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Persian Gulf War 1991 [5]
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Persian Gulf War 1991 [5]
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F [2]; 1998-0099-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29166
Folder ID Number:
29166-007
Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [5]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
3
4
CONFIDENTIAL
August 9, 1990
Daily Report on Iraq-Kuwait Developments
The following countries have announced they will impose the U.N.
sanctions against Iraq/Kuwait:
South Korea, Poland, Portugal, Chile, Uruguay, Hong Kong, Taiwan
Argentina (announcement came after Irag ambassador indicated
Argentina's current and future interests would be
"prejudiced" by the decision)
Jordan has given strong indications it will impose sanctions
Financial Assets
- Australia has announced a freeze on all Iraqi and Kuwaiti
assets
- Brazil banned financial transfers to Iraq or Kuwait
- Malaysia's national bank informally freezes Kuwaiti assets,
formal Cabinet ratification expected soon
Legal Aspects
- At London meeting EC reps indicate that the community's regs
will cover goods transactions but regulation of services and
financial transactions up to individual EC members
- In U.K., Queen's consent to Orders in Council provides legal
authority for imposition of U.N. sanctions
- Japanese Ministry of Finance expects to have all legal
measures in place on Friday
- Austrian officials concerned by country's lack of legal
provisions for asset freeze; requested USG assistance in
determining legitimate Kuwaiti officials
Other news
- Arab Summit in Cairo delayed until tomorrow; some leaders
have yet to arrive
- By unanimous vote, U.N. Security Council declares Iraqi
annexation of Kuwait "null and void"
- A number of countries indicate they will follow U.S.
practice and exempt Kuwaiti commercial entities from asset
freeze while maintaining prohibition on transfers to
Kuwait/Iraq
- Venezuela President Perez indicated that he wants to confer
with other OPEC countries before increasing oil production or
prices
- U.S. Embassy in Bahrain reports run on Bank of Bahrain and
Kuwait (classified as Category II by Foreign Asset Control)
due to concern the U.S. will freeze its assets on August 18.
- EC President Delors proposed in a radio interview that G7
Finance Ministers meet quickly to coordinate strategy
- France regulates price of petroleum products; will set
ceiling which will be adjusted to reflect world prices
DECLASSIFIED
2.23.00 GF
PER E.O. 12958
98.0099.F
Note: Information drawn from a variety of news sources and
cables
CONFIDENTIAL
FOOTNOTES
Yes = action already taken or explicitly decided upon.
(1) Official assets only.
(2) Prohibits travel and transportation.
(3) Assumes that action will be taken as a result of the EC decision.
(4) Assumes that action will be taken based on U.N. Resolution.
(5) Suspends capital transactions and trade finance; exports of military equipment Constitutionally
prohibited.
(6) Denies trade preferences and technology and scientific cooperation.
(7) Banned maritime transport; official credit guarantees suspended.
(8) Iraq is off-cover for official export credit guarantees.
(9) Prior approval of all financial transactions.
(10) Also forbidden: provision of funds or loans to public/private in Kuwait and Iraq, transportation
of merchandise.
(11) Bans: credit, dealings in securities or property, maritime transport.
(12) Provides administrative guidance to banks but no official freeze.
NOTE: Information in this table is drawn from several sources (i.e., Treasury Financial Attaches; State
reporting cables; and press reports) and is subject to change as additional information is receive
August 9, 1990
August 9, 1990, as of 4:00 p.m.
SUMMARY OF KUWAITI/IRAQI ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Freeze Assets
Embargo Oil
General Trade
Suspend Credits
Suspend Arms
Other
of
Imports
from
Embargo
on
(or Guarantees)
To Iraq
Action
COUNTRY
Kuwait
Iraq
Kuwait
Iraq
Kuwait
Iraq
to Iraq
U.S.
Yes (1)
Yes (1)
Yes
Yes
(4)
Yes
Yes
Yes
(2)
Japan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(5)
EC
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
?
Yes
(6)
U.K.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(3)
France
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(7)
Germany
Yes (1)
Yes
(1)
(4)
Yes
(4)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Italy
Yes (1)
Yes
(1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(8)
Luxembourg
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(9)
Belgium
Yes
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Netherlands
Yes
Yes
(3)
(3)
(3)
Denmark
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Greece
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Ireland
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Portugal
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Spain
Yes (1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Switzerland
Yes
(1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(10)
Canada
Yes (1)
Yes
(1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(11)
Austria
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Singapore
(12)
No
Bahamas
?
?
Hong Kong
Yes
Yes
Netherlands
Antilles
Norway
Yes
Yes
Australia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
USSR
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
Yes
China
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
Yes
Yes
Brazil
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Turkey
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sweden
Yes (?)
Yes
(?)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Finland
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Malaysia
No
No
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE CHIEF of STAFF
January 2, 1991
has seen
MEMORANDUM TO JOHN H. SUNUNU
FROM:
Nicholas E. Calio NEC
THROUGH: Fred McClure
sub
RE:
Attached letter/Persian Gulf Resolution from Duncan
Hunter
I thought you should see the attached since word of our "help" in
drafting the resolution is out. I had been taking a "go-slow"
attitude with Duncan in the belief that we did not want a lot of
proposed resolutions coming up that we could not control.
How do we want to handle this?
CC: Andy Card
Rob Portman
Brent is aware of this and, according to
Sunny Lampley, may call Duncan.
DEC-28-90 FRI 15:02 ASCF
P.01
REPUBLICAN CO-CHAIRMEN
DEMOCRATIC CO-CHAIRMEN
JOHN MCCAIN. ARIZONA
RICHARD SHELBY, ALABAMA
Bos DOLE. KANSAS
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON. LOUISIANA
JAKE GARN, UTAH
DENNIS DECONGINI, ARIZONA
JIM MCCLURE. IDAHO
HOWELL. HEFLIN, ALABAMA
DUNCAN HUNTER. CALIFORNIA
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, GEORGIA
ROBERT MICHEL, ILLINOIS
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY. MISSISSIPPI
JOHN P. MURTHA, PANNSYLVANIA
National Security Caucus
WILLIAM L DICKINSON, ALABAMA
133 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5672
December 28, 1990
The Honorable Nicholas E. Calio
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Nick:
The enclosed letter to General Scowcroft will hopefully be self
explanatory. Congressman Sonny Montgomery spent the weekend at Camp
David, and the President and General Scowcroft made changes in the text of
the Resolution.
As the letter indicates, this Resolution will not be introduced In
elther the House or Senate unless we have first secured a solid
bi-partisan majority. I would still like a statement from the President,
and anything you can do to assure Buddy Darden of White House support
would be greatly appreciated. If I am not available please contact my
Legislative Director, Vicki Middleton, and I want to do everything
possible to support Operation Desert Shield.
Cordially,
Duncan Buncan Hunter, M.C.
Co-Chairman
National Security Caucus
DEC-28-90 FRI 15:03 ASCF
P.02
DEMOCRATIC CO-CHAIRMEN
REPUBLICAN CO-CHAIRMEN
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
RICHARD SHIP BY, ALABAMA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON LOUISIANA
BOB DOLL. KANGAS
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
JAKE GARN, UTAH
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALADAMA
JIM MCCLURE. IDAHO
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN. GEORGIA
DUNCAN HUNTER. CALIFORNIA
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY. MISSISSIPPI
ROBERT MICHEL ILLINOIS
JOHN P MURTHA. PENNSYLVANIA
National Security Caucus
WILLIAM L DICKINSON. ALABAMA
133 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5672
December 28, 1990
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear General Scowcroft:
Congressman Sonny Montgomery has relayed to me your concerns about
our Concurrent Resolution on the Persian Gulf (John McCain and Richard
Shelby are gathering support for a similar resolution in the Senate). The
changes you recommended (regarding "the employment of all necessary
measures to achieve them") will obviously be made in both resolutions.
I also share your concerns about the possibility that these
resolutions could be defeated. That would be the entirely wrong message
to send to Baghdad, and I want to assure you these resolutions will not
move forward in the House and Senate until we have achieved a solid
bi-partisen majority of co-sponsors. If we do not have sufficient
co-sponsors we will simply abandon this effort.
The primary motive of the original co-sponsors is to support the
President, and if this is not helpful we will immediately stop. I believe
we have an excellent opportunity to gather a solid majority because our
effort is being supported by over 20 prominent private sector
organizations. They are all planning to contact lawmakers regarding the
Resolution, but once again, we only want to do things that will assist
you.
With this in mind it would certainly boost our efforts to gather
co-sponsors if we had a statement of support from the President that we
could circulate to our colleagues. Also, please do not hesitate to let us
know of any other assignments that would assist your efforts.
If I am not available please have your office contact my Legislative
Director, Vicki Middleton, and I am looking forward to hearing from you.
Cordially,
Duncan Hunter, M.C.
Co-Chairman
National Security Caucus
DEC-28-90 FRI 15:05 ASCF
P.01
42 W"
DECEMBER 19, 1990
102d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Hunter submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning Operation Desert Shield
in the Persian Gulf region.
Extended Page 1.1
Whereas, on August 2, 1990, military forces of the Republic of
Iraq, under the direction of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein,
invaded the small nation of Kuwait,
Whereas, in an effort to promote peace and regional stability in
the Persian Gulf region, President Bush has deployed troops
of the United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region,
in Operation Desert Shield, and has undertaken diplomatic
initiatives;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
678, authorizing the use of military force if Iraqi forces
do not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991;
Whereas, if the objective of Resolution 678 is to be achieved without
war, Saddam Hussein must realize that the United States is
steadfast in its determination to use the military force
authorized by the resolution, if such action becomes necessary;
Whereas Saddam Hussein has been led to believe that there exists
opposition in the United States to the use of military force
against Iraq and may believe that the steadfast determination
of the United States will erode with the passage of time; and
Whereas Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait
must be answered in a swift and appropriate manner: Now,
therefore, be it
DEC-28-90 FRI 15:06 ASCF
P.02
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress --
(1) expresses its support for bipartisan efforts to
bring a just and meaningful peace to the Persian Gulf
region;
(2) expresses its support for the diplomatic
initiatives undertaken by President Bush, the deployment
of troops of the United States Armed Forces to the
Persian Gulf region, and the adoption of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 678;
(3) expresses its support for the goals and objectives
of Operation Desert Shield and for the employment of all
necessary measures to achieve them; and
(4) urges the United States Armed Forces to develop a
strategy to achieve a quick, decisive victory in the event
the use of military force against Iraq becomes necessary.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
January 3, 1991
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Galf
More than one month ago, on November 30, I proposed that Iraqi
Foreign Minister Aziz travel to Washington to meet with me late
in the week of December 10, to be followed shortly thereafter by
a trip to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker. I did so
"to go the extra mile for peace" and to demonstrate our
commitment to all aspects of U.N. Security Council Resolution
678, including its "pause for goodwill" designed to give Iraq one
final opportunity to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait on or
before January 15.
While I offered 15 days during which Secretary Baker was prepared
to travel to Baghdad, including Christmas, Saddam Hussein showed
himself to be more interested in manipulating my offer to his
advantage than in a serious response. He was not too busy to see
on short notice a wide range of individuals, including Kurt
Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly,
and Ramsey Clark, but he was too busy to find even a few hours to
meet with the Secretary of State of the United States. Today
marks the last of the fifteen dates we suggested and that effort
is therefore at an end.
Secretary Baker is departing on January 6 for several days of
close consultations with coalition partners as the UNSC date of
January 15 approaches. While I am not prepared to repeat my
previous offer, rejected by Saddam Hussein, I am ready to make
one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace. I have
therefore offered through CDA Joe Wilson in Baghdad to have
Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in
Switzerland during the period January 7 - 9, while he is
travelling on his consultations.
This offer is being made subject to the same conditions as my
previous attempt: No negotiations, no compromises, no attempts
at face-saving and no rewards for aggression. What there will be
if Iraq accepts this offer is simply and importantly an
opportunity to resolve this crisis peacefully.
#
#
#
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Wednesday
THE CHIEF of STAFF
November 28, 1990
has seen
gulf
MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
JOHN SUNUNU
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FRED MCCLURE
I called Pat Moynihan today regarding the attached letter.
He wants to meet with me and I agreed to do so. As you know,
he is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations. We had a very pleasant
conversation.
193503
Moynihan
New York
United Stules Lenate
Washington. D.C.
CC
November 26, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
Dick Lugar has told me of your
telephone call to him and that settles
the matter so far as I am concerned. I
would, however, like to note the comment
of the Administration official in the
Washington Post on November 15, to the
effect that "[the President] expects
[members of Congress] to tell him their
concerns before they run to 'Good Morning
America
"
Fair enough, I never called you.
But I did spend much of September and
October near to pleading with
Administration officials to help draft a
resolution of support for your policy.
Thus, September 24 on the floor:
As the human toll begins to
rise, the President may well
find his popularity ratings
slumping and his congressional
support evaporating
How
much better it would be if the
Congress and the President take
this opportunity to state that
in this crisis we stand
together in opposing this
illegal invasion and enforcing
the resolutions of the Security
Council.
2
It happens I am chairman of the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations and
necessarily involved with the issue. I
had a theory of the case. Namely that
the United States was acting, as required
by Article 25 of the Charter, to carry
out the decisions of the Security
Council, to pursue "measures not
involving the use of armed force" as
provided in Article 41. The issue of war
powers did not arise and we could agree
on a Joint Resolution endorsing our
actions. I grant that there was not a
great deal of support for this theory
among my colleagues, but there was some.
There was, however, none in the
Administration. The attitude as conveyed
to me was that no Congressional
endorsement was required or desired.
We have been friends long enough for
me to hope you will see this letter and
understand why I have sent it.
Best,
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE: November 23, 1990 (Cairo)
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Gulf
wi
To:
John Sununu
Boyden Gray
Fred McClure
The attached were given to
me by Bob Dole and Bob Michel
at the last Leadership meeting.
fr
Some Presidential Authorities Available Under A Declaration of War
A declaration of war would satisfy the War Powers Resolution,
trigger the Trading with the Enemy Act, permitting the seizure of
enemy assets, permit the call-up of all reserves for the duration
of the conflict plus 6 months, and suspend certain ceilings on
the number of officers and enlisted personnel on active duty. In
addition, the following authorities are among those that would be
available to the President:
-- Would grant wide authority to "recapture" real estate
formerly part of military installations
-- Would grant wide authority to direct that manufacturing
plants meet military needs before other needs
-- Would authorize arming of civilian ships and aircraft (war or
determination by the President that the security of the United
States is threatened)
-- Would authorize the President to take control of any
transporation system for purposes related to the emergency
-- Would permit immediate condemnation of private property for
certain identified war purposes
-- Would permit suspension of laws governing retention and
reappointment of CJCS, commissioned officers, reserve units,
enlistments
-- Would grant wide authority on control of travel by aliens
(war or national emergency declared by the President) and the
apprehension, restraint, or removal of enemy aliens
-- Would grant wide authority to authorize military construction
-- Would permit suspension of maximum rental or leases of
building (war or national emergency declared by the President or
by Congress)
-- Would permit sale of war materiel to foreign governments on
our side in war
-- Would give government the right of first refusal on all
natural resources
-- Would permit suspension of leases on continental outer shelf
(war or national emergency declared by the President or by
Congress)
-- Would grant wide authority with respect to communications
(may suspend or amend regulations, close facilities or stations,
authorize use by any department of any facility)
- 2 -
-- Would permit contracting for war materiel and enforcement of
contracts through plant seizures
-- Would authorize contracts for war materiel, changing
contracts, seizing plants, ships, and war material
-- Would suspend restrictions on CBW (war or national emergency
declared by the President or by Congress)
-- Would authorize licensing use of enemy patents, trademarks,
and processes
Bases: The President may suspend the normal procedures for
closing military installation if he certifies to Congress that
closure is necessary for reasons of national security or military
emergency. (Note: This provision probably does not waive
applicable provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) )
Memo to the President
from
michel
November 14, 1990
patty
Oil
One of the criticisms that has been made about the presence of
FAr
Mich
American troops in Saudi Arabia is that we are there to fight for "oil"
and that oil isn't worth fighting for.
Bob
to
The argument, insofar as it goes, is correct: 'oil, in and of itself, is not
harded
worth fighting for. Oil has no intrinsic value. It is the value human
beings place on it that gives it meaning in our lives. And in the entire
we
world, the meaning of oil is enhanced freedom: freedom of movement
for hundreds of millions, freedom from ancient rituals of drudgery in
the workshop and on the farm, freedom of opportunity for those
last, weetom
3
fortunate enough to live in nations whose industrial progress is
based on an assured supply of oil.
Oil has been called "black gold", but in fact oil is worth more than
gold to average human beings, because gold's value results from
what people think about it, but oil's value lies in what people can
cab-diship
do
with it in expanding freedom, in their personal lives and in the
workshop and on the farm.
Condemn the use of oil, but remember that hundreds of millions of
ordinary human beings depend on it to give them the kind of life that
only a few generations ago could be lived only by a relative handful
of the very, very rich.
The argument that it is demeaning to fight for oil is rooted in the
idea that wars must be fought only for abstract principles like justice
or freedom of honor.
But these abstractions have no meaning unless they in turn are
rooted in a the realities of everyday life, in how people work, what
they value, etc. To say that we will not allow the oil fields of Kuwait
and of Saudi Arabia (and, by extension, of the entire Middle East) to
become the private property of an aggressive dictator with delusions
of grandeur, is not some exercise in economics, or in energy
production, but, instead, a firm and unmistakable commitment to
defending a way of life whose material basis is inexorably linked
with oil as an energy source.
Page 2
Some intellectuals may detest the American way of life, saying it is
too materialistic, too crude, for their delicate tastes, and that oil is not
worth fighting for. But Mr. President, your swift decision to rush
American troops to the Middle East, had complex motivations as you
have enumerated them and one is the realization that oil is, for good
or ill, at the heart of the economic progress of our nation.
Many of those who scold us for relying too much on oil are precisely
those who tell us nuclear power is bad, coal destroys the
environment, and that the best our civilization can do is settle for
less, the old Jimmy Carter malaise scenario But if the "American
Dream" means anything at all, it means a certain way of life, based
on certain optimistic assumptions about material progress. That way
of life, that progress, in the United States and in the western world,
are based on oil.
If it is argued that Europe and Japan depend on Middle East oil more
than we do, and that there should be more European soldiers and
Japanese soldiers over in Saudi Arabia, I would agree, but American
interests should not and cannot be linked with the actions or
inactions of our allies. The choice we face is not one between
intervention and isolation, but between intervention and decline.
Arguments showing how we could "easily" survive without mid-east
oil, and on how Saddam would be "forced" to sell us oil because he
would need the money are ingenious. Saddam's control of mid-east
oil would be the prologue to a new age in the Middle East, in which a
a latter-day Nasser, the "new Saladin" looked for by Muslims, would
stride the Middle East like a Colossus. He'd quickly show the world
what oil is worth.
We have troops in the Middle East for a number of inter-related
reasons--one of them is keeping all that oil out of the hands of
someone who would use it as a weapon against our values and our
very way of life. We should not apologize for that. Every time you
argue the case for your decision, Mr. President, you should list the
various reasons for doing what you did, and included among them
should be an unapologetic defense of our decision to keep oil from
the hands of Saddam Hussein, in our own national interest.
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE:
11-29-
FROM THE PRESIDENT
To; John S and Brent
To:
Latest on Possible Congressional
Action on Gulf.
Lunch with Foley and michel
Both strongly oppose
special "lame duck" session.
They fear out of control House,
with lame duck people being
bad and newly elected feeling
left out. Can't narrow agenda,
thus therewill be veto over ride
attempts and chaos.
Simpson calls in. He tlaked ot Dole. Tomorro
AM, Lugar, Kassebaum, Dole Simpson
will meet .They FAVOR lame duck
session. They will try to draft a resolutio:
They worry Republicans are beign branded
with "war " label. Confident
agenda can be narrowed to business of
Gulf Resolution. Can get accurate whip
count.
John McCain told me today he favors
"SPecial session now".
December 21, 1990
AIPAC
The President
The American Israel
The White House
Public Affairs Committee
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
America's Pro-Israet Lobby
Washington, DC 20500
4 10 First Street, N.W.
Dear Mr. President:
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-5200
During our last meeting on November 8, each of us expressed
strong support for your goals in the Persian Gulf crisis. Let us
assure you that we--as well as virtually the entire organized Jewish
President:
Mayer Mitchell, AL
community--continue to support and admire your firm stand against
Chairman of the Board:
Saddam Hussein's aggression. We agree with you that Iraq cannot be
Edward C. Levy. Jr., MI
Chairmen of the Board,
rewarded for its aggression, that Iraq's withdrawal must be
Emeritus:
unconditional, and that any linkage between the Gulf issue and the
Robert II. Asher, 11.
Lawrence Weinberg, CA
Arab-Israeli conflict must categorically be ruled out.
Vice Presidents:
Michael M. Adler, Fl.
Marshall Brac hman, TX
It is for this reason that we deeply regret the U.S. vote
Samuel M. Eisenstat, NY
Monte Friedkin, FI.
yesterday in favor of the latest Security Council resolution, an
Jordan Goldman, DC
Barnard J. Gottstein, ЛК
issue we also discussed in our November 8th meeting. We are aware
Roselyne Swip. CA
that our UN delegation fought hard to remove some of the most
Harriet Zimmerman, GA
Regional Vice Presidents:
egregious clauses from the nonaligned draft resolution; we
Norman Brownstein, CO
appreciate those efforts. Nonetheless, the resolution remains
Harvey Friedman, Fl,
Morton Friedman, CA
unbalanced. We are particularly troubled by the Council's decision
Steven Grossman, MA
Bernice Manocherian, NY
to "deplore" Israel's intention to deport four Palestinians, whereas
Robert Mazer. II.
Shaol Pozez. A%
the reference to the assassination of three Israeli workers by
Ruth Singer, CA
Palestinian terrorists which led to Israel's deportation decision
David Steiner, NJ
Secretary:
is couched in vague and ambiguous terms. We are also disappointed
Charles Schusterman, OK
by the depiction of Jerusalem as part of "the Palestinian
Treasurer:
Gary Wallin. NII
territories occupied by Israel since 1967;" by the inauguration of
Presidents Emeritus:
a process leading to the convening of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Robert II. Asher. II.
Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, NY*
signatories; by the expansion of the mandate of UN personnel in the
Irving Kane. on
I.I.. Kenen. DC*
territories to include monitoring of the situation there; and by the
Louis Lipsky, NY*
Edward C. Levy, Jr., MI
support for the idea of an international conference in the Security
Edward Sanders, CA
Council Presidential Statement.
Morton Silberman, FI."
Lawrence Weinberg, CA
("Dereased)
We know that you remain firmly opposed to Saddam Hussein's
Executive Director:
Thomas A. Dine
demand that linkage be established between the Gulf crisis and the
Operations Director:
situation in the territories. We are, however, concerned that the
Robert V. Dietz
Executive Branch
vote at this time in favor of an unfair resolution denouncing Israel
Relations Director:
Howard A. Kohr
will be widely interpreted as implicit U.S. acquiescence in such
Legislative Director:
linkage.
lister Kurz
Foreign Policy Issues
Director:
Steven J. Rosen
Turning to another matter that we discussed in November, we
Policy and Development
Director:
hope the Administration will refrain from submitting to Congress a
Roy I. Rosenbaum
Political Director:
massive new arms deal with Saudi Arabia. As presently constituted,
Elizabeth Schrayer
the sale would be irrelevant to the current crisis because delivery
Regional Directors:
Seth Buchwald
of the proposed equipment would take years. It would strain our
New York
commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative edge, and would
Amy Cooper (Acting)
Southeast
further exacerbate the dangerous and debilitating arms race in the
Leonard J. Davis
Jerusalem
Richard Fishman
l'lorida
Naomi Lauter
Pacific Northwest
Sam Witkin
Southwest
Murray Wood
Southern Pacific
Middle East. A Saudi arms sale would not advance U.S. interests in
this most volatile of regions.
We continue to admire your steadfast approach to the Persian
Gulf crisis and wish you success in reversing Iraq's aggression.
At the same time, we ask that you move to repair the bruised U.S.-
Israel relationship. Your friendly meeting with Prime Minister
Shamir was an important step toward putting that vital relationship
back on track. We are aware of your desire to make these meetings
meaningful and successful. For the benefit of both countries, we
ask that you continue on that path.
Finally, we wish you and your family a Merry Christmas and a
Happy New Year. May 1991 be a year of peace with stability and
security around the world.
May Mith Sincerely, Jom Thomas A. Dine Dine
Mayer Mitchell
President
Executive Director
DEC-18-90 TUE 1:10
P.04
12-18-90 12:33 T-USUN
#208 P01
The members of the Security Council reaffirm their
determination to support an active negotiating process in which
all relevant parties would participate leading to a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli
conflict through negotiations which should be based on
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council
and which should take into account the right to security of all
states in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate
political rights of the Palestinian people.
In this context they agree that an international conference, at
an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, the members of the Council agree that the appropriate
time for such a conference will need to be decided by the
parties to #salmains to be discussed.
In the view of the members of the Council, the Arab-Israeli
conflict and Iraq invasion of Kuwait must be addressed
independently each on its own merits,
situation seture bag
and Kuwait
OK
is unique and
must be addressed
independently and a
to own ments.
10/298
DEC-18-90 TUE 1:08
P.02
#206 P02
To: GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM: Bobbic KiLbeRs
Finnish Draft
12/18/90
00:30 a.m.
sulf
The Security Council,
Nations Charter,
Reaffirming the obligations of member states under the United
Reaffirming further the principle of the inadmissibility of the
Resolution 242 (1967),
acquisition of territory by war set forth in Security Council
Having received the report of the Secretary-General submitted
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 672 (1990) on
ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the
Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation and in
particular taking note of paragraphs 20 - 26 therein (S/21919),
Taking note of the interest of the Secretary-General to visit
and send his envoy to pursue his initiative with the Israeli
authorities, as indicated in paragraph 22 of the report of the
Secretary-General (S/21919), and of their recent invitation
extended to him,
Gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the
situation in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel
tension in Israel,
since 1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising
Taking into consideration the statement made by the President
the methods and approaches for
harrwork
of the Security Council on 17 December 1990 concerning an instructional
act Ive negotiating process for a comprehensive, just, and
lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Recalling its resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989)
and 641 (1989) and alarmed by the decision of the Government of
Israel to deport four Palestinians from the occupied
territories in contravention of its obligations under the
Fourth Geneva Convention,
1. Expresses it appreciation to the Secretary-General for his
report contained in document S/21919;
2. Expresses its grave concern over the rejection by Israel of
Security Council resolutions 672 (1990) and 673 (1990),
3. Deplores the decision by the Government of Israel, the
occupying power, to resume deportations of Palestinian
civilians in the occupied territories;
DEC-18-90 TUE 1:09
P.03
12-18-30 12:00 1-450N
#206 HUS
4. Urges the Government of Israel to accept de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all
the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide
scrupulously by the provisions of the said convention;
5. Calls on the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying
power, for its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention
in accordance with Article 1;
6. Requests the Secretary-General in cooperation with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to develop further the
idea from the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919) of
convening a meeting of the high contracting parties to the
Fourth Geneva convention and to discuss possible measures that
might be taken by them under the Convention and for this
purpose to invite these parties to submit their views on how
the idea could contribute to the goals of the Convention as
well as on other relevant matters and to report to the Council;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the
situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli
occupation, making new efforts in this regard on an urgent
basis, and to utilize and designate or draw upon the United
Nations and other personnel and resources present there in the
area and elsewhere needed to accomplish this task and to keep
the Security Council regularly informed;
8. Requests further the Secretary-General to report on the
possidicali
progress in the implementation of this resolution tby (note
date to be determined in consultations with the SYG)] and
every 4
9. decides to remain seized of the matter.
on
9. Decides
193503
Burnish Uvynihan
New York
June Chere
United Plulas Lenate
Washington. D.C.
November 26, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
Dick Lugar has told me of your
telephone call to him and that settles
the matter so far as I am concerned. I
would, however, like to note the comment
of the Administration official in the
Washington Post on November 15, to the
effect that "[the President] expects
[members of Congress] to tell him their
concerns before they run to Good Morning
America "
Fair enough, I never called you.
But I did spend much of September and
October near to pleading with
Administration officials to help draft a
resolution of support for your policy.
Thus, September 24 on the floor:
As the human toll begins to
rise, the President may well
find his popularity ratings
slumping and his congressional
support evaporating
How
much better it would be if the
Congress and the President take
this opportunity to state that
in this crisis we stand
together in opposing this
illegal invasion and enforcing
the resolutions of the Security
Council.
2
It happens I am chairman of the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations and
necessarily involved with the issue. I
had a theory of the case. Namely that
the United States was acting, as required
by Article 25 of the Charter, to carry
out the decisions of the Security
Council, to pursue "measures not
involving the use of armed force" as
provided in Article 41. The issue of war
powers did not arise and we could agree
on a Joint Resolution endorsing our
actions. I grant that there was not a
great deal of support for this theory
among my colleagues, but there was some.
There was, however, none in the
Administration. The attitude as conveyed
to me was that no Congressional
endorsement was required or desired.
We have been friends long enough for
me to hope you will see this letter and
understand why I have sent it.
Best,
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
November 29, 1990
Golf
NOTE TO: WHITE HOUSE STAFF
FROM:
BILL KRISTOL
Here's the text of the speech the Vice President is
delivering today at Seton Hall University. The speech discusses
U.S. Persian Gulf policy in the broader context of our strategic
objectives in the Middle East for the past 40 years, and
addresses some of the moral issues at stake.
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
Embargoed until delivered -- 12:00 p.m. EST, November 29, 1990
PREPARED TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY
South Orange, New Jersey
Thank you. As always, I am happy to once again talk with
the student body of an outstanding American University -- I did
so last month at DePauw. As Vice President, I do a lot of
international travel. Nothing makes me more proud than to hear
the international community rave about America's colleges and
universities.
Our finest schools have kept firmly in mind what Dr. Samuel
Johnson, the great eighteenth century British man of letters,
termed the "supreme end of education: expert discernment in all
things -- the power to tell the good from the bad, the genuine
from the counterfeit, and to prefer the good and the genuine to
the bad and the counterfeit."
I am honored to have the opportunity to address the Seton
Hall community -- a community which truly strives to promote
"expert discernment in all things." Since your founding in 1856
by Bishop James Roosevelt Bayley, you have understood that
questions of good and bad, right and wrong, are not just minor
add-ons to the serious business of life. Rather, they constitute
its very core. As the eighth largest Catholic university in the
U.S., you have drawn on a rich tradition to promote a greater
sense of moral discernment throughout your community and your
2
country. Your motto puts it in perspective: "Advance despite
difficulties."
As all of you know, our country, along with the rest of the
international community, currently faces a grave crisis in the
Persian Gulf. This crisis carries with it the risk of war. Some
in this country have questioned whether the U.S. has any interest
in the Gulf that is worth fighting for. Today, I would like to
step back a bit from the current debate. I'd like to speak to
the larger perspectives of the subject that is too often
presented in ten second soundbites on television. Why is the
region so important? What have the strategic goals of U.S.
Middle East policy been over the last forty years? And how do
these goals apply in the current crisis?
The Middle East, as everyone knows, is the source of much of
the oil on which the industrialized world and developing nations
depend. It is a region of striking contrasts: Vast wealth and
grinding poverty; secular radicalism and religious
fundamentalism; hatred of the West and emulation of the West.
Most importantly, perhaps, the Middle East is caught up in a vast
process of change, as ancient societies and cultures strive to
adapt to the modern world. This process of adaptation, which
entails much turmoil and instability, is what makes the Middle
East such an interesting place. Unfortunately, it also makes the
Middle East a dangerous place.
Since the onset of the Cold War, the United States has had
three strategic objectives in the region. The first objective
3
was to contain Soviet expansionism. In 1947, the Soviet threat
to one regional state, Turkey, played a role in President
Truman's decision to issue the doctrine that bears his name.
Thirty-three years later, the threat of Soviet encroachment on
another region of the Middle East -- the Persian Gulf -- led
President Carter to proclaim the equivalent of the Truman
Doctrine for the Gulf. The Carter Doctrine, which was also
reinforced by President Reagan, warned that, "Any attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force."
But the Cold War is over. And because it is over, because
one of America's strategic objectives has been realized, some
commentators have assumed that all of our objectives have been
realized. They could not be more mistaken. For in addition to
containing the Soviets, American foreign policy has traditionally
pursued two other strategic objectives in the Middle East. It
has sought to prevent any local Middle East power from achieving
hegemony over its neighbors; and it has sought to secure the
uninterrupted supply of oil at a reasonable price. Let me
describe both of these objectives in greater detail.
Today, all the states of the Middle East face a major threat
in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saddam's ambitions are not confined to
Kuwait. Rather, his goal is to dominate the Persian Gulf region
and use its vast wealth to become the greatest Arab hero of
4
modern times, the leader of a new Arab superpower. To that end,
he spent some fifty billion dollars on arms imports during the
1980's alone. He has launched two wars of aggression during this
period, against Iran and against Kuwait, at a cost of some one
million lives -- thus far. He has built the sixth largest
military force in the world. He has acquired a sizeable
stockpile of both chemical and biological weapons, and is
estimated to have employed several thousand tons of chemical
agents against Iranians and against his own people -- Iraqi Kurds
-- in the 1980's. And he has launched a massive program to
acquire nuclear weapons.
The United States opposes Saddam Hussein's bid for regional
hegemony for the same reasons that we have opposed other bids.
We do not think any government has the right to impose its
political will on other countries through subversion or conquest.
We do not think Israel's existence, or the existence of other
friendly regional states, should be threatened. And, of course,
the prospect of Saddam Hussein strutting across the world stage
at the head of a malevolent global power, armed to the teeth with
weapons of mass destruction, an controlling a large portion of
the world's energy supplies, is something no sane person would
welcome. That is why we are working to contain Saddam Hussein's
bid for hegemony today -- just as we worked to contain other bids
for hegemony yesterday.
Of course, no discussion of America's strategic objectives
in the region is complete without mention of oil, so let me turn
5
to that issue now. A key strategic goal of U.S. Middle East
policy has been to assure the uninterrupted flow of oil at
reasonable prices. This does not mean, as some cynics have
suggested, that we are risking war to prevent the price of oil
from going up a few cents a gallon. During the Arab oil embargo
of 1973-74, and during the 1979 oil price shock that came in the
wake of the Iranian revolution, the price of oil went up much
more than that. But we never thought of going to war because the
price of oil was too high. We were confident that market forces
would eventually bring the price of oil down -- and we were
right.
We did prepare for all contingencies, however, when the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with instability in Iran,
brought Soviet forces within striking distance of the Persian
Gulf -- hence the Carter Doctrine. For if "any outside force",
as the Carter Doctrine put it, could control the flow of Persian
Gulf oil it would, as President Bush said, place our independence
and way of life at risk. No nation should be willing to tolerate
such a state of affairs, just as no individual should be willing
to allow anyone to hold a gun to his or her head.
That is why President Carter was willing to commit the
United States to preventing a single power -- the Soviet Union --
from controlling the Gulf. And that is why President Bush has
dispatched American troops to Saudi Arabia to prevent another
power -- Iraq this time -- from doing likewise. Neither
President was prepared to jeopardize American security by
6
permitting, in President Bush's words, "a resource so vital to be
dominated by one so ruthless" -- either Leonid Brezhnev of
Moscow, or Saddam Hussein of Baghdad.
So far, I have talked about traditional U.S. strategic
objectives in the Middle East. But there is another strategic
American objective in the current crisis that is not traditional
-- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the
Cold War. This objective might be described as strengthening the
foundations of world order. Let me explain what I mean.
When the Cold War was still raging, any regional crisis in
the Third World contained within it the seeds of a possible
Soviet-American confrontation. That is why, in the Middle East
and elsewhere, both the United States and the Soviet Union often
made significant efforts to restrain their clients from rash
behavior. These efforts were part of the unwritten "rules of the
game" that prevented Soviet-American competition from getting out
of hand. during the Cold War.
With the end of the Cold War, the chances of a Soviet-
American clash in any Third World conflict, including the Middle
East, have greatly diminished. Unfortunately, so have the
traditional restraints that the superpowers used to impose on
their regional clients. As a result, unless the U.N. Charter's
rules about using force are not reaffirmed and defended fairly
quickly, we face the dangerous prospect of a new, post-Cold War
world that is actually more anarchic, and more violence-prone,
than the world which preceded it.
7
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-
Cold War world. One way or another, it is bound to set a
precedent -- either on behalf of greater world order or on behalf
of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression,
it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to
emulate his example. But if he fails -- and believe me, he will
fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does not make
right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.
This is why President Bush has sought to rally the
international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why
the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions condemning
Iraq, and is considering yet another resolution today. This is
why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or
militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. And this
is why twenty-seven nations have sent troops or military materiel
to the Persian Gulf. Everyone recognizes that this is a test
case. Everyone can see that, beyond America's traditional
objectives in the region, what is at stake is nothing less than
the shape of tomorrow.
None of these considerations, of course, frees us from the
responsibility to proceed carefully. The moral and human
implications of war -- any war -- are very grave. No reasonable
effort should be spared in the quest for a peaceful solution.
That is why, despite the use of American hostages as human
shields, despite the outrages against our embassy, despite Iraq's
8
continued barbarism in Kuwait, we have refrained from military
action against Saddam Hussein.
But even as we exercise patience and restraint, we must also
be alert to the moral costs of such a course. Consider, for
example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day that
passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with
Iraq allows Saddam Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a
moral course of action?
or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi
Arabia. The longer we refrain from action against Iraq, the more
time Saddam Hussein has to tighten his grip on Kuwait, and the
harder it may be to break that grip, if and when war comes. Does
patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if
so, is this a moral course of action?
Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. As President
Bush told American troops in Saudi Arabia during Thanksgiving,
"Each day that passes brings Saddam one day closer to realizing
his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal
And we do know this for
sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. " Will
continued patience with Iraq help make the world vulnerable to
nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, is this a moral
course of action?
Please don't misunderstand me. I believe that every
reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis peacefully.
I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And
those limits are reached when our restraint threatens to
9
undermine other, equally moral goals. These goals, as I said,
include ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing
American casualties in the event of war; and preventing Saddam
Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his already formidable
arsenal of mass destruction. It is in order to prevent Saddam
Hussein from thwarting these goals that the U.N. Security Council
is expected to adopt a resolution today endorsing the use of
force against Iraq if Saddam does not withdraw his forces from
Kuwait.
The challenge the civilized world faces today is very grave.
But it is not unprecedented. In 1936, the world faced a rather
similar challenge when Adolf Hitler, who had only recently come
to power, moved German troops into the Rhineland, in open
defiance of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno. British and
French leaders faced a major dilemma. To confront Hitler
militarily could mean war. Not to confront him meant acquiescing
in a cynical breach of international law. What to do?
But while British and French leaders vacillated between
their hopes and their fears, one voice rang out loud and clear.
On March 13, 1936, Winston Churchill called on the League of
Nations to take tough action against German aggression. His
words deserve to be quoted at some length:
"If no means of lawful redress can be offered to the
aggrieved party,' Churchill wrote, " the whole doctrine
of international law and cooperation upon which the
hopes of the future are based would lapse
ignominiously
10
But the risk! No one must ignore it. How can it be
minimized? There is a simple method: the assembly of
an overwhelming force, moral and physical, in support
of international law If the forces at the disposal of
the League of Nations are four or five times as strong
as those that the aggressor can yet command, the
chances of a peaceful and friendly solution are very
good
The constabulary of the world is at hand. On every side
of Geneva stand great nations, armed and ready, whose
interests as well as whose obligations bind them to
uphold, and in the last resort enforce, the public law.
This may never come to pass again. The fateful moment
has arrived for choice between the New Age and the
old."
Tragically, most leaders did not see the stakes as clearly
as Churchill did. They did not force the issue to a head in the
League of Nations. Instead, they acquiesced in Hitler's
aggression. When, many years later, Churchill called World War
II the "unnecessary war", it was the failure of British and
French statesmanship during the Rhineland crisis that he had in
mind.
Today, the U.N. Security Council stands poised at an
historic juncture not unlike that faced by the League of Nations
in 1936. We are hopeful -- indeed, we are confident -- that it
will not fail the test. Some will thoughtlessly say that a vote
for today's U.N. resolution is a vote for war. We reject this
idea. Saddam has shown that he understands no language other
than the language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last
and best hope for peace -- for a genuine peace, not the false
peace that is only a prelude to another "unnecessary war. "
Thank you, and God bless you.
###