficiency will be an important policy evaluation
criteria.
4. Section I will consider general principles of economic policy,
particularly the role of information and incentives. Section II
will consider the criteria that should be used to evaluate the
relative merits of policy options. Section III will then examine
the options that an individual nation faces as it develops economic
policy related to global climate change. While this section is
written from the perspective of an industrialized market economy,
1
many of the lessons could be applied to both developing and
decentralized economies. Section IV will conclude with a
discussion of how the lessons of the first three sections can be
generalized to development of international agreements and policy.
I. The Role of Information and Incentives in Economic Policy
Measures
5. Most environmental problems arise when decision makers, whether
they are consumers, farmers, government officials or any other
individual who makes decisions about how to use resources, face one
or both of two situations - inadequate information or improper
incentives.
6. Information: There are three types of information problems.
1) The information does not exist - for example, we
simply do not know or are very uncertain about the
magnitude of environmental impacts, we do not have
adequate technology to accomplish certain goals, we can
not predict the social impacts of certain actions;
2) The information is not disseminated - either the
public is not aware that its decisions have an impact on
the environment, or they do not know that there are
alternatives to their current actions;
3) The decision makers do not know how to use the
information - that is, they do not possess the technical
skills needed to implement desired changes.
7. The first of the information problems - that the information
does not exist - suggests that governments have a role in
uncovering new information, whether it relates to the science and
prediction of climate change, the development of new technologies,
or the measurement of likely impacts of shifts in precipitation
patterns.
8. While the first type of information problem relates to the
existence of adequate information, the second and third deal with
its dissemination. The specific policy measures related to
information dispersal will be discussed in the two companion papers
on Public Education and Technical Assistance that will be submitted
to the Response Strategies Working Group.
9. Incentives: Information alone is insufficient, however, to
assure that the public interest and welfare will be protected.
Many environmental problems arise when decision makers have
incentives that differ from those of the larger society. For
example, the prices we pay for electricity may not reflect
environmental costs, so we use more than we should. Or, farmers
may be wasteful with their water supply if they gain no personal
2
benefit from conservation because they are not allowed to sell
their surplus water rights. While it may be beneficial to the
global community to undertake reforestation projects, no individual
has a reason to bear that burden alone.
10. The important lesson here is that both information and
incentives are important in the development of policy, neither one
alone is sufficient. Where either is lacking, the government has
a responsibility to step in and correct the situation.
II. Developing Policy Options
11. The process of policy development can be separated into two
related parts. The first part asks if we should undertake a given
policy, such as decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases, and to
what extent. Answering this question may involve cost-benefit
studies, impact assessments and least cost analysis to examine the
potential for social welfare improvement. It is also true that
political benefits and costs may weigh in to override the results
of economic analysis.
12. The second part of the policy development is to determine how
best to proceed with the implementation of a given policy. Which
of the policy response options are the most promising? If the
decision to take policy action is based on socio-economic analysis,
then the determination of the best means to proceed may be inherent
in that study. However, if political considerations are an
important factor in the decision to take action (again, such as
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions), then it is the role of the
policy analyst to determine the most socially beneficial policy
options, given the political constraints.
13. In the next section we will examine some of the specific
economic policy options available to an individual nation. But
first, we will examine how a policy maker could judge the relative
merits of those options by proposing several evaluation criteria.
In cases where the impact of the option is very simple or there is
ample information available, this evaluation may be quite detailed
and quantitative. In other cases, where there is limited
information or the impacts are complex, these criteria may be used
as a preliminary screening process for eliminating clearly
undesirable options and identifying areas where further research
is required.
14. The proper execution of this evaluation will ultimately require
a great deal of economic analysis in order to quantify the effects
of each response option. This analysis will be useful in
addressing questions of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and
national security. Other criteria such as information needs,
acceptability to the public, ease of administration and legal and
institutional requirements will require mostly qualitative
evaluation. In all cases, it will be necessary to recognize that
3
tradeoffs must be made between the various criteria, and that the
weighing process is inevitably difficult.
15. The following evaluation criteria are suggested under the three
broad categories of "effectiveness", "social, environmental and
economic consequences" and "implementation":
Effectiveness
The option should have reasonable certainty of bringing about
the desired change.
Social, environmental and economic consequences
Because implementation of new policies will inevitably require
tradeoffs between societal goals, it is important to evaluate
policies for their negative impacts as well as for their
positive effects. The following criteria are useful in
examining these criteria.
Efficiency
Cost-effectiveness suggests that for a given level of
action (e.g., a set amount of emissions reduction), the
implementation mechanism (s) that imposes the least cost
or burden on society are generally preferred. Costs
include social, environmental and economic consequences.
Failure to choose the most cost effective alternatives
may cause unnecessary rises in prices and unemployment
and reductions in standard of living. However, the level
of action taken through a given implementation mechanism
must be carefully chosen so as to assure that benefits
exceed the social costs (but again, political
considerations may prevent this). An implication of this
is that scarce resources should be allocated to their
most socially valuable use.
Equity
Policies should reflect equity, both in procedure and in
outcome. Procedural equity requires that affected
parties be given standing in the decision process.
Outcome equity must consider redistribution of costs
along geographic, intergenerational and income class
categories. Two common concepts are horizontal and
vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires that people
in similar situations should be treated similarly.
Vertical equity suggests that people in disadvantaged
situations should be treated preferentially.
National Security
Policies that relate to global climate change may have
significant national security implications, particularly
if the policies effect modes of production. Any option
should be evaluated for its potential impact on the
security of individual nations, and how that will effect
4
their willingness to participate in cooperative efforts.
Implementation
Many policies that seem effective and efficient in theory are
simply not feasible because of noneconomic factors. The
following criteria can be used to evaluate a response option
or implementation mechanism for its potential for successful
implementation.
Acceptability to the public
In order to receive general public support a policy
should be understandable to the general public. This
implies that both the need for the policy and the manner
in which it achieves its goals should be readily
apparent.
Institutional and legal impediments
There may be significant legal and institutional
impediments associated with particular response options.
As such, many options will require changes in the legal
and institutional environment.
Ease of administration
As policies become more complicated, the cost of
administration generally goes up, even as the
effectiveness of that administration decreases. Policies
should be easily understood and realistic with respect
to implementation and monitoring requirements.
Information needs
Effective policies can not require unrealistic or
excessive amounts of information. They must also take
into account the high level of uncertainty involved in
global climate change and how this affects the decision
process.
III. Economic Measures in a National Climate Change Policy
16. Consider an individual nation that has decided, perhaps
unilaterally or in agreement with other nations, to implement a
national policy on climate change that includes emissions
reduction. The decision to take action has been settled - whether
because of compelling benefit-cost figures or due to political
imperative does not matter. Policy makers and analysts must now
ask how to best implement the policy. While the following
discussion is developed around the example of emissions reductions
the observations can be generalized to other areas of climate
change policy.
17. A nation generally has a choice between two general policy
approaches - direct control of production/consumption decisions,
or other more flexible programs.
5
18. There are many types of direct control. Substances may be
totally banned from use or permitted only under very narrowly
prescribed circumstances (e.g. CFC production and consumption).
Production processes may have limits on the amount of emissions
that are allowed (e.g. restrictions on the level of SOX per MBtu
in electricity generation), or restrictions on the type of
materials or energy that are used as input (e.g. requirements for
use of specific fuel types in the generation of electricity).
Consumption controls can be used to ration or disproportionately
increase the cost of certain types of activities that the
government wishes to limit (e.g. efficiency standards for
automobiles and appliances). Choices of technology can either be
prescribed directly through technology standards (e.g. scrubbers
for smokestacks) or indirectly through licensing requirements.
19. Each of these measures has the common feature of regulatory
intervention in the decision making process, prescribing and
limiting the activities themselves rather than their negative
effects on society. In terms of the evaluation criteria, they tend
to score very well with respect to effectiveness, implementation
and equity. They are weaker on the efficiency criteria. This is
inherent in their inflexibility; producers and consumers can not
shape their choices to reflect new technologies, local
circumstances, personal preferences or shifts in costs. For
example, if CO2 reductions are primarily regulated through energy
efficiency standards, there is little incentive to develop and
adopt CO2 capturing technologies.
20. The challenge, then, is to develop economic policies that
provide flexibility, so that the decision maker can pursue more
efficient outcomes, while at the same time retaining the positive
aspects of effectiveness, equity and feasibility of implementation.
The emphasis needs to be placed on holding the decision maker
responsible for the outcome of his actions, not the means by which
the end is achieved. For this we will look to more market-oriented
approaches.
21. As mentioned in the discussion of incentives, problems arise
when individual decision makers face different incentives than the
larger community - i.e. individual costs vary from social costs.
The purpose of market-oriented economic policy measures is 1) to
force decision makers to consider and respond to social costs (such
as environmental impacts) as if they were personal costs, and 2)
to provide those individuals the flexibility to decide how best to
respond to the costs. There are several mechanisms to do this.
22. Taxes and Fees - Excise taxes, pollution fees, and
environmental charges (which will be taken as virtually synonymous)
are perhaps the simplest way to inject social cost considerations
into private production and consumption decisions.
6
23. When the purpose of the fee is to send a price signal regarding
the social cost of the emissions, the tax level per unit of
pollution is set equal to some measure of the social cost of that
pollution. Alternatively, the primary purpose of the tax may be
to raise revenue. The two goals are not inconsistent, but the
emphasis of one or the other may effect the shape of the particular
environmental charge chosen. For example, if the primary purpose
of the tax is to decrease pollution, it is often politically more
palatable to link the revenues from these charges to dedicated
uses, such as subsidizing environmental cleanup. If the tax is
more of a revenue raising devise, the proceeds are less likely to
be encumbered. Experience has indicated that in general the tax
systems are more durable if they are designed to increase at small,
steady, predictable increments over time, so as to avoid undue
economic and social disruption.
24. The tax/fee approach has several advantages as well as
limitations. In general it is more efficient to raise revenues by
taxing activities that society wants to discourage, such as CO2 or
methane emissions, rather than those which are viewed positively,
such as labor or investment. Further, it assures that producers
of pollutants will decrease their emissions as long as the cost of
doing so is less than the level of the emission charge.
25. The problem with this tax is that if it is intended to send a
price signal to greenhouse gas emitters, it requires government to
determine the social cost of pollution emissions (or the benefit
of avoiding those emissions), a task that is currently impossible
in the case of CO2. Also, a simple tax has no explicit limit on
the level of emissions, only on the economic cost of each unit of
emissions reductions. If the tax is set too low it may be
ineffective at reducing emissions levels.
26. An additional problem is one that is common to any pollution
control system, that of monitoring. How does a government assess
a tax on nonpoint sources of emissions such as methane from rice
patties, or nitrogen compounds from fertilizer use? The problem
is somewhat better for point source pollution, but there are many
countries where even these would require more record keeping than
is feasible.
27. There has been some practical application of environmental
charges. For example, Sweden has a gasoline tax that increases
with the lead and sulfur concentration of the gasoline. The United
States has a system of taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks,
the revenues of which are used to finance hazardous waste cleanup
under Superfund. The Netherlands has had a system of wastewater
effluent charges in place since 1969 which appears to have made
significant difference in the levels of BOD and heavy metals.
28. Marketable Permits - Marketable permits can be used to put a
cap on total emissions, while still maintaining the flexibility
7
that allows decision makers to respond to their particular
situations. Under this system policy makers are not required to
assess the social cost of each unit of emissions, but rather to
determine the overall level of greenhouse gases emissions that is
acceptable. (It could be argued, however, that this is the same as
implicitly determining the social value of avoiding the emissions.)
The government then issues a limited number of emissions permits
each year (or other arbitrary time period), that entitles the
holder to a certain amount of greenhouse gas emissions for each
permit owned. The permits may be bought and sold just like any
other private resource. They represent a tradeable commodity - the
right to emit a set amount of pollutant. If the markets for
emissions rights function well, the permits will eventually find
their way to the highest value use. This is a economically
efficient outcome.
29. The government has various options regarding the initial
distribution of the permits. They may be distributed on the basis
of some prior claim, such as grandfathering emitters to some
proportion of their former level. Alternatively, the permits may
be dispersed through an auction which distributes the permits to
the highest bidders. The former approach, distributing permits on
the basis of historical use levels, may present the potential for
large windfall profits to those who can decrease their emissions
at relatively low costs. This is not unlike rewarding those who
have historically been the most careless polluters. On the other
hand, the latter approach may appear to be an unfair seizure of
assumed rights to pollute - forcing emitters to pay for what they
have previously enjoyed free of charge.
30. In contrast to the tax system, the drawback of this approach
is that it is difficult to predict beforehand what the ultimate
market price will be. This could lead to inordinately high costs
of pollution abatement, higher than the value of the social
benefits. It also makes it very difficult for businesses to plan
production costs. However, the same is generally true of emissions
standards that can be varied over time. Also, in marketable permit
programs where extra regulations make trading difficult, or where
the future of the program is uncertain, or where there are very few
participants in the program, the effectiveness of the system is
likely to be severely limited.
31. One example of a successful marketable permit program is the
case of lead trading in the United States from 1982 to 1987. This
program allowed gasoline refiners greater flexibility during a
period when the amount of lead in gasoline was being significantly
reduced. There was a great deal of trading activity -
approximately 15% of the total lead rights used were banked.
32. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has implemented the
CFC phasedown requirements of the Montreal protocol by allocating
production and consumption limits to producing and importing firms
based on their 1986 levels and then allowing the firms to use or
8
transfer these rights among themselves.
33. Subsidies - Subsidies can be used to encourage actions that the
government sees as beneficial. Subsidies have commonly been used
to encourage purchase of energy efficient equipment and
installation of alternative energy equipment. They are designed
to make the preferred alternatives more cost competitive with the
status quo. There are two problems with this approach. Subsidies
can be prohibitively expensive, potentially draining large sums
from the government coffers. More importantly, subsidies
inadequately deal with the real problem. For example, a tax on
energy consumption or on the carbon content of fossil fuels
encourages decision makers to switch to alternative fuels and to
decrease the use of fuel in general. A subsidy on renewable
energy, on the other hand, encourages switching to alternative
fuels, but encourages a general increase in energy consumption.
The net effect may be either a rise or fall in CO2 emissions.
34. As mentioned above, the national climate change policy should
be aimed at the end product of an activity not at the means of
reaching that end. So, in the case of subsidies, where possible
the government should aim not at specific technologies, but at the
effect or outcome of using those technologies. It should subsidize
the removal of carbon from the atmosphere, not the use of energy
efficient equipment. It should tax the release or production of
CFCs, not subsidize the purchase of alternative refrigeration
equipment.
35. In the development of a national policy, there is a reverse
side to the use of subsidies to encourage socially beneficial
activities. That is the removal of subsidies that are counter to
the welfare of the community. Many countries provide tax
incentives for oil production, energy use, or other activities that
have socially harmful externalities. These subsidies send exactly
the wrong price signal to consumers and producers.
36. Offsets - An offset system allows polluters to balance their
emissions by proving that they have removed equal amounts of the
substance elsewhere. A good example of this is the electric
company that pays to have land areas planted in trees that will
sequester CO2 at a rate equal to the projected emissions of the
generation plant. Similarly, companies could scrub CO2 out of their
flue gases. Such a program would assure that for all new sources
of CO2, an equal amount of CO2 is sequestered.
37. Deposit/Refund - This system can be thought of as a hybrid of
either the tax and subsidy mechanism, or the marketable permits and
offsets systems. It addresses some of the problems inherent in the
tax scheme - that of determining the social costs of pollution and
the potential for little or no pollution reduction - but still
avoids the danger of the permit system, i.e. the unpredictability
of the final cost of pollution abatement.
9
38. The program is based on several premises. First, the individual
consumers and producers should be forced to cover the social cost
of their choices - the polluter pays principle. Second, taxes and
subsidies should be aimed directly at the problem, in this case
greenhouse gases that will be emitted to the atmosphere. Third,
amounts of CO2, methane, and CFCs can be expressed in terms of
their relative contribution to global warming. We will posit a
hypothetical unit of gas called a greenhouse gas equivalent (GHGE)
which is the amount of each gas that causes a set amount of
warming. Fourth, withdrawing or sequestering GHGs from the
environment has the same social value as avoiding the emission in
the first place.
39. The components of the program are as follows.
i. Producers of carbon based fuel must pay a carbon tax
proportional to the carbon content of the fuel, regardless of
the energy content of the fuel. This could be paid at the
wellhead or mine and will involve a relatively few number of
producers. (If there is concern that the price signal would
be completely damped before reaching the consumer, the tax
could be placed on the end use product.) Taxes would be
applied to the harvest of wood products for fuel or shortlived
consumer products. Importers of fossil fuels will be charged
a similar fee. Producers of CFCs and methane would be charged
the same fee on the basis of GHGEs.
ii. Payments will be provided to those who can show that they have
effectively decreased atmospheric carbon through:
a.
Planting of trees for sequestering carbon;
b. Removing fossil fuels from the energy production process
(such as use of petroleum products for feed stock rather
than energy) ;
C. Scrubbing carbon from flue gases;
d.
Captured, CFCs, methane, or other GHGs that have been
taxed.
e. Other verifiable means.
iii. The charge for the production of a GHGE is set equal to the
fee paid for sequestering or capturing a GHGE, which in turn
is set equal to the government's least cost method for
removing a GHGE from the atmosphere (probably reforestation
of government owned land).
40. This system has several important features.
10
i. The energy and chemical producers will likely pass some
portion of the cost of the GHG tax on to the consumers who
will respond to this new higher price by decreasing
consumption, increasing efficiency, and substituting
alternatives.
ii. It minimizes the cost of collecting taxes by assessing GHG
production at the earliest possible point. This is much
simpler than assessing every electricity producer, gasoline
station, heating oil distributor and appliance manufacturer,
etc. The monitoring costs will be minimized.
iii. The programs requires a new mechanism for making payment
(essentially subsidies) to those with claims for GHG
sequestering. Perhaps existing forestry and industrial
monitoring systems can be adapted to this purpose.
iv. It encourages private entrepreneurs to seek least cost methods
to sequester GHGs. At the same time it encourages development
of alternative energy and energy efficiency technologies,
substitutes for CFCs and natural gas production systems that
reduce fugitive methane.
v.
By setting the GHGE tax equal to the government's cost of
sequestering a GHGE, it avoids the problem of having to define
the social costs of GHG emissions. It also allows the
government to control the level of total net emissions. If
the gap between GHG emissions and private GHG sequestering is
larger than the government wishes, it can use a portion of the
taxes to undertake public programs of GHG removal.
41. In terms of the evaluation criteria, this program would likely
be effective and efficient as well as relatively easy to administer
(when compared to current control technologies). There are,
however, some potential drawbacks to such a system. First, it
would be necessary to account for the energy content of exports and
imports. This would likely require a relatively complex system
akin to the current EEC value added tax (VAT) system of accounts.
42. Second, it is not clear that a program such as this would be
highly acceptable to the public. It would entail dramatic changes
in energy prices. Also, the subsidies or payments are aimed at
relatively untraditional activities (tree planting and flue gas
scrubbing) rather than to more traditional endeavors such as energy
efficiency investments. For such a program to be implemented, it
would have to be presented carefully, in terms which the general
population can understand and accept.
43. Perhaps most importantly, as mentioned earlier, there are
serious equity considerations involved in any program of this
magnitude. First, there is the question of allocation of pollution
11
rights. If the GHG production rights are distributed as permits
on the basis of who had already been producing GHGs, the recipients
would stand to gain an enormous windfall. On the other hand, the
imposition of a new tax or fee could be viewed as an unfair removal
of previously established rights. However, this differs little
from the imposition of new emissions standards - both cases involve
unexpected new costs.
44. Another equity concern arises with respect to low income
individuals. If these people tend to spend relatively more of
their disposable income on energy needs, then they could be
disproportionately effected by the carbon component of the new tax.
The only simple solution to this is to use some portion of the
revenues of the GHG tax to redistribute wealth to the poor through
any number of government assistance programs.
IV. International Applications
45. Many of the observations and lessons regarding the development
of national policy within the boundaries of a sovereign country
apply equally to the development of international agreements. In
this section we will first consider the role and importance of
international cooperation and then turn to the role that market
mechanisms could play in promoting that cooperation.
46. One of the roles of a national government is to enforce
compliance with rules that are established for the general good of
the citizens. Even individuals who agree that the rules are
beneficial and needed might not observe them if they felt that
enforcement was inadequate and that others were not cooperating.
47. Similarly, a nation may feel that reducing greenhouse gases is
an urgent priority, but be unwilling to take unilateral action for
one or both of two reasons. First, because limiting emissions could
put the country at a trade disadvantage. The opportunity to emit
GHGs is a resource, similar to energy, labor and capital resources
- it is an environmental resource. And like the other resources
it is used in the production of goods and services, some of which
are traded internationally. If the country decides to give up some
of its energy or capital resources, the remaining capital and
energy would become more expensive and the country would find
itself at a disadvantage in the world trade market. The same is
true of GHG emissions; a decision to limit the use of this resource
would require substitution from other resources, and would have a
negative impact on trade. At the same time it is important to note
that there may be limits to the size of the GHG sink. The ability
of the biogeosphere to absorb carbon dioxide and related GHGs may
be a limited resource.
48. Second, it likely that anything less than a cooperative global
effort to reduce GHGs will be ineffective. The dynamics of the
12
distribution of GHG emissions is such that in the next few decades
any real reductions in GHGs will require that all types of nations
reduce their emissions, developing and industrial countries alike.
49. Therefore, if a sufficient number of countries have decided
that there exists sufficient evidence regarding the benefits of
reducing greenhouse gases, it is likely that they will attempt to
act in consort, coordinating their efforts and sharing the burden.
50. The Montreal Protocol serves as an example of such a
cooperative action. The threat to the ozone layer was sufficiently
clear that several countries jointly committed to reductions in the
production and consumption of CFCs and other potential ozone
depleting substances. This was accomplished through negotiations
to determine the required reductions that each country would
accept. Individual country circumstances were considered.
Developing countries were allowed a longer grace period before
reductions were required. Countries with plants already under
construction were also given special consideration. At the end of
all of this, the outcome was that each country had an allowable
production and consumption level which to be met.
51. A similar arrangement may be made with respect to emissions of
greenhouse gases. And it is in this respect that observations from
the discussion of domestic policy development become valuable.
First, in development of domestic policy we observed that it is
preferable to allow individual decision makers the freedom to find
the most efficient means to achieve the stated goals, given the
regulatory or market constraints. Similarly, an international
agreement should allow individual countries to choose how best to
pursue stated goals.
52. Accordingly, a protocol on GHG reductions should not prescribe
that coal burning be reduced, that alternative energy sources be
adopted or that energy efficiency standards be observed. Rather,
each country should be allocated a set amount of the fixed
resource, in this case the emission of GHGs. This may be assigned
on the basis of some notion of fairness - per capita, historical
contribution to the problem, potential for benefiting from
cooperation - or according to political might, bargaining power or
strategic position. Regardless of the process, the outcome is that
each country would have a target level or quota of emissions and
the freedom to choose the most appropriate path to reach that
level.
53. Second, an important element of increasing the efficiency of
environmental protection methods was to provide for markets in
tradeable emissions permits. This assured that the "right to
pollute" would go to the highest value user. In the same way, the
signatories to an emissions protocol should have the opportunity
to trade portions of their permissible levels if they do not use
all of their quotas. For example, if one country is easily staying
13
within the limits of its allocation of GHG emissions, it may choose
to sell some its allocation to a country that is finding the quota
to be a serious constraint on production and consumption.
Implicitly, the property rights to this resource initially rest
with the governments of the individual nations. They may choose
to sell off some of those rights to governments or firms from other
countries, or they may distribute those rights with in the country
and allow the private sector to trade intra- and inter-nationally.
54. Such a provision is likely to benefit the developing countries.
In the case of the Montreal Protocol the LDCs were allowed targets
that were above their actual consumption levels. A similar
arrangement in a GHG protocol that has provisions for trading
emissions allowances, would place the LDCs in a position to bargain
for the technology and economic resources needed to adapt to the
changing climate and energy resource restrictions. They will have
the means and incentives to develop more energy efficient
technologies. Countries will need to recognize this as they
negotiate individual country allocations. Such an arrangement
would certainly raise the stakes of the protocol negotiations, but
it would ultimately lead to a more efficient, equitable outcome.
14
THE WHITE HOUSE
Will
WASHINGTON
in
June 13, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
geobe line
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
THE ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY
THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC
AND ECONOMIC POLICY
FROM:
DAVID BATES,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY TO
THE CABINET
SUBJECT:
Options paper for the International
Conference on the Environment
Attached is a paper discussing various options for an
international conference on the environment that the
President could announce this year.
This paper will be discussed at a meeting on Thursday,
June 15, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. The
Chief of Staff will chair the meeting.
Thank you for keeping this paper closely held.
June 13, 1989
ISSUE:
A decision is needed on the structure, agenda, and timing
of an international conference on global environmental
issues to fulfill the President's campaign pledge.
BACKGROUND:
The President's campaign pledge:
"The problem is international in scope;
unilateral action on the part of the United States
alone will not solve it...
"In my first year in office, I will convene a
global conference on the environment at the White
House. It will include the Soviets, the Chinese, the
developing world as well as the developed. All
nations will be welcome -- and indeed, all nations
will be needed
"The agenda will be clear. We will talk about
global warming. We will talk about acid rain. We
will talk about saving our oceans, and preventing the
loss of tropical forests. And we will act."
In the year ahead, as many as 15 international meetings
will be held to address international environmental
issues, particularly global warming. A partial sampling
of other international meetings on environmental issues
includes:
9/89: Tokyo Summit on global Environment
11/89: Hague Ministerial on Global Environment
4/90: London Meeting of CFC Protocol Parties
11/90: World Meteorological Organization Second
World Climate Conference
Moreover, under the auspices of the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP), the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created to provide an
international forum for discussion of global warming
issues. The U.S. was an aggressive partner in shaping the
IPCC and succeeded in winning the chair of a crucial
working group, the Response Strategies Working Group
(RSWG) that will consider mitigating strategies for global
warming. The U.S. convened and chaired the first meeting
of RSWG in January, 1989.
2
At the most recent meeting of the RSWG Steering Group,
May, 1989, the U.S. delegation issued an invitation to the
participating countries to attend a "workshop" in the U.S.
in the fall of 1989 to discuss a framework convention on
climate change. The workshop will be a lower-level
working meeting that would probably not be appropriate for
Presidential participation. Moreover, many in the
environmental community believe that the President is
planning a conference in addition to the workshop to
fulfill the campaign pledge.
The emphasis of most meetings is the science of global
climate change, "legal mechanisms" for encouraging or
requiring responses, or environmental effects and response
strategies of potential warming.
The challenge is to convene a conference to explore
substantive new information, to promote U.S. policy goals
and to avoid "reinventing the wheel.
OPTIONS:
Four options have been identified:
OPTION 1: GLOBAL OPTION
A. GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE COST OF RESPONSE; THE COST
OF INACTION
The United States would hold the first international
conference on the economic and social costs and
benefits of global climate change. The conference
would address the costs of both mitigation and
adaptation measures. This option would allow the
President to develop internationally the theme that
it is possible to have both economic growth and
environmental protection.
All nations would be invited to the conference. The
President would host the conference and would address
the opening or plenary session.
PRO
- Fulfills the President's campaign pledge in a
unique way that does not merely echo other
international discussions.
- Focuses much needed attention on the
significant social and economic impacts of the
global warming issue (including the effect on
3
U.S. competitiveness). Even though there are
large uncertainties in the range of economic
costs and social impacts, an early international
forum on the topic would greatly contribute to
more responsible debate on the issue.
- Builds upon the current U.S. role as Chair of
the IPCC Working Group on Response
Strategies, since the responsibility for
developing response strategies must include a
consideration of economic and social costs.
CON
- Because of the large scientific uncertainties,
it is extremely difficult to estimate the costs
that may result from global warming or the cost
of response strategies.
- A conference focused on social and economic
issues may be perceived as self-serving of U.S.
economic interests, and may not advance the
President's intent to assert a leadership role
for the U.S. in. global environmental issues.
- A conference emphasizing economics may be
perceived as a delaying tactic to divert
attention from the scientific assessments and to
delay response actions.
B. PLENARY SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
Under this option, the U.S. would simply utilize the
structure of the IPCC already in place to host a
conference on climate change. The U.S. would
propose, at the June, 1989, IPCC Bureau meeting, to
host the scheduled plenary session for January, 1990
in the United States. It should be noted that the
U.S. is committed to hosting a RSWG workshop on a
framework convention in the fall of 1989; the State
Department believes the IPCC will not agree to do
both the workshop and the plenary in the United
States. It would be possible to allow the workshop
to take place elsewhere and commit to the IPCC
plenary for January. The President would address the
opening session. Attendance would be at least the 35
IPCC member nations.
4
PRO
- avoids duplicating a forum and process already
in existence to which the U.S. is committed.
- reaffirms the U.S. commitment to orderly
development of global climate policy.
- fulfills campaign pledge.
- reaffirms U.S. leadership role in IPCC.
CON
- utilizing a conference that would take place
with or without the U.S. could be seen as
an insincere attempt to gloss over campaign
pledge.
- The IPCC is not controlled by the U.S.; it is
a U.N. forum subject to East-West and North-
South tensions.
- IPCC may not agree to allow U.S. to host the
meeting.
- The conference would be difficult to announce
within the intended time-frame because our
invitation must be negotiated and agreed to in
the IPCC Bureau meeting.
- This option would require making a choice
between the workshop on the framework convention
which we have already announced our intention
to host and the IPCC plenary. The State
Department believes there is some flexibility to
move the workshop to another country, despite
our initial invitation.
OPTION 2: REGIONAL OPTION
NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE
Under this option, the U.S. would invite Canada and
Mexico to join in a discussion of international
environmental issues that are of immediate mutual
concern to North America. It would be possible to
include issues in addition to global warming, such
as air pollution, protection of international water
bodies, pollution prevention and waste minimization,
5
debt exchange for environmental protection and ozone
layer depletion.
PROS
- This conference would provide an opportunity
to develop North American unity/goals/agenda for
environmental efforts, with the U.S. as a
catalyst.
- Relations with Mexico and Canada are
particularly important and environmental
relations have been for the most part positive.
- Does not conflict with the many other
international conferences due to limited scope.
- Logistically possible to implement this year.
CONS
- Does not fulfill President's campaign
pledge to host a global conference that would
include the Soviets, the Chinese, the
developing world
- Canada is likely to pursue commitments on
acid rain issues before they are sorted out
domestically.
- Mexico is likely to pursue financial
assistance for environmental programs in excess
of U.S. fiscal ability to assist.
- Both Canada and Mexico's separate agenda may
place the United States in a negative
posture at its own conference.
- Environmental groups have stated in response
to this option that it is not sufficiently broad
in scope.
OPTION 3: PROBLEM-SPECIFIC OPTION
CONFERENCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
REFORESTATION/DEFORESTATION/AGRICULTURE
Forests and agriculture represent a major "sink" for
CO2 emissions which otherwise would reach the upper
atmosphere and contribute to the greenhouse effect.
6
Reforestation appears to be a very promising strategy
for reducing emissions at a comparatively low cost
with other control technologies. There are other
benefits as well: timber and biomass energy
production, improved water quality, reduced soil
erosion and wildlife habitat creation. The
conference would be a much-needed forum for the
discussion of plant resiliency so that areas are
better able to adapt and respond to climate change.
The conference could follow a U.S. announcement of
"no net loss of forests" as a policy goal similar to
the "no net loss of wetlands" policy goal. The
Response Strategies Working Group, chaired by the
United States under the IPCC, plans to address the
forestry issue in three technical working-level
workshops. Hosting a ministerial-level conference on
this issue would elevate the importance and potential
of forestry/agriculture in mitigating global warming.
PROS
- Forestation /agriculture has received little a
formal attention in the climate change debate.
Such a conference could significantly alter the
terms of debate and would reflect very favorably
on the United States.
- The forestation theme could provide positive,
action-oriented outcomes and would be
controllable by the United States.
- Forestation does not cause fear of undue
economic costs for emission controls.
- The issue provides a link for programs between
private and public sectors.
CONS
- Developing countries, particularly Brazil, may
view the issue as a means of preventing
development. Developing countries would need to
be carefully consulted.
- Current U.S. forest policies may not be
consistent with the "no net loss" goal or with
concern about climate change.
7
DISCUSSION:
There is some support for Option 2 (North American
Conference) on its merits, yet it falls short of the
campaign pledge to host a global conference.
Although Option 1 (Economics of Climate Change) is sound
from a public policy viewpoint and would yield the most
needed information heretofore ignored, it is possible it
would be criticized by environmentalists for focusing only
on climate change's effect on the economy. This option is
consistent with the President's over-arching theme:
economic growth and sound ecology can coexist.
Option 1A (Plenary Session of the IPCC) is an otherwise
good option, except for the complication of the workshop
on a framework convention which we previously committed to
host. According to the State Department, the communique
resulting from the May, 1989 RSWG meeting does not specify
the U.S. as the host for the workshop, although there is
an informal agreement that the U.S. would do so. It is
possible to move the workshop to Geneva in favor of
hosting the IPCC plenary. This option avoids any
duplication of other efforts and would be simple to
implement. Choosing this option would require a decision
not to host the workshop on the framework convention.
Option 3 (Forestation and Climate Change) is very
attractive because it places the U.S. in a favorable
position of strength, would address a potential solution
to global warming, as opposed to merely warning about its
effects, and does not require nations to commit to
expensive control technologies. However, it could cause
concern in the U.S. timber industry and create friction
with several developing country governments. The
Department of Agriculture strongly supports this option
and believes U.S. research and policy is consistent with
this approach. The President has also stated that he
wants to implement an aggressive tree-planting program to
mitigate global-warming.
DECISION:
Option 1 A
B
Option 2
Option 3
and
THE WHITE HOUSE
Bob Bob Hown Hahn
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
THE ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY
THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC
AND ECONOMIC POLICY
FROM:
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT 10002 AND SECRETARY TO
DAVID Q. BATES
THE CABINET
SUBJECT:
Meeting on the International Conference on
the Environment
Attached are two papers prepared by EPA and the Department
of State at the Chief of Staff's request at the June 15,
1989 meeting on the International Conference on the
Environment. The first paper (Attachment 1), prepared by
EPA, discusses the general status of scientific consensus
and budgetary issues on global climate change. The second
paper (Attachment 2), prepared by the Department of State,
discusses the status of scientific consensus and inquiry
in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
These papers, as well as the original options paper on a
possible international conference, will be discussed at a
meeting on Friday, June 23, 1989, at 4:15 p.m. in the
Roosevelt Room. The Chief of Staff will chair the
meeting.
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SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
Past research has provided an understanding of many important
aspects of the greenhouse effect, the warming of the atmosphere
through the absorption of radiation by gases such as carbon
dioxide. This paper summarizes current knowledge and uncertainties
ranging from unequivocal increases in the abundance of these gases
in the atmosphere to the uncertain ability to predict consequences
for specific regions.
HUMAN INDUCED CHANGES IN THE ATMOSPHERE
Given current trends in emissions, an equivalent doubling
of carbon dioxide and other gases compared to pre-
industrial levels, is virtually certain and may occur as
early as the 2030's.
Emissions of carbon dioxide are increasing largely due
to fossil fuel combustion and to a much lesser extent
because of deforestation. Future atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 will depend strongly on economic,
technical and policy developments and on the net uptake
by vegetation and the oceans, the effects of which is
somewhat uncertain.
The existence and increases of other greenhouse gases are
well known.
Methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's), ozone (low level)
and nitrous oxide are also increasing in the atmosphere.
The increases are documented by current monitoring
stations, but the reasons for some of the increases are
only partially clear. For example, the specific
emissions of methane from rice fields, gas pipelines,
cattle, coal mines, and wetlands can only be estimated
at this time. While future concentrations are difficult
to predict, it is clear that they will add to the
greenhouse effect produced by CO2.
Confidence is high in the understanding of the basic
radiation physics of trace gases.
By virtue of evidence from palioclimatic records and
probes to other planets, there is solid agreement that
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the addition of greenhouse gases will increase the
thermal forcing of the climate system and that global
temperatures will increase.
Predicting the response of the entire climate system is
much more difficult because the role of clouds and the
oceans is less certain.
Based on complex simulation models, the National
Academy of Sciences has estimated that it is likely the
average global temperature increase could range from 1.5
to 4.5 degrees Celsius. The academy has also indicated
that temperature increases near the poles would be higher
(very probably), that precipitation would increase
globally (very probably), that mid-continental dryness
would increase (likely in the long term) and that
increases in sea level are probable. Some scientists
caution that we do not yet have enough knowledge about
many processes and others indicate that the earth's
system could produce 'surprises e.g., changes in ocean
currents that could radically alter the climate response.
Current models do not have the ability to predict the
climate of a particular region or year. Other relevant
variables, such as rainfall and winds are difficult to
estimate.
There is a wide spectrum of opinion (and no consensus)
on whether a greenhouse "signal" has already been seen.
The surface air and sea temperature records indicate that
there has been an increase of between 0.5 and 0.7 degree
Celsius over the last century. The pattern of the
increase, that was interrupted by a cooling between the
1940's and the 1960's, suggests that natural variations
play an important role. In addition, the reliability of
the records has been questioned. Thus for several
reasons there are differences of opinion among scientists
as to whether warming has actually begun.
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The environmental effects of a relatively rapid warming
over the next century are difficult to predict. It is
likely that many natural systems (forests/wetlands) would
not be able to adapt, while impacts on other systems
(agriculture) could be managed, but would be expensive
even in the U.S.
Sensitivity studies of many systems including water
resources, forests, wetlands, agriculture, cities,
electricity demand and human health suggest that climate
change would significantly alter the lives of many
Americans. Changes in the landscape of North America,
06/21/89 12:33
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EPA ADMINISTRTR
005
due to similar temperature increases since the last ice
age, confirm these findings. The impacts of these
changes will vary between regions, with the timing of
change, and with changes in the frequency of extreme
unlikely to have sufficient resources to adapt.
countries could be even more significant, since they are
events. The impacts of these changes on developing
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DRAM
FEDERAL RESEARCH EXPENDITURES IN GLOBAL CHANGE
A Federal Global Change Research Program has been developed by
the Committee on Earth Sciences (CES) of the Federal Coordinating
Council on Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCESET), in the
President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). EPA
was a founding member in March, 1987. The first government-wide
budget crosscut was undertaken for FY-1988 in close collaboration
with OMB. This exercise was undertaken to determine the
feasibility of such an exercise, and to establish agreed upon
budget categories. Seven research foci were developed based on
the work of the Committee on Global Change (CGC) of the National
Academy of Sciences.
CES, at the request of OMB, established two major categories of
research: focussed and supporting. Focussed research was
research conceived, funded, and undertaken to address the problem
of global change. Supporting research was work that was or would
be undertaken in any case, but would provide essential support to
the global change effort. Table 1 indicates the FY-89 and FY 90
budget breakdowns, for the focused budget. The supporting budget
was not published, but the ratio of supporting to focussed was
about 10 to 1.
A similar exercise is being undertaken for FY-91. Whereas for
FY-89 and 90, OMB simply accepted the figures submitted by the
agencies, it has indicated that it intends to use the recently
drafted Global Change Federal Research Plan to prioritize
research and allocate investments. As a result, several problems
have arisen.
1. CES maintains that only the causes and some effects of
global change are to be considered. EPA staff in ORD and OPPE
holds that mitigation and response research must be included, as
scenarios of change will be dependent on evolving technologies
and social decisions, and that response strategies are critical
research issues. Although a separate Committee under OSTP may be
established to address mitigation and response concerns, this
issue is currently unresolved. Inasmuch as OMB has indicated that
the Research Plan represents ALL federal investment in global
change, this issue is of critical importance to EPA.
2. Whereas EPA's work in this area is broadly supported by
the Agency, and it's budgets are reasonably accurate
representations of planned activities, this may not be the case
for other agencies and departments as they pre-submit their
budgets for FY-91. They are using their budget number
presubmissions as a political tool to garner support in OMB and
elsewhere, to use in influencing their own organizations.
Numbers from certain agencies, therefore, may be quite
speculative.
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3. DOI has only just begun to formulate its program in this
area, and USDA has just begun to reevaluate its program. We are
not aware of any specific global change research in DOI; rather,
from their submissions to date, it appears that they will simply
pick and choose work they would be doing anyway and call it
global change research. Similar exercises are going on in other
agencies as well.
06/21/89
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008
FY 1990 U.S. Global Change Research
Program Budget
Biogeochemical Dynamics: These programs concentrate
Human Interactions: These programs study the interface
on the study of the biogrochemical constituents (e.g., oxy-
between natural processes and human activities. Roughly
sen. carbon. nitrogen, etc.) within the earth system and
two-thirds are policy studies and not earth science research.
their influence on the life-sustaining envelope of the earth.
However, these studies benefit greatly from close associa-
including global warming. The FY 1990 budger proposes
tion with the research activities. The FY 1990 budget
$44.9 million for this element. a 51 percent increase over
proposes $22.0 million for this element.
the FY 1989 level
Earth System History: This element is crucial to docu-
Ecological Systems and Dynamics: These programs
menting past natural changes. Climate information from
focus on how ecological systems both impact and respond
the past will be very important in distinguishing the relative
to a wide range of global changes. The FY 1990 budget
roles of natural phenomena and human activity in global
proposes $39.5 million for this element. a 41 percent
change. The FY 1990 budget proposes $7.0 million for this
increase over the FY 1989 level.
element, roughly doubling the FY 1989 level.
Solid Earth Processes: Interactions between the earth's
Climate and Hydrological System: This research exam-
surface and the aunosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, and
ines the physical processes that govern the climate and
biosphere are the key elements of this program. The FY
hydrologic system, including the atmosphere. hydrosphere,
1990 budget proposes $10.5 million for this element, an 18
cryosphere, land surfaces. and biosphere. These efforts are
percent increase over the FY 1989 level.
clearly central to the description, understanding. and pre-
diction of global change. The FY 1990 budget proposes
Solar Influences: These programs are designed to study
$59.3 million for this element, a 56 percent increase over
the impact of solar variability on the atmosphere and
climate. The FY 1990 budget proposes $7.3 million for
the FY 1989 level.
this element, a 78 percent increase over the FY 1989 level.
Table 1
1989-1990 U.S. Global Change Research Program Budget
(Dollars in Millions)
Biogeochemical
Ecological Systems
Climse and
Human
Earth System
Solid Earth
Solar
Pocused Program
Total Budget
Dynamics
and Dynamics
Hydrologic System
Interactions
History
Processes
Influences
1989
1990
1989 1990
1989
1990
1989
1990
1989 1990
1989
1990
1989
1990
1989 1990
Agency Totals
133.9
190.5
29.8
449
28.1
39.5
38.0
593
220
220
3.0
7.0
19
10.5
4.1
73
NSF
39.2
53.5
135
183
19
1.9
13.2
17.0
0.0
0.0
20
4.7
6.2
6.5
24
5.1
DOE
20.2
272
6.0
5.5
42
6.7
7.0
10.2
20
3.6
0.0
C.O
0.0
0.0
1.0
12
DOL/USGS
13
103
0.0
0.0
0.0
03
23
5.0
15
2.0
1.0
23
0.5
0.7
0.0
0.0
NASA
145
21.5
3.0
4,4
4.3
6.4
4.3
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
22
33
0.7
1.0
DOC/NOAA
9.0
20.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
9.0
17.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
EPA
27.4
35.3
0.3
35
7.4
13.2
0.7
22
18.5 16.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
USDA
183
227
65
10.2
103
11.0
15
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
SOURCE:
Our Changing Planet:
A Report by the Committee on Earth Sciences
A U.S. Strategy for Global Change Research
To Accompany the
A Perspective on the Science of
Global Climate Change
Introduction
Past and present research provide an incomplete
understanding of the greenhouse effect, i.e. the warming of
the Earth's atmosphere through absorption of longwave
radiation by certain gases like carbon dioxide. Some aspects
of the issue are clear; others are poorly understood.
Basic Mechanism and Emissions Trends
The basic mechanism of greenhouse warming has been well
understood since the end of the 19th century. Trace
quantities of greenhouse gases -- water vapor, CO2, methane,
N₂O, chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) and others -- absorb
infrared radiation from the earth's surface in the troposphere
and warm the earth. If this greenhouse effect did not take
place, the earth's surface would be approximately 60 degrees
Fahrenheit cooler and life as we know it could not exist.
The increasing accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere resulting from fossil fuel combustion and other
human activities has also been well documented. Measurements
at the Muana Loa Observatory in Hawaii and analysis of ice
cores have shown that atmospheric CO2 concentrations have
increased by approximately 25 percent from 280 ppm before the
industrial revolution to 350 ppm today. Concentrations of
other greenhouse gases have also been increasing. At current
rates of increase it is expected that overall concentrations
of greenhouse gases will reach the equivalent of a doubling of
C02 from preindustrial levels before 2050.
Predictions of Future Greenhouse Warming:
General Circulation Models
Scientists have developed complex computer models to estimate
the consequences of such a doubling by simulating the
interactions of the complex global climate system. Based on
these simulations, many scientists believe that an eventual
average global warming in the range of one to five degrees
Celsius is a reasonable estimate of those consequences.
Discrepancies among the results of different models and
disagreements among scientists indicate, however, that we have
not identified or correctly characterized all of the key
processes involved. This is particularly true of several of
-2-
the so called "feedback" processes such as the occurrence of
clouds and their ability to reflect incoming solar radiation
(see testimony by Dr. Daniel Albritton at TAB B for a fuller
discussion of this issue.)
A key question is whether the behavior of the global
climate system is consistent with the prediction of our
existing models. The answer to this question is unclear.
During the last hundred years there appears to have been an
increase in the average global temperatures of between 0.3 and
0.7 degrees Celsius. The magnitude, timing and distribution
of this change does not fully comport with what would have
been predicted by our current models. Thus, while our recent
climate experience can be considered consistent with the
greenhouse hypothesis, we do not yet have a clear signal that
such warming is occurring.
It is clear, however, that if we do experience greenhouse
warming at even the lower end of the range predicted by
current models, we will experience climate changes which are
more rapid and far reaching than any in recent history.
The impacts of climate changes, even at the lower end of
the estimated range, would almost certainly be considerable
and could result in major social and economic dislocation.
For example, a rise in the sea level caused by thermal
expansion of the oceans and melting mountain glaciers and
polar ice sheets would have significant effects. While the
degree of sea level rise from global warming is uncertain,
coastal communities would have to invest in massive shore
protection projects to ensure their continued viability. In
addition, it is possible that between 30 to 70 percent of U.S.
coastal wetlands would be lost using moderate impact
assumptions.
Climate System Responses and Potential Impacts
Most, but not all, climate scientists currently believe
that the eventual response of the climate system to greenhouse
forcing is likely to be, on the average, a global warming.
While it is clear that current science can accurately
calculate the thermal forcing of the atmosphere due to
increases in greenhouse gases, it is also clear that
estimating the subsequent response of the climate system to
that forcing is a much more difficult task. Several of the
key processes which govern that response are quite complex,
such as the occurrence of clouds, which reflect radiation. On
the other hand water vapor itself is a greenhouse gas.
-3-
An example of a critical feedback is the melting of ice
and snow during warmer periods, which exposes darker surfaces
that absorb more radiation and add to the warming. It is the
net effect of the interactions among all these processes,
including positive and negative feedbacks, that determines the
new equilibrium climate state that the planet will reach after
an increase in radiative forcing by the greenhouse gases.
At this point it is not possible to say with certainty
what specific impacts are likely to occur. Scientists believe
that warming is likely to be more pronounced at higher
latitudes than at lower latitudes. This suggests that higher
evaporation rates will increase demand for scarce water
resources in areas that are now particularly important to
agriculture. Thus, global warming could result in major
shifts in agricultural production patterns.
Current models do not predict with certainty the climate
of a particular region or of a given year. Other relevant
climate variables, such as rainfall, are also beyond the
capacity of existing models. However, many scientists believe
that the models do suggest that, because of the greenhouse
effect, regional changes in climate patterns, like the drought
in the mid-west, would become more likely in coming decades.
The working group to reduce science uncertainties of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has prepared a work
program focused on how each key climate forcing element has
changed relative to the past, how they operate today, and how
they may change in the future. This work program will assess
the current understanding of the geophysical and biological
processes that determine the radiative balance of the
atmosphere. Both man-made and natural emissions sources will
be considered.
The science working group is to produce by mid-1990 a
peer-reviewed study by the best scientists available worldwide
and an executive summary directed to policy officials and
suitable for release to the private sector and general
public. The study will consider the full range of climate
change phenomena: climate forcing aspects, past climate
record, processes involved in climate change, climate model
formulation, tests of climate models, simulation of past
climate changes, predictions of future climate, and physical
and biological responses to climate change. It will focus
particularly on identifying gaps in our knowledge and a better
quantification of uncertainties. Drafting is underway in a
series of sub-groups keyed to specific chapters of the study.
John Houghton of the U.K. chairs the science working
group; Brazil, Denmark, the FRG, Japan, Italy, Senegal,
FROM LAE
6.19.1989 9:40
B
Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change
Status Report: 19 June 1989
Daniel 1. Albritton (NOAA) and Robert T. Watson (NASA)
U.S. Representatives on the IPCC Science Working Group
Introduction
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) are sponsoring the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) to obtain an international, state-of-the-knowledge review of
climate change. There are three companion IPCC assessments: (1) science, (2) socio-
economic impacts, and (3) policy options. The IPCC has assigned lead
responsibilities for the preparation of the assessments reports as follows: (1) Science -
United Kingdom; (2) Socio-Economic Impacts - USSR; and (3) Policy Options - USA.
The counties represented on the Science Working Group are United
Kingdom (chair), Brazil, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan,
Senegal, Switzerland, Tanzania, United States of America, and Union Soviet
Socialists Republics.
This summary gives the current status of the progress of the Science Working
Group on the Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change.
Scope
The main features of the Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change are the
following:
o
It will be a peer-reviewed scientific document done by the best scientists
available and submitted to the IPCC. It will be accompanied by a summary
directed to government officials and suitable for IPCC release to the private
sector and the general public.
o
Its scope will be the full climate change phenomenon, namely: climate
forcing agents, past climate record, processes involved in climate change,
climate model formulation, tests of climate models, simulation of past
climate changes, predictions of future climate, and physical and biological
responses to climate change.
o
A special emphasis throughout will be an identification of gaps in the
knowledge and a better quantification of uncertainties.
FROM NOAR AERONOMY LAE
6.19.1989 9:44
F.3
Timetable
The timetable established by the IPCC for the completion of the three
assessments is brisk. The major events and milestones for the Scientific
Assessment of Climatic Change are the following:
9 - 11 November 1988
First meeting of the IPCC to establish the goals, scopes,
and schedule of the assessments. (Geneva, Switzerland)
24 - 26 January 1989
First plenary meeting of the Science Working Group (WG
1) to establish the features of the Scientific Assessment of
Climatic Change and the interactions with the other
Working Groups. (Oxford, United Kingdom)
6- 7 February 1989
IPCC Bureau meeting to review the plans of the three
Working Groups. (Geneva, Switzerland)
7- 8 March 1989
Lead authors of the Scientific Assessment of Climate
Change meet to establish the contents of the Assessment,
the participants, and the schedule of working meetings.
(Princeton, USA)
April 1989 - Feb 1990
Subgroup meetings to draft the individual chapters of the
Assessment.
June 1989
Plenary meeting of the IPCC to review progress and
interactions of the Working Groups. (Nairobi, Kenya)
5- 9 March 1990
Meeting of the lead authors of the Science Working
Group to review the draft of the Assessment. (United
Kingdom)
March 1990
The draft Assessment is sent out for formal peer review.
May 1990
Comments received from Peer Reviewers.
July 1990
Meeting of lead authors and members of the Science
Working Group to consider the comments and
suggestions of the peer review. (United Kingdom)
July 1990
The Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change is sent to
the IPCC.
12 - 16 November 1990
Second World Climate Conference, at which the reports
of the IPCC will be presented. (Geneva, Switzerland)
2
FROM NORM AEFONOM. LAB
6.19.1989 9:45
P. 4
Contents
The Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change is to have ten sections. Lead
authors are coordinating the work within each section. Other scientists have been
selected as participants. Subgroup meetings have been held or planned in many
cases. The lead authors, major topics, and activities of each section are summarized
below.
SECTION 1. Greenhouse Gases and Other Forcing Agents
Lead Authors: Watson (USA), Siegenthaler (Switzerland), Oeschger (Switzerland),
and Rodhe (Sweden).
Areas of Emphasis: Biospheric feedbacks of carbon dioxide and methane,
anthropogenic aerosols as cloud condensation nuclei, and ecosystem flux
measurements.
Liaison with Working Group 3: Emission scenarios and joint meeting (Bilthoven, 7
8 April 1989).
SECTION 2. Relative Importance of Climate Forcing Agencies
Lead Authors: Morcrette (France) and Ramanathan (USA).
Areas of Emphasis: Revised calculations of relative "greenhouse" role of gases
(including potential substitutes for the fully halogenated chlorofluorocarbons).
SECTION 3. Processes and Modelling
Lead Authors: Cubasch (FRG) and Cess (USA).
Areas of Emphasis: Review of critical processes and details of models used for
climate predictions.
Activities: Meeting of subgroup lead authors (New York, 15 May 1989). Next
working meeting scheduled for October, 1989 (FRG).
SECTION 4. How Large are Potential Effects?
Lead Authors: Mitchell (UK), Tokioka (Japan), Manabe (USA), and Meleshko
USSR).
Areas of Emphasis: Paleo-analog versus General Circulation Models as approaches
to scaling effects, effects of critical feedbacks on uncertainties in prediction, and
possible changes in extremes of climate.
3
Activities: Contributors meeting held (Amherst, 13 May 1989) and contributors
workshop planned (Brisbane, December, 1989).
SECTION 5. Validation of Climate Models
Lend Authors: Gates (USA), Rowntree (UK), and Zeng (PRC).
Areas of Emphasis: Simulation of extremes, simulation of feedbacks, and response
to anomalies.
SECTION 6. Transient Climate Change
Lead Authors: Schlesinger (USA) and Bryan (USA).
Areas of Emphasis: Use of simple transient models to investigate policy-related
scenarios, examination of coupled atmosphere-ocean models regarding differences
from equilibrium results, and effects of ocean circulation changers.
Activities: Contributors meeting (Amherst, 13 May 1989) and contributors
workshop planned (Brisbane, December, 1989).
SECTION 7. Climate Observations
Lead Authors: Folland (USA), Karl (USA), Trenberth (USA), and Vinnikov (USSR).
Areas of Emphasis: Changes in frequencies of extremes, corrections in the
temperature record, and cryosphere observations.
Activities: Lead authors meeting (Washington, March, 1989), contributors meeting
(Amherst, 13 May 1989), and contributors workshop planned (29 November - 1
December 1989, United Kingdom).
SECTION 8. Comparison of Observations and Simulations
Lead Authors: Wigley (UK) and Barnett USA).
Areas of Emphasis: Natural variability, "greenhouse" signal detection, and climate
sensitivity.
SECTION 9. Sea Level Rise
Lead Authors: Warrick (UK) and Oerlemans (Netherlands).
Areas of Emphasis: Estimation of contributions to sea level change and estimation
of uncertainties.
4
Activities: Lead authors meeting (Utrecht, March 1989) and contributors workshop
planned (Reading, September 1989).
SECTION 10. Effects on Ecosystems
Lead Authors: Mellilo (USA), Salati (Brazil), Sinha (India), and Woodward (UK).
Liaison with Working Group 2: Interaction at meetings (Birmingham, 21 April 1989
and Bracknell, 16 May 1989) and plans for scientific basis for impacts to be used in
Working Group 2's report.
Relation to Policy
While the Scientific Assessment of Climatic Change will be a scientific
document, its value to decisionmakers will be considerable. The reasons for this
are severalfold:
o
It will be a strong single concise statement from the scientific community.
In the Assessment, major representatives of the scientific community will speak at
one time and one place regarding the knowns and unknowns of climate change,
including global warming. Dissenting viewpoints and their biases will be stated
clearly. The Assessment can, therefore, be a common reference point for
decisionmakers, in contrast to sporadic and separate statements reflecting the
opinions of individuals.
o
It will be an international scientific assessment.
All nations would have a common basis of scientific input for their decision
making, as opposed to only several national statements.
O
The scientific scope will be comprehensive.
With the Assessment, decisionmakers will have available a single, homogeneous
summary of the current scientific understanding of the whole climate change
phenomenon, ranging from the causes of change to the physical and biological
responses to that change. This is likely to be be more useful than separate reviews
of components of the phenomenon done at different times and perhaps for different
purposes.
O
Both natural and human-induced climate change will be considered.
In contrast to considering only the potential perturbation of climate by human
activities, the Assessment will place that predicted change in the context of the
observed and predicted changes that are a natural part of the climate system. The
5
comparison of the two will afford immediate and straightforward insight into the
significance of any predicted human-induced perturbations.
o
The focus on identifying gaps in the knowledge and quantifying uncertainties
will aid risk analysis.
The difference between (a) "The predicted range of possibilities is from X to Z" and
(b) "The prediction is Y" is, with regard to decision making, a highly relevant
difference, since the first statement explicitly reflects the existence of uncertainties in
the prediction.
6
CORE MEMBERSHIP OF WORKING GROUPS
WORKING GROUP I n
WORKING GROUP II .
WORKING GROUP III .
CHAIR
UK (Dr. Houghton)
USSR (Prof. Izrael)
USA
V/CHAIR
BRAZIL
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
SINIGAL
JAPAN
CHINA
MALTA
NETHERLANDS
ZIMBABWE
MEMBERS
CHINA
ALGERIA
AUSTRALIA
FRG
CANADA
BRAZIL
ITALY
FINLAND
GDR
JAPAN
INDIA
INDIA
denmark
ISRAEL
JAPAN
SWITZERLAND
MEXICO
SWEDEN
TANZANIA
new ZEALAND
UK
USA
MIGERIA'
USSR
USSR
INDONESIA
NORWAY
KENYA
FRANCE
SAUDI ARABIA
EX OFFICIO
CHAIRMAN JSC2
SAC
REP IGBP'
1) NIGERIA or another country from Africa
2) JSC - WMO/ICSU Joint Scientific Committee for the World Climate Research Programme
3) IGBP - ICSU International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme
4) SAC - Scientific Advisory Committee for the UNEP World Climate Impact Studies Programme
. The tasks assigned to Working Groups I, II and III are, respectively, assessment of available scientific
information on climate change, assessment of environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change
and formulation of response strategies.
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(1
TESTIMONY OF
DR. DANIEL L. ALBRITTON
DIRECTOR, AERONOMY LABORATORY
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORIES
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 21, 1989
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Dan Albritton. I am Director of NOAA's Aeronomy
Laboratory in Boulder, Colorado, which studies the chemistry and
dynamics of the Earth's atmosphere. I appreciate this.
warming. opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee to discuss global
As you requested, I will focus this summary on three topics:
(1) the uncertainties in our scientific understanding of global
warming, (2) the current efforts of the international scientific
community to assess that state of knowledge, and (3) the
highest-priority research that is needed in order to reduce those
uncertainties.
I. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES
Past and present research have provided an understanding of
several aspects of the greenhouse effect, the warming of the
Earth's atmosphere through the absorption of longwave radiation
by certain gases like carbon dioxide. Some things are known with
high certainty, others remain very poorly understood. This
testimony will summarize this spectrum of knowledge and
uncertainty, ranging from unequivocal increases in the atmo-
spheric abundance of carbon dioxide (a "known") to the
inability to predict the climatic consequences for a specific
region and year (an "unknown"). The focus in this summary is on
the most policy-relevant aspects, namely, those points relating
to the following questions:
What can caus. climate change, particularly human
activities that may influence change?
What are the predicted changes associated with human
influences, and how do they compare with natural
variability?
Have we seen any human-induced changes yet?
What is the degree of confidence in current
predictions?
The following summary is my personal interpretation of the
current spectrum of viewpoints in the scientific community
regarding the state of the science of the greenhouse effect.
A.
Human-Influenced Climate Forcings
Given current trends in emissions, a doubling of carbon
dioxide in the next century, compared to pre-industrial
levels, is virtually certain.
The atmospheric abundance of carbon dioxide is increasing,
in large part due to the combustion of fossil fuels by
humans. All scientists are convinced of this. The future
rate of increase will depend strongly on (1) technical
developments, economic factors, and policy decisions which
cannot be predicted in advance, and (2) the net uptake of
carbon dioxide by vegetation and the oceans, the effect of
which is still somewhat uncertain. Nevertheless,
essentially all scientists agree that a doubling of carbon
dioxide abundances will occur within the next century.
The existence of other greenhouse gases is well known.
Methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's), ozone in the lower
atmosphere, and nitrous oxide are also greenhouse gases.
Their abundances are also increasing in the atmosphere. The
reasons for these increases are only partially clear. The
CFC's are industrially produced; however, the sources of the
other gases are not as clear because the biological mecha-
niams for their emission characteristics are particularly
ill-defined at present. While the future atmospheric
abundances of these gases cannot be reliably predicted yet,
it is clear that they will add to the greenhouse effect
produced by carbon dioxide.
Confidence is high in the understanding of the basic
radiation physics of trace gases.
The above mentioned gases act to reduce the loss of outgoing
thermal radiation to space, thereby increasing the
radiation back toward the surface of the planet. Thus,
scientists are in solid agreement that the greenhouse gases
increase the "thermal forcing" of the climate system.
B. Climate System Responses
Most (but not all) climate scientists currently believe that
the eventual response of the climate system to greenhouse
forcing is likely to be, on the average, a global warming.
While it is clear that current science can accurately
calculate the thermal forcing of the atmosphere due to
increases in the greenhouse gases, it is also clear that
estimating the subsequent response of the climate system to
that forcing is a much more difficult task. Several of the
key processes which govern that response are quite complex,
for example, the occurrence of clouds and their ability to
reflect radiation. Many of these processes are so-called
"feedbacks," An example is ice and snow which melt during
warmer periods, exposing darker surfaces that absorb more
radiation and add to the warming; hence, the warming is
amplified. Other processes could involve negative feedbacks
which would dampen the warming. It is the net effect of the
interactions among all these processes, including positive
and negative feedbacks, that determines the new equilibrium
climate state that the planet will reach after an increase
in radiative forcing by the greenhouse gases.
Scientists have simulated this complex system with computer
models and have used these models to estimate the
consequences of a doubling of carbon dioxide. Based on
those simulations, many scientists believe that an eventual
global average warming in the range of 1-5 degrees Celsius
is & reasonable estimate. Based on disagreements among
models and different approaches to simulating nature, some
scientists, however, caution that we have not identified
and/or characterized all of the key processes) hence, the
above uncertainty range may be optimistically large. If,
however, a warming in the range of 1-5 degrees Celsius were
to occur, it would be comparable to, or substantially larger
than, the known temperature changes that have happened
naturally in the past.
o
There is a wide spectrum of opinion (and no consensus) on
whether a greenhouse "signal" has already been seen.
Current models predict that, due to the greenhouse gases
already in the atmosphere, the global average surface
warming should be in the range of 0.5 to 1 degree Celsius.
Has that warming been seen in the temperature record? The
answer is not clear. While the surface temperature record
shows that there has been an increase of that magnitude over
the past several decades, the pattern of that increase - one
relatively rapid increase in the 1920's and another in the
1980's - does not match that predicted from models of the
greenhouse effect, namely, a gradual increase in tempera-
ture. This suggests that our models may be incomplete, or
that there are other, presumably natural, processes at work
that can influence temperature changes of a fraction of a
degree Celsius. As a consequence, scientists are searching
for a "signal" whose magnitude is likely to be comparable to
the natural variations of the climate system, which is a
challenging task indeed! Furthermore, the reliability of
some of the temperature records, both global and regional,
have been questioned, adding another complication. On a
regional scale, for example, a recent analysis of about 100
years of temperature and precipitation records for about
6000 U.S. weather stations shows no statistically
significant evidence of an overall increase in annual
temperature or change in annual precipitation for the
contiguous United States batween 1895 and 1987 (Geophysical
Research Letters, Vol. 16, No. 1, pages 49-52, January,
1989). Thus, for several reasons, the current differences
of opinion among scientists as to whether the greenhouse
warming has actually begun are substantial.
0
Current models do not have the ability to predict the
climate of a particular region or the climate of a given
year. Other socially relevant climate variables, such as
rainfall, are also difficult to estimate with climate
models.
Those who construct climate models clearly state that models
are not yet sufficiently realistic representations of the
global system to yield reliable estimates of climate
features on regional scales. Similarly, they cannot
estimate the climate of a particular year. This means that
the models cannot say whether the U.S. midwestern drought of
1988 was due to the greenhouse effact, nor can they predict
the climate features of the next few years. However, many
scientists do believe that the models can (and do) suggest
that, because of the greenhouse effect, regional changes in
climatic patterns, like the U.S. midwestern drought, would
become more likely in coming decades.
II. STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT
I would now like to summarize an-assessment process that
will undoubtedly be of great use to national and international
efforts to evaluate and respond to potential changes in global
climate. Namely, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are sponsoring
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to obtain an
international, state-of-knowledge review of climate change.
A.
Timetable and Content
The main features of this Scientific Assessment of Climatic
Change are as follows:
There are three companion WMO/UNEP assessments taking
place: (1) science, (2) socio-sconomic impacts, and (3)
policy options.
They will be prepared internationally, with the following
leaders: science - U.K.; socio-economic impacts -
U.S.S.R) and policy options - U.S.A.
O
The highlights of the process and schedule that the U.S. is
following in their participation on the Science Working
Group are the following:
-
The Committee on Earth Sciences (CES) charged Messrs.
Albritton (NOAA) and Watson (NASA) to draft a plan
for & scientific assessment which would provide the
basis for U.S. involvement. (June, 1988)
-
Draft plan described to:
-- CES (July, 1988)
-- Ad Hoo Group of U.S. Scientific Experts
(July, 1988)
-- Domestic Policy Council Working Group
(September, 1988)
-- National Academy of Sciences
(October, 1988)
-
Watson and Albritton, representing CES, met informally
in London with the U.K. Chairman to discuss plans for
the Science Assessment. (December, 1988)
-
The U.S. position and plans were completed. Albritton
and Watson were named as (1) representatives of the
interagency stearing committee for IPCC and as (11) the
U.S. delegates on the IPCC Science Working Group.
(January, 1989)
-
The Science Working Group met in Oxford, U.K. and
established the plans for the Scientific Assessment. A
summary report is available. (January, 1989)
0
The main features of the Scientific Assessment of Climatic
Change are the following:
-
It will be a peer-reviewed scientific document done by
the best scientists available and submitted to the
IPCC. It will be accompanied by a summary directed to
government officials and suitable for IPCC release, to
the private sector, and the public,
-
Its scope will be the full climate change phenomenon,
namely: climate forcing agents, past climate record,
processes involved in climate change, climate model
formulation, tests of climate models, predictions of
past and future climate, and physical and biological
responses to climate change.
-
A special emphasis throughout will be an identification
of gaps and knowledge and a better quantification of
uncertainties.
The timetable is brisk: lead authors will meet in early
March, 1989; a draft will be available for review in
December, 1989; lead authors and Science Working Group will
examine the revised draft in April, 1990; and the Assessment
will be provided to the IPCC in September, 1990 and to the
Second World Climate Conference and the United Nations
General Assembly in late 1990.
B.
Relation to Policy
of what value will this Assessment be to decision-makers?
The answer is "considerable, but it may be useful to
elaborate here on the fundamental reasons why this is true:
o
It will be a strong single concise statement from the
acientific community.
In the Assessment, major representatives of the scientific
community will speak at one time regarding the knowns and
unknowns of climate change, including global warming.
Dissenting viewpoints and their biases will be clearly
stated. This can be a common reference point for
decision-makers, in contrast to sporadic and separate
statements reflecting the opinions of individuals.
It will be an international scientific statement.
All nations would have a common basis of scientific input
for their decision-making, as opposed to several national
statements.
The scientific scope will be comprehensive.
With the Assessment, decision-makers will have available a
single, homogeneous summary of the current scientific
understanding of the whole climate change phenomenon,
ranging from the causes of change to the physical and
biological responses to that change. This is likely to be
more useful than separate reviews of components of the
phenomenon done at different times and perhaps for different
purposes.
Both natural and human-induced climate change will be
considered.
In contrast to considering only the potential perturbation
of climate by human activities, the Assessment will place
that predicted change in the context of the observed and
predicted changes that are a natural part of the climate
system. The comparison of the two will afford an immediate
and straightforward insight into the significance of any
predicted human-induced perturbations.
The focus on identifying gaps and knowledge quantifying
uncertainties will aid risk analysis.
The difference between (a) "The predicted range of
possibilities is from X to Z." and (b) "The prediction is
Y." is, with regard to decision-making, a highly relevant
difference, since the first explicitly reflects the
existence of uncertainties in the prediction.
III. RESEARCH NEEDS
While the Assessment will usefully summarize the current
state of understanding, it is clear that key issues related to
global warming need further elucidation. Therefore, it will
prove to be crucially important over the coming years to continue
to improve, test, and assess our understanding of the phenomenon,
as embodied in numerical, climate-system models.
These models ara, of course, only as good as the accuracy
and completeness with which their components represent the
relevant processes of the "real" world. Some of the shortcomings
of our understanding of these processes are clear now, and hence,
define some of the priority tasks that need research emphasis.
other required tasks are associated with establishing a better
observational system that could not only provide additional input
to the models, but also could serve as a means of detecting
whether greenhouse warming is taking place. Resolving these
shortcomings will require collaborative research among several
disciplines, including atmospheric and biological sciences.
Some of the highest-priority needs are the following:
Better characterization of the cloud feedback mechanisms,
such as observations and theories that can relate the
radiative effects of cloud-scale processes to planetary-
scale processes.
Identification of other significant feedback processes, such
as biogenic emissions/cloud-formation interactions.
Better experimental and theoretical understanding of the
biological, chemical, and physical processes that control
the emissions and uptake of the radiatively important trace
gases other than carbon dioxide.
Defining the trends of likely additional greenhouse
molecules, such as lower-atmospheric ozone and stratospheric
water vapor.
Characterizing the trends and spatial variations of climate-
sensitive properties, such as temperature and ozone, in the
middle-to-upper stratosphere.
Better global coverage of the observations of key response
variables, such as surface temperature and albedo globally
at oceanic locations and a better monitoring record of sea
level.
Establishing more accurate decadal trends in the radiative
forcings, such as cloud cover, in order to develop and test
improved models of key feedback systems.
Improving the understanding (that is, the observations,
process studies, and modeling) of major subcomponents of the
climate system, such as the coupled ocean-atmosphere of the
equatorial South Pacific, since these submodels are part of
the basis of eventual global coupled models.
Better characterization of the processes that determine the
thermal inertia of the oceans, such as large-scale vertical
motions.
Improving the quality of, and learning to interpret better,
the long-term record of past climate change in order to
develop and test our century-scale models, as a means of
validating models within the range of experience before
using them under new conditions.
EPILOGUE
Global climate has often changed substantially and severely
in the past. There is every reason to believe that such natural
change will continue in the future. There is now the likely
prospect that human activities will add to climate change in the
future. There are two implications for us to consider. They
both have separate, different, and equally important associated
policy questions.
(1) Natural Variation: How do we accommodate it?
(2) Human-Induced Variation: Do we need to mend our ways?
Policymakers will be addressing both questions. Scientists must
assist with both answers. Improved answers require a better
understanding of the fundamental processes of the ocean/
atmosphere climate system, which is a challenging task.
0)
Nevertheless, the fundamental understanding of natural
processes that relate to the well-being of mankind are almost
always cost-effective. For example, comparison of the cost of a
salk/Sabin vaccine for polio to the economic and human costs of
an iron lung teaches us what can be achieved when the cause of a
means to us all, it is the price of ignorance that we cannot
thing is truly understood. Regarding our environment and what it
afford.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
be pleased to answer any questions that you or the members of the
Subcommittee may have.
B C T A
GREENHOUSE POLICY AND CLIMATE UNCERTAINTY
Robert M. White
President
National Academy of Engineering
National Academy of Sciences
Annual Meeting
April 24, 1989
Washington, D.C.
Greenhouse Policy and Climate Uncertainty
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The global climate warming issue has now become an
international scientific and political happening. It is
difficult today to pick up a newspaper, or view television
without encountering a story or an interview on the subject
of global climate warming now familiarly embraced in the
vernacular under the rubric of the "Greenhouse" effect.
No ideological or political boundary separates the
calls to action. From General Secretary Gorbachev of the
USSR to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the U.K., from
Prime Ministers Mulroney of Canada and Brundtland of
Norway, calls for international action resound.
Last month representatives of twenty-three nations
including many heads of state, gathered in the Hague at the
urging of President Mitterand of France and other European
1
leaders and recommended that the United Nations be given
supranational authority to regulate global activities
regarded as the causes of the greenhouse problem.
Not to be outdone, in the bidding for international
leadership on the issue, the United States through the
pronouncements and actions of President Bush and Secretary
of State Baker, is urging action on many international
environmental fronts. The Congress is no less active. A
half dozen new pieces of climate legislation are being
considered.
Nor have the Academies of Sciences and Engineering
been silent. Quite the contrary, we have been vocal and
forward on the issue. For over a decade these Academies
have conducted studies on global climate change,
assessments that have buttressed the legitimacy of the
concerns expressed by our political representatives. Most
recently, as a result of legislation in the last Congress,
the Academies have embarked on new studies of climate and
2
the underlying energy issues. In a move to place its views
before the new Bush Adrinistration, the Academies have
issued a "white paper" on global change with broad policy
recommendations.
The scientific community has identified an issue that
lends itself to support by leaders everywhere the mission
of saving the habitability of the planet. It is a mission
that now ranks in importance and political panache with
saving the planet from nuclear destruction. And like the
mission to save the planet from nuclear destruction, it
raises politically divisive concerns as between the
technologically advanced and developing nations.
How robust is the scientific basis for this grand
outpouring of world concern? What are the policy
directions that make sense in the light of the certainties
and uncertainties in our knowledge? What are the policy
problems that need resolution given the likely social and
economic costs of action or the consequences of inaction?
3
My colleagues Bert Bolin and Steve Schneider have ably
described the state of our knowledge of the forcing
functions those activities that cause the changes in the
composition of the atmosphere and the atmosphere's
response to these changes the ways in which the climate
of the earth is projected to be altered as a result of such
compositional changes.
As scientists and engineers we often eschew
responsibility for policy decisions because they are laden
with judgments balancing known facts, uncertain
interpretation and social and economic costs more properly
made in the political arena. Unfortunately we cannot
totally escape that responsibility because those political
judgments are shaped by the way we present our conclusions
to those who have to formulate policy. We have it in our
power to trigger political action unwarranted by data or
scientific findings. Conversely, we can so allay real
concerns that inaction results when action is desirable.
4
Whether we in the scientific community like it or not,
we have awakened the political beast and those communities
of scholars who revel in the challenge of public policy
formulation and debate. The ability of the scientific
community to influence actions recedes as groups are
increasingly locked into policy positions.
The fact is that we grapple with an issue that is
noisy in many dimensions. The climate record is noisy, as
are the results of mathematical computations. Knowledge of
likely impacts is speculative and the policy debate is
informed with contradictory data and interpretations. Can
we isolate the signals from the noise in all significant
dimensions? That is our task. That is our obligation.
2.0 THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
Any soundly based policy actions must emerge from our
knowledge of causes and effects and the uncertainties in
that knowledge weighed against the risks, consequences and
costs of action. We know much about the former and little
5
about the latter. Our knowledge of the likely causes is
well documented. Our knowledge of the climate syster
response to these causes is extensive but frought with
uncertainty. Our knowledge of the social and economic
consequences is weak and speculative.
The concentrations of greenhouse gases have been
accurately measured for over a quarter of a century in many
parts of the world and they reveal inexorable increases.
The CO2 record of observations taken at the NOAA Mauna Loa
Observatory in Hawaii is arguably the most important
geophysical record in this century. We know much about
causes of changing atmosphere composition the burning of
fossil fuels, the industrial production of CFC's and the
agricultural production of nitrous oxides. We know less
about others, the sources of the increases in methane for
example.
We can assess the climate system response in two ways.
We can simulate the system with mathematical models and
6
examine the range of responses to the known and projected
forcing functions. We can also examine the actual climatic
record. Mathematical models developed by many groups in
the U.S. and abroad yield the basic projections on which
our concerns are principally based. As Steve Schneider has
described, they yield projections of global average surface
temperature increases ranging from 2°-5°C since the turn of
the century with greater increases in polar regions for a
doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations sometime after
the middle of the next century. The models do not portray
regional and local effects well.
The models are approximations to the real world and
their simulation of natural physical processes is well
known to generate considerable uncertainties in the
results, especially as they reproduce critical feedback
processes.
Our confidence in the mathematical models is based on
their ability to reproduce the seasonal variations of
7
climate, the general reasonableness of the manner in which
climatic factors are portrayed, and the consistency of
results. Some question whether our confidence in the
output of these models is well placed given the
uncertainties. Yet there is a preponderance of views among
those who have worked the problem, that a large measure of
confidence is warranted but that the uncertainties are
troubling and need much attention.
What about the system response as deduced from the
observational record? Does the observational system
response support the theoretical response calculations and
does the response evidence any systematic changes in
climate.
It is well documented that climate is observed to
fluctuate on all time and space scales. Drought and wet
climates have been the perennial scourge of mankind. For
the past century in which humanity's introduction of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere has increased greatly,
8
the instrumental record is equivocal. It is a noisy record
affected by the sampling of the global atmosphere through a
network of observations established for other reasons---
principally weather forecasting. It is affected by the
accuracy and representativeness of the observations. It is
also affected by external factors such as urban growth
which produces real, but climatically artificial local and
regional temperature readings. Such data reveal that
global average surface temperatures have had a roller
coaster history. During the period 1900 to 1940
temperatures increased, cooled during the period 1940 to
1965 and have increased again from 1965 to 1988.
Over land areas of the United States where we have the
richest and probably most reliable data, there has been no
detectable increase in temperature since the turn of the
century. This could be a sampling problem. The U.S. may
be unrepresentative of the global average temperature. For
the globe, the data pool presents sampling difficulties
9
also. Over many parts of the less developed world, the
tropics, and the oceans, data are of poor quality, sparse
and may be unrepresentative. The best analyses of such
data reveal a net increase of about 0.5°C over the past
century. This net temperature change is consistent with
the lower end of the projections from the mathematical
models but could also be a natural phenomenon. Recent
findings of the effects of urban growth suggest that this
increase may be an overestimate.
But, there are puzzling features of the observed
global climate record. For example, temperature increases,
largely attributable to the records from tropical and ocean
areas, are not consistent with model projections that the
largest temperature increases should occur in polar
regions.
Is it too early to extract the signal from the noise
of the record? Many would argue, yes. Others would argue
that a century during which the CO₂ content of the
10
atmosphere has increased some 25% should have revealed a
clear signal by now. Those who argue that the global
temperatures of the past five years, the warmest in the
instrumental record, signal the onset of the greenhouse
climate could have come to an analogous conclusion during
the drought of the thirties. However, they would have
encountered the systematic cooling during the mid-century
years, which incidentally gave rise at that time to
predictions by some of a new ice age. In my view, the jury
is out.
We are confronted with an inverted pyramid of
knowledge: A huge and growing mass of proposals for policy
action is balanced upon a handful of real facts. Data on
likely causes are robust, though future emission
projections vary widely. Projections based upon
mathematical approximations of atmospheric and oceanic
conditions are credible but uncertain. Evidence from the
climatic data is equivocal.
11
Policy actions must reflect the risk of serious social
and economic consequences of climatic change. They could
be severe but are in the realm of informed speculation.
Most of our information is analogue or scenario based. We
know a great deal about the effect of weather and climate
on agriculture, water resources, forestry and other
economic functions from extensive study of the effects of
droughts or heat waves or severe winters. We know the
devastating ramifications for economic and social
conditions---witness the effects of the droughts of the
Sahel in Africa in recent years, and the drought of last
summer on the midwest of the U.S. Such analogue
information is sound and extrapolable. It is the scenario
based information that is speculative. By scenario I refer
to the "what if" studies. These studies are useful if they
are considered for what they do provide a range of
possibilities. But frequently they are interpreted as
forecasts. It is here that the apocalyptic nature of
12
outcomes emerges and penetrates the political consciousness
through news stories about imminent global catastrophe.
If our model projections are correct we can say some
interesting things. For example, we can expect an increase
in sea level and recent observations seem consistent with
this projection. If sea level rises we can be reasonably
certain that coastal areas will be affected with saline
intrusions and increased coastal erosion. On the other
hand we cannot say much about local and regional effects of
temperature and precipitation changes and their specific
local effects on agriculture, water resource, and
ecological and economic systems. There would be effects on
agriculture but we're not quite sure what they would be and
whether they might be acceptable or even beneficial.
Increased carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere favors
increased photosynthesis and crop growth. There would be
effects on storm tracks, probably moving them toward the
poles, a result of the reduced pole to equator temperature
13
gradients. Precipitation belts would likely migrate to
more polar latitudes with consequences for agriculture and
water resources in the U.S. southwest. There would be
effects on natural ecosystems and their resiliency would
depend upon the rate of change of climatic temperatures and
precipitation. But it is impossible to be specific beyond
such generalization.
3.0 POLICY PRINCIPLES
And so we find ourselves in a classic dilemma of
policy formulation. Possibly severe but unknown levels of
risk of undesirable consequences of climatic change in the
face of great uncertainty about causes, costs and
consequences. The dilemma is compounded because the
consequences will be visited on future generations and
unevenly through the redistribution of global climatic
resources. Policy principles in such a situation would
suggest;
14
Investment in improving the information base to
reduce uncertainties so that policy actions could be based
on improved understanding.
O
Adoption of policies that address causes and
predicted consequences in such a way that future options
are not foreclosed if projections turn out to be incorrect,
and which may be desirable for other environmental and
economic reasons. Insurance policies if you wish.
The policy framework would have to recognize the
inherent international nature of the issue; its potential
divisiveness as between developed and developing nations;
the considerable social and economic costs attendant on
significant actions; and the absence of institutions on the
international scene in a position to formulate and
implement necessary policies. Let us examine the policy
issues and see what conclusions they lead to.
Improving the information base to reduce uncertainties
in our data, in our projections and in the understanding of
15
consequences would seem to be a sine qua non. These
actions are not costly, do not preclude future policy
options and can sharpen policy decisions. This means
investment in improved understanding of physical processes
so that they can be modelled more accurately, intensified
examination of climate data bases, improved assessments of
projected emission rates of greenhouse gases, and improved
space and ground based monitoring systems. Programs to
achieve some of these objectives have been formulated in
President Bush's proposed "Global Change Initiative" and it
is expected that strong support will be forthcoming from
the Congress. The World Climate Research Program of the
World Meteorological Organization and the International
Geosphere-Biosphere Program of the International Council of
Scientific Unions are underway and receiving widespread
international support. The first international
intergovernmental forum has been established to examine the
full range of climate problems including the possibilities
16
for national and international responses under the aegis of
the World Meteorological Organization and the United
Nations Environmental Program.
The really controversial policy issues surround the
possibilities for intervention in the climate change
process. Can we arrest or slow the processes that increase
the concentrations of greenhouse gases? The answer is yes.
But we have no grasp on the social and economic
ramifications of intervention. We have a reasonable grip
on the sources and amounts of emissions. We have a
reasonable grasp on the reductions in emissions that would
be necessary to constrain the global temperature increase.
The possible courses of policy action are in a sense
obvious, and they relate largely to the production,
distribution and end use of energy. If fossil fuels use is
the principal culprit in the CO₂ buildup, policies should
be directed to the use of the least polluting fossil fuels;
the reduction in use of all fossil fuels; and development
17
and use of non-fossil energy sources. In practical terms
we must shift from coal to oil to natural gas; undertake
major efforts to increase energy efficiency; develop and
deploy passively safe and publicly acceptable nuclear power
as well as other non-fossil energy sources.
Energy policy actions have great leverage because they
also address a broad set of environmental issues. Most
environmental problems are interrelated through their
physics, chemistry and biology and have common causes.
Thus certain policies will have multiple environmental
leverage. For example, the problems of acid rain, global
warming and local air pollution are largely energy based
environmental problems, generated by the use of fossil
fuels.
Energy policies that move the national energy system
toward energy efficiency also serve many other national
objectives: the lessening of dependence on foreign sources
of oil, thus achieving a greater measure of energy
18
independence; reduction of the energy component of the
trade deficit; and increasing industrial competitiveness to
the extent that energy efficiency can lower costs of
production.
It is in the implementation of policies that the
issues are joined. It is here that we finally address the
economic and social consequences and the hard questions of
who pays, who is affected, at what costs and with what
societal disruptions. In the case of the greenhouse
problem, we are forced to address the fundamental
activities of society that relate to economic growth, the
production of food and the sources of energy. We are
talking about changing the global energy and agricultural
systems to say nothing of the implications for global
population.growth.
Recently the EPA issued a most useful report in
response to a Congressional request on options for
"stabilizing" the greenhouse gas concentrations in the
19
atmosphere. A sampling of some of their proposals
indicates the pervasiveness of the measures that need to be
considered. The social and economic costs were not
assessed. Raise average gasoline mileage of new cars to 50
mpg---a doubling of present fleet mileage. Impose fuel
emission fees to reflect full social costs of abut $30/ton
of coal and $3.00 barrel of oil. Launch major
reforestation programs. Phase out CFCs.
Ultimately if the climate warming is to be prevented
other forms of intervention in the world energy structure
will be required. The logical direction for policy is to
encourage the development and use of non-fossil energy
sources. Science, engineering and technology offer the
promise of alternative energy sources nuclear and other
alternative forms of energy. Today the problems of public
acceptability of nuclear power are severe. Concerns about
nuclear power plant safety and the disposal of radioactive
wastes dominate any concerns about the greenhouse problem.
20
But research on passively safe reactors has been underway
for years and it appears that commercially useful passively
safe reactors are on the horizon.
The world must face up to the fact that within the
bounds of current technological knowledge there may be no
way out of the greenhouse problem without some recourse to
the nuclear option. Other forms of non-fossil energy have
become more promising as the years have passed. There is
new promise in photovoltaics with efficiency increases up
to 30% in recent experiments. And biomass as source of
energy can be further emphasized. Policy options aimed at
other causes of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations
such as the release of CFCs and deforestation present their
own politically divisive features. The tropical
deforestation issue confronts us with the conflict between
economic development and environmental protection in a
direct way. Mankind has traditionally used the environment
for economic growth and mankind's track record is poor. We
21
in the United States have polluted our rivers, destroyed
our wildlife and replaced our forests with farms. We
continue to overuse the last of our natural rain forests in
the northwest for economic gain.
Now, recognizing the global consequences of the
destruction of forests we call upon other nations emerging
from economic penury to arrest their development to protect
the global environment. Is it any wonder that countries
like Brazil or India or China perceive our proposals as
hypocritical? Nobody has yet advanced a workable proposal
but many have been suggested. The swap of foreign debt for
the preservation of tropical forests is an interesting
proposal, but who will pay?
The issue of economic development and environmental
protection arose only last month in London at a conference
called by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to phase out the
production of CFCs. China, India and other nations refused
to submerge their need for CFCs and associated economic
22
development to the global interest in environmental
protection. If we are to be serious about international
action, a global bargain will be necessary. But what kind
of global bargain makes sense?
The divisive nature of the issue is also evident in
the suggestion that we shift from fossil fuels such as coal
to other kinds of fossil fuels such as oil and gas. But
what of countries like China whose energy future is
dependent on their large supplies of coal? The recent U.N.
report, Our Common Future, (1987) on economic development
and the environment carried the message on the necessary
global bargain clearly. Global environmental protection
will only be resolved in the context of the economic
development of less prosperous nations.
If we cannot arrest the processes of climate change
then we will need to adapt to them. And adaptation
policies also need to be those that will foreclose least on
future options. It seems wise that we introduce into our
23
long range planning for our coastal areas the possibility
of a sea level rise of the order of a half meter over the
next fifty years. Water resource planning must take into
account the possibility that the climatic regimes of the
future will be different and water resource infrastructures
and management techniques will have to incorporate a
flexibility not inherent in present planning. Planning for
agricultural adjustment will need to take advantage of
genetic engineering of plants and animals so that they can
be more tolerant of environmental extremes.
Perhaps, however, the policy approaches to the climate
warming issue which we seem to be taking are inappropriate
to the problem. We are dealing with intergenerational
matters where the consequences of action taken by one
generation are visited on another. Nor do we have
guidelines for developing policies in the face of
uncertainties of the scope involved in the climate problem.
We address a problem in which knowledge and information are
24
being continually refreshed by new findings and
interpretations, and our assessment of risk and
uncertainties are continually changing.
Robert Lind of Cornell has suggested that we should
not think in terms of choosing a static "best policy", but
think in terms of strategies and sets of options. We
should think in terms of a continuous policy process where
we periodically reassess our responses in light of new
findings and information. In such a policy approach the
design of research and information gathering projections
must become an integral part of the policy process.
This view suggests that what we might do is establish
continuing mechanisms and processes that periodically, say
every three or five years that would be charged with
performing an evaluation of the state of our knowledge
about the science and the implications of various policy
options. Through this process, recommendations for changes
in policies and in areas of scientific investigation would
25
emerge. In this way by a series of incremental policy
steps, policy would be kept in lockstep with knowledge.
In the end scientists and engineers must accept the
responsibility for having triggered a worldwide movement
which may result in policies of a pervasive nature
affecting all humanity. Each of us is responsible for
representing the extent of our knowledge and accompanying
uncertainties so that there is a balance between optimism
and catastrophism. Each of us can make headlines any day
by projecting or intimating that mankind faces a global
catastrophe.
We have sufficient experience to know that controversy
makes headlines and those not as familiar with the
scientific uncertainties take us at our word. Our
pronouncements will be excerpted to suit the needs of an
exciting story. We need to make sure that the
uncertainties in our knowledge are well understood and that
there are risks in action as well as in inaction. We need
26
to be true to ourselves and our work as well as to the
humanity we serve.
Let us not confuse selected observations with
representative samples. Let us not confuse scenarios with
predictions. Let us not confuse short term fluctuations
with long term implications. Above all let us not confuse
our friends and colleagues who must make the political
decisions that will ensure the habitability of this planet.
Thank you.
4/19/89-3NAS
27
D B T A
U.S. INTERNATIONAL POSTURE ON CLIMATE CHANGE
A Discussion Paper
Prepared for
the Advisory Committee
to the Department of State
Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
October 31, 1988
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
U.S. International Posture
on Climate Change Issues
At the request of Frederick M. Bernthal, Assistant
Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, a working group of
the OES Advisory Committee met to examine elements of the
U.S. international posture on greenhouse/climate issues.
Members of the working group were Robert M. White
(Chairman), Jessica Mathews, Christian Herter, Jr., Gordon
J. MacDonald, William Nierenberg, and Herman Pollack. Our
views are presented below:
STATE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Policies and programs to be advanced by the United
States in international forums should be based on the
current state of scientific knowledge. Numerous scientific
assessments have been carried out both domestically and
internationally. It is our view that the U.S. accept as a
basis for policy determination now, the "basic scientific
understanding" as outlined in the 1985 Villach
International Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and
of Other Greenhouse Gases (Text appended.) This assessment
was prepared under the sponsorship of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), and the International Council
of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The summary of that report's
1
scientific assessment is attached. This assessment is a
reasonable appraisal of the present state of scientific
knowledge. Other scientific appraisals prepared by the
NAS/NAE/National Research Council and by the Scientific
Committee on Problems of the Environment yield similar
conclusions but differ in details. U.S. policy
determination should of course be reviewed as new
assessments are made.
MONITORING, RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT
The United States should exercise leadership in
stimulating the organization of international programs to
advance research, monitoring and assessment activities on
problems of climate change. A useful first step would be
to urge that an inventory of work related to climate change
in all countries be prepared to identify the scope of the
present international effort and lay the basis for future
programmatic efforts. Within the United States we
understand that such an inventory is being prepared by the
Committee on Earth Sciences of the Federal Coordinating
Council on Science Engineering and Technology (FCCSET).
While monitoring, research, and assessment of many
different kinds will be needed, we have identified a number
of areas which we believe should have priority in
international efforts to improve our understanding of the
greenhouse/climate problem.
2
a) Signal/Noise Issue
It is crucial that international agreement be reached
on the extent to which the observations of global surface
temperature increases during the past century and increases
in sea level are the result of natural fluctuations or due
to the effects of increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases. Analyses of global temperature data by Hansen,
earlier by wigley, and still earlier by Mitchel, indicate
that global temperature increases are consistent with the
hypothesis that increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases are causing an anomalous increase in global
temperature. Because of the central importance of such a
conclusion to further policy and program formulation, and
because of the uncertain representativeness of some
observational data, we urge a review of the data and
analyses of the temperature records of the past century
under international auspices. Such an assessment should be
undertaken at a qualified center or centers such as the
National Center for Atmospheric Research. We recommend
that the U.S. offer to have the National Center for
Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado undertake such a
study under the auspices of an international steering
committee, possibly in cooperation with other qualified
centers. These analyses should also examine sources of
corroborating data such as data on subsurface temperatures
3
in permafrost. It is important that outstanding
independent statisticians be involved in this effort.
b) Monitoring
We strongly recommend that the U.S. urge the
establishment in appropriate countries of monitoring
systems and other means that would provide more accurate
and representative data on emissions, and concentrations of
greenhouse and related gases (carbon monoxide, oxygen,
etc.) and other geospheric and biospheric parameters over
long periods of time. Such monitoring systems would
provide the essential data, on the basis of which, changes
in planetary environmental conditions could be confirmed.
Space and other technologies now place such capabilities
within reach, although emissions in some cases will need to
be calculated from surrogate data such as data on fossil
fuel use and agricultural production. The many proposals
for such monitoring systems include the planned 1990 FAO
Forest Assessment Program and the space monitoring systems
proposed in NASA's Earth Systems Science program. Support
for these and other monitoring efforts will be important.
c) Mathematical Modeling
Mathematical models of the atmosphere represent the
only way the effects of greenhouse gases on climate can be
simulated. It is therefore important that such models
4
simulate atmospheric, oceanic and other changes with great
fidelity. Further research is required to achieve this
goal. Present mathematical models are deficient in
accounting for exchange processes between the atmosphere,
on one side and boundary surfaces of the solid earth, the
oceans, and the biosphere on the other. They are also
deficient in simulating hydrologic processes. They do not
at present predict finer scale regional changes with great
accuracy. Nor do they provide data on the statistical
properties of weather in an altered climate regime. Since
many economic losses are associated with extreme events,
the development of appropriate models is an important task.
For these reasons we recommend that a program of research
addressing mathematical model deficiencies be undertaken
now and be strongly supported.
d) Assessments of Climate Effects
It is important to support continued studies of the
potential effects of climate changes on societal activities
such as agriculture, water resources, coastal habitability,
etc. The United States should encourage such climate
assessments in all countries, by regional groups, and by
international organizations. It is important that these
climatic effects address the social and economic
consequences so that the costs of remedial actions can be
judged against the costs of adaptation or inaction. In
5
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
this connection it will be important to consult with
appropriate industrial groups such as utilities, energy and
chemical companies as well as independent research groups
in universities and other institutions. We noted the
complexity of the interactions of the effects of the recent
drought in the United States and suggest that integrated
regional studies analyzing the complexity of the effects on
all functions in a region may be helpful. The U.S. should
encourage such analyses by competent bodies throughout the
world such as the OECD, and other international
organizations.
POLICY ISSUES
Considering the present state of scientific knowledge
we suggest that the U.S. government adopt the following
policy posture.
a) Although there are other factors that must be
considered, we agreed that the climate change issue is
primarily a global energy policy issue. In light of the
present state of scientific knowledge, we recommend that
the U.S. government advocate a prudent set of energy
options that: (1) favor lower CO₂ emissions, (2) would be
desirable for other environmental and economic reasons; and
(3) would not foreclose future options that might be
desirable in the light of improved understanding. The U.S.
6
government should take the strong position that increased
international attention be directed toward improved energy
efficiency and that research, development, and application
of high energy efficiency technologies be pursued. This is
a direct and immediate way to reduce fossil fuel
consumption, thus reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide
and some other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide and
methane. Such a course would also have beneficial effects
on other environmental problems such as acid deposition.
It should advocate the use wherever economically feasible
of fossil fuels that yield the least carbon dioxide per
thermal unit. Where economically advantageous, natural gas
will be the fuel of choice. The U.S. should further
recognize that ultimately non-fossil energy sources,
incl ding nuclear, solar, and biological will need to
comprise a larger fraction of world energy production and
consumption. We urge that increased research on
alternative energy systems be strongly supported. Most of
us believe that the nuclear energy option needs to be
revisited and steps taken to investigate inherently safe
and publicly acceptable nuclear power systems. We also
note the progress made in solar photovoltaic energy
efficiency, and urge support for the further development of
this option.
We believe it important to recognize that small
reductions on the order of 10-20% in the atmospheric CO₂
7
emission rates will not have large effects on predicted
global temperature increases because of the long residence
time of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. However, it was
recognized that any slowing of the rate of increase of
temperature would be beneficial, to the extent that further
time will be available for adoption of various options.
We discussed proposals for quantitative reductions in
the CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere, such as those proposed
at the recent Toronto Conference where a 20% reduction in
CO₂ loading by the year 2000 was advocated. We agree that
it is premature to set quantitative goals for CO₂ reduction
at the present time because of present scientific
uncertainties and a lack of understanding of the full
economic and social consequences and how such a goal would
be achieved. However, we urge that the U.S. advocate that
each country explore how each can reduce its CO2 emissions.
Discussions on feasible goals and methods of obtaining them
would be useful.
The U.S. government should recommend that governments
and international organizations assess the implications of
various energy options. It is likely that global energy
policy deliberations will be divisive between advanced and
developing countries. The U.S. position on international
energy policy issues will need to take the political
consequences of its positions fully into account.
8
c) Trace Gases
Other greenhouse gases contribute significantly to the
climatic warming. Reductions in Chloro-fluorocarbons
(CFCs) have been successfully addressed by international
treaty in the Montreal Protocols. Because CFCs also
represent a greenhouse gas, we agree that the U.S. should
seek a complete phase out of CFCs on a reasonable time
scale.
d) International Action
The United States might exercise leadership in urging
international action through a presidential statement or
appearance at the United Nations. The issue should also be
raised in all pertinent international forums, such as the
Economic Summits, NATO Foreign Ministers meetings, OECD
Ministerial conferences, etc. to familiarize the world's
political and economic leadership with the problem and
through them raise the world's consciousness about the
climate issue. We note that presidential candidates of
both parties have declared that they will call an
international meeting to address the climate issue.
INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
a) International action on climate change requires
international organizations capable of effectively
addressing the multiple aspects of the problem. The
9
climate change issue is very broad and complex, extending
beyond the purview of any existing intergovernmental
organization. The WMO working with ICSU should remain the
central U.N. technical agency on climate change matters
working closely with other technical agencies, including
UNEP, FAO, and UNESCO in their fields of specialization.
However, the WMO and other technical agencies are not
appropriate forums to address broad policy responses. At
the present time the United Nations' Environmental Program
is the only existing agency with sufficient scope to
address the policy aspects of the climate problem. Some of
us felt that UNEP could not adequately discharge these
functions. Others felt strongly that UNEP has a successful
track record in arriving at international agreements on
environmental problems and could serve as the focal U.N.
agency for policy matters. We also discussed the
possibility of the establishment of a new U.N. council on
climate change, analogous to the Outer Space Committee of
the United Nations which could have the breadth of purview
necessary to deal with climate policy issues. Careful
study should be given to the many possible organizational
arrangements.
b) We examined the desirability of U.S. government
participation in the preparation of a convention on
climate. We came to the conclusion that it is premature to
10
consider a climate convention. The economic, political,
and social consequences are not well enough known and the
uncertainties of current scientific knowledge are too
great. Some of us felt that the U.S. should be willing to
seek international exploration of principles that might
serve as guides for national activities and at a later
date, when sufficient knowledge of consequences are
available, be the basis of a future convention. Others
felt that a "framework" convention might be explored which
would by international agreement establish a set of
principles which could serve as a basis for a more specific
convention.
STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS
There are some actions wholly within the authority of
the Department of State that should be undertaken:
1. AID programs should encourage energy efficiency and
conservation, emphasizing economic benefits while
achieving some small steps toward CO₂ reduction.
2. The Department should stimulate a broad international
educational and consultative process at both technical
and political levels to acquaint leaders in all
countries with the nature of the climate issues.
3. The Department should establish a process for further
education of members of the Foreign Service through
programs at the Foreign Service Institute, newsletters
11
and ambassadorial briefings on the nature of the
climate issue and current USG national and
international efforts.
4. Finally, the Department should undertake a review of
existing treaties and international agreements that
bear some analogy to the greenhouse issue. Although
climate change is very different from other treaty
issues and will undoubtedly require new approaches, we
believe it would be helpful if previous precedents
were well understood for their applicability to the
climate issue.
OES-11/3/88
12
FROM
CONFERENCE STATEMENT
INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF CARBON DIOXIDE
AND OF OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES IN
CLIMATE VARIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS
Sponsored by UNEP/WMO/ICSU
VILLACH, AUSTRIA, 9-15 October 1985
basic scientific understanding:
These conclusions are based on the following consensus of current
dioxide (CO2). nitrous oxide (M₂O), methane (CHe). ozone (0,)
The amounts of some trace gases in the troposphere. notably carbon
and chloro-fluorocarbons (CFC) are increasing. These gases are
essentially transparent to incoming short-wave solar radiation
the they absorb and eait longwave radiation and are thus able to influence but
Earth's climate.
The is role of greenhouse gases other than CO, in changing the climate
continue, the combined concentrations of atmospheric CO2 and trends
already about as important as that of CO2. If present
CO2 greenhouse from gases would be radiatively equivalent to a other of
pre-industrial levels possibly as early as the doubling 2030s.
The most advanced experiments with general circulation
the equivalent, temperature climatic climatic system of for systes between a show doubling and increases 1.5 the and of imperfections the 1.5°C. of atmospheric the global Because of the mean CO2 of models. the concentration, equilibrium complexity models particularly of surface of or the
greenhouse changes reaching outside with respect will this the Bean be to range slowed ocean-atmosphere equilibrium cannot by the be excluded. temperatures inertia interactions of The the corresponding realization oceans: and clouds. the of to delay values such doubled in
gas concentrations is expected to be a matter of decades.
While other factors such as aerosol concentrations,
the energy input, and changes in vegetation may also influence changes in solar
climate greenhouse gases are likely to be the most important cause climate, of
change over the next century.
show that However, regional differences from the modelled global with
Regional confidence. scale changes in climate have not yet been
warming may be greater in high latitudes during late averages autumn
high and winter latitudes: than in the tropics; annual mean runot! may increase
regions. temperature at middle latitude in the Northern Hemisphere. In over the
continents and summer dryness may become more frequent in
will convective have average far increase global reaching rainfall throughout rise, consequences. could but increases the the increase. tropics effects are Potential expected whereas on ecosystems evapotranspiration to in be moist smaller and tropical humans than probably could tropical regions the
of It this is estimated on the basis of observed changes since the
and this range would have major direct effects on coastal upper
portion of of 20-140 centimeters. A sea level rise in the lead to
sea-level century, rise that global warming of 1.5°C to 4.5°C would beginning a
future leading to a such larger rise in sea level, although possible at sheet some
estuaries. A significant melting of the West Antarctic ice areas
date. is not expected during the next century.
global Based on analyses of observational data. the estimated increase
attributable is consistent with the projected temperature years of increase between
0.3 and Bean 0.7°C temperature during the last one hundred in
gases. to the observed increase in CO2 and other
manner to although it cannot be ascribed in a scientifically greenhouse rigorous
these factors alone.
obtained from future change in climate of the order of there is
doubt Based that on evidence a of effects of past climatic changes. little
agriculture. water could resources have profound and sea effects ice. on global atmospheric ecosystems,
concentration climate models for a doubling of the magnitude CO2