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Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #2 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][3]
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Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #2 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][3]
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These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
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Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #2 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and
Other Information][3]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 7, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR D. ALLAN BROMLEY
WILLIAM K. REILLY
RICHARD STEWART
charge
FRED BERNTHAL
C. BOYDEN GRAY
DICK SCHMALENSEE
BOB GRADY
THERESA GORMAN
FROM:
STEPHEN DANZANSKY
SUBJECT:
Position Paper for Bergen Conference
Attached for your review is a draft position paper prepared by
the State Department for the delegation to the Bergen Conference.
It attempts to respond to the changes suggested by our strategy
task force (described in the second attachment). Several
sections of the paper should be reviewed carefully to ensure that
the revised positions satisfy our concerns:
(1) The fall-back position regarding the precautionary
principle, described on page 4 (with the first position
being deletion of the principle in its entirety), which
seeks to insert the converse of the concept of doubt not
being used to postpone action, i.e., doubt not being used as
the sole justification for action.
(2) The suggested revision to the language regarding the cost-
effective methods of preventing and minimizing emissions,
described on page 10. The response is to note that
abatement strategies must be established based on cost-
benefit analysis, with their implementation being tied to
cost-effectiveness. State asserts that this is what has
always been intended and that this clarification will be
acceptable to the other parties at Bergen.
(3)
The non-bracketed language in the declaration reflecting the
relative importance of human health over biological
dait
degradation, discussed on page 17. State argues that
opening this language would invite possible amendments from
cheskute
other nations, most of which we would probably not want; it
would prefer to hold this suggested change in reserve and
offer it if another nation opens this section for
modification.
As the delegation is leaving within the next few days, any
revisions must be worked out quickly. Please provide me or Barry
McBee with your comments by noon on Tuesday May 8.
STRATEGY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDED CHANGES
TO
STATE DEPARTMENT DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO POSTS RE:
9 March 1990
DRAFT BERGEN MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
Paragraph 6 (Declaration paragraph 7): Confirm that
deletion of "precautionary principle" is first
priority. Fall back position, if bracketed language is
not deleted, is to delete all wording after
"degradation," namely, "even if final scientific proof
is lacking. Doubt should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation."
Paragraph 7 (Decl. para. 12c): Strongly confirm that
U.S. cannot abide CO2 targets and timetables. We will
accept first bracketed language to the extent that it
accurately repeats language of Noordjwig but will not
walk forward or backward from Noordjwig agreement.
Paragraph 9 (Decl. para. 13b): Emphasize USG objection
to any language calling for "phasing out" of toxics as
ultimate aim and substitute instead the standard of
protecting the public health. Public health protection
should be the primary motivating force.
Paragraph 12 (Decl. para. 12c): Contrary to State
draft the USG should not support the first option as
presently drafted. The language implies that we must
be guided by the principle of prevention and
minimization of emissions but do so in the most cost-
effective manner. The test must be cost-benefit, not
cost-effective, so that costs of prevention are always
weighed against the economic consequences. The test
must come before the commitment to prevention and
minimization not after the decision is made.
Similarly the USG alternative language should also
reflect the concept of cost-benefit tied to prevention
and minimization.
O Comment on non-bracketed language (Decl. para. 5):
Changes must be made in draft Declaration to modify and
shift emphasis in statement of Common Challenge
contained in draft Declaration para 5. Human health
must take preeminence over biological degradation and
should be the primary (and thus first in order)
motivator and responsibility of governments. Likewise
the word "may" must be inserted before "threaten many
of the earth's biological systems This will
be
dealt with by delegation during final negotiations
since it isn't within bracketed language.
4/30/90
BERGEN CONFERENCE: "ACTION FOR A COMMON FUTURE"
May 8-16
Bergen, Norway
POSITION PAPER
I. THE JOINT AGENDA FOR ACTION
The Joint Agenda for Action (JAA) will be the focus of
activity and discussion during the May 8-11 "Working
Session" of the Bergen conference. The JAA was drafted
jointly by representatives of industry, science, youth,
labor, and environmental NGOs as a more detailed statement
of environmental objectives than the Ministerial
Declaration. At the March 5-9 Geneva Prepcom for the Bergen
conference, ECE government representatives negotiated
together and with representatives of the five interest
groups to produce the present document. Crucial to the
willingness of the ECE governments to accept the document
was the addition of the second and third paragraphs of the
"Introduction". These paragraphs characterize the JAA as "a
variety of policy and action proposals (which)
warrant
study, elaboration, or further action," or "discussion,
consideration, or decisions." Paragraph three explicitly
notes that inclusion of an item in the JAA does not
pre-judge the final view of any of the participants.
The intent of the second and third paragraphs is to
enable the JAA to serve as a safety valve, where ideas on
which there was no consensus for inclusion in the
Ministerial Declaration could nevertheless be listed by the
conference as worthy of discussion without commiting
governments to action. It is therefore essential that the
non-binding intent of the second and third paragraphs be
maintained.
Further evidence of the desire of the ECE governments to
regard the JAA as a non-binding document is contained in
paragraph three of the Ministerial Declaration where the JAA
is referred to by the phrase "of which we take note," one
of the lowest orders of diplomatic recognition.
4/30/90
- 2 -
Representatives of the five interest groups also meeting
at Bergen are likely to propose additions or revisions to
the JAA during the Working Session, when representatives
will address sessions devoted to a discussion of the four
main concerns of the conference: awareness raising and
public participation; sustainable energy use; sustainable
industrial development; and the economics of sustainable
development. So long as nothing inconsistent with the
intent of the second and third paragraphs is proposed, the
US can be relatively flexible in considering any such
proposals for inclusion in the document if they seem
appropriate for consideration by governments or NGOs.
Each of the five interest groups holding their own
conference at Bergen is expected to adopt a list of
"commitments", or an "agenda", embodying goals toward which
the interest groups will work. It is expected that these
groups will request that these commitments or agendas be
added to the JAA, to give them some standing as Bergen
conference documents. The method agreed upon by ECE
governments and NGO representatives at the Geneva Prepcom
was that these commitments would be accepted as attachments
or annexes to the JAA, so long as they are clearly
identified as such, with clear lines of demarcation between
the NGO commitments and the core of the JAA.
US Objectives Concerning the Joint Agenda for Action
--maintain the non-binding nature of the JAA, as
expressed in its second and third paragraphs.
--ensure clear identification of NGO "commitments" or
"agendas" and a clear demarcation between such statements
and the body of the JAA if such statements are proposed for
addition to the JAA.
--maintain a posture of flexibility and openness to
other proposed additions or revisions in the JAA so long as
the proposals could correctly be judged to be worthy of
"discussion, consideration, or decision."
--use the opportunities presented by the Working Session
to convey an impression of open-mindedness, of willingness
to cooperate with NGOs to achieve environmental objectives,
and to stress the commitment of the USG to the principles of
sustainable development.
4/30/90
- 3 -
II. THE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
Points are dealt with in sequence where bracketed
language appears in the Declaration. Because the present
draft represents the result of extensive negotiations at the
Geneva Prepcom, re-opening negotiations on any language
which is not bracketed at present should be limited largely
to grammatical and syntactical points. To do more than this
would open the entire document for review, which would not
likely be in USG interests.
Paragraph 7: Precautionary Principle
Achieving a satisfactory resolution of this issue is
essential if the USG is to join in the ECE consensus on the
Ministerial Declaration.
Bracketed Paragraph:
"7. [Policies must be based on the precautionary
principle. Environmental measures must therefore
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental
degradation, even if final scientific proof is lacking.
Doubt should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
to prevent environmental degradation.
Objective: Deletion of the paragraph from the
Declaration.
Fall-back objective: Define the principle in terms the
USG can accept.
Background: The US was alone at Geneva in objecting to
the inclusion of paragraph 7, contending that the language
is unclear and that we could not be sure what kind of
commitment is intended. The likelihood of deleting the
paragraph is low.
The precautionary principle (PP) has begun to appear in
a number of documents introduced at international
environmental meetings, particularly those dealing with
marine pollution. The Nordics and the FRG are strong
advocates.
The principle does not have an internationally-agreed
definition. Some have described it as expressing the
general notion that it is desirable to prevent pollution.
Others have described it as meaning that before an activity
may be undertaken, it must be proven by the activity's
proponent that the activity will not harm the environment.
In effect, this interpretation shifts the burden of proof
from the opponent of an activity to show harm to the
proponent of an activity to show no harm.
4/30/90
- 4 -
Talking Points in Favor of Deletion
--The PP does not have an agreed definition.
--The draft declaration language is too broad and
open-ended.
--It poses a "single-criterion" decision rule for
making policy judgments on complex issues with many
economic, socio-cultural, as well as scientific
aspects. The approach is impractical in that it
does not allow sufficient latitude for taking into
account the particular activity in question, nor
the likelihood, nature, or magnitude of potential
harm.
--A strict application of the PP implementing
measures to prevent environmental degradation even
where the threat is in doubt would cause societies
to use scarce resources or costly regulatory
measures in ways that might later be found not to
attack the real problem. Investments to reduce
uncertainty (e.g. in research) can in many
circumstances be more cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation than a frontal
attack on threats which may be poorly understood.
Indeed, costly assaults on problems later shown not
to exist could undermine credibility and public
support for well-founded programs of environmental
protection.
Fall-back Position
Option A: Seek to reword the definition of the
precautionary principle in paragraph 7 to bring it
into line with the President's "no regrets" policy.
Propose as substitute for paragraph 7:
"Policies promoting sustainable development should
be based on the principle of a precautionary
approach inherent in responsible stewardship.
Environmental measures must therefore anticipate,
prevent, and attack the causes of significant
environmental degradation, even if final scientific
proof is lacking. Doubt should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation, nor should doubt alone
be invoked as adequate justification for action."
4/30/90
- 5 -
"Must" is acceptable in place of "should" if
necessary to achieve the acceptance of this
proposal.
If objection is raised to the phrase "inherent in
responsible stewardship", the phrase may be dropped
if it assists in gaining acceptance of the other
changes proposed above.
Talking Points in Favor of Option A
-This language recognizes the need to take action
where significant possibilities of degradation
exist, even in cases of scientific uncertainty.
--It recognizes that scientific uncertainty should
not be invoked to justify postponing measures, but
balances this recognition by noting that it is
equally true that scientific uncertainty cannot be
invoked alone to justify action.
Option B: Make the paragraph less specific by
shortening it to read:
"Policies must be based on the precautionary
principle. Environmental measures must therefore
anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of
environmental degradation."
Talking Points in Favor of Option B
--We accept the need to deal prudently with
scientific uncertainty. Such uncertainty, however,
should not be invoked as justification for action
where the nature of the threat to be addressed is
unclear.
--All of our societies face limited financial
resources and must employ these prudently. Costly
assaults on problems later shown not to exist could
undermine credibility and public support for
well-founded programs of environmental protection.
4/30/90
- 6 -
Paragraph 11d: Economic and technological assistance
Bracketed Paragraph:
(d) To support, in addition to present development
assistance, programmes by multilateral agencies to increase
the flow of capital and environmentally benign technology to
developing and East European countries, [through financial
mechanisms appropriate to the economic conditions of each
country, to meet incremental costs incurred in addressing
international obligations to protect the global
environment. ] OR [in support of high priority resource and
environmental management projects, especially those that
protect the international environment.] [To participate
actively, throught existing fora, to establish a mechanism
to finance the reduction of ozone depleting substances to
assist developing countries implementing their obligations
under the Montreal Protocol.] Furthermore, donors and
multilateral agencies should take into account the
relationship between debt service burdens and the ability of
countries both within and outside the ECE to carry out
measures which ensure the protection of the environment. We
will also urge that bilateral and multilateral partners and
financial institutions take full account of environmental
considerations and opportunities for natural resource
savings in their project and structural adjustment lending
operations, and that these operate in an efficient and
non-wasteful manner."
Objective: Adoption of the first bracket. ["through
financial mechanisms appropriate to the economic conditions
of each country, to meet incremental costs incurred in
addressing international obligations to protect the global
environment."]
Talking Points in Favor
--This general statement allows flexibility in
determining the appropriate mechanisms for
assistance, and is applicable to a wide variety of
global environmental problems.
Fall-back Position: The second bracket is acceptable.
4/30/90
- 7 -
Paragraph lld (Third Bracket): Funding Mechanism for
Montreal Protocol Obligations
(Third bracket: "To participate actively, through
existing fora, to establish a mechanism to finance the
reduction of ozone depleting substances to assist developing
countries implementing their obligations under the Montreal
Protocol. ")
Objective: We prefer the deletion of this third bracket
on grounds that the question of how to assist developing
countries to meet their obligations under the Montreal
Protocol is being actively addressed at the present time in
negotiations devoted specifically to amending the Protocol.
This question need not be addressed in the Bergen
declaration. The point can also be considered as covered in
the language of the first bracket. The third bracket also
contains bad syntax.)
Fall-back Position: Accept the bracket, since the USG
is already doing what it calls for. However, attempt to
substitute "establish means to help finance" for the phrase
"establish a mechanism to finance".
Paragraph lle: Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers on Trade
With Developing Countries
Bracketed Paragraph:
"(e) To accelerate in the OECD and other appropriate
fora, the dialogue on the interlinkages between
environmental and trade policies. The dialogue should focus
on, inter alia, the role of international trade in promoting
sustainable development through growth and increased
efficiency, and the application of trade rules and
instruments to environmental measures [and the reduction of
tariff and non-tariff barriers on the imports of goods from
developing countries.]
Objective: Eliminate the reference to "imports" and
"developing countries" by substituting the following:
"and the reduction of tariff and non-tariff
barriers which hinder sustainable development.'
4/30/90
- 8 -
Talking Points in Favor of Substitution
--We support the reciprocal reduction of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade, but the language
presently contained in the declaration suggests an
assymetrical reduction which would only favor
developing countries. We believe the ECE desire to
recognize the special needs of developing countries
can be accomplished by adopting the more general
language we propose.
Fall-back Position: Revise the bracket to read "and the
reciprocal reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers on
international trade."
Paragraph 12b: The IPCC and Protocols to a Framework
Climate Change Convention
Bracketed Language:
"(b) To reaffirm support for the IPCC as the principal
forum for scientific assessment related to climate change;
the potential impacts of such change; and the options
available for preventing or adapting to changes in the
climate of the earth. We pledge our nations to continued
support for the work of the Panel [after its interim report
this August. ] We pledge our full support for the early
completion of the work on a framework convention on climate
change and the [subsequent] development of protocols dealing
with, inter alia, greenhouse gases and forestry."
Objective: Drop the brackets--keep the phrase--in the
sentence "We pledge our nations to continued support for the
work of the Panel [after its interim report this August. ]"
Talking Point in Favor of Keeping the Phrase
--Virtually all parties agreed at the IPCC Plenary
in February that the work of the Panel should
continue after the issuance of its interim report.
Objective: Retain the word "subsequent" so that the
final sentence in this paragraph reads:
"We pledge our full support for the early
completion of the work on a framework convention on
climate change and the subsequent development of
protocols dealing with, inter alia, greenhouse
gases and forestry."
4/30/90
- 9 -
Talking Point in Favor of Retention of the Word "Subsequent
--It is premature to commit ECE members to
negotiate protocols to a convention which itself
has not yet been drafted.
--It was agreed at the Geneva Prepcom that the word
"subsequent" would be accepted. Bracketing the
word was a clerical error by the Secretariat.
Paragraph 12c: CO2 and Greenhouse Gas Levels
Achieving a satisfactory resolution of this issue is
essential if the USG is to join in the ECE consensus on the
Ministerial Declaration.
Bracketed Language:
"(c) [To recognize the need to stabilize, while ensuring
stable development of the world economy. CO2 emissions and
emissions of other greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol. The industrialized nations agree that
such stabilization should be achieved by them as soon as
possible, at levels to be considered by the IPCC and the
Second World Climate Conference.] OR [to take other
actions to stabilize the overall CO2 emissions at present
levels by the year 2000. This is a preliminary target which
has to be considered in the light of the recommendations
from the IPCC and Second World Climate Conference.] The
process of the IPCC should be supported by the investigation
of the feasibility of achieving targets to limit or reduce
CO2 emissions including e.g. a 20% reduction of CO2 emission
level by the year 2005 as recommended by the Scientific
World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto 1988. "
Objective: Do not exceed or walk backward from the
commitment entered into in the Noordwijk Declaration.
Retain the first bracket in the paragraph and drop the
second.
Talking Point in Favor of Repeating Noordwijk
Declaration Language
--It is premature to pre-judge the outcome of the
IPCC process by entering into new commitments on
greenhouse gases at the present time.
--It is unwise to give undue prominance to CO2. It
is well established that CO2 is only one of many
greènhouse gases which need to be reduced to solve
the problem of global climate change.
4/30/90
- 10 -
--Bergen is an opportunity to consolidate much good
work of the recent past. It is not an occasion to
extend committments previously agreed upon in the
Noordwijk Declaration or in other fora. We must
concentrate now on carrying out undertakings
previously agreed upon before we decide what
further commitments may be called for. Let us not
in our impatience to achieve real progress in
facing the many environmental problems before us
send the wrong signal to the rest of the world.
This would surely be the result if the major
industrialized nations of the world were reported
as being unable to reach a consensus on this
extremely important issue.
Paragraph 12f: Abatement Strategies/Best Available
Technologies/Critical Loads
There are 3 bracketed versions proposed under this point:
"(f) [The establishment of adequate abatement strategies
should be guided by the principle of prevention and
minimization of emissions in the most cost-effective way.
OR
[Our work to formulate abatement strategies should make use
as appropriate of the priniciple of best available
technology not entailing excessive costs [or other
cost-effective policy options] to ensure that local,
regional and global critical loads are [achieved] OR [not
exceeded. ]
OR
[The concept of critical loads, at a local, regional and
global level, should [not be exceeded and] OR [where
possible, ] serve as an underlying principle to guide-our
national efforts to formulate abatement strategies. Such
strategies will be devised according to national
circumstances and may include best available technologies or
other economically efficient approaches. ]"
Objective: Revise the paragraph to read:
"The establishment and implementation of adequate
abatement strategies should be guided by the principle
of prevention and minimization of emissions in the most
cost-beneficial and cost-effective way.
Talking Points to Support Revision of First Bracket
--Delegation may discuss the comprehensive approach
the US takes toward the question of abatement
strategies.
4/30/90
- 11 -
Talking Points to Oppose Second and Third Brackets
--This language gives too much prominence to the
concept of "best available technology". While this
concept may be useful at times, it needs to be
employed with care only when circumstances fully
justify it.
--US experience with the "best available
technology" standard has convinced us that the use
of this concept as a benchmark standard can result
in undesirable and perverse consequences, both
environmental and economic.
--BAT imposes a stagnant technology standard chosen
by governments rather than by expert engineers and
scientists in the field. Once the technology is
installed, a firm has no further incentive to
develop new and better technology or otherwise to
control pollution further until governments impose
new standards.
--Incentive-based approaches are preferable because
they provide continuing motivation for firms to
develop better pollution control methods and to use
resources efficiently.
Paragraph 12g: Fuel Consumption by Automobiles
Bracketed Paragraph:
" (g) To introduce and update an energy labelling system
and voluntary agreements or mandatory standards, as may be
appropriate, for products and processes aimed at improving
energy efficiency of buildings and appliances and to ask the
ECE to review progress in this regard at regular intervals.
[In particular governments will consider targets for energy
efficient cars, taking into account the experience gained
with prototypes which have achieved 2 to 4 litres per 100 km
under special conditions]
Objective: Eliminate the reference to cars "which have
achieved 2 to 4 liters per 100km".
Talking Points in Favor of Dropping This Bracket
This point is too specific for a ministerial
declaration. It detracts from the ministerial
quality of the Declaration as a whole.
--The point is covered in a preferable, more
general way in paragraph 12i, second tick-mark,
where it is stated that governments should promote
"energy efficient vehicles with low emission
levels.
4/30/90
- 12 -
Paragraph 12j, third tick-mark: Renewable Sources of
Energy
"(All relevant international organizations are
requested) to redress imbalances between
institutional arrangements for renewable sources of
energy compared with those for nuclear and other
conventional sources."
Objective: Delete this point. If not possible to
delete it, relocate it within the Declaration, with a more
appropriate preambular phrase.
Talking Point for Deletion of "Institutional Imbalance" Point
--This is an inappropriate task to assign to
"international organizations" for action. If we
accept that an institutional imbalance does exist,
then it is national governments, not international
organizations, which should address the issue and
seek to correct the imbalance.
--In this case, this point should be moved
elsewhere in the "Sustainable Energy Use" section,
and should be re-written to read:
"All ECE member countries should work individually
and collectively towards redressing any imbalances
which may exist between institutional arrangements
for addressing issues related to renewable sources
of energy, compared to existing arrangements for
addressing questions related to nuclear and other
conventional sources."
--However, the United States is not convinced that
there is in fact an institutional imbalance in the
handling of these issues. We would ask delegations
which support the inclusion of this point to
explain to us the nature of the perceived imbalance.
Paragraph 13: Best Available Technologies/Critical Loads
Bracketed Language:
"(13.) The ECE countries should further develop
cost-effective bilateral and regional strategies for
preventing pollution. [This should be based on appropriate
use of best available technology not entailing excessive
costs or other cost effective measures, so as to ensure that
local, regional and global critical loads are not exceeded. ]"
4/30/90
- 13 -
Objective: Replace "cost-effective" with
"cost-beneficial" both places where it appears. The first
replacement is in the opening, non-bracketed sentence.
Procedurally it would probably be easier to obtain agreement
to substituting "cost-beneficial" within the bracket, and
then noting that editorial consistency would then require a
similar change in the opening unbracketed sentence.
Talking Point for "Cost-Benefit" Substitution
--"Cost-benefit" means that the costs of prevention
are always weighed against the economic
consequences. This test must come before the
commitment to prevent pollution, not after the
decision is made. Once a decision has been made to
pursue a course of action, it would then be
implemented in a "cost-effective" manner, i.e., in
an economically efficient way.
Paragraph 13b: Phasing Out of Toxic Substances
Achieving a satisfactory resolution of this issue is
essential if the USG is to join in the ECE consensus on the
Ministerial Declaration.
Bracketed Language:
" (b) To encourage the safe and appropriate use and
disposal of hazardous substances. To accelerate work on
reducing the use and emission of hazardous substances that
are toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative [with the
ultimate aim of phasing them out.] [Prepare regional
timetables by 1992 for phasing out the most environmentally
damaging substances. ]"
Objective: (1) Delete references to "phasing out" the
use of toxic substances. Re-focus attention on the point
that it is the protection of the public health which should
be our primary concern. Our efforts should be to reduce the
risks associated with the use of such substances.
(2) Place period after "bioaccumulative", drop
remaining two brackets.
4/30/90
- 14 -
Background: A significant number of ECE members, with
Sweden the most vigorous advocate, want to commit to phasing
out toxic substances. These are not further defined in
paragraph 13b, but the Joint Agenda for Action makes
explicit reference to the "Black List" of the Paris
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Land-based Sources, a list of about 1000 toxic substances
including the heavy metals mercury and cadmium. These
substances are also sometimes referred to as the "Sunset
List" in reference to proposals to phase them out of use.
At an April OECD meeting in Stockholm, participants agreed
upon a more comprehensive approach incorporating the concept
of total risk reduction, which may moderate somewhat the
previous insistence on total phase-out as a goal.
Talking Points in Favor of Dropping References to
"Phasing Out" Toxic Substances
--Our primary concern should be the protection of
the public health. We strongly support work to
reduce risks associated with the use of hazardous
substances. This commitment may result in the
phase-out of some chemicals, but leaves open the
consideration of factors such as the availability
of substitutes, economic considerations, and risk
assessments.
--We cannot commit ourselves to a blanket
phasing-out of all hazardous substances without
regard to needs, costs, or other benefits from
their use.
--Even without the bracketed phrases, we believe
paragraph 13b contains a significant commitment by
ECE members which can be regarded with
satisfaction. "Accelerating work" on reducing the
use and emission of these substances is the
appropriate commitment at our present state of
knowledge.
Fall-back objective: Revise the first bracket to read:
["with the ultimate aim of overall risk reduction,
taking into account benefits from their use,
availability of substitutes, economic considerations,
and risk assessments."
Substitute the following for the second bracket:
["Prepare timetables for completion of scientific and
economic assessments and for establishing timing and
targets for the subsequent reduction in the use of
environmentally damaging substances. "]
4/30/90
- 15 -
Paragraph 13d: Extra-territorial Application of
Environmental Standards
Bracketed Language:
"(d) To encourage investors to [apply, as a minimum], OR
[take into account] environmental analysis procedures and
the environmental standards required in their home country
to investments abroad. Industry and government should
co-operate in establishing guidance for this purpose."
Objective: Adopt the second bracket: domestic
environmental standards should be "taken into account" when
investors invest abroad.
Talking Points in Favor of Deleting First Bracket
("apply as a minimum")
--Environmental standards to be applied to
investments abroad should be determined by the host
country, in the absence of binding international
agreements.
--Applying domestic environmental standards abroad,
as a minimum, suggests that the developed country's
standards would carry more weight than those of the
country receiving the investment. Many developing
countries would object to this attitude.
--In bidding on projects in other countries,
countries having the strictest environmental
standards would be placing their companies at a
competitive disadvantage compared to other
companies from countries which might have lower
standards.
--In our view, each country should develop and
enforce its own laws and regulations to safeguard
its environment. Standards developed in one
country may not always be applicable to another.
It is fine to take these standards into account,
but to apply them as a minimum in some other
country raises a variety of other difficult
issues. How would the enforcement of such "minimum
standards" be enforced abroad, for instance?
4/30/90
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Paragraph 14e: Environmental Impact Assessments
Bracketed Language:
"(e) [To undertake the prior assessment and public
reporting of the environmental impact and risks of any
policies, plans, projects, products or industrial facilities
that may have significant] effects on human health and state
of the environment OR [To undertake the prior assessment and
public reporting of the environmental impact of projects
which are likely to have a significant effect on the human
environment and, so far as practicable, of the policies,
programmes and plans which underlie such projects] and to
ensure that developing countries are assisted through
bilateral and multilateral channels in evaluating the
environmental impact and sustainability of their own
development projects."
Objective: Seek adoption of the second bracket:
Talking Points in Favor of the Second Bracket
--We are already following this practice in the US.
Paragraph 14f: Rights of Individuals to Participate in
Decision-Making Process
Bracketed Language:
" (f) To reaffirm and build on the CSCE conclusions
regarding the rights of individuals, groups and
organizations concerned with environmental issues, and in
addition to safeguard the rights of individuals and
concerned groups to have access to all relevant information
and to be consulted and participate in the planning and
decision-making concerning activities which may affect
health and environment with reasonable access to appropriate
legal or administrative remedies and redress [according to
national regulations and administrative practices.
Objective: Prefer to see the bracketed phrase dropped,
but are flexible on this point.
Talking Point in Favor of Dropping Bracketed Phrase:
--The commitment is stronger without the qualifying
phrase at the end. The phrase is already implied
by "reasonable access to appropriate legal or
administrative remedies and redress."
4/30/90
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III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
Paragraph 5: Threat to Human Health and Biological
Systems
Paragraph is not bracketed at present:
"5. Today environmental degradation and depletion of
resources threaten many of the earth's biological systems as
well as human health and the quality of human life.
Unsustainable patterns of production and consumption,
particularly in industrialized countries, are at the root of
numerous environmental problems, notably the depletion of
the resource base which would foreclose options for future
generations."
Objective: Revise the first sentence to read:
"Today environmental degradation and depletion of
resources may threaten human health as well as the
earth's biological systems and the quality of human
life."
Talking Points in Favor of Revision
--There are a few places in the text which, even
though not bracketed, could be improved if small
editorial or syntactical changes could be made.
--It is important when we speak to the entire ECE
community and to the general public at large that
we not be unduly alarmist in our assessments of the
environmental challenges we face.
--Insertion of the word "may" before "threaten"
more accurately reflects the current state of our
scientific knowledge. The consequences of many
environmental challenges are by no means certain.
We recognize the possibility of a threat to human
health and other biological systems, but the exact
nature and extent of this threat is in many cases
unclear.
--Human health should be our preeminent concern,
even before biological degradation. For this
reason we believe it should be spoken of before
reference to the earth's biological systems.
4/30/90
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Charter of Environmental Rights and Obligations
Objective: Oppose any recognition of the idea of
embodying environmental rights in a charter.
Background: A group of experts hosted by the Dutch
government has drawn up a proposed environmental rights
charter. A briefing on this charter was presented to the
March Geneva Prepcom but no thorough discussion of the idea
took place. We understand that this charter, which has the
support of some NGOs, may be presented for consideration at
Bergen, either to the working sessions devoted to the Joint
Agenda for Actyion or to the ministerial sessions. The
long-range objective of this effort seems to be the adoption
of a document on environmental rights by the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development.
Talking Points on "Charter of Environmental Rights and
Obligations"
--We firmly support political and civil rights, but
do not believe that environmental "rights" should
be the subject of an international "charter."
--We recognize that one of the objectives of
supporters of an environmental rights charter is to
promote citizens' rights to participate in the
policy formulation process. We believe this issue
was squarely addressed in the November 1989 Sofia
CSCE Conference Declaration, and that it would be a
mistake for the ECE to take any action which would
divert attention from the important commitments
agreed upon at that time.
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United States Department of State
Will Mean
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520
Jumb
March 23, 1990
Chrry (ipcc)
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM
To:
Distribution
From:
OES - Richard J. Smith at
Subject:
RSWG Legal Mechanisms Paper
Attached is the revised legal mechanisms paper prepared by
the international topic coordiators. We have worked with the
British and Canadians informally to ensure, as was agreed in
February, that the structure of the paper is that of an
"issues" paper. The paper is a distinct improvement over the
previous two versions and would appear to be a valuable
contribution to future negotiators.
We are seeking to clarify the status of the two U.S.
contributions on existing legal agreements and institutional
arrangements; as you may recall, they were to be attached as
appendices to this report.
Roger Beetham has invited one representative each from a
limited number of RSWG members (20) to attend a meeting in
mid-April to further refine the paper. In preparation for that
meeting, we request that you submit any comments to Sue Biniaz
(phone: 647-1370; fax: 647-1037) by March 30.
UNCLASSIFIED
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IPCC: RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
Legal Measures: Report of Topic Co-ordinators
(Canada, Malta and the UK)
1. The following report has as its primary objective the discussion
of elements that might be included in a future framework Convention
on Climate Change, and a discussion of the issues that are likely, to
arise in the context of developing those elements.
2. There is a general view that while existing legal instruments
and institutions with a bearing on climate should be fully utilized
and further strengthened, they are insufficient alone to meet the
challenge. A very broad international consensus has therefore
emerged in the IPCC, confirmed notably at the 44th United Nations
General Assembly, on the need for a framework Convention on Climate
Change. Such a Convention should generally follow the format of the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, in laying
down, as a minimum, general principles and obligations. It should
further be framed in such a way as to gain the adherence of the
largest possible number and most suitably balanced spread of
countries; contain provision for separate annexes/protocols to deal
with specific obligations, eg research and systematic observation,
obligations concerning greenhouse gases. As part of the commitment
of the parties to action on greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse
effects of global warming, the Convention would also address the
particular financial needs of the developing countries and the
question of the access to and transfer of technology.
3. The paper points out a number of issues to be decided in the
negotiation of a Convention. In general these are:
- the political imperative of striking the correct
balance between the arguments for a far-reaching,
action-oriented Convention and the need for urgent
adoption of such a Convention so as to begin tackling
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04
- the extent to which specific obligations, particularly
on the control of emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases, should be included in the Convention
itself or be the subject or separate protocols:
- the timing of negotiation of such protocols in relation
to the negotiations on the Convention.
4. In particular, within the Convention the following specific
issues will need to be addressed:
"
(a) Financial needs of developing countries.
The need for additional resources for developing
countries, and the manner in which this should be
addressed, particularly in terms of the nature, size
and conditions of the funding, even if detailed
arrangements form the subject of a separate protocol.
(b) Transfer of technology. The basis on which the
promotion of the development and transfer of technology
and provision of technical assistance to developing
countries should take place will need to be elaborated,
taking into account considerations such as terms of
transfer, assured access, intellectual property rights
and the environmental soundness of such technology.
(c) Institutions. Views differ substantially on the role
and powers of the institutions to be created by the
Convention particularly in exercising supervision and
control over the obligations undertaken.
5. The co-ordinators do not seek to make a value judgement in
listing and summarising in the attached paper the elements proposed
for inclusion in a framework Convention: their text seeks merely to
assist the future negotiators in their task. They note however that
a readiness to address the foregoing fundamental problems in a
realistic manner will be a prerequisite for ensuring the success of
the negotiations and the support of a sufficiently wide and
representative sureed of
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05
ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
1. PREAMBLE
In keeping with common treaty practice including the format of
the Vienna Convention, the Climate Change Convention would contain a
preamble which might seek to address the following items:
- a description of problem and reasons for action (need for
timely and effective response while awaiting absolute
scientific certainty);
"
- a reference to relevant legal instruments (such as the
Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol) and declarations
(such as UNGA Resolution 43/53, Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and the ENMOD Treaty);
- recognition that climate change is a common concern of
mankind, affects humanity as a whole and should be
approached within a global framework;
- recognition of the need for an environment of a quality
that permits a life of dignity and well-being for present
and future generations;
- reference to balance between sovereign right of states to
exploit natural resources and concomitant duty to protect
and conserve climate for benefit of mankind;
- endorsement of concept of sustainable development;
- recognition of the need to improve scientific knowledge
(eg through systematic observation) and to study the social
and economic impacts of climate change;
- recognition of the importance of development and transfer of
technology and of the circumstances and needs, particularly
financial, of developing countries; need for regulatory,
supportive and adjustment measures to take into account
different levels of development of countries;
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06
- recognition of responsibility of all countries to make
efforts to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
prevent activities which would adversely affect climate;
- recognition of need for development of strategies to absorb
greenhouse gases, ie protect and increase greenhouse gas
sinks, to limit or reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions and to adapt human activities to the impacts of
climate change.
"
Other issues which may rise during the development of the
preambular language could include:
- whether it is sufficient for the preamble to recognise the
responsibility of all countries to address climate change,
noting that most emissions currently and historically
originate in industrialized countries where the scope for
change is greatest: that emissions from developing countries
may need to grow in order to meet development requirements
and thus are likely to represent, over time, an increasingly
significant percentage of global emissions; that
implementation of the Convention may take place in different
time frames for different categories of countries and may be
qualified by the means at the disposal of individual
countries and their scientific and technical capabilities;
- whether already in the preamble the particular problems of
countries with an agricultural system vulnerable to climate
change and with limited access to capital and technologies
should be addressed, recognising the link with sustainable
development;
- whether mankind's interest in a viable environment should be
characterised as a fundamental right;
- whether there is an antitlement not to be subjected,
directly or indirectly, to the adverse effects of climate
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- whether, in view of the inter-relationship among all
greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks, they should be
treated collectively;
- whether a number of countries should be permitted to meet
their aggregate global climate objectives through joint
arrangements.
2. DEFINITIONS
As is the practice, definitions will need to be elaborated in a
specific article on definitions. The actual terms to be defined
will depend on the purpose of the Convention and thus the language
used by the negotiating parties, and may need to include:
- climate;
- climate change;
- adverse effects;
- greenhouse gases;
- their sinks and sources;
- co₂ equivalence.
3. GENERAL ODLIGATIONS
Following the format of such treaties as the Vienna Convention,
an article would set out the general obligations agreed to by the
Parties to the Convention. Such obligations may relate to, for
example:
- the responsibility to adopt appropriate measures to protect
against the adverse effects of climate change, to limit,
adapt to, and as far as possible prevent, climate change and
to avoid creating other environmental problems in taking
such measures;
- the responsibility to protect and improve the composition of
the atmosphere in order to conserve climate for the benefit
of present and future generations;
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08
- encouragement of steps having the effect of limiting climate
change (eg reforestation, energy efficiency) but which are
already justified on other grounds;
- exploitation of climate for peaceful purposes only and in
accordance with the principles of good neighbourliness;
- co-operation by means of research, systematic observation
and information exchange in order better to understand and
assess the effects of human activities on the climate and
the potential adverse environmental and socio-economic
impacts that could result from climate change;
- encouragement of the development and transfer of relevant
technologies, as well as the provision of technical and
financial assistance, taking into account the particular
needs of developing countries to enable them to fulfil
their obligations;
- co-operation in the formulation and harmonization of
policies and strategies directed at limiting, reducing,
adapting to and, as far as possible preventing, climate
change;
- co-operation in adoption of appropriate legal,
administrative or regulatory measures to address climate
change;
- provision for bilateral, multilateral and regional
agreements or arrangements not incompatible with the
Convention and its annexes/protocols, including
opportunities for groups of countries to fulfil the
requirements on a regional or sub-regional basis;
- permissibility of more stringent national or regional
emission targets than provided for in the Convention
and/or it's annexes/protocols:
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- co-operation with competent international organisations
to implement effectively the objectives of the Convention;
- encouragement of and co-operation in the promotion of
public education and awareness of the environmental and
socio-economic impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and of
climate change;
- commitment to formulate appropriate annexes/protocola on
a sound scientific basis;
- strengthening of existing legal and institutional
instruments and arrangements relating to climate change,
and making full use of existing funding mechanisms.
Other issues which may be expected to arise in the process of
elaborating this article might include the following:
- whether a provision should set any specific goal with
respect to levels of emissions (global or national) or
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases while
ensuring stable development of the world economy,
particularly stabilisation by industrialised countries, as
a first step, of co₂ emissions and emissions of other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
- whether a provision should recognise that implementation of
obligations may take place in different time frames for
different categories of country and/or may be qualified
by the means at a parties' disposal;
- whether, in addressing the transfer of technology, the
provision should address the terms of such transfers (ie
commercial vs. non-commercial, preferential vs.
non-preferential, the relationship between transfers and
the protection of intellectual property rights);
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- whether the question of additionality, with respect to
financial assistance, or the development of new funding
mechanisms and additional financial resources (eg a
Climate Trust Fund), should specifically be mentioned in
regard to aiding (compensating) developing countries in
meeting their obligations under the Convention, particularly
those which may have to bear an abnormal or special burden;
- whether to provide for prior notice and provision of
relevant environmental impact assessment information of
large-scale planned activities that are likely to cause
signficant climate change;
- what should be the basis of emission targets in the
protocols (eg per capita, GDP);
- the particular problem of sea level rise;
- how much detail the Convention should go into, eg over
obligations in respect of co-operation in research and
information.
4. INSTITUTIONS
It has been the general practice under international
environmental agreements to establish various institutional
mechanisms. The Parties to a Climate Change Convention might,
therefore, wish to make provision for a Secretariat, a Conference of
the Parties and a Bureau/Executive Committee. The Secretariat would
perform certain administrative functions assigned to it under the
Convention. The Conference of the Parties may, among other things:
keep under continuous review the implementation of the Convention:
review current scientific information: and promote harmonization of
appropriate policies, strategies and measures for minimising the
release of substances causing or likely to cause climate change.
The Bureau/Executive Committee might be entrusted with functions in
respect of surveillance, verification and compliance.
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11
Issues that may arise in developing provisions for appropriate
institutional mechanisms include:
- whether any of the Convention's institutions (eg the
Conference of the Parties or the Bureau/Executive Committee)
should have the ability to take decisions on response
strategies or functions in respect of surveillance,
verification and compliance that would be binding on all
the parties and, if 80, whether such an institution would
represent all of the parties or be composed of a limited
number of parties based on equitable geographic
representation;
- if a trust fund or other financial mechanism were
established under the Convention, whether there should be
an institution for the administration of such a mechanism;
- whether or not to establish a Scientific Council to provide
advice and make recommendations to the Conference of the
Parties concerning research activities and measures to deal
with climate change,
- whether to provide for the establishment of working groups,
eg on scientific matters as well as on socio-economic
impacts and response strategies.
5. RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATIONS
It would appear to follow general practice to include provision
for co-operation in research and, particularly with respect to air
pollution agreements, systematic monitoring. In terms of research,
if one were to follow the Vienna Convention model, the parties might
be called upon to undertake, initiate, and/or co-operate in,
directly or through international bodies, the conduct of research
on:
- physical and chemical processes that may affect climate;
- substances, practices, processes and activities that could
modify the climate;
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12
- techniques for monitoring and measuring greenhouse gas
emission rates;
- improved climate models, particularly for regional climates:
- environmental, social and economic effects that could result
from modifications of climate;
- alternative substances, technologies and practices;
- environmental, social and economic effects of response
strategies:
- human activities affecting climate;
- coastal areas with particlar reference to sea-level rise;
- water resources; and
- energy efficiency.
Other issues that might arise in developing this provision might
include:
- whether consideration should be given to the establishment
of panels of experts or of an independent scientific board
responsible for the co-ordination of data collection from
the above areas of research;
- whether the parties should co-operate in promoting or
establishing, directly and/or through competent
international bodies, joint or complementary programmes for
systematic monitoring of the climate, including a possible
worldwide system:
1 whether to co-operate in ensuring the collection, validation
and transmission of research and observational data through
appropriate data centres.
- the possibility of on-site inspection.
6. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND REPORTING
Precedents would suggest the inclusion of provision for the
transmission of information through the Secretariat to the
Conference of the Parties on measures adopted by them in
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13
implementation of the Convention and of protocols to which they are
party. In an annex to the Vienna Convention the types of
information exchanged are specified and include scientific,
technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information.
For the purposes of elaborating this provision, issues having to
be addressed by the negotiating partias might include Liie following:
- whether there is the need for the elaboration of a
comprehensive international research programme in order to
facilitate co-operation in exchange of scientific,
"
technological and other information on climate change;
- whether parties should be obliged to report on measures they
have adopted for the implementation of the framework
Convention, with the possible inclusion of regular reporting
on their emissions of greenhouse gases;
- whether each party should additionally be called upon to
develop a national inventory of emissions, strategies and
available technologies for addressing climate change; if so,
the Convention might also call for the exchange of
information on such inventories, strategies and
technologies.
7, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
While the issue of technology has been addressed in the section
on General Obligations, it might be considered desirable to include
a separate provision on technology transfer. Such a provision could
call upon the parties to promote the development and transfer of
technology and provision of technical assistance, taking into
account particularly the needs of developing countries, to enable
them to take steps to limit, reduce and as far as possible prevent
climate change, or to adapt to it.
An issue that is likely to arise is whether special terms (eg
preforontial and/or non-commercial) would attach to climate-related
transfers of technology. This provision will require further
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14
consideration of issues related to assured access Lu, and transfer
of, environmentally sound technologies on favourable terms to
developing countries, and the protection of intellectual property
rights.
8.
CONSULTATION
The parties negotiating the Convention may wish to consider a
provision on consultation between, on the one hand, parties whose
planned activities are likely to cause climate change and, on
the other hand, the Secretariat, relevant international
is
organisations and other parties concerned.
9. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
It would be usual international practice to include a provision
on the settlement of disputes that may arise concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention and/or ito
annexes/protocols. Provisions similar to those in the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer might be employed,
ie voluntary resort to arbitration or the International Court of
Justice (with a binding award) or, if neither of those options is
elected, mandatory resort to concillation (with a recommendatory
award).
10. OTHER PROVISIONS
It would be the usual international practice to include clauses
on the following topics:
- amendment of the Convention:
- status, adoption and amendment of annexes;
- adoption and entry into force of, and amendments to,
protocols:
- signature:
- ratification;
- accession;
- right to vote:
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15
- relationship between the Convention and its protocols:
- entry into force;
- reservations:
- withdrawal;
- depositary:
- authentic texts.
11. ANNEXES AND PROTOCOLS
The negotiating parties may wish the Convention to provide for
the possibility of annexes and/or protocols. Annexes might be
concluded as integral parts of the Convention, while protocols might
be concluded subsequently (as in the case of the Montreal Protocol
to the vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer). The
following among others, might be considered as possible subjects for
annexes or protocols to the Convention:
- fossil fuels;
** carbon dioxide;
- agricultural practices;
- methane;
- nitrous oxide;
- tropospheric ozone;
- forestation;
- funding mechanisms;
- research and systematic observations;
- energy conservation and alternative sources of energy:
- protection of greenhouse gas sinks;
- liability and compensation:
- international emissions trading:
- emission control technologies;
- adaption technologies and practices;
- development and transfer of technology;
Issues that may arise in connection with the development of
annexes and protocols include:
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- whether a single annex or protocol might cover more than
one of the above subjects (eg all greenhouse gases might be
the subject of a single protocol);
- timing, ie, negotiating parties advocating a more action-
oriented Convention may seek to include specific
obligations in annexes as opposed to subsequent protocols;
- sequence, ie, if there are to be a series of protocols, in
what order are they to be taken up (for example, whether
priority should be given to those areas concerning which
the state of scientific understanding is most develped or
,
whether greenhouse gases should be treated in accordance
with their significance in torms of contributing to climate
change.
HD
SUNUKIN
UNITED 2
DS
WMO
UNEP
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICYMAKERS
SUMMARY
OF THE
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Report to IPCC from Working Group 1
Second Draft, 12 March 1990
Redraft following discussion at the WGI Lead Authors Meeting
Edinburgh, 26 February - 2 March, 1990
Prepared by the IPCC Group at the Meteorological Office, Bracknell, UK
1
Draft : Monday, March 12. 1990
1
Executive Summary
2
3
4
We are certain of the following:
5
6
The greenhouse effect is real; natural greenhouse gases already keep the earth over
7
30°C warmer than it would otherwise be.
8
9
Man made emissions are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of
10
the main greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, the chlorofluorocarbons, and
11
nitrous oxide. These increases will lead to a warming of the Earth's surface.
12
13
14
Our best tools predict that, in the absence of other effects, man made
15
emissions will lead to the following changes:
16
17
By the year 2020, global mean temperatures will have risen 1.8 C above pre-industria!,
18
with a probable range between 1.3 and 2.5 C; global mean precipitation and
19
evaporation will have increased by 3%. By the year 2070, the range of temperature
20
increase will be 2.4 to 5.1 C with a best estimate of 3.5 C, and precipitation will be 7%
21
greater. Areas of snow cover and sea-ice will be smaller.
22
23
Regional changes will in most cases be different to the global mean; in general, land
24
surfaces warm more rapidly than the oceans. Examples of regional change are that
25
temperature increases in Southern Europe and North America will be higher than the
26
global mean, accompanied by reduced summer precipitation and soil moisture.
27
28
Sea Level is expected to rise mainly due to the thermal expansion of the oceans and
29
the melting of some land ice. Sea level will rise by about 20cm (with a probable range
30
of 10cm to 32cm) by 2030, and by 2070 it will have risen 45cm (with a range of 33cm
31
to 75cm). Within the next century, it is unlikely that there will be a major outflow of ice
32
from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet due directly to greenhouse warming.
33
34
35
Our best judgement is that:
36
37
Global mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3 to 0.6 C over the last 100
38
years, with the six global-average warmest years being in the 1980s.
39
40
The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models but,
41
because of natural variability and other factors, we cannot say how much of the
42
observed temperature rise to date is due to man-made greenhouse gases.
43
44
There is no real evidence that climate has become more variable over the last few
45
decades. However, episodes of high temperatures will become more frequent in the
46
future simply due to an increase in the mean temperature.
47
48
Ecosystems will be affected by a changing climate and by increasing carbon dioxide
49
concentrations. Many ecosystems disadvantaged by climate change will be unable to
50
migrate fast enough, and will become prone to extensive damage by exceptional
51
events such as drought and fire.
52
2
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
We calculate with confidence that:
3
4
Some gases are potentially more effective than others at changing climate; the Global
5
Warming Potential index of each gas relates the warming effect of its emissions to
6
those of equal emissions of carbon dioxide. Because carbon dioxide emissions are
7
much larger than those of the other greenhouse gases, it is likely to be responsible for
8
over half the total man-made greenhouse effect.
9
10
To stabilise the atmospheric abundances of most greenhouse gases at present levels
11
would require reductions in man-made emissions of 50-80%; methane would require
12
only a 15-20% reduction.
13
14
There is a long lag between changes in the emission of greenhouse gases and the
15
resultant change in climate. Therefore, reductions in man-made greenhouse gas
16
emissions will take decades to centuries to be become fully effective. Emission
17
decreases made sooner will have a greater effect than the same decreases made
18 later.
19
20
21
To Improve our predictive capability, we need:
22
23
To accelerate the development of numerical models.
24
25
To undertake experimental and theoretical studies aimed at understanding
26
critical processes within the climate system.
27
28
To maintain and improve global observing systems, particularly those which
29
are space-based.
30
31
To increase support for national research activities, and for international
32
programmes under which they can be carried out.
33
34
3
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
Introduction: what is the issue ?
2
3
There is concern that man may be inadvertently changing the climate of the globe
4
through the enhanced greenhouse effect, by continuing to emit pollutants which
5
will eventually cause the temperature of the earth to increase - the so called "global
6
warming". If this occurs, consequent changes to sea level and to ecosystems may
7
have a significant impact on society and economies.
8
9
The purpose of the Working Group I report, as determined by the first meeting of
10
IPCC, is to provide a scientific assessment of:
11
12
1) the factors which may affect climate change during the next century
13
especially those which are due to human activity.
14
15
2) the responses of the atmosphere - ocean - land - ice system.
16
17
3) current capabilities of modelling global and regional climate changes
18
and their predictability.
19
20
4) the past climate record and presently observed climate anomalies.
21
22
On the basis of this assessment, the report presents current knowledge regarding
23
predictions of climate change (including sea level rise and the effects on
24
ecosystems) over the next century, the timing of changes together with an
25
assessment of the uncertainties associated with these predictions.
26
27
This Policymakers Summary aims to bring out those elements of the main report
28
which have the greatest relevance to policy formulation, in answering the following
29
questions:
30
31
What factors determine climate, and how might man change them?
32
33
What are the greenhouse gases, and how and why are they increasing?
34
35
Which gases are the most important?
36
37
How much do we expect the climate to have changed by the year 2020
38
and beyond?
39
40
How much confidence do we have in our estimation?
41
42
What will be the effects on sea level and ecosystems?
43
44
Are the predicted climate changes unusual?
45
46
Has man already begun to change global climate?
47
48
What should be done to reduce uncertainties, and how long will this
49
take?
50
51
52
4
Draft Monday, March 12, 1990
1
Throughout the report, we keep in mind the practical needs of the policymaker.
2
The report is not an academic review, neither is it a plan for a new research
3
programme. Uncertainties attach to almost every aspect of the report, yet
4
policymakers are looking for clear guidance from scientists; hence authors have
5
been asked to provide best-estimates wherever possible, together with an
6
assessment of the uncertainties.
7
8
This report is a summary of our understanding as at mid-1990. Although continuing
9
research will deepen this understanding and require the report to be updated at
10
frequent intervals, basic conclusions concerning the reality of the greenhouse
11
effect and its potential to alter global climate are unlikely to change.
12
13
14
15
What factors determine global climate and how
16
might man change them ?
17
18
The driving force for weather and climate comes from the sun. The earth intercepts
19
solar radiation (mainly in the short-wave, visible, part of the spectrum); about a third
20
of it is reflected, the rest is absorbed by the different components (atmosphere,
21
ocean, ice, land and biosphere) of the climate system. The energy absorbed from
22
solar radiation must be balanced (in the long term) by outgoing radiation from the
23
earth and atmosphere; this terrestrial radiation takes the form of long-wave invisible
24
infra-red energy. As the amount of outgoing terrestrial radiation is determined by
25
the temperature of the earth, this temperature will adjust to emit just the right
26
amount of radiation to balance that coming from the sun.
27
28
There are several important factors which can change the balance between the
29
energy (in the form of solar radiation) absorbed by the earth and that emitted by it in
30
the form of longwave infra-red radiation - the radiative forcing on climate. The
31
most obvious of these is a change in the amount or seasonal distribution of solar
32
radiation which reaches the earth; these changes were probably responsible for
33
initiating the ice ages.
34
35
One of the most important of these factors is the greenhouse effect. Shortwave
36
solar radiation can pass through the clear atmosphere relatively unimpeded. But
37
long-wave terrestrial radiation emitted by the warm surface of the earth is partially
38
absorbed and then re-emitted by a number of trace gases in the atmosphere
39
above. Since the atmosphere is cooler than the earth's surface, the emission to
40
space is reduced. Both the atmosphere and the surface warm until the outgoing
41
long wave radiation balances the incoming solar radiation. This is the basic
42
greenhouse effect. The main greenhouse gases are not the major constituents,
43
nitrogen and oxygen, but water vapour (the biggest contributor), carbon dioxide,
44
methane, nitrous oxide, ozone in the low atmosphere and (in recent years)
45
chlorofluorocarbons Naturally occurring greenhouse gases keep the earth warm
46
enough to be habitable, but their increase will raise temperatures- and change
47
other aspects of climate, particularly precipitation and evaporation.
48
49
Other factors which affect climate are mentioned later in the Summary, when we
50
discuss uncertainties in climate predictions.
51
52
5
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
Simple diagram Illustrating the greenhouse effect
3
4
5
How do we know that the greenhouse effect is real ?
6
7
The greenhouse effect is real: infrared absorbing gases in the atmosphere make
8
the surface of the earth warmer than it would otherwise be. It is a well understood
9
effect, based on established scientific principles.
10
11
We know that the greenhouse effect works in practice, for several reasons. Firstly,
12
the mean temperature of the earth's surface is already about 33 C warmer than it
13
would be if the natural greenhouse gases (mainly carbon dioxide and water
14
vapour) were not present. Satellite observations of the radiation emitted from the
15
earth's surface and atmosphere demonstrate the absorption due to the
16
greenhouse gases.
17
18
Secondly, we know the compositions of the atmospheres of Venus, Earth and Mars
19
are very different, and their surface temperatures are in good agreement with
20
greenhouse theory.
21
22
Thirdly, measurements from ice cores going back 160,000 years show that the
23
earth's temperature closely paralleled the amount of greenhouse gases in the
24
atmosphere. It is likely that changes in greenhouse gases were part (but not all) of
25
the reason for the large (4 - 5 C) temperature swings between ice ages and
26
interglacial periods.
27
28
29
2
30
31
Local temperature
c
-2
32
change C
-E
33
-8
34
700
10
35
36
methane
500
37
38
39
500
40
41
methane concentration ppbv
400
42
1990
43
level
44
45
300
300
46
280
280
47
250
48
carbon dioxide
concentration ppmv
carbon dioxide
260
240
240
49
220
220
50
200
200
51
180
180
52
0
53
40
BO
120
160
Age (thousand years before present)
6
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
The enhanced greenhouse effect
2
3
We are confident that an increase in concentrations of the greenhouse gases will
4
raise the global, annual-mean surface-air temperature (which, for simplicity, is
5
referred to as the "global temperature"). Strictly, this is an enhanced greenhouse
6
effect - above that occurring due to natural greenhouse gas concentrations; the
7
word "enhanced" is usually omitted, but it should not be forgotten. A global
8
warming will cause sea levels to rise, partly due to the thermal expansion of the
9
ocean surface waters, and partly due to the melting of land ice (but not due to the
10
melting of sea ice - such as the north polar sea ice - which is already floating and
11
thus displacing water).
12
13
14
What are the greenhouse gases and how are they
15
changing ?
16
17
We know, with certainty, that the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
18
atmosphere have changed naturally on ice-age timescales, and have been
19
increasing since pre-industrial times due to human activities. The table below
20
summarizes the present and pre-industrial abundances, present rates of change
21
and atmospheric lifetimes of the main greenhouse gases.
22
23
SUMMARY OF KEY MAN-MADE GREENHOUSE GASES
Carbon
Methane
CFC-11
CFC-12
Nitrous
Dioxide
Oxide
Atmospheric
concentration
ppmv
ppmv
pptv
pptv
ppbv
Pre-industrial
280
0.79
0
0
288
Present daytt
354
1.717
280
484
310
Current rate of change
1.6
0.015
10
17
0.8
(0.5%)
(0.9%)
(4%)
(4%)
(0.25%)
Atmospheric lifetime
(50-200)+
10
65
130
150
(years)
24
ppmv = parts per million by volume; ppbv = parts per billion by volume;
25
pptv = parts per trillion by volume.
26
27
tt - estimated
t- The way in which CO2 is absorbed by the oceans is not simple and a single value cannot be given
28
29
Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide all have significant natural and man-
30
made sources, while the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are purely man-made. Water
31
vapour is also a major greenhouse gas and, although its concentration may also
32
change in future, this will be as a consequence of any global warming and not as a
33
direct result of man-made emissions; we incorporate the effects of this in the
34
estimates of future climate change discussed later.
35
7
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
For a thousand years prior to the industrial revolution, the abundances of these
2
3
greenhouse gases were relatively constant. However, as the world's population
increased, and the world became more industrialized, the abundances of the
4
greenhouse gases increased markedly. The figures below illustrate this for carbon
5
dioxide and methane.
6
7
8
9
350
10
350
11
12
348
13
14
18
Carbon dioxide (ppmv)
330
15
320
16
17
318
19
330
20
21
290
22
D
282
23
D
D
24
270
25
1700
1800
26
1900
2000
27
YR
28
Carbon dioxide concentration from ice cores (squares)
29
and surface observations (Mauna Loa - crosses)
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
1,600
38
39
40
41
42
44
CH4 concentration (p.p.b.v.)
1,200
43
45
46
800
47
48
49
1600
1700
1800
50
1900
51
Year
Methane concentration deduced from ice cores
and from recent surface observations
8
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
We know quite well the reasons for the increased abundances of carbon dioxide,
2
methane, chlorofluorocarbons, and tropospheric ozone, but those for nitrous oxide
3
are less certain. Since the industrial revolution carbon dioxide has increased by
4
25% because of the combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation practices, in mid-
5
latitudes and in the tropics. Methane has more than doubled because of rice
6
production, breeding domestic ruminants, biomass burning, coal mining and
7
ventilation of natural gas; transport and industry may have also contributed in an
8
indirect way. Low - level ozone has doubled because of increased abundances of
9
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons from industry and transport;
10
and nitrous oxide has increased by 8% probably because of fossil-fuel combustion
11
or agricultural practices. Chlorofluorocarbons, which are used as aerosol
12
propellants, solvents, refrigerants, and foam blowing agents were not present in the
13
pre-industrial atmosphere.
14
15
16
Lifetimes and stabilisation of the gases
17
18
The lifetimes of the greenhouse gases are determined by their sources and sinks in
19
the oceans, atmosphere and biosphere. Carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons and
20
nitrous oxide have long lifetimes; hence, following a change in emissions, their
21
atmospheric concentrations respond slowly and would not reach a new equilibrium
22
state for many centuries. In contrast, some of the CFC substitutes and methane
23
have relatively short atmospheric lifetimes so that their atmospheric concentrations
24
respond quite quickly and would reach a new equilibrium within a few decades
25
following a change in emissions. This emission-concentration relationship is
26
illustrated below for some of the gases.
27
28
29
30
31
32
sac
soo
1000
33
Care an 1990 emessions
Thes in 2010
CFC12 - -
soc
800
34
480
CO2
35
co? Concentrations (ppm)
son
450
con concentration ppm
= - in 1990
36
400
400
37
CFCI2 concentration pprv
600
400
100% reduction
38
350
50% Reduction
aso
acc
39
CO2 errossion reduction
40
300
300
.
41
1075
2000
2029
2050
2075
2180
1978
2000
2025
2050
2078
9100
1975
2000
2025
2050
2075
42
YEAR
TEAR
YEAR
43
44
45
46
47
It can be seen, for example, even with a complete cessation in the emission of
48
CFC 12 in the year 1990, its atmospheric abundance would still be about a third of
49
today's level in the year 2100. Also shown is the effect on concentrations of
50
continuing man-made emissions of carbon dioxide at 1990 levels, or 50% of 1990
51
levels, and of a reduction in global emissions of 2% per year from 1990 and from
52
2010; if there are critical concentration levels that should not be exceeded then it
53
can be seen that earlier emission reductions are more effective than later ones.
54
9
Draft Monday, March 12, 1990
1
The term "atmospheric stabilisation" is often used to describe the limiting at
2
present day values of the concentration of the greenhouse gases. The amount by
3
which man-made emissions of a greenhouse gas must be reduced in order to
4
achieve this is shown in the box below.
5
6
7
STABILISATION OF ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATIONS
8
9
Reductions in the man-made emissions of greenhouse gases required to
10
stabilise concentrations at present day levels:
11
12
Carbon Dioxide
60 - 80%
13
Methane
15 - 20%
14
Nitrous Oxide
70 - 80%
15
CFC11
70 - 75%
16
CFC12
75 - 85%
17
HCFC22
40 - 50%
18
19
Natural sources and sinks are assumed to remain unchanged
20
Note that the stabilisation of each of these gases would have different
21
effects on climate, as explained in the next section.
22
23
24
The same models used for these calculations are also used to determine future
25
concentrations of the greenhouse gases which would arise from scenarios of future
26
emissions generated by IPCC Working Group 3. Shown below are the
27
concentration trends of some of the greenhouse gases expected to result from the
28
High Emissions scenario.
29
30
31
CO2 Average Concentrations
CH4 Average Concentrations
32
CFC12 Average Concentrations
33
900
5000
1400
34
800
1200
4000
35
co2 Concentration (ppm)
700
36
600
CH4 Concentration (ppb)
1000
3000
800
37
500
600
38
2000
CFC12 Concentration (ppl)
39
400
400
40
300
1000
200
41
1975
2000
2025
2050
2075
2100
1975
2000
2025
2050
2075
2100
1975
2000
2025
2050
2075
2100
42
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
43
44
45
46
Which gases are the most important?
47
48
We know, with certainty, that more greenhouse gases means more radiative forcing
49
and hence a global warming. We can calculate the the radiative forcing due to the
50
increase in concentration of each gas with much more confidence than the
51
calculation of the resulting climate change because the former only involves
52
laboratory measurements of the gases: how strongly, and where in the spectrum,
10
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
they absorb infra-red radiation. We then have a base from which to calculate the
2
relative effect on climate of an increase in concentration of each gas in the
3
atmosphere: both in absolute terms and relative to carbon dioxide. These relative
4
effects span a wide range; methane is about 21 times more effective, molecule-for-
5
molecule, than carbon dioxide, and CFC11 about 12 000 times more effective.
6
7
The total radiative forcing at any time is the sum of those from the individual
8
greenhouse gases. For simplicity, we can express total forcing in terms of the
9
amount of carbon dioxide which would give that forcing; this is termed the
10
equivalent carbon dioxide concentration. We show how this quantity has
11
changed to date (based on observations of all the greenhouse gases) and how it
12
might change in the future (based on the IPCC Working Group 3 High Emissions
13
scenario) in the figure below. At present, greenhouse gases have increased since
14
pre-industrial times (the mid 18th century) by an amount that is radiatively
15
equivalent to about a 53% increase in carbon dioxide, although carbon dioxide
16
itself has only risen by 26% other gases have made up the rest.
17
18
19
Change in Equivalent CO2
1600
1400
projected
Equivalent CO2 ppmv
1200
1000
800
600
observed
400
200
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100
YEAR
20
21
22
23
24
The contributions of the various gases to the total increase in climate forcing during
25
the 1980s is shown below as a pie diagram; carbon dioxide is responsible for
26
about half the decadal increase.
27
28
29
30
11
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
Contribution to climate forcing change:
1980-90
surface
ozone
CFCs+HCFCs
carbon
dioxide
N20
methane
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
How can we evaluate the effect of different greenhouse gases?
8
9
To evaluate possible policy options, it is useful to know the relative radiative (and,
10
hence, climate) effect of equal emissions of each of the greenhouse gases. The
11
concept of relative Global Warming Potentials (GWP) has been developed
12
which takes into account the differing times that gases remain in the atmosphere.
13
14
This index allows for the determination of the time-integrated, relative warming
15
effect based on the instantaneous release of a unit mass (1 kg) of a given
16
greenhouse gas. These GWPs are defined for convenience relative to carbon
17
dioxide, the greenhouse gas of most concern. The GWPs in the following table are
18
shown for three time horizons, reflecting the need to consider these cumulative
19
effects on climate over various time scales.
20
21
The table indicates, for example, that the effectiveness of methane in influencing
22
climate will be greater in the first few decades after initial release, whereas
23
emission of the longer lived nitrous oxide will affect climate for a much longer
24
period of time. The lifetimes of the proposed CFC replacements range from 1 to 40
25
years. The longer lived replacements are still potentially effective as agents of
26
climate change. The extreme example of this, HCFC 143a (with a 40 year lifetime),
27
has a very similar effect (when released in the same amount) to CFC11 on a 20
28
year timescale.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
12
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
3
GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIALS
4
5
The warming effect of an emission of 1kg of each gas relative to that of CO2
6
time horizon
7
20 yr
100 yr
8
500 yr
9
Carbon dioxide
1
1
1
10
11
Methane
63
21
9
12
13
Nitrous oxide
270
290
190
14
15
CFC11
4500
3500
1500
16
17
CFC12
7100
7300
4500
18
19
HCFC22
4100
1500
510
20
21
22
Global Warming Potentials for a range of CFCs and potential replacements are given in the full text
23
24
25
26
Although the table shows carbon dioxide to be the least effective greenhouse gas
on an equal emissions basis, the warming effect on will depend on the size of
27
emissions. In the example shown below, 1990 emissions of carbon dioxide will
28
29
contribute well over half the man-made warming effect over the next 100 years.
30
31
32
THE RELATIVE CUMULATIVE CLIMATE EFFECT OF 1990 EMISSIONS
33
34
GWP
1990
relative
35
(100yr
emissions
contribution
36
horizon)
(Tg)
37
over 100yr
38
carbon dioxide
1
26000t
61%
39
40
methane
21
300
15%
41
42
nitrous oxide
290
6
4%
43
44
CFC11
3500
0.3
2%
45
46
CFC12
7300
0.4
7%
47
48
HCFC22
1500
0.1
0.4%
49
50
Others (including indirect effects, eg that of NO2 on surface ozone)
10.6%
51
52
53
t26000Tg of carbon dioxide = 7Gt of carbon
13
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
There are other criteria which may help policymakers to decide, in the event of
2
emissions reductions being necessary, which gases should be considered. Does
3
the gas contribute in a major way to current, and projected future, climate forcing?
4
Does it have a long lifetime, so that controlling its concentration would require
5
emissions to be reduced sooner rather than later? And are its sources and sinks
6
well enough known to decide which of them could be controlled in practice? The
7
table below illustrates these factors.
8
9
10
11
MAJOR
LONG
SOURCES
12
GAS
CONTRIBUTOR?
LIFETIME?
KNOWN?
13
14
carbon dioxide
yes
yes
yes
15
16
methane
yes
no
qualitatively
17
18
nitrous oxide
no
yes
qualitatively
19
20
CFCs
yes
yes
yes
21
22
HCFCs etc
not at
mainly no
yes
23
present
24
25
surface ozone
yes
no
yes
26
27
28
29
30
How much do we expect climate to change?
31
32
Computer-based numerical models are the best tools we have for making climate
33
predictions; a description of their main features, and how much confidence we can
34
place in their results, are given in the boxes. We outline below the predictions they
35
make for changes at a global and sub-global level.
36
37
To estimate the change in climate, we need to know what emissions of greenhouse
38
gases will be over the next decades; in the predictions below we assume the High
39
Emissions scenario developed by IPCC Working Group 3. The concentrations
40
and radiative forcing derived from this emissions scenario were shown earlier.
41
42
How quickly will global climate change ?
43
44
Using this emissions scenario we estimate that, by the year 2020, the increase in
45
global mean temperatures due to man-made greenhouse gas emissions will be 1.8
46
c above pre-industrial, with a probable range between 1.3 and 2.5 C. By the year
47
2070, the range is 2.4 to 5.1 C with a best estimate of 3.5 C. The best-estimate
48
projection out to the year 2100 is shown in the diagram below.
49
50
14
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
IPCC High Emissions Scenario
7
High Estimate
C
6
5
Best
Temperature rise from 1765
4
3
2
Low Estimate
1
0
1880
1930
1980
2030
2080
YEAR
1
2
3
The global warming will also lead, on average, to increased precipitation and
4
evaporation; perhaps by 3% and 7% by the years 2020 and 2070. Not surprisingly,
5
we expect areas of sea-ice and snow to diminish.
6
7
There will be large variations in the magnitude of the warming, and those in
8
precipitation will be even greater, with substantial areas of decreased precipitation
9
within an overall global increase.
10
11
What will be the patterns of climate change by about 2020?
12
13
Knowledge of the global mean warming and change in precipitation is of limited
14
use in determining the impacts of climate change, for instance, on agriculture. To
15
do this we need to know what these changes will be at a smaller scale. Our best
16
models predict that surface air over land warm faster than that over oceans; the
17
northern hemisphere will warm faster than the southern, and a minimum of
18
warming will occur around Antarctica and in the North Atlantic region.
19
20
There are some continental scale changes in which we have relatively high
21
confidence because they are consistently predicted by the most comprehensive
22
models and because we understand the physical reasons for them. The warming
23
is predicted to be 50-100% greater than the global mean in high northern latitudes
24
in winter, and substantially smaller than the global mean in regions of sea ice in
25
summer. Precipitation is predicted to increase in middle and high latitude
26
continents in winter (by some 5- - 10% over 35-55 N).
27
28
In the box below are given the changes in temperature, precipitation and soil
29
moisture, which are predicted to occur by 2020, averaged over the 5 regions (each
30
of which are a few million square kilometres in area) selected by IPCC. There may
31
be considerable variations within the regions. In general, confidence in these
15
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
regional estimates is low, especially for the changes in precipitation and soil
2
moisture, but they are examples of our best estimates. We cannot yet give reliable
3
regional predictions at the smaller scales demanded for impacts assessments.
4
5
6
CURRENT BEST ESTIMATES FOR CHANGES BY 2020
7
(IPCC High Emissions scenario; changes from pre-Industrial)
8
9
Central North America (35 -55N, 85 -105W)
10
11
The warming ranges between 3 and 4 C in winter and 2 to 3 C in summer.
12
Precipitation increases range from 0 to 20% in winter whereas there are
13
deceases of 5 to 10% in summer. Soil moisture decreases in summer by 10
14
to 15%.
15
16
South East Asia (5 -30N, 70 -102 E)
17
18
The warming ranges from 1 to 2 C throughout the year. Precipitation changes
19
little in winter and generally increases throughout the region by 5 to 15% in
20
summer. Summer soil moisture increases by 5 to 10%.
21
22
Sahel (10 - 20 N, 20 -38 E)
23
24
The warming ranges from 1 to 2 °C. Area mean precipitation increases and
25
area mean soil moisture decrease marginally in summer. However there are
26
areas of both increase in and decrease in both parameters throughout the
27
region which differ from model to model.
28
29
Southern Europe. (35 - 50 N, 10 W - 45 E)
30
31
The warming is about 2 °C in winter and varies from 2 to 3 °C in summer.
32
There is some indication of increased precipitation in winter, but summer
33
precipitation decreases by 5 to 15%, and summer soil moisture by 10 to 25%.
34
35
Australia (12 43 S, 115 - 154 E)
36
37
The warming ranges from 1 to 2 O in summer and is about 2 °C in winter.
38
Summer precipitation increases by around 10% , but there the models do not
39
produce consistent estimates of the changes in soil moisture. There are large
40
variations at the sub-continental level within this area.
41
42
43
44
How will climate extremes and extreme events change?
45
46
Changes in the variability of weather and the frequency of extremes will generally
47
have more impact than changes in the mean climate at a place. With the possible
48
exception of an increase in the number of intense showers, there is no evidence
49
from our work so far that weather variability will change in the future. However, with
50
51
no change in variability, even for a modest change in the mean, the number of days
with temperatures above a given value at the high end of the distribution will
52
increase substantially. Similarly, there will be a decrease in days with temperatures
16
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
at the low end of the distribution. So the number of very hot days or frosty nights
2
will be substantially changed without any change in the variability of the
3
weather. Changes in the number of days with a minimum threshold amount of soil
4
moisture (for viability of a certain crop, for example) would be even more acute.
5
6
7
Will storms Increase in a warmer world?
8
9
Storms can have a major impact on society. Will their frequency, intensity or
10
location increase in a warmer world?
11
12
13
Tropical storms, such as typhoons and hurricanes, only develop at present over
14
seas that are warmer than about 26°C. As the area of sea having temperatures
15
over this critical value will increase as the globe warms, the potential certainly
16
exists for there to be a wider area available for storm development. However, the
17
vertical structure of the atmosphere may also change, and offset this increase.
18
Climate models give no clear indication whether tropical storms will increase or
19
decrease in frequency or intensity as greenhouse gases increase; neither is there
20
any evidence that this has occurred over the past few decades.
21
22
23
Mid-latitude storms, such as those which track across the North Atlantic, are
24
driven by the equator-to-pole temperature contrast. As this contrast will probably be
25
weakened in a warmer world (at least in the northern hemisphere), it could be
26
argued that mid-latitude storms will also weaken. But higher in the atmosphere the
27
thermal contrast strengthens, and it addition the increased amount of water vapour
28
in the atmosphere can supply extra energy to storm development. We do not know
29
which of these factors will be the more influential, and how storms will change in
30
frequency or intensity. Even if changes of this sort do not occur, the tracks they take
31
might move and affect new regions; again, we have no evidence of where, or if, this
32
would happen.
33
34
35
36
What tools do we use to predict future climate ?
37
38
It is relatively easy to predict the direct effect of the radiative forcing due to increases in greenhouse
39
gases. However, as climate begins to warm, various processes act to amplify (through positive
40
feedbacks) or reduce (negative feedbacks) the warming. The feedbacks are due to changes in
41
water vapour, sea-ice, clouds and the oceans. In making a climate forecast, all these processes
42
have to be taken into account. These are described in three-dimensional mathematical model of
43
the atmosphere and ocean (often known as a general circulation model or GCM). These are
44
based on the equations of motion and use descriptions in simple physical terms (called
45
46
parameterisations) of the smaller scale processes such as those due to clouds and to deep mixing
in the ocean. (The atmospheric component of a climate model is essentially the same as a weather
47
prediction model).
48
49
17
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
3
Equilibrium and realised climate change
4
5
We have explained that increases in greenhouse gases will (instantaneously) increase radiative
6
forcing. However, the full warming will not occur instantaneously, because of the effect of the
7
oceans. Firstly, the mixed layer of the ocean (about 100m deep) will have to warm at about the
8
same rate as the atmosphere, because transfer of heat from one to the other takes place very
9
efficiently; this will take typically 10 years. Secondly, there are two areas of the oceans (the
10
northern North Atlantic and the Antarctic ocean) where circulation patterns act to draw down water
11
from the warm upper layers into the very deep ocean. Some of the heat from the upper layers is
12
therefore also drawn into the deep ocean, where it remains for a very long time - upwards of a
13
thousand years; on the century timescale we are considering here, the heat is effectively lost.
14
15
Consider the case where continuing increases in greenhouse gases is giving a steady increase in
16
radiative forcing at a rate of about 1% per year - this is roughly what is happening at the moment.
17
The first diagram below shows the equilibrium temperature rise which would ultimately occur due
18
to this forcing - this is also the temperature we would experience straight away if there were no
19
oceans. The lower line shows our best estimate of the realised temperature rise; the temperature
20
trend that (in the absence of other forcing and variability) we would observe. The realised
21
temperature trend approximates to the eventual temperature trend reduced (mainly because of
22
the heat sequestered into the deep ocean) by about a third.
23
24
The concept of the equilibrium temperature can best be illustrated (as in the second diagram
25
below) by the artificial case of halting and stabilising the radiative forcing at a future date
26
(remembering that this would require a very large reduction in emissions). The realised
27
temperature would then rise slightly over a ten year period as the ocean mixing layer "catches up"
28
with the atmosphere, but then rise further only very slowly, to meet the equilibrium temperature in
29
over a thousand years.
30
31
32
forcing
33
stabilisation
34
35
36
FORCING
37
38
39
40
equilibrium
41
42
equilibrium
temperature
43
44
TEMPERATURE
slow rise (1000yr)
45
toward equilibnum
46
realised
47
temperature
48
49
50
TIME
TIME
51
52
53
The long term change in surface air temperature following from a doubling of carbon dioxide
54
(generally used as a benchmark and referred to as the climate sensitivity) is most likely to be
55
somewhere between 1.5 and 4.5°C, with a most likely estimate of 2.5°C. The lowest result from all
56
models so far is about 1.5°C and, although some models give figures higher than 4.5°C (up to
57
5.2°C), there are good reasons to believe that the less detailed representation of cloud processes
58
in these models leads to an over-estimation of the warming. This range of climate sensitivity
59
deduced from mathematical models is consistent with empirical evidence from paleo epochs.
60
18
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
How do we forecast climate ?
3
4
Climate forecasts are derived in a different way from weather forecasts. A weather prediction model
5
gives a description of the atmosphere's state up to 10 days or so ahead, starting from a detailed
6
description of an initial state of the atmosphere at a given time. Such forecasts describe the
7
movement and development of large weather systems, though they cannot represent very small
8
scale phenomena; for example, individual shower clouds.
9
10
To make a climate forecast, the climate model is first run for a few (simulated) decades. The
11
statistics of the model's output will be a description of the model's simulated climate which, if the
12
model is a good one, will bear a close resemblance to the climate of the real atmosphere and ocean.
13
The above exercise is then repeated with increasing concentrations of the greenhouse gases in
14
the model. The differences between the statistics of the two simulations ( for example in mean
15
temperature and interannual variability) provide an estimate of the accompanying climate change.
16
17
A completely different, and potentially powerful, way of predicting patterns of future climate is to
18
search for periods in the past when the global mean temperatures were similar to those we expect
19
in future, and then use the past spatial patterns as analogs of those which will arise in the future.
20
For a good analog, it is also necessary for the forcing factors (eg. greenhouse gases, orbital
21
variations) and other conditions (e.g. ice cover, topography, etc.) to be similar; direct comparisons
22
with climate situations for which these conditions do not apply cannot be easily interpreted. So far,
23
analogs of future greenhouse-gas-changed climates have not been found. We cannot therefore
24
advocate the use of paleo climates as predictions of regional climate change due to future
25
increases in greenhouse gases.
26
27
28
29
How much will sea level rise ?
30
31
Simple models were used to calculate sea level rise to the year 2100 AD; the
32
results are illustrated below. The calculations necessarily ignore any long-term
33
changes, unrelated to greenhouse forcing, that may be occurring but cannot be
34
detected from the present data on land ice and the ocean. For the IPCC High
35
Emissions scenario, sea level is expected to be between 10 cm and 32 cm higher
36
than today by the year 2030, with a best-estimate of 20 cm.
37
38
SEA LEVEL RISE A BETA=1.0 K=0.6338 DT =1.5.2.5,4.5 W=4 DQ=4.367
39
40
41
Sea Level Rise estimated from IPCC
42
100
Business as Usual emissions scenario
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Sea Level Rise (cm)
50
54
55
0
2000
2025
2050
2075
2100
19
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
The best estimate is made up of positive contributions from thermal expansion of
2
the oceans (12cm); melting of glaciers (8cm) and the Greenland ice sheet (1cm),
3
with a 1cm negative contribution from Antarctica due to higher ice/snow
4
accumulation in a slightly warmer climate. By the year 2070, sea level is expected
5
to be 45cm higher, with a range of 33cm to 75cm.
6
7
By 2030, even if greenhouse forcing increased no further, the world would still be
8
committed to a continuing sea level rise for many decades and even centuries, due
9
to delays in climate, ocean and ice mass responses (see figure below). Sea level
10
would go on rising from 2030 to 2100, by a further 23cm, due to the effects of pre-
11
2030 greenhouse gas increases alone. Moreover, in the longer term, irreversible
12
changes could be triggered with long-lasting effects. For instance, for a persistent
13
4°C warming, the major part of the Greenland ice sheet would eventually
14
disappear (but over thousands of years), and would not reform even with a return to
15
the present climatic conditions.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Sea Level Rise (cm)
50
26
STOP CHANGE IN
GREENHOUSE
27
FORCING IN 2030
43cm
28
29
20cm
30
31
O
2000
2025
2050
2075
2100
32
YEAR
33
SEA LEVEL RISE COMMITMENT. Even if
34
greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilised in
35
2030, sea level would continue to rise steadily
36
37
38
39
The West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) is of special concern, as a large portion of it is
40
grounded far below sea level and it contains an amount of ice equivalent to 5m of
41
global sea level. Recent studies have demonstrated that individual ice streams are
42
changing rapidly on a decadal to century time scale. This variability is not
43
necessarily related to climate, but is important for future sea level change. Within
44
the next century, it is not likely that there will be a major outflow of WAIS ice due
45
directly to greenhouse warming.
46
47
Regional rise in sea level is expected to differ substantially from the global mean
48
value. Thermal expansion, changes in ocean circulation, and surface air pressure
49
will vary from region to region as the world warms, but in a yet unknown way. Such
50
regional details await further development of realistic physical models of the ocean
51
circulation. In addition, vertical land movements can be as large or even larger
52
than changes in global mean sea level. For estimates of regional sea level rise,
53
these should be added to climate-related changes in ocean volume.
20
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
How much confidence do we have in our
2
predictions?
3
4
Uncertainties in the predictions above arise from a number of sources. Firstly, it is
5
obvious that future climate change will depend on the rate at which greenhouse
6
gases (and other gases which influence them) are emitted; this in turn will be
7
determined by various complex economic and sociological factors.
8
Scenarios of future emissions were generated within IPCC by Working Group 3;
9
four such scenarios are explored in the main report, and one of these
10
(corresponding to a Business - as- Usual case) is used to illustrate this Summary.
11
12
Secondly, because we do not fully understand the sources and sinks of the
13
greenhouse gases, there are uncertainties in our calculations of future
14
concentrations arising from a given emissions scenario. For carbon dioxide, for
15
example, the concentration calculated for 2070 from the Business-as-Usual
16
emissions scenario ranged from 560ppmv to 720ppmv; we have chosen a best
17
estimate for each gas. Furthermore, because natural sources and sinks of
18
19
greenhouse gases are sensitive to a change in climate, they may substantially
modify future concentrations; ice core records show that methane and carbon
20
21
dioxide concentrations changed in the same way as temperature between ice ages
and interglacials. For example, if wetlands become warmer, methane emissions
22
(and hence concentrations) will increase; if they become drier, methane emissions
23
24
will decrease. Although these factors are complex, it appears that they are more
likely to increase greenhouse gas abundances overall and hence increase the
25
climate change estimates given above.
26
27
28
Thirdly, although we understand quite well the forcing due to changing gas
concentrations, other factors apart from these can influence climate. Those which
29
30
could be important on a decadal timescale are: short term variability of solar
radiation output; aerosols from a large volcanic eruption and low level aerosols
31
32
arising from man-made sulphur emissions. On the timescale of the next century,
33
however, the change in climate due to increasing greenhouse gases is likely to be
far more important than that from these other effects.
34
35
Because of long period couplings between ocean and atmosphere the earth's
36
climate would still vary without being perturbed by any external influences. This
37
38
natural variability could act to speed up, or slow down, any man-made warming
39
but on a century timescale would be less than greenhouse gas-induced changes.
40
Fourthly, models are only as good as our understanding of the processes which
41
affect climate, and this is far from perfect. The range in the climate predictions
42
given above reflects an estimate of uncertainties due to model imperfections; the
43
44
largest of these is cloud feedback, leading to a factor of two uncertainty in the size
of the warming. Neverthless, for reasons given in the box below, we have
45
substantial confidence that models can predict at least the broad scale features of
46
climate change.
47
21
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
3
Confidence in predictions from climate models
4
5
What confidence can we have that climate change will look anything like what the models tell us?
6
Weather forecasts can be compared with the actual weather the next day and their skill assessed;
7
8
we cannot do that with climate predictions. There are several indicators that give us some
confidence in the predictions from climate models.
9
10
When they are run with the present amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere their simulation of
11
12
present climate is generally realistic, capturing the major features such as the wet tropical
convergence zones and mid-latitude depression belts, as well as the contrasts between summer
13
14
and winter circulations. The models also simulate the observed variability; for example, the large
day-to-day pressure variations in the middle latitude depression belts and the maxima in interannual
15
16
variability represented. responsible for the very different character of one winter from another both being
17
18
19
Overall confidence is increased by their generally satisfactory portrayal of aspects of variability of
20
the Pacific). atmosphere such as that associated with EI Niño (the irregular warming of the Eastern tropical
21
22
23
In addition, when forced with correct conditions (solar radiation, greenhouse gas forcing, ice
24
caps,etc) they can capture important features of climates 6,000 to 9,000 years ago and the most
recent ice age about 20,000 years ago.
25
26
It is also worth noting that the weather forecasting models (from which climate models have been
27
developed) predict weather for several days ahead, with generally great success.
28
29
30
31
32
Will the predicted changes be unusual?
33
34
When considering future climate change, it is clearly essential to look at the record
35
of climate variation in the past. From this record we can learn about the range of
36
natural climate variability, to see how it compares with what we expect in the future,
37
and also look for evidence of recent climate change due to man's activities.
38
39
Climate varies naturally on all time scales from hundreds of millions of years down
40
to the year to year. Prominent in the earth's history have been the 100,000 year
41
glacial-interglacial cycles when climate was mostly cooler than at present. Global
42
surface temperatures have typically varied by 5 to 7°C through these cycles, with
43
large changes in ice volume and sea level, and temperature changes as great as
44
10-15°C in some middle and high latitude regions of the northern hemisphere.
45
Since the end of the last ice age, about 10,000 years ago, global surface
46
temperatures have probably fluctuated by little more than 1°C. Some fluctuations
47
have lasted several centuries, including the Little Ice Age which ended in the
48
nineteenth century and which appears to have been global in extent.
49
50
The changes predicted to occur by about 2040 due to man made increases in
51
greenhouse gas concentrations will make global mean temperatures higher than
52
they have been in the last 100,000 years.
53
54
55
56
22
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
Has man already begun to change the global
2
climate?
3
4 The instrumental record of surface temperature is fragmentary until the mid
5 nineteenth century, after which it slowly improves. Because of different methods of
6
measurement, historical records have to be harmonised with modern ones,
7
introducing some uncertainty. Despite these problems we believe that a real
8 warming of the globe of 0.3 C - 0.6 C has taken place over the last century.
9
Moreover since 1900 similar temperature increases are seen in three
10 independent data sets: one collected over land and two over the oceans. The
11
figure below shows current estimates of smoothed global mean surface
12
temperature over land and ocean since 1860.
13
14
15
Global average (land + sea) temperature change
16
0.6
17
18
Change relative to 1951-80 mean
0.4
19
20
21
22
24
25
Temperature change C
0.2
-0.0
23
-0.2
26
-0.4
27
-0.6
28
1870
1890
1910
1930
1950
1970
1990
2010
29
30
31
32
Although overall temperature rise has been broadly similar in both hemispheres, it
33
has not been steady, and differences in their rates of warming have sometimes
34
persisted for decades. Much of the warming since 1900 has been concentrated in
35
two periods, the first between about 1920 and 1940 and the other since 1975. The
36
northern hemisphere cooled between the 1940s and the early 1970s when
37
southern hemisphere temperatures stayed nearly constant. The pattern of global
38
warming since 1975 has been uneven with some regions, mainly in the northern
39
hemisphere, continuing to cool until recently. This regional diversity indicates that
40
future regional temperature changes are likely to differ considerably from a global
41 average.
42
43
That there has been a real temperature rise is strongly supported by the retreat of
44
most mountain glaciers of the world since the end of the nineteenth century and
45 the fact that sea level has risen over the same period by an average of 1 to 2 mm
46 per year.
47
48
Estimates of thermal expansion of the oceans, and of increased melting of
49
mountain glaciers and the ice margin in West Greenland over the last century,
50
shows that the major part of the rise appears to be related to the observed global
51
warming. This apparent connection between observed sea level rise and global
52 warming provides grounds for believing that future warming will lead to an
53
acceleration in sea level rise.
23
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
The magnitude of the warming over the last century is broadly consistent with the
2
theoretical predictions of climate models. If the sole cause of the observed warming
3
were the man-made greenhouse effect, then the implied climate sensitivity would
4
be in the lower half of the range inferred from the models. However, the range of
5
natural variability is almost certainly as large as any change to date due to the
6
man-made greenhouse effect.
7
8
Global-mean temperature alone is an inadequate indicator of greenhouse-gas-
9
induced climatic change. Identifying the causes of any global-mean temperature
10
change requires examination of other aspects of the changing climate, particularly
11
its spatial and temporal characteristics - the man-made climate change "signal".
12
However, we do not yet know what the "signal" looks like because, as we have
13
seen, prediction of many of these detailed characteristics is not yet possible;.
14
15
Although we are convinced of the reality of an increasing anthropogenic
16
greenhouse effect, by the time unequivocal detection has been achieved, the
17
commitment to future climate change will be considerably larger than it is today.
18
19
20
What will be the effect of climate change on
21
ecosystems ?
22
23
Our life support system depends on the basic functioning of our ecosystems.
24
Photosynthesis captures atmospheric carbon dioxide and solar energy and stores
25
them in organic compounds which are then utilized for subsequent plant growth,
26
the growth of animals or the growth of microbes in the soil which release CO2 via
27
respiration into the atmosphere.
28
29
The rates of ecosystem processes are dependent on climatic factors in the short
30
term and carbon dioxide concentration may also modify the rates of
31
photosynthesis and respiration. In the longer term, climate and atmospheric
32
carbon dioxide control the structure of ecosystems by selecting species which
33
together function within them. Changes in climate and atmospheric carbon dioxide
34
concentrations will, therefore, modify both function and structure in our
35
ecosystems.
36
37
Photosynthesis fixes 120-160 Gt of carbon each year (90-120Gt on land and 30-40
38
Gt in the oceans). Most land plants have a system of photosynthesis which will
39
respond positively to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide ("the carbon dioxide
40
fertilization effect"), but the response varies with species and may decrease with
41
time. The response to increased carbon dioxide results in greater efficiencies of
42
water and nitrogen use and may be particularly important in plants of stressed
43
ecosystems (in arid/semi arid and infertile areas). Photosynthesis will also
44
increase as temperature and moisture increase and as nutrient availability
45
46
temperatures. increases through the stimulation of the decomposition process by increased
47
48
So far there is no incontravertible proof that net terrestrial ecosystem production
49
has increased. If there were, it would be almost impossible to apportion this
50
between land use effects, fertilization by atmospheric pollutants and climate
51
change. The extent to which ecosystems can sequester increasing atmospheric
52
carbon remains to be quantified.
24
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
As various species respond differently to various components of the physical
2
environment, some species in a particular location will be more advantaged than
3
others by global change. They will then displace other species and communities
4
and ecosystems will change in structure. Displaced species will be forced to
5
higher latitudes and altitudes, and will be prone to extinction, having no potential
6
habitat while existing where change is predicted to be greatest. Communities will
7
not move en bloc and new assemblages of species will form at new locations.
8
However, a major constraint on the movement of species will be their potential
9
migration rates which will almost always be less than the rates projected for climate
10
change. The result is likely to be unstable ecosystems prone to extensive damage
11
by exceptional events such as drought and fire.
12
13
14
Deforestation and Reforestation
15
16
17
Man has been deforesting the Earth for millennia since the development of shifting cultivation.
18
During the early part of the century this was mainly in temperate regions, more recently it has been
19
concentrated in the tropics. Deforestation has three potential impacts on climate: through the
20
carbon and nitrogen cycles (where it can lead to changes in carbon dioxide concentrations):
21
through the change in reflectivity of terrain when forests are cleared. and through their effect on
the hydrological cycle (precipitation and evaporation).
22
23
24
The destruction of 100,000 square km of tropical forest has been estimated to release up to 2 Gt
25
of carbon (GtC) to the atmosphere, though allowing for replacement by grassland suggests that
26
nearer 1 GtC is a likely figure. If all the tropical forests were removed, the input is variously
27
estimated at from 150 to 350 GtC; this would increase atmospheric carbon dioxide by 35 to 80
28
ppmv. The rate of loss of forest is difficult to estimate; probably till the mid-20th century,
29
deforestation was a more important contributor to atmospheric carbon dioxide than was the burning
30
of fossil fuels. Since then, fossil fuels have become dominant; one estimate is that around 1980
31
1.7 GtC was being released annually from the clearing of tropical forests, compared with 5 GtC from
32
burning of fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide will be absorbed from the atmosphere during the growth,
33
phase of new forests; it is estimated that the planting of 4 million square kilometres of temperate
34
forest would withdraw about 1Gt of carbon from the atmosphere per year for over 100 years.
35
36
Deforestation can also after climate directly by decreasing the absorption of solar radiation, so
37
weakening the local heat source and decreasing rainfall. Experiments with climate models predict
38
that replacing all the forests of the Amazon basin by grassland reduces the rainfall over the basin
by about 20%.
39
40
41
How can we limit climate change?
42
43
From studies of how quickly ecosytems can adapt to climate change, it may be
44
relevant to assess what maximum emissions of greenhouse gases would result in
45
global temperatures changing by, say, 0.1°C or 0.2°C per decade.
46
47
Even if we were able to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse
48
gases at present day levels (requiring, as we saw above, cutbacks in emissions of
49
50
50 - 80% in most gases), this would still not keep climate as it is today; we may
already be committed to a global rate of change of about 0.1 C per decade. To limit
51
global temperature increase to about 0.2 c per decade, emissions of carbon
52
dioxide would have to be reduced by about XX% (calculation to be finalised),
53
54
making reasonable assumptions about the effect on CFCs of the Montreal Protocol,
and assuming emissions of other gases remain unchanged.
25
Draft: Monday, March 12, 1990
1
What should be done to reduce uncertainties, and
2
how long will this take ?
3
4
Policymakers will be aware from this assessment that, although we can say that
5
significant climate change is unavoidable, much uncertainty exists in prediction of
6
global climate properties such as the temperature and rainfall near the surface and
7
the mean sea level. Even greater uncertainty exists in predictions of regional
8
climate change.
9
10
To reduce these uncertainties large improvements are required in our capability to
11
model and to observe the global climate system, and to understand it through
12
studies of the processes that need to be represented in the global models. As far
13
as the global modelling is concerned, it is particularly urgent to develop coupled
14
atmosphere -ocean-ice models with increased spatial resolution, incorporating
15
more realistic formulations of relevant physical, chemical and biological processes.
16
17
As far as the processes are concerned, the main areas of uncertainty are (1) the
18
role of the clouds which lead to feedback that may amplify or limit the response of
19
the atmosphere to greenhouse forcing, (2) the changes that can occur in the world
20
ocean circulation and in the heat intake of the ocean which acts to reduce and
21
delay surface warming, and (3) the changes that will modify biological activity on
22
land and in the seas. Detailed field studies of these processes are either planned
23
or underway.
24
25
As far as the global observational capability is concerned there needs to be
26
increased accuracy and coverage in the observations of the properties of the
27
atmosphere and oceans, especially those directed to the earlier possible detection
28
of climate changes and towards the verification of climate models. The main
29
observational requirements are (1) the maintenance and improvement of
30
observations provided by the World Weather Watch programme of WMO, (2) the
31
development of major new satellite observing systems to obtain global description
32
of properties such as three dimensional cloud distribution and rainfall from polar
33
orbiting platforms, and three dimensional wind fields from a low altitude satellite
34
covering tropical regions, and (3) a new initiative to establish measurements from
35
ships and automatic instrumented vehicles, deep sea moorings and shore stations.
36
37
International cooperation to carry out all aspects of this work is concentrated in the
38
World Climate Research Programme and the International Geosphere-Biosphere
39
Programme. These are large and complex endeavours - the largest coordinated
40
international scientific programmes yet attempted. To reinforce existing projects
41
and tackle new scientific problems not only will increased resources be necessary
42
to support existing research teams in each nation, but an increased supply of
43
trained scientists will also be essential; this has implications now at all levels of
44
education. The international community of scientists also needs to be widened to
45
include more participants from developing countries.
46
47
As research advances, increased understanding and improved observations will
48
lead to progressively more reliable climate predictions. However considering the
49
complex nature of the problem and the scale of the scientific programmes to be
50
undertaken we know that rapid results cannot be expected. Indeed further
51
scientific
26
Draft : Monday, March 12, 1990
1
2
advances may expose unforseen problems and areas of ignorance. Surprises are
3
possible; for instance it is worth noting that the "ozone hole" resulting from the
4
effects of CFCs was entirely unpredicted. The box below gives some important
milestones towards narrowing the uncertainties.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TIMESCALES FOR
12
13
NARROWING UNCERTAINTIES
1990
PREDICTIONS OF RATE OF CHANGE OF CLIMATE
(as a result of coupled atmos-ocean models
1995
and better understanding of the ocean)
PREDICTIONS OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN
CLIMATE INCLUDING WATER RESOURCES (as
2000
a result of higher resolution models and a
better understanding of the water cycle)
IMPROVED RELIABILITY OF PREDICTIONS &
DEFINITION OF RANGE OF POSSIBLE CLIMATE
2005
VARIATION (as a result of models
containing better representations of
clouds, oceans, ice-sheets, chemistry &
biosphere)
27
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL
Char Tob
February 9, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR DPC TASK FORCE ON ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL CHANGE
FROM:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE Rf
SUBJECT:
"Insert 9"
As promised, we discussed the "insert 9" issue -- the last
outstanding substantive issue in the whole report -- with Bob
Corell. He agreed that some balancing of the cloud feedback
discussion was appropriate to indicate that the relevant
uncertainty was two-sided, but he was not comfortable with the
draft insert. The alternative language he gave us appears in the
paragraph beginning on the bottom of the first of the two
attached pages. If you have problems with this paragraph, please
call me by noon on Monday, February 12. If you call, please have
in mind a plan of action to get closure on this issue by COB
Monday. If nobody calls, the paragraph goes as it stands.
We have finally surfaced from the Economic Report of the
President and Clean Air negotiations long enough to prepare a
draft that embodies all changes agreed to. The final report will
go out our door as soon as a final editorial scrub is completed
(this weekend, we hope) and the "insert 9" issue is settled.
11
As in the case of methane, most N2O emissions are associated
with agricultural activity and with developing nations.
Increased fertilizer use has both raised N2O emissions and
dramatically increased food supplies in many developing nations.
The U.S. share of world N2O emissions is only about 14 percent
and is expected to fall below 10 percent by mid-century.
B. Potential Climate Changes
Formulating a realistic and responsible outlook on possible
climate effects associated with increasing atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations requires providing answers to a sequence of
increasingly complex questions.
1. Uncertainties. It is first necessary to project future
emissions of greenhouse gases. As noted above, such projections
are inevitably uncertain. It is then necessary to predict how
much of the assumed emissions will remain in the atmosphere after
accounting for the effects of natural processes. Most tentative
scenarios, like those above, project that emissions will be
sufficient to result in the radiative equivalent of a doubling of
atmospheric carbon dioxide (the combined effects of CO2 and other
trace gas increases) between 2030 and 2070.
Once the greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere are
projected, the next step is to project associated changes in
heating of the earth system as a whole. An increase in radiative
forcing by greenhouse gases does not necessarily imply a
significant warming of the planet. For instance, it has been
argued that a strong negative cloud feedback mechanism could
counter the effects of greenhouse gas buildup. In this case
little net warming of the system would take place. A recent
study found that using a different representation of clouds in a
climate model reduces the predicted global warming by a factor of
two to three. However, the best climate models available today
indicate that increased greenhouse gas concentrations will lead
12
to some warming of the overall earth system. Because potentially
important positive and negative feedbacks which have not been
adequately modeled are known to exist, the questions of whether a
systematic warming will take place, and its magnitude, must still
be considered as open.
The next question is more subtle and complex: To what extent
will a warming of the earth system be manifested in actual
surface temperature change? The role of the ocean as a heat
sink illustrates this issue well. Recent computations with one
of the world's leading coupled ocean/atmosphere models indicate
that a one percent per year carbon dioxide buildup (doubling by
2040; redoubling by 2120) would produce for the Northern
hemisphere a warming of 2°C at the equator by 2050, increasing to
around 4°C at high latitudes. But in this computation, the high
Southern latitudes hardly warm at all because the high latitude
southern ocean absorbs virtually all the heat from greenhouse
warming (ocean temperatures actually increase slightly). Under
this model, the earth system would clearly warm, but surface
temperatures would scarcely be affected in the Southern
Hemisphere. The particular configuration of the ocean,
atmosphere and land surface in the Southern Hemisphere is
responsible for this asymmetry. More generally, observed surface
temperature increases are likely to remain less than equilibrium
temperature increases (those that would eventually occur with
given atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases) for decades
or even centuries.
While considerable advances have been made in climate
models, it is important to note that model simulations of global
warming are not consistent with the historical record, itself the
subject of considerable debate. The available models predict an
increase in global surface temperature with increasing greenhouse
gases, but analyses of land and sea surface temperature changes
over the past century generally fail to detect such a pattern.
On the other hand, our ignorance is a two-edged sword; some
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/2/90
Please deliver to:
NANCY MAYNARO
OSTP- NEOB-RM 5005
FAX number of addressee: 395-3719
Telephone number of addressee: 395-3637
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE. MEMBER
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4
TOTAL 0:02'21"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
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Date:
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Please deliver to:
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Communce RM 4850
FAX number of addressee: 377-0432
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From:
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FAX number of sender:
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1
3770432
2- 9-90 5:08PM
2'50"
4
TOTAL 0:02'50"
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XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
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Please deliver to:
LIN OR STUNTZ
DOE- RM 7B-090
FAX number of addressee:
586- 586-5313 5313
Telephone number of addressee:
586-5316
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
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202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
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1
202 586 5313
2- 9-90 5:05PM
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4
TOTAL 0:02'48"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/9/90
Please deliver to:
JOHNSCHROTE
INTERIOR. RM 6214
FAX number of addressee: 343 - 3561
Telephone number of addressee: 343-4123
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
FAX number of sender:
202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
+
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1
93433561
2- 9-90 5:02PM
2'46"
4
TOTAL 0:02'46"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
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Please deliver to:
BARRY McBEZ
OCA- - RM 235
FAX number of addressee: 456-2223
Telephone number of addressee: 456-6437
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
FAX number of sender:
202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
4
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1
2024562223
2- 9-90 4:58PM
2'21"
4
TOTAL 0:02'21"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
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Please deliver to:
NANCY MALOLEY
OPD- 0 OEOD-RMZZT
FAX number of addressee: 456-7739
Telephone number of addressee: 456-6554
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
From:
202-395-6947
FAX number of sender:
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Number of pages, including cover sheet: 4
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OPD
2- 9-90 4:55PM
2'26"
4
TOTAL 0:02'26"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
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Date:
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Please deliver to:
C Boy DEN GRAY
WH - WEST mr's
FAX number of addressee: 456-6279
Telephone number of addressee: 456-2632
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
From:
202-395-6947
FAX number of sender:
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Number of pages, including cover sheet: 4
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2024566279
2- 9-90 4:52PM
2'26"
4
TOTAL 0:02'26"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/9/90
Please deliver to:
FREO BERNTHAL
DEPT WF STATE, RM 783,
FAX number of addressee:
647-0774
0217
Telephone number of addressee: 647- 1554
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
202-395-6947
FAX number of sender:
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
4
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202 647 0217
2- 9-90 4:49PM
2'49"
4
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
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Please deliver to:
ROBERT GRADY
GMB- RM 260-0500
FAX number of addressee: 395-5730 395- 5730
Telephone number of addressee: 395-4844
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
FAX number of sender:
202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
4
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4
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XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/9/90
Please deliver to:
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USDA- RM 227E
FAX number of addressee: 475
Telephone number of addressee: 447-4164
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
FAX number of sender:
202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet: 4
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202 475 4915
2- 9-90 4:41PM
3'05"
4
TOTAL 0:03'05"
4
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
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Date:
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Please deliver to:
J. CIARENCE DAVIES
EPA RM 1013 -WT
FAX number of addressee: 252-0780
Telephone number of addressee: 3e2-4332
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
From:
202-395-6947
FAX number of sender:
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Number of pages, including cover sheet:
4
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4
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XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/9/90
Please deliver to:
BRUCE BARILETT
TREAS URY, RM 3445
FAX number of addressee: 786 8452
Telephone number of addressee: 566-2768
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
202-395-6947
FAX number of sender:
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet:
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XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
2/9/90
Please deliver to:
ROBERT CORELL
NSF
FAX number of addressee: 395-6947
Telephone number of addressee: 395-5036
From:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MEMBER
FAX number of sender:
202-395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 202-395-5036
Number of pages, including cover sheet: 4
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2- 9-90 4:28PM
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XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
MAR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE DPC WORKING GROUP
ON GLOBAL CHANGE
FROM:
UPDATE ON PLANS FOR THE Ryadey 1990 WHITE HOUSE
D. ALLAN BROMLEY
SUBJECT:
CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH
RELATING TO GLOBAL CHANGE
The DPC Working Group on Global Change, at its meeting on
Tuesday, January 30, 1990, made several decisions with
regard to the President's meeting on Science and Economics
Research Relating to Global Change.
1) It was agreed that the meeting will be held on
Wednesday and Thursday, April 18-19, 1990 in
Washington, D.C. Subsequent discussions require
that these dates be changed to April 17-18 in
order to make available the new Georgetown
University Leavey Conference Center and Quest
House (where the IPCC meeting was held this
week).
2) It was agreed that the criteria for the
invitations would be those countries that "because
of their land masses, large populations or heavy
future energy needs, will be compelled to deal
with environmental problems having a global
magnitude and impact," and those countries that
have the scientific and technology capabilities to
address the substantive questions of global
change. The list of invitee countries was
endorsed and is:
The G-7 nations, Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Mexico, Nigeria (or another African
nation, the Soviet Union, Zaire,
Netherlands, Norway, the European Community,
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). We have, for a whole
series of good reasons, added Zaire, Norway
and the Netherlands to the earlier list.
3) It was decided that the President's invitation to
the Heads of State of those nations should be
sent out ASAP.
4) It was decided that the DPC Working Group would
meet in two or three weeks to review progress,
including matters such as the agenda for the
meeting, schedule of "things-to-do" during the
next two and a half months, (PERT chart) and
logistics.
To facilitate the next DPC Working Group meeting on the
Conference, we will prepare a Concept Paper on the Conference
which details:
1) Concepts and expectations for the meeting:
o The rationale and purposes of hosting the
meeting, i.e., why is the President hosting
this meeting and what do we expect to
accomplish by having the meeting?
O What is the proposed agenda and schedule
of events for the meeting, and what is the
rationale behind the elements included in
the agenda?
O What are the expected outcomes and products
from the meeting?
2) An initial outline of arrangements and logistics
for the meeting.
3) A schedule for the decisions, arrangements,
logistics, etc. for the meeting, probably through
Gantt and PERT charts.
4) An outline of the budget and financial
considerations for the meeting.
5) Specific action items on which the DPC Working
Group agreements and endorsements are requested.
If there are questions, comments, needs for information
concerning the conference, please contact Bob Corell at
357-9715, or by FAX at 357-9629, or through the OMNET
Telemail System at R. CORELL.
CC: Gov. Sununu
MEMORANDUM
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
file
February 13, 1990
Tark
TO:
MICHAEL BOSKIN
STEPHEN DANZANSKY
FROM:
Cluih
Ene
DICK SCHMALENSEE
SUBJECT: Toward an Administration strategy
on global warming
At one time or another I have promised both of you a few
thoughts on this subject. Hence this note, which argues for
developing an explicit strategy on global warming -- a set of
principles that will inform the many tactical/operating decisions
to be made in coming months -- and offers some thoughts on the
elements of such a strategy. My apologies for its length; if I
had had more time, I would have written less.
Why do we need an Administration strategy? The main reason
is that this issue is hot: it is on the minds of the public, and
the Administration will be required to make a host of decisions
on it in the domestic and international arenas in coming months.
(Action-forcing events include the April conference, future IPCC
and other international meetings, likely Congressional
initiatives, and a host of agency proposals of the CAFE and tree-
planting varieties.) Without a strategy, each of these decisions
will involve a struggle between those with differing views on
appropriate general policy.
In addition, many members of the Administration will be
called upon to talk about global warming in coming months.
Without a clear strategy, speeches by different people are likely
to point in somewhat different directions.
If we do not formulate an Administration strategy, we thus
will experience slow and difficult decision-making, more bad
press, and growing intra-Administration tensions; and we will
produce a set of actions and statements that is unlikely to have
any coherence or to advance systematically what anyone considers
to be sensible policy objectives. On the other hand, if we can
agree (through the DPC or EPC process) on the broad outlines of a
sensible policy, we would have some chance of advancing it by our
actions and public statements.
What sort of strategy should the Administration adopt? We
have made it clear that we are against hasty and expensive
action; we need to find an attractive package of things that we
are for.
2
We are now perceived as simply stalling; our implicit
strategy is interpreted at home and abroad as "Do nothing until
the scientific questions are answered." This is, I think, a
loser politically and weak scientifically. Nobody argues that
the key scientific questions are likely to be definitively
answered in the next 5 years, and the lags involved in acting
would not be trivial.
Some thoughts as to what we might be for follow:
We must of course continue to stress the high level of
scientific uncertainty regarding possible future climate
change, our commitment to serious research, and our hope
that other nations will help carry this burden.
We should begin to make exactly parallel statements in other
related research areas:
-- On the economic side, the costs of warming and of
reducing greenhouse emissions are highly uncertain.
Moreover, so little work has been done that it is not
unreasonable to expect that the application of existing
techniques to available data can reduce this
uncertainty substantially over the next 5 years or so,
though significant uncertainty will inevitably remain.
-- Techniques for abatement of emissions of methane and
nitrous oxide have not been much studied, and there is
undoubtedly more to be learned about carbon dioxide
abatement as well.
-- My impression is that there is also good science and
engineering to be done in the area of adaptation.
O Internationally, we should press aggressively, through the
IPCC process, for the development of a framework convention
that would permit a serious attack on the problem to be
mounted at least cost, should such an attack be someday
found necessary. This means
-- Shifting from "No framework now" to "A sound framework
as soon as possible."
-- Continuing to stress that the problem is global and
involves sources and sinks of many gasses. (The entire
U.S. transportation system contributed around 3 percent
of human-related greenhouse emissions in the 1980s, for
instance, and this share is declining.)
-- Marketing our comprehensive/trading approach
aggressively for what it is: the way to minimize the
costs of serious, global action. While a framework
3
convention based on this approach may take a year or
two longer to negotiate than a framework that merely
anticipates a large number of source-specific
protocols, it is much more likely to permit serious
action, should such action be found necessary.
We should define the "no-regret" strategy clearly, adopt it
explicitly, and move forward visibly to implement it. This
means
-- Making it clear that the "no-regret" strategy means
ordering the agenda to take quick action on proposals
for which non-greenhouse benefits exceed costs and some
greenhouse benefits are expected. If it were to be
interpreted as "adopt all policies with both greenhouse
and non-greenhouse benefits, the economy would be
placed at serious risk -- not to mention the budget.
-- Proposing international research and technology
transfer programs (in which the Japanese have expressed
serious interest), probably at the G-7 summit.
- Research on new energy supply technologies and on
methods of reducing greenhouse emissions or
enhancing the corresponding sinks is, at the very
worst, advancing technology generally and
purchasing insurance.
- If nothing else, raising the energy efficiency of
the developing nations will serve to hold down
fossil fuel prices on world markets.
-- Moving quickly to implement the no-regret strategy
domestically. There are a variety of candidate actions
here; these include
- Issuing an Executive Order requiring Federal
Facilities to identify possibilities for reducing
emissions -- particularly by improving efficiency.
- Actively encouraging changes in utility regulation
to deal with apparent market failures that serve
to limit investments in conservation.
- Marketing the tree-planting program externally as
it was marketed internally -- as a program that
has beautification and greenhouse benefits.
- Considering the imposition of a small carbon fee,
which would serve to reduce emissions, raise
revenue, and be an important symbolic step.
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
file
canter
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1990
MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL Tort
pm
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY MAYNARD, OSTP
FROM:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
RL
SUBJECT:
Economics on the Questionnaire
Here are some quick thoughts on the 2/5/90 meeting notes on
the conference questionnaire, organized following those notes. A
general comment: the final document should be vetted by the State
Department after it has been re-written by somebody who has
produced similar documents in the past. We want to avoid giving
offense, getting useless answers to badly-posed questions, and
posing absurd burdens on respondents and ourselves. We should
structure this document so that we can fairly quickly make a
useful summary/compilation available for the conference.
1.
I would suggest that we provide a broad outline of relevant
topics in both science and economics, that we ask for only
major projects, and that we ask for short descriptions and
for the name and address of a contact person. On the
economics side, the outline might be as follows:
1. Forecasts of future greenhouse gas emissions.
2. Forecasts of future relevant technologies.
3. Studies of methods or costs of adapting to warming.
4. Studies of methods or costs of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
2.
This might be phrased as "What are the scientific and
economic questions that it is most important to answer in
order to develop domestic and international policies?"
3.
This seems to be exactly the same as #2...
4.
This is a fairly complete list; what follows is an attempt
to put some structure on it.
O What is your nation's current budget for climate-related
scientific and economic research (public and private
sectors, if possible)? How does it break down according to
the outline [furnished in item #1, above]?
2
In what aspects of climate-related economic and scientific
research is your nation particularly strong? What aspects
would you particularly like to discuss at the conference?
What are your government's estimates of your nation's
current and future (through 2010 or 2030) net emissions of
the main greenhouse gasses: carbon dioxide, CFCs and related
compounds, methane, and nitrous oxide.
-- How do these emissions break down among major sources?
[use the (EPA) breakdowns in the task force report?]
-- What pattern of fuel use is assumed in the carbon
dioxide projections?
-- How accurately are current net emissions of these
gasses measured?
-- What are the key uncertainties attached to your
estimates of future emissions, and how important are
they?
-- What research is ongoing to reduce these uncertainties
and to improve measurement accuracy?
O If warming occurs, what are the major economic costs your
country expects to incur as a consequence?
-- What studies support these estimates?
-- What adaptation measures are now under active
consideration?
O If your nation were required to make significant reductions
in future net greenhouse emissions, how would you propose to
accomplish this?
-- What studies support your choice of mitigation
strategies?
- If you have decided not to use incentive-based
approaches (charges and/or marketable permits),
why not?
- If you have not considered abatement of gasses
other than carbon dioxide, why not?
-- How would you anticipate altering (directly or
indirectly) your nation's use of fossil fuels to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions?
3
- What role would new technologies play in this
process?
- What role would nuclear power play?
-- What cost estimates have you produced for various
levels of mitigation?
- How do these costs compare with those imposed on
your nation by the oil shocks of the 1970s?
-- What actions, if any, do you plan to take in the near
future to limit net greenhouse gas emissions?
- What reductions do you expect them to produce,
when, and at what cost?
What mechanism is your government employing to make
decisions regarding possible future climate change?
These are only my own hurried thoughts; Howard and Michael may
have useful additions, deletions, or modifications to suggest.
CC: Michael J. Boskin
Howard K. Gruenspecht
DRAFT
DRAFT
December 26, 1989
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Hon. D. Allan Bromley
Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
Chairman, Domestic Policy Council Working Group
on Global Change
C. Boyden Gray
Counsel to the President
Robert E. Grady
Associate Director, Natural Resources, Energy & Science
Office of Management and Budget
FROM:
Richard B. Stewart
Assistant Attorney General
SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Order on Global Environmental Change
As requested, we have prepared a draft of an Executive
Order that might be issued by the President to direct federal
agencies to assess their programs in light of potential global
environmental change. This memorandum discusses several salient
features of the Draft Executive Order.
This Draft Executive Order has not been circulated for
comment by other agencies, and has not received formal approval
as to form and legality within the Justice Department. In the
past, draft executive orders have received interagency comment
before final issue. For example, Executive Order 12630,
directing agencies to assess the impacts of their activities on
"takings" concerns, was circulated for comment. Coupled with the
technical nature and potential burden on agencies of the present
draft order, this experience suggests that circulation for
interagency comment would be desirable.
DRAFT
2
1. Purpose and Scope of the Draft Executive Order.
Global environmental change has emerged as a potentially
important issue with broad implications for both domestic and
international policy. Although the scientific understanding of
global environmental phenomena is less than complete and
continues to evolve, such phenomena may have sufficient primacy
in both expert and public opinion, and their effects may
ultimately prove sufficiently significant, to warrant inquiry now
into the relationship between federal programs and global
environmental change.
Issuance of the attached Executive Order ("EO") would be a
proactive measure which would provide a solid and necessary
informational base for future policy initiatives. It would also
assist the President in taking the initiative on the nation's
environmental agenda. At the same time, the attached Draft EO
does not direct agencies to change the substance of their
programs. Such changes might be made after an informational base
is collected under the present Order.
The Draft EO directs a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between Federal Government activities and global
environmental change. Each federal agency is required promptly
to evaluate its activities, on a programmatic basis, in relation
to global environmental change. These evaluations will permit a
government-wide inventory of the relationship between government
and global environmental change, assist the development of a
broad portfolio of possible responses to such change, and
identify areas showing the greatest need or promise for
innovative future initiatives. In combination, these results may
substantially improve our ability to make intelligent policy
choices on global environmental change, and our ability to
support these choices with informed analysis.
The evaluations ordered by the Draft EO are programmatic,
not project-specific. That is, agencies are directed to review
their broad programs, not each project separately. This choice
is made largely because the science of global environmental
phenomena is rarely sufficiently precise to pinpoint the
relationship between a specific federal project and global
changes. Additionally, a project-specific review could be too
time-consuming, and too burdensome, to achieve the pragmatic
goals of the Draft EO.
The analysis ordered by the Draft EO is intended to provide
information on two aspects of the relationship between federal
programs and global environmental change: the potential effects
of federal programs on such change, and the impact such change
may ultimately have on governmental programs. The first involves
federal programs' contributions to the causes of global
DRAFT
3
environmental change, including programs that affect sources of
greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substances and that affect
3
sinks that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. The
second deals with programs potentially vulnerable to global
things
environmental change, such as management of public lands, water
supplies, forests, and coastal facilities, and federal
construction programs. In addition, the Draft EO directs
agencies to identify opportunities for improved policy responses
to the problems posed by global environmental change.
The Draft EO contemplates that "lead agencies" -- identified
to be the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the
White House, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the
Department of Justice -- will assist the responding agencies in
carrying out the terms of the EO. The lead agencies are to issue
guidance and provide assistance to the responding agencies. For
example, OSTP and/or CEQ would develop scenarios for global
environmental change and send these scenarios to the agencies so
that all agencies assess their program impacts and
vulnerabilities relying on the same idea of what global
environmental changes may occur. The Land & Natural Resources
Division of the Justice Department might assist responding
agencies in determining the extent of their legal authority to
develop new programmatic responses to global environmental
issues.
The proposed order does not require agencies to evaluate
all the effects that private activities -- for example, the
agency's regulated community -- may have on global environmental
change (or all the effects that global environmental change may
have on private activities). Although some private activities
may be so directly regulated or supervised by federal agencies
that the relationship between those activities and global
environmental change is a relevant part of those agencies'
reviews of their own programs (e.g., EPA review of regulations,
Army Corps of Engineers review of coastal construction practices,
or DOE review of development strategies), the EO in its present
form does not require that federal agencies evaluate all the
indirect effects of their programs on private activities. A
requirement that federal agencies study the global environmental
implications of all private activities regulated or otherwise
influenced by federal programs would be too broad and too
burdensome. Consideration should, however, be given to
instructing agencies' evaluations under the EO to include certain
important categories of directly affected private activities,
such as air pollution sources regulated under the Clean Air Act.
Such categories might be developed through the process of agency
comment on the Draft EO, and could be implemented through the
guidance to be issued by the lead agencies under the EO.
The Draft EO defines the term "agency" broadly, to include
all executive agencies, including the independent regulatory
DRAFT
4
agencies and the military services. Special circumstances of
certain agencies can be addressed in the guidanoe to be issued
under Section 4 of the Draft EO. For example, guidance might be
issued to make clear that responses to the Draft EO are not to
reveal classified information, nor to compromise national
security interests. (If desired, such concerns could be
addressed in the EO itself.)
The Draft EO identifies two main phenomena to be included in
the definition of "global environmental change": global climate
change due to the "greenhouse effect," and depletion of the
stratospheric ozone layer. Provision is made to add other
phenomena to this list by appropriate guidance.
2. Relationship of Executive Order and Planned Issuance of NEPA
Guidance.
The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") is currently
reviewing agency comments on a draft guidance issued by CEQ in
June 1989 on the treatment by federal agencies of global climate
change issues in reviews required by the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"). The Draft EO we recommend could largely,
although not entirely, serve as a substitute for such NEPA
guidance, at least in the near term. It is our view that the
EO should be issued first, before any NEPA guidance on the
subject is issued. NEPA guidance could then be issued, if
desired, in a format which complements the EO directives and the
guidance to be issued under the EO. In addition, NEPA guidance
could be based on the information produced by agencies under the
EO.
Meanwhile, our Draft EO incorporates an important advantage
of the NEPA guidance route: expert coordination by CEQ. CEQ's
advice and direction to agencies will be crucial to the success
of the EO. The EO itself leaves open the specific scientific
bases for agency evaluations to follow, preferring to refer that
question to guidance issued by OSTP in cooperation with CEQ.
A. We recommend adoption of the Draft EO before any NEPA
guidance for several reasons.
(i) The EO is a prompt, consolidated, short-term action
involving all agencies at once. It will gather information which
can be used promptly and compared across agencies. In contrast,
NEPA guidance would come into play only as new decisions on
programs or large projects are made. The NEPA route is ad hoc,
while the EO route is a comprehensive baseline inventory.
(ii) The EO is a Presidential directive, with a proactive
stance. NEPA guidance by CEQ is likely to be seen as an agency
DRAFT
5
interpretation of a Congressional enactment. The results of NEPA
guidance will be occasional reports issued by diverse agencies,
often under the pressure of litigation. In contrast, the results
of the EO will be a set of companion reports, relying on the same
scenarios for change and employing the same format, released
simultaneously at a predetermined date, and ready for
announcement and presentation by the Administration.
(iii) The EO permits the Administration to direct the agency
activities and to define the parameters of the evaluations
conducted. It does not depend, as NEPA guidance does, on the
edicts of a statute designed to serve purposes not entirely
matching the goals of the EO, and the case law developed by
courts in years of litigation. Nor would the EO be as vulnerable
to interpretation by courts, since it is crafted by the Executive
Branch for Executive Branch responses and since it expressly
provides that it creates no rights enforceable by others.
Furthermore, structuring the conduct and content of the
evaluations (and managing budgetary resources) can be much more
finely tuned and accurately handled by the Administration under
an EO than in a NEPA process.
(iv) The EO addresses programs with an eye to identifying
prospective areas for improvement, including potential changes in
policy and law. Thus, the information collected under the EO
could be used as the basis for Administration proposals for
administrative, legislative or international action to address
the problems of global environmental change. In contrast,
assessments performed under NEPA must consider the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and its alternatives, but they
typically are restricted to relatively narrow range of
alternatives and do not consider long-range policy directions.
(v) The EO will address both the effects of government
programs on the global environment, and the effects of global
environmental change on the conduct of federal programs. There
is a serious question whether the latter effect is within the
scope of the review required by NEPA, since the NEPA statute
refers to assessment of the impacts of federal action on the
environment.
(vi) The EO will rely on uniform scenarios for describing
global environmental change, and uniform guidelines for
conducting evaluations and presenting output, rather than leaving
such decisions up to individual agencies and individual judges.
Although NEPA guidance could provide standards to help achieve
uniform methods and assumptions, it is more likely than the EO to
be subject to diverging methods and assumptions.
(vii) The NEPA guidance proposed by CEQ last spring
potentially rendered already-completed Environmental Impact
Statements legally vulnerable for failure to consider global
DRAFT
6
change impacts. The EO avoids that question by making review
prospective, and by creating no rights enforceable against any
project or other agency decision.
B. Although the EO is the logical first step in addressing
the relationship of federal programs to global environmental
change, there are reasons why some NEPA guidance may still be
desirable after the issuance of the EO.
(i) NEPA guidance may be made applicable to future
programmatic decisions, enabling periodic update of the same
review requested by the EO. The EO itself does not call for
future updates.
(ii) Agencies are already beginning to face court challenges
arguing that the failure to evaluate the impacts of federal
programs on global climate change violates NEPA. See Foundation
on Economic Trends V. Watkins, (Civ. No. 89-1483-GHR, D.D.C.)
(challenging programs of Departments of Energy, Interior and
Agriculture). NEPA guidance from CEQ would help agencies to know
when they should perform analyses of such impacts and when not,
and would thus give the agencies CEQ standards -- entitled to
deference by the courts -- to rely on in defense of their impact
statements. For example, CEQ could issue guidance stating that
assessment of the impacts on global environmental change of some
kinds of projects is not realistic because such micro-level
relationships with global phenomena are not ascertainable, and
therefore that such assessments are not required by NEPA. Or CEQ
could issue guidance directing agencies to employ certain
technical methodologies, or to rely on certain scenarios, in
assessing the impacts of their projects on global environmental
change pursuant to NEPA.
(iii) There is a possibility that EO-mandated evaluations
might be used by a citizens group to claim that the agency is
violating NEPA by not assessing the same impacts under NEPA.
NEPA guidance from CEQ could explain how the one-time EO reviews
differ from that mandated by NEPA, and point out that some of the
factors analyzed under the EO are not required to be considered
under the NEPA statute. (On the other hand, the EO itself may
assist agencies in complying with NEPA requirements. Depending
on the specific circumstances, the program or project challenged
under NEPA, and the extent of analysis undertaken by the agency,
certain agencies might be able to submit their EO responses
should a NEPA document on global environmental change be
required, or even argue that compliance with the EO is the
"functional equivalent" of NEPA review.)
DRAFT
Draft Executive Order -- Evaluation of federal programs
relating to global environmental change
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, and to further
social, economic, environmental, and national security objectives
consistent with the domestic and foreign policies of the United
States, it is ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. (a) Policy. It is the policy of the Federal
Government to protect and enhance the social, economic and
environmental well-being and national security interests of the
United States, to preserve world stability and sustainable
development of the global economy and environment, to prevent
unintended harm to other nations, and to assist other nations of
the world in meeting the challenges of the next century.
(b) Purpose and scope.
(i) In furtherance of that policy, and in recognition that
global environmental change is an emerging issue of potentially
great significance to the Nation's social, economic and
environmental well-being and national security interests, this
Order is issued to direct a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between Federal Government activities and global
environmental change.
(ii) Uncertainties surround the nature of global
environmental change, the timing of such change, and even the
likelihood of its occurrence. Nonetheless, the potential
severity of the impacts from such change requires evaluation now
of the potential effects of Federal activities on global
environmental change, the potential impacts of global
environmental change on Federal activities, and the possible
Federal responses to such change.
(iii) This Order is issued to require each Federal agency to
evaluate, on a programmatic basis, its activities in relation to
global environmental change. These evaluations will (A) permit a
government-wide baseline analysis of the relationship between
government and global environmental change; (B) assist the
development of a broad portfolio of possible responses to such
change both domestically and internationally, and; (C) identify
areas showing the greatest need or promise for future
initiatives.
[optional provision, to link this EO with the evolving
international agreement process:
(iv) This Order additionally will assist the Nation's
ability to negotiate and implement an international agreement on
steps to prevent deleterious global environmental change.]
DRAFT
- 2 -
SEC. 2. Definitions. As used in this Order:
:
(a) "Global environmental change" refers to several
phenomena, including:
(i) A change in global climatic conditions that has been
hypothesized to be occurring, due to increasing atmospheric
concentrations of "greenhouse" gases (potentially including
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons,
and nitrogen oxides) which may act to trap heat radiated from
the earth's surface;
that
(ii) A depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer
hypothesized to be occurring due to increasing atmospheric
concentrations of certain substances, potentially including
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, methyl chloride, chloroform,
carbon tetrachloride, and other chemical compounds;
(iii) Other global environmental changes as may be
elaborated in guidance issued under Section 4 of this Order.
(b) "Agency" shall have the same meaning as the term
"Executive agency" in Section 105 of Title 5 of the United States
Code, and shall include the military departments and the United
States Postal Service.
SEC. 3. Agency evaluations of global environmental change.
(a) Each agency shall submit to the Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology, and to the Chairman,
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an evaluation of its
programs of statutory, regulatory, and administrative activities,
in relation to global environmental change, by [July 1, 1990].
Need much
move time
(b) In preparing its evaluation, each agency shall:
to scenavior
(i) evaluate its activities according to a scenario or set
of scenarios of global environmental change provided or approved
by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and CEQ;
(ii) recognize, in identifying response strategies, the need
both to achieve goals at least cost and to retain flexibility to
respond to new information, changing circumstances, and diverse
local conditions; and
(iii) cooperate with the lead agencies identified in Section
4 of this Order in compiling and exchanging relevant data and
information concerning global environmental change.
(c) Each agency's evaluation shall include:
(i) analysis of the potential direct or indirect effects of
DRAFT
- 3 -
the agency's activities on global environmental change, including
the effects of its activities on both sources and sinks of
greenhouse gases;
(ii) analysis of the potential direct or indirect effects of
global environmental change on the agency's activities, including
consideration of the broad range of possible social, economic,
environmental, and national security consequences of such change;
(iii) analysis of possible Federal responses that might be
taken to mitigate the effects of the agency's activities on
global environmental change;
(iv) analysis of possible Federal responses that might be
Too
taken to mitigate the effects of global environmental change on
the agency's activities;
opended
(v) analysis of possible Federal responses that might be
taken to assist adaptation of the agency's activities to global
environmental change; and
(vi) identification of opportunities for specific
administrative or legislative proposals which could facilitate
mitigation of, or adaptation to, global environmental change, by
providing for innovative government-initiated response measures,
encouragement of innovative private response measures, and use of
market-based mechanisms and other alternatives to command and
control mechanisms in environmental regulation.
SEC. 4. Lead responsibility. OSTP, CEQ, and the Department
of Justice, shall be the lead agencies supervising the conduct of
this government-wide evaluation. To effectuate this Order, the
lead agencies shall:
(a) issue guidance on preparation of the evaluations
directed by this Order to the agencies, by [March 1, 1990], both
(i) establishing a scenario or set of scenarios of global
environmental change through identification of the possible
sources and effects of such change, so as to better inform those
preparing the evaluations, and
CEA cear
(ii) establishing a standard format for preparation of the
evaluations and presentation of assumptions, data, methods, and
SIRA
conclusions. The agencies shall be afforded an opportunity to
comment on the proposed format;
(b) develop and maintain, with the cooperation of other
interested agencies and to be made available to interested
agencies, a compilation of data and information relevant to
global environmental change; and
DRAFT
- 4 -
(c) advise and assist the agencies in the preparations of
their evaluations.
SEC. 5. General provision. This Order is issued solely for
the purpose of conducting an evaluation of the relationship
between governmental activities and global environmental change.
This Order is not issued to implement any statutory requirement,
and nothing in this Order shall create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
global
December 27, 1989
MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL Clent
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE as
SUBJECT:
Comments on Working Group II Papers
Attached are comments that were accepted to be included in
the Legal Measures and Economic Measures papers drafted by
Working Group II. We would like these changes transmitted to the
IPCC.
Attachment
ATTACHMENT A
SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR RSWG LEGAL MEASURES TOPIC PAPER
The following should be inserted under Section 1 (Preamble)
Commitment to consider the possible adverse socio-
economic impacts of policies that might be taken to
address climate change.
Recognition that the interests of the international
community relate to global climate objectives, not the
means by which they are achieved.
Recognition that any arrangements between individual
countries that maintain an overall greenhouse
contribution within the sum of their individual
obligations should be acceptable as a compliance
strategy.
ATTACHMENT B
U.S. COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC MEASURES PAPER
Given that the paper is inclusive rather than exclusive of
differing viewpoints, we hope that the following perspectives can
be reflected in the body of the final paper. Suggested insertion
points are provided alongside each item.
Page 2, paragraph 1: (substitute for or expand on last sentence)
The ultimate purpose of policy measures to slow climate change
is to enhance overall welfare. Overall well-being depends on
both the socio-economic and environmental effects of climate
change and the socio-economic effects of emission targets and
the policy measures implemented to reach them. Whether or not
a strict cost benefit approach is applied, it seems clear (to
some?) that both kinds of socio-economic impacts must be taken
into account in setting policy targets.
Page 5, enumeration of criteria for convention or protocol.
(additions)
The international policy regime should recognize that the
interests of the international community relate to global
climate objectives, not the means by which they are achieved.
International measures should recognize any arrangements
between individual countries that maintain an overall
greenhouse contribution within the sum of their individual
obligations as an acceptable compliance strategy.
Page 7, paragraph 1 discussion of right to pollute (points to weave
into the discussion)
Both regulation and economic instruments effectively allow
for the same right to pollute: the only difference is in the
transferability of this right. Regulation does not banish the
profit motive, since profit opportunities in regulatory
systems are often directly dependent on securing favorable
regulatory treatment. The waste of resources in lobbying for
favorable regulatory treatment represents a drawback to the
regulatory approach.
Page 9, paragraph 2 discussion of sinks (addition)
An international policy regime that focuses on global climate
objectives, rather than the means by which they are achieved,
would treat sink creation and emissions reduction as one for
one substitutes.
2
Page 9, enumeration of benefits (additional point)
opportunity for low income rights holders to sell rights to
others in exchange for compensation of greater value.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
December 27, 1989
Please deliver to:
Frederick M. Bernthal
FAX number of addressee: 647-0774
Telephone number of addressee: 647-1554
From:
Barbara Claffey
FAX number of sender:
395-6947
Telephone number of sender: 395-3114
Number of pages, Including cover sheet: 6
TRANSMISSION REPORT
THIS DOCUMENT (REDUCED SAMPLE ABOVE)
WAS SENT
** COUNT **
# 5
*** SEND ***
NO
REMOTE STATION I.D.
START TIME
DURATION
#PAGES
COMMENT
1
202 647 0774
12-27-89 2:53PM
2'51"
5
TOTAL 0:02'51"
5
XEROX TELECOPIER 7020
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
with
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Mr
WASHINGTON
December 20, 1989
MEMBER OF THE Clemit COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE FREDRICK M. BERNTHAL
Chose
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
Rl
SUBJECT:
U.S. Position on RSWG Topic Papers
As indicated in both Presidential statements and in the
charge to the DPC Working Group on Climate Change, the policy
response of the international community should be determined
based on consideration of the costs of action and inaction.
Despite this, relatively little attention is given to assessment
of the social and economic costs of action in the RSWG documents
that we have seen to date.
We understand that the consequences of inaction are being
considered by the Working Group on Impacts (WGII). In our view,
the development and presentation of information on the
consequences of action that is essential to the choice of an
appropriate response strategy clearly falls within the purview of
the RSWG. From the perspective of the United States, development
of this information is of co-equal importance to the development
of information on legal, economic, technology transfer, and
public information mechanisms that will ultimately be used to
implement whatever strategy is decided upon.
It is important that the RSWG topic papers incorporate
language that is inclusive of the current USG position on global
climate change. Attachment A provides language for two new ticks
in the Preamble of the RSWG Legal Measures Paper. The first new
tick states that the socio-economic impact of policy responses as
well the socio-economic impact of climate change be listed as a
factor to be considered in any Protocols negotiated under the
framework. The second new tick states that the interests of the
international community relate to global climate objectives, not
the means by which they are achieved. In particular, any
arrangements between individual countries that hold their overall
greenhouse contribution within the sum of their individual
obligations should be acceptable as a compliance strategy.
Attachment B provides comments and suggested language for
the Economic Measures Topic Paper.
2
We will assume that the contents of Attachments A and B will
be fully incorporated in the U.S. comments to be submitted by
January 1 unless we hear from you to the contrary.
Attachments
ATTACHMENT A
SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR RSWG LEGAL MEASURES TOPIC PAPER
The following should be inserted under Section 1 (Preamble)
Commitment to consider the possible adverse socio-
economic impacts of policies that might be taken to
address climate change.
Recognition that the interests of the international
community relate to global climate objectives, not the
means by which they are achieved.
Recognition that any arrangements between individual
countries that maintain an overall greenhouse
contribution within the sum of their individual
obligations should be acceptable as a compliance
strategy.
ATTACHMENT B
U.S. COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC MEASURES PAPER
Given that the paper is inclusive rather than exclusive of
differing viewpoints, we hope that the following perspectives can
be reflected in the body of the final paper. Suggested insertion
points are provided alongside each item.
Page 2, paragraph 1: (substitute for or expand on last sentence)
The ultimate purpose of policy measures to slow climate change
is to enhance overall welfare. Overall well-being depends on
both the socio-economic and environmental effects of climate
change and the socio-economic effects of emission targets and
the policy measures implemented to reach them. Whether or not
a strict cost benefit approach is applied, it seems clear (to
some?) that both kinds of socio-economic impacts must be taken
into account in setting policy targets.
Page 5, enumeration of criteria for convention or protocol.
(additions)
The international policy regime should recognize that the
interests of the international community relate to global
climate objectives, not the means by which they are achieved.
International measures should recognize any arrangements
between individual countries that maintain an overall
greenhouse contribution within the sum of their individual
obligations as an acceptable compliance strategy.
Page 7, paragraph 1 discussion of right to pollute (points to weave
into the discussion)
Both regulation and economic instruments effectively allow
for the same right to pollute: the only difference is in the
transferability of this right. Regulation does not banish the
profit motive, since profit opportunities in regulatory
systems are often directly dependent on securing favorable
regulatory treatment. The waste of resources in lobbying for
favorable regulatory treatment represents a drawback to the
regulatory approach.
Page 9, paragraph 2 discussion of sinks (addition)
An international policy regime that focuses on global climate
objectives, rather than the means by which they are achieved,
would treat sink creation and emissions reduction as one for
one substitutes.
2
Page 9, enumeration of benefits (additional point)
opportunity for low income rights holders to sell rights to
others in exchange for compensation of greater value.
CLOSE HOLD
12-15-89 12:00
PM Winn will
Cupy
FINAL
December 15, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
serve
SUBJECT:
Reforestation Initiatives
clinic
Issue:
The parameters and details of an Administration initiative
for trees.
Background:
The President is committed to wise stewardship of our
nation's natural resources. In the book Building a Better
America, the President noted the environmental and recreational
significance of our parks, forests, and similar areas. As part
of this commitment, the President has long advocated
reforestation. A White House fact sheet dated September 18, 1989
noted the President's personal interest in planting trees. The
emphasis on reforestation also has implications for international
environmental issues, specifically global change.
In 1988, the President stated he would combat the greenhouse
effect with the "White House effect." The June 1989 Paris
Economic Summit highlighted environmental issues, including
climate change. The final summit communique called for "adoption
of substantial forest management practices." In November 1989,
the U.S. joined 70 nations in signing the Noordwijk Declaration.
Although not a binding document, signatory countries recognized
the need to stabilize the emissions of greenhouse gases as soon
as possible and agreed that it is timely to explore targets for
CO₂ emissions reductions. Also noted in the declaration was the
importance of reforestation.
There is substantial scientific consensus and public concern
over the adverse effects that atmospheric increases in
"greenhouse gases,' such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄),
and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), are likely to have on the global
climate. Such gases come from industrial and natural sources, as
well as from land use changes such as deforestation. CO2
accounts for less than half of greenhouse emissions, yet it is
politically controversial, and one of the major issues under
discussion in international environmental negotiations. A small
reforestation program may establish U.S. leadership and give
added credibility to any proposal we may put forth regarding
large-scale, global reforestation. Unilateral adoption of a
large scale program, however, could reduce our leverage by giving
away something with which we might bargain.
2
The United States contributes 23 percent of the total
worldwide fossil fuel CO2 emissions (not including the effects of
tropical deforestation), although its share of the total has been
and is expected to continue rapidly to decline. In absolute
terms, U.S. CO2 emissions from 1973 through 1987 have been
essentially flat, with the emissions average during that time
period equal to the 1972 level. Plausible unilateral U.S.
actions to reduce CO2 emissions, including the reforestation
options presented here, will have negligible effects on the
global environment. Analysis of a wide range of emission
scenarios in which the U.S. acts unilaterally to reduce CO2
emissions by 10 percent in 1995, shows that the expected
worldwide doubling of CO2 in the mid-21st century is delayed by
only 2 to 6 months.
There are substantial scientific uncertainties about the
actual strength, timing and character of human and nature induced
climate change. Nevertheless, planting trees, especially where
justified by more certain non-climate benefits, can be an
effective way to reduce levels of CO2 while obtaining other
benefits. Of course, CO₂ taken up by trees is sequestered only
until they are burned or decompose.
Tree planting can provide other environmental benefits,
including improved air quality, increased water quality, and
reduced soil erosion. It can also result in improved wildlife
habitat and enhanced opportunities for outdoor recreation.
Current Reforestation Activities:
In FY 1988, approximately 3.4 million acres were planted in
trees or seedlings on public and private lands. Total trees
planted exceeded 2.3 billion (see figure 1).
Land available for planting trees can be divided into
agricultural and non-agricultural. In the agricultural category,
land is used for crops and pasture. Pastureland is usually
economically marginal, environmentally sensitive and frequently
erodible if overgrazed. Agricultural land offered for tree-
planting is most likely to be idle, very poor land, owned by
individuals who do not depend on farming for most of their
income. Non-agricultural land includes private (industrial or
non-industrial) and public (Federal, state and local) forestland.
Nearly three fourths of the productive timberland in the
U.S. lies on private lands. Seventy-five percent of this
timberland is owned by non-commercial, small woodlot owners. The
current growth and opportunity for future growth in tree planting
is on agricultural and other privately owned land, especially on
small woodlots after timber harvests.
3
Figure 1. Tree Planting By Ownership - FY 1988
Percent
Trees Planted
of all
Federal Government
Acres
in Thousands
Planting
National Forests
293,271
199,000
8.6
Dept. of the Interior
40,482
27,000
1.2
Other Federal Agencies
10,738
7,500
0.4
Total
344,491
233,500
10.2
Non Federal Public
State Forests
59,323
40,000
1.7
Other State Agencies
13,520
9,200
0.4
Other Public Agencies
12,378
8,400
0.4
Total
85,221
57,600
2.5
Private
Industrial Owners
1,389,716
945,000
40.9
Small Owners
1,575,050
1,017,000
46.4
Total
2,964,766
2,016,000
87.3
Grand Total
3,394,478
2,305,100
100.0
Both public and private sector programs are involved in tree
planting. Most financing and technical assistance for non-
industrial, private tree planting is provided by the Department
of Agriculture and their Forest Service. Actual planning and
planting are undertaken by state foresters in the 50 states and 3
territories. Private sector organizations, such as the American
Forestry Association ("Global Releaf", National Urban Forestry
Council) and the National Arbor Day Foundation ("Tree City USA",
Trees for America), also provide technical assistance.
USDA Tree Planting
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), operated by USDA, is
designed to retire environmentally sensitive and economically
marginal agriculture-related land to soil conserving cover,
including forest through 10 year contracts with farmers. To the
extent practicable, 12.5 percent of this land is to be devoted to
trees. The land can reconvert to agricultural uses at the end of
the contract period.
4
Technical responsibility for CRP planting is assigned to the
Forest Service, and technical service to landowners is provided
by state forestry personnel. The CRP contributed 245,000 acres
of trees planted in 1989 (167 million trees/year and over 1.3
billion trees since the beginning of the program). The current
CRP authorization expires at the end of the 1990 crop year. Some
portion of the 82.1 million acres of crop and pasture land which
meet the criteria of environmental sensitivity could be included
in a tree planting CRP-like program.
Current Federal programs targeting non-Federal forest lands
include the Forest Incentives Program (FIP) and a program of
technical assistance provided through the Forest Service. FIP
provides about $12 million per year for technical assistance and
Federal 50/50 cost share for reforestation, timber stand
improvement, and other forest needs on non-industrial private
forest lands (NIPF). The Forest Service annually funds about $5
million for direct technical assistance through State forestry
agencies to NIPF landowners. These programs are used for
planting on non-Federal forestlands, such as non-industrial
private forests, and on crop and pasture lands on a cost-shared
basis, without rental payments.
Additional tree planting could be linked to existing crop
subsidy programs. The concept is not fully addressed in the
current options, but could be developed. This "agricultural
incentive program" would have farmers participate in a trees
planting program as a requirement of receiving benefits from USDA
crop support programs. Farmers could plant trees in a portion of
their eligible acreage. In recent years, acreage participating
in the five largest programs (corn, sorghum, wheat, cotton, and
rice) amounted to roughly 225 million acres -- with about 40
million acres set-aside by farmers to participate in the support
programs. Federal outlays for these programs exceed $5 billion
per year. A requirement that 5 percent of eligible acreage be
planted with trees would yield an additional 10 million acres, on
lands heretofore used as croplands.
Reforestation of National Forest lands totaled 300,000 acres
in FY 1988. Nearly 200 million trees were planted. Planting is
done following: timber harvest; natural disasters such as fire,
insects and disease; and previously unsuccessful reforestation.
Some sites regenerate naturally without special treatment or
investment. Others require site preparation to encourage natural
regeneration or preparation for seeding or planting. Total
Federal cost for Forest Service reforestation in FY 1988 was
about $250 million.
The Urban and Community Forest Program provides technical
assistance for community forests in cities and towns. It is
designed to improve soil, water and air quality and is funded
5
through the USDA Forest Service.
Other Federal Tree Planting
The Department of the Interior and other agencies reforested
about 51,000 acres in FY 1988, with 34 million trees. Most is
done by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), principally in
Oregon. BLM spent over $22 million in FY 1988 for reforestation.
Any new program could be a mix of non-Federal forestlands
and agricultural lands. Some agricultural land can be attracted
with cost-sharing, while other agricultural land can only be
attracted with a CRP-like program. While planting costs
themselves are moderately lower on agricultural lands than on
non-industrial forestland, if CRP-like annual rentals were
required, the total cost would be much higher. Furthermore, some
land which would require a CRP-type rental could revert to its
previous use after the full rental period is over.
Another concern is that a large tree planting initiative
could have a depressing effect on non-subsidized planting. This
would occur if a large subsidized tree planting program depressed
timber prices and resulted in reduced planting by forestry firms.
Congressional Activity:
There are several legislative proposals that would increase
tree planting, four in the Senate and one in the House. The Farm
Conservation and Water Protection Act of 1989 (S. 970, the
"Fowler Bill") is the probable vehicle for any action in the near
future. It is a forerunner of the 1990 Farm Bill and contains
specific authority to increase tree planting through a CRP-like
program, directing a greater percentage of lands under the
program to be planted with trees, instead of grasses (currently
only 6.7 percent of CRP lands are planted with trees.)
Options For a Tree Planting Initiative:
Prior to the Paris Economic Summit, the Environmental
Protection Agency proposed a major commitment to tree planting to
reduce the effects of global warming. Subsequent to the Summit,
a task force consisting of DOE, EPA, OPD, USDA, and USDI met to
further develop and refine options for a reforestation
initiative, in consultation with other agencies. According to
the interagency task force, the goals of a reforestation
initiative include:
Offset increases in U.S. CO2 emissions.
Demonstrate U.S. commitment to worldwide forest management
and address global change.
6
Provide leadership to support conservation in the U.S.
through public-private partnerships and volunteer approaches
to tree planting and forest management.
Improve forest management and provide multiple environmental
and economic benefits.
Several options are presented below. All have some
volunteer component. They differ in the amount and type of
Federal programmatic activity. The FY 1991 Budget now includes
Option #3 as a part of a proposed initiative, with budgetary
costs entirely offset by revenue from user fees to be paid into
an environmental endowment fund.
Community Trees/Volunteer Program
Provides Federal Government leadership, coordination, and
promotion, designed to stimulate an all-out volunteer effort to
plant an average of 30 million trees annually. It includes
provisions for technical assistance to make tree planting
effective.
It would expand the existing USDA Forest Service Urban and
Community forestry network of Federal-State-Local government
agencies, organizations and community activists and generate
private contributions of funds and volunteer labor to sustain the
planting and maintenance of urban and community trees.
Federal funds would be allocated through state forestry
agencies and as direct grants to conservation and citizen
organizations. State forestry staff or contract forestry
consultants would provide technical assistance and program
coordination activities. It is anticipated that national
leadership would be provided by a Presidential Blue Ribbon
Commission, ensuring proper coordination between Federal, state
and local efforts. A Volunteer Trees Foundation under Commission
oversight could promote and organize private contributions for
tree planting.
This option would provide high non-climate payoffs, such as
savings on residential air-conditioning, or improved recreational
opportunities on community lands. Furthermore, it would reverse
the present "deforestation" trend occurring in America's cities
and towns, where only one tree is now being planted for every
four that die or are removed. Through personal involvement and
commitment of the volunteers, the option would result in a
renewal of public support and commitment to improving the
environmental, economic, and social well-being of the nearly
40,000 cities, towns, and communities in the United States.
Annual trees planted:
30 million trees
7
Federal Costs:
Total (20-year):
$1.0 billion
First year:
$50 million
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$1.67
Option I - Current Agricultural Land Program
The Conservation Reserve Program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting. It
is designed to retire environmentally sensitive and economically
marginal agriculture-related land to soil conserving cover, such
as forest and grasses. Technical responsibility for CRP planting
is assigned to the Forest Service, and technical service to
landowners is provided by state forestry personnel.
This option is estimated to have the least amount of carbon
sequestered, of the options presented here.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Continue Current CRP:
318 million trees
-- 50/50 cost share for establishment, technical assistance,
and annual rental payments by the Federal government.
-- 12 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural land in 20 years.
o 8 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
O 92 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
348 million trees
Federal Costs:
A. Total (20 year):
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B. Total (35 year):
$4.2 billion
First year:
$ 57 million
Total A to B (20/35 years)
$5.2 billion
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.74
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget Year Costs:
107
121
136
151
166
8
Pros
Maintains existing USDA/State delivery system for tree
planting developed under CRP, no build-up in delivery system
is necessary.
Very modest commitment to offsetting CO₂ emissions.
Additional tree planting keeps prices stable and avoids
negative impact on forest industry.
Small effect on agricultural commodities markets.
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
High cost of rental payments, committing Federal
participation for 35 years with high total costs. Requires
the Federal government to pay landowners to convert from one
land use (crop or pasture) to another use (forest), rather
than to simply improve a use currently in place, such as on
non-Federal forest land. Actual experience under the CRP
for converting cropland to trees shows that costs exceed
estimates. A survey of CRP participants who planted trees
(about 6 percent of the CRP program) found that landowners
would require rental rates 25 percent higher than they
accepted the first time around to induce them to convert
more cropland to trees under 10-year contracts.
Some local negative effects on agricultural input
industries.
There is a risk that CRP enrolled agricultural lands will be
reconverted into row crop or pasture production at the end
of the contract period, eliminating the expected CO2 and
other benefits despite the costs.
A tree planting initiative that puts more than 3/4 of the
funding into technical assistance and rental payments and
less than 1/4 into actual tree planting may be less
efficient and credible than other options.
Option II - Agricultural Land Emphasis
This is a CRP-like program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting.
This option is estimated to have a moderate amount of carbon
sequestered, of the options presented here.
9
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A.
Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Agricultural Land Initiative:
700 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment,
technical assistance, and annual rental payments by the
Federal government).
-- 20 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural land in 20 years.
O
8 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
O
92 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
C.
Non-industrial Forestland Program:
230 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment and
technical assistance and annual rental payments by the
Federal government for private, non-industrial forestlands).
-- 10.7 million acres of non-Federal forestland tree planting
and forest stand improvement in 20 years.
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
960 million trees
Federal Costs:
A. Total (20 year) :
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B & C. Total (35 year) :
$8.7 billion
First year:
$170 million
Total A to C (20/35 years)
$9.7 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs
170
203
233
273
298
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.49
Pros
Demonstrates U.S. commitment to offsetting CO2 emissions.
Reduces consumer lumber prices from what they would be
without a trees initiative and still gives tree growers
substantial earnings.
Small effect on agricultural commodities markets.
10
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
High cost of rental payments, committing Federal
participation for 35 years with high total costs. Requires
the Federal government to pay landowners to convert from one
land use (crop or pasture) to another use (forest), rather
than to simply improve a use currently in place, such as on
non-Federal forest land. Actual experience under the CRP
for converting cropland to trees shows that costs exceed
estimates. A survey of CRP participants who planted trees
(about 6 percent of the CRP program) found that landowners
would require rental rates 25 percent higher than they
accepted the first time around to induce them to convert
more cropland to trees under 10-year contracts.
Some local negative effects on agricultural input
industries. Some regional redistribution of the timber
industry may result, from the West to the Southeast.
It is doubtful that the acreage target can be met while
holding cropland to only 10 percent of enrolled acreage.
The cost of an agricultural lands program may be even higher
than 47 cents per tree if a larger proportion of cropland is
needed (rather than pastureland) to meet acreage targets.
There is a risk that CRP enrolled agricultural lands will be
reconverted into row crop or pasture production at the end
of the contract period, eliminating the expected CO2 and
other benefits despite the costs.
Fewer non-climate benefits under the agricultural component
since erosion and water quality problems are less on
pastureland (90 percent of the program) than on cropland.
A tree planting initiative that puts more than 3/4 of the
funding into technical assistance and rental payments and
less than 1/4 into actual tree planting may be less
efficient and credible than other options.
Option III - Non-Industrial Forestland Emphasis
An FIP-like technical assistance, cost-sharing program for
private, non-industrial forestlands and agricultural land, with
no CRP-like component. It is included in the FY 1991 Budget as a
part of a new initiative. The costs would be fully funded by
increased user fee revenues through an environmental endowment
fund also proposed in the Budget.
It also includes funding of $35 million in the first year to
11
capitalize a Volunteer Foundation or provide the Presidential
Commission with funds for a challenge cost share program to
leverage initial private funds for early, highly visible tree
planting. The Community Trees/Volunteer program in the other
options provides no funds for actual planting of trees. Instead,
it funds technical assistance and coordination.
This option is estimated to have a moderate amount of carbon
sequestered, of the options presented here.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B.
Non-Industrial Forestland Initiative:
970 million trees
-- Based on current FIP (from 50/50 to 75/25 cost share for
establishment and technical assistance for private, non-
industrial forestland and agricultural land in rural areas).
-- A goal of 20 million acres of non-Federal forestland
planting and forest stand improvement. Around 12 to 15
million acres is realistically attainable. It is uncertain
whether there is enough incentive in a 50/50 cost share
program to attract the remaining 5 to 8 million acres.
C.
Forestry Stewardship Initiative:
-- Expand current stewardship program (partly 50/50 cost shared
with states to provide a basic technical assistance
capability in State Foresters offices, and partly 100
percent Federal program to reach the needed scale to support
all of the planting funded under A and B, above).
-- State forestry staff or contract forestry consultants assist
land owners in developing property management plans.
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
1 billion trees
A. Total (20 year) :
$700 million
First year:
$35 million
B. Total (20 year) :
$1.8 billion
First year:
$90 million
C. Total (20 year) :
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
Total A to C (20 years)
$3.5 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs
175
175
175
175
175
12
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.18
Pros
Has no impact on the deficit because the budget costs are
fully offset from an environmental endowment fund. Funds the
budgetary costs of the Trees program entirely from user fees
paid into an environmental endowment fund by those who use
and have the most concern about protecting the high quality
of the outdoor environment.
No new legislation is needed.
Demonstrates some U.S. commitment to offsetting CO2
emissions.
Low total costs, funds are allocated mainly to a more cost
effective option: the FIP-like cost sharing and technical
assistance program which leverages Federal and State funds,
and small owner cost-sharing to improve the economics of
some small owner investment. Allocates more funds to actual
tree planting and improvement, rather than to rental costs
under a CRP-type program.
Makes a trees initiative an integral part of a broader
environmental initiative which stresses improving the
outdoor environment of America in a number of ways.
The Forestry Stewardship consolidates technical assistance
from three programs: woodlot owners receiving Federal cost-
sharing, woodlot owners assisted by separate State programs,
and assistance to community governments and organizations.
This consolidation should improve productivity and give
flexibility to allocate effort where the payoff in trees
planted is highest.
Improved harvesting practices and replanting will help to
ensure adequate regeneration of harvested stands on NIPF
lands. This should help to lessen harvest pressures on
Federal lands in future years.
Minor impact on food supply and agricultural input sector,
would enhance timber supply without depressing stumpage
prices.
Cons
Would have deficit impacts several times higher than the
Volunteer Program alone, if offsetting receipts to the
environmental endowment are not enacted, though
substantially lower than option II or IV.
13
Principal program benefits beyond the Volunteer Program
accrue to private, small woodlot owners, does not fully use
available opportunity to plant on agricultural lands.
Requires a massive landowner behavioral response to a
limited financial incentive (50/50 cost share). Private
ownership investment funds and demand for cost sharing on
non-industrial forest land may be insufficient to accomplish
annual acreage target over 20 year program. Cost share may
have to be increased to 75 percent Federal.
Excludes farmers and ranchers from subsidy unless they own
lands where it is economical to invest in tree planting on a
50/50 cost-sharing basis.
Will replant trees that should have been planted anyway.
Option IV - Enhanced Agricultural Lands Emphasis
An expanded CRP-like program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting, but
at a much larger scale to offset additional CO₂ emissions.
This option is estimated to have the most amount of carbon
sequestered, of the options presented here.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Enhanced Agricultural Land Initiative: 1.295 billion trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment,
technical assistance, and annual rental payments by the
Federal government) but much larger scale.
-- 37 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural lands in 20 years.
20 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
80 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
C. Non-industrial Forestland Program:
624 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment and
technical assistance and annual rental payments by the
Federal government for private, non-industrial forestlands).
-- 26.8 million acres of non-Federal forestland tree planting
and forest stand improvement in 20 years.
14
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
1.95 billion trees
Federal Costs:
A.
Total (20 year):
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B & C. Total (35 year):
16.2 billion
First year:
$187 million
Total A to C (20/35 years):
$17.2 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs:
237
300
363
434
488
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.44
Pros
Highest level of CO₂ emissions offset. Most clearly
establishes U.S. in a leadership role in tree planting to
offset CO₂ while proposing actions likely to be less
controversial than direct reductions of fossil fuel
emissions. Could provide an example for other countries.
Includes a significant effort in all areas where major
opportunities for tree planting exist - in urban and
community locations, on agricultural lands, and on non-
industrial private forests.
Greatest favorable effect on rural economies through
creation of new employment opportunities and increased
economic activity.
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
Highest cost option, uses a CRP-like program, in order to
attract a large amount of agricultural land. Inefficient as
it requires payments to landowners at high Federal cost to
convert from one land use (crop or pasture) to another use
(forest), rather than to simply improve a use currently in
place, such as on non-Federal forest land.
Commits Federal participation for 35 years with high total
costs of $17.2 billion, a substantial portion of which is
annual rental payments. (Although focus on pasturelands and
forestlands will have much lower rental rates than CRP
croplands). Actual experience under the CRP for converting
15
cropland to trees shows that costs exceed estimates.
Non-climate benefits are unlikely to justify a costly
program on this scale. Justification hence, depends on
highly uncertain climate benefits.
Greatest negative impact on food production and timber
supply and on agricultural input sector.
See Option II for additional cons.
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Wub
WASHINGTON
December 13, 1989
Clemit
MEMORANDUM FOR D. ALLAN BROMLEY
FROM:
MICHAEL J. BOSKIN mys
Charge
SUBJECT:
U.S. Position on Climate Change Convention
I have recently had some disturbing conversations about the
ongoing international discussions aimed at the development of a
framework climate change convention and subsequent protocols, as
well as the position that U.S. representatives have taken in
those discussions. I am writing to let you know that it is
imperative that a major shift in our position be made.
The U.S. has apparently not challenged the view (which is
reflected in Fred Bernthal's memo to you of October 24 and, even
more clearly, in the legal and institutional measures portions of
the October RSWG Workshop draft report now being circulated for
comment by EPA) that the convention should be drafted in
anticipation of a large number of gas-specific and policy-
specific follow-on protocols. This many-protocol approach
ignores important regulatory lessons that have been painfully
learned in the U.S.; it would place us and the world as a whole
on a path toward unending negotiation and detailed regulation
that would be both ineffective and expensive. This approach is
philosophically inconsistent with the President's approach to
regulation in general and with his stated position on the need to
reconcile the environment and economic growth.
A far superior approach, which the U.S. should adopt
forthwith, would be to draft the convention in anticipation of
negotiating only country-specific limits on total net greenhouse
emissions (or, more plausibly, a formula for computing those
limits), along with protocols on baselines, funding mechanisms,
enforcement, research, monitoring, technology transfer, and
related implementation issues. This approach, which explicitly
rules out gas-specific protocols and international agreements on
specific control measures, would allow each country to find the
best way to reduce its impact on global climate, taking into
account its own economic, political, national security, and
lifestyle conditions and concerns. Most nations, we should hope,
would adopt flexible, incentive-based approaches, but those who
choose to rely on other methods would be free to do so. All the
world as a whole legitimately cares about is the change in the
global atmosphere, not the method by which the U.S. or any other
nation makes its contribution to that change.
2
The many-protocol approach would lead us instead to attempt
to replicate on a world scale the sort of detailed command and
control regulation (epitomized by scrubbers on powerplants) that
we have tried and found wanting in the U.S. The inflexibility
that would be induced by a large number of specific protocols
would dramatically raise the costs of whatever actions were
ultimately taken to mitigate global change. (We should also
reconsider the need for multilateral protocols on adaptation,
which are now envisioned, since, research and technology transfer
aside, the adaptation measures that have been widely discussed
have at most regional effects.)
The many-protocol approach may be a recipe for inaction.
Strong actions to control emissions of any particular greenhouse
gas or operation of any particular source category would impose
very different costs on different nations. We might be willing
to take drastic steps to reduce methane emissions from our rice
paddies, for instance, but it is hard to imagine much enthusiasm
in East Asia. If those nations don't go along with a strong rice
paddies protocol, however, methane emissions from rice
cultivation will not be noticeably decreased, even if such
decreases would represent the most cost-effective way for East
Asia to reduce its net greenhouse emissions. Bundling issues
(gasses, sources, and sinks) makes an effective agreement to
control net emissions more likely.
At the same time, the many-protocol approach may be a recipe
for singling out the U.S. and other advanced nations for
disproportionate burdens, since we might well find it hardest
politically to resist any proposed protocols. Under this
scenario, the first protocol would call for the equivalent of 50
m.p.g. CAFE standards for all new cars, the second would set
absurd efficiency standards for home appliances, and so on. We
could easily find ourselves nibbled to death by a large number of
protocols aimed at rich nations but having, in aggregate, little
effect on ambient greenhouse gas concentrations.
I thus consider it vitally important that the U.S. firmly
and quickly reject the many-protocol approach in the IPCC
process. That approach is inconsistent with the President's
stated view, which is solidly grounded in U.S. experience, that
flexible and incentive-based regulation best harmonizes
environmental concerns with economic growth, and is particularly
unlikely to produce sound policy in this multi-national setting.
On the other hand, I do not mean to suggest that a crusade
on your part will be necessary to bring this about. Last week
Boyden Gray met with representatives of EPA, State, Justice, CEA,
and other interested parties, and he made the case for a position
shift of the sort I have described. There was no visible
resistance, so that this shift may occur without your
participation. On the other hand, appearances can be deceptive,
3
and meditation may produce opposition. I thus urge you, if the
occasion arises, to support movement away from the many-protocol
approach to drafting a climate change convention and to a simpler
and more rational approach based on changes in what matters: net
greenhouse emissions.
I would, of course, be most interested in your reactions to
all this.
UNITED PROTECTION STATES AGENCY
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
DEC I 1989
OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: IPCC/RSWG October Workshop Report: Request for
Comments
FROM:
Scott A. Hajost Acott
TO:
Alan Hecht
Dick Morgenstern
Courtney Riordan
Eileen Claussen
Attached is a copy of the legal and institutional measures
portions of the October RSWG Workshop draft report. We can both
correct the report and make additional suggestions. (In this
regard, I might note that the general approach taken at the
Workshop was to include suggestions as put forward.)
In order to meet State's deadline of December 15, please
provide comments by COB December 13 to me (382-4550) or Tom
Marshall (382-5313) of my staff.
Thank you.
CC Terry Davies
Tim Atkeson
Jack Fitzgerald w/o attachment
Dennis Tirpak w/o attachment
Steve Seidel
Attachment
- 13 - -
4.
REPORTS FROM THE TOPIC COORDINATORS
It may be recalled that the RSWG Steering Committee had agreed
upon five topics for consideration at this session under its Task B,
namely the broad crea of implementation mechanisms and associated
arrangements (see reference 1). The topics are:
0. Legal measures and processes (with Canada, Malta and UK as topic
coordinators);
b. Public education and information (with China and the USA as topic
coordinators);
c. Technology transfer and development measures (with Indio and Japan
as topic coordinators);
d. Financial measures (with France and the Netherlands as topic
coordinators with consultation with Egypt);
and
e. Economic (Market) measures (with Australia and New Zealand as topic
coordinators).
At the invitation of the chairman, the topic coordinators
reported on the synopses papers developed by them from the invited sub-
missions from governments and organizations.
4.1
Report of the topic coordinators on legal measures and processes
The report by Mr. R. Beetham (U.K.) is reproduced in its entirety below.
"
1.
I have very little to add to the synopsis produced by the
Canadians, Maltese and ourselves on Legal Measures. We are very
grateful to all those countries who contributed.
2. We asked contributors four questions:
-
which existing international legal instruments have a
bearing on climate and how could these instruments be strengthened
to deal with climate change?
- 14 -
-
what elements should be included in a framework Convention
on climate?
-
what other legal instruments (eg Protocols) might be
considered?
-
what institutional implications might such a Convention have?
3.
There was a general view that, although existing international
instruments should be fully utilised and further strengthened they
are insufficient alone to meet the challenge of climate change.
The majority of contributions therefore concentrated on proposals
for elements to be included in a framework Convention and Protocols.
Our synopsis
inevitably reflected this main thrust.
4.
As a result, we are conscious that we have not been able to
do full justice to two contributions in particular, namely those
from France and the United States. Eoth these papers, whilst not
conflicting with the majority of views expressed by other
contributors, set out a more general, almost, philosophical
approach which it was difficult to align with the rather more
concentrated and specific approach of the large majority.
5.
This broad statement does however need to be qualified by
the recognition that only some two dozen countries sent
contributions, and the majority of those came from developed
countries. We should very much welcome further indicationsof view
at this meeting - indeed that seems to us one of its principal
purposes.
- 15 -
6.
Equally, as we state in the paper, we could not always be sure
where some ideas have been put forward by a limited number of
countries, what degree of support or indeed opposition they might
encounter: this week's meeting is an opportunity to gauge that more
clearly.
7.
We deliberated at length as to whether we should include in
the synopsis attributions of ideas to particular countries. We
concluded that we should not: partly because we felt it might be
invidious, partly because we, inevitably in a summary, might not
have accurately represented those views, and partly because we did
not think it right ot make assumptions on the degree of support
which particular suggestions might enjoy.
8.
Nevertheless, as our synopsis paper makes clear, there is a
broad mainstream of opinion which characterises the majority of
the contributions, from which one can see a consensus of approach
emerging on the principal elements which should be included in
a framework Convention, the need for which is widely seen.
9.
We have been encouraged by the emergence of the clear
mainstream of opinion I have mentioned. We hope this week
to hear further views with regard to what the principal elements
in a convention should be so that we can enlarge on and deepen
this mainstream. We also look forward to discussing how we
might best take this work forward. We hope that our synopsis will
"
contribute to such forward movement.
IPCC: RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
Legal Measures
I.
SUMMARY REPORT
1.
The Workshop considered, on the basis of a synopsis of numerous
written contributions and views expressed at the meeting, what elements should
be included in a framework convention on climate change, what other
instruments (e.g., protocols) might be employed, and the institutional
implications of a framework convention.
2.
There is a general view that existing legal instruments and
institutions with a bearing on climate should be fully utilised and further
strengthened (a list of relevant instruments and institutions is annexed), but
that they are insufficient alone to meet the challenge of climate change. The
discussion therefore concentrated on proposals for elements to be included in
a framework convention, annexes and protocols, together with the institutional
implications.
3.
There is a very broad consensus among the participants on the need for
a framework convention on climate change and that the framework Convention
should generally follow the format of the Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer, and consensus that the framework convention would lay
down, at a minimum, general principles and obligations, and provide for a
continuing assessment of the scientific aspects of climate change and its
impacts, and for response strategies.
4.
There is also broad agreement that the framework convention should
contain provision for separate annexes and protocols to be negotiated to deal
with specific obligations, e.g., research and systematic observations,
different greenhouse gases.
5.
The participants recognise the political imperative of striking the
correct balance between the call for a far-reaching action-oriented framework
convention and the need urgently to adopt such a convention so as to begin
tackling the problem of climate change. They also attach particular
importance to the convention being framed and drafted in a way to gain the
adherence of the largest possible number and most suitably balanced spread of
countries.
6.
Several participants advocate more far-reaching provisions,
particularly on institutional aspects and control measures. There are
differing views on the timing of negotiations both on a framework convention
and on related annexes and protocols.
7.
The following sections comprise a compilation of possible elements for
a framework convention on climate change proposed by various participants.
The inclusion of any particular element does not imply consensus with respect
to that element, or the agreement of any particular government to include that
element in a framework convention. Some of the proposed elements are
controversial, some were in fact objected to, but all have been included to
stimulate discussion at the national and international levels.
(WCP-662)
- 2 -
II.
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
1.
PREAMBLE
- Description of problem and reasons for action (need for speedy and
effective response without waiting for absolute scientific certainty)
- Reference to relevant instruments (such as UNGA Resolution 43/53,
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, ENMOD Treaty)
- Relationship to Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol
- Common concern of mankind
- Respect for fundamental rights, such as a right to an environment of
a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, or a right not to be
subjected, directly or indirectly, to the adverse effects of climate change
- Need to balance sovereign right of states to exploit natural
resources with duty to protect and conserve climate for benefit of mankind
- Endorsement of concept of sustainable development as key test in
promoting long-term economic growth, and conservation of environment
- Importance of development and transfer of technology and recognition
of circumstances and needs, particularly financial, of developing countries
- Need to increase research to improve scientific knowledge and study
social and economic impacts
- Importance of systematic observation to develop further scientific
knowledge of climate and the possible adverse effects resulting from changes
to it
- Recognition of fact that most emissions affecting the atmosphere at
present originate in industrialised countries where the room for change is
greatest
- Recognition of fact that emissions from developing countries are
growing rapidly and will represent over time a- increasingly significant
percentage of global emissions
- Development of stategies to absorb greenhouse gases, i.e. protect
and increase greenhouse gas sinks
- Development of strategies to limit or reduce anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions
- Development of strategies to adapt human activities to the impacts
of climate change
- Need for regulatory, supportive and adjustment measures that take
into account different levels of development of countries.
(WCP-662)
- 3 -
2.
DEFINITIONS
Definitions will need to be elaborated on the basis of consensus as to
the purpose of the framework convention (e.g., protection from the adverse
effects of climate change), and according to the terms in which the framework
convention is drafted.
The following definitions of certain terms for the purposes of the
framework convention have so far been suggested:
(a) Climate
Adopt accepted WMO definition
(b) Climate change
"Change induced by human activities, directly or indirectly
causing, or likely to cause, significant adverse environmental,
economic or social effects provided that the human activities and
their effects are not both wholly located within the area under
the national jurisdiction of one state"
"Global climate change resulting from the growing accumulation of
atmospheric greenhouse gases generated by human activities"
(c) Adverse effects
"Changes in global climate caused by human activities having
signif_cant deleterious effects on natural or managed
eco-systems, sea levels, etc."
There will be a need to define other terms.
3.
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
As stated earlier, the following sections comprise a compilation of
possible elements for a framework convention on climate change proposed by
various participants. The inclusion of any particular element does not imply
consensus with respect to that element, or the agreement of any particular
government to include that element in a framework convention. Some of the
proposed elements are controversial, some were in fact objected to, but all
have been included to stimulate discussion at the national and international
levels. The degree of support for, or opposition to, individual ideas
contained in this section is not reflected in this document.
- Responsibility to adopt appropriate measures to protect against the
adverse effects of climate change, to limit and adapt to climate change and
not transform adverse effects on the climate into any other adverse
environmental or health effects
- Responsibility to protect and improve the composition of the
atmosphere in order to protect and conserve climate for the benefit of present
and future generations
(WCP-662)
- 4 -
- Encouragement to take steps having the effect of limiting climate
change (e.g., reforestation, energy efficiency) but which are already
justified on other grounds
- Specific objectives and time-targeted emission limitations/
reductions of greenhouse gases by industrialized countries
- Specific objectives and time-targeted emission
reductions/limitations of greenhouse gases, for example an obligation to
stabilise total global emissions of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic
sources by the year 2000 and, as soon as possible thereafter reduce these
emissions down to levels which according to the best scientific knowledge will
secure human health and the Earth's capacity to sustain life processes
- Deferral of specific emission limitation/reduction obligations to
subsequent protocols
- Use and exploitation of climate for peaceful purposes, encouragement
of regional and global peace, and good neighbourliness
- Duty to carry out and co-operate in research and information
exchange, systematic collection and transmission of data from observation,
research and assessment
- Development and transfer of relevant technologies and the provision
of technical assistance, particularly bearing in mind the needs of developing
countries, including the prevention of climate change and adaptation to
adverse impacts resulting from climate change
- Transfer to relevant technologies on a non-commercial and
preferential basis to the developing countries irrespective of the stands of
the various countries on the protection of intellectual property rights and
free access to relevant scientific information
- Transfer of relevant technologies on a non-commercial and
preferential basis to the developing countries and free access to relevant
scientific information
- Encouragement of the transfer of technology related to climate
change through adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights in developing countries and removal by developing countries of other
impediments to such transfers
- Open and nondiscriminatory access to meteorological data developed
by all countries
- Financial assistance by the industrialised countries to the
developing countries to enable the developing countries to meet the
incremental costs of measures to minimize greenhouse gas emissions and to take
adaptive measures. The specific mechanisms of such assistance including the
share of various industrialised countries, and arrangements for making the
funds available annually, should be included either in a convention or
finalized within one year of coming into effect of the convention
(WCP-662)
- 5 -
- Fair and equitable assistance to countries which have to bear an
abnormal or special burden, including provision of funds, over and above
official development assistance, by the industrialised countries to the
developing countries, to enable them to fulfil their obligations under the
framework convention
- Co-operation in formulation and harmonisation of policies and
strategies directed at limiting and adapting to climate change
- Co-operation in adoption of appropriate legal, administrative or
economic measures to address the adverse effects of climate change
- Co-operation at national and international levels in adoption of
appropriate legal, administrative and economic measures, including fair and
equitable assistance, to address the adverse effects of climate change to the
end that no island nation's very existence be allowed to be threatened by sea
level rise
- Avoidance of other environmental problems in taking measures to
address climate change
- Prior notice and provision of relevant information such as
environmental impact assessment of large-scale planned activities that are
likely to cause significant climate change
- Prior notice and provision of relevant information such as
environmental impact assessment of large-scale planned activities that are
likely to cause significant climate change. Each country has the right to
withhold any information sensitive to its security or commercial right
- Recognition of the need for developing countries to increase their
present levels of per capita emissions of greenhouse gases in order to meet
their development needs
- Clear recognition of responsibility by all member countries to make
efforts to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions
- Recognition that implementation may take place in different time
frames for different categories of countries and/or may be qualified by means
at the disposal of parties, and their scientific and technical capabilities
- Provision allowing for bilateral, multilateral and regional
agreements or arrangements not incompatible with the framework convention,
including opportunities for groups of countries to fulfil the requirements of
the convention and associated protocols on a regional or sub-regional basis
- Co-operation with competent international bodies to implement
effectively the objectives of the framework convention
- Public education and information
- Liability and compensation
- Commitment to formulate appropriate annexes and protocols, on a
sound scientific basis
(WCP-662)
- 6 -
- Agreement on measures to be implemented by amending existing legal
instruments
- Strengthening existing legal and institutional instruments and
arrangements
- Making full use of existing funding mechanisms
- Creating new funding mechanisms
- Permissibility of more stringent national or regional emission
targets than provided for in the framework convention and its protocols
4.
INSTITUTIONS
- A Secretariat
- A Conference of the Parties
- A Bureau
- An Executive Committee composed of a limited number of parties,
based on equitable geographical representation, possibly with binding
decision-making powers and including functions in respect of surveillance,
verification and compliance
- An Executive Committee with functions analogous to those assigned to
the Executive Body under the ECE Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Convention
- Working Groups, e.g., on scientific matters as well as on
socio-economic impacts and response strategies
- Institution for the administration of a climate fund
5.
RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATIONS
Co-ordinated research and systematic observations (which could be
amplified in annexes), including for example the establishment of expert
panels or of an independent scientific board responsible for the co-ordination
of data collection from:
- scientific research
- the monitoring of climate change
- human activities affecting climate
(WCP-662)
- 7 -
6.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND REPORTING
- Co-operation in exchange of scientific, technological and other
information on climate change, with possibly the elaboration of a
comprehensive international research prorgramme
- Transmission of information on measures adopted by the parties for
the implementation of the framework convention, possibly including regular
reporting on emissions of greenhouse gases
- Development of national emission inventories and strategies for
addressing climate change, exchange of information on such inventories and
strategies.
7.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
- Promotion of the development and transfer of technology, taking into
account particularly the needs of developing countries
- Preferential and non-commercial transfer of technology to developing
countries to enable them to limit or adapt to climate change
8.
CONSULTATION
Consultations between, on the one hand, parties whose planned
activities are likely to cause climate change and, on the other hand, the
Secretariat, relevant international organisations and other parties concerned.
9.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
- Provisions similar to those in the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer
- A system with compulsory recourse to the ICJ or another appropriate
tribunal issuing binding decisions.
10.
OTHER PROVISIONS
(a) Status, adoption and amendment of annexes
(b) Rules for amendment of the framework convention
(c) Provisions for the adoption and entry into force of, and
amendments to, protocols
(d) Periodic review of specific obligations based on assessments
similar to those required by the Montreal Protocol
(WCP-662)
- 8 -
(e) Final clauses, including:
- Signature
- Ratification
- Accession
- Right to vote
- Relationship between the framework convention and its protocols
- Entry into force
- Reservations
- Withdrawal
- Depositary
- Authentic texts
11.
ANNEXES AND PROTOCOLS
The following subjects among others have been suggested for
consideration as possible annexes or protocols to the framework convention,
- Fossil fuels
- Carbon dioxide
- Agricultural practices
- Methane
- Nitrous oxide
- Tropospheric ozone
- Forestation
- Funding mechanisms, particularly for developing countries
- Research and systematic observations
- Energy conservation and alternative sources of energy
- Protection of greenhouse gas sinks
- Liability and compensation
- Emission control technologies
(WCP-662)
- 9 -
- Adaptation technologies and practices
- Development and transfer of technology.
Individual annexes or protocols might cover more than one of the above
subjects.
- Priority should be given to those areas in respect of which the
state of scientific understanding is the most developed and international
concern the greatest
- Polluting gases should be dealt with according to their importance
in increasing the greenhouse effect.
(WCP-662)
ANNEX TO LEGAL MEASURES PAPE
International Agreements Potentially Relevant to
Climate Change
Climate
Contribution of the United States
World Meteorological Organization, Convention, Oct. 11, 1947
Provides framework for cooperation on research and weather
observation. Could assist in monitoring climate change.
Open to U.N. members.
Various Bilaterals -- e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on
1972 Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23,
Specifies "influence of environmental changes on climate"
as one of the areas for cooperation in solving problems.
Contemplates exchange of experts, information and joint
development of scientific programs.
Energy
International Energy Agency -- Agreement on an International
Energy Program, Feb. 5, 1975
Provides framework to promote energy diversification,
energy efficiency and conservation, and alternative energy
sources. The IEA promotes R&D by sponsoring state-of-the-
art reviews of promising energy technologies and by
promoting collaborative projects between two or more
member countries. The IEA has established an energy
technology data exchange and a number of information
centers dealing with specialized technology areas,
including coal technology, heat pumps, air infiltration,
biomass, and end-use technologies. Numerous implementing
agreements cover wind, wave, biomass, solar, hydrogen,
coal, and other energy sources, as well as conservation in
specific industries. Twenty-one OECD countries are
members; method for participation by other states not
specified.
Solar Heating and Cooling Systems in Buildings -- Memorandum of
Understanding, Oct. 4, 1974
Provides for research and information exchange to develop
practical applications of solar power, a potential source
of nonpolluting energy. Membership consists of mostly
vestern countries.
-1-
1956 International Atomic Energy Agency -- U.N. Statute, Oct. 26,
Agency under the aegis of the U.N. to develop peaceful
applications of atomic energy and to establish
safeguards. Atomic energy does not produce greenhouse
gases. Open to U.N. members and to states which are not
U.N. members upon approval of IAEA General Conference.
Various Bilateral Energy Agreements
For example, the agreement between U.S. Department of
Energy and its PRC counterpart has as its purpose "to
explore the relationship of climate changes and
atmospheric levels of CO2".
Bilateral Atomic Energy Agreements -- e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, June 21, 1973
Agreement to develop energy sources from thermonuclear
fusion and fast breeder reactors and to establish
scientific workgroups and exchanges.
Pollution Control
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP
Convention), Nov. 13, 1979
Establishes research and monitoring programs. Broad
definition of "air pollution" could include greenhouse
gases. Open to members of the U.N. Economic Commission
for Europe.
Protocol to LRTAP Convention on Long-Term Financing of the
Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the
Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP),
September 28, 1984. Open to members of the U.N. Economic
Commission for Europe.
Protocol to LRTAP Convention Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes
("Sofia Protocol"), Oct. 31, 1988
Freezes emissions/transboundary fluxes of, and requires
parties to utilize best available technologies
economically feasible to reducing emissions of nitrogen
oxides, which are greenhouse gases. Also requires parties
to facilitate exchange of technology to reduce emissions
of nitrogen oxides. Open to members of the ECE Economic
Commission for Europe.
-2-
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982. (not in
force, but largely reflects customary international law)
Agreement to control pollution of the marine environment,
includes measures to minimize "release of ... harmful or
noxious substances through the atmosphere." (Art. 194)
Potentially applicable to the extent that greenhouse gases
and climate change are "harmful" to oceans.
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March
22, 1985, and Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987
The chemicals (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) that are
regulated to protect the ozone layer are also greenhouse
gases. Montreal Protocol, which provides for 50%
reduction in production and consumption by 1999, is under
review to accelerate reductions. Open to all states.
Convention on the Protection of the Environment between
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974
Agreement is intended to protect and improve the
environment through cooperation to ensure that activities
under the jurisdiction of one State do not cause damage to
the environment of other States.
Various Bilaterals -- e.g., United States-Mexico, Feb. 16, 1984
U.S. -Mexico agreement provides framework for Annexes on
specific pollution reductions.
Natural Resources
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in
the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940
Could be made applicable to protecting forests. Open to
"American Governments".
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978
Applies to Amazonian Basin and any other "closely
connected" territory. Declares that right to use natural
resources is inherent in each state's sovereignty.
Promotes development consistent with "preservation of the
environment". Parties are Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela.
-3-
Southeast Asia Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, 1985
Adopts goals of sustainable development and maintaining
ecological processes. Parties undertake, e.g., to manage
forest resources and to control air pollution.
South Pacific Convention for Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment, Nov. 25, 1986
Contains agreement to reduce and control pollution from
discharges into the atmosphere. Potentially applicable to
measures to prevent climate change which harms oceans.
Africa Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, Sept. 15, 1968
Parties agree to consider ecology and natural resources in
development plans.
Water Resources Management
Convention Establishing a Permanent Inter-State Drought Control
Committee for the Sahel, Sept. 12, 1973
Established committee to promote cooperation to combat
consequences of drought. Open to any African country
declared to be a disaster area as the result of ecological
conditions of the Sudano-Sahelian region.
Various regional and bilateral water basin agreements -- e.g.,
U.S.-UK Treaty on Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909
Approval of International Joint Commission required for
obstructions or diversions from Great Lakes or other
boundary waters between U.S. and Canada. Precedence for
water uses specified.
Agriculture
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -- Constitution, as
amended, Nov. 1959
Could assist adaptation to climate change by disseminating
technical information and recommending action for
agriculture and forestry. Subsidiary groups, like the
International Rice Commission, could help with response
strategies, for example, reducing methane emissions from
rice paddies.
-4-
Various Regional Agreements -- e.g., Inter-American Institute
for Cooperation on Agriculture, Convention, March 6, 1979
Possible frameworks for development of adaptation
agriculture. strategies or for limiting methane emissions from
International Tropical Timber Agreement, NOV. 18, 1983
This agreement provides a framework for cooperation and
consultation on, inter alia, improving reforestation and
encouraging the development of national policies aimed at
forests. sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical
Various Bilateral Agreements -- e.g., U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, June 19, 1973
information. Possible framework to formulate joint plans, exchange
Financial Institutions
World Bank-Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, Articles of
Agreement, Jan 26, 1960
Loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and concessional loans by the International
Development Association fund projects that could be
helpful to minimizing climate change (e.g., agroforestry)
or harmful (e.g., highway construction leading to
deforestation). Environmental policies being implemented
by the Bank could be adjusted to support limitation or
adaptation response options.
Regional Development Banks
Could give regional support for limitation or adaptation
response options. Regional banks include:
Inter-American, Indus Basin, African, Andean, Asian,
Caribbean, Arab, Central American, European, OPEC, Nordic
Sectorial Funds -- e.g., International Fund for Agricultural
Development, Agreement, June 13, 1976
Concessional loans to developing countries. Could adopt
policies options. to assist limitation or adaptation response
-5-
Groval United States Department of State
lewis! NC
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Dratt: to owall
Washington, D.C. 20520
objecting objective defails.
October 24, 1989
RANDUM
TO:
Dr. D. Allan Bromley, Assistant to the President
Chairman, Working Group on Global Change
FROM:
OES - Frederick M. Bernthal
SUBJECT:
Legal Issues Relevant to Climate Change Convention
The Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has a mandate
to "examine existing legal and institutional mechanisms to
determine how they might be used to implement options to limit
or adapt to climate change" and to "consider new legal and
institutional mechanisms that could be used to implement
options to limit or adapt to climate change".
Although the U.S. was initially non-committal about whether
the RSWG's consideration of new legal mechanisms should include
discussion of a framework climate convention, President Bush
announced last May that the U.S. would host a RSWG workshop in
the fall to consider various mechanisms (e.g., economic,
financial, legal) that might be used to implement responses to
potential climate change and that this would include
consideration of elements of a framework climate convention.
He also indicated his expectation that the IPCC process would
lead to formal negotiation of such a convention.
To prepare for this October workshop, all IPCC member
states were asked to contribute their views to designated
international topic coordinators. The attached paper was the
U.S. contribution to the legal mechanisms discussion, and was
cleared by all interested USG agencies at the policy level.
As you will see from section IV, the U.S. expressed the
view that a framework climate convention should generally
follow the model of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Vienna Convention is a
barebones agreement that contains general principles of
- 2 -
cooperation and certain research and monitoring obligations,
but no targets or timetables. Specific obligations are
contained in subsequent protocols (to date, the Montreal
Protocol) there is no obligation placed upon a party to the
framework convention to join any protocol.
It should be noted that the RSWG workshop, which was held
on October 2-6 in Geneva, revealed very broad consensus that:
"[A] framework convention on climate change
...
should
generally follow the format of the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
...
would
lay
down,
at a minimum, general principles and obligations, and
provide for a continuing assessment of the scientific
aspects of climate change and its impacts, and for
response strategies
...
[and] should contain provision for
separate annexes and protocols to be negotiated to deal
with specific obligations, e.g., research and systematic
observations, different greenhouse gases."
However, several industrialized countries (Netherlands,
FRG, Norway, New Zealand) indicated a desire to go beyond the
"minimum", and key developing countries (Brazil, China, India,
Mexico) made it clear that their price for any such convention
"with teeth" would be high.
I would appreciate your views on how State/Justice might
now expand on this work, pursuant to the directive of the first
meeting of the Working Group on Climate Change.
Attachment: As stated
CC: C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President
Table of Contents
I.
International Agreements Potentially Relevant
to Climate Change
p. 1
II.
International Institutions Potentially Relevant
to Climate Change
p. 7
III. Domestic Legal Mechanisms Potentially Relevant
to Climate Change
p. 13 r
IV. Elements of a Framework Convention on Global
Climate Change
P. 16
International Agreements Potentially Relevant to
Climate Change
Climate
World Meteorological Organization, Convention, Oct. 11, 1947
Provides framework for cooperation on research and weather
observation. Could assist in monitoring climate change.
Open to U.N. members.
Various Bilaterals -- e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23,
1972
Specifies "influence of environmental changes on climate"
as one of the areas for cooperation in solving problems.
Contemplates exchange of experts, information and joint
development of scientific programs.
Energy
International Energy Agency -- Agreement on an International
Energy Program, Feb. 5, 1975
Provides framework to promote energy diversification,
energy efficiency and conservation, and alternative energy
sources. The IEA promotes R&D by sponsoring state-of-the-
art reviews of promising energy technologies and by
promoting collaborative projects between two or more
member countries. The IEA has established an energy
technology data exchange and a number of information
centers dealing with specialized technology areas,
including coal technology, heat pumps, air infiltration,
biomass, and end-use technologies. Numerous implementing
agreements cover wind, wave, biomass, solar, hydrogen,
coal, and other energy sources, as well as conservation in
specific industries. Twenty-one OECD countries are
members; method for participation by other states not
specified.
Solar Heating and Cooling Systems in Buildings -- Memorandum of
Understanding, Oct. 4, 1974
Provides for research and information exchange to develop
practical applications of solar power, a potential source
of nonpolluting energy. Membership consists of mostly
western countries.
-1-
International Atomic Energy Agency - -- U.N. Statute, Oct. 26,
1956
Agency under the aegis of the U.N. to develop peaceful
applications of atomic energy and to establish
safeguards. Atomic energy does not produce greenhouse
gases. Open to U.N. members and to states which are not
U.N. members upon approval of IAEA General Conference.
Various Bilateral Energy Agreements
For example, the agreement between U.S. Department of
Energy and its PRC counterpart has as its purpose "to
explore the relationship of climate changes and
atmospheric levels of CO2".
Bilateral Atomic Energy Agreements -- e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, June 21, 1973
Agreement to develop energy sources from thermonuclear
fusion and fast breeder reactors and to establish
scientific workgroups and exchanges.
Pollution Control
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP
Convention), Nov. 13, 1979
Establishes research and monitoring programs. Broad
definition of. "air pollution" could include greenhouse
gases. Open to members of the U.N. Economic Commission
for Europe.
Protocol to LRTAP Convention on Long-Term Financing of the
Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the
Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP),
September 28, 1984. Open to members of the U.N. Economic
Commission for Europe.
Protocol to LRTAP Convention Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes
("Sofia Protocol"), Oct. 31, 1988
Freezes emissions/transboundary fluxes of, and requires
parties to utilize best available technologies
economically feasible to reducing emissions of nitrogen
oxides, which are greenhouse gases. Also requires parties
to facilitate exchange of technology to reduce emissions
of nitrogen oxides. Open to members of the ECE Economic
Commission for Europe.
-2-
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982. (not in
force, but largely reflects customary international law)
Agreement to control pollution of the marine environment,
includes measures to minimize "release of ... harmful or
noxious substances through the atmosphere.' (Art. 194)
Potentially applicable to the extent that greenhouse gases
and climate change are "harmful" to oceans.
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March
22, 1985, and Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987
The chemicals (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) that are
regulated to protect the ozone layer are also greenhouse
gases. Montreal Protocol, which provides for 50%
reduction in production and consumption by 1999, is under
review to accelerate reductions. Open to all states.
Convention on the Protection of the Environment between
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974
Agreement is intended to protect and improve the
environment through cooperation to ensure that activities
under the jurisdiction of one State do not cause damage to
the environment of other States.
Various Bilaterals -- e.g., United States-Mexico, Feb. 16, 1984
U.S. -Mexico agreement provides framework for Annexes on
specific pollution reductions.
Natural Resources
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in
the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940
Could be made applicable to protecting forests. Open to
"American Governments".
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978
Applies to Amazonian Basin and any other "closely
connected" territory. Declares that right to use natural
resources is inherent in each state's sovereignty.
Promotes development consistent with "preservation of the
environment". Parties are Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela.
-3-
Southeast Asia Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, 1985
Adopts goals of sustainable development and maintaining
ecological processes. Parties undertake, e.g., to manage
forest resources and to control air pollution.
South Pacific Convention for Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment, Nov. 25, 1986
Contains agreement to reduce and control pollution from
discharges into the atmosphere. Potentially applicable to
measures to prevent climate change which harms oceans.
Africa Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, Sept. 15, 1968
Parties agree to consider ecology and natural resources in
development plans.
Water Resources Management
Convention Establishing a Permanent Inter-State Drought Control
Committee for the Sahel, Sept. 12, 1973
Established committee to promote cooperation to combat
consequences of drought. Open to any African country
declared to be a disaster area as the result of ecological
conditions of the Sudano-Sahelian region.
Various regional and bilateral water basin agreements -- e.g.,
U.S.-UK Treaty on Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909
Approval of International Joint Commission required for
obstructions or diversions from Great Lakes or other
boundary waters between U.S. and Canada. Precedence for
water uses specified.
Agriculture
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization -- Constitution, as
amended, Nov. 1959
Could assist adaptation to climate change by disseminating
technical information and recommending action for
agriculture and forestry. Subsidiary groups, like the
International Rice Commission, could help with response
strategies, for example, reducing methane emissions from
rice paddies.
-4-
Various Regional Agreements -- e.g., Inter-American Institute
for Cooperation on Agriculture, Convention, March 6, 1979
Possible frameworks for development of adaptation
strategies or for limiting methane emissions from
agriculture.
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983
This agreement provides a framework for cooperation and
consultation on, inter alia, improving reforestation and
encouraging the development of national policies aimed at
sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical
forests.
Various Bilateral Agreements -- e.g., U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, June 19, 1973
Possible framework to formulate joint plans, exchange
information.
Financial Institutions
World Bank--Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, Articles of
Agreement, Jan 26, 1960
Loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and concessional loans by the International
Development Association fund projects that could be
helpful to minimizing climate change (e.g., agroforestry)
or harmful (e.g., highway construction leading to
deforestation). Environmental policies being implemented
by the Bank could be adjusted to support limitation or
adaptation response options.
Regional Development Banks
Could give regional support for limitation or adaptation
response options. Regional banks include:
Inter-American, Indus Basin, African, Andean, Asian,
Caribbean, Arab, Central American, European, OPEC, Nordic
Sectorial Funds -- e.g., International Fund for Agricultural
Development, Agreement, June 13, 1976
Concessional loans to developing countries. Could adopt
policies to assist limitation or adaptation response
options.
-5-
Regional Economic Cooperation Organizations
Affect development strategies, address energy and
environmental issues. May develop binding regulations or
proposed agreements. Regional organizations include:
U.N. Regional Economic Commissions
European Economic Community (e.g., adopted resolution
on energy policy with specific fuel use targets;
adopted EC environmental assessment procedures)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization of American States
COMECON
Organization of African Unity
ASEAN
South Asia Regional Council
South Pacific Forum
Andean Common Market
Caribbean Community
Economic Community of West African States
-6-
International Institutions
Potentially Relevant to Climate Change
Climate
-- World Meteorological Organization (WMO) To coordinate,
standardize, and improve world meteorological activities and to
encourage an efficient exchange of meteorological information
between countries. More specifically, WMO is charged with: 1)
facilitating worldwide cooperation in the establishment of
networks of stations to provide meteorological, hydrological, and
other geophysical services and observations; 2) promoting the
establishment and maintenance of systems for the rapid exchange of
meteorological and related weather information; 3) promoting
standardization of meteorological and related observations and to
ensure the uniform publication of observations and statistics; and
4 ) assisting in coordinating the international aspects of research
and training in meteorology. In addition, WMO manages the World
Climate Program, which consists of applications, data, impact
studies, and research, and is administered in coordination with
UNEP and ICSU.
-- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): An ad hoc
working group jointly established by WMO and UNEP, the IPCC is to
assess available scientific information on climate change; assess
available environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate
change; and formulate response strategies. The IPCC is to submit
an interim report on these topics in the fall of 1990.
Science
-- International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU): To
encourage international scientific activity by coordinating
interdisciplinary and worldwide scientific projects and by working
with appropriate nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies in
their implementation.
-- International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP):
Interdisciplinary body under ICSU within which the international
scientific community seeks to identify and understand the basic
global processes, including the basic forces driving environmental
change.
-- UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):
To contribute to peace and security by promoting international
collaboration through, inter alia, science.
-- Intergovernmental Committee for Science and Technology for
Development: The General Assembly, following 1979 UN Conference
on S&T for Development, established this committee to assist it in
issues related to science and technology policy and coordination,
including initiating arrangements for the early identification and
assessment of new S&T developments that may have potential
importance for strengthening the S&T capacity of developing
countries. Reports to General Assembly through ECOSOC.
-7-
-- Advisory Committee on Science and Technology for Development:
This is the advisory body to the Intergovernmental Committee for
Science and Technology for Development.
-- Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) A
subsidiary, semi-autonomous body of UNESCO, the IOC coordinates
international marine science and ocean monitoring activities,
including global sea-level observation and global climate
research. It could be called upon to accelerate the limited
activities now underway for collecting and exchanging data
required for assessing climate change.
Environment
-- UN- Environment Programme (UNEP): To promote and coordinate
international cooperation in the field of the human environment
and to provide general policy guidance for the direction and
coordination of environmental programs within the UN. UNEP is
also responsible for keeping under review the world environmental
situation to ensure that international environmental problems
receive appropriate consideration by governments.
-- Committee on Natural Resources: This Committee is under
ECOSOC. It is to assist ECOSOC in the planning, implementation,
and coordination activities in the UN system for the development
of natural resources, as well as in selecting and following up
priority questions of long-term problems and trends of worldwide
significance in the field of natural resources.
-- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):
The OECD's environment work is supervised by the Environment
Committee (ENVCOM). The ENVCOM has two groups working on climate
change studies -- the Group on Energy and the Environment and the
Group of Energy Experts. These groups have been assigned projects
on energy options for addressing climate change and on
socioeconomic implications of climate change, respectively. Both
of these projects will produce draft reports in 1989. The OECD
generally promotes policies designed to achieve the highest
sustainable economic growth and a rising standard of living in
member countries, to contribute to sound economic expansion in
non-member countries, and to contribute to the expansion of world
trade on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory basis.
-- The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides a
forum for coordinating donor efforts to address environmental
problems in developing countries. Initial DAC efforts developed
recommendations for environmental assessments of all development
projects. Subsequently, DAC's efforts have been expanded, and a
special working has been set up on the environment (which will
have its first meeting later this fall). The group's preliminary
work plan gives high priority to helping developing countries
participate in and/or implement provisions of major international
agreements, including those on climate change, ozone depletion,
hazardous wastes, and biological diversity.
-8-
General
-- United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): The UNGA may discuss
any questions or matters within the scope of the UN Charter or
relating to the powers or functions of any organ provided for in
the Charter. It may make recommendations to UN members or to the
Security Council on any such questions or matters except on
disputes or situations in respect of which the Security Council is
currently exercising its functions.
-- United Nations Security Council: The Security Council has
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security. The functions of the council fall mainly into two
topics: pacific settlement of disputes; and action with respect
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.
-- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): ECOSOC makes or
initiates studies and reports with respect to international
economic, social, cultural, educational, and health matters. It
makes recommendations on such matters to the UNGA, to UN members,
and to specialized agencies. It prepares draft conventions for
submission to the UNGA on matters within its competence and calls
for international conferences on such matters.
-- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): The GATT is the
basic multilateral instrument that sets out agreed rules for
international trade. Obligations of GATT members would apply to
transactions in the area of global climate change.
Population
-- UN Population Commission: This Commission was established by
ECOSOC to study and advise ECOSOC on population changes and their
effect on economic and social conditions and other demographic
questions.
-- UN Population Fund (UNFPA): Established under UNDP to promote
awareness of the social, economic, and environmental implications
of national and international population problems, as well as
possible strategies to deal with them, and to provide sustained
assistance to developing countries to deal with population
problems.
Funding/Technical Assistance
-- UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF): To assist developing
countries through grants and loans, particularly long-term loans
made free of interest or at low interest rates. Assistance is
directed toward achieving accelerated and self-sustained growth of
the economies of the poorest developing countries and is oriented
toward the diversification of their economies, with due regard to
the need for industrial development and using light capital
technologies as a basis for economic and social progress.
-9-
-- UN Development Program (UNDP): To provide systematic and
sustained assistance in fields essential to technical, economic,
and social development of the developing countries. One of the
trust funds under UNDP is the UN Fund for Science and Technology
for Development.
-- IAEA Technical Assistance Fund: To support technical
cooperation activities in developing countries related to the use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
-- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): To
mobilize financial resources and make them available on
concessional terms for agricultural development in developing
countries, particularly for projects specifically designed to
improve food production systems in the poorest food deficient
regions. Jointly funded by OPEC and OECD members.
-- UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO): To promote and
accelerate industrialization in the developing countries. UNIDO
works with the private sector and encourages investment as a means
of fostering industrialization.
-- Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in
Asia and the Pacific: To assist in the economic development of
Asia and the Pacific through exchanges of views on problems of
technical assistance, collection of information on technical
assistance programs undertaken by its members on a bilateral
basis, and the encouragement of developing members to become
donors of capital and technical cooperation assistance to other
members.
-- Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR): To provide and coordinate funding for a network of
international agricultural research institutes, e.g., the
International Rice Research Institute (Philippines), the
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (Nigeria), the
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (Colombia).
-- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank) Although originally created to assist in financing the
rebuilding of nations devastated by World War II, the Bank's main
objective now is to lend for productive projects that will lead to
economic growth in less developed member countries.
-- International Development Association: To promote economic
development by providing financing to less developed countries on
much more concessionary terms that those of conventional loans.
It is designed especially to finance projects in countries that
are not able to service loans from the World Bank.
-10-
Regional Development Banks: These include Inter-American,
Indus Basin, African, Andean, Asian, Caribbean, Arab, Central
American, European, OPEC, and Nordic.
International Finance Corporation (IFC): The IFC invests in
productive private or partly governmental enterprises in
association with private investors, with the aim of promoting the
growth of the private sector and assisting productive private
enterprises in developing countries.
Human Settlements
-- UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat): Promotes
international cooperation in the field of human settlements in
order to enhance countries' efforts to solve their problems and to*
increase resources available to developing countries. The Centre
has three operating divisions: Research and Development (research
on innovative ideas for human settlements developments) Technical
Cooperation (project-based technical assistance to developing
countries); and Information, Audio Visual and Documentation,
(information collection and exchange channel).
-- Commission on Human Settlements: This Commission is under
ECOSOC. It is to assist regions in increasing and improving their
own efforts to solve human settlements problems, to promote
greater international cooperation to increase the resources of
developing countries.
Agriculture
-- Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO): To raise level of
nutrition and standards of living, to secure improvements in the
efficiency of production and distribution of all food and
agricultural products, and to better the condition of rural
populations (e.g., through dissemination of information and
furnishing of technical assistance to governments).
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture:
Member states promote and support agricultural development in
their countries, including education, research, planning, science,
and technology.
-- International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) To provide
an effective framework for cooperation and consultation between
tropical timber producing and consuming countries, with a view to
promoting the expansion of trade. Seeks to promote research and
development aimed at improving forest management; to encourage
reforestation; and to encourage national policies aimed at
sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical forests and
at maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned.
-11-
Energy
-- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): To seek to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to
peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world.
-- International Energy Agency (IEA): This international
organization has programs designed to promote reduced dependence
on oil imports and enhanced energy security through energy
diversification, energy conservation and efficiency, and promotion
of alternative energy fuels. Programs include annual reviews of
member country energy policies, technical analyses and information
exchange, and collaborative R&D programs on various energy
technologies.
-- Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA): The NEA, a semi-autonomous agency
under the OECD, is primarily responsible for developing technical
policy guidance in the field of civilian nuclear power. Specific
activities include: the coordination of R&D projects among
national government agencies, technical information exchanges, and
the preparation and dissemination of related nuclear studies and
publications. The subjects of primary interest include nuclear
safety, waste management, and radiation protection.
Judicial
-- International Court of Justice (ICJ): The ICJ is the principal
judicial organ of the UN. Its principal function is to decide, in
accordance with international law, such cases as are submitted to
it by member nations.
Regional Economic Cooperation Organizations
-- These include:
U.N. Regional Economic Commissions
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP)
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC)
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA) )
European Economic Community
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization of American States
COMECON
Andean Common Market
Caribbean Community
Economic Community of West African States
Organization of African Unity
ASEAN
South Asia Regional Council
South Pacific Forum
-12-
Domestic Legal Mechanisms
Potentially Relevant to Climate Change
-- It would be useful for the RSWG to compile an inventory of
types of legal mechanisms that could be used at the domestic level
to implement responses to climate change.
-- An inventory would include not only those legal mechanisms
explicitly directed at the climate change issue (if any), but also
those that are related to the issue but based on other grounds
(such as those directed at energy efficiency) and those that could
be made relevant, such as air pollution controls.
-- A preliminary outline of potentially relevant mechanisms might X
include:
I. General
A. Environmental assessment requirements
B. Government information dissemination programs
II. Emission Reduction
A. Environmental Regulation
1. Control of air emissions (stationary sources, mobile
sources, consumer products)
a. 'national ambient air quality standards
b. level of air emissions requirements
C. best available technology requirements
d. operating standards
e. labeling requirements
2. Control of chemicals and toxics
B. Energy Regulation
1. Industrial efficiency standards
2. Vehicle and other product efficiency standards
3. Alternative energy sources (hydro, solar, geothermal,
wind, nuclear)
4. Economic incentives to reduce consumption of fossil
fuels
-13-
5. Building codes
6. Standards for government-financed construction
7. Consumer rebates for efficient appliances
C. Transportation regulation
1. Highway construction
2. Mass transit
3. Transportation planning
D. Agriculture regulation (methane emissions)
E. Human Settlement Planning
F. Population Planning
G. Government Information Dissemination Programs
II. Affecting Sinks
A. Forestry (e.g., logging restrictions, reforestation
requirements)
B. Land use planning (cluster developments, greenbelts, parks)
C. Acquisition/management of public lands
III. Adaptation
A. Coastal zones
1. Setback laws
2. Land acquisition/open space dedication/purchase of
development rights
3. Building codes
4. Insurance (limits in vulnerable areas, requirements
on relocation/rebuilding)
5. Incorporation of potential sea-level rise into
governmental and private infrastructure planning and
development
6. Filling coastal lands
-14-
B. Water resource management
1. Allocate water resources to their highest economic
uses through greater use of market pricing
2. Develop alternative water sources
3. Restrictions on withdrawal of water from coastal
aquifers (to slow salinization)
4. Desalinization processes for industrial use and
human consumption
C. Agriculture
1. Technical assistance to farmers
2. Encouraging shifts to different crops
IV. Tax burdens, tax incentives, price supports, investment
guarantees, grants as they relate to any of the above
V. Other mechanisms (or aspects of above) that relate to
climate change abroad
A. Debt-for-nature swaps
B. Environmental assessment requirements for actions
having effects abroad
C. Development assistance programs
-15-
Elements of a Framework Convention on Global Climate Change
General Principles
1. A framework convention on global climate change should
be drafted to be amenable to adherence by a significant
majority of the world's countries, including those comprising a
significant majority of the world's population and those whose
actions are significantly influencing atmospheric
concentrations of CO2, methane, and other greenhouse gases. As
such, the negotiating process to develop the convention should
have as an explicit objective the broadest possible
participation.
2. The framework convention should generally follow the
model of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer (the "Vienna Convention").
3. The convention should provide an institutional
framework for ongoing assessment of global climate change and
discussion of possible responses. It should also provide a
legal framework under which future specific response measures
could be subsequently developed and agreed.
midigation>
4. The convention's twin goals should be to provide a
framework for: 1) increasing our understanding of the
scientific aspects of global climate change and its potential
impacts; and 2) protecting social, environmental, and economic
well-being from adverse impacts likely to result from climate
change.
5. The framework convention should provide for cooperation
with competent international bodies to implement effectively
its objectives.
6. The framework convention should take into account the
need to involve, as well as assist, developing countries in
addressing global climate change issues.
Convention Elements Implementing General Principles
-- The framework convention will most likely gain the adherence
of the largest number and widest array of countries if it
contains broad principles of cooperation rather than complex or
potentially contentious provisions (such as provisions on
liability, establishment of a trust fund, or enforcement
measures), and if it contains provisions to deal with the
special position of developing countries, as discussed below.
-16-
-- The convention should track the Vienna Convention in that it
should be a framework convention (i.e., one that includes
general principles of cooperation but does not itself set forth
emissions targets and timetables) and should generally contain
the same kinds of elements (e.g., general obligations,
cooperation in research and monitoring, exchange of
information, conference of the parties, secretariat, provision
for adoption of protocols).
-- The convention should provide an institutional framework for
cooperation by establishing a Conference of the Parties and a
Secretariat, along the lines of the Vienna Convention. It
should serve as a legal framework for future agreed measures by
providing for the adoption of protocols and/or the use of other
legal and institutional mechanisms. The use or amendment of
existing legal or institutional arrangements might be
particularly appropriate in the case of region-specific
responses.
-- The terminology of the framework convention should reflect
its twin goals and should not, as is sometimes suggested, refer
to "protecting the climate". Protecting the climate per se is
work a adoptation
not our objective; rather, our objective is to protect social,
4hy intl
environmental, and economic well-being from the adverse effects
likely to result from global climate change. Further,
adaptation measures (as opposed to limitation measures) are not
aimed at "protecting the climate".
-- The framework convention should implement its twin goals by
generally adopting the conceptual approach taken by the IPCC.
Thus, the convention should focus on cooperation in 1)
assessing the relevant scientific information related to global
climate change; 2) assessing potential impacts of global
climate change and their likelihoods; and 3) formulating and
evaluating appropriate response measures, on the basis of such
assessments as well as social, economic, and environmental
factors and cost effectiveness.
-- With respect to the assessment of information and impacts,
the framework convention should provide for the exchange of
data, including, inter alia, data related to atmospheric
chemistry, climate, sea level and river flow, energy supply
(coal, oil, gas, nuclear power, biomass, solar, wind), energy
end use (automobile production, residential/commercial.
appliance data), agriculture (rice production, fertilizer
production, cattle, sheep goats), and forest acreage (acreage
cleared/reforested/trees planted). There should be open access
to such data. The parties should also draw upon the expertise
of existing international organizations.
-17-
-- In addition, the framework convention should go beyond
assessment of information (to which the IPCC's work is limited)
by calling for enhanced cooperation in producing information.
In the particular case of scientific information, the
convention should provide for coordinated monitoring of
evolving phenomena and coordinated research to improve
knowledge about the origins, mechanisms, and effects of global
climate change. Cooperation in monitoring should involve the
planning, standardization, collection, analysis, and
dissemination of appropriate information, utilizing as far as
possible existing national and international activities. The
results of the IPCC's inventory of current monitoring systems
should be the basis for developing provisions on monitoring.
-- Because enhanced cooperation in monitoring is vital to the
process of scientific assessment, such cooperation should begin
immediately upon entry into force of the convention rather than
wait for elaboration in a subsequent protocol or other legal
arrangement. (It could, for example, be the subject of an
original annex to the convention.)
-- The framework convention should provide for the
establishment of expert panels (either ad hoc or standing) to
collect, analyze, and report to the parties on relevant
scientific, technical, environmental, social and economic
information referred to above. In the case of scientific
information, periodic updates approximately every three years
would probably be appropriate.
-- On the basis of such information, the parties will be in a
position to develop and evaluate possible response measures.
Measures that are agreed to may be implemented through various
means. They may be contained in protocols to the convention
?
(although the convention would not impose any obligation on the
parties to join any protocol). Alternatively, as noted above,
agreed measures may also be implemented by amending existing
legal arrangements, using existing institutional arrangements,
or creating new legal or institutional arrangements. Agreed
measures with respect to the production and consumption of CFCs
should be implemented within the framework of the Vienna
Convention and its Montreal Protocol.
-- Financial issues are too complex to be dealt with in the
framework convention. However, the convention might establish
a working group on financial implementation measures that could
be charged with preparing a report as expeditiously as possible
for the Conference of the Parties to consider.
-18-
-- In terms of taking into account the special position of the
developing countries, the framework convention should go beyond
the IPCC's work in another important respect, namely it should
provide for cooperation in the development and transfer of
technologies to limit or adapt to climate change. The
development and transfer of technologies to limit emissions of
greenhouse gases, such as energy end-use and supply techniques,
CFC substitutes, and agricultural and forestry practices, will
be critical to the implementation of limitation response
strategies. Similarly, the development and transfer of.
technologies to adapt to global climate change, such as
structural and non-structural coastal management techniques and
practices, will be critical to the implementation of adaptation
strategies. (The principles and specific procedures might be
elaborated in an original annex to the convention. Further, a
special working group on technology transfer might be
established.)
-- Finally, it is currently premature to consider the subject
of possible protocols and other agreed response measures, the
order in which they might be taken up, and whether there will
be linkage between various agreed measures. The IPCC has yet
to complete its interim report (due in November 1990); in
addition, the parties to the framework convention will continue
to consider the appropriateness and timing of various response
measures.
-19-
les
1/1- Cose protocols for with
Cory
CLOSE HOLD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
with
December 14, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR INTERESTED WHITE HOUSE STAFF
FROM:
KENNETH P. YALE
Clinic
SUBJECT:
Reforestation Initiative
Thank you for the time you have spent reviewing and
commenting on the previous editions of the issue paper.
Attached you will find the final paper. There will be some
carbon sequester numbers added for comparison purposes.
I do apologise for the delays in arranging a DPC meeting.
However, the additional time has allowed us to put some finishing
touches on the paper. A meeting of the DPC has now been set for
Monday December 18 and we will try to send this paper out by noon
today, Thursday December 14.
Please feel free to call if you have any questions.
attachment
4:00
Cross HORD
CLOSE HOLD
12-14-89 8:00 AM
December 14, 1989
MEMORANDUM
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Reforestation Initiatives
Issue:
The parameters and details of an Administration initiative
for trees.
Background:
The President is committed to wise stewardship of our
nation's natural resources. In the book Building a Better
America, the President noted the environmental and recreational
significance of our parks, forests, and similar areas. As part
of this commitment, the President has long advocated
reforestation. A White House fact sheet dated September 18, 1989
noted the President's personal interest in planting trees. The
emphasis on reforestation also has implications for international
environmental issues, specifically global change.
In 1988, the President stated he would combat the greenhouse
effect with the "White House effect." The June 1989 Paris
Economic Summit highlighted environmental issues, including
climate change. The final summit communique called for "adoption
of substantial forest management practices." In November 1989,
the U.S. joined 70 nations in signing the Noordwijk Declaration.
Although not a binding document, signatory countries recognized
the need to stabilize the emissions of greenhouse gases as soon
as possible and agreed that it is timely to explore targets for
CO2 emissions reductions. Also noted in the declaration was the
importance of reforestation.
There is substantial scientific consensus and public concern
over the adverse effects that atmospheric increases in
"greenhouse gases," such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄),
and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), are likely to have on the global
climate. Such gases come from industrial and natural sources, as
well as from land use changes such as deforestation. CO2
accounts for less than half of greenhouse emissions, yet it is
politically controversial, and one of the major issues under
discussion in international environmental negotiations. A small
reforestation program may establish U.S. leadership and give
added credibility to any proposal we may put forth regarding
large-scale, global reforestation. Unilateral adoption of a
2
large scale program, however, could reduce our leverage by giving
away something with which we might bargain.
The United States contributes 23 percent of the total
worldwide fossil fuel CO2 emissions (not including the effects of
tropical deforestation), although its share of the total has been
and is expected to continue rapidly to decline. In absolute
terms, U.S. CO₂ emissions from 1973 through 1987 have been
essentially flat, with the emissions average during that time
period equal to the 1972 level. Unilateral U.S. action regarding
CO2 emissions would produce trivial results. Analysis of a wide
range of emission scenarios in which the U.S. acts unilaterally
to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 percent in 1995, shows that the
expected worldwide doubling of CO2 in the mid-21st century is
delayed by only 2 to 6 years.
There are substantial scientific uncertainties about the
actual strength, timing and character of human and nature induced
climate change. Nevertheless, planting trees, especially where
justified by more certain non-climate benefits, can be an
effective way to reduce levels of CO₂ while obtaining other
benefits. Of course, CO2 taken up by trees is sequestered only
until they are burned or decompose.
Tree planting can provide other environmental benefits,
including improved air quality, increased water quality, and
reduced soil erosion. It can also result in improved wildlife
habitat and enhanced opportunities for outdoor recreation.
Current Reforestation Activities:
In FY 1988, approximately 3.4 million acres were planted in
trees or seedlings on public and private lands. Total trees
planted exceeded 2.3 billion (see figure 1).
Land available for planting trees can be divided into
agricultural and non-agricultural. In the agricultural category,
land is used for crops and pasture. Pastureland is usually
economically marginal, environmentally sensitive and frequently
erodible if overgrazed. Agricultural land offered for tree-
planting is most likely to be idle, very poor land, owned by
individuals who do not depend on farming for most of their
income. Non-agricultural land includes private (industrial or
non-industrial) and public (Federal, state and local) forestland.
Nearly three fourths of the productive timberland in the
U.S. lies on private lands. Seventy-five percent of this
timberland is owned by non-commercial, small woodlot owners. The
current growth and opportunity for future growth in tree planting
is on agricultural and other privately owned land, especially on
small woodlots after timber harvests.
3
Figure 1. Tree Planting By Ownership - FY 1988
Percent
Trees Planted
of all
Federal Government
Acres
in Thousands
Planting
National Forests
293,271
199,000
8.6
Dept. of the Interior
40,482
27,000
1.2
Other Federal Agencies
10,738
7,500
0.4
Total
344,491
233,500
10.2
Non Federal Public
State Forests
59,323
40,000
1.7
Other State Agencies
13,520
9,200
0.4
Other Public Agencies
12,378
8,400
0.4
Total
85,221
57,600
2.5
Private
Industrial Owners
1,389,716
945,000
40.9
Small Owners
1,575,050
1,017,000
46.4
Total
2,964,766
2,016,000
87.3
Grand Total
3,394,478
2,305,100
100.0
Both public and private sector programs are involved in tree
planting. Most financing and technical assistance for non-
industrial, private tree planting is provided by the Department
of Agriculture and their Forestry Service. Actual planning and
planting are undertaken by state foresters in the 50 states and 3
territories. Private sector organizations, such as the American
Forestry Association ("Global Releaf", National Urban Forestry
Council) and the National Arbor Day Foundation ("Tree City USA",
Trees for America), also provide technical assistance.
USDA Tree Planting
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), operated by USDA, is
designed to retire environmentally sensitive and economically
marginal agriculture-related land to soil conserving cover,
including forest through 10 year contracts with farmers. To the
extent practicable, 12.5 percent of this land is to be devoted to
trees. The land can reconvert to agricultural uses at the end of
the contract period.
Technical responsibility for CRP planting is assigned to the
Forest Service, and technical service to landowners is provided
4
by state forestry personnel. The CRP contributed 245,000 acres
of trees planted in 1989 (167 million trees/year and over 1.3
billion trees since the beginning of the program). The current
CRP authorization expires at the end of the 1990 crop year. Some
portion of the 82.1 million acres of crop and pasture land which
meet the criteria of environmental sensitivity could be included
in a tree planting CRP-like program. Additional tree planting
could be linked to existing crop subsidy programs. This concept
is not addressed in the current discussion.
Current Federal programs targeting non-Federal forest lands
include the Forest Incentives Program (FIP) and a program of
technical assistance provided through the Forest Service. FIP
provides about $12 million per year for technical assistance and
Federal 50/50 cost share for reforestation, timber stand
improvement, and other forest needs on non-industrial private
forest lands (NIPF). The Forest Service annually funds about $5
million for direct technical assistance through State forestry
agencies to NIPF landowners. These programs are used for
planting on non-Federal forestlands, such as non-industrial
private forests, and on crop and pasture lands on a cost-shared
basis, without rental payments.
Reforestation of National Forest lands totaled 300,000 acres
in FY 1988. Nearly 200 million trees were planted. Planting is
done following: timber harvest; natural disasters such as fire,
insects and disease; and previously unsuccessful reforestation.
Some sites regenerate naturally without special treatment or
investment. Others require site preparation to encourage natural
regeneration or preparation for seeding or planting. Total
Federal cost for Forest Service reforestation in FY 1988 was
about $250 million.
The Urban and Community Forest Program provides technical
assistance for community forests in cities and towns. It is
designed to improve soil, water and air quality and is funded
through the USDA Forest Service.
Other Federal Tree Planting
The Department of the Interior and other agencies reforested
about 51,000 acres in FY 1988, with 34 million trees. Most is
done by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), principally in
Oregon. BLM spent over $22 million in FY 1988 for reforestation.
Any new program could be a mix of non-Federal forestlands
and agricultural lands. Some agricultural land can be attracted
with cost-sharing, while other land can only be attracted with a
CRP-like program. While planting costs themselves are moderately
lower on agricultural lands than on non-industrial forestland, if
CRP like type annual rentals were required, the total cost would
be much higher. Furthermore, land which would require a CRP-
5
type rental would be likely to revert to its previous use after
the full rental period is over.
Congressional Activity:
There are several legislative proposals that would increase
tree planting, four in the Senate and one in the House. The Farm
Conservation and Water Protection Act of 1989 (S. 970, the
"Fowler Bill") is the probable vehicle for any action in the near
future. It is a forerunner of the 1990 Farm Bill and contains
specific authority to increase tree planting through a CRP-like
program, directing a greater percentage of lands under the
program to be planted with trees, instead of grasses (currently
only 6.7 percent of CRP lands are planted with trees.)
Options For a Tree Planting Initiative:
Prior to the Paris Economic Summit, the Environmental
Protection Agency proposed a major commitment to tree planting to
reduce the effects of global warming. Subsequent to the Summit,
a task force consisting of DOE, EPA, OPD, USDA, and USDI met to
further develop and refine options for a reforestation
initiative, in consultation with other agencies (including CEA
and DOT). According to the interagency task force, the goals of
a reforestation initiative include:
Offset increases in U.S. CO₂ emissions.
Demonstrate U.S. commitment to worldwide forest management
and address global change.
Provide leadership to support conservation in the U.S.
through public-private partnerships and volunteer approaches
to tree planting and forest management.
Improve forest management and provide multiple environmental
and economic benefits.
Several options are presented below. All have some
volunteer component. They differ in the amount and type of
Federal programmatic activity. The FY 1991 Budget now includes
Option #3 as a part of a proposed initiative, with budgetary
costs entirely offset by revenue from user fees to be paid into
an environmental endowment fund.
Community Trees/Volunteer Program
Provides Federal Government leadership, coordination, and
promotion, designed to stimulate an all-out volunteer effort to
plant an average of 30 million trees annually. It includes
provisions for technical assistance to make tree planting
effective.
6
It would expand the existing USDA Forest Service Urban and
Community forestry network of Federal-State-Local government
agencies, organizations and community activists and generate
private contributions of funds and volunteer labor to sustain the
planting and maintenance of urban and community trees.
Federal funds would be allocated through state forestry
agencies and as direct grants to conservation and citizen
organizations. State forestry staff or contract forestry
consultants would provide technical assistance and program
coordination activities. It is anticipated that national
leadership would be provided by a Presidential Blue Ribbon
Commission, ensuring proper coordination between Federal, state
and local efforts. A Volunteer Trees Foundation under Commission
oversight could promote and organize private contributions for
tree planting.
This option would provide high non-climate payoffs, such as
savings on residential air-conditioning, or improved recreational
opportunities on community lands. Furthermore, it would reverse
the present "deforestation" trend occurring in America's cities
and towns, where only one tree is now being planted for every
four that die or are removed. Through personal involvement and
commitment of the volunteers, the option would result in a
renewal of public support and commitment to improving the
environmental, economic, and social well-being of the nearly
40,000 cities, towns, and communities in the United States.
Annual trees planted:
30 million trees
Federal Costs:
Total (20-year):
$1.0 billion
First year:
$50 million
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$1.67
Option I - Current Agricultural Land Program
The Conservation Reserve Program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting. It
is designed to retire environmentally sensitive and economically
marginal agriculture-related land to soil conserving cover, such
as forest and grasses.
Technical responsibility for CRP planting is assigned to the
Forest Service, and technical service to landowners is provided
by state forestry personnel.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
7
A. Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Continue Current CRP:
318 million trees
-- 50/50 cost share for establishment, technical assistance,
and annual rental payments by the Federal government.
-- 12 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural land in 20 years.
8 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
o
92 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
348 million trees
Federal Costs:
A. Total (20 year):
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B. Total (35 year):
$2.6 billion
First year:
$ 26 million
Total A to B (20/35 years)
$3.6 billion
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.52
Pros
Maintains existing USDA/State delivery system for tree
planting developed under CRP, no build-up in delivery system
is necessary.
Very modest commitment to offsetting CO2 emissions.
Additional tree planting keeps prices stable and avoids
negative impact on forest industry.
Small effect on agricultural commodities markets.
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
High cost of rental payments, committing Federal
participation for 35 years with high total costs. Ineffi-
cient as it requires the Federal government to pay
landowners to convert from one land use (crop or pasture) to
another use (forest), rather than to simply improve a use
currently in place, such as on non-Federal forest land.
Actual experience under the CRP for converting cropland to
trees shows that costs exceed estimates. A survey of CRP
8
participants who planted trees (about 6 percent of the CRP
program) found that landowners would require rental rates 25
percent higher than they accepted the first time around to
induce them to convert more cropland to trees under 10-year
contracts.
Some local negative effects on agricultural input
industries.
There is a very high risk that CRP enrolled agricultural
lands will be reconverted into row crop or pasture
production at the end of the contract period, eliminating
the expected CO₂ and other benefits despite the costs.
A tree planting initiative that puts 76 percent of the
funding into technical assistance and rental payments and
only 24 percent into actual tree planting is neither
credible nor efficient.
Option II - Agricultural Land Emphasis
This is a CRP-like program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Agricultural Land Initiative:
700 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment,
technical assistance, and annual rental payments by the
Federal government).
-- 20 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural land in 20 years.
8 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
92 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
C. Non-industrial Forestland Program:
230 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment and
technical assistance and annual rental payments by the
Federal government for private, non-industrial forestlands).
-- 10.7 million acres of non-Federal forestland tree planting
and forest stand improvement in 20 years.
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
960 million trees
9
Federal Costs:
A. Total (20 year) :
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B & C. Total (35 year) :
$8.2 billion
First year:
$142 million
Total A to C (20/35 years)
$9.2 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs
142
175
205
245
270
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.49
Pros
Demonstrates U.S. commitment to offsetting CO2 emissions.
Reduces consumer lumber prices from what they would be
without a trees initiative and still gives tree growers
substantial earnings.
Small effect on agricultural commodities markets.
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
High cost of rental payments, committing Federal
participation for 35 years with high total costs. Ineffi-
cient as it requires the Federal government to pay
landowners to convert from one land use (crop or pasture) to
another use (forest), rather than to simply improve a use
currently in place, such as on non-Federal forest land.
Actual experience under the CRP for converting cropland to
trees shows that costs exceed estimates. A survey of CRP
participants who planted trees (about 6 percent of the CRP
program) found that landowners would require rental rates 25
percent higher than they accepted the first time around to
induce them to convert more cropland to trees under 10-year
contracts.
Some local negative effects on agricultural input
industries. Some regional redistribution of the timber
industry may result, from the West to the Southeast.
It is doubtful that the acreage target can be met while
holding cropland to only 10 percent of enrolled acreage.
The cost of an agricultural lands program may be even higher
than 47 cents per tree if a larger proportion of cropland is
needed (rather than pastureland) to meet acreage targets.
10
There is a very high risk that CRP enrolled agricultural
lands will be reconverted into row crop or pasture
production at the end of the contract period, eliminating
the expected CO2 and other benefits despite the costs.
Fewer non-climate benefits under the agricultural component
since erosion and water quality problems are less on
pastureland (90 percent of the program) than on cropland.
A tree planting initiative that puts 76 percent of the
funding into technical assistance and rental payments and
only 24 percent into actual tree planting is neither
credible nor efficient.
Option III - Non-Industrial Forestland Emphasis
An FIP-like technical assistance, cost-sharing program for
private, non-industrial forestlands and agricultural land, with
no CRP-like component. It is included in the FY 1991 Budget as a
part of a new initiative. The costs would be fully funded by
increased user fee revenues through an environmental endowment
fund also proposed in the Budget.
It also includes funding of $35 million in the first year to
capitalize a Volunteer Foundation or provide the Presidential
Commission with funds for a challenge cost share program to
leverage initial private funds for early, highly visible tree
planting. The Community Trees/Volunteer program in the other
options provides no funds for actual planting of trees. Instead,
it funds technical assistance and coordination.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Non-Industrial Forestland Initiative:
970 million trees
-- Based on current FIP (from 50/50 to 75/25 cost share for
establishment and technical assistance for private, non-
industrial forestland and agricultural land in rural areas).
-- Around 12 to 15 million acres of non-Federal forestland
planting and forest stand improvement.
C. Forestry Stewardship Initiative:
-- Expand current stewardship program (partly 50/50 cost shared
with states to provide a basic technical assistance
capability in State Foresters offices, and partly 100
percent Federal program to reach the needed scale to support
11
all of the planting funded under A and B, above).
-- State forestry staff or contract forestry consultants assist
land owners in developing property management plans.
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
1 billion trees
A. Total (20 year) :
$700 million
First year:
$35 million
B.
Total (20 year) :
$1.8 billion
First year:
$90 million
C. Total (20 year) :
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
Total A to C (20 years) :
$3.5 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs
175
175
175
175
175
Offset from Environ-
mental Endowment
-175
-175
-175
-175
-175
Net Deficit Impact
0
0
0
0
0
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.18
Pros
No new legislation is needed.
Low total costs, funds are allocated mainly to a more cost
effective option: the Forestry Stewardship technical
assistance program which leverages Federal and State funds,
and small owner cost-sharing to improve the economics of
some small owner investment. Allocates more funds to actual
tree planting and improvement, rather than to rental costs
under a CRP-type program.
Makes a trees initiative an integral part of a broader
environmental initiative which stresses improving the
outdoor environment of America in a number of ways.
Funds the budgetary costs of the Trees program almost
entirely from user fees paid into an environmental endowment
fund by those who use and have the most concern about
protecting the high quality of the outdoor environment.
The Forestry Stewardship consolidates technical assistance
from three programs: woodlot owners receiving Federal cost-
sharing, woodlot owners assisted by separate State programs,
and assistance to community governments and organizations.
This consolidation should improve productivity and give
12
flexibility to allocate effort where the payoff in trees
planted is highest.
Improved harvesting practices and replanting will help to
ensure adequate regeneration of harvested stands on NIPF
lands. This should help to lessen harvest pressures on
Federal lands in future years.
Minor impact on food supply and agricultural input sector,
would enhance timber supply without depressing stumpage
prices.
Cons
Would have deficit impacts several times higher than the
Volunteer Program alone, if offsetting receipts to the
environmental endowment are not enacted, though
substantially lower than other options presented here.
Principal program benefits beyond the Volunteer Program
accrue to private, small woodlot owners, does not fully use
available opportunity to plant on agricultural lands.
Requires a massive landowner behavioral response to a
limited financial incentive (50/50 cost share). Private
ownership investment funds and demand for cost sharing on
non-industrial forest land may be insufficient to accomplish
true annual acreage target over 20 year program. Cost share
may have to be increased to 75 percent Federal.
Excludes farmers and ranchers from subsidy unless they own
lands where it is economical to invest in tree planting on a
50/50 cost-sharing basis.
Will replant trees that should have been planted anyway.
Option IV - Enhanced Agricultural Lands Emphasis
An expanded CRP-like program, emphasizing Federal rental
payments as an incentive to set aside land for tree planting, but
at a much larger scale to offset additional CO2 emissions.
Includes the following, along with annual trees planted or
improved:
A. Community Trees/Volunteer program:
30 million trees
B. Enhanced Agricultural Land Initiative:
1.295 billion trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment,
technical assistance, and annual rental payments by the
Federal government) but much larger scale.
13
-- 37 million acres of economically marginal, environmentally
sensitive agricultural lands in 20 years.
20 percent cropland (more expensive to enroll)
O
80 percent pastureland (less expensive to enroll)
C.
Non-industrial Forestland Program:
624 million trees
-- Based on CRP model (50/50 cost share for establishment and
technical assistance and annual rental payments by the
Federal government for private, non-industrial forestlands).
-- 26.8 million acres of non-Federal forestland tree planting
and forest stand improvement in 20 years.
Annual Trees Planted/Improved:
1.95 billion trees
Federal Costs:
A. Total (20 year) :
$1 billion
First year:
$50 million
B & C. Total (35 year) :
16.2 billion
First year:
$237 million
Total A to C (20/35 years) :
$17.2 billion
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Budget year costs:
237
300
363
434
488
Est. Average Annual Federal cost/tree:
$0.44
Pros
Highest level of CO₂ emissions offset. Most clearly
establishes U.S. in a leadership role in tree planting to
offset CO₂ while proposing actions likely to be less
controversial than direct reductions of fossil fuel
emissions. Could provide an example for other countries.
Includes a significant effort in all areas where major
opportunities for tree planting exist - in urban and
community locations, on agricultural lands, and on non-
industrial private forests.
Greatest favorable effect on rural economies through
creation of new employment opportunities and increased
economic activity.
14
Cons
CRP component requires new legislative authorization.
Highest cost option, uses a CRP-like program, in order to
attract a large amount of agricultural land. Inefficient as
it requires payments to landowners at high Federal cost to
convert from one land use (crop or pasture) to another use
(forest), rather than to simply improve a use currently in
place, such as on non-Federal forest land.
Commits Federal participation for 35 years with high total
costs of $19.2 billion, a substantial portion of which is
annual rental payments. (Although focus on pasturelands and
forestlands will have much lower rental rates than CRP
croplands). Actual experience under the CRP for converting
cropland to trees shows that costs exceed estimates.
Non-climate benefits are unlikely to justify a costly
program on this scale. Justification hence, depends on
highly uncertain climate benefits.
Greatest negative impact on food production and timber
supply and on agricultural input sector.
See Option II for additional cons.
11/21/1989 08:06 FROM USDA/ECON RM. 227E
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3956947 P.02
Department of
Agriculture
TREE PLANTING and
Forest
Service
FOREST IMPROVEMENT
To Reduce Global Warming
UAS
11/21/1989 08:06 FROM USDA/ECON RM. 227E
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3956947 P.03
TREE PLANTING AND FOREST IMPROVEMENT
TO REDUCE THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING
The information and analysis on which this option paper is based was provided by a coalition of Federal
Government Agencies, including the following:
Council of Economic Advisors
Department of Agriculture
Office of the Secretary
Agricultural Research Service
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
Cooperative State Research Service
Economic Research Service
Forest Service
Soil Conservation Service
World Agricultural Outlook Board
Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
/
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Land Management
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Highway Administration
Office of Management and Budget
11/21/1989 08:07 FROM USDA/ECON RM. 227E
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3956947 P.04
Contents
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1
PROGRAM OPTIONS
2
ACTION PROGRAM
3
11/21/1989 08:07 FROM USDA/ECON RM. 227E
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3956947 P.05
TREE PLANTING AND FOREST IMPROVEMENT
TO REDUCE THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
Introduction
Sccientific consensus and public concern are growing that atmospheric increases in "greenhouse gases,'
principally carbon dioxide (CO₂), will alter the global climate. While the eventual solution of the problem
requires control of CO₂ emissions at their sources, an immediate opportunity exists to offset CO2 increases
through a tree planting and forest Improvement program. Such a program could produce positive results for
thee Administration in the following areas:
1. Presidential Leadership.
2 Volunteerism.
3. Partnerships.
4. International Leadership.
5. Multiple Environmental Benefits.
Groats
To offset U.S. CO2 emissions Increases through a tree planting and forest
improvement program.
To demonstrate U.S. commitment to worldwide sustainable forest management
and reduction of global warming. (Summit of the Arch Statement, Paris, France, 1989)
To provide leadership and action in building the conservation spirit and ethic in
the U.S. through cooperative public-private partnerships and citizen volunteer approaches to
tree planting and forest management.
To Improve forestland management and produce multiple environmental and
economic benefits from forests and community trees throughout the U.S.
Siltuation
Akn analysis of a national program of sustained tree planting and forest improvement activities indicates the
foollowing key findings.
1.
A Community Trees Program is essential. Urban and community forests are in decline. Community
trees produce major benefits for the environment. The public is anxious to participate.
2
The Nation would benefit from additional forestland. A long-term downward trend is beginning to
stabilize. Additional forestland would produce benefits and enhance the U.S. position in dealing with
international issues regarding reforestation (See following table).
3.
The USDA-Forest Service/State Forester cooperative tree planting delivery system is presently operat-
ing at a high level due to the Conservation Reserve Program. Transition into a new program could be
effectively managed (See following table).
4,
Economically marginal and environmentally sensitive agricultural lands are available for conversion to
forestland. The levels of tree planting being proposed could be accomplished. Actual enrollment would
depend on landowner willingness to participate (See following table).
1
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Forestland Trends
The total U.S. land area is 23 billion acres.
It is estimated that in the year 1630 forestland area was 1.1 billion acres.
By 1920, clearing of forestland for agriculture and development reduced the area to 751 million
acres. Since 1920, agricultural land abandonment and increased urbanization have produced the
following trends in forestland area.
Area of Forest Land in the U.S.
1920 to 1987, with 10 - 20 Year Outlook
Million Acres
800
780
760
Short-term . CRP
740
Short-term
trand
720
Leng-term trend
700
1920
1940
1960
1980 1967
2000
Long-term average trend since 1880 is downward + but with short-term cycles.
Both FS and SCS data show that forestland stabilized in the 1982 - 1987 period.
CRP has probably reversed the 1952 . 1987 decline.
2
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3956947 P.07
Tree Planting in U.S.
Tree planting history and trends by ownership are shown in the following table. The trend has been upward
since 1950, with major surges during the Soil Bank years and the current Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP). Forest industry and public land tree planting are now stable and expected to remain that way. The
current growth and opportunity for future growth is in the farmers and other private ownerships. This is
consistent with the major categories of lands suitable and available for a Tree Initiative.
Millions of Acree
5.0
4.0
-ORP*
B.O
Farmera and
Other Private
2.0
-Forest Industry
1.0
-Other Public
-National Forests
0.0
1850
1980
1970
1960
1990
*2.2 Million Adres In CRP 8/86-10/89
**2.2 Million Acree In Soll Bank 1956-1962
Souroe-U.8. Forest Planting Report, U.S. Department of
Agriculture-Forest Service (Annual Report)
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3956947 P.08
Agricultural Related Land Availability
Only those acres that were classified as environmentally sensitive or economically marginal when used in
agricultural production based on the 1982 SCS National Resources Inventory are considered as candidate
acres for tree planting. Further, it is assumed that no more that 25 percent of the cropland acres and 50
percent of the pastureland acres in any county would be enrolled in a tree planting program.
As shown in the following table, the above criteria Identifies 40.4 million acres of cropland and 41.7 million
acres of pastureland in the major tree planting regions of the Nation. This provides an ample pool of
environmentally sensitive and economically marginal agriculture related land available for tree planting.
... CROPLAND ...
... PASTURELAND ...
REGION
Total
Ellgible %
Total
Eligible %
(thousand acres)
(thousand acres)
Southeast
18,214
5,077
28
12,275
5,643 46
Delta
21,925
2,884
13
12,137
5,991 49
Missouri
3,468
653 19
4,591
3,232 70
Texas
1,966
374
19
5,581
2,701 48
Appalachia
22,711
9,618 42
18,477
13,812
75
Northeast
17,258
8,529
49
8,820
5,498 62
Lake
43,924
13,284
30
9,895
4,862 49
TOTAL
129,466
40,419
31
71,776
41,739
58
4
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3956947 P.09
Program Options
The following options provide the essential elements for a Presidential decision. They fall into two major
aspects of Communities and Rural Areas. For comparison purposes the options are numbered consecutively.
COMMUNITIES
1. Community Trees-Volunteer Program
This option provides Federal Government sponsored leadership, coordination, and promotion, designed to
stimulate an all-out volunteer effort to plant an average of 30 million trees annually in communities throughout
the U.S. It includes provisions for technical assistance to make volunteer tree planting effective.
The general organizational framework of this option would include the following features:
o Build on existing Federal Government networks with State
forestry agencies and private sector associations and
organizations.
Establish a blue ribbon national panel of public and
private sector leaders to promote partnerships.
Establish a network of full-time State and community
level volunteer program coordinators.
Utilize existing community volunteer groups and encourage
new coalitions of citizens to obtain maximum success.
Provide technical assistance through State Forestry agencies
and local government.
RURAL AREAS
2. Continue Current Level (CRP) Planting
This option provides for a continuation of the current high level of tree planting (3.4 million acres annually-see
earlier chart). The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contributes 600 thousand acres per year. Since the
CRP expires at the end of the 1990 crop year, this option would replace and continue that amount of planting
for a total of 12 million acres over 20 years.
3. Five Percent CO₂ Reduction
This option expands tree planting on agriculture related land to a total of 20 million acres or 1 million acres
annually. It adds a component of non-Federal forestland planting and forest improvement amounting to 536
thousand acres annually for a total of 10.7 million acres.
4. Ten Percent CO2 Reduction
This options expands tree planting on agriculture related land to a total of 37 million acres. it adds a larger
component of non-Federal forestland planting and forest improvement amounting to 1.3 million acres annual-
ly for a total of 26.8 million acres.
This option is the same as the five percent option, but on a much larger scale. The critical factor is the
expansion of agriculture related land to 37 million acres over the 20 year period.
5
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3956947 P.10
5. Increased Cost-Sharing and Technical Assistance
This option expands the tree planting and forestland improvement activities accomplished under the Forestry
Incentives Program (FIP) and the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP). Currently these cost-sharing
programs result in planting about 312,000 acres of trees annually and improvement of 67,000 acres of
forestland productivity annually. Doubling these efforts along with a doubling of the technical assistance by
USDA and its cooperators would result in 300,000 additional acres of tree planting. Since at least half of these
acres would be on existing forestland, the overall contribution to carbon dioxide offset will be modest.
Public Forestland Option
in addition to the above options there is potential for a public forestland option. These are forestlands
managed by Federal, State and County Governments. While this is a large area of forestland, it is essentially
in good condition at present and making a major contribution to current levels of carbon sequestration and
carbon dioxide emission reduction. An interagency team is presently evaluating these lands for possible
inclusion in this program proposal. This potential is yet to be determined and could be added to the proposal
at a later date.
Options Summary Table
The following table displays the basic information for each option as well as information on costs, key effects,
and the pros and cons for each option.
6
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ACTION PLAN
This basic Action Plan will apply regardless of the option(s) selected. A much more detailed action plan would
be developed for the final program.
Leadership and Coordination
The [Secretary of Agriculture) will provide national leadership and coordination through the [Chief of the
Forest Service]. An interdepartmental Task Force will be formed to provide overall Federal Government
direction and guidance. The [Secretary of Agriculture] will chair the Task Force which will have representa-
tives from the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, Department of Energy, Department
of Defense, and others who contribute to the Federal effort. Consultation and coordination with State and local
government and the private sector could be managed through committees, panels, and groups involving
trade associations, the business community, civic groups, and others.
Program Delivery
The delivery system for this effort would call for a combination of the traditional governmental system with
private sector efforts and the citizen volunteer movement. This approach has already been successfully
demonstrated by efforts such as the "Touch America Program," and many state and local projects. This
proposal expands the concept by a linkage to a global issue with a focus on the simple subject of trees. A
closely related promotional and informational campaign entitled, "Global ReLeaf," is already under way under
the auspices of the American Forestry Association.
The basic framework for delivery would be the USDA system, which reaches all land, communities, and
people considered in the program options. The system would be expanded in cooperative approaches to all
levels of government, private associations, businesses, and citizens groups. It would build on existing USDA
Forest Service networks involving the National Association of State Foresters, the American Forestry Associa-
tion, the National Arbor Day Foundation, the American Association of Nurserymen, and others. The system
can reach out to the entire Nation.
Schedule
A possible general schedule would be as follows:
1990 - Announce, plan, and organize program within existing capability.
1991 - Major implementation. Possible link to the Administration's FY 1991
Budget which is now being developed.
1992 * People mobilized. Program in action.
1995 - Major accomplishments and results in full flow.
2000 - Ten year benchmark report. Turn of the century events.
2010 - Full benefits of trees being achieved. Worldwide situation
improved.
Full on-the-ground Implementation of a greatly expanded tree planting program would require several years
to achieve. This is due to the time involved in expanding nursery capacity, tree seedling production, and
transplant operations. Existing capability would suffice while the program gets organized.
7
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3956947 P.12
COMMUNITY TREES
Proposal
Plant an average of 30 million trees annually during the next 20 years to stop the
"deforestation" occurring in America's cities and towns and offset an additional 5.2
million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually by the year 2010.
Implementation Strategy:
Implementation would build upon the existing USDA Forest Service urban and community forestry
cooperative network. (See Chart)
The community tree network would consist of a public-private partnership at the national, regional, and
local level to mobilize the public, commercial, and private sectors to provide leadership, underwrite
costs, and organize volunteers at the grass roots level to plant community trees. The public and private
sectors would work in tandem to plant trees on community public lands and on private lands.
National leadership would be provided by a Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission (using the Commis-
sion for the Bicentennial of the Constitution, restoration of the Statue of Liberty, and sponsorship of
the Olympic Games in Los Angeles as templates). Technical and financial support and coordination
would be provided by the USDA Forest Service.
Comparable partnerships would occur at the regional, State, and local levels, supported by a cadre
of professional community tree coordinators at each level to provide the technical support and
coordination of the volunteer efforts.
8
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COMMUNITY TREES NETWORK
Federal
National
COOPERATORS
Blue Ribbon
Government
- American
Commission for
Association of
Community
Nurserymen
Trees
- American Forestry
Association
- American Society
State
State
of Landscape
Foresters
Coordinators
Architects
for Community
- International
Trees
Society of
Arboriculture
1 Municipal
Arborists and
Urban Foresters
Community
Local
Society
Arborists
Coordinators
- National Arbor
for Community
Day Foundation
Trees
(Technical
Assistance
- Others
and
Quality
Control)
COMMUNITY TREE PLANTERS:
a coalition of volunteers - business and civic leaders
- grass roots organizations in the 40,000 incorporated
and non-incorporated communities of the United States.
Existing Urban Porestry Network
- Administrative and Technical Assistance
by Federal/Siate/Local Government Agencies
- Cooperators
Community Trees Proposal - Network Expansion
- Permanent Community Trees Commission and Coordinators
- Volunteers
9
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Private Sector Role in Community Trees Proposal
National Level
-Blue Ribbon Commission
provide leadership in national awareness and informational campaign;
raise funds to underwrite community costs for massive tree planting and maintenance;
mobilize the Nation's civic and business leaders into action at the national, State and
local levels.
-Cooperators
provide information, education, and technical assistance (e.g., American Forestry Asso-
ciation's Global ReLeaf campaign) about community trees:
coordinate the availability of suitable tree planting stock among private sector nurseries;
increase awareness of need for improved municipal, residential, and commercial design
and construction to provide spaces for trees;
provide guidance and assistance to arborists.
State Level
provide parallel efforts to the national level. (State Governors could establish Blue Ribbon
Commissions)
Local Volunteers
participate in fund-raising efforts, awareness and promotional activities, training, and tree
planting and maintenance;
individual citizens and businesses would plant trees on their own property and contribute
to local community efforts.
Public Sector Role In Community Trees Proposal
National Level
provide national leadership and oversight;
provide technical and financial support to the National Blue Ribbon Commission;
develop national awareness/informational/promotional campaign and related materials
(e.g., posters, brochures, media information, etc.):
work with national cooperators and partners to coordinate implementation efforts.
State Level
provide technical information and expertise, training and financial assistance;
coordinate Statewide implementation efforts;
develop State partnerships with organizations, civic and business leaders;
coordinate awareness/promotional campaign to mobilize volunteer participation.
Local Level
coordinate with private sector nurseries to ensure availability of suitable tree planting
stock;
provide technical expertise, labor, equipment for tree planting in the public sector,
coordinate efforts of community volunteers and provide training and technical assistance
in tree selection, site selection and preparation, and tree planting and maintenance.
10
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Federal Costs:
an average of $20-50 million annually through 2010.
Funding would provide technical and financial assistance for:
urban forestry professional and technician staff and program
coordinators at the Federal, State and local levels.
$8-20 million
communications/fund raising/volunteer coordination/promotion/
informational materials.
$8-20 million
demonstration projects.
$2-5 million
training of the Community Trees workforce
(volunteers, laborers, technicians, etc.)
$2-5 million
Results
A doubling of the number of publicly-owned street trees, presently estimated at 60 million (estimated
to be half the current capacity).
A reversal of the present trend of planting only one tree for every four that die or are removed.
Planting over the 20-year period approximately 4 community trees for each man, woman, and child
presently living in America's cities and towns.
Offsetting by the year 2010 an additional 5.2 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually. By
contrast, if the current rate of "deforestation" in America's communities were to continue, carbon
dioxide emissions would increase by 9 million tons annually by the year 2010.
A renewal of public support and commitment to improving the environmental, economic, and social
well-being of the nearly 40,000 cities, towns, and communities in the United States.
Authority:
Public Law 95-313, the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978
11
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3956947 P.16
RURAL TREE PLANTING AND FORESTLAND IMPROVEMENT
Proposal
Includes several options of increased tree planting and forestland improvement in rural
areas. Requirements for agricultural land and non-Federal forestland are summarized
below:
OPTIONS
5. Increased
2. Current
3. Five Percent
4. Ten Percent
Cost-Sharing
Level
CO2 Offset
CO2 Offset
and Technical
Assistance
Agricultural
600,000
1 million
1.85 million
150,000
Land
acres
acres
acres
acres
Tree
per
per
per
per
Planting
year
year
year
year
Non-Federal
none
536,000
1.3 million
150,000
Forestland
acres
acres
acres
Planting &
per
per
per
Improvement
year
year
year
Public
TBD*
TBD*
TBD*
TBD*
Forestland
Planting &
Improvement
*To be determined.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
Agricultural Land Delivery System The delivery system for tree planting on agricultural lands would be the
Conservation Reserve Program, or a similar program. Overall administration of payments and program
administration is handled by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Land eligibility is deter-
mined by the Soil Conservation Service. Technical responsibility for tree planting is assigned to the Forest
Service, and on-the-ground technical services to landowners are provided through State Foresters. Respon
sibilities for tree planting include: practice installation, inspection, and certification: and, the development and
implementation of site specific tree planting plans.
Non-Federal Forestland Delivery System The delivery system for non-Federal forestland tree planting and
improvement would be an extension of the delivery system already in place to implement the Forestry
Incentive Program (FIP) and forestry practices under the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP). As with
the Agricultural Land Delivery System. technical responsibility for tree planting is assigned to the Forest
Service with on-the-ground technical assistance to landowners provided by State forestry personnel. Techni-
cal services to landowners are essentially those stated above except the non-Federal Forestland Delivery
System would also include site specific silvicultural prescriptions for forest improvement cuttings.
Public Forestland Planting and Improvement Additional opportunities for tree planting and forest improve-
ment exist on Federal and non-Federal public lands. Where they exist, planting and improvement activities
will be accomplished under existing authorities. Lands in this category include those, for example, which are
managed by the Department of Defense, agencies of the Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service.
12
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3956947 P.17
Federal Costs:
Federal cost data are derived from the latest information on tree planting and forestland improvement where
practices are cost-shared. For rural tree planting and forestland Improvement options, Federal costs would
be as follows:
OPTIONS
5. Increased
2. Current
3. Five Percent
4. Ten Percent
Cost-Sharing
Level
CO₂ Offset
CO2 Offset
and Technical
Assistance
Total Cost
$2.6 billion
$5.3 billion
$12.9 billion
$1.2 billion
(20 years)
First Year Cost
$26 million
$50 million
$100 million
$58 million
Fifth Year Cost
$58 million
$110 million
$210 million
$58 million
The costs for public forestland planting and improvement will be determined once the analyses presently
underway have been completed.
Results
The accomplishments from increased rural tree planting and forestland improvement over the 20-year period
are summarized below:
OPTIONS
5. Increased
2. Current
3. Five Percent
4. Ten Percent
Cost-Sharing
Level
CO2 Offset
CO2 Offset
and Technical
Assistance
Agricultural
12
20
37
3
Land
million
million
million
million
Tree Planting
acres
acres
acres
acres
Non-Federal
None
10.7
26.8
3
Forestland
million
million
million
Planting &
acres
acres
acres
Improvement
Public
TBD*
TBD*
TBD*
TBD*
Forestland
Planting &
Improvement
*To be determined.
The results for public forestland planting and improvement will be determined once the analyses presently
underway have been completed.
13
TREE INITIATIVE - OPTIONS SUMMARY TABLE
OPTION
ITEM
1. Community Trees
2. Continue Current Level
3. Five Percent C02
4. Ten Perce:
(CRP) Planting
Reduction
Reduction
Volunteer Program
o Trees Planted Annually
30 million trees
409 million trees
900 million trees
1,800 mill
20 million acres
37 mill
12 million acres
o Agricultural Land Tree
3956947 P.18
Planting in 20 Years
None
(0.6 million acree/yr.)
(1 million acres/yr.)
(1.85 million
10.7 million acres
26.8 mill
0 Non-Pederal Forestland
Planting and Improvement
None
None
(536,000 acres/yr.)
(1.3 million
in 20 Years
0 Federal Costs:
Total Cost (20 years)
$1 billion
$2.6 billion
$5.3 billion
$12.9 bi
$50 million
$26 million
$50 million
$100 ai
First Year Cost
Fifth Year Cost
$50 million
$58 million
$110 million
$210 mi
0 KEY EFFECTS
Some negative
TO
Agricultural Land
Minimal impact
Minimal impact
pasturel
Availability
No impact
Food Supply
No impact
Minimal impact
Minimal impact
Some impact
and beef pro
Rural Development
Enhances social, economic,
Provides increased timber
Provides increased timber
Shift in short
agricultural
environmental well-being
base: strengthens rural
base; strengthens rural
of small towne and
economy (jobs in timber
economy (jobs in timber
timber-based
communities.
and related support
and related support
Long-term gai
businesses).
businesses).
diversified E
11/21/1989 08:13 FROM USDA/ECON RM. 227E
base.
o PROS AND CONS
o Massive volunteerism.
o Additional tree planting
o Holds consumer lumber
o Stumpage pri
Pros
o Modest Federal outlays.
keeps pricee stable and
prices down and still
diminished.
o Highly visible to
avoids negative impact
gives tree growers
o Substantial
on forest industry.
substantial earninge.
C02 emission
public--urban and
o Demonstrates U.S. com-
o Establishes
suburban people.
o Maintains existing
o Could provide Jobs for
USDA/State delivery
mittment to offsetting
leadership I
eystem for tree planting
C02 emissions.
in tree plai
urban youth.
developed under CRP--no
offset C02 I
build-up in delivery
system is necessary.
Cone
o Much of cost shifted to
o May adversely affect
o Some local negative
o Requires sul
other levels of govern-
agricultural input
effects on agricultural
cost increa:
ment and private sector.
input industries.
USDA delive
industries.
0 Requires additional
o Substantial
o No direct control of
accompliehments.
USDA program delivery
Federal cos
resources.
mainly to 1.
incentives.
18.1
ent C02
5. Increased Cost-Shari
& Technical Assistan
on
lion trees
99 million trees
Extended Page
lion acres
3 million acres
acres/yr.)
(0.15 million acres/yr
lion acres
3 million acres
acres/yr.)
(0.15 million acres/yr
TOTAL P.18
illion
$1.2 billion
illion
$58 million
illion
$58 million
e impact--
land
Minimal Impact
on crops
Minimal Impact
oduction.
t-term from
Minimal Impact
economy to
1 economy.
in in
economic
'ices are
o Uses existing programs
o Cost effective.
Ily offsets
ins.
$ U.S. in
position
anting to
emissions.
ibstantial
o Not Presidential
ises for
in scope.
ary system.
o Small size does little
1 annual
for C02 offset.
at keyed
0 100% cost share would
landowner
undercut State
incentives programs.
-2) 1) Irput of teah Ecan/ art a state costs to
3) Eval, of Sci. to noture
(any
quostion
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
Winst
December 19, 1989
MEMBER OF THE Clent COUNCIL
Charge
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD B. STEWART
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FROM:
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE R
SUBJECT:
Justice Draft of Framework Convention
I agree with the overall DOJ approach, subject to the
changes outlined below.
The Administration's position that the economics of action
and inaction must both be considered in policy formation should
be reflected in our comments to RSWG. The USG should request
that the following bullet should be added to Section 1 (preamble)
of the IPCC RSWG Legal Measures Paper:
Commitment to consider the possible adverse
socio-economic impacts of policies that might
be taken to address climate change.
The draft Concept Paper is very strong and clear. It might
be worth flagging that the choice of an appropriate discount rate
is a key issue in the design of a Global Warming Index, since the
atmospheric lifetime of greenhouse gases varies widely. A markup
with suggested language is attached (Attachment A).
Finally, although we will not be placing any framework
language on the table in the immediate future, it is important
that any draft framework documents produced for internal use
reflect the need to consider both costs and benefits in setting
greenhouse policy targets. Yet, the DOJ draft repeatedly notes
the need to address "adverse socio-economic impacts stemming from
climate change" without parallel mention of the need to consider
the adverse socio-economic impacts that might stem from any
policy. A marked up copy of the first six pages of the DOJ draft
with suggested changes to reflect the cost side of the policy
equation is also attached (Attachment B).
Attachments
ATTACHMENT A
DRAFT
U.S. CONCEPT PAPER
COMPREHENSIVE GREENHOUSE GAS APPROACH TO
A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Proposal:
The RSWG should seriously: 1) consider the merits of combining
a framework convention on climate change with one or more protocols
that would treat greenhouse gases collectively on the basis of a
warming potential index, and 2) evaluate alternative implementation
procedures including international tradeable emission reduction
credits.
Summary:
Global emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH,, N2O, CFCs, CO,
and other trace gases) are currently increasing in overy country
because of man's activities. Addressing the problem requires a
comprehensive and flexible approach that will enable countries to
find economically efficient measures to stabilize or reduce
emissions while achieving economic growth. The U.S. government
believes that a framework convention on climate change should
establish a process focusing on the collective warming potential
of greenhouse gases rather than on individual greenhouse gases.
Countries should be free to select between emission reduction or
sink enhancement strategies and among gases as long as these are
consistent with a negotiated "collective" greenhouse gas target.
Trading emission reduction credits between countries could be an
option in implementing this approach. Under this approach, the
Convention would set forth a general goal of stabilizing or
reducing greenhouse gas emissions at levels and dates to be
established in a protocol or protocols to the convention to be
developed as soon as possible.
Concepts and Definitions:
Greenhouse gases differ in both their ability to trap heat
and their atmospheric lifetimes. For example, methane traps heat
approximately 30-40 times more effectively than CO2, but has a
lifetime of 8-12 years, while CO2 has an effective lifetime of
several hundred years. The concept of a Global Warming Potential
index has been proposed as a means of accounting for these
differences. Recent papers by B. Assarsson and by Lashof and Ahuja
propose two similar approaches for defining such an index. For
example, the second paper suggests that the Global Warming
Potential of methane relative to CO2 is 3.7. In economic terms
this suggests that one could spend up to 3.7 times for reducing
methane emissions relative to CO2 emissions.
The concept of having the government set broad national
emission standards, but having flexibility to achieve the goals has
been used in the U.S. For example, the trading of emission
DRAFT
2
reduction credits has been used as a means of achieving real
emission reductions of lead in an economically efficient manner.
Further, under the proposed Clean Air Act Amendments, a national
SO2 emission target has been identified and each utility company
has the choice of achieving SO2 reductions by either directly
reducing emissions at its own facilities or by purchasing
allowances from another company, whichever is more economical.
The application of such a concept, while never attempted on a
cross-pollutant or global scale, would enable each country to
achieve emission targets using a least cost approach.
Advantages of the Proposed Approach:
The proposed approach has the following benefits:
It would encourage economically efficient approaches
within countries and possibly among countries. This is
especially important for developing countries that are
constrained economically.
By addressing greenhouse gases collectively, it would
reduce the number of separate protocols, thereby
accelerating comprehensive international action.
It may serve to facilitate the process of developing a
convention even though uncertainties remain over the
economic impacts of a protocol. Trading could act as a
safety valve, if it turned out that reductions within a
country were more expensive than anticipated.
It provides flexibility to each country to manage
emissions in a manner consistent with its own social and
political needs. It allows tradeoffs between sources and
sinks, to the extent feasible.
It provides incentives to develop and use cost-effective,
energy-efficient industrial and consumer products,
emission control technologies, reforestation and
agricultural practices.
It may especially benefit developing countries where low
cost emission reductions may be possible and where there
is the greatest need for economic support.
Issues to be Addressed:
In developing a convention/protocol (8) along the lines
suggested, the following factors would need to be considered:
o
Defining an appropriate Global Warming Potential index.
Initial consideration should be given to including at a
minimum CO2, CH., and CO. Also, the approach should allow
and the choice of an appropriate
discount rate to be used in aggregating
DRAFT
the greenhouse potential of gases with
varying 3atmospheric lifetmes
other gases to be added at a later date as new scientific
information is developed. The issues of whether CFCs
should be included must be addressed.
Establishing global and equitable national targets in
terms of the index. This will require estimating each
country's emissions by major gas for a baseline year. It
will also require careful consideration of when the
treaty should enter into force and the need for interim
objectives. Each country would be free to allocate
current and future emissions in any manner.
Evaluating whether and how credits should be given to
national governments for actions taken prior to when the
convention enters into force, e.g., nuclear power,
reforestation, CFC reductions and others.
Evaluating alternative administrative, implementation,
and enforcement mechanisms, including possibly a system
of international emissions trading. International
emissions trading could leave the primary burden for
arranging trades to the private sector, but national
governments will have to provide guidance, monitoring and
enforcement. In addition, an international tracking
system will be needed to record data and assess trends
as a complement to current UN efforts to compile fuel use
and other data.
Assessing the special needs of developing countries
including their specific technological needs, financial
requirements and the most appropriate manner for them to
participate in such a convention.
Evaluating the interrelationship of other complementary
global initiatives such as the call to reforest 12
million hectares of forest land per year.
Evaluating how to determine credits for sinks, such as
reforestation and agricultural practices.
SENT BY:DAAB LANDS
ATTACHMENT B
Convention on Global Climate Change
The Parties to this Convention,
Recognising that anthropogenically-induced increased
concentrations of the so-called "greenhouse gases' in the
atmosphere may lead to global warming and other changes in the
global climate,
Recognizing further that such changes in the global
climate could result in significant adverse environmental and
socio-economic inpacts,
Recognising that such potential adverse impacts are a
common concern of mankind,
Recognising the interrelationship among all the greenhouse
gases, their sources and sinks, and the consequent utility of
addressing them collectively,
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and in
particular Principle 21, which provides that "states have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction",
that could result
Recognising the right of mankind to live in a viable
global environment and the desirability of avoiding adverse
impacts on that environment anthropogenically-
induced global climate change, for the benefit of present and
future generations,
Recalling the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), which was Jointly established by the
world Metecrological Organization and the United Nations
Invironment Programme,
Recalling further UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 of
6 December 1988 on global climate change,
Taking into account the circumstances and particular
requirements of the developing countries,
Recalling the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Rewgnizing also that continued economic growth serves the
vital interests of present and future generations,
2
Supportive of the vital contributions rade by the world
Meteorological Organisation, the United Nations Environment
Programme, the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission, and other organizations involved in the study of
climate change,
Conscious of the need to support and ensure coordination
with the international studies of global processes being
conducted with the International Geosphere Biosphere Program of
the International Council of Scientific Unions,
Aware of the need for further research and systematic
monitoring to develop scientific knowledge about the global
climate and possible adverse environmental impacts resulting
from its modification,
Aware also of the need for further study of the social and
economic impacts of global climate change,
Mindful of precautionary measures that have already been
taken at the national, regional, and international levels,
Noting the need to develop further stratogies to limit and
adapt to potential global climate change,
Aware that measures to limit or adapt 10 potential global
climate change will be more effective if based on international
cooperation and action,
Aware further that such measures should be based on
relevant scientific and technical considerations, and should be
as equitable and economically efficient and effective as
possible,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
and of measures
that might be used
Article 1
Definitions
to address it,
For purposes of this Convention:
1. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates,
Parties to this Convention.
2. "Protocols" means protocola to this Convention.
3. "Global climate" means
1. "Adverse impacts" means
5. "Greenhouse gases' means
6. "Not emissions" means
3
7. "Clobal warming potential index" means
1. "Sources" means
9. "Binks" means
10. "Regional economic integration organization" means an
which has competence in respect of matters governed by this
organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region
Convention or its protocola and has been duly authorized, in
accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify,
accept, approve 0: accede to the instruments concerned.
Article 3
General Obligations
1. The objective of this Convention is to provide the
scientific, environmental, technical, and economic bases for
effective strategies aimed at addressing the potential
developing and implementing, " appropriate, realistic and
modification of the global climate caused by man-induced
emissions of greenhouse gases and the potential adverse
therefrom. environmental and socio-economic impacts that could result
2. To this end, the Parties shall, in accordance with the
means at their disposal and their capabilities:
and information exchange in order to botter understand research, and
(a) cooperate by means of systematic monitoring,
climate and the potential adverse environmentalland
assess the effects of human activities on the global
global climate
soolo economi impacts resulting from modification of the
NOTE
em SSLMS name
(b) cooperate, individually, Jointly, and/or through
competent international bodies, in promoting public
no socio-ecor
awareness ogin of the potential adverse environmental
impact (r. are
impacts of emissions of greenhouse gases;
or themselves
limit or adapt to potential global climate change,
technical, and economic assessments, possible measures to
(c) consider, on the basis of scientific, environmental,
limit or acapt to potential global climate change,
(d) cooperate in the formulation of agreed measures to
(e) endeavor to take steps that would have the effect
justified limiting potential on other grounds, global climate change that are already of
(f) encourage the development and transfer of relevant
assistance; technologies, as well as the provision of technical
(c') Consider the likely effect of these measures on prospects
for economic growth
4
(g) develop national net emissions inventories and
and strategies for addressing potential global climate change:
(h) cooperate with competent international bodies to
implement effectively the objectives of this Convention.
Article 3
Research and Systematic Monitoring
1. The Parties undertake, " appropriate, to cooperate in,
directly and/or through competent international bodies, the
conduct of research into and/or development of:
(a) the physical and chemical processes that may affect
the global climate,
(b) activities, substances, practices, and processes that
could modify the global climate,
(c) instrumentation and other techniques for monitoring
and measuring emission rates of greenhouse gases;
(d) improved models for a better understanding of the
effects of greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate,
(a) the environmental and socio-economic impacts that
could result from modification in the global climate,
A
(f) alternative substances and technologies,
socia economic impact
(g) the coopenia appears of various means of addressing
the potential modification of the global climate;
and as further elaborated in Annex 1.
2. The Parties undertake to promote or establish, as
appropriate, directly and/or through competent international
bodies and taking fully into account national legislation and
relevant ongoing activities at the national, regional, and
international levels, goint or complementary programmes for
systematic monitoring of the global climate, as elaborated in
Annex I.
3. The Parties undertake to cooperate, directly and/or through
competent international bodies, in ensuring the collection,
validation and transmission of research and chservational data
fashion. through appropriate world data centers in & regular and timely
Article 4
Exchange of Information
1, The Parties shall facilitate and encourage the exchange of
scientific, technical, socio-economic, economic, commercial and
legal information relevant to this Convention, as further
elaborated in Annex II. such information shall be supplied to
bodies agreed upon by the Parties, Any such body receiving
information regarded as confidential by the supplying party
shall ensure that such information 18 not disclosed and shall
aggregate it to protect its confidentiality before It 18 made
available to all Parties.
2. In addition, the Parties shall, through a body agreed upon
by the Parties, exchange information on the national emissions
inventories and strategies referred to in Article 6.
Article 5
Public Awareness
international bodies, shall cooperate in promoting public
The parties, individually, jointly or through competent
adverse impacts of global climate change, as well as practices
awareness and common understanding of the causes and potential
climate change.
that would have the effect of limiting or adapting to global
Article 6
National Not Emissions Inventories and Strategies
The Parties shall, by
, develop inventories of
for sources and sinks of all greenhouse gases and strategies
Article 7
Response Measures
1, The Parties, acting through the Conference of the
Parties established under Article 9, shall develop, as soon as
The protocol shall treat all adequately scientifically
possible, a protocol containing specific response measures,
understood greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks,
through national performance targets, The protocol shall
comprehensively to control net emissions of greenhouse gases
potential index", The Parties shall develop equitable and
employ the concepts of "not emissions" and a "global Warming
economically efficient and effective implementation mechanisma,
including a system of international emissions trading,
SENT 0400 DATE
2. The parties, in developing the protocol called for in
paragraph 1, shall, inter alia,
(a) define an appropriate global warming potential index,
(b) establish global and national greenhouse gas not
emissions targets in terms of both the global warming
potential index and factors such as population and GDP,
mechanisms, (c) evaluate alternative administrative and enforcement
(d) assess the special needs of developing countries,
including their specific technological and financial needs
and the zost appropriate manner in which they should
participate in the protocol, and
(e) evaluate the relationship between the protocol and
other complementary global initiatives related to climate
change such as reforestation targets.
3. The protocol called for under paragraph I shall be
based, inter alia, on the Parties' assessment of the available
with respect to:
scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information
a) the potential effect of anthropogenically-induced
greenhouse qas emissions on the global climate;
of global clinate change.
b) the potential environmental and socio-economic impacts
the production and consumption of osone-depleting substances
4. The Parties agree that agreed measures with respect to
will be implemented within the framswork of the 1985 Vienna
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
5. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect
either the right of a Party to adopt, in accordance with
international law, domestic measures relevant to modification
Party, provided that these measures are not incompatible with
of the global climate or domestic measures already taken by a
its obligations under this Convention.
Article 5
Technology Development and Transfer
[elaborate Article 2(2)(2)] (2)]
c) the potential socio-economic impacts of targets that
might be adopTed
TRANSMISSION REPORT
TTI NO.
202786421
DATE AND TIME
12.19.89 07:41 PM
DURATION
08:08
MODE
PAGE
11
RESULT
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Francin This (for went Haward) through
BUSH LIBRARY COPY - PRESERVATION
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Date:
12/19/89
Please deliver to:
Richard Stewart
FAX number of addressee: 786-4215
Telephone number of addressee:
From:
R Schmalensee, CEA
FAX number of sender:
395-6947
Telephone number of sender:
Number of pages, including cover sheet: 11
_@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
DS
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL
December 7, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN YALE
FROM:
DICK SCHMALENSEE
Chil
SUBJECT:
Today's Reforestation Paper
While this version is better in many respect from the last
one, I still have problems:
In the first line of the last paragraph on page 1, "of"
should be "to". The second sentence would be clearer as,
"Plausible unilateral U.S. actions to reduce CO2 emissions,
including the reforestation options presented here, will
have negligible effects on the global environment." The
third line from the bottom in this paragraph should become
"emissions to 80 percent of 1987 levels by 1995 and to 50
percent by 2002 "
I can't figure out what purpose is served by the second
paragraph under Current Reforestation Activities. The first
paragraph implies that we now carry about 1,000 trees per
acre, while the second suggests a steady-state value of 100.
I can't offhand see how this detail will help DPC principals
understand what's going on here; I, at least, was only
confused by it.
The second sentence in the second complete paragraph on page
4 is somewhat misleading. The act of planting may be less
expensive on agricultural land, but the net cost of
reforesting such land may be higher because its value in
other uses (the rental rate that is its opportunity cost) is
higher.
Unless and until somebody shows me that somebody at CEA has
participated in a meaningful way in the analytical work
underlying this document or gives us a chance to review that
work in detail, I strongly object to CEA's being listed at
the bottom of page 4. We have not reviewed and do not in
any way endorse the estimates presented here. (See the next
two points.) I wonder if DOT was any more involved than we
were.
I remain very skeptical of the CO2 reductions claimed for
these options. I have only been able to obtain the Forest
Service analysis underlying the estimates for the (now-
excluded) community trees/volunteer program, and that
2
analysis is badly flawed. If the other work is as bad as
what I have seen, the CO2 reduction estimates presented here
are extremely unreliable. They should be closely reviewed
by somebody outside the Forest Service, and, if controversy
remains, ranges should be presented instead of point
estimates -- as was done for Clean Air.
To repeat a point I made in my earlier memo, large
subsidized tree planting programs like Options 1-3 will tend
to depress future timber prices. This, in turn, will tend
to reduce planting by forestry firms. Absent some sort of
comprehensive regulatory program to control planting and
removal everywhere, there is absolutely no reason to suspect
that the net effects of these options will be even close to
the effects presented here. Given what I have seen, I would
be stunned if the Forest Service analysis takes these
important depressing effects on non-subsidized planting into
account. I also note that this point appeared as a con
under only one option in the earlier edition; now it appears
nowhere even though it now applies to all options.
Since the environmental effects of all these options are
trivial, I fail to see why the volunteer program was dropped
as a separate option because "it would be too small a
program by itself to have substantial effect on CO2
reduction." (Note that an "a" is missing from this
sentence.) Surely the DPC should decide whether we need an
expensive, large reforestation program that has a
substantial effect on US emissions but no effect on global
change.
with
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
seric
Working Group on Global Change
Task Force on Economic Costs
Charge
Attendees from Monday, November 27, 1989 Meeting
Tork
NAME
AGENCY
PHONE/FAX
Bruce Bartlett
Dept of Treasury
566-2768/786-8452
For
Barbara Claffey
CEA
395-3114/395-6947
Keith Collins
USDA
447-5955/475-4915
Robert Corell
NSF and CES
357-9715/357-9629
Alexander Cristofaro
EPA
382-5490/252-0275
Alan Dunn
Dept of Commerce
377-0614/377-8836
Howard Gruenspecht
CEA
395-6982/395-6947
Michael Hall
Dept of Commerce
443-8415/443-5167
Jeffrey Holmstead
WH/Ofc of Counsel 456-7803/456-7929
John Houghton
OSTP
395-3902/395-3719
Mark Kerrigan
Dept of Energy
586-4159/586-5313
Leo Mayer
USDA
447-6185/475-4915
Nancy Maynard
OSTP
395-3902/395-3719
Barry McBee
White House/OCA
456-6437/456-2223
William Nitze
Dept of State
647-2232/647-0774
Daniel Reifsnyder
Dept of State
647-4069/647-5947
Paul Roellig
White House/OPD
456-7988/456-7739
Daniel Rosenthal
Dept of Interior
343-2563/343-4867
Morton Schnabel
Dept of Commerce
377-3753/377-0432
John Schrote
Dept of Interior
343-4123/343-3561
2
William Sprigg
Dept of Commerce 443-8646/377-0432
Michael Springer
Dept of Treasury 343-0275/786-8452
Raymond Squitieri
Dept of Treasury 566-6918/786-8452
Robert Watson
NASA
453-1681/755-2552
Edward Williams
DOE
586-2061/586-5313