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472802454
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Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [2]
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472802454
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document
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Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [2]
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CF00554-002
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Andrew Card Subject Files
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472802454
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1991-11-08
month
11
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1991
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6
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1991-11-06
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11
year
1991
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0142-F; 2025-0373-S
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Card, Andrew, Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
OA/ID Number:
CF00554/1
Folder ID Number:
CF00554-002
Folder Title:
Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
22
2
5
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
1. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.)
11/91
P-1,F-1,"C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
2. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
3. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
4. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
5. Paper
Issues for NATO Summit (3 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C",
P-5
6. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
7. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "S"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
8. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
9. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
10. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
11. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
Page 1 of 2
COLLECTION
Bush Presidential Records
Chief of Staff
Andrew Card Files
FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00554]
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the
[(a)(4) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the
PRA]
FOIA]
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
[(b)(8) of the FOIA]
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA]
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
12. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "S"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
13. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
14. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
15. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
16. Talking
Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
17. Scene-
Meeting with Prime Minister Major (3 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C",
setter
P-5
18. Talking
Points to be made RE: meeting with Prime Minister Major (7 pp.)
11/91
P-1, F-1, "C"
points
(SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)
19. Profile
Political profile (1 p.)
10/29/91
P-1, F-1, "S",
P-5
Page 2 of 2
COLLECTION
Bush Presidential Records
Chief of Staff
Andrew Card Files
FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00554]
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the
[(a)(4) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
FOIA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the
PRA]
FOIA]
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
[(b)(8) of the FOIA]
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA]
Agency Referral/Mandatory Review
Disposition Sheet
(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)
This document sheet records the disposition of all actions in response to agency referral and/or mandatory review
requests. Full citations for each record are listed on the preceding withdrawal sheets and correspond to the
document numbers listed below.
DOCUMENT ACTION TAKEN
DATE OF
RECLASSIFICATION
CASE NO.
NO.
ACTION
01
Document Released in Part
12/23/98
98-0142-F
02
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
03
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
04
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
06
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
07
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
08
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
09
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
10
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
11
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
12
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
13
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
14
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
15
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
16
Document Released in Full
12/23/98
98-0142-F
18
Document Released in Part
12/23/98
98-0142-F
COLLECTION
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Card, Andrew, Files
FILE LOCATION
Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5]
OA/ID NO. CF00554
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTION INITIATIVE AND SOVIET RESPONSE
-- Our initiative, and the Soviet's positive reply, are proof
that a new era has dawned in the U.S. -Soviet military
relationship.
-- The most dangerous weapons of the Cold War, nuclear forces,
will now be subject to dramatic, rapid, and truly
cooperative reductions.
-- The Soviet peoples' historic choice of democracy in August
has opened new options for securing a lasting peace between
East and West.
-- We can now conceive a new, truly cooperative approach to
security -- one based on mutual confidence.
-- Many of the proposed reductions in our nuclear forces, and
the decision to make them unilaterally, were unthinkable
only months ago.
-- Perhaps the most striking new development is the U.S. and
Soviet decisions to destroy, on a global basis, all their
nuclear weapons for ground-launched short-range missiles and
artillery.
-- The U.S. initiative reflects not only vastly improved
political relations, but a recognition of a fundamental
change in the Soviet military posture as well.
-- We are gratified that the Soviet Union has elected to take
comparable steps.
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 4/24/24
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
2
--
While we implement these measures, we must move on to reach
agreement on the other elements of our proposal, including
the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.
-- We believe future reductions should focus on those systems
that are most destabilizing.
-- The Soviets have proposed a different approach -- focussed
on numerical reductions of strategic systems to 50% below
START levels.
-- Despite these conceptual differences, both sides have
fundamentally compatible objectives and agree that
effective, secure deterrence can be maintained at still
lower levels of strategic forces.
-- Our recent discussions in Moscow showed a new openness in
discussing the two sides' future force structures that was
not present even during the START negotiations.
--
We are pleased that the Soviets have agreed to address our
proposal for limited defenses against limited ballistic
missile threats. We believe that ballistic missile defenses
can play an important role in securing the peace.
-- We will continue to pursue this and other important subjects
such as nuclear weapons safety with the Soviets.
(If Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons (ADNW) are raised:
-- As I said in my address September 27, an effective
air-delivered nuclear deterrent is essential to NATO's
security.
-- The precise configuration of that force is a matter for
discussion and agreement among the allies concerned.
CONFIDENTIAL
3
--
I can say that it is important that nuclear responsibilities
continue to be shared among basing countries and that no
ally be required to bear unique burdens in relation to
NATO'S nuclear deterrent.
-- The Soviet proposal for central storage sites for ADNW is
interesting, and we are studying it.
-
It is noteworthy that the Soviets did not call for the
removal of U.S. ADNW from Europe.)
(If Verification or Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are
raised:
-- The measures which we have announced as unilateral are just
that -- we do not envisage verification mechanisms or CBMs
that in the past have been part of negotiated arms control
agreements in the past.
-- We are open to steps to increase the transparency of our
implementation of these measures -- for example, we will
release to the public information about withdrawals and
eliminations.
-- We also believe previously agreed confidence-building and
transparency measures may help provide further insight into
developments.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
Release
part
NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTION INITIATIVE AND SOVIET RESPONSE B/,
-- Our initiative, and the Soviet's positive reply, are proof
that a new era has dawned in the U.S.-Soviet military
relationship.
-- The most dangerous weapons of the Cold War, nuclear forces,
will now be subject to dramatic, rapid, and truly
cooperative reductions.
--
The Soviet peoples' historic choice of democracy in August
has opened new options for securing a lasting peace between
East and West.
-- We can now conceive a new, truly cooperative approach to
security -- one based on mutual confidence.
-- Many of the proposed reductions in our nuclear forces, and
the decision to make them unilaterally, were unthinkable
only months ago.
--
Perhaps the most striking new development is the U.S. and
Soviet decisions to destroy, on a global basis, all their
nuclear weapons for ground-launched short-range missiles and
artillery.
-- The U.S. initiative reflects not only vastly improved
political relations, but a recognition of a fundamental
change in the Soviet military posture as well.
-- We are gratified that the Soviet Union has elected to take
comparable steps.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958
Case No.98-0142-F
CONFIDENTIAL
JGP, 5/20/99
Declassify on: OADR
DP
2
--
While we implement these measures, we must move on to reach
agreement on the other elements of our proposal, including
the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.
--
We believe future reductions should focus on those systems
that are most destabilizing.
-- The Soviets have proposed a different approach -- focussed
on numerical reductions of strategic systems to 50% below
START levels.
--
Despite these conceptual differences, both sides have
fundamentally compatible objectives and agree that
effective, secure deterrence can be maintained at still
lower levels of strategic forces.
-- Our recent discussions in Moscow showed a new openness in
discussing the two sides' future force structures that was
not present even during the START negotiations.
-- We are pleased that the Soviets have agreed to address our
proposal for limited defenses against limited ballistic
missile threats. We believe that ballistic missile defenses
can play an important role in securing the peace.
-- We will continue to pursue this and other important subjects
such as nuclear weapons safety with the Soviets.
(If Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons (ADNW) are raised:
-- As I said in my address September 27, an effective
air-delivered nuclear deterrent is essential to NATO's
security.
-- The precise configuration of that force is a matter for
discussion and agreement among the allies concerned.
CONFIDENTIAL
3
I can say that it is important that nuclear responsibilities
continue to be shared among basing countries and that no
ally be required to bear unique burdens in relation to
NATO'S nuclear deterrent.
B/
1.5(d)
(If Verification or Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are
raised:
-- The measures which we have announced as unilateral are just
that -- we do not envisage verification mechanisms or CBMs
that in the past have been part of negotiated arms control
agreements in the past.
-- We are open to steps to increase the transparency of our
implementation of these measures -- for example, we will
release to the public information about withdrawals and
eliminations.
-- We also believe previously agreed confidence-building and
transparency measures may help provide further insight into
developments.)
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
NATO LIAISON WITH THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS
-- NATO's liaison program has helped promote the fundamental
political and security goals of the Alliance.
-- Expanding the program through concrete initiatives will help
respond to Eastern security concerns and promote positive
change in the East.
-- We've been very pleased with the success of NATO's liaison
program.
-- Through dialogue, the Alliance has influenced Soviet and
East European thinking on a range of security issues.
-- By sharing our technical expertise, we've helped those
countries begin resolving problems that can affect European
stability as a whole.
-- But there is room to expand the program, and the Soviets and
East Europeans have made it clear that they would welcome
such an expansion.
-- Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jim Baker recently put forth a
set of solid initiatives to do so.
-- These initiatives are practical, are timely, and demonstrate
that NATO can play a vital role in helping liaison states to
determine military capabilities proportionate to legitimate
defense needs, develop democratic systems, and balance
market economies.
-- They would also help regularize the liaison process without
giving the liaison states a voice in NATO decision making.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CONFIDENTIAL
case No. 98-0142-F
Declassify on: OADR
JGP, 5/25/99
CONFIDENTIAL
2
--
And they are crafted to complement efforts in the CSCE and
other fora to develop arrangements for cooperative security
to meet the needs of the newly emerging democracies.
--
The Soviets and East Europeans have indicated their support
for those initiatives.
-- I hope this summit will agree to adopt them.
(If liaison with Soviet republics is raised:
-- The evolving relationship between the center and the
republics is highly sensitive, and this is not the time to
begin a liaison relationship with the republics.
-- But it is important that we keep the liaison program
flexible and be prepared to respond to new circumstances. )
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)
-- I'm very pleased to see how successfully CSCE has developed
since our summit last November in Paris. The results of the
Moscow human rights meeting show that CSCE remains vital to
the realization of a truly democratic Euro-Atlantic
community.
-- I look at CSCE as one of the cornerstones of the new Europe.
Its values and principles form the basis of our vision for a
democratic, economically prosperous, and secure Europe in
the coming months and years.
-- As we move toward the Helsinki meeting, NATO's role will be
critical. Concerted NATO action to focus CSCE's
institution-building can have dramatic effects, as we saw
last year.
-- We want to strengthen the CSCE's role in conflict prevention
and dispute settlement. We should also preserve CSCE's
traditional role in advancing principles and values among
all its members.
--
We've suggested a series of proposals for specific CSCE
steps which we urge NATO to endorse. They would help to
focus the work of the CSCE Council of Ministers and the coso
as they consider ways to strengthen CSCE.
-- We think NATO should propose amending the consensus rule,
but only in cases of gross and uncorrected violations of
CSCE rules.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
case No.98-0142-F
CONFIDENTIAL
JGP, 5/25/99
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL,
2
--
As we work to finalize the structure of post-Helsinki
security talks, we must make every effort to maintain
Alliance solidarity.
-- We should also not hesitate to strengthen NATO's ties to
CSCE, including by establishing a formal liaison.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONE IDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
POST-HELSINKI SECURITY TALKS (SF-38)
-- We continue to regard NATO as the forum for Allied
consultation on policies bearing on the security and defense
commitments of its members.
-- We are pleased with the depth of NATO preparations conducted
to date to establish a common position on the post-Helsinki
Security Forum.
-- We would like to see this process intensify SO that a common
Alliance position will be ready for Helsinki.
If Allies raise the need for more arms reductions and limits:
-- The need to implement the CFE Treaty and NATO's strategy
review, as well as the need to analyze the emerging
situation in the former Soviet Union, all argue for a pause
for reflection before seeking further reductions.
-- But, there is much for the Alliance to do in the SF-38
forum. We need to deepen and expand our security dialogue,
expand conflict prevention mechanisms and measures, and
tackle global security issues such as restraints on arms
transfers.)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
5
LISTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
POINTS TO BE MADE
PER E.O. 12958
NATO STRATEGY REVIEW
case No. 78-0142-F
JG P, 5/25/99
-- NATO is a strong and vital alliance that is adapting to the
changing security situation in Europe and the world.
-- The Alliance is bound together by shared values and
interests, as well as by common security challenges.
-- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" outlines a vision for
NATO that is flexible and robust and that confirms the
Alliance's central role in European security and stability.
- - The dramatic events of the last two years have moved Europe
beyond confrontation into a much more promising era, opening
up a second chapter in the alliance.
-- But the end of the Cold War has not meant an end to
uncertainty and risk. It will be difficult to solidify
democracy and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and to
nurture its development in the Soviet Union.
-- In the complex situation now developing, NATO provides the
certainty and confidence of a democratically based,
integrated military power and structure.
-- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" focuses on this
reality, and adds "cooperation" with all states in Europe --
including our former adversaries -- to NATO's traditional
dual approach of "dialogue" and "collective defense
capability."
-- The new strategy recognizes NATO's increasing role in
contributing to stability and crisis management, even as it
emphasizes NATO's core security functions with an integrated
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
SONFIDENTIAL
2
military structure and appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional weapons.
-- The positive changes in Europe allow all of us the
opportunity to reduce the size and readiness of some of our
forces. Those remaining will be more flexible and capable
than ever before; they will be deployed closer to home when
possible; and many will be assigned to multi-national
formations, including rapid reaction units.
--
The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" re-affirms the
defensive nature of the Alliance, the resolve of NATO
members to defend themselves, and NATO's importance as the
fundamental link between the security of Europe and North
America.
(If the issue of out-of-area use of NATO forces is raised:
-- NATO has always had an important role during crises outside
its territory that could affect the security of its members.
We did not need a NATO flag hoisted prominently during the
Gulf crisis to appreciate how crucial NATO patterns of
cooperation were to ensure our success. NATO logistics and
planning, developed and maintained during peacetime, were
vital to success in ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.)
(If NATO's continued central role in Europe is questioned, in
view of the recent Franco-German security proposal:
--
The recent Italian-British and French-German proposals and
the Baker-Genscher statement of October 2 have contributed
to discussions of European security.
--
In our view, these ideas go to the issue of partnership with
our allies, and cooperation with our former adversaries.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
(If the continued role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO is
questioned:
--
The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" notes the continued
deterrent role of NATO nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.
I specifically noted the importance of these systems in my
September 27 nuclear reduction initiative.
-- On the issue of partnership, we do not see NATO and a
European Security Identity competing with one another. In
defense of its members there is no substitute for the
Atlantic Alliance.
-- At the same time, NATO does not and need not have to get out
in front on every potential security problem. This would be
impractical and unnecessary. It is important, however, that
NATO remain the venue where consultations are held and
decisions are made on policies affecting the security of its
members.)
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE
YUGOSLAVIA
NATO'S ROLE
-- We all agreed that NATO should not involve itself publicly
on the Yugoslav crisis. We consulted but took no steps that
might undermine EC-led efforts under CSCE mandate.
-- A statement now will be useful -- in support of the EC's
efforts, adding NATO's voice to those of the CSCE and UN.
-- If it comes to serious consideration of a peacekeeping
force, NATO should consult.
-- Even under optimum conditions in Yugoslavia, such an
operation would be complex and dangerous.
-- Neighboring states, including NATO members, could be
affected directly. All of us would be affected indirectly.
EC-LED EFFORTS
--
We strongly support the EC's efforts and the principles they
have laid down for the negotiations: consensus, guarantees
for minority rights, and no border changes by force.
-- If the talks break down, we should step up the pressure on
all parties to get back to the bargaining table.
-- Recognition of Slovenia or Croatia without an agreement
would escalate the violence and undermine negotiations.
-- We should continue close consultations SO that we can stay
in step on possible sanctions, peacekeeping, and the
question of recognition.
-- Is there anything more the U.S. or the Alliance could be
doing now to support the EC's efforts?
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
JGP, 5/25/99
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF)
-- NATO's strategy for deterring aggression has worked, and
pared to the appropriate level, our nuclear deterrent will
continue to serve vital transatlantic interests.
-- The U.S. nuclear reductions initiative has met in full the
Alliance's core arms control objectives as set forth in the
London Declaration of July 1990.
-- The security of the United States remains linked with that
of Europe. To provide the necessary insurance against
future uncertainties, U.S. air-delivered nuclear weapons
will remain in Europe as part of NATO's posture of minimum
deterrence.
--
NATO's strategy of deterrence has worked.
-- For 40 years NATO has deterred possible Soviet aggression
with balanced deployments of nuclear and conventional
forces.
-- The London Declaration of July 1990 reflected NATO's
conclusion that changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union meant far fewer NATO nuclear weapons were needed.
-- That same month, the North Atlantic Council directed the
Special Consultative Group to discuss ways to achieve these
reductions. The SCG met seven times through October 1991.
-- It has become clear over the past two years or SO that a
Soviet invasion of Europe, with little or no warning, is
impossible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CONFIDENTIAL
Case No.518-0142-F
Declassify on: OADR
JGP, 5/25/99
CONFIDENTIAL
2
--
The events of the failed coup in August confirmed this
judgment.
-- These events reinforced the approach which the SCG was
already considering. The new circumstances called for bold
action.
- - The SCG's deliberations played a significant role in
formulating our initiative.
-
The initiative I announced on September 27 has achieved
what it would have taken years to negotiate:
commitments to destroy every short-range
ground-launched nuclear warhead owned by the United
States and the Soviet Union.
-- This initiative is a revolutionary alternative to
traditional arms control: complex, protracted negotiations
in an atmosphere of distrust are superseded by mutual
commitments to rapid, cooperative and stabilizing
reductions.
-- President Gorbachev has since answered my challenge for
comparable Soviet moves by agreeing to destroy all Soviet
ground-launched SNF warheads.
-- As a result, by the mid-90s NATO will move to a posture
deterrence, which relies on a dramatically reduced level of
air-delivered nuclear weapons.
-- Retaining these weapons will insure against the
uncertainties of the future, and signal the continuation of
the historic linkage between the security of the United
States and its NATO allies.
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--
I am pleased to see that the SCG "Report to the Heads of
State and Government" states that the initiative meets the
Alliance's SNF arms control commitment established in the
London Declaration of July 1990.
--
It is with great pleasure that I present this report to you
as a symbol of the enormous success and continued importance
of this Alliance, both in its effective and productive
consultations, and, most importantly, in protecting peace
and freedom in Europe.
(If air-delivered nuclear weapons (ADNW) are raised:
-- We are continuing to study Mr. Gorbachev's proposal to
remove air-delivered nuclear weapons from operational status
and place them in central storage.
-- The configuration of NATO's nuclear structure is a subject
for concerned Allies to discuss and agree upon.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
START
-- Prompt START ratification remains essential to lock in
Soviet reductions and verification provisions.
-
Your recent nuclear initiative builds on START and
assumes it will be ratified and implemented by both
sides.
-- Despite recent political changes in the Soviet Union, START
implementation is moving forward.
-- Prompt ratification of START by both parties is essential.
-
Our nuclear initiative goes beyond START, but is
premised on START ratification by both sides.
-- We have no reason to doubt Soviet assurances that central
authorities have always kept, and continue to keep, control
over strategic nuclear weapons.
-- The role of the republics in Soviet security policy is an
internal matter. However, we believe it is critical that
the command and control of Soviet strategic nuclear forces
remain under a single unified command.
-
We do not want changes in the Soviet Union to result in
the emergence of new nuclear powers in the area.
-
We have taken every opportunity to make this clear to
Soviet leaders, both those from the center and the
republics.
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(If asked why the Administration has not yet submitted the START
treaty to the Senate:
-- We are preparing the documentation and analysis that will be
submitted to the Senate along with the Treaty. Our goal is
to submit START before the Senate adjourns this year.
-- We encourage the Soviets to move forward quickly to ratify
START.)
(If asked about Soviet ratification of START:
-- The specifics of their ratification process are for the
Soviets to work out.
-- However, the ongoing transformation in the Soviet Union is
not a reason to delay Senate ratification.
-- It is in our interest to put in place as soon as possible
START's reductions, limitations and openness measures no
matter what the outcome of the political changes in the
USSR.
-- The START implementation process is underway. The sides are
carrying out early exhibitions and other preliminary tasks
required prior to ratification.)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE
-- The CFE Treaty continues to be a cornerstone of future
security and stability in Europe. All CFE signatories
should ratify as quickly as possible.
-- A key issue in CFE ratification is the status of the Baltic
States and other potentially independent republics.
-
The independent Baltic States are not CFE participants.
-
The Soviets have agreed that their equipment in the
Baltics continues to count under the Treaty.
-- The CFE 1A follow-on negotiation limiting manpower of the 22
participants is scheduled to conclude by March 1992.
-- A ratified CFE Treaty will introduce an element of stability
into a rapidly shifting European security scene.
-
We urge CFE signatories to ratify the treaty before
November 19 and certainly no later than year-end. We
are working with our Senate on speedy ratification.
-- We sent a high-level briefing delegation to the Baltics,
which was well received. We will now need to work with the
Baltic States to permit inspection of Soviet forces on
Baltic territory.
-- The U.S. is fully prepared to conclude manpower limitation
talks in Vienna by March 1992.
(If asked about the pace of U.S. ratification:
-- The legally binding commitment by the Soviet Union regarding
TLE located in the Baltic States is helpful in addressing
concerns in the U.S. Senate.
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--
The Senate has a heavy fall agenda and remains concerned
about the impact of events in the Soviet Union. We continue
to work intensively with our legislators to secure rapid
ratification. )
(If asked about Ukrainian independence:
--
It is our view that it will be necessary for Ukraine to
participate in CFE if it opts out of the new union and
retains significant amounts of treaty-limited equipment
(TLE) .)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMs)
-- We have made good progress in implementing the CSBMs
endorsed at the Paris summit. These secured most of NATO's
goals in the area of CSBMs.
-- We hope to have an additional package of measures ready by
the time of the Helsinki Conference.
-- We look forward to the opening of the post-Helsinki Security
Forum where a Europe no longer divided by blocs can begin to
define its new security tasks.
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SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE
GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES (GPALS) / ABM TREATY
-- The U.S. is committed to GPALS to defend the United States,
our forward deployed forces, and our friends and Allies
against limited ballistic missile attacks.
-- The U.S. seeks to cooperate with the Soviet Union in
adapting to the changed security environment by facilitating
the deployment of ballistic missile defenses.
-- The U.S. has tabled a new proposal at the Defense and Space
Talks that could accept limits on strategic defenses, and
the Soviets have responded constructively. Prospects for
agreement are better than ever before.
-- The U.S. intends to implement GPALS in a manner that
preserves strategic stability and takes account of the
importance of maintaining the credibility of Allied nuclear
deterrent forces.
-- My decision to revise SDI's mission reflects the U.S.
perception that missile proliferation poses a growing threat
to international security and stability, and that the Soviet
threat has receded.
-- The recent experience in the Gulf War and the widespread
proliferation of ballistic missiles underscore the
importance of defenses to protect against limited missile
attacks.
-- The U.S. is committed to deploying GPALS in a manner that
preserves strategic stability. We are convinced that this
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will not threaten the credibility of Allied nuclear
deterrents.
-- We welcome President Gorbachev's willingness to discuss my
proposal to join the U.S. in taking immediate, concrete
steps to permit the deployment of limited defenses.
-- For our part, we have proposed at the Defense and Space
Talks to accept limits on strategic defenses consistent with
GPALS limited objectives.
-- We seek to cooperate with the Soviet Union in relaxing ABM
Treaty constraints that would permit the type of limited
defenses envisioned in GPALS.
-- GPALS is an integral element of a comprehensive U.S.
strategy to address the threat posed by ballistic missiles
encompassing diplomatic efforts, multilateral arms control,
export controls and regional restraint.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
NUCLEAR TESTING
-- We do not intend to undertake a moratorium on nuclear weapon
tests such as that unilaterally declared by the USSR.
-- The cuts included in my initiative will make our nuclear
deterrent smaller, safer, and more stabilizing.
-- The number of tests we conduct has been declining. But, as
long as nuclear deterrence continues to play a critical role
in our national security policy, we must test to ensure that
it remains safe and effective.
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Case No.98-0142-F
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CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE
-- Following on NATO's force modifications, the Alliance is
reorganizing its command structure as a further reflection
of NATO's adaptation to the new Europe.
-- The twin goals are to conserve resources and to give a more
European cast to NATO's structure.
-- NATO's command structure is being streamlined to reflect a
revised force structure and the changed security situation
in Europe.
-- Alliance Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers have been
working this issue and expect agreement by the December NATO
Defense Ministers meeting.
(If asked about the dispute among the UK/Norway/Denmark and
Germany over the boundary between AFNORTHWEST and AFCENT:
-- I understand that some of the remaining issues in the
command structure review are being worked out in military
channels. We look forward to seeing their recommendations.,
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CONE IDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE ON OPEN SKIES
-- Events in the Soviet Union underscore the importance of Open
Skies as a multilateral confidence building and openness
measure covering all the European states and North America,
from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
-- Unfortunately, the Open Skies negotiations have been stalled
for over a year now due to Soviet intransigence on such key
issues as territorial coverage, flight quotas, and sensor
capabilities.
-- Indications that the Soviets are now prepared to be more
forthcoming on these issues are encouraging, however, and we
are optimistic that an Open Skies treaty can be completed
before the Helsinki conference next March.
-- Our delegation to the talks which just resumed in Vienna
will be in the forefront of the Alliance's efforts to meet
this objective.
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POINTS TO BE MADE
ASSISTANCE TO THE SQVIET UNION
-- The situation in the Soviet Union represents an opportunity
unparalleled in history to help secure freedom and
democracy.
-- We will provide food and other humanitarian assistance to
ease hardship and provide support to the democrats.
-- The union and republics need to develop a credible market
reform plan with the IMF and World Bank.
-- We have encouraged mechanisms that will preserve cooperation
and cohesion among republics, such as the Treaty on Economic
Community.
-- The Europeans' reluctance to agree to debt deferral hurts
the Soviets and could prevent us from providing the food
credits the Europeans want us to provide.
-- We will help the Soviet people make it through the winter.
FOOD ASSISTANCE
-- We made available a total $2.5 billion in credit guarantees
to the USSR for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products
in 1991.
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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
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-- We have provided over $18 million worth of pharmaceuticals
and medical supplies to targeted areas in the Soviet Union
and the Baltics since February 1991.
-- We are expanding our technical assistance program and will
concentrate on food distribution, energy, defense
conversion, and democratic institution building.
CONFIDENTIAL
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2
--
We need to move quickly on Soviet debt deferral if we are to
prevent default. Hesitation by some Europeans to agree to
deferral may trigger default, which would result in a cut
off of our credit guarantee program.
-- While our immediate focus is necessarily on this winter, we
cannot forget our longer-term goals of building a democratic
society with a market economy.
-- We strongly support IMF efforts to help the union and
republics come up with credible market reform plans.
CONF IDENTIAL
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)
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POINTS TO BE MADE
to
MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
declarity 11/20/16
EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY
-- We have particular concerns about the Franco-German
initiative, but we have kept these disagreements out of the
public eye to avoid the appearance of divisive debate on the
eve of the NATO summit.
-- I have written both Francois and Helmut about our concerns.
-- In your November 1 meeting were you able to solidify
Helmut's support for a European Security Identity that
strengthens NATO?
-- In my intervention, in my meetings with Helmut and Francois,
and in public, I intend to say the following:
-
The U.S. welcomes allied efforts to take on more
responsibility.
-
Strengthening the WEU would be a step in this
direction, and it could link the alliance to the EC.
-
We have all learned that European and American security
are indivisible and that the U.S. must maintain its
responsibilities in Europe in this new era.
I
Thus, there can be no substitute for the alliance. A
European defense identity will not assume NATO
responsibilities, diminish the need for NATO, or one
day replace it. Rather, it will complement and
strengthen NATO.
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-
The U.S. and its allies consider the alliance to be the
guarantor of their security and the cornerstone of
European stability.
-- I would appreciate your support for these messages. I
intend to ask Helmut and Francois to do the same.
NATO LIAISON
-- We have worked out an effective and practical package of
proposals that responds to the changes in the East.
-- We have made it clear that this program will neither dilute
the Alliance's structures, nor compete with CSCE.
-- With the possible exception of the French, the Allies all
support the idea of expanding the liaison program. I will
take up this issue in my meeting with Francois tomorrow.
G-7 AID TO THE USSR
-- The United States has provided over $18 million worth of
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to targeted areas in
the Soviet Union since February 1991.
-
This program will be extended and expanded.
-- We have made available $2.5 billion in Commodity Credit
Corporation credit guarantees to the USSR for the purchase
of U.S. agricultural products in 1991.
-
I have sent two high-level delegations to the Soviet
Union recently to examine the food distribution system
and to assess food needs.
-- Our ability to extend food credit guarantees to the USSR
will be curtailed if the Soviets default on their debt.
-
The G-7 Deputy Finance Ministers meeting in Moscow
convinced us that the debt problem is critical.
CONE IDENTIAL
3
-
While the agreement reached will help, the credit-
worthiness problem of both the union and the republics
will not go away.
-- I ask that you weigh in with Chancellor Kohl and President
Mitterrand in an effort to secure their support for our debt
deferral arrangement.
-- This winter we will each need to work with the Soviet
central and republic governments to avert massive food
shortages. I know that you have provided food aid through
the EC and direct technical assistance through your "Know-
How Fund". I hope that you can focus your technical
assistance efforts on Soviet food distribution problems.
-- Your initiative to promote G-7 coordination on humanitarian
relief efforts will help to avoid wasteful duplication.
PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE
-- I appreciate your support for this initiative.
-- I am firmly committed to maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe as part of our transatlantic NATO commitment, and as
a reflection of the continuing link between U.S. and
European security.
-- I am committed to supporting you in the maintenance of an
independent British nuclear deterrent. We will ensure that
GPALS does not jeopardize your deterrent.
(If TASM is raised:
-- With the withdrawal of ground-launched nuclear systems from
Europe, we will all need to be unequivocal that we will
preserve an effective and up-to-date NATO air-delivered
nuclear capability in Europe.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONE IDENTIAL
4
--
However, I believe an attempt now to add further specificity
within the alliance to that commitment would not be wise.
-
It would generate political tensions among the NATO
allies which would benefit no one, and would be more
likely to foreclose future options than to protect
them.
-- We are prepared to cooperate with you on future air-delivery
options, and I can arrange to have U.S. experts meet with
your officials to discuss this at an early date.
-- We will avoid any action that would erode political support
for efforts by Britain, either alone or in collaboration
with France, to pursue whatever options seem opportune in
this area.)
(If GPALS is pressed:
-- We have discussed your concern about the potential impact of
advanced defensive systems. My proposal for steps to permit
the limited deployment of ballistic missile defenses against
limited attacks is intended to respond to a very real threat
which has become even more serious in recent months.
-- Any such steps will not undercut the credibility of existing
nuclear deterrent forces -- including yours.
-- To underscore the limited objectives of such defenses, on
October 3 the United States put forward a new position at
the Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, indicating our
willingness to negotiate a new regime that includes limits
on U.S. and Soviet defensive deployments consistent with
these limited objectives.)
(If nuclear testing is raised:
CONF IDENTIAL
5
--
We do not intend to undertake a moratorium on nuclear weapon
tests such as that unilaterally declared by the USSR.
-- The cuts included in my initiative will make our nuclear
deterrent smaller, safer, and more stabilizing.
--
The number of tests we conduct has been declining. But, as
long as nuclear deterrence continues to play a critical role
in our national security policy, we must test to ensure that
it remains safe and effective.
(If Uruguay Round is raised:
-- I was grateful that Germany renewed its efforts within the
EC Council to break the deadlock and give EC negotiators a
new mandate.
-- As I said in my letter, we are ready to bargain on all of
the four core areas we identified at our London summit --
agriculture, market access, intellectual property, and
services.
-- As you know, we are negotiating with the EC Commission on a
compromise that we hope all can accept. Do you think the
French will agree?
-- You know how crucial this is -- for the world trade system,
the LDC's the emerging democracies, and U.S. -European
relations.
-- I hope you will continue doing all you can. We have to give
a strong political push for these negotiations to succeed.
(If Vietnamese Boat People are raised:
-- We are heartened that arrival rates are down in Hong Kong
and numbers of volunteers set to return to Vietnam are up.
CONE IDENTIAL
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6
-- As I said in my message to you, we understand your case for
repatriating the double-backers. We hope that their return
will send a strong enough message to deter others and
encourage voluntary returns.
-- While we support your plans to screen newcomers first and
encourage those screened out to return home, we retain our
opposition to mandatory return and use of force for the
other screened-out asylum seekers.
-- We worry that use of forcible return could spread to the
other first asylum countries, causing collapse of the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA).
-- I hope the Cambodia settlement is a harbinger of change in
Vietnam. As we near the time when the boat people problem
could end, it is in everyone's interest to close out the
Vietnamese boat people saga with dignity.
(If arm sales to Argentina are raised:
-- After a careful review, we have decided to revise our policy
on arms sales to Argentina.
-- At home, Menem has consolidated the return to democratic
rule and reasserted civilian control over the armed forces.
In the international arena, Menem's dispatch of naval forces
to the Gulf during the war and Argentina's recent withdrawal
from the non-aligned movement are but two examples of his
efforts to more closely align Argentina with the West.
-- At the same time, we have been greatly encouraged by the
improvement in your relations with Argentina.
DENTIAL
IDENTIAL
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--
We believe it is important to reinforce Menem's efforts to
reintegrate the armed forces into the national and
international mainstream.
B1,
11.,5(d)
(If Trinidad terms are raised:
-- I understand that you are anxious to move ahead with your
Trinidad Terms proposal for the poorest nations.
-- We agreed in London to improve the terms for these
countries, and we are working on the budgetary and legal
questions which prevent our going ahead now.
-- The principle of consensus in the Paris Club has served all
creditors well.
I
We hope the UK will cooperate with us to preserve
consensus in the Paris Club on this and all issues.
-- We have no objection to your going ahead with these terms
bilaterally outside the Paris Club.
CONE IDENTIAL
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