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Persian Gulf War 1991 [7]
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Persian Gulf War 1991 [7]
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F [2]; 1998-0099-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29166
Folder ID Number:
29166-009
Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [7]
Stack:
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15
25
3
4
NOV-30-90 FRI 10:28 NuclearControlInstitute P.02
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
THE CHIEF of STAFF
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
has seen
Rovember 30, 1990
Dear John-
l thought this statement or Irag: mulear
potential, which l. submitted to Sents and Services,
would be 7 openal interest to you.
l hope my might drawns then anlyest facther.
But wishes,
Pr
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admira Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
NOV-30-90
FRI
NuclearControlInstitute
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
For Immediate Release
Friday, November 30, 1990
PRESENT ASSESSMENTS UNDERSTATE
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POTENTIAL
Official and unofficial estimates that it would take Iraq
at least six months and probably years to build an atomic bomb are
"dangerously ill-informed," according to Paul Leventhal, president
of the Nuclear Control Institute.
These estimates, Leventhal said, do not take into
consideration that the time needed to convert the uranium-
aluminium fuel that Iraq now possesses for a research reactor into
pure uranium fuel for a bomb is only one to three weeks. These
estimates also do not take into consideration evidence that Iraq
has been designing and developing the non-nuclear components for
nuclear weapons in advance of having the essential nuclear
ingredients highly enriched uranium or plutonium--ready to
place in them. Finally, these estimates do not consider the
plausibility of Iraq now acquiring or having already acquired
substantial quantities of these weapons materials by clandestine
means from poorly protected civil nuclear facilities in other
countries---especially in western Europe and Japan---or even
possibly from willing suppliers in the Third World.
"It is remarkable," Leventhal said, "that non-proliferation
experts inside and outside the U.S. government have been so fast
to trash President Bush's statements about Iraq's short-term
nuclear potential as nothing more than political opportunism. It
is ironic that when the White House finally wakes up to the
long-neglected proliferation danger in Iraq, unnamed non-
proliferation officials in the government, as well as former
senior officials and independent experts, downplay the danger by
suggesting that the President is merely playing to public concerns
reflected in opinion polls."
Leventhal said that the new U.S. intelligence assessment,
which apparently provides the basis for the President's concerns
and for Defense Secretary Cheney's estimate of Iraq being as close
as six months to a bomb, may itself be flawed.
"This U.S. assessment appears to contain a worst-case
scenario of Iraq needing six months to build a bomb from the time
it seizes the French-supplied research reactor fuel that is now
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret). Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
NOV-30-90
FRI
NuclearControlInstitute
under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)," Leventhal said. Six months represents the time span
between routine visits to Iraq by IAEA inspectors to make sure the
fuel is still there, but the IAEA officially states--based on the
advice it gets from an international team of safeguards experts---
that the time needed to convert this reactor fuel into weapons
fuel is only one to three weeks. If Iraq has the components of an
implosion device--save the nuclear core---completed and ready to
be assembled, Iraq could have a bomb within the one-to-three-week
conversion time.
Iraq now has 12.3 kilograms (27 pounds) of 93%-enriched
uranium contained in the uranium-aluminum fuel plates provided by
France for use in the French-built Osirak research reactor. The
fuel has been in storage near Baghdad ever since Israel destroyed
the reactor with a bombing raid in 1981 before the reactor went
into operation. This amount of highly enriched uranium is enough
for at least one implosion device. An additional 18.7 kilograms
(41 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium would be needed for a crude
gun-type device utilizing two critical masses of this material
weighing a total of 31 kilograms (68 pounds). (This is the amount
of 93%-enriched uranium that would be needed, utilizing a
beryllium reflector. See attached analysis.)
There is ample evidence that Iraq is designing and building
components of nuclear weapons, Leventhal said. A Congressional
investigation disclosed that Iraq had received, by June 1989, 18
reports from U.S. national laboratories relating to the detonators
and chemical explosives used in nuclear weapons. U.S. and British
customs officials have stopped illegal exports of electronic
capacitors and a vacuum furnace applicable to building nuclear
weapons, but Saddam Hussein later displayed Iraqi capacitors
(high-speed electronic triggers needed for an implosion device)
based on an American capacitor that he suggested was smuggled
successfully from the U.S.
"The bottom line question," Leventhal said, "is whether Iraq
now has enough material to build nuclear weapons. If Iraq does,
it would be foolhardy to assume that it lacks the technical
wherewithal to explode nuclear weapons with it. Only a year ago, U.S.
experts were caught by surprise and expressed disbelief when Iraq
claimed to have launched a three-stage rocket capable of carrying
satellites into space, only to have to eat their words when U.S.
intelligence confirmed the launch. We cannot afford to be caught
off guard again, this time by Iraqi nuclear weapons.
"It is clear that Iraq has enough highly enriched uranium for
one implosion device. What is not clear is whether it has
obtained enough uranium or plutonium for a few or several such
devices, or enough uranium for less sophisticated gun-type devices
(which require more material but are easier to detonate). Expert
assessments have focused almost exclusively on Iraq's nascent
industrial capacity tc produce its own bomb material capacity
that apparently has not grown sufficiently to produce such
material in quantities needed for weapons. These assessments
2
FRI
10:30
have ignored the possibility that Iraq could use or may already
have used its highly sophisticated clandestine purchasing
networks, or its terrorist surrogates, to obtain bomb-grade
uranium and plutonium from abroad.
"If indeed there is no evidence of diversions of nuclear bomb
materials to Iraq, this does not mean such diversions have not
occurred only that none has been detected. By definition, a
successful diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from
an IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facility is one that goes undetected.
"The Achilles heel of the global non-proliferation regime is
the legitimate place that bomb-grade uranium and plutonium have
been given in civilian nuclear programs despite the inadequacy of
international safeguards and national protective measures on this
material.
"Because of measurement uncertainties, hundreds of kilograms
of plutonium are 'unaccounted for' in large civilian nuclear fuel
facilities each year, but always the IAEA determines, in the
absence of evidence of a diversion, that none of the unaccounted-
for material has been diverted. The materials accounting
measures used by IAEA inspectors are supposed to detect the loss
of one weapons quantity of plutonium-- 8 kilograms (17.6
pounds) in a year, but the IAEA admits that it cannot meet its
own detection goal in large plutonium plants. The best it can do
in meeting its own goal of a 95% confidence level of detection and
only a 5% probability of a false alarm is to detect a loss of
about 250 kilograms (550 pounds) of plutonium a year in such a
plant. Any loss less than that could go undetected.
"Thus, the undetected loss of a very small percentage of the
total inventory of plutonium in a major industrial state like
France, Germany or Japan--where plutonium is processed and stored
in multi-ton quantities would represent a very substantial
amount of bomb material for Saddam Hussein. It is by no means
implausible that a plant worker or manager, acting under duress or
by reason of bribery or ideology, could successfully remove
substantial quantities of plutonium from a safeguarded plant into
the hands of an Iraqi agent.
"A number of civilian facilities, known as critical
assemblies, contain large amounts of pure plutonium and highly
enriched uranium in metallic form the ideal material for nuclear
weapons that, according to the IAEA, can be converted into weapons
components in as little as 7 to 10 days. The material is often
stored in the form of many thousands of foil-thin metal coupons,
which present IAEA inspectors with a materials-accounting
nightmare.
"At one such facility, the fast critical assembly in Japan,
there are some 325 kilograms (715 pounds) of plutonium metal and
180 kilograms (396 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium metal acquired
from the U.S. defense program for breeder fuel experiments. A few
years ago, U.S. inspectors became so alarmed by lax physical
3
FRI
protection measures at the facility that the Sandia National
Laboratory was called upon to develop a crash improvement program.
"Beyond the possibility of undetected diversions of bomb
material to Iraq from civil nuclear programs in Europe and Japan,
there is also the possibility that Third World countries with
advanced nuclear programs---such as China and Pakistan---might
have supplied highly enriched uranium to Iraq. Such friendly
clandestine transfers would be more likely to be detected by
intelligence methods, however."
Leventhal said present assessments of Iraq's nuclear
potential "reflect the dangerous tendency to 'mirror-image' the
adversary---that is, to assume that he will act the way we act.
In this case, the assumption is that he will not have nuclear
weapons until he has done what we and every other weapon state
have done: build an industry to produce the needed material.
Thus, too much emphasis has been placed on analyzing how far Iraq
has gone in importing essential industrial materials and
components and building the gas centrifuges of a uranium
enrichment plant; too little emphasis has been placed on the
possibility that Iraqi agents have acquired bomb materials
undetected from abroad. "
"In this regard," Leventhal said, "present assessments of
Iraq's nuclear weapons potential are dangerously ill-informed."
Short of military intervention now being considered by the
Bush Administration, Leventhal proposed a number of remedial
measures:
First, the frequency of IAEA inspections in Iraq should be
increased to coincide with the conversion time of the highly
enriched uranium fuel--that is, inspections should take place
weekly, or at least once every three weeks, to verify that the
material has not been removed from safeguards for use in a bomb.
Second, the IAEA should exercise its "special inspections"
safeguards authority to seek out and enter facilities where
fissionable material might be located.
Third, all civilian nuclear facilities in the world
possessing weapons quantities of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium should be placed on special alert, and extraordinary
measures should be taken to protect against diversions.
Fourth, Iraq, now a party in good standing of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be condemned in a resolution
signed by the 140 other parties to the Treaty for its blatant
disregard of its pledge not to seek or to develop nuclear weapons.
#
4
NOV-30-90
FRI
P.07
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
Uranium Requirements for a Gun-Type Device
In this analysis, a gun-type nuclear device is based on the
assembly of two critical masses of highly enriched uranium metal.
The uranium components in the gun-type design are surrounded by
several inches of metal to reflect neutrons and reduce the
quantity of uranium that is needed. Beryllium, natural uranium
or tungsten are possible reflectors. The Hiroshima (gun-type)
bomb used a tungsten carbide reflector.
The amount of uranium in a reflected critical mass depends
on the enrichment of the uranium and the choice of reflector.
With a 4-inch thick beryllium reflector surrounding a sphere of
93-percent enriched uranium, the critical mass of the enriched
uranium is 15.5 kilograms, or 31 kilograms in two critical
masses. For either a tungsten or natural uranium reflector, the
reflected critical mass of 93-percent enriched uranium is about
25 kilograms, or about 50 kilograms for two critical masses.
A compact gun-type weapon would use beryllium as the
preferred reflector material, but use of beryllium, a highly
toxic material, is probably beyond the capability of a terrorist
group. The extent of Iraq's activities to acquire and use
beryllium are not known. Iraq is known to have a sizeable stock
of natural uranium.
The nominal yield of the gun device is about 10 kilotons,
equivalent to ten thousand tons of TNT. The minimum or "fizzle"
nuclear yield is probably on the order of some several hundred
tons of TNT.
Iraq's Needs Using Various Enrichments
Iraq is known to have 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched
uranium in Osirak reactor fuel that currently is under
International Atomic Energy safeguards. Should Iraq withdraw
this fuel from safeguards and recover the highly enriched uranium
metal, it would have enough material for an implosion device. To
make a less sophisticated gun-type device, Iraq would need to
acquire the following additional quantities of highly enriched
uranium to make up two critical masses for a beryllium-reflected
gun-type weapon:
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul 1. I eventhal. President Peter A: Bradford. David Cohen. Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter. Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
NOV-30-90
FRI
10:32
NuclearControlInstitute
93-percent enriched. Iraq would need an additional 18.7
kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical
masses totalling 31 kilograms.
80-percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 24 kilograms of
80-percent enriched uranium to the 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent
enriched from the Osirak fuel to obtain two reflected critical
masses totaling 36.3 kilograms of net 84.4-percent enriched
uranium. Iraq is reported to have about 10 kilograms of 80-
percent enriched uranium on hand in fuel for a Soviet-design
research reactor.
36 percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 82 kilograms of
36-percent enriched uranium to the combined 12.3 kilograms of 93-
percent enriched uranium and 10 kilograms of 80-percent enriched
uranium to obtain two reflected critical masses totalling 104.3
kilograms of net 47-percent enriched uranium. Iraq is understood
to have at least several kilograms of 36-percent enriched uranium
in research reactor fuel.
For a gun-type device using a tungsten or natural uranium
reflector, Iraq would need to acquire an additional 37.7
kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical
masses totaling 50 kilograms. Correspondingly larger quantities
of 80-percent and 36-percent uranium would be required to make up
two critical masses.
The values given here do not take into account possible
uranium conversion and fabrication losses which in some cases may
be as high as ten percent.
Milton Hoenig
November 29, 1990
2
DEC 03 '90 18:19
P.3
HALEY BARBOUR
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
POST OFFICE BOX 980
BUITE 1010
YAZOO CITY, MISSISSIPPI 39194
BOC NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
(601) 746-2134
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20037
(202) 333-8787
MEMORANDUM
R
TO: FROM: GENERAL HALEY BARBOUR BRENT SCOWCROFT HaleyB
DATE: NOVEMBER 30, 1990
RE: AUSTRALIA VIEWS AND CONCERNS ON THE PERSIAN GULF
For the last two weeks I have been in Australia as a guest of
its government and have met with a variety of Australian elected
officials, party leaders and journalists. The Persian Gulf
situation came up in virtually every meeting. I want to share with
you what I heard in these meetings.
The Hawke Government considers itself firmly committed to our
and the U.N.'s positions in the Gulf. The Opposition Coalition is,
if anything, even more strongly in favor of our Gulf position than
Labor, so Hawke's only opposition, still muted, is from the left
wing of his own ALP. Conversations with Senator Evans, the Foreign
Minister, other Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials
and both government and opposition politicians convince me that
they are there to stay, even if there is a fight.
The Aussies seem concerned about the U.S. While one finds
very little concern about the President's own resolve, I was
repeatedly asked about Congress and the apparent opposition to the
Gulf effort or, at least, the attempt to question the President's
actions. The Australian media gives substantial coverage to this
Congressional activity, and the politicians fear the President will
somehow get hamstrung by it.
There is a view that Hawke would take some flack if a shooting
war started, and more than just the fullblown pacifists may
question what role Australian forces would play in such a conflict.
All in all, however, with strong Opposition support, I feel the
Hawke government will stay the course as long as the U.S. is
resolute.
HB/ds
CC: John Sununu
DEC 03 '90 18:19
P.4
HALEY BARBOUR
POST OFFICE BOX 980
SUITE 1010
YAZOO CITY, MISSISSIPPI 39194
BOO NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
(801) 746-2134
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
MEMORANDUM
(202) 333-6767
TO: SECRETARY CLAYTON YEUTTER
FROM: HALEY BARBOUR
DATE: NOVEMBER 30,
RE: IMPRESSIONS OF AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON GATT AND
FARM SUBSIDIES
For the last couple of weeks I have toured Australia as a
guest of its government. Since agricultural policy was frequently
brought up to me, I want to share a couple of impressions that may
be of value to you.
First, the Australian politicians, journalists and farm
leaders with whom I met feel the U. S. has genuinely and
aggressively sought to achieve the proper agreements on farm
subsidies in GATT, and they are appreciative. While they believe
we still subsidize agriculture too much, the anger SO evident a few
years ago has subsided to a fraction of its former level.
Second, senior officials at the Australian Wheat Board are not
optimistic about getting the right kind of ag agreement out of
GATT. For this they blame the EC, especially France. They have
not given up on GATT, but feel the odds are against us and the
Cairns group.
Third, they feel the failure to achieve a good GATT resolution
may lead to renewed and perhaps intensified U. S. farm subsidies,
with Australia and similarly situated exporters being caught in the
middle between us and the EC.
Finally, the financial situation of Australia's agriculture
sector is bad and getting worse, perhaps much worse. While they
apparently don't have a.8 much farm debt burden as we, the collapse
of the wool market coupled with weak wheat prices has driven the
ratio of farm revenue to expense to the lowest level in history.
The papers are full of very discouraging and worsening farm
economic statistics. The urban economy is softening significantly
and quickly, and most budgets are extremely tight. The
Commonwealth has a budget surplus, but it has a huge wool surplus
hanging over its head. It is hard to find a silver lining for
their farmers especially if they don't get GATT relief.
DEC 03 '90 18:20
P.5
This is not to elicit any action by you or our government; I
simply wanted to pass along to you the information and impressions
I received in Australia.
HB/ds
00: John Sununu
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
has seen
THE CHIEF of STAFF
December 4, 1990
6-6
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SUNUNU
FROM:
FRED MCCLURE for
SUBJECT:
Congressional Hearings on the Persian Gulf
Below for your review is an outline of the hearing schedule for
the rest of the year. Rob is working with Public Liaison and NSC
to help with witnesses and outreach efforts in key Congressional
districts.
We have recently learned that Sam Nunn may want to reconvene the
Senate Armed Services Committee sometime this month to hear from
Jim Baker. Finally, we have heard that the Constitution
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee may want to hold a
hearing on the War Powers Act and other separation of powers
issues.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 4, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR DEB AMEND
LEIGH ANN METZGER
FROM:
ROB PORTMAN RP
SUBJECT:
Desert Shield Hearings Scheduled for December
1. SENATE:
The Senate Armed Services Committee has completed its round of
hearings that began last week. The Foreign Relations
Committee is holding hearings today, Wednesday and Thursday.
Below is a tentative witness list:
Tuesday December 4, 1990
Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
Judith Kipper, the Brookings Institution
Sam Zakhem, former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain
J. Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard University
Gary Hufbauer, Georgetown University
Melvin Conant, Conant Associates
Wednesday, December 5, 1990
Secretary of State Jim Baker
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor
Thursday, December 6, 1990
Roger Fisher, Harvard University
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
George Rathjens, MIT
Charles Floweree, former U.S. Ambassador to UN for Arms
Control
Reverend Jesse Jackson, Shadow Senator
Archbishop Roach, Conference of U.S. Catholic Bishops
Dr. Dale Bishop, National Council of Churches
There are no other Senate hearings scheduled at this time.
- 2 -
2. HOUSE:
The House Armed Services Committee also begins hearings today.
Hearings are expected to go into next week, and perhaps the
week after next. Below is a tentative witness list for this
week:
Tuesday, December 4, 1990
James Akins, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Judith Kipper, the Brookings Institution
Phoebe Marr, National Defense University
Dr. Jerrold Post, George Washington University,
formerly with the Central Intelligence Agency
Wednesday, December 5, 1990
William Webster, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Thursday, December 6, 1990
Janna Nolan, the Brookings Institution
Brad Roberts, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Leonard Specter, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
James Bill, William and Mary College
Martin Indyk, the Washington Institution for Near East
Policy
William Quandt, the Brookings Institution
Friday, December 6, 1990
Secretary Dick Cheney
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
For outreach purposes, attached is a list of House Armed Services
Committee Members and their districts, including all major urban
areas.
A previously scheduled Thursday House Budget Committee hearing on
the budgetary impact of Desert Shield has been cancelled.
However, Thursday morning there will be a general hearing on the
U.S. economy, at which time the Persian Gulf may be discussed.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing on
Thursday, with Secretary Baker testifying. Foreign Affairs
Subcommittees may hold further hearings.
- 3 -
The House Intelligence Committee will hold a closed door hearing
Wednesday with Administration witnesses.
We are aware of no other House hearings scheduled at this time.
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
DEMOCRATS:
Les Aspin, Chairman. (wi.-1) - Racine, Kenosha, Janesville,
Beloit
Charles E. Bennett (Fla.-3) - Northeast Jacksonville
G.V. Montgomery (Ms.-3) - Meridian, Laurel, Rankin County,
Columbus, Starkville
Ronald V. Dellums (Cal.-8) - Berkeley, Oakland, near Alameda
County Coliseum and Oakland International Airport
Patricia Schroeder (Co.-1) - Denver
Beverly Byron (Md.-6) - Hagerstown, Cumberland, Frederick
Nicholas Mavroules (Ma.-6) - North Shore, Lynn, Peabody, Salem,
Gloucester, Haverhill
Earl Hutto (Fla.-1) - Northwest Pensacola, Panama City
Ike Skelton (Mo.-4) - Kansas City suburbs, Jefferson City,
Sedalia, Warrensburg
Marvin Leath (Tx.-11) - Waco, Killeen, Temple
Dave McCurdy (Ok.-4) - Southwest part of Oklahoma City, Lawton,
Norman
Thomas M. Foglietta (Pa.-1) - South and Central Philadelphia
Roy Dyson (Md.-1) - Eastern Shore, Southern Maryland, Waldorf
Dennis M. Hertel (Mi.-14) - Northeast Detroit, Warren, Hamtramck
Marilyn Lloyd (Tn.-3) - Chattanooga, Oak Ridge
Norman Sisisky (Va.-4) - Chesapeake, Portsmouth
Richard Ray (Ga.-3) - West Central Columbus, Plains, Warner
Robins
John Spratt (S.C.-5) - Sumter, Rock Hill, Lancaster
Frank McCloskey (In.-8) - Southwest Evansville, Southern
Bloomington
Solomon Ortiz (Tex.-27) - Gulf Coast, Corpus Christi, Brownsville
George Darden (Ga.-7) - Northwest Rome, Marietta, Cobb County
(Suburbs of Atlanta)
Albert Bustamante (Tex.-23) -23) - San Antonio suburbs, Laredo
George Hochbrueckner (N.Y.-1) - Long Island, Eastern Suffolk
County, Montauk, Southold, Sag Harbor, Shelter Island, Stony
Brook
Joseph Brennan (Me.-1) - South Portland, Augusta, Biddeford,
Saco, Waterville
Owen Pickett (Va.-2) - Norfolk, Virginia Beach
Martin Lancaster (N.C.-3) - Goldsboro; Wayne, Onslow, and
Johnston Counties
Lane Evans (II.-17) - Rock Island, Moline, Galesburg
James H. Bilbray (Nv.-1) - Las Vegas
John Tanner (Tn.-8) - Jackson, Frayser area of Memphis, Northern
Shelby County, Madison County
Michael McNulty (N.Y.-23) - Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, Albany,
Schenectady
Glen Browder (Ala.-3) - Anniston, Opelika, Tuskegee, Auburn
Gene Taylor (Ms.-5) - Hattiesburg, Bay St. Louis, Biloxi
REPUBLICANS:
William Dickinson (Ala.-2) - Montgomery, Dothan
Floyd Spence (S.C.-2) - Columbia, Orangeburg
Bob Stump (Az.-3) - Glendale, Flagstaff, Sun City, Suburbs west
of Phoenix
Jim Courter (N.J.-12) - Morristown, Princeton, Hackettstown, Far
Hills, Peapack
Larry Hopkins (Ky.-6) - North Central Lexington, Frankfort
Bob Davis (Mich.-11) - Upper Peninsula, Northern Lower Peninsula,
Sault Ste. Marie, Charlevois, Petoskey, Escanaba, Manistique
Duncan Hunter (Cal.-45) - Imperial Valley, Eastern suburbs of San
Diego (Chula Vista, El Cajon and Lakeside), Coronado
David Martin (N.Y.-26) - Plattsburgh, Watertown
John Kasich (Oh.-12) - Northeast Columbus and Suburbs, Bexley,
Whitehall,
Herb Bateman (Va.-1) - Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg,
Jamestown, Yorktown
Ben Blaz (R-Gu.) - Guam
Andy Ireland (Fla.-10) - Central Lakeland, Winter Haven,
Bradenton
Jim Hansen (Ut.-1) - Ogden, Rural Utah, Washington, Millard,
Weber, and Davis counties
John Rowland (ct.-5) - West Waterbury, Danbury
Curt Weldon (Pa.-7) - Southwest Philadelphia Suburbs
Jon Kyl (Az.-4) - Northeast - Northern Phoenix, Scottsdale
Arthur Ravenel (s.c.-1) - Charleston, Beaufort County, Hilton
Head
Robert Dornan (Cal.-38) - Northwestern Orange County, Western
half of Anaheim, Santa Ana, Garden Grove
Joel Hefley (Co.-5) - Colorado Springs; Jefferson, Arapahoe,
Douglas, and Elbert Counties
Jim McCrery (La.-4) - Shreveport, Bossier City
Ronald Machtley (R.I.-1) - Part of Providence, Pawtucket
Robert Smith (N.H.-1) - Manchester, Portsmouth
I
Suggested List of Baker/Cheney/Member Consultation Meetings
For December 3, 1990 - January 3, 1991
Foley/Mitchell
Dole/Michel
Gephardt/Fascell/Hamilton
Gingrich/Broomfield/Dickinson/Hyde
Lugar/Cohen/Kassebuam/Kasten
How be halfful?
Pell/Sarbanes/Boren/Leahy
Biden/Glenn/Inouye/Moynihan/Robb
Stevens/Hatfield/Warner/Rudman
Conte/McDade/Myers/Edwards
Wallop
Gray/Hoyer/Obey/McHugh
Berman/Levine/Weber/Gilman
Metzenbaum/Lieberman/Specter/Mack
(Note: Cheney to meet with Murtha and Aspin separately)
THE WHITE HOUSE
90 NOV 30
WASHINGTON
AM
November 30, 1990
8.-
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the, Chief of Staff
Panuld Leisler Feisler
FROM:
RONALD GEISLER
Executive Clerk
SUBJECT:
Recalling the Congress into Session
Under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution, the President
may, "on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either
of them,
"
The last time the Congress was recalled from a sine die
adjournment -- the situation we would have today -- was in 1939.
The first session of the 76th Congress adjourned sine die on
August 5, 1939. The next session was to have commenced on
January 3, 1940. Pursuant to Proclamation 2365 of September 13,
1939, the Congress was required to reconvene on September 21,
1939, to consider the repeal of the embargo provisions of the
neutrality law. The second session of the 76th Congress -- the
special session -- did convene on that date and adjourned sine
die on November 3, 1939. The third session (which ordinarily
would have been the second session) convened on January 3, 1940.
Pocket Vetoes
During the 5 1/2-week intersession adjournment between August 5,
1939, and the commencement of the special, second session on
September 21, 1939, the President pocket vetoed 40 bills. None
of those pocket vetoes were invalidated by the return of the
Congress. The Congress could not override the bills since they
were not in session to receive returned vetoes at the end of the
10 days.
The second session of the 101st Congress adjourned sine die on
Sunday, October 28, 1990. The President has thus far pocket
vetoed four bills. When these bills were pocket vetoed, the
101st Congress had adjourned sine die (the 102nd Congress will
convene, on January 3, 1991). We consider these vetoes to be
"classic" pocket vetoes, which will remain unaffected by a
Presidential recall of the Congress. We note that the last day
for action on the two remaining pending bills is November 30,
1990, for S. 2834, Intelligence Authorization, Fiscal Year 1991,
and December 1, 1990, for H.R. 5316, the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990.
Recess Appointments
Article II, section 2, clause 3, of the Constitution provides
that:
The President shall have the Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at
the End of their next Session. (emphasis added)
My predecessor in this office told me that in 1939 he had to deal
with the question of whether or not the calling of a special
session of the Congress would terminate, at the end of such
special session, recess appointments made prior to the convening
of that session. A determination was made in the affirmative. A
quick search of our records shows that about 15 recess
appointments were made before the convening of the special
session. For example, on August 11 and September 1, 1939, the
President granted recess appointments to James W. Young, of New
Mexico, to be Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Department of Commerce, and George A. Malcolm, of Michigan, to be
Attorney General of Puerto Rico, respectively. On November 4,
1939, the day after the adjournment of the special session, those
gentlemen again were given recess appointments, their first
having expired at the end of the special, second session. It
should be noted, however, that the law in effect in 1939 would
have, in my opinion, prohibited payment to an individual who
received successive recess appointments (I could not determine
whether or not these recess appointees received pay).
Since the adjournment on October 28, 1990, President Bush has
issued no recess appointments. If the President were to issue
recess appointments during this sine die adjournment, prior to
the commencing of a special, third session of the Congress, I
believe these recess appointments would expire at the end of the
special, third session. I also believe that, if given a second
recess appointment, after the third session has adjourned, these
appointees would not be eligible for pay while serving under a
second, consecutive recess appointment (5 U.S.C. 5503 (a) (2)
Because this pay matter is not free from doubt, I recommend that
you obtain an opinion from Counsel's Office if the Congress is to
be recalled and the President is contemplating making recess
appointments prior to the recall.
Gulf
From the desk of
George Bush
To Bob Dole
Batten down the
hatches!
PAUL D. WELLSTONE
MINNESOTA
SENATOR ELECT
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEE
United States Senate
11-29-90
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2303
November 28, 1990
are
Dear President Bush:
I supported you when you joined with leaders of other United
Nations member states in economic sanctions against Iraq, aimed
at forcing its withdrawal from Kuwait and its release of
hostages. So did the vast majority of Minnesotans.
I supported you when you deployed American troops in Saudi
Arabia, in what you promised would be a "wholly defensive"
posture. So did the vast majority of Minnesotans.
But suddenly you changed your tune--renouncing the sanctions and
diplomacy approach before it had a chance to succeed, building up
a patently offensive force and threatening to start a war.
should know the likely consequences of that choice--the enormous
Before the war option is chosen, the people of this democracy
estimates of civilian and military casualties, the disastrous
consequences to the U.S. and the global economies, the
irreparable damage to prospects for resolving the most serious
long-term problems in the Middle East.
And before the choice is made, people should also know the likely
consequences of vigorously and patently pursuing the sanctions
and diplomacy option--its excellent chances of achieving our
the stage for truly productive negotiations about the long-term
short-term national objectives in the Persian Gulf and of setting
political and military stability of the region.
Taking democracy seriously means that the people of this country
must engage in an urgent informed national debate this December;
and must ultimately decide whether we will go to war.
I am going back to begin that debate in Minnesota. Starting next
week, I will hold town meetings around the state, aimed at
informing people, letting them know where I stand and listening
to what they have to say. I urge my colleagues in the Senate and
House to do the same. And I further urge you or members of your
staff to join me at any of these town meetings.
With such meetings in congressional districts throughout the
country, we could have the historic December Debate this grave
situation warrants and we could return to Washington in January
with a mandate from the American people, prepared to make the
ultimate decision the Constitution requires of us.
Mr. President, I respectfully request that you support and
participate in this historic debate. It is the mark of a great
nation that it is strong enough to listen to its people.
There is still time to stop the momentum towards war. We can
suspend the current troop build up and return to a policy based
on stringent economic sanctions coupled with vigorous and
creative diplomatic initiatives. I strongly advocate that path
and if we have an informed nationwide debate, I am confident that
is what the vast majority of American will demand.
Sincerely,
Paul
Paul David Wellstone
Senator-Elect
DRAFT
Whereas the Congress recognizes the historic action taken
by the United Nations Security Council on November 28, 1990, in
passing Resolution 678, which "authorizes member states
to
use all necessary means" to "restore international peace and
security" in the Persian Gulf region.
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That:
1. The United States, in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 678, is prepared to use all necessary means to
achieve the goals outlined in Resolution 678 and the ten
earlier resolutions on the Persian Gulf crisis passed by the
Security Council since August 2, 1990, and articulated by the
President of the United States in his Address to the Nation of
[DATE].
2. The President shall continue to consult with the
Congress on decisions on the means necessary to achieve those
goals.
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Mr. Kissinger told them unat economic
President-Oops,
sanctions won't do the job-they expect. "I
would like to bélieve what so many here
believe, that the sanctions will work," he
Sen.-Nunn Sides
said politely, much to the consternation of
Democrats. But what did they mean ex
actly by sanctions "working?" He said he
With Gulf Doves
doubts sanctions will force Saddam from
Kuwait, and they, certainly won disarm
his missiles or nuclear weapons.
President Bush has persuaded Mikhail
It's true, he said, that sanctions might
Gorbachev, won over Deng Xiaoping, ca-
get Saddam to talk. But Mr. Kissinger,
joled the Europeans and coopted Syria's
who remembers Vietnam, added that "if
brutal Assad. So what's wrong with Sen.
one studies almost every conflict in which
Sam Nunn?
the U.S. was involved, there is period in
Something like that is the question be
which the impression is created that talk is
ing asked privately at the White House this
its. own objective. In other words, Sad-
week. At the usually treacherous United
dam and some U.S. special envoy' will
Nations, the world is telling the U.S. it can
repair to Geneva, and proceed to fight over
use force against Iraq. But back on this
the shape of the table.
side of the water's edge, the Georgia Dem-
Meanwhile; said Mr. Kissinger, support
ocrat is holding hearings in Congress that
will erode for Mr Bush's delicate anti Sad-
are building a case for war not with Sad-
dam coalitions, domestic and international.
dam Hussein, but with George Bush. Mr.
The Mideast isn't Europe; its culture and
Nunn may be making that domestic war-
politics won' sustain a long term U.S.
with Mr. Bush-all but inevitable.
ground force deploy-
Other Democrats plan to hold hearings
ment. As for fading
too, but the ones that matter are Mr.
domestic support,
Nunn's. He's the most prominent Defense
Mr. Kissinger said,
Democrat, the Bigfoot of any bipartisan-
wryly, that "you
ship. If he's on board with the president,
gentlemen are in a
such lesser critics as Rep. Dick Gephardt
better position to
don't count for much. If he's not, the sena
judge that-though
tor's political credibility gives cover to ev-
the senators own
eryone in the Democratic Party Pat Bu-
questions proved his
chanan-Ramsey Clark wing Right now
point
he's casting the shadow of a condor.
Mr.Nunn and his
Republicans, naturally, suspect politics.
allies didn't seem
Sen. Malcolm Wallop, the forthright Wyo
convinced, but at
man, says the hearings and criticism are
least Mr. Kissinger
designed to advance Mr. Nunn's 1992 presi
forced them to face
Sam Nunn
dential ambition. And Virginia Sen. John
the risks of U.S. failure in the Gulf. So far
Warner, Mr. Nunn's usually reliable GOP
the public debate has focused largely on
alter ego, began his hearing remarks with
the risks of war. If Saddam can claim to
the Freudian slip, Mr President excuse
have stood down the world, said Mr. Kis-
me-Mr. Chairman
singer, the result would undermine moder
It's also true that the White House
ate Arabs, damage U.S. influence and lead
hasn't handled him well. Mr. Nunn likes to
to another Arab-Israeli war, perhaps in
two or three years.
Potomac Watch
President Bush is debating whether to
call Congress into session to declare sup-
By Paul A. Gigot
port for the use of force, and the risk is?
great. If Congress réjected a declaration,
the U.S. would face a "debacle" in the
be consulted, and lately President Bush
Gulf (Mr. Kissinger's word), and Mr.
hasn't done his legendary schmoozing. Mr.
Bush's leadership would be crippled.
Nunn learned about this month's decision
But by now the question is whether the
to add troops to the Gulf,only hours before
White House has a choice if it's going to
Mr. Bush announced it, in a phone* call
succeed in the Gulf. The congressional fuss
from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. But
may have convinced Saddam that the U.S.
in meetings only a day earlier, the senator
consensus will fracture as it did in Viet-
hadn't received even a hint of the bigger
nam. By now only a congressional man-
deployment. He was clearly irked.
date may convince Saddam that the U.S.
By now, though, the rift looks bigger
really would fight a war
than any lack of private consultation. It's
If Congress does vote declaration
become a public dispute over policy. To his
down then at least Mr. Nunn and his allies
credit, "Mr. Nunn isn't, merely debating
will have to accept responsibility for what
procedure; he's' going right at the sub-
happens next the Gulf. Perhaps the Sen-
stance. President Bush wants to build up
ate has a plan to dispatch Jesse Jackson to
the threat of war, and perhaps even fight a
negotiate the release of the hostages? Or
war, to compel Saddam Hussein to leave
maybe Paul Warnke is ready to negotiate
Kuwait. Mr. Nunn has begun to suggest
an arms control treaty with Saddam, com-
that he sides with the doves who want to
plete with "on-site inspection" of his nu-
give economic sanctions time to do that
clear sites? Unlike hearings in Haydebate
job, perhaps as long as 18 months. In
with a vote Congress would to answer
short, Mr. Nunn is offering his own judg-
ment as a second commander in chief.
The Nunn hearings threatened to be a
long argument for this emerging position,
until Henry Kissinger showed up. Demo-
crats had fawned all over earlier wit-
nesses, especially dovish former generals.
But the former secretary of state spoiled
the love-in. He sounded like a realist
among innocents.
THE WASHINGTON POST
11/30/50
Charles Krauthammer
Make Congress Choose
Enough earnest questions, idle talk and stacked hearings.
Three days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former
freezeniks of the world have been chastened, I've missed it. In
secretary of defense James Schlesinger rushed into print to
fact, many are back with free advice on the Gulf. The Catholic
declare that "there is no effective policy option available to
bishops met earlier this month and once again deplored war
respond to the seizure of Kuwait." An oil embargo? That
and contraception.
would be so ruinous to us that Saddam "could be assured that
The Gulf battle lines today are becoming clear and quite
any threat not to buy his oil would be an idle one." The United
partisan. Republicans (most, for now) support the president as
States, wrote Schlesinger, is "now attempting to persuade all
he marches toward a winter war. Democrats tend toward a
nations not to buy Iraqi oil." But other nations will cheat, and
sanctions and no-war policy. But most prefer to have others
thank goodness for it: "Other nations will be buying Iraqi crude
say it for them.
at knockdown prices, but that is better than our being
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), chairman of the Senate Foreign
successful in our attempt [at embargo], for that would be
Relations Committee, holds his own set of Gulf hearings next
devastating."
week with a stacked witness list. Apart from Secretary of
Four months later, Senate Armed Services Committee
State James Baker, eight witnesses have been chosen by the
chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) kicks off the national debate on
Democrats. (Minority witnesses have not yet been an-
war and peace in the Gulf by calling as his lead witness the
nounced.) Not one has expressed support for the president's
same James R. Schlesinger. Schlesinger's message? That the
war policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski counsels containment. The
embargo on Iraq is such a smashing success ("the most
National Council of Churches counsels withdrawal. In between
successful ever achieved aside from time of war") that it must
are such Democratic doves as Arthur Schlesinger, Robert
not be interfered with by any precipitous military action.
McNamara and John K. Galbraith. And, of course, the bishops.
Schlesinger's, er, flexibility on this issue did not seem to
No anti-war parlay is complete without them.
bother the senators. In four hours of hearings, not one was so
At the opening of the Nunn hearings, Sen. Carl Levin
indelicate as to ask the Schlesinger of November about the
(D-Mich.) complained that for Congress to approve in advance
Schlesinger of August. Why? Because for most members of
the use of force would be to give the president a blank check.
the committee, today's Schlesinger is a most useful witness: a
But what is any declaration of war if not a blank check? What
reputed hard-liner who makes the case they want to make-
did Congress give FDR in December of 1941 if not a blank
the case against war-without their having to make it.
check? The Constitution is quite clear. On war, Congress
The Democrats' agenda in these hearings is clear: (1) To
decides whether. The commander-in-chief then decides how.
raise enough doubts about U.S. policy to give them cover if it
The choice between containment and war is agonizingly
fails. But (2) to stop short of openly voting for their preferred
difficult. The outcome for each is highly uncertain. But
policy-indefinite sanctions-because that would make them
choosing in contingent circumstances is the essence of policy
responsible for its success or failure. Hence the choice of
making. Questions and stacked hearings will not do. Congress
Schlesinger-followed by two former chairmen of the Joint
has to decide. The president should call Congress back into
Chiefs-to present their victory-through-embargo line.
session immediately, present it with a resolution authorizing
As part of the choreography, Sen. Nunn began the hearings
the use of force and make the gutless wonders choose.
in utmost modesty, not with answers but with questions.
"What are our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region?" "Will
United Nations economic sanctions force Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait?" "How durable is the multinational coalition?"
Important questions all. But they are not new: everybody
who has been thinking about the Gulf has been struggling with
them for the past four months. Moreover, the reason that
these questions are still around after four months is that they
have no definitive answer. There are simply too many
unknowns: the stability of the Saudi regime, the morale of
Saddam's troops, the staying power of the American public,
the rate of breakdown of Iraqi equipment and the rate of
breakdown of the allied coalition. And war itself is a maelstrom
of contingencies.
Nunn is not going to get clear answers to his questions. And
questions alone are cheap unless in the end one is prepared to
make a judgment. In an atmosphere of unavoidable uncertain-
ty, the president is going to have to make a decision. So should
Congress.
Simply holding hearings is a way for Democrats in Congress
to put themselves in a no-lose position. If the president chooses
war and it turns out badly, they can say I told you so. If the
president chooses war and wins, who will then remember the
questions and the doubts amid the general euphoria?
After all, we've just won the Cold War, and all those
defeatists who had urged that we sue for peace now act as if
nothing had been said. If the McGoverns, the Fondas, the
BY MARGARET SCOTT
11/30/90
10:05
PRESS OFFICE
002
Page 4 ROLL CALL Thursday,November 29,1990
ROLL
CALL
THE
NEWSPAPER
OF
CAPITOL
HILL
Established 1955
Founding Editor and Publisher, Sidney Yudain
Vol, 36, No. 43 Thursday, November 29, 1990
Editor, James K. Glassman
Managing Editor, Stacy Mason
Associate Editor, Kim Mattingly
Photo Editor, Laura Patterson
Copy Editor, Alice M. Perry
Feature Editor, Deborah Well
Staff Writers, Timothy J. Burger, Craig Winneker, Karen Foerstel,
Glenn R. Simpson, Timothy Curran, Susan B. Glasser
Contributing Writers, Charles E. Cook, Duncan Spencer
Staff Illustrator, RJ. Matson
Photographer, Maureen Keeting
Photo Intern, Anthony Marill
Editorial Interns, Karen Kolbe, Gabrielle Zaklad
Publisher, Mary H. Glassman
Business Manager, Laurie Battaglie
Office Manager, Gall Harris
Business Associate and Reception, Veronica Pinder
Circulation Director, Lucy Kelly
Production Director, Matthew H. Raphael
Production Manager, HII C Shomer
Director of Advertising, Karen Whitman
Senior Account Executive, Shella Burke
Account Executives, John Seeley, Kelly Lindner, Carson Raugh,
Tracey Rogers, Stade Aheam
Traffic Manager, Darlene Ann Matik
Classified Manager, Christopher Davis
A publication of Levitt Communications, Inc.
Chairman, Arthur Levitt Jr.
VBPA
President, James K. Glassman
Roll Call (ISSN 0035-788X) is published twice weekly (except two weeks in August and two weeks
In December) on Mondays and Thursdays. The publication office is 900 Second Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20002. Copyright 1990 Levitt Communications, Inc. Reproduction of this
publication In whole or part Is prohibited except with the written permission of the publisher. Roll
Call maintains strict neutrality on all partisan issues. Subscriptions to Roll Call are $175 for one
year (96 Issues). $325 for two years. Phone: 202/289-4900. Roll Call is printed on recycled paper.
Editorial
President Bush Should
Reconvene Congress
The Persian Gulf crisis has presented Democrats in Congress with a
From Sen Dole
dilemma - one that Senate Majority George Mitchell (D-Maine) appears, at
least for now, to have finessed as beautifully as he finessed the capital-gains
tax cut earlier in the 101st Congress. The dilemma is this: On the one hand,
Congress wants to assert its right to declare war. On the other hand, many
Democrats don't want to go on the record either for or against the use of
troops against Saddam Hussein. The solution, as crafted by Mitchell and Sen.
Sam Nunn (ID-Ga), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is to snipe, to
grouse, and to complain - but not actually to vote on either a declaration of
war or a resolution that clearly takes a stand on Gulf strategy and tactics. We
think that this solution, while it makes temporary political sense, in the long
run hurts the institution. It's also dishonest. Congress has every right to debate
the proper US role in the Gulf, but that debate should revolve around a serious
resolution or a declaration of war. The resolution could resemble the one that
the United Nations Security Council will consider today: permitting the use of
force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Or, as columnist Charles
Krauthammer suggested last week, it could simply be a reaffirmation of the
Carter Doctrine, enunciated Jan. 23, 1980. That doctrine declares that "an
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America.
And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force."
The question is: Are Members who are 80 eager to criticize the President's
policy in hearings and in interviews ready to go on the record with a vote in
opposition to that policy, ready to make a choice that posterity can read? We
doubt it, Members, who correctly detect a weakening of American will, are
also worried about getting caught on the wrong side of history. And they
should be worried. "Rarely in the post-war world," as Krauthammer writes,
"have the issues been as clear as they are in the Gulf crisis today." But if
America wants to choose appeasement, if America is no longer prepared to
use force against this poison gasser and torturer (and for those who want
particulars, we urge a reading of Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf
by Judith Miller of the New York Times and Laurie Mylroie of Harvard) who
committed an act of aggression with not the slightest ambiguity, then let's not
continue the pantomime. Let's call it quits as soon as possible.
Our guess is that, when the roll is called, Members will stop playing
games. They will vote history, future, and conscience. But the problem is that
politics seems to dictate that the roll not be called any time soon. We have a
solution: Since the leaders of the House and Senate do not appear ready to
bring Congress back into session, we urge the President to do so. "He may,"
says the Constitution in Article II, Sect. 3, "on extraordinary occasions,
convene both Houses." Let him do so next week, so we can at last have an up-
or-down vote on the most important issue facing this nation.
11/30/90
14:30
PRESS OFFICE
002
20 AP 11-30-90 12:58 EST
42 LINES
PM-Dole-Gulf,360<
Dole Supports Sending Secretary of State to Iraq<
By BARRY MASSEY=
Associated Press Writer"
WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., said
today it was a positive step'' for President Bush to open a
high-level diplomatic channel to Iraq.
I think it's another indication that the president wants a
peaceable settlement, Dole said in a telephone news conference
with broadcasters in Kansas.
Dole also renewed his call for Congress to convene a special
session to vote on a resolution that would authorize the use of
military force if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein fails to meet a
deadline for withdrawing occupation forces from Kuwait.
The senator's comments followed Bush's announcement that he
would dispatch Secretary of State James Baker III to Baghdad to
discuss an ending to the Gulf crisis and that the Iraqi foreign
minister would be welcome in Washington for consultations the week
of Dec. 10.
Dole said the president's action would help ensure Iraq
understood U.S. intentions on using military force and that the
nation was united in its demand for an unconditional Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait.
Dole complained that Saddam Hussein has probably been getting
mixed messages'' in part because of congressional divisions over
U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf.
This will make it very clear to Saddam Hussein that the
president is firm, he's not going to back off,'' Dole said of the
secretary of state's mission to Iraq.
Dole said he would continue to urge the president to call
Congress back into session to vote on a Persian Gulf resolution. He
said it would complete the circle'' if Congress would approve a
resolution similar to one endorsed by the U.N. Security Council,
which set a Jan. 15 deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Dole predicted bipartisan support for a resolution if Congress
takes up the issue.
I think you would find a lot of these members in both parties,
a big majority supporting the United States of America and our
young men and women because they want a peaceful resolution of this
crisis,' Dole said.
Page 4 ROLL CALL Thursday, November 29, 1990
ROLL
CALL
E
S-
P
E
R
0
CAPITOL
HILL
Established 1955
Founding Editor and Publisher, Sidney Yudain
Vol. 36, No. 43 Thursday, November 29, 1990
Editor, James K. Glassman
Managing Editor, Stacy Mason
Associate Editor, Kim Mattingly
Photo Editor, Laura Patterson
Copy Editor, Alice M. Perry
Feature Editor, Deborah Weil
Staff Writers, Timothy J. Burger, Craig Winneker, Karen Foerstel,
Glenn R. Simpson, Timothy Curran, Susan B. Glasser
Contributing Writers, Charles E. Cook, Duncan Spencer
Staff Illustrator, R.J. Matson
Photographer, Maureen Keating
Photo Intern, Anthony Marill
Editorial Interns, Karen Kolbe, Gabrielle Zaklad
Publisher; Mary H. Glassman
Business Manager, Laurie Battaglia
Office Manager, Gail Harris
Business Associate and Reception, Veronica Pinder
Circulation Director, Lucy Kelly
Production Director, Matthew H. Raphael
Production Manager, Jill C. Shomer
Director of Advertising, Karen Whitman
Senior Account Executive, Sheila Burke
Account Executives, John Seeley, Kelly Lindner, Carson Raugh,
Tracey Rogers, Stacia Ahearn
Traffic Manager, Darlene Ann Malik
Classified Manager, Christopher Davis
A publication of Levitt Communications, Inc.
Chairman, Arthur Levitt Jr.
VBPA
President, James K. Glassman
Roll Call (ISSN 0035-788X) is published twice weekly (except two weeks in August and two weeks
in December) on Mondays and Thursdays. The publication office is 900 Second Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20002. Copyright 1990 Levitt Communications, Inc. Reproduction of this
publication in whole or part is prohibited except with the written permission of the publisher. Roll
Call maintains strict neutrality on all partisan issues. Subscriptions to Roll Call are $175 for one
year (96 issues), $325 for two years. Phone: 202/289-4900. Roll Call is printed on recycled paper.
Editorial
President Bush Should
Reconvene Congress
The Persian Gulf crisis has presented Democrats in Congress with a
dilemma - one that Senate Majority George Mitchell (D-Maine) appears, at
least for now, to have finessed as beautifully as he finessed the capital-gains
tax cut earlier in the 101st Congress. The dilemma is this: On the one hand,
Congress wants to assert its right to declare war. On the other hand, many
Democrats don t want to go on the record either for or against the use of
troops against Saddam Hussein. The solution, as crafted by Mitchell and Sen.
Sam Nunn (D-Ga), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is to snipe, to.
grouse, and to complain - but not actually to vote on either a declaration of
war or a resolution that clearly takes a stand on Gulf strategy and tactics. We
think that this solution, while it makes temporary political sense, in the long
run hurts the institution. It's also dishonest. Congress has every right to debate
the proper US role in the Gulf, but that debate should revolve around a serious
resolution or a declaration of war. The resolution could resemble the one that
the United Nations Security Council will consider today: permitting the use of
force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Or, as columnist Charles
Krauthammer suggested last week, it could simply be a reaffirmation of the
Carter Doctrine, enunciated Jan. 23, 1980. That doctrine declares that "an
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America.
And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force."
The question is: Are Members who are so eager to criticize the President's
policy in hearings and in interviews ready to go on the record with a vote in
opposition to that policy, ready to make a choice that posterity can read? We
doubt it, Members, who correctly detect a weakening of American will, are
also worried about getting caught on the wrong side of history. And they
should be worried. "Rarely in the post-war world," as Krauthammer writes,
"have the issues been as clear as they are in the Gulf crisis today." But if
America wants to choose appeasement, if America is no longer prepared to
use force against this poison gasser and torturer (and for those who want
particulars, we urge a reading of Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf
by Judith Miller of the New York Times and Laurie Mylroie of Harvard) who
committed an act of aggression with not the slightest ambiguity, then let's not
continue the pantomime. Let's call it quits as soon as possible.
Our guess is that, when the roll is called, Members will stop playing
games. They will vote history, future, and conscience. But the problem is that
politics seems to dictate that the roll not be called any time soon. We have a
solution: Since the leaders of the House and Senate do not appear ready to
Nowthorg Points
bring Congress back into session, we urge the President to do so. "He may,"
says the Constitution in Article II, Sect. 3, "on extraordinary occasions,
convene both Houses." Let him do so next week, so we can at last have an up-
or-down vote on the most important issue facing this nation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
November 30, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
C. BOYDEN GRAY CMG
SUBJECT:
President's Statements on A Special Session of
Congress
As you requested, I have looked at the President's statements in
this morning's press conference about the possibility of a
special session of Congress in light of the constitutional
procedure for reconvening Congress. Under Article II, Section 3
of the Constitution, only the President can convene a session of
Congress on a date other than a date that has been fixed by law
for Congress to convene. Thus, the procedure in Congress's
adjournment resolution purporting to give the Speaker of the
House and the Majority Leader of the Senate authority to
reconvene Congress on a date of their choosing is not, strictly
speaking, constitutional.
I would interpret the President's statements this morning to mean
that if, because of developments in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker
and the Majority Leader decide to invoke the procedure contained
in the adjournment resolution, he will consider their action a
request that he reconvene Congress under Article II, Section 3,
and in this instance he will grant that request.
12/3 andy, id, marlin, Demarest, Porter, Cecconi
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: December 2, 1990
FOR:
GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ED ROGERS
Action
Your Comment
Let's Talk
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®
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CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
NATIONAL TRACKING SUMMARY
November 27, 1990
#5332-12
1363 Beverly Road, McLean, Virginia 22101 (703) 556-0001 Fax (703) 893-3811
The Wirthlin Group
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking Summary
Tuesday November 27, 1990
The Wirthlin Group
OVERVIEW
Recent events relating to the crisis in the Gulf, including Secretary of State Baker's visit
to United Nations countries, President Bush's visit to the American troops in the Gulf
and the recent emphasis on a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force to
drive Iraq out of Kuwait, have. had a marked impact on Americans' attitudes toward
the crisis.
Nearly one-third (29%) of Americans cite the Middle East Situation as the
Most Important Problem currently facing the nation. This represents a 10
percentage point increase over the course of one month.
Moreover, one-in-five Americans (21%) have spoken to someone "today"
about the events in the Middle East. This indicates that the saliency of
the issue is again on the rise.
President Bush's thermometer score has reached its highest
point (66) in nearly two months.
Following last week's drop of 8 percentage points, overall approval of
Bush's handling of the Mideast crisis has risen 6 percentage points to
61%.
Americans hold steadfast to their opinions regarding a possible conflict and its
consequences:
By a margin of nearly three to one, Americans continue to believe that the
conflict in the Middle East will be resolved military (70%) as opposed to
peacefully (26%). An overwhelming majority of Americans (72%) continue
to believe that "we are still very far away from a solution" to the crisis in
the Gulf.
Six-in-ten (61%) agree that "given everything that has happened, the U.S.
is justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
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Tuesday November 27, 1990
The Wirthlin Group
A small majority (52%) agree that "we have arrived at the time for the
United States to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait." The
proportion of Americans who agree has dropped marginally (4 points)
since last reported.
Despite the hawkish sentiments of Americans, nearly seven-in-ten (68%)
continue to agree that "the death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq
is too high a price to pay in this Middle East conflict."
MOOD OF THE COUNTRY
Although Americans remain twice as pessimistic (64% Wrong Track) as optimistic (28%
Right Direction), the proportion of Americans who say the country has "pretty seriously
gotten off on the Wrong Track" has declined 8 percentage points over the past two
weeks.
The most optimistic subgroups include: Americans residing in the South
(32%), self-identified Republicans (36%), Americans earning over $30,000
(34%), those with a College Education or more (39%), Men 18-34 (40%),
Middle-Aged Men (33%), and Information Elites (33%).
Recent events relating to the crisis in the Gulf, including Secretary of State Baker's visit
to United Nations countries, President Bush's visit to the American troops in the Gulf
and the recent emphasis on a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force to
drive Iraq out of Kuwait, have made a marked impact on Americans' attitudes toward
the crisis.
Nearly one-third (29%) of Americans cite the Middle East Situation as the
Important Problem currently facing the nation. This represents a 10
percentage point increase over the course of one month.
--
Self-identified Republicans (34%), those earning between $15,000
and $25,000 (38%), Young Women (40%) and Middle-Aged Women
(32%) are more likely than other subgroups to cite the Middle East
Situation as the Most Important Problem currently facing the nation.
One-in-five Americans (21%) have spoken to someone "today" about the
events in the Middle East.
However, Americans continue to cite Pocketbook/Economy issues (27%) and Social
issues (22%) as important problems that are currently facing the nation. This is the
lowest level of concern about Pocketbook/Economy issues since the weeks
immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
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Tuesday November 27, 1990
The Wirthlin Group
SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT BUSH & U.S. POLICY
As last week's events had an impact on American perceptions toward the importance
of the situation in the Middle East, they have also had a positive impact on American
support for President Bush and U.S. policy.
President Bush's thermometer score has reached its highest
point (66) in nearly two months.
Following last week's drop of 8 percentage points, overall approval of
Bush's handling of the Mideast crisis has risen 6 percentage points to
61%. The intensity of this support remains evenly divided -- 31%
"strongly" approve; 31% "somewhat" approve.
American perceptions of the degree of severity of American actions in the Gulf remain
on par with previously reported results. A plurality of Americans (43%) feel U.S.
actions in the Gulf have been "just about right"; a slightly smaller proportion (39%) feel
U.S. actions have not been tough enough.
ATTITUDES TOWARD KUWAIT
Although awareness of the Kuwaiti government has eroded to the level reported one
month ago (39%), support for the Kuwaiti government remains relatively robust (57%
agree that the legitimate, constitutional government of Kuwait is worth fighting for).
Furthermore, Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah's thermometer score has
risen 6 points to 37.
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONFLICT
By a margin of nearly three to one, Americans continue to believe that the conflict in
the Middle East will be resolved military (70%) as opposed to peacefully (26%). It is
hypothesized that last week's decline in the proportion of Americans who believed the
crisis would be resolved military was reversed by recent events, specifically the
pending UN resolution authorizing the use of military force in the Gulf.
An overwhelming majority of Americans (72%) continue to believe that "we are still very
far away from a solution" to the crisis in the Gulf. However, this proportion has eroded
6 percentage points since last reported. Concurrently, the proportion of Americans
who believe that a "solution is close" has increased to 22%.
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
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Tuesday November 27, 1990
The Wirthlin Group
Americans hold steadfast to their opinions regarding a possible conflict and its
consequences:
Six-in-ten (61%) agree that "given everything that has happened, the U.S.
is justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."
By a margin of two to one, Americans "strongly" support (41%) launching
an attack against Iraq.
Subgroups most likely to express a hawkish sentiment include: Americans
earning between $25,000 and $30,000, Younger Men (70%), those who
feel the country is going in the Right Direction (71%), and those who
approve of Bush's management of the Gulf Crisis (76%).
However, a small majority (52%) agree that "we have arrived at the time
for the United States to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait." The
proportion of Americans who agree has dropped marginally (4 points)
since last reported.
Subgroups most likely to believe that now is the time to use military force
to drive Iraq out of Kuwait include: Americans earning between $30,000
and $40,000 (62%), Younger Men (67%), Younger Women (63%), those
who approve of Bush's management of the Gulf crisis (63%) and those
who express a hawkish sentiment (71%).
Despite the hawkish sentiments of Americans nearly seven-in-ten (68%)
continue to agree that "the death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq
is too high a price to pay in this Middle East conflict."
Americans most likely to agree that the death of American soldiers is too
high a price to pay include: Blacks (84%), self-identified Democrats (75%),
Americans earning between $15,000 and $25,000 (80%), those with a
High School Education or less (75%), Younger Women (84%), Women
55+ (80%), those who disapprove of Bush's management of the crisis
(84%), those who express a dovish sentiment (87%), and those who
believe the country has gotten off on the Wrong Track (73%).
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
4
Tuesday November 27, 1990
The Wirthlin Group
METHODOLOGY
Universe:
Americans aged 18 and over living in the continental United
States
Sample Size:
100 interviews are completed each night
For the purposes of analysis, data will be aggregated into
weekly.
Confidence Interval:
+ 4.00 in 95 out of 100 cases (p = .5)
Mode of Interview:
Computer Assisted Telephone Interview
Interview Length:
10 minutes
30 closed-end questions
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
5
Tuesday November 27, 1990
Mood of the Country:
Right Direction - Wrong Track
80%
+
60%
Budget
Bush Sends
Compromise
150,000 More
Failure
American Troops
40%
Budget
Compromise
20%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Right Direction
Wrong Track
No Opinion
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"Generally speaking, would you say that things in this
National Tracking
country are going in the right direction, or have they
The Wirthlin Group
pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?"
Most Important Problem
50%
BUSH SENDS
t
+1
150,000 MORE
40%
Budget
it
AMERICAN TROOPS
H
*
Compromise
it.
+
+
+
Failure
+
't'
+
't'
*
30%
+
+
20%
10%
Budget
Compromise
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Social
+--
Pocketbook/Economy
*
Foreign Policy/Peace
Middle East
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking
"What would you say is the single most important
The Wirthlin Group
problem facing the United States today?"
Conversations About
the Middle East
100%
80%
¥
60%
40%
20%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Yes
No
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"Did you happen to speak with anyone today
National Tracking
about the events in the Middle East?"
The Wirthlin Group
World Leaders Thermometers
Thermometer Rating
80
70
66
60
50
37
40
30
20
6
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
4
18
2
16
30
13
27
10
24
10
24
7
21
George Bush
+
Kuwaiti Emir
Saddam Hussein
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking
1 - 100 scale. 1 means NOT AT ALL FAVORABLE
The Wirthlin Group
10 means EXTREMELY FAVORABLE.
Approve/Disapprove of Bush's Handling
of the Situation in the Middle East
80%
60%
40%
+
20%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Total Approve
Total Disapprove
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"Do you approve or disapprove of the
National Tracking
way President Bush is handling the
The Wirthlin Group
situation in the Middle East?"
How Bush is Handling Middle
East Situation
Approve -- Disapprove
Strongly Approve
31%
Somewhat Approve
30%
Somewhat Disapprove
15%
Strongly Disapprove
16%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
"From what you have heard or read, do you approve
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
or disapprove of the way President Bush is handling
National Tracking
The Wirthlin Group
the situation in the Middle East?"
U.S. Action in the Middle East:
Too Tough -- Not Tough Enough
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 1017 31 14 28
Too Tough
Not Tough Enough
Just About Right
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"What do you think about the actions the U.S.
National Tracking
has taken so far in the Middle East? Do you think
The Wirthlin Group
U.S. actions have been..
Amount of Kuwaiti Resistance
50%
40%
*
+
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8101214 1618202224262830 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Great Deal/Fair Amt.
+
Not Very Much
*
None At All
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"To date, how much resistance would you say
National Tracking
the Kuwaitis remaining in Kuwait since the
The Wirthlin Group
invasion have mounted against the Iragi invaders?"
Legitimate Kuwaiti Government
Still Functioning Outside of Kuwait
50%
40%
K
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Total Agree
Total Disagree
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking
"The legitimate Kuwait government is still
The Wirthlin Group
functioning and active outside of Kuwait."
Legitimate, Constitutional Government
is Worth Fighting For
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Total Agree
Total Disagree
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"The legitimate, constitutional government
National Tracking
of Kuwait is worth fighting for."
The Wirthlin Group
"The Legitimate, Constitutional
Government of Kuwait
is Worth Fighting For."
Strongly Agree
27%
Somewhat Agree
26%
No opinion
12%
Somewhat Disagree
18%
Strongly Disagree
16%
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking
The Wirthlin Group
Conflict in the Middle East --
Peaceful Negotiations/Military Conflict
80%
70%
*
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Peaceful Negotiation
+
Military Conflict
No opinion
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"From what you have heard and read, do you believe the
National Tracking
conflict in the Middle East will be resolved through
The Wirthlin Group
peaceful negotiation or a military conflict?"
Very Close to a Solution VS.
Still Very Far from a Solution
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 13 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Solution is Close
Solution is Far Away
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
Some people feel that we are very close to a solution to
National Tracking
the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Other people feel that we
The Wirthlin Group
are still very far far away from any solution.
U.S. Justified to Launch
Attack Against Iraq
70%
60%
50%
40%
+
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 23 6 20 3 17 3 17 31 14 28
Total Agree
Total Disagree
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"Given everything that has happened, the
National Tracking
U.S. is justified in launching an attack against
The Wirthlin Group
Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."
"We have arrived at the time for the
United States to use military force
to drive Iraq out of Kuwait?"
Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
37%
38%
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Agree
15%
19%
No opinion
No opinion
4%
5%
Somewhat Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
16%
Strongly Disagree 20%
Strongly Disagree
24%
23%
11/12-11/18
11/19-11/25
n=600
n=400
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
National Tracking
The Wirthlin Group
Death of American Soldiers
Too High a Price to Pay
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
*
30%
+
20%
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 4 18 2 16 30 16 27 10 24 10 24 7 21
Total Agree
Total Disagree
CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT
"The death of American soldiers in a fight
National Tracking
with Iraq is too high a price to pay in this
The Wirthlin Group
Middle East conflict."