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Global Warming 1990 (1 of 2) [3]
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F[1]
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29157
Folder ID Number:
29157-003
Folder Title:
Global Warming 1990 (1 of 2) [3]
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G
15
25
2
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
4-18-90
FOR: Gov. Sunumu
FROM:
ANDY CARD CARDAndy
Action ASAP
Your Comment
Let's Talk
FYI
I recommend that you
all and say the document
is not a WH document.
04. 18. 90 01:29 PM *SENATOR KERRY
P02
JOHN KERRY
MASSACHUSETTS
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
April 18, 1990
The Honorable John Sununu
Chief of Staff
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500
Dear John:
The attached document was delivered to me by an
individual attending the White House conference on global
warming.
Obviously, some of the document conforms with the
President's comments yesterday. Some of it however, points
out a strategy that seems very much at odds with the intent
of the global warming conference, ie: to make real progress
and develop policy options to resolve the issues associated
with global warming. Certainly at first blush this paper
presents a disturbing insight into the Administration's
position on addressing global warming.
It is possible that this document does not in fact
represent the Administration's approach to the issues under
discussion at the conference. Perhaps the document is not
itself a White House document at all. I have been told that
a number of environmental organizations and several reporters
at the conference will have this document and will soon be
contacting several of us on the hill for comment, I would
greatly appreciate it if you could telephone me on this
matter as soon as it is possible to discuss its content.
Sincerely,
United States Senator
John Jay Kerry
attachment,
04. 18. 90 01:29 PM *SENATOR KERRY
P03
DEBATES TO AVOID
* NOT BENEFICIAL TO DISCUSS
WHETHER THERE IS OR IS NOT
WARMING, OR HOW MUCH OR HOW
LITTLE WARMING. IN THE EYES OF
THE PUBLIC WE WILL LOSE THIS
DEBATE. A BETTER APPROACH IS
TO RAISE THE MANY UNCERTAINTIES
THAT NEED TO BE BETTER
UNDERSTOOD ON THIS ISSUE.
* DON'T GET INTO AN ADVOCACY
POSITION OF THE MERITS OF
VARIOUS POLICY PROPOSALS.
* DON'T LET REPORTERS POSITION
THIS CONFERENCE AS AN ATTEMPT
TO DELAY SERIOUS DECISIONS ON
THIS ISSUE.
* THIS CONFERENCE IS ACCELERATING
THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION
AND UNDERSTANDING OF THESE
ISSUES. (DON'T USE SPECIFIC
NUMBERS IE., DEGREES, DOLLARS,
RATES ETC. )
04. 18. 90 01:29 PM *SENATOR KERRY
P04
TALKING POINTS
APRIL 17, 1990
* The - U.S. is taking
environmentally responsible
actions that make sense on
their own merits that also help
deal with global change issues.
* The U.S. Conference is working
in complement to the IPCC.
* The world community is making
great strides towards
understanding the science of
global change, but many
fundamental questions remain
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
April 18, 1990
FACT SHEET
UNITED STATES INITIATIVES ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
During his first year in office, the President has advanced a
large number of initiatives to enhance the quality of the
environment. Several of these initiatives, when fully
implemented, will result in substantial reductions in future
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States -- at least 15
percent by 2000, and even more in later years. The measures are
outlined below.
Full Phase-Out of Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs)
The President has committed the United States to a worldwide
phaseout of the production and use of CFCs by the year 2000. As
a further step, the President signed into law a unilateral U.S.
fee on production of CFCs. This will reduce U.S. emissions of
CFCs below levels allowed by international protocols.
Clean Air Act
The President's proposed revisions to the Clean Air Act call for
two steps which will substantially reduce carbon dioxide
emissions:
A 10 million ton reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions
from 1980 levels; and
A cap on emissions at this sharply reduced level in
perpetuity.
These measures in combination create a powerful incentive for
energy conservation in the electric utility sector. The
President's proposal on clean air would also increase the use of
alternative fuels and includes measures to reduce carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. Both
of these initiatives will result in substantial reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions.
2
Reforestation
The President's fiscal year 1991 budget contains $175 million to
fund the first year of a multi-year program to plant one billion
trees a year across America. This program has the potential to
sequester up to 5 percent of annual U.S. carbon dioxide emissions
within 20 years.
Increased Funding for Solar and Renewable Energy and for Energy
Conservation
The President's fiscal year 1991 budget contains about $360
million for research and development activities in solar and
renewable energy and energy conservation. This represents a 75
percent increase over the amount requested in the previous year,
and an increase of about 10 percent above fiscal year 1990
enacted levels. This research will be critical to identifying
technologies which will allow us to meet our energy needs in
environmentally efficient ways.
Energy Saving Appliance Standards
The Department of Energy recently issued new appliance standards
which will result in increased energy conservation and reduced
energy demand to service affected products. These standards are
projected to reduce U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by up to one
percent by the year 2000.
The White House Conference
on
Science and Economics Research Related to Global Change
REPORT ON FIRST DAY
April 17, 1990
THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE:
The White House Conference on Science and Economics Research Related to Global
Change started with a successful and well received reception at the National
Air and Space Museum on the evening of April 16, 1990. The highlight of the
evening was the showing of several minutes of spectacular IMAX film of the
planet, taken from the space shuttle, and narrated by the shuttle commander
and photographer, Jim Weatherbee. A pre-conference luncheon for developing
countries also added to the beginning of the Conference. The reaction of many
delegates to these beginning events of the Conference seemed to be very
positive, which set a constructive tone for the formal opening on Tuesday,
April 17, 1990. Seventeen nations and the leadership of the E.C. and the OECD
sent ministerial-level delegations to the Conference ( a list of Delegates is
attached along with the Conference Agenda).
SUMMARY OF THE FIRST DAY'S ACTIVITIES
The Conference was initiated with a welcome by Secretary Brady. President Bush
then formally opened the Conference and welcomed the delegates with an address
that was well received by the visiting delegates. A number of delegations
commented on the commitment of the President and his administration to the
issues of Global Change, and on the importance of the ideas outlined in his
opening remarks, which set an important tone for the Conference. The goals and
expectations of the Conference were outlined by D. Allan Bromley, on behalf of
the Conference Co-Chairmen, which was followed by a few remarks by the head of
the Polish delegation, a Deputy Prime Minister (Speech enclosed). The
substantive issues being raised by the Conference were developed in three
Theme addresses by the three Conference Co-Chairmen, Michael J. Boskin, D.
Allan Bromley, and Michael R. Deland.
A luncheon address by William Reilly was very well received, in which he
addressed the important issues of international cooperation in the science and
economics research of Global Change and outlined a comprehensive action plan
for addressing the policy issues of Global Change
The afternoon sessions of the Conference were devoted to Working Group
discussions, focussing primarily on the first two themes of the Conference,
the research challenges of Global Changes and strategies for and challenges to
integrating economics and science research. The sessions were chaired by
visiting delegates, mostly the heads of country delegations, who each gave
Wednesday
1
April 18, 1990
6:24 am
short introductory remarks. The science and economics of Global Change were
addressed in well received presentations by U.S. scientists and economists.
These opening presentations set a positive tone which lead to constructive
dialogue. The U.S. offered two of its four proposals, both of which were well
received ( the other two proposals are scheduled to for introduction during
the first session on Wednesday, April 18 - all four proposals are enclosed).
The Working Group sessions appeared to be very well received by the delegates
providing an opportunity for discussions by many delegates on the substantive
topics of the Conference.
The expectations of visiting delegations, on arrival, appeared to range from a
complete understanding of the U.S. goals and expectations for the Conference
to suggestions that the agenda be altered to provide more opportunity to
address policy related Global Change issues. The combination of an opening
plenary session, a focussed address during lunch, and Working Group sessions
for the full afternoon seems to have set a very constructive and positive tone
for the whole Conference. The formal Conference meetings for the day appeared
to end with high expectations for continued and constructive discussions
during the Wednesday Working Group sessions. Two of the Conference goals, that
of adding a integrating focus for international thought on Global Change, the
concept of "Global Stewardship", and the introduction of a new dimension to
the international dialogue on Global Change -- the proposition that economics,
both analysis and research on broad economic policy and on economic
consequences of policy options, is an essential link between the science of
Global Change and policy alternatives, are being well received and are
contributing to good discussions.
FILE= WHC_REPT.417
Wednesday
April 18, 1990
2
6:24 an
SILCEI
NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH
P.O. Box 3000
Boulder, Colorado 80307-3000
Telephone: (303) 497-1000
Telex: 989764
12 April 1990
Dr. John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear John:
I enjoyed meeting with you, Allan Bromley, and Dan Albritton on
30 March. I hope we are making progress in answering your questions about
climate models. Your comments are well taken on the need for adequate
vertical, as well as horizontal, resolution in climate models.
If I recall correctly, you wanted to know what happens, in terms of slow-
ing down greenhouse warming, when we increase the depth of the upper ocean
(where most of the additional heat goes). The atmospheric radiative forcing
part of the model allows for solar and infrared radiation with clouds (Kiehl et
al., 1987). Solar radiation is generally broken down into two regions-one is
between 0-0.9 µm and is usually denoted ultraviolet and visible; the other is
0.9-4.0 µm and is denoted near-infrared. In the present calculation, we make
this division into 0.0-0.9 µm and 0.9-4.0 µm intervals. The model includes
fractional clouds, absorption by gases in the ultraviolet, absorption by ozone
in the visible spectral regions, carbon dioxide, water vapor, oxygen, cloud-level
liquid water, and albedos (that is, reflectance of clouds and the surface).
After averaging out horizontal effects, we set forth the basic physics of
the climate model (see enclosed reprint by Dickinson, 1981), where steady-
state global temperature change T, due to a change in external heating QQ
in the climate system, gives
(1)
where 1 is the feedback describing the change of outgoing thermal and re-
flected solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere. If 1 is large, then the
temperature change is small and vice versa. Various National Academy studies
estimate that (approximately) 1 12 2 W m⁻² K⁻¹.
In time-dependent form, (1) becomes
(2)
The National Center for Atmospheric Research is operated by the University Corporation
for Atmospheric Research under sponsorship of the National Science Foundation.
An Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer
To Dr. John H. Sununu
12 April 1990
Page 2
where C is the heat capacity of atmosphere-ocean climate system. Because
the climate system has several sub-systems, such as the atmosphere and the
oceans with different heat capacities, it is better to separate them into two
equations for each medium, that is,
(3)
(4)
where Ta and Tₘ are atmospheric temperature and ocean mixed-layer temper-
ature; Ca and Cₘ are heat capacities of the atmosphere and ocean mixed layer;
Àaₘ is the feedback parameter between the atmosphere and ocean mixed layer
(estimated 2 50 W m⁻² K⁻¹). The latter term allows transfer of heat for the
atmosphere and ocean. The following table provides quantitative measures
of the parameters:
Mass
Heat Capacity
Medium
(x 10³ Kg m⁻²) (W m⁻² year K⁻¹)
Atmosphere
14
Ca = 0.45
Ocean mixed layer (81 m)
81
Cₘ = 10
The solution to (3) and (4) can be simplified by combining the two
first-order ordinary differential equations into one second-order ordinary dif-
ferential equation that can be solved by a simple Runge-Kutta numerical
method incorporated into the computer program.
In determining climate change in this simple model, we first estimated
1 from a radiative column model by using, say, a vertical profile of tropi-
cal atmospheric temperature. The climate sensitivity factor is obtained from
variations of the net radiative flux at the tropopause due to changes in tem-
perature and moisture. Thus,
(5)
The quantities F/T, F/dq, and as/dq are obtained from the column radiation
model. dq/dT is estimated from the assumption of fixed relative humidity.
Calculations from the column model yield a value of 1 21 2 W m⁻² K-¹. Once
1 has been determined, it can be used in (4) to obtain a change in the ocean
mixed-layer temperature for a given forcing Q. For example, a doubling
of carbon dioxide yields QQ 2 4 W m⁻². Thus, from (1) the equilibrium
temperature change would be expected to be T 21 2°K.
To Dr. John H. Sununu
13 April 1990
Page 3
The time-dependent evolution of T can be obtained from the com-
puter model of the mixed-layer temperature change described above. The
column radiation model can also be used to calculate ДО for other carbon-
dioxide concentrations. A note of caution, however-Figures 2.12 and 2.13
(enclosed) show that the upper mixed layer of the ocean is approximately
70 m or so. Our knowledge of the ocean's thermal structure indicates that,
except in the high latitudes, only the upper mixed layer of the ocean is in-
volved in greenhouse warming. The latest 3-D climate models support this.
In fact, in the greenhouse warming scenario, the ocean becomes more stati-
cally stable and contains less coupling between the top and bottom, except
for some regional features in the high latitudes.
Several sample computations with the 1-D model with different ocean
depths are enclosed.
Next week I will be attending meetings in Washington, DC, including
the White House Conference on Science and Economics Research Related to
Global Change. I will bring along a floppy disk containing a 1-D model with
interactive oceans, and, at your convenience, 1 could install the model on your
computer.
Sincerely, M.
Warren M. Washington, Director
Climate & Global Dynamics Division
Telephone: (303) 497-1321
Fax: (303) 497-1137
E-Mail: warren [email protected]
Enclosures:
1. Figures 2.12 and 2.13
2. Documentation of the column radiation and cloud model
3. Reprint by Robert Dickinson on simple climate model
CC: D. Allan Bromley
Nancy Maynard
Daniel Albritton
0
-1.5
26
24
os-is
-10
22
18
1.0
200
0.5/
20
16
14
0.5
400
12
0.5
8
600
2
6
800
DEPTH (m)
1000
1000
-0.5
3
2000
2.5
-1.0
3000
1.5
O
4000
1.25
1.25
a5
0.25
0.75
1.25
5000
5500
90N
60
30
EQ
30
60
90S
LATITUDE
Fig. 2.12 Annually averaged ocean potential temperature (in °C) as a func-
tion of latitude and depth. [Redrawn from Levitus (1982).]
0
May
July
August
20
March
September
40
DEPTH (m)
60
November
80
January
2
4
6
8
ID
12
14
16
TEMPERATURE (°C)
Fig. 2.13 Standard ocean temperature profiles in the Northern Hemisphere
mid-latitudes in January, March, May, July, August, September, and
November. [After Knauss (1978).]
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memo
From D. Allan Bromley to John Sununu
7/2/90
P/S
Re: IPCC Summary Report (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By
(NLGB) on 10/28/05
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Global Warming 1990 (1 of 2) [3]
Date Closed:
12/20/2004
OA/ID Number:
29157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July2. 1990
Memo to: JohnSanunu
from Allan Bromley
Re: IPCC Summary Report.
Bob watson and
ted Bernthal went to Scrope two weeks
ago towark with Bat Balin to draft
arepared a good draft and The assump tim
an IDCC final sunnary sept. Boln had
chairmen, eachin Tha backup (watson
was, ouccur part That The warhinggroup
mour use ) would workarth Bohn to
massage The draft and include suggestion
suchas Those Iam others had made.
In The event, Bolin lost control
The meeting and instead J finalizh
a draft fn presentation at the IPCC
Plenary in early Au gust, The entire
Structure and content Jhe report
were openedup without too much
agreement or conclusion
Atthe end ghe meeting Balin
was pent off to tryagain Jam
second draf That we have just
enclosing herewith capy of The
received from Balin. Ihaae not
yet read it but am Fold That
The deadline fn proments is COB
today (monday)
Helcertain That Ber can be
stretched for adayerso.
Ishaet be happy to try to
have into -bntrealize
inject anycomments you may
Thatyouhave many other Things on
your mind.
Bastogards.
Aclan
(sent by FAX, July2)
Structure and content Jhe report
were opened up without too much
Photo Copy Preservation
agree ment or conclusion
Atthe end ghe meeting Balin
was pent off to try again Iam
enclosing herewith capy of The
Thatwe have just
received from Balin. Theaenot
yet read it but am Fold That
The deadline for proments is COB
today (monday)
that Tecs can be
stretched for adayerso.
Ishael be happy to by to
have into Thesystem -bntreakize
inject anycommenticy may
Thatyou have many other Things on
your mind.
Bast Togards.
Auan
(sent by FAX, July2)
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
01
- Xecutive Summary United States Department of State
to 7/2/90 arrive today
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
- will send
when available Washington, D.C. 20520
RAPIDFAX TRANSMISSION
Date 6/29/90
TO:
AID: Jeff Schweitzer, tel 647-7052, fax 647-8518
AID/S&T/EN:Jack Vanderryn, tel 875-4205, fax 875-4394
CEA: Howard Gruenspecht, tel 395-6982, fax 395-6947
CEA: Richard Schmalensee, tel 395-5036, fax 395-6947
X
CEQ: John Cohrssen, tel 395-5750 fax 395-3928
DOC:Alan Dunn, tel 377-0614, fax 377-8836
DOC/NWS:Martin Yerg, tel 427-7645, fax 587-4524
DOC/NOAA:William Sprig, tel 673-5360, fax 673-5355
DOC/NOAA:Milliam Hooke, tel 377-1437, fax 377-8203
DOC/NOAA:Tom McGuiness, tel 377-5837, fax 377-8203
DOC:J.R. Spradley, tel 377-2151, fax 377-8203
DOD: Morgan Rees, tel 695-1370, fax 697-3366
DOD: John Thomas, tel 694-6550, fax 693-5305
DOE: Richard Williamson, tel 586-5493, fax 586-3047
DOE: Ted Williams, tel 586-2061, fax 586-2062
DOE: Denise Dwyer, tel 586-6384, fax 586-6148
DOE: Mark Kerrigan, tel 586-4259, fax 586-5313
DOI: Indur Goklany, tel 208-4951, fax 208-4867
DOI: John Schefter, tel 648-6800, fax 648-5295
DOJ: Jonathan Wiener, tel 514-2744, fax 514-0557 Dick Stewart
EPA: Jack Fitzgerald, tel 382-4034, fax 252-0780
EPA: Dennis Tirpak, tel 475-8825, fax 252-0780
and
EPA:Dick Morgenstern, tel 382-4034, (fax 252-0780
EPA:Alan Hecht, tel 382-4870, fax 382-4470
EPA: Sandy Vogelgesang, tel 382-4870, fax 382-4470
EPA: Pat Koshel, tel 382-4880, fax 382-4470
HUD: Truman Goins, tel 755-7894, fax 755-0299
NSF: Eugene Bierly, tel 357-9874, fax 357-7745
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White House: Barry McBee, tel 456-2800, fax 456-2223
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White House:Andrew Card, tel 456-2533, fax 456-2397
FROM: CES/EGC Dane
OES/EGC: tel 647-4069, fax 647-5947
36 PAGES TO FOLLOW
06/29/90 14:34
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
04
1
2
OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
3
4
Climate Change: a key Global Issue
5
6
7
The consideration of the Final Report by the World
8
Commission on Environment and Development by the UN General
9
Assembly in 1987 brought the issue of a possible future man-
10
induced climate change to world attention and recognition. In
11
1988, following the decisions of the Tenth World Meteorological
12
Congress, its Executive Council and the 14th session of the
13
Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme
14
(UNEP), the Executive Heads of the World Meteorological
15
Organization and UNEP pursued the issue by inviting all nations
16
of the UN to take part in a more elaborate study of a possible
17
man induced climate change. The first meeting on such a study
18
was held in Geneva in November 1988, in which 30 countries
19
participated. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
20
(IPCC) thus formed, and open to all countries, agreed on the
21
following tasks (see reference 1):
22
23
:.
assessment of available scientific information on
24
climate change;
25
26
2.
assessment of environmental and socio-economic impacts
27
of climate change;
28
29
3. formulation of response strategies.
30
31
The Panel set up Working Group I on Science, Working Group
32
II on Impacts and Working Group III on Response Strategies to
33
carry out the three tasks listed above.
34
35
At its second meeting held in Nairobi in June 1989, IPCC
36
responded to the request by the UN General Assembly (see
37
reference 2) to present its First Assessment Report in September
38
1990, to be available to the UN General Assembly later that year.
39
The present report is an outcome of the deliberations by the
40
Panel and its Working Groups. At its third session held in
41
Washungton D.C. in February 1990, IPCC responded to the request
42
of the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution
43
44
and Climate Change to examine the feasibility of various options
to stabilize and/or reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other
45
greenhouse gases. This work is now under way.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
1
2
3
06/29/90 14:35
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
05
2
1
It should be emphasized that the issue of a possible man-
2
induced climate change is very different from any other
3
environmental issue that has emerged. It is a truly global
4
problem, and will be a concern for all countries. Although the
5
contributions to the emissions of greenhouse gases into the
6
atmosphere are very different and will remain so in the future,
7
all countries will be influenced in one way or another. Joint
8
actions by all countries will be required in order to prevent or
9
mitigate the consequences of climate change.
10
11
The IPCC's objective has been to provide the scientific and
12
technical basis for action. It is clear that the present
13
overview, supported by the extensive working group reports and
14
their policymakers summaries, that some very specific general
15
conclusions can already be drawn from this first phase of broad
16
assessment of the issue, although many uncertainties remain. It
17
should constitute a useful synthesis for our present knowledge
18
that could serve as basis for negotiations about how to deal with
19
the issue. It is, however, also obvious that we are facing a
20
very difficult problem, and there will be no simple solutions.
21
22
The following overview of the IPCC Assessment presents a
23
synthesis of the most important conclusions that have been
24
reached by the Working Groups and are judged to be of particular
25
importance for the political analyses and the negotiations that
26
will begin after the fourth IPCC plenary meeting. To address
27
more specific questions, in an analysis of this major
28
environmental issue, reference is made to the Working Group
29
reports.
30
31
The Scientific Issue
32
33
Increasing Greenhouse Gas Concentrations
34
35
It is first of all important to emphasize that although
36
uncertainties exist with regard to the likelihood and the
37
38
character of human-induced climate change, we do know some things
with considerable certainty. Working Group I has structured its
39
Policy-makers' Summary to distinguish clearly between:
40
41
-
what we know with certainty
42
-
what we calculate with confidence
43
-
what is predicted by current models
44
-
45
uncertain what our best judgement is on matters that are more
46
47
48
First it is stated that we are certain of the following:
49
-
50
Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.
there is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the
51
52
-
53
increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse
emissions resulting from human activities are substantially
54
55
and gases: nitrous carbon oxide dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
06/29/90 14:35
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06
3
1
warming of the Earth's surface.
2
3
The table below summarizes the present and pre-industrial
4
abundances, current rates of change and present atmospheric
5
lifetimes of greenhouse gases influenced by human activities.
6
Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide all have significant
7
natural and human sources, while the chlorofluorocarbons are only
8
produced industrially.
9
10
SUMMARY OF KEY GREENHOUSE GASES AFFECTED BY HUMAN ACTIVITIES
11
12
13
Carbon
Methane
CFC-11
CFC-12
Nitrous
14
Dioxide
Oxide
15
16
Atmospheric
17
concentration
ppmv
ppmv
pptv
pptv
ppbv
18
19
Pre-industrial
20
(1750-1800)
280
0.8
0
0
288
21
Present day (1990)
353
1.72
280
22
484
310
23
Current rate of change
1.8
0.015
9.5
17
08
24
per year
(0.5%)
(0.9%)
(4%)
(4%)
25
(0.25%)
26
27
Atmospheric lifetime
50-200
10
65
130
150
28
(years)
29
30
ppmv = parts per million by volume;
pobv = parts per billion (thousand million) by volume:
31
pptv - parts per trillion (million million) by volume.
32
33
Since the industrial revolution the combustion of fossil fuels
34
and deforestation have led to an increase of 26% in carbon
35
dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. Methane concentrations
36
have more than doubled because of rice production, cattle
37
rearing, biomass burning, coal mining and ventilation of natural
38
gas; also, fossil fuel combustion may have also contributed
39
through chemical reactions in the atmosphere which reduce the
40
41
rate of removal of methane. CFCs, which were not present in the
42
atmosphere before their invention in the 1930s, are used as
43
aerosol propellants, solvents, refrigerants and foam blowing
44
agents. The total increase of all human-made greenhouse gas
45
emissions is at present equivalent to an increase of carbon
dioxide since pre-industrial times of about 50%,
46
47
48
The scenario assumes that, although oil and natural
49
will play an important role as energy sources for several decades gas
50
into next century, the major energy supply will be from coal,
51
while renewable and nuclear energy sources are judged not to play
52
53
Account has been taken of the Montreal Protocol for reducing the
a more important role globally until well into the 21st century.
54
them emissions out. of The the CFC-gases but not the possibility of phasing
Extended Page
6.1
55
UL greenhouse concentrations will be
56
equivalent of a doubling of the carbon dioxide concentration by
about 2025 and guadrupling during the latter part of next century
06/29/90 14:36
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4
07
4
1
although the scenario is most uncertain beyond the middle of next
2
century. Emissions in 1985 and 2025 in the Business-as-Usual
3
scenario are given in the table below.
4
5
:
1985
2025
6
7
carbon dioxide (GIC)
5.9
11.5
8
9
10
methane (Tg)
541
761
11
12
nitrous oxide (Tg)
13
16
13
14
CFCs and HCFCs (Mt)
740
1900
15
16
17
It is interesting to note that national plans for the future
18
(Reference Scenario; Working Group III) show a somewhat greater
19
increase of carbon dioxide and methane emissions until 2025 than
20
implied by the Business-as-Usual scenario.
21
22
The anthropogenic fluxes of CO2 are much smaller (approx.
23
6Gt C/year) than the natural exchange fluxes (200Gt C/year) which
24
occur between the atmosphere and the terrestrial biota and
25
between the atmosphere and the oceans. Note that the figure
26
should also include the emissions due to deforestation and
27
changing land use, However, the anthropogenic fluxes have been
28
large enough to modify significantly the natural balance during
29
pre-industrial times as evidenced by the 25% increase of
30
atmospheric carbon dioxide during the last 200 years.
31
32
Man-induced climate change
33
34
It is relatively easy to determine the direct effect of the
35
increased radiative forcing due to increases in greenhouse gases.
36
However, as climate begins to warm, various processes act to
37
amplify (through positive feedbacks) or reduce (through negative
38
feedbacks) the warming. The main feedbacks which have been
39
identified are due to changes in atmospheric water vapour,
40
clouds, sea-ice and the oceans.
41
42
The best tools we have which take the above feedbacks into
43
account are mathematical models of the climate system which
44
45
synthesise our knowledge of the physical and dynamical processes
and allow for the complex interactions between the various
46
47
components. However, in their current state of development, the
48
descriptions of many of the processes involved are comparatively
49
crude. Because of this, considerable uncertainty is attached to
50
these predictions of climate change, which is reflected in the
51
ranges of values given below. Based on current model results the
52
rate of increase of temperature is estimated by WGI to be about
53
0.3°C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0,5°C
54
this is greater than any changes seen over the past 10,000 years.
55
or This about will result t in a likely increase in global mean temperature
06/29/90 14:37
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
08
5
1
above pre industrial) before the end of the next century with an
2
uncertainty range of about 50%. The projected temperature rise
3
out to the year 2100, with high, low and best-estimate climate
4
responses, is. shown in the diagram below. Because of other
5
factors which. influence climate, we would not expect the rise to
6
be a steady one.
7
8
7
9
BUSINESS
HIGH ESTIMATE
10
6
AS-USUAL
11
12
13
14
17
18
REALISED TEMPERATURE RISE
5
BEST ESTIMATE
4
15
3
16
above 1765 (C)
LOW ESTIMATE
2
19
1
20
21
0
22
1850
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100
23
YEAR
24
25
26
The temperature rise shown above is the realised
27
temperature; due to the delaying effect of the oceans at any
28
given time we would also be commited to a further temperature
29
rise which would become apparent in decades to a century, Models
30
predict that the realised temperature rise at any time is between
31
50 and 80% of the committed temperature rise,
32
33
It is finally important to recognize that a climate change
34
that has occurred because increase concentrations of greenhouse
35
gases in the atmosphere will disappear only slowly, even if all
36
man-induced emissions would be stopped instaneously. This is
37
due to the fact that the life-times in the atmosphere of the
38
major greenhouse gases with which we are concerned, carbon
39
40
dioxide, nitrous oxide and the CFC-gases about half a century
to a few centuries. From a point of view, a climate change due
41
42
irreversible. to increasing amounts of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is
43
44
How much confidence do we have in our predictions?
45
46
47
There are many uncertainties in our predictions,
48
particularly with regard to the timing magni tude and regional
49
patterns of climate change. These uncertainties arise from our
imperfect knowledge of:
50
51
&
52
future rates of human-made emissions
-
53
how these will change the atmospheric concentrations
-
54
the response of climate to these changed concentrations
55
Extended Page
8.1
56
change depends on the rate at which greenhouse gases (and other
16 18 obvious that the extent to which climate will
06/29/90 14:38
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
09
1
gases which affect their concentrations) are emitted. This in
2
turn will be dependent on various complex economic and
3
sociological factors.
4
5
Secondly, because we do not fully understand the sources and
6
sinks of the greenhouse gases, there are uncertainties in our
7
calculations of future concentrations arising from a given
8
emissions scenario. Furthermore, because natural sources and
9
sinks of greenhouse gases are sensitive to a change in climate,
10
they may substantially modify future concentrations. It appears
11
that, as climate warms, these feedbacks will lead to an overall
12
increase, rather than decrease, in natural greenhouse gas
13
abundances, For this reason, climate change is likely to be
14
greater than the estimates we have given.
15
16
Thirdly, climate models are only as good as our
17
understanding of the processes which they describe, and this is
18
far from perfect. The ranges in the climate predictions given
19
above reflect the uncertainties due to model imperfections; the
20
largest of these is cloud feedback (those factors affecting the
21
cloud amount and distribution and the interaction of clouds with
22
solar and terrestrial radiation). Note a factor of two is larger
23
than the total uncertainty range, Others arise from the transfer
24
of energy between the atmosphere and ocean, the atmosphere and
25
land surfaces, and between the upper and deep layers of the
26
ocean. The treatment of sea-ice and convection in the models is
27
also crude. Nevertheless we have substantial confidence that
28
models can predict at least the broadscale feature of climate
29
change, and we are confident that existing reliability of the
30
predictions can be improved by further research.
31
32
Furthermore, we must recognise that our imperfect
33
understanding of climate processes (and corresponding ability to
34
model them) could make us vulnerable to surprises; just as the
35
human-made ozone hole over Antarctica was entirely unpredicted.
36
37
In particular, the ocean circulation, changes in which are
38
thought to have led to periods of comparatively rapid climate
39
understood or modelled.
change at the end of the last ice age, is not well observed,
40
41
42
Testing Model Computations against Observations
43
44
reality in order to validate the results.
It is of course essential to test model calculations against
45
46
47
We know from observations that the global mean temperature has
48
increased between 0.30C and 0.60C, since the middle of last
49
50
and during two periods, i.e., the first four decades of this
century and that most of this change has occurred primarily
51
criticism since 1975. Working Group I has carefully considered century
52
the that local warming at observations sites within the
53
of the vicinity observed of densely change; populated such urban regions biasses may explain some or part in
5.4
Extended Page
9.1
V.OV
-------- LUMOVED
55
56
When trying to validate the model computations with the aid
06/29/90 14:39
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
10
1
of these observations a further complication arises in that the
2
global mean temperature has not been increasing steadily; even
3
a slight decline was observed in the Northern Hemisphere during
4
the period 1949 -1975, Such irregular variations of the global
5
mean temperature by several tenths of a degree are to be expected
6
due to internal interactions (eg between ocean and atmosphere)
7
in the climate system. These natural variations further obscure
8
the warming trend that may result from increasing amounts of
9
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
10
11
The size of the warming over the last century is broadly
12
consistent with the predictions of climate models, but is also
13
of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. If the
14
sole cause of the observed warming were the human-made greenhouse
15
effect, then the implied climate sensitivity would be near the
16
lower end of the range inferred from the models. The observed
17
increase could be largely due to natural variability;
18
alternatively this variability could have offset a still larger
19
man-made greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the
20
enhanced greenhouse effect from observations is not likely for
21
a decade or more, during which time the commitment to future
22
climate change would have grown considerably larger than it is
23
today
24
25
Regional Patterns of Climate Change
26
27
Knowledge of the global mean warming is of limited use in
28
determining the impacts of climate change, for instance on
29
agriculture. For this we need to know changes of temperature and
30
precipitation regionally and seasonally. Models predict that
31
regional climate changes will be different from the global mean.
32
For example, temperature increases in Southern Europe and central
33
Northen America are predicted to be higher than the global mean,
34
accompanied on average by reduced summer precipitation and soil
35
moisture. In general, confidence in regional estimate is low,
36
37
especially for the changes in precipitation and soil moisture.
38
Therefore we cannot yet give reliable regional predictions at the
smaller scales demanded for impacts assessments.
39
40
41
A completely different, and potentially useful way of
42
predicting patterns of future climate is to search for periods
43
in the past when the global mean temperatures were similar to
44
those we expect in future, and then use the past spatial patterns
45
as analogues of those which will arise in the future. Paleo-
46
climatological information can provide useful insights into
47
climate processes, and can assist in the validation of climate
48
models. In addition, paleo-analogue scenarios are useful for
49
change. sensitivity studies to evaluate regional impacts of climate
50
51
52
climate extremes will generally have more impact than changes in the
Changes in the variability of weather and the frequency of
53
54
at a particular location. With the possible exception mean
06/29/90 14:40
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
11
1
an increase in mean temperature, episodes of high temperatures
2
will most likely become more frequent in the future, and cold
3
episodes less frequent.
4
5
Environmental Impact of Climate Change and Socio-Economic
6
consequenços
7
8
Impacts and Sensitivity
9
10
Because we are not yet able to foresee future likely changes
11
of the regional distribution of climate with much accuracy we
12
cannot predict more specifically the probable impacts of regional
13
changes and are therefore limited to assessing them in rather
14
general terms. Quantitative assessments of the socio-economic
15
implications of a climate change for specific regions and
16
countries are not either yet possible. We can, however, analyze
17
the sensitivity of the environment to a given change of climate
18
and much of what is brought out in the report of the Working
19
Group II should be interpreted in that way.
20
21
Our ability to make more precise assessments of the impacts
22
of global change will only come gradually during the 1990s, as
23
regional predictions of climate change become more reliable.
24
25
The Working Group II Report concludes that:
26
27
The uncertainty of the regional predictions of climate
28
change at present, limits our possibility to assess
29
30
quantitatively the impacts of such a change. For the time being
31
we rely on sensitivity analyses for the assessement of the likely
32
impacts, which should, however, yield rather clear qualitative
33
views about the vulnerability of nations to such changes. This
34
uncertainty about the spatial characteristics of regional and
35
local changes of climate must not overshadow the earlier
36
conclusion that a significant change of the global mean
37
local scale.
temperature is associated with larger changes on the regional and
38
39
40
A climate change will bring with it both positive
11
Working Group II). It is likely that, to a greater or lesser
negative impacts, although the negative ones will dominate and (cf
42
43
extent, all countries will be affected either directly or
44
indirectly by climate change.
45
46
47
A rising sea level and its impacts
48
49
50
due expansion of sea water when being warmed. partly
to A warmer the climate will induce a rise of the sea level,
51
52
change of is more uncertain, since both accumulation the
Antarctica response of the ice sheets over Greenland and particularly in The
53
54
climate. Working snowfall) Group and I melting concludes is that: influenced by a change (due of to
55
Extended Page 11. 1
55
56
under of the IPCC Business-as-Usual emissions scenario, an
rate global mean sea levol rise of about 6cm per decade average over
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
12
06/29/90 14:41
9
1
2
under the IPCC Busincss-as-Usual emissions scenario, an average
3
rate of global mean sea level rise of about 6cm per decade over
4
the next century (with an uncertainty range of 3-10cm per decade
5
is expected); this is three to six times faster than that seen
6
over the last 100 years, The predicted rise is about 20cm in
7
global mean sea level by 2030, and 65cm by the end of the next
8
century, more detail is shown in the diagram below. There will
9
be significant regional variations. Furthermore, even if
10
greenhouse forcing stabilised, there would still be a commitment
11
to a continuing sea level rise for many decades and even
12
centuries, due to delays in climate, ocean and ice mass
13
responses.
14
15
120
16
BUSINESS
HIGH ESTIMATE
17
100
AS-USUAL
18
19
20
22
SEA LEVEL RISE (cm)
80
21
BEST ESTIMATE
60
23
40
24
LOW ESTIMATE
25
26
20
27
28
0
29
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
2080
2100
30
YEAR
31
32
These values are less than those given in earlier
33
assessments, particularly the upper bounds. The lower values do
34
not give rise to an immediate concern except in the coastal areas
35
of some countries with extensive coastlines of low-lying land
36
and for some island states. The Working Group II recommends a
37
more precise assessment of the risks to coastal areas and islands
38
and to living resources caused by a 0.3-0.5 m rise of sea level
39
which might be expected towards the latter part of next century,
40
if no preventive measures were taken.
41
The slowly rising mean sea level is not an immediate threat.
42
Increased damage will rather be experienced during storms, when
43
short term variations of sea level induced by winds and by high
44
waves would cause more destructive flooding. Delta regions of
45
major rivers are obviously sensitive and often also heavily
46
exploited for agricultural production.
47
48
49
The rise of sea level might threaten some low island and
50
coastal zones by the middle of next century. A one meter rise,
51
which is at the upper limit of what might occur in 100 years
52
time, would impact 360,000 km of coastline (Working Group III),
53
would render some island countries uninhabitable, displace tens
54
of millions of people, seriously threaten low-lying urban
55
flood productive land and
10
1
The West Antarctic Ice Sheet is of special concern because
2
Working Group I concludes that "within the next century, is
a large part of it is grounded far below sea level. However, it
3
4
not likely that there will be a major outflow of ice from the
5
West Antarctica due directly to global warming".
6
7
Impacts on land, water and ecosystems
8
9
Turning next to the more difficult question of impacts of
10
climate change on land, water and ecosystems, it is first
11
important to recognize that a warmer climate is not necessarily
12
harmful, if precipitation is adequate. The ecosystem composition
13
might of course change, which in turn would imply the loss of
14
plant species.
15
16
It is likely, however, that the distribution of
17
precipitation would change and that soil moisture predominantly
18
might decrease in continental regions. A change of the
19
distribution of climatic zones probably also occur and be
20
associated with large regional local changes. Some ecosystems
21
might well have difficulties to adjust in this process. Working
22
Group II Policymakers' Report gives a more detailed analysis of
23
the expected impacts in the case of the Business-as-Usual,
24
Scenario A. Some key features of these impacts as described by
25
Working Group II have been extracted for the present overview.
26
27
"Changes of climate would have an important effect on
28
agriculture, including livestock. Studies have not yet
29
conclusively determined whether on average, global
30
agricultural potential would increase or decrease. Negative
31
impacts could be felt at the regional elevel" and "there may
32
be severe effects in some regions, particularly decline in
33
production in regions of high present-day vulnerability,
34
that are least able to adjust." These include Brazil, Peru,
35
Sahel, S.E. Asia, Asian USSR and China. "Patterns of
36
agricultural trade could be altered by decreased cereal
37
production in some of the currently high-production areas.
38
Although not analyzed more specifically, the supply of food
39
would become more vulnerable to disturbances caused by
40
changes of climate in a world with a rapidly growing
41
population.
42
43
"The rotation period of forests is long and current forests
44
will mature and decline in a climate, to which they are
45
increasingly more poorly adapted. "Major forest-type zones
46
and species ranges in the Northern Hemisphere could shift
47
significantly as a result of climate change." "The most
48
sensitive areas will be where species are close to their
49
biological limits in terms of temperature and moisture", as
50
"for example in semi-arid areas. Social stresses can be
51
expected to increase and consequent damage to forest may
52
occur. These increased and non sustainable uses will place
53
more pressure on forest investments, forest conservation and
54
sound forest management."
55
56
"Natural terrestrial ecosystems would be markedly influenced
06/29/90 14:42
II
1
because the rates of projected climatic change are likely
2
to be faster than the ability of some species to respond.
3
Flora and fauna would lag behind these climatic shifts and
4
could find themselves in a different climatic regime. Major
5
vegetation zones could face severe disturbances and
6
disruptions, influencing plant and associated animal
7
populations". "Species could disappear and lead to
8
substantial reduction in biological diversity". "The socio-
9
economic consequences of these impacts will be significant,
10
especially for those regions of the globe where socicties
11
and related economies are dependent on natural terrestrial
12
ecosystems for their welfare. Changes in the availability
13
of food, fuel, medicine, construction materials and income
14
are possible as these ecosystems are changed. Important
15
fibre products could also be affected in some regions."
16
17
Enhanced carbon dioxide concentratios in the atmosphere
18
would increase the water-use efficiency in the process of
19
photosynthesis which might enhance growth for certain plants
20
in some regions of the globe, which might be beneficial in
21
agriculture and forestry as well as for natural ecosystems.
22
"Consequences of CO2 enrichments and climate change could be
23
modified by other environmental factors, both natural and
24
man-induced (e.g. by air pollution)."
25
26
"Relatively small climate changes can cause large water
27
resource problems. In many areas, especially in arid and
28
semi-arid regions and those humid areas where demand or
29
pollution has led to water scarcity." While "many areas
30
will have increased precipitation, soil moisture will
31
decrease in other areas, particularly in those that are
32
"already in marginal situations such as the Sahellan zone
33
in Africa. Increased drought risk represents potentially
34
the most serious impact of climate change on agriculture.
35
"Future design in water resources engineering will need to
35
take possible impacts into account when considering
37
structures with life span to the end of the next century",
38
but necessary analyses are uncertain at present because of
39
the lack of adequate regional predictions.
40
41
"Global warming can be expected to affect the availability
42
of water and biomass, both major energy sources in many
43
developing countries. These effects are likely to differ
44
between and within regions with some areas losing and others
45
gaining water and biomass. Such changes in areas which lose
46
water may jeopardise energy supply and materials for human
47
habitation and energy."
48
49
It is obviously difficult to Judge how serious a climatic
50
change might be to an individual nation, or to humankind as a
51
whole, on the basis of the still largely qualitative findings as
52
given in the Working Group II report.
53
54
Means to integrate more quantitatively the implications of
55
these many possible impacts, both positive and negative, are
56
needed. The impacts as briefly described call for careful
12.
1
consideration of the consequences of climate change in the
2
developments of plans for resource use and management.
3
4
Impacts on People
5
5
Direct impacts of climate change on people are modest. A
7
warmer climate may imply, however, that previously hot places
8
become even hotter. Even though this may cause problems for
9
olderly and sensitive people, it usually cannot be considered as
10
a serious problem.
11
12
Changing climate could, on the other hand, affect human
13
settlement and change the geographical distribution of deceases
14
in the world and stimulate a spread of epidemic diseases. The
15
IPCC recognizes the views as expressed by Working Goup II, that
16
17
"The most vulnerable human settlements are those especially
18
exposed to natural hazards, e.g. coastal or river flooding,
19
severe drought, landslides, severe wind storms and tropical
20
cyclones. Most vulnerable populations are in developing
21
countries, in the lower income groups, residents of coastal
22
lowlands and islands in semi-arid and in grasslands."
23
24
"Changes in precipitation and temperature could radically
25
alter the patterns of vector-borne and viral diseases by shifting
26
them to higher latitudes and thereby putting large populations
27
at risk." This could initiate migrations of people in turn
28
leading to disruptions of settlement pattern and social
29
instability in some areas."
30
31
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases -- the scope of the
32
problem
33
34
Emission Scenarios
35
36
As pointed out above, man's emissions of greenhouse gases
37
have enhanced their concentration in the atmosphere so that their
38
present integrated effect is equivalent to a concentration of
39
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere of about 150% of the pre-
40
industrial concentration. Half of this increase has occurred in
41
less than 25 years. The analysis of different scenarios of the
42
future increase of greanhoude gasses in the atmosphere show that
43
the equivalent carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere
44
probably measures to limit future emissions were taken. Before
45
considering what measures to limit future emissions might be
46
justified, it 1s important to recognize the very major efforts
47
that are required in order to slow down or to halt climate
48
change.
49
50
The Scope of the Problem
51
52
It is important to clarify first the relative importance
53
of the different greenhouse gases in bringing about a climate
54
change. We need to understand the difficulties that will be
55
56
encountered in efforts to reduce their emissions and thereby to
slow down their rates of increase or ultimately to stabilize
06/67/90
13
1
their atmospheric concentrations.
2
Working Group I and III have presented relative contributions
3
to the additional forcing (heating) of the atmosphere during the
4
period 1765 1990, the last decade and their predicted
5
contributions for the period 2000 - 2025 under the Business-as-
6
Usual, (in percent);
7
BaU
8
9
1765-1990
1980-90
2000-25
10
11
Carbon dioxide
61
55
63
12
Methane
23
15
17
13
CFC
12
24
7
14
HCFCs
0
0
8
15
Nitrous Oxide
4
6
5
18
17
(Ozone may be an important contributor, but its effects are
18
difficult to quantify and have not been included above)
19
20
The recent (1980 - 1990) reduction in the proportion of
21
forcing change due to carbon dioxide is primarily due to the very
22
rapid increase in the role of the CFC-gases as forcing agents.
23
Because of the Montreal agreement on limiting the use of CFC-
24
gase, the relative contribution of carbon dioxide as a heating
25
agent will increase throughout the 21st century according to the
26
Business-as-Usual scenario, Working Group III has developed
27
three other scenarios, all having the same assumptions about
28
population growth as the Business-as-Usual (Scenario A). The
29
man-made emissions of carbon dioxide and methano from all four
30
WGIII scenarios are shown in the diagrams below.
31
32
33
BUSINESS
34
AS-USUAL
35
20
36
37
38
39
41
C02 EMISSIONS (GtC/year)
SCENARIO 3
10
40
SCENARIO c
42
SCENARIO D
43
0
44
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
2080
2100
45
YEAR
46
47
1100
48
BUSINESS
49
1000
54
55
56
METHANE EMISSIONS (Gliyear)
AS-USUAL
50
900
51
52
800
SCENARIO a
53
700
SCENARIO C
600
300
SCENARIO 0
400
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
2080
2'00
06/29/90 14:44
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
4.
17
14.
1
Scenarlo B, Low Emission, assumes the energy supply mix of
2
fossil fuels shifts towards natural gas, large efficiency
3
increases are. achieved, deforestation is reversed and the
4
Montreal Protocol on CFCs is fully implemented. This results in
5
a doubling of equivalent carbon dioxide by about 2040.
6
7
Scenario c, Control Policies, assumes a shift towards
8
renewable energies and nuclear energy takes place in the latter
9
part of the next century, CFC-gases are phased out and
10
agricultural emissions (methane and dinitrogen oxide) are
11
limited; an equivalent doubling of carbon dioxide will occur in
12
about 2050. It should be recalled that there is a 50%
13
uncertainty range around each one of the curves shown in the
14
figure.
15
16
Scenario D, Accelerated Policies; assumes a rapid shift to
17
renewable energies and nuclear energy takes place early in the
18
next century in the cases of Scenarios B, C and D will be between
19
70% and 50% of the stringent emission controls in industrial
20
countries and moderate growth of emissions in developing
21
countries. This scenario stabilises equivalent dioxide
22
concentrations at about twice pre-industrial levels towards the
23
end of the next century.
24
25
26
27
10
BUSINESS
28
AS USUAL
1120
29
8
30
B
31
32
6
C
33
34
560
4
35
SCENARIO D
36
FORCING (watts/metre2)
37
2
EQUIVALENT CO2
CONCENTRATION (ppm)
38
39
0
280
40
1900
1950
2000
41
2050
2100
YEAR
42
43
44
Contribution by Sector
45
46
47
"For the later analysis of possible measures to be
48
implemented it is of interest also to give the relative
49
contributions to the enhanced radiative forçing during the decade
50
of the 1980s and the projected distribution for the period 2000
51
2025 by sector. The still relatively large contribution from -
52
be CFC-gases is due to the assumption made that these will largely
53
text replaced by HCF and HCFC-gases" The numbers given the
54
should be presented in a table in
Extended Page 17. 1
55
56
also in the included report. can be deleted, since they have been given presently earlier
CARD the different greenhouse gases - as Relative
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
06/29/90 14:44
13
1
2
3
Climate change when emissions are controlled
4
5
Under the other Working Group III emission scenarios which
6
assume progressively increasing levels of controls, rates of
7
increase in global mean temperature are predicted to be about
8
0.200 per decade (Scenario B), just above 0.10C per decade
9
(Scenario C and about 0.10C per decade (Scenario D). Further
10
details are shown in the diagram below.
11
12
5
13
BUSINESS
14
4
AS-USUAL
15
16
17
18
19
REALISED TEMPERATURE
RISE above 1765 (C)
3
SCENARIO B
SCENARIO C
2
20
SCENARIO D
21
22
1
23
24
0
25
1850
1900
1950
2000
2050
2100
26
YEAR
27
28
29
30
Sea level rise by the end of the next century will be
31
between 50% and 70% of the Business-as-Usual scenario.
32
33
34
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
35
36
37
To limit future climate change we need to examine the
38
effectiveness of reductions in the emissions of each of the
39
greenhouse gases. Atmospheric concentrations of the long-lived
40
gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and the CFCs) adjust only
41
slowly to changes in emissions. Continued emissions of these
42
gases at present rates would commit us to increased
43
concentrations for centuries ahead. The longer emissions
44
continue to increase at present day rates, the greater reductions
45
would have to be for concentrations to stabilise at a given level
46
(see diagram below). The long-lived gases would require
47
immediate reductions in emissions from human activities by more
48
than 60% in order to stabilise their concentrations at today's
49
levels; methane would require a 15-20% reduction
50
51
52
53
54
06/29/90 14:45
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
J.
19
1
2
3
4
500
2% pa DECREASE
10
11
C02 CONCENTRATION (ppmv)
FROM 2010
$
(d)
6
7
8
400
9
(c)
2% pa DECREASE
FROM 1990
12
13
300
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2090 2100
14
15
YEAR
16
17
18
(c) emissions reduced by 2% pa from 1990
19
(d) emissions reduced by 2% pa from 1990 to 2010, Then reduced
20
by 2% pa
21
22
There are other technical criteria which may help
23
policymakers to decide, in the event of emissions reduction being
24
deemed necessary, which gases should be considered. Does the gas
25
contribute in a major way to current, and future, climate
26
forcing? Does it have a long lifetime, so earlier reductions in
27
emissions would be more effective than those made later? And are
28
its sources and sinks well enough known to decide which could be
29
controlled in practice? The table below illustrates these
30
factors.
31
32
33
34
35
MAJOR
LONG
SOURCES
36
GAS
CONTRIBUTOR?
LIFETIME?
KNOWN?
37
38
Carbon dioxide
yes
yes
yes
39
40
Methane
yes
no
semi-quantitatively
41
42
Nitrous oxide
not at
yes
qualitatively
43
present
44
45
CFCs
yes
yes
yes
46
47
48
HCFCs, etc
not at
mainly no
yes
49
present
50
51
Ozone
possibly
no
qualitatively
52
53
54
55
6475947
STATE
DEPT
06/29/90 14:46
1
Chlorofluorocarbons
2
3
The Working Group I assessment clearly show that the CFC-
4
gases are much more effective per kilogramme emitted in heating
5
the atmosphere than any of the other greenhouse gases in today's
6
atmosphere.
7
8
A reduction of the use of CFC-gases would be a cost-effective
9
measure to contribute to the slowing down of global warming.
10
11
The role of the CGCs is expected to decrease because of the
12
Montreal Protocol. It should be noted, however, that the CFCs
13
will probably be partially replaced by HCFCs and HFCs which are
14
weaker greenhouse gases because their atmospheric lifetimes are
15
shorter than those of the CFCs. Still, because of the
16
difficulties being encountered when attempting to prevent a
17
further build up atmospheric areenhouse gases, serious
18
consideration should be given to other replacements to the CFC-
19
cases than HFCs and HCFCs as is now being proposed.
20
21
Methane, nitrous oxide and ozone
22
23
Reductions of the emissions of methane and particularly
24
nitrous oxide are difficult to achieve, since they are primarily
25
due to wide spread activities in society related to agriculture,
26
forestry and waste management. Because the quantitative
27
importance of each of these sources is not well known at present
28
the effectiveness of different control strategies is hard to
29
evaluate. We are less able to specify the sources of nitrous
30
oxide; thus, strategies to reduce their emissions are even more
31
difficult to develop. Tropospheric ozone is predicted to
32
increase due to enhanced emissions of carbon monoxide,
33
hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides released mainly by transport and
34
industry.
35
36
Carbon dioxide
37
38
It is clear from the analysis above that the major and
39
increasing source of greenhouse emissions is due to the emission
40
of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation.
41
42
Carbon dioxide emissions are due to fossil fuel burning, at
43
present 5.5 - 6.0 billion tons of carbon per year (Gtc pa), and
a net decrease of the terrestrial biosphere due to deforestation
44
45
and changing land use of 0.6 -2.5 GtC pa in 1980 (at present
46
probably somewhat larger). The total emissions are thus at
47
present at least 6.5 - 8.5 Gtc pa. The world population is about
48
5.2 billion and the emission per capita thus about 1.1 tons of
49
carbon due to fossil fuel emissions and 0.35 billion tons due to
deforestation and changing land use.
50
51
52
The emissions due to fossil fuel burning are, however, very
53
unevenly distributed between regions of the world as shown in
the following table:
54
18
Carbon emissions
Carbon emissions
Carbon emissions
billion tons of
tons of carbon
tons of carbon
4
Year: 1985
carbon per year
per capital and year
per GNP
5
6
7
Global Totals
5.15
1.06
8
9
North America
1.34
10
5.08
11
Western Europe
0.85
2.14
12
OECD Pacific
0.31
2.14
13
Centr. Planned Europe
1.33
3.19
14
Africa
0.17
0.29
15
Centr. Planned Asia
0.54
0.47
16
Latin America
0.22
0.55
17
Western Asia
0.13
1.20
18
Scuth and East Asia
0.27
0.19
19
20
It is difficult to deduce accurate values for the carbon dioxide
21
emissions due to deforestation and changing land use. It seems clear,
22
however, from the reports by Working Groups II and III that the net
23
emission of carbon dioxide from the tropics due to deforestation
24
amounted to about 1.7 GtC pa (range 0.6-2.5) in 1980. The average
25
emissions per capita in the tropical countries is about 1 ton of
26
carbon per year while some with more intense exploitation of their
27
forests account for a per capita emission that approaches that of
28
industrial countries due to fossil fuel emissions.
29
30
"One the basis of the various emission scenarios and assuming
31.-
that the global population is about 8 million in 2030, we compute the
32
per capita emissions at that time to be (revised numbers from Jenkins)
33
and that at due to deforestation and changing land use about 0.35 tons
34
of carbon per year. If now, on the basis of the various emissions
35
scenarios, we project the per capita emissions to the year 2070,
36
37
assuming that the global population is 10 billion at that time, we
38
emissions. arrive at the figures in the following table for the per capita
39
40
41
Scenario
C02
42
Methane
(tC/capita)
43
(t/capita)
44
45
Business-as-Usual
1.8
46
0.1
47
Scenario B
0.8
48
0.07
49
Scenario C
0.5
50
0.06
51
Scenario D
0.3
52
0.05
53
54
55
56
57
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
22
06/29/90 14:47
19
1
Noting that, only under scenario D is the carbon dioxide
2
concentration stabiliscd, and then at a level 50% above pre-
3
industrial, it is clear that achieving the figures in this table that
4
achieving stabilisation of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations
5
would require very major efforts by the global society, Even to
6
reduce the rate of change of climate as in scenarios B and C would
7
clearly be very difficult.
8
9
It is important in this context also to compare the possible
10
importance of reducing the rate of deforestation and expanding
11
reforestation. We note first that, at present, the total emissions
12
of carbon dioxide due to man's use of the terrestrial ecosystems are
13
about 25% of the total man-induced emissions of carbon dioxide into
14
the atmosphere, A major decrease of the rate of deforestation would
15
contribute significantly to slowing down the rate of carbon dioxide
16
increase in the atmosphere, but not stop it,
17
18
It has been proposed that a major programme for reforestation
19
should be initiated. The Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration in
20
November 1989 requested the IPCC to explore the effects of an annual
21
reforestation of 12 million hectares. Working Group I has calculated
22
roughly the transfer of carbon from the atmosphere into the
23
terrestrial biosphere that thereby would be achieved. If such a
24
policy would be maintained for a period of 40 years an area as large
25
as about 50% of the total area of the United States would have been
26
reforested. By 2030, 1.e. 40 years from now, about 25 billion tons
27
of carbon would have been sequestered into the terrestrial biosphere,
28
possibly somewhat more if also the soil carbon would increase. After
29
100 years the accumulated uptake might be 50-70 billion tons of
30
carbon. This is 5-10% of the emissions of carbon dioxide into the
31
atmosphere that is expected during these periods of time due to fossil
32
fuel burning according to the Busines-as-Usual and the Reference
33
Scenario, The practical difficulties of implementing such a policy
34
have not been analysed by Working Group III,
35
36
A reduction of the rate of increase of carbon dioxide in the
37
atmosphere by 10-15% could be achieved if the present rate of
38
deforestation Hould be reduced to about half of the present rate. In
39
tropical countries this would also contribute to maintaining
40
biological diversity. A major program of reforestation as considered
41
by the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference in November 1989 would play
42
some role in slowing down the rate of increase of carbon dioxide in
43
the atmosphere, but would at most reduce it by 5-10%, if fossil fuel
44
use would continue to increase in accordance with the scenarlo
45
Businoss-as-Usual (Scenario A).
46
47
48
49
50
Future Programme of the Working Groups
51
52
a.
Science and Impacts
53
54
55
Because of the pace with which scientific research is advancing,
56
it is vital that IPCC is provided with timely updates to its reports,
so that policymakers are provided with the best foundation for their
20
1
deliberations. whereas complete new assessments will probably not be
2
required until about 1995, revisions in areas of major progress and
3
greatest uncertainty should be made by about 1992. In addition, the
4
capability should be provided to respond to ad hoc scientific
5
questions which may arise from negotiations toward a climate
6
convention.
7
8
Close liaison should be maintained with elements of WCP to ensure
9
that latest scientific results contribute to the assessment process,
10
and that the scientific programmes are structured to maximise their
11
relevance to IPCC.
12
13
b.
Response Stategies
14
15
(para from WG3)
16
17
Narrowing the Uncertainties
18
19
To improve our predictive capability, Working Groups I and Il
20
point out the need:
21
22
*
to understand better the various climate related processes,
23
particularly those associated with clouds, oceans and the
24
carbon cycle;
25
26
to improve systematic observation of climate variables on
27
a global basis, and further investigate changes which took
28
place in the past;
29
30
to develop improved model of the Earth's climate system;
31
32
to increase support for national and international
33
activities especially in developing countries,
34
35
*
to facilitate international exchange of climate data;
36
37
*
to understand better the impacts of climate change on
38
natural terrestrial and marine ecosystems, agriculture and
39
forestry, water resources and human settlements and health;
40
41
In addition to the increased support for national activities, the
42
required programme of research will need unprecedented international
43
cooperation with the WCRP of WMO and ICSU and IGBP of ICSU playing
44
vital roles. The IPCC points out that thore 1s no need to establish
45
new international mechanisms, but rather urges all countries to
16
contribute to these programmes through their national efforts, and to
47
increase financial support and assistance in kind to these programmes,
48
and to the climate related components of WMO, UNEP, UNESCO and its IOC
49
and FAO.
50
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
24
06/29/90 14:48
21
2
RESPONSE STRATEGIES
2
The scientific assessment of a possible man-induced climate
3
change, the environmental and socio-economic consequencos of
4
such a change, and the difficulties we encounter in attempting
5
to slow down or halt it calls for the dovelopment of strategies
6
on a long term basis. The great diversity in the situation of
7
different countries and their responsibilities for combatting
8
climate change will have to be taken into account in such
9
development. It is clear that this is not going to be a simple
10
undertaking.
11
12
with time, we will learn more from further research and
13
monitoring activities, and from experience with implementing
14
limitation/adaptation measures. To take maximum advantage of such
15
growing knowledge and experience, a flexible and progressive
16
approach to addressing climate change is required.
17
18
Working Group III has addressed the issue of formulating
19
response strategies. The following subsections are extracts of
20
the main findings of the policymakers summary of that Working
21
Group,
22
23
MAIN FINDINGS
24
25
The following findings have been identified as a basis for
26
action now and in the future:
27
28
29
1)
Climate change is a global issue: effective responses would
30
require a global effort which may have a considerable impact
31
on humankind and individual societies.
32
33
2)
Industrialized countries and developing countries have a
34
common responsibility in dealing with problems arising from
35
climate change.
36
37
3)
Industrialized countries should take the lead and have
38
specific responsibilities on two levels:
39
40
a) Major part of emissions affecting the atmosphere
41
at present originates in industrialized countries where
42
the scope for change is greatest. Industrialized
43
countries should adopt domestic measures to limit
44
climate change by adapting their own economies in line
45
with future agreements to limit emissions
46
47
b) To co-operate with developing countries in
48
49
international action without standing in the way of the
50
latter's development by contributing additional
51
financial resources, by appropriate transfer of
52
technology, by engaging in close co-operation
53
concerning scientific observation, by analysis and
54
research, and finally by means of technical co-
55
environmental problems.
operation goared to forestalling and managing
56
57
4)
Emissions from developing countries are growing and may
06/29/90 14:49
22
1
need to grow in order to moot their development requirements
2
and thus, over time, are likely to represent an increasingly
3
significant percentage of global emissions. Developing
4
countries should, within the limits feasible, take measures
5
to cuitably adapt thoir economies.
6
7
5)
Sustainable development requires the proper concern for
8
environmental protection, as the necessary basis for
9
continuing economic growth. Continuing economic dovelopment
10
will increasingly have to take into account the issue of
11
climate change. It is imporative that the right balance
12
between economic and environmental objectives be struck.
13
14
6)
Limitation and adaptation strategies must be considered as
15
an integrated package and should complement each other to
16
minimize net costs. Strategies that Iimit greenhouse gases
17
emissions also make it easier to adapt to climate change.
18
19
7)
The potentially serious consequences of climate change on
20
the global environment give sufficient reasons to begin by
21
adopting response strategies that can be justified
22
immediately even in the face of significant uncertainties.
23
24
a)
A well-informed population is essential to promote awareness
25
of the issues and provide guidance on positive practices.
26
The social, economic and cultural diversity of nations will
27
require tailored approaches.
28
29
Because large, projected increase in world population will
30
be a major factor in causing the projected increase in global
31
greenhouse gases, it is essential that global climate change
32
strategies include strategies and measures to deal with the rate
33
of growth of the world population.
34
35
Working Group III has also identified measures at the
36
national, regional and international levels as applicable which,
37
while helping to address the issue of climate change, can yiold
38
other benefits in the shorter term.
39
40
LIMITATION OF NET EMISSIONS FROM THE ENERGY SECTOR
41
42
The energy sector plays a vitally important role in economic
43
well-being and development for all nations. At the same time,
44
because energy production and use accounts for about one half
45
of the radiative forcing from human activities, energy policies
46
neod to ensure that continued economic growth occurs in a manner
47
that, globally, conserves the environment for future
48
generations.
49
50
However, there is no single, quick-fix technological option
31
for limiting greenhouse gas emissions from energy sources. A
52
comprehensive strategy is necessary which doals with improving
53
efficiency on both the demand and supply sides as a priority and
54
emphsizes technological research, development, and deployment.
55
Achieving even a 20% reduction in CO2 from current emission
56
levels would require major changes in global energy markets,
57
plans, and infrastructure, with intervention by governments.
58
Maintaining this emission reduction goal would require continued
06/29/90 14:49
23
1
technological improvements, structural changes in the global
2
economy, and changes in the proportion of carbon-based fuels
3
utilized over the whole of the next century.
4
5
In the energy category, Working Group IIT cspecially noted
6
that:
7
B
-Improved energy efficiency reduces emissions of carbon
9
dioxide, the most significant greenhouse gas, while
10
improving overall economic performance and reducing other
11
pollutant emissions and increasing cnergy security;
12
13
--Use of cleaner energy sources and technologies reduces
14
carbon dioxide emissions, while reducing other pollutant
15
emissions that give rise to acid rain and other damaging
16
effects.
17
18
Working Group III recognizes the particular difficulties
19
which will be faced by countries, particularly developing
20
countries, whose economy is heavily dependent on production
21
and/or export of fossil fuels, as If consequence of actions taken
22
by other countries to limit or reduce energy related greenhouse
23
gas emissions. These difficulties should be takon into account
24
when elaborating international strategies.
25
26
Various potential options have been identified for reducing
27
greenhouse gas emissions from energy systems. The most relevant
28
categories of options appear to be:
29
30
-
efficiency improvements and conservation in energy
31
supply, conversion, and end use:
32
33
-
fuel substitution by energy sources which have lower
34
or no greenhouse gas emissions;
35
36
-
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by removal,
37
recirculation or fixation;
38
39
-
management and behavioral changes (e.g. increased
40
work in homes through information technology) and
41
structural changes (e.g. modal shift in transport).
42
43
The potential for energy efficiency savings in a number of
41
these options ranges from 15 to as much as 60% (see the
45
Policymakers Summary of Working Group III).
46
47
The feasibility of a particular option depends on mcre than
48
its technical potential alone. Important additional factors are
49
its economic potential (economic efficiency and cost
50
effectiveness) and its market potential (the likelihood of
51
52
consumer acceptance, reflecting attitudes to risk and non-
monotary costs).
53
54
55
The challenge to policy makers is to chhance the continual
56
diffusion of technological options into the market place, to
57
encourage behavioral and operational changes, and to address the
58
more of the potential that exists,
broader issues outside the energy sector in order to capture
06/29/90 14:50
6475947 STATE DEPT OES/E
27
2't
1
2
LIMITATIONS OF NET EMISSIONS FROM THE AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY
3
ACTIVITIES
4
5
Agriculture, forestry and other human activities are also
6
responsible for substantial quantities of greenhouse gas
7
emissions.
8
9
About 9 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
10
can be attributed to the agricultural sector. Limitation of
11
emissions from this sector presents a challenge because the
12
processes by which greenhouse gases, in particular methane and
13
nitrous oxide, are released in agricultural activities are not
14
well understood. In addition, response options in the
15
agricultural sector must be designed to ensure maintenance of
16
food supply.
17
18
In the short term, reductions can be achieved through
19
improved livestock waste management, altered use and formulation
20
of fertilizers, and other changes to agricultural land use,
21
without affecting food security.
22
23
Forestry practices and other human activities associated
24
with land use, such as biomass burning and landfills, account
25
for about 18 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
26
The forest crisis is rooted in the agricultural sector and in the
27
human need for employment and income. Deforestation will be
28
stopped only when the natural forest is economically more
29
valuable for the people who live in and around the forests than
30
alternative uses for the same land. Useful steps might include:
31
32
--Improved forest management and, where feasible, expansion
33
of forest areas as possible reservoirs of carbon.
34
35
--Possible key elements of a world forest conservation
36
protocol could be identified in the context of a climate
37
convention process, that also addresses energy supply and
38
use and practical means of implementing it.
39
40
--Use - of forest products and wood could be strengthened and
41
improved through measures such as substituting a portion of
42
fossil energy sources by wood or other sustainable managed
43
biomass; partial replacement of high energy input materials
44
by wood; further recycling of forest products; and, improved
45
efficiency of use of fuel wood.
46
47
LIMITATION BY PHASING OUT CFC's UNDER THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
48
49
50
CFCs represent a very important source of greenhouse gas
emissions and account for about 25% of the total contributions
51
to the enhanced radiative forcing for the period of the 1980s.
52
Phasing out of CFCs under the Montreal Protocol would remove
53
54
some of the most powerful and long-lived greenhouse gases, while
also protecting the stratospheric ozone layer.
55
56
57
need ** no
But the review of the Montreal Protocol [now underway. may
account the global warming potential of proposed CFC
Levined 82 appropriate after London] should take into
59
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25
1
substitutes. For a given emission rate, HCFCs and HFCs are less
2
effective greenhouse gases than the CFCs because of their shorter
3
lifetimes. The growth rates assumed in the IPCC scenarios will
4
result in the atmospheric concentrations of HFCs and HCFCs
5
becoming comparable to the CFCs during the next several decades
6
assuming that-the CFCs had continued to be used at current rates.
7
8
MEASURES FOR ADAPTING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
9
10
In addition to the limitation options discussed above,
11
Working Group III reviewed measures for adapting to potential
12
climate change with respect to coastal zones and resource use
13
management. These include:
14
15
--Developing emergency and disaster preparedness policies
16
and programs.
17
18
--Assessing areas at risk from sea-level rise and developing
19
comprehensive management plans to reduce future
20
vulnerability of populations and coastal developments and
21
ecosystems as part of coastal zone management plans.
22
23
--Improving the efficiency of natural resource use, research
24
on control measures for desertification and enhancing
25
adaptability of crops to saline regimes.
26
27
A programme could begin now to enable developing countries
28
to implement coastal zone management plans by the year 2000. The
29
programme would provide for training of country experts, data
30
collection and technical assistance and co-operation.
31
32
IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
33
34
Working Group III also considered several priority areas
35
which must be addressed in order to adequately implement
36
limitation or adaptation responses. These "implementation
37
mechanisms" represent the primary vehicles through which
38
national, regional and international responses to climate can
39
be effected.
40
41
Public Information and Education
42
43
44
A well informed global population is essential for
45
addressing and coping with an issue as complex as climate change.
46
Because climate change would affect, either directly or
47
indirectly, almost every sector of society, broad global
48
understanding of the issue will facilitate the adoption and
49
implementation of such response options as deemed necessary and
50
appropriate. The dissemination of information also represents
51
a powerful economic instrument for ensuring that markets
52
opportunities of climate change.
accurately take into account potential consequences and/or
53
54
Technology Development and Transfer:
55
56
new technologies may provide the means by which societies can
any effort to address global climate change. The development of
89
07 TRAIA ST IO TATQUOTA nun
LS
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26
1
meet their energy, food, and other needs in the face of changes
2
in global climate, while at the same time minimizing emissions
3
of greenhouse gases.
4
5
Technological development, including improvement and
6
reassessment of existing technologies, is needed to limit or
7
reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions; absorb such gases
8
by protecting and increasing sinks; adapt human activities and
9
resource use and management to the impacts of climate change;
10
and detect, monitor and predict climate change and its impacts.
11
12
There is a need for the rapid transfer of technology to the
13
developing countries on a preferential basis, of technologies
14
for addressing climate change. Developing countries are of the
15
view that transfer of technologies on a non-commercial basis is
16
necessary and that specific bilateral and multilateral agreements
17
should be established to promote this. Some other countries where
18
technologies are not owned by the government believe that
19
transfer of technologies would be a function of commercial
20
negotiations. The issue of intellectual property rights also
21
presents a case where international opinion is mixed.
22
23
Economic Mechanisms
24
25
It is important that any potential measures to limit or
26
adapt to global climate change be as economically efficient and
27
cost-effective as possible, while taking into account important
28
social implications.
29
30
In general, environmental objectives can be achieved either
31
32
through regulations requiring the use of a specific technology
or attainment of specified goals, or through economic instruments
33
34
such as emissions fees, subsidies, sanctions, tradeable permits,
35
or a comprehensive system that might address all greenhouse gas
36
sources and sinks. Market based economic instruments encourage
37
limitations in emissions by those who can achieve them at least
38
cost. Careful and substantive analysis of the implications of
such instruments is needed.
39
40
41
Economic instruments, through their encouragement of
42
flexible selection of abatement measures, frequently offer the
43
possibility of achieving environmental improvements at lower
44
45
mechanisms also have the potential to provide the signals
technologies and practices for reducing emissions. Economic
tend to encourage innovation and the development of improved they
cost than regulatory mechanisms. Unlike many regulations,
46
47
48
49
will be applicable to all circumstances.
markets. It is unlikely, however, that economic instruments of
necessary for more environmentally sensitive operation
50
51
Financial Mechanisms
52
53
54
change. adequate measures to limit and/or adapt to climate for
undertaking important that assurances of financial mechanisms are needed it
Industrialised and developing countries consider
55
56
57
Extended Page 29. 1
58
Financial resources channolled to developing countries would
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27
1
be most effective if focused on those activities which contribute
2
both to limiting greenhouse gas emissions and promoting economic
3
development. Areas for cooperation and assistance could include:
4
5
Efficient use of energy resources and the increased
6
use-of fossil fuels with lower greenhouse gas emission
7
rate or non-fossil sources;
8
9
Rational forest management practices and agricultural
10
techniques which reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
11
12
Facilitating technology transfer and technology
13
development;
14
15
Measures which enhance the capacity of developing
16
countries to develop programs to address climate
17
change, including research and development activities
18
and public awareness and education;
19
20
Participation by developing countries in international
21
fora on global climate change, such as the IPCC.
22
23
Legal Measures
24
25
The measures noted above would require a high degree of
26
international cooperation, with due respect for national
27
sovereignty of states. To assist in that process, international
28
negotiation on a framework convention on climate change should
29
start as quickly as possible after the completion of the IPCC
30
First assessment Report. This, together with any additional
31
protocol (s) that might be agreed upon, would provide a firm basis
32
for effective cooperation to act on greenhouse gas emissions and
33
to adapt to any adverse effects of climate change.
34
35
36
The framework convention should, at a minimum, contain
37
general principles and obligations. It should be framed in such
38
a way as to gain the adherence of the largest possible number
39
timely action to be taken.
and most suitably balanced range of countries while permitting
40
41
42
Working Group III compiled & list of possible elements for
43
a framework convention. The inclusion of any particular element
44
in this list does not imply consensus with respect to that
41
negotiating element or the such agreement a convention; of any these narticular include: government -- include
48
49
0
50
the political imperative of striking the correct
51
balances (a) between the arguments for a far-reaching,
52
53
problem of climate change; and (b) among the risks of
adoption of a convention so a3 to begin tackling the
action-oriented convention and the need for urgent
54
55
scientific uncertainty;
inaction, the costs of action and current levels of
56
57
o
58
on the the extent to which specific obligations, particularly
control of emissions of greenhouse gases, should
06/29/90 14:53
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28
1
be included in the convention itself, possibly as
2
annexes, or be the subject of a separate protocol (s) ;
3
4
the timing of negotiation 01 protocol (s) in relation
5
to the nogotiations on the convention;
6
7
the introduction as appropriate of sound scientific
8
bases for establishing emission targets (such as total
9
emission levels, per capita emissions, emissions per
10
GNP, emissions per energy use, climatic conditions,
11
past performance, geographic characteristics, fossil
12
fuel resource base, carbon intensity per unit of
13
energy, energy intensity per GNP, socio-economic costs
14
and benefits or other equitable considerations) i
15
16
the extent to which specific goals with respect to
17
global levels of emissions or atmospheric
18
concentrations of greenhouse gases should be addressed;
19
20
whether obligations should be equitably differentiated
21
according to countries' respective responsibilities
22
for causing and combatting climate change and their
23
level of development;
24
25
the need for additional resources for developing
26
countries and the manner in which this should be
27
addressed, particularly in terms of the nature, size
28
and conditions of the funding, even if detailed
29
arrangements form the subject of a separate protocol;
30
31
O
32
the basis on which the promotion of the development
and transfer of technology and provision of technical
33
34
assistance and co-operation to developing countries
35
should take place, taking into account considerations
36
such as terms of transfer (preferential or non-
37
preferential, commercial or non-commercial), assured
38
access, intellectual property rights, the environmental
39
soundness implications; of such technology, and the financial
40
41
O
42
the nature of any new institutions to be created by
43
the convention (such as a Conference of the Parties,
44
an Executive Organ, as well as other bodies), together
45
with their functions, composition and decision-making
46
powers, e.g., whether or not they should exercise
47
undertaken; supervision and control over the obligations
48
49
o
50
the criteria, timing, legal form and incidence of
51
gases. obligations to control the net emissions of greenhouse any
52
53
54
55
56
57
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1
Stratugies for the future
2
3
The major dilemmas
4
5
The conclusions of Working Group I show clearly that the
6
scientific community essentially agrees about the climate changes
7
that could occur if the present build-up of greenhouse gas
8
emissions continues or even accelerates into the next century as
9
projected by both the Scenario A (Business-as-Usual) and the
10
Reference Scenario. Working Group II envisages potentially far-
11
reaching environmental consequences of such changes. This threat
12
to the global environment and its implications for countries and
13
the peoples of the world must be weighed against the costs and
14
other socio-economic implications for limiting, and/or adapting
15
to, any adverse effects of climate change. It is, therefore,
16
essential to address a few fundamental questions in this context.
17
18
The developed countries have emitted most of the greenhouse
19
gases into the atmosphere that now cause us concern. The
20
developing countries are rapidly increasing their emissions in
21
striving for improving their living standards, particularly by
22
increasing their use of fossil fuels as the prime source of
23
energy. Cheap energy has in the past contributed substantially
24
to the rapid increase of the standards of living in
25
industrialized countries. They possess the knowledge and the
26
human and financial resources to develop the necessary means to
27
combat climate change. Recognizing the poverty that prevails
28
among the populations of developing countries, it is natural
29
that fight against poverty and achieving economic growth is given
30
priority by them. Closing the gap between the industrialized and
31
the developing countries is a prerequisite for a full partnership
32
of all nations of the world in the development of a strategy to
33
deal with the climate change issue.
34
35
A rapidly increasing world population will mean greater
36
demands for resources in general and energy in particular.
37
Management of the world's natural resources is also closely
38
linked to the climate change issue. It is obvious, that all these
39
and other global issues have to be addressed simultaneously.
40
41
Climate change issue is a long term, evolutionary issue. We
42
are not able to foresee its long term consequences very well yet
43
and will not be able to do so soon. However, scientific data
44
indicate that at present the atmospheric concentrations of carbon
45
dioxide and methane are on their way to reaching values well
46
outside the range that has prevailed for more than 100, 000 years.
47
It seems prudent, then, to consider that an unlimited growth in
48
the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is not
49
acceptable. Although stabilization of the greenhouse gas
50
concentrations in the atmosphere is ultimately a necessity. we
51
cannot as yet determine at what levels they should be stabilized
52
or the costs of such stabilization,
53
54
The discussions in Working Group III show that the
55
difficulties in assessing the social and economic costs of
56
climate change, as well as the consequences of the
57
required to slow and
Extended Page 32. 1
58
with serious difficulties when trying to develop a strategy present us to
RACE and uitimately stop such a change,
one measures
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33
3D
1
deal with the greenhouse gas issue. An obvious reason is that
2
we cannot as yet predict reliably enough how a change of climate
3
would influence different countries directly. on the other hand,
4
the implications and particularly the costs, of the specific
5
actions that are being considered to slow down or prevent a
6
change of climate can be envisaged more easily by economists and
7
politicians. Yet, it is not evident that more stringent and
8
therefore costly measures would find approval amongst a broad
9
majority of people even in countries where they may be reasonably
10
well informed about environmental problems.
11
12
International agreements are necessary in order to have a
13
balanced development of the world economy and to safeguard at
14
the same time the global environment. This applies particularly
15
when confronted with as complex an issue as that of climate
16
change. If individual countries can optimize their benefits by
17
letting other countries share their costs (i.e. pay for
18
pollution) without they themselves taking the necessary
19
precautions (reducing pollution), the economy of the total system
20
becomes unstable and a catastrophic development may occur ("the
21
law of the commons"). We must also recognize the vast differences
22
in economic strength between the players on the international
23
scene, 1.e., the nations and the large multinational companies
24
in the world. The fundamental question becomes: How can a
25
sustainable and improving future for the developing countries
26
1.e., for three quarters of humanity, as well as for the
27
industrial countries, be achieved faced with the potential threat
28
of climate change?
29
30
31
It is also clear that the effects of specific preventive
32
actions being considered on the countries of the world vary much
33
from one to another. At present fossil fuels account for 80 -
34
85% of the primary energy supply in the world, but different
35
countries are very differently dependent on their use. Producers
36
and users of fossil fuels will experience restrictions on the
37
emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere very differently.
38
39
fossil fuels for meeting their increased energy demands for
Many developing countries have extensive plans of using
40
41
development. extent has The infrastructure of most countries to a large
42
been based on a fossil-fuel driven transport system.
43
44
45
Measures agriculture to or the dependance on forest products for expand
Deforestation is in part an expression of the need to
46
47
unpredictable major changes of traditional management practices may
imply limit methane production in wet-land agriculture export.
48
for consequences for the farmers involved. with
49
50
countries. and many other concerns that will be faced by the consider
these combatting man-induced climate change must carefully Any plan
51
controversies As a matter of fact, it is not surprising world's
52
in particular arise about as complex an issue as the present that
53
may be yet incomplete. The major dilemma is that likely
problems is as when the detailed understanding of the one,
54
55
resolved. required well before many of these specific issues actions can be
56
57
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34
31
1
Elements of a strategy and an action programme
2
3
The complexity of the problem as outlined above based on the
4
detailed reports of the IPCC Working Groups, means that
5
agreements on necessary actions will not be easy to reach.
6
Working Group I has concluded that "the longer emissions continue
7
to increase at present day rates, the greater reductions would
8
have to be for concentrations to stabilize at a given level".
9
10
The IPCC emphasizes that despite scientific uncertainties
11
endortiming of climate change. but because of the
12
yery long response times of the atmosphere. climate and society
13
it would be prudent to initiate negotiations on a framework
14
convention on climate change as soon as possible,
15
16
First we address actions that could be taken now.
17
18
It is clear from the Working Group III report that there
19
are a number of actions that also would be beneficial for other
20
environmental reasons and that would cost comparatively little,
21
as a matter of fact in some cases rather imply savings. These
22
deserve attention now. An action program to take advantage of
23
such possibilities has been called a "no regrets policy" defined
?4
as a policy of taking "measures in the shorter term which while
25
helping to tackle climate change also can yield other benefits".
26
Numerous measures of this kind have been considered by the
27
Working Group III and are summarized in a previous section of
28
this overview.
29
IPCC confirms that such measures would, if widely used,
30
significantlky slow down the further increase of greenhouse
31
concentrations in the atmosphere, These measures to be taken at
32
the national, regional and international levels include:
33
* CFC controls to include resticted use of greenhouse
34
active alternatives,
-
35
36
* use gases, of energy sources with lower emissions of greenhouse
37
* improved energy end use efficiency,
38
39
of forest areas,
* improved forest management and where feasible expansion
40
41
* review of agricultural practices aiming at reduced
greenhouse gas emissions,
42
43
44
sections of this report.
More elaborate descriptions of these are given in earlier
45
46
47
48
to reduce the rate of increase in global emissions and order
nations, should consider actions to stabilize emnissions groups in
IPCC further believes that individual nations, or of
49
50
assist in the prevention of an acceleration of greenhouse thus gas
51
52
accelerate progress towards international agreements.
concentrations in the atmosphere, such initiatives may
53
54
Secondly, longer term. we address the need for a phased strategy for the
55
56
57
on a convention. it is agreements
Awaiting the outcome of negotiations for general
06/29/90 14:57
6475947 STATE DEPT
31
1
Because existing information is inadequato to understand
2
what rate of change of climate, and of greenhouse gas emissions,
3
might be acceptable, there is a need for a phased approach. The
4
first step would be to set criteria.
5
6
The IPCC considers that work should begin on
7
definingcriteria which would reflect the impacts of climate
8
change and their costs on the one hand, and the costs and
9
practicalities of reductions in emissions on the other.
10
Such criteria would be evolutionary; they should take into
11
account what might be an acceptable level of climate change and
12
reflect the changes in our scientific and economic understanding
13
and technological capabilities.
14
15
In the light of the importance of understanding better the
16
economics of the greenhouse gas issue,
17
18
the IPCC recommends that research on the international
19
economic implications of the global climate issue be
20
intensified. with particular regard to the specific
21
circumstances of individual countries as well as the broad
22
generic differences between developed and developing
23
countries, Governments may consider developing mechanisms
24
by which the international market can find optimal means to
25
recognize the implicit climate change cost of human
26
activities without hampering sustainable development, and
27
in this regard, should fully evaluate economic consequences of
28
such mechanisms.
29
30
Working Group III also emphasizes in this context the
31
importance of public information and education.
32
33
IPCC supports the view that because climate change would
34
affect, either directly or indirectly, almost every sector of
35
society, and also because important policy responses will have
36
to be developed against a background of uncertainty, broad global
37
understanding of the issue will facilitate the adoption and the
38
implementation of such response options as deemed necessary and
39
appropriate. Further efforts to achieve this are urgently
40
needed,
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
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33
1
The Special Circumstances of the Developing Countries
2
3
It is obvious that the impact on and the participation by
4
the developing countries in the further development of a future
5
strategy is essential. The IPCC has addressed this specific issue
6
by establishing a Special Committee on the Participation of
7
Developing Countries. This subsection summarizes the findings on
8
the issue.
9
10
Although emissions of greenhouse gases are increasing in
11
developing countries, where about 75% of the world population
12
lives, they emit only about 25% of the world total. Their per
13
capita emission is only about a tenth of that in the
14
industrialized world.
15
16
Industrialized countries and developing countries have a
17
common responsibility in dealing with the adverse effects of
18
climate change, taking into account not only the past and present
19
responsibility of the industrialized world in the accumulation
20
of greenhouse gases but also the present technological, human and
21
financial capacities of the developed countries. An acceptable
22
standard of living in the developing countries needs to be
23
achieved before a developing country can be expected to
24
participate fully in addressing issues related to climate chnage.
25
In this context,
26
27
a) Industrialized countries should take the lead and have
28
specific responsibilities on two levels:
29
30
1) To adopt domestic measures to limit greenhouse gas
31
emissions by adapting their own economies in line with relevant
32
future international agreements;
33
34
11) To cooperate with developing countries in
35
international action without standing in the way of the latter's
36
development by contributing additional financial resources, by
37
appropriate transfer of technology, by engaging in close
38
cooperation concerning scientific observation, by analysis and
39
40
research, and finally by means of technical cooperation geared
to forestalling and managing environmental problems;
41
42
b) Emissions from developing countries are growing and need
43
44
to grow in order to meet their development requirements.
45
Thus, over time, they are likely to represent an
46
increasingly significant percentage of global emissions.
47
Developing countries should, within the limits feasible,
take measures to suitably adapt their economies.
48
49
50
Against this background, IPCC requested its Special
51
Committee to identify factors inhibiting the full participation
52
of the developing countries in IPCC and recommend remedial
53
measures where possible. The Committee stressès that full
54
but participation includes not only the physical presence at meetings
55
issues of concern such as the appreciation of the scientific
also the development of national competence to address all
56
57
basis change of and climate change, the potential impacts on
06/29/90 14:59
34
1
The factors identified by the Special committee are:
2
3
*insufficient information;
4
*insufficient communication;
5
*limited human resources;
6
*institutional difficulties;
7
*limited financial resources.
8
9
On some of these factors, the IPCC Working Groups have
10
developed policy options which are to be found in their
11
respective reports. The Special Committee itself has made a
12
number of specific recommendations including the development of
13
specific programmes of action; these are to be found in its
14
report, The implementation of the recommendations and appropriate
15
policy options will require commitment of financial resources and
16
mechanisms.
17
18
Financial resources channelled to developing countries would
19
be most effective if focused on those activities which contribute
20
both to limiting greenhouse gas emissions and/or adapting to any
21
adverse effects of climate change, and promoting economic
22
development. Areas for cooperation and assistance could include:
23
24
Efficient use of energy resources and the increased
25
use of fossil fuels with lower greenhouse gas emission
26
rate or non-fossil sources;
27
28
Rational forest management practices and agricultural
29
techniques which reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
30
31
Pacilitating technology transfer and technology
32
development;
33
34
Measures which enhance the capacity of developing
35
countries to develop programs to address climate
36
change, including research and development
37
activities and public awareness and education;
38
39
Participation by developing countries in international
40
fora on global climate change, such as the IPCC.
41
42
It was recognized that cooperation and assistance for
43
adaptive measures would be required, noting that for some regions
44
and countries, adaptation rather than limitation activities are
45
potentially most important.
46
47
The IPCC concludes that the recommendations of the Special
48
49
Committee need not and should not await the outcome of future
negotiations on a climate convention. It appeals to the
50
51
multilateral and bilateral funding organizations to implement
52
the recommendations. It further appeals to the governments for
53
continuing and increased contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund on
an urgent basis,
54
55
56
57
58
25
ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW FROM BUSINESS
by Thomas G. Lambrix
Introduction
such as Kristallnacht. presaged the holocaust. Those that
I have heard it said that global climate change is the
do not recognize this have been labeled modern-day Ne-
"super tanker" of environmental issues. It has all the
ville Chamberlains. Draconian interventionist legislation
characteristics of becoming the foremost environmental
has been proposed and the implementation of 'global
crusade of the 1990s and well into the next century. In fact,
warming' is now a touchstone of U.S. foreign policy.
some would argue that it already is the principal environ-
Clearly, deep emotional commitments now guide this
issue.'
mental concern facing all nations of the world today. That
is because the ecological implications from a future that
While there has been considerable attention to these
is significantly or even moderately warmer than today are
views, little public scrutiny has so far been given to what
potentially substantial. perhaps resulting in incredible
it might mean to adjust lifestyles and otherwise pay for
changes to our physical world. These changes. should they
corrective measures here and around the world to address
occur, would also manifest themselves in economic as
global climate change. So, while the issue has been "teed
well as societal impacts that are hard to quantify, but would
up," awaiting action for some months. its full dimensions
undoubtedly be dramatic.
still remain unclear, and consensus on solutions is elusive.
As I have said. global climate change is the super tanker
However, understanding and attempting to describe
environmental issue; it can potentially affect our values,
future global climate change is perhaps one of the most
our behavior, our social structures. and our institutions.
challenging undertakings that our modern scientific com-
which, like a super tanker, are slow to form. slow to stop.
munity will face because attempting to understand the
and slow to change. All of this, from the science to the
world's climate involves grasping the innumerable inter-
politics, is incredibly complex.
active and complex variables that make up our global
In commenting on this notion recently. Dr. Allan
environment.
Bromley. President Bush's Science Advisor. drew this
The political dimensions of global climate change are
humorous anecdote: "In considering the challenge of un-
also extremely complex. Nations look at this issue differ-
derstanding global change, it is easy to sympathize with
ently-some with more concern than others, and some
the remark of the medieval king Alfonso X of Castile. who
who support responses that are more radical than others.
said, 'If the Lord Almighty had consulted me before
As for the United States, our citizens have for the past year
embarking on the Creation, I would have recommended
and a half been shown an array of stories from the print
something simpler.
and visual media describing a whole range of possible
It is within this context that U.S. industry wants to be
impacts associated with global climate change. They have
an active and constructive participant in offering reasoned
heard from scientists, government representatives, and
and responsible actions to address this aspect of Alfonso's
leaders in environmental groups. As a result, people have
dilemma.
become aware and many are anxious over what global
warming means for them and their children. While an
informed public is desirable, in my opinion most of this
The Global Climate Coalition
concern has been focused on the more pessimistic impact
Earlier this century, U.S. President Calvin Coolidge
scenarios that have been given visibility by the popular press.
announced, "The chief business of America is business."
Dr. Patrick Michaels, a climatologist from the Univer-
Today, promoting economic growth through private enter-
sity of Virginia recently noted,' Time Magazine painted
prise remains a chief business of America, although there
the following picture in its 1988 'Man of the Year' issue,
is a maturity to business actions that bear distinction.
featuring Planet Earth: If left unchecked, anthropogener-
Businesses today recognize the need to not only make a
ated alterations of the atmosphere will bring, by the years
profit and to enhance shareholder value, but to be respon-
2030-2050, a global temperature rise of 4°C, ecological
sible corporate citizens that are concerned about the
chaos including famine, related civil strife, and tidal
quality of lives in America and around the world.
waves crashing through a Manhattan landscaped with
This has especially been true over the last 20 years as
palm trees
businesses have invested in environmental quality, cor-
Dr. Michaels continues, "Such scenarios also abound
porate philanthropy, education, drug abuse prevention,
in the writings of politically active environmental scien-
and other worthy social programs.
tists, environmental lobbyists, and newswriters. United
I think today business recognizes that it must be accur-
States elected officials have compared the current situ-
ately perceived by the public as pursuing an agenda that
ation to that of fascist Germany, where several events,
is in harmony with society's goals. Particularly, managers
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ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE
of U.S. industries appreciate that citizens will no longer
warming (responding to a carbon dioxide doubling) to
tolerate poor environmental quality. even in the name of
about 2° Celsius. 3 This is at the low end of the scale from
absolute economic progress.
the predictions that were publicized only a year ago.
Businesses today spend many billions annually for
In addition, The Washington Post recently reported.
environmental protection measures. and businesses recog-
"According to Mark Meier of the Institute of Arctic and
nize that more investments will be required. And. these
Alpine Research at the University of Colorado, the con-
investments have paid off in demonstrable improvement
sensus now is that sea level will rise by about a foot in the
to U.S. environmental quality.
next century. rather than the three feet that had been
So in approaching this complex question of potential
suggested in previous studies.
changes to our global climate, businesses in this country
Even Dr. Stephen H. Schneider. the National Center
have taken an active interest. The Global Climate Coali-
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) climatologist who has
tion is a result of that interest. It it an ad hoc organization
publicly stated a personal bias for moving ahead with
of a broad spectrum of U.S. companies and trade organiz-
policies to slow down the rapid buildup of greenhouse
ations representing energy consumption. energy produc-
gases. wrote recently. "The consensus about the likelihood
tion. information. and allied industries.
of future global change weakens over detailed assess-
Our involvement is premised upon the seriousness
ments of the precise timing and geographic distribution of
with which we view this issue and on the potentially
potential effects and crumbles over the value question of
enormous impact certain suggested resolutions of the is-
whether present information is sufficient to generate a
sues may have on our industrial base and the national
societal response stronger than more scientific research on
economy. For the past year. the Coalition has embarked
the problems ..5
on programs to encourage scientific research. reviewed
It is, therefore. our opinion that enhanced scientific
voluntary initiatives that can be adopted. participated in
research should be our first priority. We should be focusing
governmental review of the issue both here and abroad.
significant resources to reducing as much of the scientific
provided economic analysis, and otherwise promoted in-
uncertainty as possible over the next 10 to 20 years.
formed debate of policy responses.
Clearly, enhanced effort will be required but we believe
this is a necessary and sound investment.
Need For Science
Again. quoting Dr. Schneider. A dedicated effort
When it has come to supporting new government laws
to accelerate the rate of progress could conceivably speed
and regulations to deal with environmental matters, busi-
up the establishment of a consensus on regional issues, but
ness has often been criticized for its opposition to new
at best 10 years or so will be necessary even with a
legislative proposals. At a minimum. business has been
dramatic effort. However. such efforts would clearly put
seen as a reluctant partner in achieving solutions. Often
future decision making on a firmer factual basis and help
business has been seen by others to be hiding behind a
to make adaptation strategies more effective sooner."
position of "more study." Critics see this stance as one of
(emphasis added)
delay, where businesses hope the problem will go away.
I am beginning to hear this comment directed toward
That is why the Coalition supports the U.S. govern-
business on global chimate change, and I expect we will
ment's efforts that are being undertaken by the Committee
on Earth Sciences and believes it should move forward
hear it again as the debate continues. This is unfortunate,
because I believe it is only natural for businesses to be
with all speed. The Coalition enthusiastically endorses
interested in obtaining as many facts as possible about a
President George Bush's call for substantially increasing
federal funding next year for research devoted to all as-
problem before acting.
pects of global climate change. In addition, we strongly
This does not equate to a lessening of concern, but to
believe that government and industry should work
a posture of responsible action. In everyday matters, busi-
together in accomplishing our research goals.
ness carefully pursues a study of data and options before
making investments. This is the nature of business. And
We should make every effort to remove any barriers to
in the case of global climate change, despite the criticisms
a greater working relationship between government and
and the emotional appeal for drastic action, more study is
industry and identify specific opportunities for forming
required.
joint industry/government partnerships.
Most readers are familiar with the outstanding dis-
We recommend, specifically, that the U.S. focus its
agreements, questions, and uncertainties regarding the
research on analytic efforts to establish the relative inte-
scientific basis for anthropogenically generated global
grity of our general circulation models; on understanding
climate change. We believe that, while there is no dis-
the dynamics of the carbon cycle; on sorting out the
agreement over the "greenhouse" theory itself and that
respective roles of cloud formation, the oceans, and vol-
atmospheric accumulations of greenhouse gases are in-
canic activity; and developing reliable regional effects
creasing, there are differing views over the significance of
and, importantly, on differentiating between real climate
future greenhouse gas emissions and whether and what
changes due to the normal variations of natural climati
should be done about it now.
phenomena and qualified changes attributable to anthro
For example, at a recent meeting of climatologists
pogenically-generated gases.
hosted by the National Academy of Sciences, a group of
While the Coalition firmly believes that additiona
nationally recognized climate experts generally agreed
scientific understanding is necessary, it is important not t
that emerging evidence has reduced expected global
leave the conclusion that we are just hiding behind th
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27
more study" solution to this problem. This is not an
growth and is sustainable to the environment. including
ccurate representation.
the global atmosphere. I am confident that U.S. businesses
will be anxious to help.
Coalition's Agenda
Support for initiatives. At home. the Coalition sup-
ports strong leadership by the president and the U.S.
The Coalition is also vigorously pursuing the follow-
Congress on global climate change. We particularly sup-
g agendas:
port the president's endorsement of a free-market ap-
Support for international leadership. The Global Cli-
proach toward identifying appropriate responses. We also
nate Coalition strongly supports leadership by the United
agree with the president that intervention action by the
tates toward developing a responsible approach interna-
United States unilaterally in the economy is not warranted
onally to the global climate change question.
at this time.
Here we believe it is important that the U.S. govern-
This does not mean that other activities cannot be
nent exercise this leadership through its chairmanship of
pursued. For example, in addition to supporting the presi-
he response strategies working group of the Intergovern-
dent's announced program for enhanced scientific re-
nental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and through the
search. the Coalition enthusiastically supports
lllocation of its financial resources toward cooperative
investments in cost-effective energy efficiency, orderly
fforts here and abroad to address scientific, economic,
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons, development of public
and technical questions.
education programs. and implementation of reforestation
The Coalition has met with various members of the
initiatives.
PCC's U.S. delegation. from the Environmental Protec-
In addition, we believe there are other opportunities to
ion Agency. and the departments of State, Energy, Com-
demonstrate presidential and congressional leadership. I
nerce, and Interior. The Coalition also recognizes and
will mention just two specific programs. The first is the
supports the efforts of the many other countries, their
announcement of a federal demonstration program for
industries, and non-government organizations involved in
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. The
the IPCC process.
U.S. government should lead by example by investing in
I believe that there is little disagreement among inter-
energy efficiency applications in the federal estate. This
ested parties over the premise that unilateral action by any
should both help educate the public at large about the
one nation will not have a meaningful impact on the
application of these technologies and also reduce produc-
accumulation of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere.
tion costs.
In fact. while North America and the industrialized
Second, the president should announce a "Nationwide
nations of the world have been and are today the major
Recognition Program" designed to identify and reward
contributors to anthropogenic atmospheric greenhouse
citizen efforts and investments in such areas as new energy
gas buildup. this trend is declining and will reverse itself
efficiency technologies; school education programs. in-
in the future when the developing world becomes the
cluding scholarship awards for science and related sub-
significant contributor.
jects; and community efforts such as recycling and
The cooperation and active input from the developing
reforestation programs.
countries will be essential for an effective global response
Towns and villages in the United States could "adopt
to potential global warming.
a town" in another country and set up information and
In a report that the Global Climate Coalition commis-
assistance exchanges to emphasize local actions by
sioned last year to evaluate some of the economic impli-
citizens around the globe. The president could instruct the
cations of unilateral action on global warming, the
chairman of his Council on Environmental Quality, in
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International
cooperation with other appropriate agencies, to develop
Studies reaffirmed the importance of this conclusion.
and implement this program. A congressional joint resol-
It stated, "The world's population is expected to grow
ution to this effect would also be welcome. Companies
from 5 billion in 1988 to 6 billion in the year 2000 and 8
could set up parallel programs, and, in fact. many com-
billion by 2025. Most of this increase will be in the Third
panies are already undertaking specific steps on their own.
World and the communist nations where energy demand
In an address to a recent meeting of the National
has doubled since 1971. Almost all of this increase has
Governors Association, Secretary of State James Baker
been in fossil fuels."
discussed the president's program to address global cli-
Developing countries are expected to quadruple their
mate change. He described this program as a "no regrets
energy consumption between now and the year 2025. By
policy." He explained that the administration was prepared
the middle of the next century, they will account for the
to take actions that are " fully justified in their own right
bulk of the greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere,
and which have the added advantage of coping with
even if they succeed in doubling their energy efficiency."
greenhouse gases. 8
Therefore, the industrialized countries must obtain the
The Coalition supports this approach to policy making
cooperation and active input from the developing coun-
on global climate change and recognizes that business has
tries for an effective global response to potential global
a responsibility for developing constructive responses. In
warming. The challenge to companies and policymakers
order to establish itself as a credible, informed, and com-
here and abroad is to work with these nations as they strive
mitted partner in the search for appropriate responses,
to improve the standard of living for their expanding
business must increase its efforts to make environmental
populations and do so in a way that promotes economic
conscientiousness a matter of routine practice and con-
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ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE
tinue to accelerate its own efforts to invest in cost-effective
After a year and a half of intense public and political
energy efficiency technologies.
visibility to the projected ecological disasters caused by
Coalition member companies have accrued almost 20
global climate change. we are only now beginning to
years of research and technological experience in the
address ourselves to the economic consequences of re-
pursuit of effective energy efficiencies which equally
sponses that some have touted as absolutely necessary to
serve sound economic and environmental policy. We be-
deal with this "crisis."
lieve we are making progress. and we intend to continue
The question of who pays and who benefits will
to look for ways to increase efficiency and reduce pollu-
become the principal negotiating point of attention in the
tion. In the future we hope that any improvements we
future as the United States and nations around the world
develop here can be made available around the world.
determine economic and societal effects of mitigation and.
At this time, the Global Climate Coalition is actively
adaptation responses.
investigating a menu of industry initiatives that can be
Here in the United States. I don't believe that we will
supported now, that make sense in their own right by
continue to view global climate change in the same context
providing cost-effective investments. and that also do not
as other environmental issues. such as enactment of new
aggravate the buildup of greenhouse gases.
clean air legislation. The issue is too complex and the
Voluntary industry adoption of specific programs now
requirements on our citizens much more drastic if severe
could include energy efficiency technologies. productivity
intervention strategies are implemented.
increases, development of new products and technologies.
This point was specifically noted in a recent report by
waste minimization. and identification of innovative pro-
the Department of Energy. which concluded: "Unless
grams to disseminate technology and deal with the real
there is uncontentious sustained evidence of climate-
problems of technology transfer from the developed to the
change impacts, a real possibility exists that the current
developing world.
appearance of societal consensus in favor of urgent action
The point to stress here. I believe. is that it is critically
on climate change may fragment as the costs to various
important that the U.S. government's policy should en-
sectors of society become clear. Even if the resulting
courage business to take these steps by creating a favor-
economic disruption and societal conflict can be over-
able climate. This means that our policy should rely
come, such conflict carries its own costs which must be
heavily on free market principles and the application of
considered part of the true social cost of a policy pack-
.,10
incentives rather than the institution of penalties. if the
age
private sector is to be most effective in responding.
To address these important economic issues. the Coali-
We need to stress flexibility in our energy. agricultural.
tion has retained a contractor team to undertake an econ-
foreign assistance. and research policies so that we can
omic assessment of potential near-term policy responses
adjust our programs and our investments as our under-
by the United States.
standing of the global climate change phenomenon in-
Specifically, the objectives of the study are to:
creases and as our multilateral discussions mature.
Analyze the impact of proposed policy actions on the
We are pleased to see that President Bush supports this
U.S. economy and on the competitiveness of U.S. industry
emphasis as well. As he stated in his remarks recently to
in world markets:
the IPCC, "If we hope to promote environmental protec-
Determine the impact of proposed policy actions on
tion and economic growth around the world, it will be
net global greenhouse gas emissions; and
important not to work in conflict, but with our industrial
sectors. That will mean moving beyond the practice of
Assess the geopolitical context of proposed policy
command, control, and compliance-toward a new kind
actions by the United States. 11
of environmental cooperation ,,,9
This project should be completed by late spring. Our
hope is that the results of this study will further advance
our understanding of the economic aspects of this issue.
Conclusion
We intend to make the conclusions available to our pol-
Global climate change has now achieved high visi-
icy-makers.
bility on the environmental/political agendas of all of the
Many sectors of society, from academic think tanks. to
industrialized nations of the world and many of the de-
environmental groups, to climatologists, to business, to
veloping nations. This has occurred in essence over a
government bureaucrats, to elected officials, to the press
period of less than two to three years, a very rapid pace.
and media, generate information themselves and are being
The result is an incredible upswell of political momentum
overwhelmed by others by a mass of materials advocating
that calls for "solutions," at a rate that has outpaced our
a full spectrum of views on this issue. Sorting out the
understanding of the scientific causes of the phenomena
tidbits of valuable information among the noise will be a
and economic impacts of responses.
real challenge. All of us need to be alert to other agendas
While scientific attention to the concern is widespread
and political motivations that will struggle and compete
with each other to influence and drive the issue.
and will continue, science still lags behind the desires of
politicians for assistance in drafting responses. Even
However, in spite of all the hype given to this issue,
though more recent scientific forecasts have lowered, not
the notion of potential climate change brought about by
raised, the range of potential warming and ecological
global warming remains a serious issue. I am optimistic
response, pressures continue for governments to do some-
that we will see serious and balanced proposals crafted to
thing now.
understand and respond. As I have said, these proposals
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ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE
29
must be developed multi-nationally to be effective and
ing: A National Partnership". sponsored by National Aero-
must be based on sound science to be credible.
nautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and
Companies are moving to adopt environmental princi-
Atmospheric Administration. and Environmental Re-
ples of operation and to ensure that their businesses are
search Institute of Michigan: National Press Club. Wash-
compatible with the goals of society. including the goals
ington. D.C., September 18. 1989. pp. 9-10.
for preserving and enhancing the quality of our environ-
3 National Academy of Sciences. Panel on Policy
ment. This trend will continue.
Implications of Greenhouse Warming, Washington. D.C.,
Business does not oppose action. But we object to
Discussions of January 24. 1990.
acting in haste when the consequences can be enormous
4 William Booth. "New Models Chill Some Predic-
and the intended result ineffective. Business by necessity
tions of Severely Overheated Earth". The Washington
will look at responding to global climate change from the
Post. January 29. 1990.
perspective of economic reality.
5 Dr. Stephen H. Schneider. "The Greenhouse Effect:
We want our actions to be supported by the science,
Science and Policy". Science. February 10, 1989. Vol. 243.
and we need to understand the tradeoffs between benefits
p. 778.
and costs. Again. as President Bush reminded the dele-
6 Ibid. p. 781.
gates to the IPCC, "Much remains to be done. Many
7
questions remain to be answered. Together. we have a
Center for Strategic and International Studies. A
responsibility to ourselves and the generations to come to
Report for the Global Climate Coalition. "Implications of
fulfill our stewardship obligations. But that responsibility
Global Climate Policies", Washington. D.C. June 27.
demands that we do it right. .,12
1989.
8
There are rapid changes occurring in our global econ-
James A. Baker. III. "Diplomacy for the Environ-
omic environment. Now more than ever. we live in a
ment" Presentation to the National Governors Associ-
global economy. International competitiveness will be a
ation, February 26, 1990, pp. 5-6.
preeminent factor in determining not only corporate. but
9 President George Bush, Remarks to the Intergovern-
national success. How our climate response strategies
mental Panel on Climate Change. Washington. D.C., Fe-
affect our competitiveness must be a major consideration.
bruary 5, 1990, p. 3.
Our view is that a strong economy will be necessary to
10 U.S. Department of Energy, Report to the Congress
provide the capital for investment in needed technology
of the United States, "A Compendium of Options for
and for taxpayer-financed assistance to other nations. This
Government Policy to Encourage Private Sector Respon-
last year alone has seen the demise of the centrally planned
ses to Potential Climate Change", October 1989. Vol. 2. p.
economic systems of Eastern Europe, as citizens of these
12-4.
nations cried out for freedom and a better life. They are
11 The Global Climate Coalition has retained the team
now endorsing market-based economies. Our policies
should stimulate the private sector's investments in these
of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).
countries and in the developing world to both lift their
Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett. Inc. (PHB). the International
economies and improve their environments.
Resources Group (IRG). The Brock Group. and
DRI/McGraw-Hill to undertake an economic assessment
I recently had the opportunity to listen to a speech by
Dr. Carl Sagan, a Cornell University astronomer. 13 Dr.
of potential near-term policy responses by the United
States in regard to reduction of emissions of greenhouse
Sagan was giving an overview of the Voyager program as
gases.
the satellite was nearing its approach to the planet Nep-
12
tune, I recall Dr. Sagan praising the accomplishments of
President Bush, p. 3.
this project. indicating that Voyager had traveled to the
13
Dr. Carl Sagan, Remarks to the Greenhouse Glas-
outer limits of our solar system, achieved far more than its
nost Conference, The Sundance Symposium on Global
objectives, and was completing its mission on budget.
Climate Change; Institute for Resource Management/So-
Sagan indicated that it was a wonderful thing what tech-
viet Academy of Sciences; Sundance, Utah. August 1989.
nology could do when it was freed up to meet this formi-
dable challenge.
Thomas G. Lambrix is Director, Government
We believe that given the same opportunity to unleash
Relations for Phillips Petroleum Company. and is
our creativity within free and strong economies, our nation
chairman of the Global Climate Coalition. Mr. Lam-
and other nations of the world will likewise respond to the
brix has degrees from Rutgers University and the
scientific and political challenges from global climate
University of Massachusetts. Before assuming em-
change.
ployment with Phillips, he worked for almost 10
years with the U.S. government, including positions
NOTES
at the U.S. Department of Interior and a presidential
I
appointment to the White House Domestic Policy
Dr. Patrick J. Michaels, "The Greenhouse Effect and
Staff. For a current listing of the Global Climate
Global Change: Review and Reappraisal" to be published
Coalition membership, please contact Mr. Lambrix
in International Journal of Environmental Studies, 1990.
at Phillips Petroleum Company, 16 D2 Phillips
2 Dr. D. Allan Bromley, Address to a Conference on
Building. Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74004.
"Earth Observations and Global Change Decision Mak-
April 1990
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Global Climate Coalition Membership
Aluminum Association
Hercules Incorporated
American Electric Power Service
IBM
Corporation
Illinois Power Company
American Gas Association
Int'l Business-Government Counsellors, Inc.
American Iron & Steel Institute
Jefferson Energy Foundation
American Mining Congress
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation
American Nuclear Energy Council
Maytag Corporation
American Paper Institute
Monsanto Company
American Petroleum Institute
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
Amoco Corporation
National Association of Manufacturers
ARCO
National Coal Association
Armco. Inc.
National Steel Corporation
Arizona Public Service Company
Occidental Chemical Corporation
Association of Home Appliance
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Manufacturers
Peabody Holding Company, Inc.
AT&T
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Automobile Importers of America
Petrochemical Energy Group
BHP - Utah Minerals International, Inc.
Petroleum Marketers Association
Business Roundtable
of America
Champion International
Phillips Petroleum Company
Chemical Manufacturers Association
Portland Cement Association
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
PPG Industries
Chrysler Corporation
Process Gas Consumers Group
Coalition Opposed to Energy Taxes
Public Service Indiana
Consolidation Coal Company
Rubber Manufacturers Association
Consumers Power Company
Shell Oil Company
Council of Industrial Boiler Owners
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc.
Dow Chemical Company
Southern Company Services, Inc.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company, Inc.
Texaco, Inc.
Eastman Kodak
Union Carbide Corporation
Edison Electric Institute
UNOCAL Corporation
Electricity Consumers Resource Council
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Entergy Corporation
U.S. Council for Energy Awareness
Ford Motor Company
U.S. Council for International Business
Fusion Power Associates
General Motors Corporation
Georgia Pacific Corporation
May 8, 1990
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02. Memo
From James Watkins to John Sununu
7/10/90
P/5
Re: Domestic Policy Council (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Open on Expiration of PRA
Subseries:
Issues Files
(Document Follows)
WHORM Cat.:
By A (NLGB) on 1/19/09
File Location:
Global Warming 1990 (1 of 2) [3]
Date Closed:
12/20/2004
OA/ID Number:
29157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
DEPA -UNITED STATES OF
OF ENERGY.
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
July 10, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John H. Sununu
The Chief of Staff
FROM:
James The White D. Watkins House /im wath
Secretary of Energy
SUBJECT:
Domestic Policy Council
Direction in Global Climate
John:
In the next few months, there will be a flurry of international
meetings to discuss responses to global warming. These include
the Fourth Plenary Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) meeting in late August, the Second World Climate
Conference in late October and early November and the
commencement of framework convention negotiations later this year
or early next year. Preparing for these meetings must be made a
major priority of the Administration.
There is no time to lose. By the end of July, we will need a
fully considered U.S. Government position on the IPCC Final
Report on Global Climate Change. As you know, John, the U.S. has
placed heavy reliance on the IPCC work. This "policymakers'
summary" is crucial. It is all anyone will ever read. It will
be a primary agenda item for the Second World Climate Conference
and will be the foundation for the framework convention
negotiations.
I believe that the U.S. position on global climate change is not
being adequately reflected in the IPCC Summary Report. Nor does
the Summary Report accurately reflect the results of the
scientific research reported in the base document. Currently DOE
and other agency staff are reviewing the document and supplying
line-by-line comments to the State Department. However, there
appears to me to be no overall U.S. strategy for the IPCC plenary
meeting in August and the follow-on meetings. We still do not
seem to have an agenda. Instead, we are reacting, fighting off
proposals that advocate immediate action on targets and
timeframes for reducing CO2. As you know, the potential
implications to the U.S. economy of adopting premature
commitments such as this are tremendous.
2
We need a better game plan for coordination and development of a
U.S. strategy on global climate. Please consider the following:
A reaffirmation of the Administration's climate change
policy to help assure that we have a strategy that
clearly supports this policy. I believe we have a
sound policy which needs to be articulated in a
positive way.
We need more White House guidance and control of the
decisionmaking process. I would propose that decisions
regarding global climate change policy should be made
only after deliberations by the Domestic Policy
Council.
The DPC should focus on a two-year horizon, coinciding
with the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development. More specifically, we need a compre-
hensive strategy that anticipates the Fourth IPCC
Plenary meeting, the negotiations on a climate change
framework convention, and carries us out to the 1992
U.N. Conference, where a framework convention will be
signed.
Additionally, after the establishment of our policies
and positions, we must begin to articulate our posture
through the preparation of our draft Ministerial
declarations, executive summaries and other
international documents. We need to stop merely
reacting to other countries' documents and start
getting our own positions on the table, early.
I believe that you share my view that we stand at a critical
juncture in the global climate change debate. I am convinced
that your active personal involvement is essential if we are to
succeed in managing this issue properly. I recommend that you
chair a special committee of the DPC on developing a long-term
strategy on global climate change. We are prepared to commit
whatever resources are necessary to assist you in this effort.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Memo
From D. Allan Bromley to John Sununu
7/12/90
P/S
Forthcoming IPCC Plenary Session in Sweden (2 pp.)
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Subseries:
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By If (NLGB) on 10/28/05
WHORM Cat.:
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Global Warming 1990 (1 of 2) [3]
Date Closed:
12/20/2004
OA/ID Number:
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
FROM:
D. ALLAN BROMLEY
an
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING IPCC PLENARY SESSION IN SWEDEN
As you know, the final plenary session in the first round of activities of the IPCC is
scheduled to take place in Sweden in early August. This memorandum is intended as
a heads up concerning aspects of U.S. participation in that meeting.
Fred Bernthal, as Deputy Director of NSF, recognizes that the meeting coincides with
Erich Bloch's last week on the job as Director of NSF and feels that he should be in
place at NSF. In my discussions with him, however, he has agreed that if it is felt
that his services are required in Sweden, he would be reluctantly willing to go and
perform his swan song as Chairman of Working Group #3. I believe that it is
important that he be present because otherwise we will have very little continuity with
the discussions that have led up to this final meeting and very little effective input
toward affecting the report that emerges from it. In his absence, also, we in the U.S.
will have little chance of holding the chairmanship of this Working Group.
John Knauss, the Director of NOAA, called me to volunteer to head up the U.S.
Delegation to the Swedish meeting but in order to make plans for the latter part of
the summer, he requests that he be told as soon as possible whether he should plan
on attending. Here again I think it is important for John to attend because he
brings an extensive technical background to the discussions and in that role can
complement Bernthal.
Finally, Bill Reilly has urged that Buff Bohlen, who has now been confirmed as
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, be named as Bernthal's replacement as Chairman of Working
Group #3, if, as seems probable, that Working Group and the entire IPCC structure
continues to function after the forthcoming plenary. Unfortunately, although Bohlen
has extensive experience in other aspects of international environmental matters, he
has had very little contact thus far with the global climate change question and in
particular, has had no contact whatsoever with the detailed IPCC discussions.
My recommendation to you would be that Bernthal, Knauss, and Bohlen should all
attend this IPCC plenary; Bernthal, to wind up his activities and make sure that U.S.
views are properly represented in the closing discussions leading to the final IPCC
report; John Knauss, because of his technical competence and because I believe that
he would be the logical replacement for Bernthal as Chairman of Working Group #3
if it continues and if, indeed, the U.S. is allowed to retain its chairmanship--
something that is far from certain at this point. Finally, Buff Bohlen, to give him an
opportunity to become acquainted with some of the issues, meet some of the people
and become sensitized to some of the very important political undercurrents that are
conditioning activities in the global change area.
I would have some concern about naming Bohlen to the working group chairmanship
if we are given the opportunity to name the chairman at least until he has had
considerably more exposure to this whole international area, but I am quite prepared
to admit that, after some decent interval and with such exposure, he might well be an
appropriate person to replace John Knauss, if such replacement were deemed
desirable. Knauss is not an accomplished chairman although a great scientist and I
am told that Bohlen has demonstated very real abiality in running meetings--both
national and internationally--very effectively.
Finally, I would welcome an opportunity, at your convenience, to discuss with you
what role you see in the future for the DPC Working Group on Global Climate
Change.
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN
July 1990
Volume 263
Number 1
The Great Climate Debate
Photo Copy Preservation
Greenhouse effect and the prospect of global warming is the
subject of scientific and political controversy. Should we take
steps now to avoid consequences we cannot foresee?
by Robert M. White
I
n the waning years of the 10th cen-
dangered Earth," as Time magazine
tween the urgings for action from the
tury, millions braced themselves
would have it in its 1988 year-end cov-
Environmental Protection Agency and
for the apocalypse, believing that
er story? Or is it as Forbes magazine
Congress and cautions from his sci-
the approaching year 1000 was the
put it, "The Global Warming Panic: A
ence adviser and chief of staff, Presi-
very millennium-the end of the heav-
Classic Case of Overreaction"?
dent Bush called two major confer-
ens and the earth prophesied in the
Debate in the media reflects uncer-
ences to address the issue of climate
Bible's Book of Revelation. Not surpris-
tainty among climatologists and geo-
warming. The first, held in April,
ingly, the prospect of the impending
physicists. Some of the world's emi-
brought together the heads of scientif-
Day of Wrath terrified normally sane
nent authorities on the atmosphere re-
ic, economic and environmental agen-
people into rash and (in retrospect)
cently hurled verbal brickbats at one
cies of many governments. The second
foolish actions. Some gave away all of
another in the pages of the prestigious
will be an initial meeting of govern-
their possessions; others hastened to
journal Science. Their charges of "junk
ments, scheduled for early 1991, to be-
do harsh penance for their deeds.
science" and "science by consensus" re-
gin negotiation of an international con-
In this final decade of the 20th cen-
flect the acrimonious nature of the de-
vention to stabilize global climate.
tury, a different kind of apocalypse
bate within the scientific community.
causes widespread concern. This time
Some members of the National Acade-
hile there are still doubts in
the hand of God has been replaced by
my of Sciences, including one of its for-
W
the White House, Congress has
more visible agents: belching smoke-
mer presidents, charge that policymak-
been environmentally hyperac-
stacks, gasoline-powered automobiles,
ers are being induced to take unwise
tive. Many pieces of legislation have
power-generating stations and the vo-
actions on the basis of uncertain scien-
been introduced to address the pre-
racious destruction of forests, all of
tific evidence. Set against this view is
dicted climate warming. Leading the bi-
which may be turning up the heat on
the recent statement of the Union of
partisan effort have been Senator Tim-
an overburdened environment. Global
Concerned Scientists urging action by
othy E. Wirth of Colorado, Senator Al
climate warming, some claim, threat-
the government. It was signed by 52
Gore of Tennessee and Congresswom-
ens the very habitability of the planet.
Nobel laureates and more than 700
an Claudine Schneider of Rhode Island.
Others hold that the predictions of en-
members of the NAS.
Some of this legislation is comprehen-
vironmental collapse are not well
In spite of the scientific uncertain-
sive and far-reaching. It offers sugges-
founded and are goading us into hasty
ty, government and nongovernment
tions for action on the energy, agricul-
political action. Is our planet the "En-
groups are rushing to outdo one anoth-
ture and transportation fronts as well
er in urging drastic action now to "sta-
as for intensified research.
bilize" the global climate. From Wash-
The actions proposed would radical-
ington to Toronto and The Hague,
ly change the most vital functions of
ROBERT M. WHITE is president of the
from Cairo to Moscow, international
National Academy of Engineering. He
human economies. They could include
was formerly chief of the U.S. Weather
conferences of experts and political
such diverse actions as using energy
Bureau and administrator of the Nation-
leaders have called for action. Soviet
more efficiently, shifting the fossil-fuel
al Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Presi-
mix from oil and coal to natural gas, re-
tion. He has also served as president of
dent George Bush, British Prime Minis-
lying more heavily on renewable energy
both the University Corporation for At-
ter Margaret Thatcher and French Pres-
sources and using more nuclear and so-
mospheric Research and the American
ident François Mitterand share similar
lar energy. Measures could also include
Meteorological Society. In 1979 he was
chairman of the first World Climate
views on the climate-warming issue.
implementing reforestation, phasing
Conference of the World Meteorological
Back home, debate within the Bush
out use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's)
Organization.
administration on how the U.S. govern-
and changing agricultural practices.
ment should act is intense. Caught be-
Policy initiatives of this kind would
36
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
alter the technology and economics of
venting much of that energy from be-
The measuring devices were placed
energy. Our use of land and water
ing reradiated to-outer space.
in the Mauna Loa climate observato-
would also need to change. Economic
At the end of the 19th century the
ry in Hawaii at an altitude of about 11,-
growth in nations dependent on fossil
Swedish scientist Svante A. Arrhenius
000 feet. Beginning in 1957, the data
fuels might be slowed. And the prob-
calculated how changes in carbon diox-
they collected revealed a systematic in-
lems of arresting the growth of global
ide content would affect the tempera-
crease in atmospheric carbon dioxide.
population would become even more
ture at the earth's surface. He estimat-
Keeling's observations were verified at
pressing. How can national and inter-
ed that a doubling of carbon dioxide
the South Pole and at other locations
national policy formulation be moving
would produce a global warming of
around the world. To date, the change
so rapidly to address the specter of cli-
about seven to 11 degrees Fahrenheit
from 290 parts per million in 1880 to
mate warming when agreement about
(four to six degrees Celsius), not too far
352 parts per million in 1989 repre-
the science is lacking and the economic
off modern calculations. Yet it was only
sents more than a 20 percent increase
and social costs of action have hardly
with the inception of the International
over the course of the past century.
been tallied? At the root of this think-
Geophysical Year, a worldwide ex-
ing is a confluence of diverse scientific,
periment in 1957 to monitor the global
ust before the International Geo-
economic and environmental forces.
environment, that scientific data validat-
J
physical Year began, on the oth-
The idea that the actions of humani-
ing the increase of carbon dioxide in
er side of the continent from
ty might change the composition of the
the atmosphere became available.
Scripps, another development key
atmosphere and hence the world's cli-
Roger Revelle, then director of the
to unraveling the climatic consequenc-
mate has deep historical roots. As early
Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
es of increasing carbon dioxide emis-
as the 1860's, it was suggested that
his colleague Hans E. Suess and C. Da-
sions was taking place. Under the lead-
slight changes in atmospheric compo-
vid Keeling, his student, undertook
ership of the world-famous mathemati-
sition might bring about major varia-
such measurements. Revelle had long
cian John von Neumann at the Institute
Photo Copy Preservation
tions in climate. Increases in carbon
contended that humans were carrying
for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J.,
dioxide (CO2) and other atmospheric
out an unintended geophysical experi-
the first attempts were made to repre-
trace gases can contribute to what has
ment on the atmosphere by burning
sent the atmosphere mathematically
been called greenhouse warming be-
fossil fuels. Determined to monitor the
on digital computers.
cause these compounds allow the sun's
carbon dioxide content of the atmos-
Von Neumann's team of brilliant
energy to reach the surface of the
phere, he persuaded Keeling to develop
young scientists was headed by Jule G.
earth, thereby warming it, while pre-
the instrumentation.
Charney. Later known as the father of
BARGES STRANDED by all-time low water levels on the Mis-
of 1988. That long, hot summer thrust the greenhouse ef-
sissippi River were one effect of the record-breaking drought
fect into the public eye and set off the present policy debate.
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
37
Photo Copy Preservation
MAUNA LOA CLIMATE OBSERVATORY in Hawaii is located
and continuing through the present, were the first to docu-
at about 11,000 feet. Data collected here, beginning in 1957
ment a steady increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.
numerical weather prediction and ar-
in the 1960's. In 1975 they calculated
humanity might actually be causing a
guably the most important American
that a doubling of the carbon dioxide
planetary disruption began to register
figure in the transformation of weather
content of the atmosphere would pro-
in the political world. Although there
prediction from art to science, Charney
duce a global climate warming of about
was much debate over the validity
demonstrated the feasibility of using
five degrees F (three degrees C), aver-
of projections from computer models,
computers to perform the task. Von
aged over the surface of the earth. This
the observations of greenhouse-gas in-
Neumann and Charney calculated the
calculation has been verified in many
creases, however, were precise, well
first 24-hour weather forecast in 1950
different laboratories and has not
measured and verified in many parts
on a primitive digital computer, the
changed substantially.
of the world. These were corroborated
ENIAC, maintained by the U.S. Army
Keeling's observations, together with
by additional data that documented in-
Signal Corps in New Jersey.
the calculation of Manabe and Weth-
creases in other greenhouse gases such
Looking beyond these efforts, von
erald, triggered the wave of climate-
as methane, or natural gas, and CFC's.
Neumann called climate forecasting the
change research that has marked the
"infinite prediction." One of the young
past two decades. Studies have since
scientists in the Princeton group, Nor-
been undertaken in many parts of the
M
eanwhile mathematical-model-
ing groups in this country had
man Phillips, made the first attempt
world, including Europe and the Soviet
been established not only by
at modeling the global atmosphere in
Union. In the U.S. the National Research
the NOAA but also by the National
1956. It was coincidence that later, in
Council conducted studies in 1966,
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1963, an unusual laboratory of the Na-
1977, 1979, 1983 and 1987. These in-
the Department of Energy and the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
quiries were chaired by such leading
tional Science Foundation. The leaders
ministration (NOAA) was established
scientists as Gordon J. F. MacDonald,
of these laboratories became the "gu-
on the campus of Princeton University
Revelle, Thomas F. Malone, Charney,
rus" of climate warming. Incisive and
under the leadership of Joseph Sma-
William A. Nierenberg and economist
original in their work, Stephen H.
gorinsky, a strong-willed and hard-driv-
William D. Nordhaus.
Schneider of the NSF'S National Center
ing young scientist who had been one
Yet because there were no immedi-
for Atmospheric Research in Boulder,
of von Neumann's group. The laborato-
ate consequences for human health
Colo., and James E. Hansen, the leader
ry was totally devoted to the mathe-
and no evident manifestation of cli-
of NASA'S Goddard Institute for Space
matical modeling of the atmosphere
mate change, the work was slow to
Studies, were soon to become frequent
using the largest and fastest digital
arouse political concern. The most po-
witnesses at innumerable congression-
computers available.
litically influential study was the one
al committee hearings on the subject.
Called the Geophysical Fluid Dynam-
prepared in 1979 at the request of
Although the mathematical models
ics Laboratory, the center harbored re-
Frank Press, now president of the NAS,
of all the groups yielded similar re-
searchers from many nations interest-
who was then White House science ad-
sults, the details of the geographic dis-
ed in this new approach to the study of
viser to President Jimmy Carter. It was
tribution of climate changes differed
the atmosphere. Among them was a
also in 1979 that the World Meteoro-
from one model to the other. All pro-
young Japanese scientist, Syukuro Man-
logical Organization in Geneva, recog-
jected that an increase in carbon di-
abe. Modest and retiring but complete-
nizing the potential global significance
oxide would bring about a gradual
ly dedicated to the work, he developed
of the issue, convened the first World
warming, but the timing of this warm-
the first climate model in collaboration
Climate Conference.
ing would depend on the rate of glob-
with his colleague Richard T. Wetherald
Gradually, scientific awareness that
al energy use. They all agreed that
38
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
if reasonable assumptions were made
known as the Little Ice Age. Nine de-
phere by thinking of it as a set of ob-
about future global energy consump-
grees F is believed to be the difference
servations spaced about 500 kilome-
tion, it would be around the middle of
in temperature that separates the end
ters apart.
the next century that the carbon diox-
of the last great ice age 12,000 years
ide content of the atmosphere might
ago from the present. Further, the pro-
double.
T
he political calls for action are
jections indicate that the Northern
being played out against the
Just how much this doubling of car-
Hemisphere would experience in just a
backdrop of that uncertainty. On
bon dioxide would increase tempera-
half century an unprecedented temper-
one side, the view is that if there is a
tures, however, varied greatly from
ature change, 10 to 50 times faster
chance that model predictions could be
model to model. Some predicted as lit-
than the change since the last ice age.
correct, the consequences could be so
tle as a two-degree F (one-degree C) in-
Those who are not familiar with
dire that immediate action to arrest cli-
crease, whereas others predicted in-
mathematical models or the way com-
mate change would be imperative. The
creases of as much as nine degrees F
puters are used to make these pro-
alternative view, equally cogent, is that
(five degrees C). The differences in pre-
jections can be forgiven for being
commitment to action with vast eco-
dictions became central elements in
confused-or even annoyed-by the
nomic and social consequences is un-
the debate about whether the models
great disparities in the results. Among
warranted in light of both the scientific
were sufficiently reliable to warrant
investigators it is understood that
uncertainty and the absence of knowl-
policy actions. Further, it made a great
mathematical models are only approxi-
edge of the economic costs. John H. Su-
difference whether the actual increase
mations that attempt to simulate the
nunu, White House chief of staff, in re-
was at one or the other end of this
processes that govern atmospheric be-
marks he made at the annual meeting
range. At the low end, the normal re-
havior. The atmosphere is so complex
of the National Academy of Engineer-
silience of society would probably be
that it is impossible to represent it in
ing in the fall of 1989 gave voice to this
sufficient to accommodate the changed
very great detail in these mathemati-
position:
climate. Changes at the high end por-
cal models. It is possible to represent
tended severe disruptions.
only certain features and to make as-
Although I agree that [global warming]
These projected temperature chang-
sumptions about how the oceans and
is a critical issue, the fact is that the
es may appear innocuous because var-
the atmosphere interact, how the rate
models with which analysis is being
iations of this magnitude are experi-
at which the oceans take up carbon
done and with which policy is being
enced in the normal course of daily
dioxide varies and how clouds affect
moved, as good as they may be, still are
and seasonal weather. Their full impli-
the exchange of energy between the
based on element sizes measured in
cations can be appreciated by noting
earth and the atmosphere. Even the
hundreds of kilometers in length and
that it took only a two-degree F average
largest computers cannot represent the
width, and tens of kilometers in thick-
Copy
decrease in temperatures in Europe to
atmosphere, oceans and land surface
ness. I suspect that no one who has ever
cause the run of several frigid cen-
in fine detail. Indeed, scientists ap-
been involved in engineering simulation
turies (from the 1400's to the 1800's)
proximate the conditions in the atmos-
would feel comfortable making major
THE RISE IN ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE
355
350
CONCENTRATION (PARTS PER MILLION)
345
340
335
330
325
Fluctuations reflect seasonal variation.
320
Summertime low is caused by uptake of
CO₂ by plants. Data were collected at
the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii.
315
310
1958 960 1962 1964 966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 978 1980 1982 1984 986 1988 61990
YEAR
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
39
decisions in which the elements were or-
temperatures a natural fluctuation or a
quick and vociferous. Several environ-
ders of magnitude greater than the de-
result of the increase in greenhouse
mental and scientific groups began to
tails on which they were looking for in-
gases? All that can be said is that the
advocate international agreements re-
formation. And yet the fact is that we
observed increase is consistent with
stricting the emissions of greenhouse
are moving toward binding internation-
the lower end of the temperature in-
gases.
al policy based on conclusions being
creases predicted by the computer
At this point, some influential atmos-
Photo Copy Preservation
drawn by policymakers who have no
models. Consequently, the temperature
pheric researchers, who believed that
sense at all of the difference between
records, as well as the predictions of
policy actions were beginning to out-
the levels of confidence they should
mathematical models, provide sub-
run the scientific evidence, weighed in
have and levels of confidence they want
stance both to those who believe the
with their views. Richard S. Lindzen of
to have. A system is not valid just be-
evidence warrants action now and to
the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
cause it gives you the answers you
those who believe the evidence is still
ogy and Jerome Namias of Scripps, the
want. And yet so much policy is being
too weak.
nation's most distinguished long-range
made in reaction to that principle.
The rush to policy action was, I
weather-forecasting expert, wrote a let-
believe, catalyzed by the disastrous
ter to President Bush urging that no
The solution to the dilemma should
drought of the summer of 1988. Dur-
action be taken. Three other members
be simple: Since the carbon dioxide
ing this drought, one of the worst on
of the NAS, including its former pres-
content of the atmosphere has in-
record, the water in the Mississippi Riv-
ident Frederick Seitz, joined in a re-
creased by more than 20 percent over
er fell so low that navigation was im-
port, published under the auspices
the past century, we ought to be able to
possible over long stretches, urban wa-
of the Marshall Institute, calling into
detect the climate warming in the glob-
ter supplies were threatened and crops
question the scientific basis for poli-
al temperature record during the same
throughout the grain belt were devas-
cy actions. They recommended a ma-
period. Researchers have sought to do
tated. Both officials and the public
jor research program in mathematical
this, but it is a much more difficult task
wondered whether this was the green-
modeling. They pointed out that there
than it first appears. The problem is
house effect manifest. Indeed, records
might be alternative explanations for
that climate is always in a state of nat-
show that in the U.S. five of the years
the climate warming that had taken
ural fluctuation. Separating out the
of the 1980's were among the hottest
place. Thus, the great climate debate
changes that are caused by increasing
on record, and the average tempera-
had been joined.
carbon dioxide from the natural chang-
ture for the decade as a whole was the
Meteorologists did not look with fa-
es is tricky scientific business. More-
warmest since instrumental records
vor on the prospect of yet another pub-
over, the climatic temperature record
have been kept.
lic debate involving their field: they had
is based on scattered and irregular
been proved wrong many times before.
observations not taken specifically for
P
rompted by heat and drought,
As long ago as 1924, Sir Gilbert Walker,
the purposes of determining climatic
congressional hearings addressed
then head of the British government's
conditions.
the question of whether the green-
Indian weather service, discerned un-
Even so, careful analysis of these
house effect had arrived. These hear-
usually close connections between rain-
temperature records by scientists in
ings were unremarkable except for a
fall, temperature and pressures in the
the U.S. and in the U.K. sought to de-
statement by Hansen. When he stated
Pacific Ocean and the Indian subconti-
tect whether a climate warming has oc-
that he was 99 percent certain that the
nent. Claims were made that the prob-
curred and whether such warming is
greenhouse warming had begun, as evi-
lem of forecasting the Indian monsoon
consistent with the prediction of the
denced by the sequence of warm years
was solved. Were it true, it would have
models. The prevailing view is that the
in the 1980's, the public took notice.
been a great boon to Indian agriculture.
climatic record over the past century
His opinion prompted members of
But it was soon recognized that the
for the entire globe reveals a net in-
Congress to consider whether the pru-
correlations had little predictive power.
crease in temperature ranging from .5
dent course was to move rapidly to leg-
Later, in the 1940's and 1950's,
to 1.0 degree F (from .3 to .8 degree C).
islation aimed at protecting the habit-
widespread claims were made, based
But set against this conclusion is the
ability of the planet from catastrophic
on the work of the late Irving Lang-
disturbing result that similar increases
consequences.
muir, Nobel laureate from the General
in temperature cannot be detected over
Hearings followed hearings. Both the
Electric Company, and Vincent J. Schae-
the past century in the U.S., where ob-
atmospheric researchers and the more
fer of the State University of New York
servations are numerous and accurate.
general environmental community be-
at Albany, that seeding clouds with dry
Even if the temperature rise is real, a
gan to choose sides on whether imme-
ice or crystals of silver iodide could
puzzle remains that workers have been
diate policy action was justified. The
bring about an increase in rainfall. Sev-
unable to unravel: Is the rise in global
reaction from environmentalists was
eral decades of research into the possi-
THE PROJECTED GROWTH OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE ATMOSPHER
CARBON DIOXIDE
METHANE
NITROUS OXIDE
YEAR
860
2035
250
500
06
3.0
0
PARTS PER MILLION
PARTS PER MILLION
PARTS PER MILLION
40
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF GLOBAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
OTHER
6%
WESTERN
OTHER
EUROPE
NORTH AMERICA
4%
17%
27%
WESTERN
EUROPE
23%
NORTH
ASIA
AMERICA
9%
ASIA
45%
1%
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
12%
U.S.S.R.
EASTERN EUROPE
18%
JAPAN,
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
U.S.S.R.
JAPAN,
AUSTRALIA
6%
EASTERN EUROPE
AUSTRALIA
3%
24%
6%
1950
1980
1,618 MILLION TONS
5,170 MILLION TONS
bilities of increasing rainfall, changing
concerns about environmental deterio-
prospects for stabilizing the climate
the intensity of hurricanes and modify-
ration see these issues as important
and arresting the deterioration of the
Photo Copy Preservation
ing hailstorms by cloud-seeding tech-
platforms and as springboards to pub-
habitability of the planet are abysmal.
niques proved abortive.
lic office. Those interested in increasing
Then, in the early 1980's, it was pos-
the competitiveness of American in-
tulated that dust thrown into the at-
dustry see greater energy efficiency as
A
re the consequences of climate
warming to be feared? People
mosphere by a nuclear exchange be-
an important step toward that goal. It
experience extremes of temper-
tween the Soviet Union and the U.S.
also serves the interest of those con-
ature in the natural course of events.
would result in a "nuclear winter." This
cerned about U.S. dependence on for-
The fact is that we do not know
idea was deflated by Schneider and his
eign energy sources. The issue of nu-
enough to predict the severity of the
colleague Stanley L. Thompson, who
clear power is also underscored. Be-
consequences. Because the warming
showed with the same models used in
cause fossil fuels are the main source
would not be uniform over the surface
the prediction of climate that the "ini-
of atmospheric carbon dioxide, strat-
of the earth, it would probably produce
tial nuclear winter hypothesis can now
egies for stabilizing climate must en-
both winners and losers among regions
be relegated to a vanishingly low level
vision non-fossil-fuel sources. Here at
and nations. Some parts of the earth
of probability."
last is justification that proponents of
would become warmer, some wetter
Given this "cry wolf" history, it is not
nuclear power can forcefully advance
and some drier. It is not possible on
surprising that many meteorologists
to support expansion of nuclear power
the basis of the evidence at hand to
harbor deep reservations about taking
facilities throughout the world.
predict who would benefit and who
costly actions on the basis of the pre-
The issue of global climate warming
would lose in such a global redistribu-
dictions of a climate warming. But the
also offers an opportunity for advanc-
tion of so-called climatic resources.
push for policy has other constituents.
ing the "new economic order" long ad-
Some aspects of global climate warm-
Climate warming also unites those who
vocated by Third World nations. Inter-
ing would be greatly beneficial in the
are concerned about biodiversity and
national action will require technologi-
view of agricultural researchers. In-
species extinction, economic develop-
cal and economic assistance to such
creased carbon dioxide will foster more
ment, human population growth, ur-
nations if they are to participate in a
active photosynthesis and enhance crop
ban air pollution, acid precipitation
global effort to reduce atmospheric
growth, to say nothing about the low-
and ozone depletion.
pollution or arrest deforestation. In
ered plant requirements for water in
Political leaders stimulated by public
fact, the world faces the prospect that
a CO2-enhanced atmosphere. In the
the greatest increases in emissions of
words of Jerry D. Mahlman, director
carbon dioxide will occur in developing
of the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Lab-
countries as their need for economic
oratory, "The things we can say with
CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS
growth is followed by increased de-
confidence, the policymakers are not
mand for energy.
interested in. And the things [they]
In like manner, those interested in
0
are interested in, we don't know with
arresting population growth, especially
confidence."
in the Third World, point out that the
Models do, however, agree that the
climate-warming problem is probably
polar regions of the world would un-
not solvable as long as the number of
dergo greater increases in temperature
human beings continues to rise. After
than would the tropics. Some of the
0
025
005
all, it is people who consume natural
projections of temperature increases in
PARTS PER MILLION
resources and energy and who farm
polar areas are startling in their magni-
the land. Without population control,
tude, predicting as much as 18 degrees
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
41
F (10 degrees C) on the average in the
north? What, then, would be the conse-
all nations in the next century as en-
Northern Hemisphere and only slight
quences in the U.S. for agriculture, for
vironmental conditions cause disrup-
increases in tropical regions.
resource availability, for energy genera-
tions worldwide.
What are the general consequences
tion, for national parks and conserva-
But scenarios should be qualified
of such a change in the temperature
tion of nature?
with the caveat that although the events
difference between equatorial and po-
The consequences of changed cli-
portrayed might in some cases be plau-
lar regions? We experience similar dif-
mates can be seen in historical records
sible, they are not real predictions.
ferences every year as the seasons
going back thousands of years, and
What, then, is a wise course in the face
change. In summer when arctic tem-
we have seen them in recent climatic
of great uncertainty? Clearly, it would
peratures are warm, we do not suffer
events. We know, for example, that the
be one that recognized uncertainty but
the great storms of winter; precipita-
Danes were able to settle Greenland
would not permit that uncertainty to
tion belts move farther north. Areas
and the Vikings to sail the North At-
forestall action. Steps for which oth-
such as the southwestern part of the
lantic to North America during a period
er economic and environmental rea-
U.S. experience very dry conditions.
of warm climate around the year 1000.
sons make sense would be taken first,
If arctic regions were to undergo sig-
Then a significant change in climate
whether or not a climate warming is
nificantly greater warming than equa-
caused the collapse of the Danish set-
taking place [see "The Changing Cli-
torial regions and if precipitation belts
tlements, prevented further explora-
mate," by Stephen H. Schneider; SCIEN-
were to move farther north, countries
tion of the North American continent
TIFIC AMERICAN, September, 1989].
in the north temperate and polar zones
and ushered in the Little Ice Age. In
Then, as scientific knowledge re-
would probably stand to benefit great-
just the past few years we have wit-
duced uncertainties, more costly meas-
ly. Their growing season would length-
nessed the effects of drought in the
ures could be taken if warranted, hence
en, and their precipitation would in-
Sahel region of Africa and northeast
closely tying policy actions to the state
crease. With suitable soils, agriculture
Brazil, as well as in parts of North
of knowledge. Scientists and others
might thrive. These are speculations,
America.
have called this a "no regrets" policy.
however.
Such scenarios can suggest apocalyp-
In gambling it would be known as
tic possibilities. A recent film in the In-
"spreading your bets."
uch speculations are formulated
finite Voyage television series showed
A recent report of the Council of Eco-
Photo Copy Preservation
S
in "scenarios" asking the ques-
the U.S. Capitol under water as the re-
nomic Advisers lends weight to this ap-
tion, What if? Unfortunately, an
sult of one possible climate-warming
proach. It states that the cost of con-
infinite number of such "what if" ques-
scenario. Some foresee vast migrations
trolling carbon dioxide emissions and
tions may be asked. What if the flow
of people as areas of the world become
of taking other actions to address cli-
of rivers in the American Southwest, al-
uninhabitable. Others see threats to na-
mate change would run into hundreds
ready fully utilized, were to be reduced
tional sovereignty and national securi-
of billions of dollars. Because such real-
by 20 percent? What if temperatures
ty. President Gorbachev has stated that
locations of resources raise the spec-
were to increase in the corn belt and
ecological security, not military secur-
ter of grave economic consequences,
precipitation were to move farther
ity, will be the principal concern of
we need to be reasonably sure such ac-
WHAT THREE COMPUTER MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE PREDICT
All models assume a doubling of global CO₂
8
4
ANNUAL
GODDARD INSTITUTE
ANNUAL
TEMPERATURE
FOR SPACE STUDIES
RAINFALL
3
GEOPHYSICAL FLUID
DYNAMICS LABORATORY
6
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
2
POTENTIAL CHANGE (KELVINS)
POTENTIAL CHANGE (MILLIMETERS PER DAY)
0
3
0
GREAT SOUTHEAST GREAT CALIFORNIA LOWER
GREAT SOUTHEAST GREAT CALIFORNIA LOWER
LAKES
PLAINS
8 STATES
LAKES
PLAINS
48 STATES
42
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
Photo Copy Preservation
tions are worth the cost. Any rational
no-regrets policy would foster as one
HUMAN ACTIVITIES THAT MAY CAUSE GLOBAL WARMING
of its prime objectives adequate invest-
ment by governments in global moni-
toring and mathematical modeling to
ENERGY USE
reduce the scientific uncertainties.
AND PRODUCTION
Where might we start? Energy con-
CHLOROFLUORO
servation and efficiency along with the
CARBONS
phaseout of CFC production would be
the first priority for national and inter-
AGRICULTURE
national action. Achieving greater ener-
gy efficiency justifies itself handily in
LAND-USE
economic terms. Increased energy effi-
MODIFICATION
ciency would also ameliorate urban air
OTHER
pollution and acid precipitation. Shifts
INDUSTRIAL
in the fossil-fuel mix from coal and
oil to natural gas could significantly
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
reduce carbon dioxide emissions per
CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL WARMING (PERCENT)
thermal unit. Technology is also avail-
able for more efficient power genera-
tion and for increased gasoline mileage.
Other modes of adaptation would
tions to adapt to these changes should
be needed if climate changes were
be possible.
isdom would also dictate
W
severe. Sea-level rise, which is one
What of the debate in the atmospher-
major investments in non-
of the predicted concomitants of a cli-
ic, environmental and political com-
fossil-energy sources. The cir-
mate warming, might inundate low-ly-
munities? Our global environment is
cumstances favor significant new in-
ing coastal areas and cause salt water
under attack on many fronts. Climate
vestments in passively safe, publicly
to intrude into freshwater bodies. Were
warming is but one, perhaps the most
acceptable nuclear power. Further de-
this to occur, society would have to
complex, of these issues. If the changes
velopment of forms of solar energy-
decide whether to invest in protective
occurring in our atmosphere are likely
photovoltaics or biomass, for exam-
structures along coasts or adapt by
to cause consequences, we must under-
ple-makes good sense. Reforestation
changing land-use patterns. The North
stand the problems and promote sen-
and forest preservation constitute a be-
Sea dikes in the Netherlands are an
sible policies to remedy them. What
nign policy that yields many ecological
outstanding example of adaptation to
would be unwise is to lapse into apoc-
and climatic benefits. Research aimed
relative rise in sea level.
alyptic thinking or ostrichlike denial.
at producing stress- and disease-resis-
Some adaptations would take consid-
We like to believe ourselves far more
tant crops would also be wise.
erable time to implement. If the price
sophisticated, more enlightened, than
The public, however, must not be
of energy were to escalate, energy-effi-
preceding generations. Until we can
misled. These no-regrets initial policy
cient habitations would be necessary.
calmly and objectively approach our
steps will not solve the climate-warm-
Present cities with their great suburban
environmental challenges without pro-
ing problem. Their effectiveness will
sprawl are not energy efficient, and
moting public hysteria and exciting
only modestly retard climate warming,
SO we might return to more compact
shortsighted, self-interested reaction,
and the future may require more dras-
cities. If we chose to maintain agricul-
we cannot claim that we are.
tic actions. No matter what policy ac-
ture in dry areas, society would need to
tions we take, fully arresting the cli-
decide whether to invest in the nec-
mate warming just does not seem to be
essary irrigation systems. In fact, the
in the cards.
economic growth of the entire west-
FURTHER READING
The difficulties of reaching an inter-
ern part of the U.S. has been based on
THERMAL EQUILIBRIUM OF THE ATMOS-
national agreement on procedures for
major investments in water storage
PHERE WITH A GIVEN DISTRIBUTION OF
mitigating climate warming will be dif-
and transport for irrigation and indus-
RELATIVE HUMIDITY. Syukuro Manabe
ficult and lengthy. The negotiations for
and Richard T. Wetherald in Journal
trial use.
of Atmospheric Science, Vol. 24, pages
the Law of the Sea Treaty provide a
Fortunately, time may for once be
241-259; May, 1967.
good lesson. They consumed 15 years
on our side. Governments generally act
CHANGING CLIMATE: REPORT OF THE
and produced a treaty that the U.S. has
only when threats become real. They
CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COM-
yet to sign because of demands by de-
act in the face of military threats or
MITTEE. National Research Council,
veloping nations for significant tech-
when areas are endangered and de-
Carbon Dioxide Assessment Commit-
nology transfer and economic assis-
stroyed by natural disasters. If the cli-
tee. National Academy Press, 1983.
tance. These issues will be even more
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, CLIMATIC
mate changes, the expectation is that it
CHANGE, AND ECOSYSTEMS. Edited by
complicated and more pervasive in any
will do so gradually. We should be able
Bert Bolin and Bo R. Doos. John Wiley
"Law of the Atmosphere Treaty."
to see the initial evidence of coastal in-
& Sons, Inc., 1986.
It is likely that humanity will have to
undation in an increasing frequency
GLOBAL TRENDS OF MEASURED SURFACE
adapt to some climate changes. Modes
of high tides and in the undercutting
AIR TEMPERATURE. James Hansen and
of adaptation by society have not been
of seacoasts. Climate warming itself
Sergej Lebedeff in Journal of Geophys-
well studied. Individuals, corporations
should be evident in a rising frequen-
ical Research, Vol. 92, D11, pages
and communities can adapt to climatic
cy of heat waves or in other weather
13345-13372; November 20, 1987.
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: SCIENCE AND
vicissitudes in myriad ways. Farmers
anomalies. The effects of a global cli-
POLICY. Stephen H. Schneider in Sci-
can change crops, water use can be reg-
mate warming are likely to take 30 to
ence, Vol. 243, No. 4892, pages 771-
ulated and management practices can
50 years to become serious, and that
781; February 10, 1989.
be altered.
is a long enough span in which ac-
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July 1990
43
Reprinted from JOURNAL OF THE ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES, Vol. 38, No. 10, October 1981
American Meteorological Society
Printed in U.S.A.
Convergence Rate and Stability of Ocean-Atmosphere Coupling Schemes
with a Zero-Dimensional Climate Model
ROBERT E. DICKINSON