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Persian Gulf War 1991 [8]
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Persian Gulf War 1991 [8]
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F [2]; 1998-0099-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29167
Folder ID Number:
29167-001
Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [8]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
3
5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Gull
DATE:
12-15-90
FROM THE PRESIDENT
To:
Brent/JS
Re: SOLARZ Group
We need to get a relatively formal
structure ot work with this
group
OP-Eds
Testimony
Phone Calls ot Individual MC"S
ETC.
Please discuss.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE CHIEF of STAFF
91 JAN -8 PH 8:15
has seen
January 8, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY DANA
SUBJECT:
Endorsement by Veteran's Groups of Gulf Policy
Secretary Derwinski requested that I bring the attached letter to
your attention. It will be signed by the commanders of eleven
national veterans organizations and will be released tomorrow to
each member of Congress. As you can see, they express their
support for your policy in the Gulf in very strong terms.
Attachment
SEN Xerox Te. ecopier 7021 : 8-91 17:57
2022334609-
The White House:# 5
VETERAN'S ORGANISATIONS ENDORSE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICY
A coalition of Veterans Organizations urges the United States
Congress to support and allow President Bush's Gulf Policy to work.
In a statement aired at each member of Congress, the Veterans asked
that Congrass join with the President and present a united front to
Iraq. The coalition consisting of American Ex-Prisoners of War,
Catholic War Vaterans, USA, Inc, Jawish Mar Veterans of the USA,
Legion of Valer of the USA, Inc., Marine Carps League, Military
Order of the Purple Meart of the USA, Inc., Non Commissioned
officers Association, Polish Legion of American Veterans, USA,
Flest Reserve Association, The Retired Enlisted Association, and
National Association for Uniformed Services, urged that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, be allowed the latitude to
determine the military strategy required to force Iraq's compliance
with the United Nations mandates, to include the January 15th
deadline for withdrawal of Iragi troops from Kuwsit. The Veterans
emphasized they are not urging the President go to war, but rather
that he be supported fully by 811 branches of Government and the
American people to take the action he deems appropriate for
American interests. should war commence, the Veterans stressed
that the United States and allied military forces must be permitted
to pursue victory using all reasonable zeans and must not be
constrained by borders from striking the enemy wherever necessary.
Such constraints in prior conflicts have cost American lives and
impeded victory.
SEN 3 Xerox Te ecopier 7021 : 1- 8-91 ; 17:57
2022334609-
The white House:# 6
We the undersigned unanimously support the prompt action previously
taken by President Bush. We continue to support his efforts to
resolve the crisis in the Persian Gulf and urge the members of
Congress and the American people to give the President the Istitude
to take any action nacessary to insure that Iraqi aggression in
Kuwait is reversed and that Kuwait be restored to its rightful
government.
American Ex-Prisoners of Var
Non Commissioned Officers Assc.
Catholic War Veterans, USA, Ins. Polish Legion American Vets USA
Jewish War Veterans of the USA
Fleet Reserve Association
Legion of Valor of the USA, Inc. The Retired Enlisted Association
Marine Corps League
National Asso. Uniformed Svcs.
Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA, Inc.
01/03/91
12:53
AV ASSOCIATES
NO. 003
002
AV ASSOCIATES
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
TO:
Governor John Sununu
FROM:
Victor Ajlouny
DATE:
January 4, 1991
RE:
Possible Effects of Gulf Crisis on Future Presidencies
Much can be said about the pros and cons of the different courses
of action available to President Bush. His decision is not an
easy one and I thank God that I am not in his shoes. We have
faith that the President will do what he believes is best for the
country. I have spent much of the last three months speaking to
students and various service organizations and I believe that the
longer the war and the greater the casualties, the lower the
possibility of President Bush's re-election. The President has
been quoted as saying his re-election will not be a deciding
factor. However, I believe that his failure to be re-elected
could have adverse effects on future presidencies. My fear is
that when the next strong man emerges, (God only knows he will)
the President of the United States will be paralyzed, remembering
what the Gulf crisis did to the Bush Presidency. What will we
have gained?
May God protect and guide all of you during these crucial times.
3440 SIERRA ROAD
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA
95132-3032
(408) 272-3976
FAX: (408) 923-0700
Personal w. Urgent
The Binding Triod System for
Global Decision-Making
Center
for War/Peace
Studies
THE CHIEF of STAFF
FAX TRANSMISSION
has seen
COVERSHEET
218 East 18 Street
New York. N.Y. 10003
(212) 475-1077
Date:
January 8, 1991
Executive Director:
Richard Hudson
BOARD OF SPONSORS:
To:
John Sununu
S.O. Adebo
Elisabeth Mann Borgese
The White House
Elise Boulding
Kenneth E. Boulding
1-202-456-2413 (or 2883)
Lora Caradon
Norman Cousins
Benjamin B. Ferencz
Thor Heyerdahl
From:
Richard Hudson, Executive Director
Betty G. Lall
Arvid Pardo
Center for War/Peace Studies
Russell W. Peterson
Charles C. Price
FAX # (212) 260-6384
Charles S. Rhyne
Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Ret)
Pages to Follow
2
Yoshikazu Sakamoto
J. David Singer
Louis B. Sohn
Any problems with FAX, please call (212) 475-1077.
Inga Thorsson
Applied Research Toward
The attached draft Security Council resolution, now in its
a World of Peace With Justice
fourth revision since October 1, is being sent to U.N. Secretary-
Publisher of Global Report
General Perez de Cuellar, President George Bush, President Saddam
Hussein, Secretary-General Abdulla Bishara of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, permanent representatives to the U.N. of all members of
the Security Council and of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Yugoslavia, Germany, and Japan, among many others,
as well as many other governmental and non-governmental people.
Most of these transmittals will be done by telefax today.
This resolution, which was known in its earlier form in U.N.
circles as the "Humpty Dumpty resolution," is now offered in the
hope that if last-minute efforts to avoid war in the Persian Gulf
appear doomed to failure, it can be laid on the Security Council
table and adopted unanimously on Monday, January 14, as the clock
strikes midnight.
Richard Huckson
01
01/08/1991 15:55 FROM C/WAR/PEACE
The President and
Scowcroft have
recieved identical
Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page
copies
Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990),
664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990),
674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678 (1990);
CONDEMNING again the aggression of Iraq against the sovereign member
state of Kuwait;
FEARING that a cataclysmic war is impending as the result of Iraq's
failure to withdraw from Kuwait as ordered by the Security Council;
FEARING ALSO that such a war would have unpredictable but certainly
catastrophic consequences not only in the area, but for the entire
world, in terms of human lives and property, international political
stability, and the global environment;
CONVINCED that this organization and this body now face a historic
test without parallel, and that we have the choice between our greatest
success, or our greatest failure;
CONVINCED FURTHER that if we succeed in avoiding war and restoring
an honorable peace in the Persian Gulf crisis, we will be able to build
on this accomplishment to carry the concept of world rule of law to new
levels of effectiveness;
NOTING that while general references to international law have been
widely made during the current crisis, few specific proposals have been
offered to settle Iraq-Kuwaiti disputes in accordance with legal norms;
ACTING under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
1. DEMANDS that forces of Iraq begin to withdraw from Kuwait within
48 hours;
2. GUARANTEES that when this withdrawal begins, and is verified by
U.N. observers, the international blockade on imports of food, medical
supplies and other humanitarian items will be lifted;
3. GUARANTEES further that when this withdrawal has been completed,
and is verified by U.N. observers, the international blockade will be
lifted in its entirety;
4. DECLARES that within 48 hours all military forces in the Persian
Gulf area, except those within their own national boundaries, shall
either begin to be withdrawn or be placed under the direct command of the
U.N. Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military
Staff Committee, as directed by Article 47 of the United Nations Charter;
5. ESTABLISHES the Iraq-Kuwait Binding Arbitration Panel (IKBAP),
with the mandate to produce a comprehensive settlement of all issues
between the two countries, to be constituted in the following manner:
01/08/1991 15:56 FROM C/WAR/PEACE
TOTAL P.03
(a) IKBAP shall consist of seven members, with two each to be
selected by the governments of Iraq and Kuwait within seven days.
These four members will have seven additional days to agree on three
neutral members, including the chairman. In the event that they
cannot do SO within this period of time, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations shall name the three neutral members, who shall
choose their own chairman, within the succeeding seven days. The
panel will then have 30 days to hear arguments from all parties and
lay down a comprehensive settlement of all issues between Iraq and
Kuwait.
(b) In the event that IKBAP, functioning on the basis of con-
sensus, cannot agree on such a comprehensive settlement after 30
days of deliberations, the panel will enter into a "last best offer"
phase. Within seven days, the three neutral members will lay down
what they consider a reasonable compromise for a comprehensive
settlement. Unless this is acceptable to both sides, each side will
be invited to submit its "last best offer" to the neutral three
members. IKBAP will then make a final decision on a settlement
based on a majority vote, which will be binding, and enforceable
by the Security Council.
6. EXPRESSES the fervent hope that this process will lead to
a peaceful, just, and productive solution to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict,
and RESOLVES to continue with new vigor toward a settlement of all
other issues in the area in accordance with applicable Security
Council resolutions.
Drafted by Richard Hudson, Center for War/Peace Studies
Original, October 1, 1990; third revision, October 29, 1990;
fourth revision, January 8, 1991
01/04/91
16:49
002
News from Senator
BOB DOLE
(R - Kansas)
SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: WALT RIKER
JANUARY 4, 1991
(202) 224-5358
PERSIAN GULF
THE BEST CHANCE FOR PEACE
I HAVE A CERTAIN SYMPATHY FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE SPIRITED DISCUSSION
WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE SENATE FLOOR YESTERDAY.
I STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE EFFORT OF THE MAJORITY LEADER TO ESTABLISH
SOME REALISTIC GUIDELINES ON HOW WE PROCEED TO DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE
CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.
THESE ARE CRITICAL DAYS --- DAYS IN WHICH EVENTS AND DECISIONS COULD
PRODUCE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE GULF CRISIS, OR COULD PROPEL US INTO
WAR.
LET'S JUST STOP AND THINK FOR A MOMENT.
IRADIS ACCEPT BUSH OFFER
THE PRESIDENT, JUST YESTERDAY, MADE ONE MORE PROPOSAL FOR A PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION -- PROPOSING THAT SECRETARY BAKER AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER
AZIZ MEET.
HAPPILY, THE IRAQIS HAVE TODAY RESPONDED POSITIVELY, AND A BAKER-AZIZ
MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT WEDNESDAY.
NO ONE KNOWS WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THOSE TALKS CAN ACCOMPLISH.
BUT DON'T WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO WAIT AND SEE?
DON'T WE HAVE A RESPONSTBILITY TO GIVE SECRETARY BAKER A CHANCE TO
DELIVER HIS MESSAGE TO AZIZ, OR TO SADDAM, OR WHOEVER -- WITHOUT HAVING
THAT MESSAGE DISTORTED OR DROWNED OUT BY THE CONFLICTING VOICES OF A
HUNDRED SENATORS, HERE ON THE FLOOR.
"GIVE PEACE A CHANCE" HAS ACHIEVED CLICHE STATUS. BUT IT HAS REAL,
CONCRETE MEANING IN THIS SITUATION.
NOT TIME FOR DIVISIVE DEBATE
LET'S GIVE THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE A CHANCE. LET'S NOT
INADVERTENTLY COMPROMISE OR KILL IT, BY ENGAGING IN A BITTER AND DIVISIVE
DEBATE THAT -- FOR ALL ITS GOOD INTENTIONS -- WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE
MISUNDERSTOOD BY SADDAM.
WE CAN DEBATE ALL WE WANT TO ABOUT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY -- BUT ISN'T IT ALSO OUR RESPONSIBILITY -- AS
SENATORS AND AS AMERICANS - TO ACT RESPONSIBLY BY GIVING THIS LAST, BEST
HOPE FOR PEACE A CHANCE?
HAVING SAID ALL THAT, THOUGH, LET ME SAY AGAIN: I AM ALSO SYMPATHETIC
TO THE FRUSTRATION THAT IS BEING EXPRESSED THAT THE CONGRESS IS NOT DOING
ITS JOB. FOR MONTHS, WE HAVE BEEN STANDING ON THE SIDELINES, MAKING ALL
KINDS OF SPEECHES -- BUT TAKING NO RESPONSIBILITY.
YESTERDAY, AN ABC-NEWSWEEK POLL INDICATED THAT 70% OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE BELIEVE THE CONGRESS HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE
PRESIDENT.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE DEAD RIGHT.
THE A.W.O.L. CONGRESS
WHILE THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN PROVIDING THE LEADERSHIP A COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF MUST PROVIDE: WHITE OUR VOUNG MEN AND WOMEN HAVE BEEN SWEATING TT
Extended Page
2.1
CHIEF MUST PROVIDE; WHILE OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN HAVE BEEN SWEATING IT
OUT -- FIGURATIVELY AND LITERALLY -- IN THE SANDS OF SAUDI ARABIA; WHILE
EVEN THE U.N. HAS MUSTERED THE WILL TO TAKE STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION --
CONGRESS HAS BEEN A.W.O.L.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T LIKE THAT. AND THEY ARE DEAD RIGHT.
I HAVE BEEN HAMMERING AWAY AT THIS POINT FOR WEEKS. THROUGHOUT
NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, I CALLED FOR A SPECIAL SESSION -- JUST so CONGRESS
COULD DEBATE, AND IF NECESSARY VOTE, IN THOSE DAYS WHEN OUR POLICY WAS
BEING FORMULATED.
I FELT THEN, AND I FEEL NOW -- WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO MORE
THAN CHEER-LEAD, OR SECOND-GUESS, OR WRING OUR HANDS.
WE GET A SALARY FROM THE TAXPAYERS, TO DO A REAL JOB. WE DO HAVE
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON EXACTLY WHAT THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF
THE SENATE IS. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT ANY SENATOR BELIEVES WE HAVE BEEN
ELECTED, AND ARE BEING PAID, JUST TO MAKE SPEECHES.
(MORE)
01/04/91
16:50
003
2
WE ARE HERE TO DO A JOB; WHEN NECESSARY, TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED;
TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.
so, AGAIN, WHILE I SUSPECT I DISAGREE IN SUBSTANCE ALMOST TOTALLY WITH
THE SENATOR FROM IOWA AND THE SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON -- I SHARE TO SOME
DEGREE THE FRUSTRATION THEY DISPLAYED YESTERDAY. AND I ALSO THINK THAT WE
ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME BASIC MOTIVE -- NOT ONLY I, AND THE SENATORS
FROM TOWA AND WASHINGTON; BUT ALL OF US IN THE SENATE.
WE DON'T WANT WAR. WE WANT PEACE.
SOLDIERS AND PARENTS, SPOUSES, CHILDREN
YOU CAN'T LOOK INTO THE FACES OF THOSE YOUNG AMERICANS -- MEN AND
WOMEN -- IN SAUDI ARABIA, WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL DANGERS AND
CHALLENGES EACH OF THEM WILL FACE; WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THEIR FAMILIES -
- THEIR FATHERS AND MOTHERS, THEIR SPOUSES, THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN; WITHOUT
IMAGING THEIR FEARS AND ANGUISH.
WE ALL WANT PEACE.
OUR DISAGREEMENT -- AND IT IS A REAL AND SINCERE ONE -- IS HOW DO WE
MINIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR WAR? HOW DO WE MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE?
IN MY VIEW, THERE IS ONLY ONE CHANCE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.
SOMEHOW -- SOMEHOW SOON -- WE MUST CONVINCE SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE
WILL NOT SUCCEED, HE WILL NOT ACHIEVE ANY REWARD, FOR HIS AGGRESSION. WE
MUST SOMEHOW DELIVER TO HIM, LOUD AND CLEAR, THE MESSAGE: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE WORLD WILL NOT TOLERATE -- IT'S NOT RHETORIC, OR A BLUFF --
WE WILL NOT TOLERATE HIS CONTINUED SAVAGE SUBJUGATION OF A SOVEREIGN
NATION, WHICH DIRECTLY THREATENS VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS.
THAT BOTTOM LINE IS NOT A MATTER FOR COMPROMISE OR NEGOTIATION. HE
WILL BE THROWN OUT OF KUWAIT, AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS, WILL BE PROTECTED -
- ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.
HE MUST GET THAT MESSAGE, AND HE MUST BELIEVE IT IS CREDIBLE.
SECRETARY BAKER WILL TRY TO DELIVER THAT MESSAGE NEXT WEDNESDAY. WE
ALL HOPE AND PRAY THAT HE WILL SUCCEED.
BUT THE RECORD TO DATE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT, IF SADDAM HAS ANY
DOUBT, IF HE HAS ANY STRAWS TO GRASP, IF HE PERCEIVES ANY WIGGLE ROOM -- HE
IS JUST NOT GOING TO GIVE IN.
AND IF HE DOESN'T GIVE IN ON THIS BASIC POINT, THERE WILL BE WAR.
THE END GAME
WE ARE GETTING CLOSE TO AN END-GAME.
WE CAN'T TURN THE SCREWS ANY TIGHTER ON SANCTIONS. AND, FRANKLY, OVER
TIME, THE LEAKS IN THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO NOW IN PLACE ARE GOING TO TURN INTO
GUSHERS.
WE CAN'T REALISTICALLY EXPECT ANY MORE INTERNATIONAL OR U.N. SUPPORT
THAN THE EXTRAORDINARY DISPLAY OF UNITY THAT WE HAVE ALREADY AMASSED.
THERE IS NO BASIS TO BELIEVE THAT THE SANCTIONS, OR ANYTHING ELSE,
WILL ERODE SADDAM'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES, OR MAKE HIM AN EASIER TARGET,
ANYTIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ON THE CONTRARY, EVER DAY HE DIGS IN DEEPER;
EVERY DAY HE HAS THE CAPACITY TO BUILD UP HIS FORCES EVEN MORE.
WE MUST FACE UP TO THE BOTTOM-LINE TRUTH. ONCE WE GET TO THE POINT
WHERE WE HAVE OUR FORCES IN PLACE, A CHILLING FACT SETS IN.
EVERY DAY THEREAFTER THAT WE WAIT, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO KILL
AND MAIM MORE AND MORE AMERICAN TROOPS GROWS. EVERY DAY WE WAIT, OUR
CASUALTY LIST PROBABLY GROWS.
WE HAVE WAITED MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS.
DOES ANY SENATOR WANT TO STAND UP AND MAKE THE CASE THAT SADDAM
HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO KILL AMERICAN SOLDIERS, OR TERRORIZE AMERICANS AROUND
THE WORLD, HAS DECREASED ONE TOTA, IN ALL THOSE MONTHS?
CAN ANYONE GIVE A COMPELLING REASON, BACKED UP BY REAL FACTS, THAT HIS
CAPACITY FOR DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IS GOING TO DETERIORATE IN THE WEEKS AND
MONTHS AHEAD?
EVERYTHING AND EVERYBODY IS IN PLACE, TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO
SADDAM HUSSEIN -- THE STRONG STAND OF OUR PRESIDENT, OUR ARMED FORCES, THE
Extended Page
3.1
SANCTIONS, THE UNPRECEDENTED U.N. ACTION, AND NOW THE BAKER-AZIZ TALKS.
EVERYBODY BUT THE CONGRESS
EVERYTHING AND EVERYBODY IS IN PLACE, I SHOULD SAY, EXCEPT THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.
MAYBE IT IS TOO LATE TO AVOID WAR. I HOPE NOT -- BUT, CANDIDLY, I'M
NOT SURE.
BUT I AM SURE OF THIS. IF WE DO HAVE A WAR, IT IS NOT BECAUSE GEORGE
BUSH, OR THE UNITED STATES, OR THE UNITED NATIONS DIDN'T TRY HARD ENOUGH TO
AVOID WAR.
IT IS NOT BECAUSE OUR SIDE -- AND OUR SIDE HAPPENS TO INCLUDE
PRACTICALLY EVERYONE IN THE WORLD EXCEPT SADDAM HUSSEIN -- IT'S NOT BECAUSE
OUR SIDE DIDN'T SHOW ENOUGH PATIENCE.
(MORE)
01/04/91
16:51
004
3
IT IS FOR ONE OF TWO REASONS.
THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS GOING TO HAVE HIS WAR, REGARDLESS.
OR BECAUSE HE SOMEHOW DESPITE EVERYTHING -- HAS FAILED TO GET THE
MESSAGE OF AMERICAN UNITY, AND RESOLVE, AND STRENGTH.
I CAN'T GUARANTEE -- NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE -- THAT A STRONG EXPRESSION
OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. ACTION TO DATE, FOR PRESIDENT BUSH,
AND MOST OF ALL FOR OUR TROOPS IN THE GULF WILL SUCCEED IN PENETRATING
SADDAM'S OBVIOUSLY RATHER DENSE CRANIUM.
BUT DON'T WE HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO AT LEAST TRY?THE IRAQIS NOW
TRY TO MAKE THE CASE THAT, IN A MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR JUST
BEFORE THEIR INVASION, THE GOT THE IDEA THAT AMERICA WOULDN'T TAKE SIDES IN
AN IRAQI-KUWAITI DISPUTE.
MIXED MESSAGES
I HAPPEN TO THINK IT'S A PRETTY BOGUS ARGUMENT, BUT IT IS A CASE THEY
ARE MAKING. AND WITHOUT SUGGESTING FOR A MOMENT THAT THERE IS CREDIBILITY
IN THE PROPOSITION THAT THEY SOMEHOW PERCEIVED A "GREEN LIGHT" ***** HOW DO WE
KNOW, FOR SURE, EXACTLY WHAT MESSAGES THEY DO TAKE FROM WHAT WE DO? AND
DOESN'T IT MAKE SENSE, IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, TO BE ESPECIALLY PRUDENT
AND JUDICIOUS IN ALL OUR ACTIONS AND WORDS?
SOMEONE IN OUR S-407 BRIEFING YESTERDAY ASKED SECRETARY BAKER A VERY
GOOD QUESTION: HOW DO WE REALLY KNOW HOW SADDAM REACTS TO WHAT IS GOING
ON, EITHER IN THE GULF, BACK HERE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE? HOW GOOD IS OUR
INTELLIGENCE?
I'M CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO DETAIL THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER, BUT I CAN
ASSURE YOU OF THIS: NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT INFORMATION SADDAM
RECEIVES, OR HOW HIS THOUGHT PROCESSES WORK.
BUT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT HE PAYS AN EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF
ATTENTION TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN THIS CITY, AND IN THIS BUILDING.
DOES ANYONE HERE WANT TO WAKE UP TOMORROW, AND FIND --- IN SOME POST
MORTEM ON A WAR -- THAT SOME WELL-INTENTIONED ACTION OR COMMENT HERE IN THE
SENATE HAD BEEN TOTALLY MISUNDERSTOOD IN BAGHDAD, AND HAD GIVEN SADDAM THE
IDEA HE COULD DRAG THINGS ON A BIT LONGER?
THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE DO OR SAY NOTHING.
GO THE EXTRA MILE
IT DOES MEAN THAT, JUST AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAS GONE THE EXTRA MILE IN
OUR DEALINGS WITH IRAQ, WE SHOULD GO THE EXTRA MILE IN INSURING THAT WE NOT
SEND THE WRONG MESSAGE TO SADDAM.
AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, IT DOES MEAN THAT WE SHOULD JOIN THE
PRESIDENT, AND THE REST OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD, IN SENDING THE RIGHT
MESSAGE TO SADDAM.
THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE.
THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCES OF WAR.
THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MEET OUR RESPONSIBILITY -- BOTH TO THE
CONSTITUTION, AND TO THE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN WHO NOW STAND, WATCHING AND
WAITING, IN THE SANDS OF SAUDI ARABIA.
###
DAB
POTENTIAL IMPACTS
OF
IRAQI USE OF OIL
AS A
DEFENSIVE WEAPON
(DRAFT WORKING PAPER)
Prepared by
Team Members
H.W. Church
M.W. Edenburn
W. Einfeld
D. Engi
S. Felicetti
T.H. Fletcher
G.S. Heffelfinger
K.D. Marx
J.T. McCord
P.W. Moore
D.A. Northrop
L.D. Potter
J.R. Waggoner
N.R. Warpinski
B.D. Zak
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A preliminary study was performed using a multi-disciplinary team to determine the
potential atmospheric optical effects, ecological stresses, and reservoir damages that
would result from the demolition of wellheads situated in Kuwaiti oil fields and
from the discharge or ignition of oil from non-reservoir sources such as oil storage
tank farms, man-made oil-filled trenches, pipelines, and oil tankers. Base-case and
worst-case scenarios for the oil fields were considered: in the base-case scenario,
one-third of all wellheads in Kuwait were destroyed and half of these were ignited;
in the worst-case scenario, all 900 wellheads were destroyed and 80% of these were
ignited. The approach taken in this study was to perform a series of time-phased
analyses, each stage of which generated not only immediate results, but also the
requisite inputs, or source terms, for the succeeding stage. Hence, reservoir
analyses provided source terms for combustion analyses in addition to estimates of
reservoir damage; combustion analyses defined combustion products, posed oil-
filled trench issues, and provided source terms for atmospheric processes;
atmospheric analyses generated potential optical effects and provided source terms
for ecological analyses that, in turn, provided estimates of ecological stresses.
In the base-case and worst-case scenarios, midday light levels are expected to be on
the order of 1/1000th of a moonlit night due to extinction of sunlight by soot within
corridors tens of kilometers wide downwind (probably Southeast) from burning oil
sources. Maximum degradation of visibility is expected in the region between
ground level and 2 km altitude at distances of 5 to 30 km from the sources.
Reduced visibility will exist at distances in excess of 100 km from the sources. Major
degradation is also expected in the infrared region of the spectrum; consequently,
electro-optical instrumentation will be affected. Use of a line source rather than a
two-dimensional array of wells is a source of uncertainty (a factor of 2 or 3 in optical
depth) in these estimates as are meteorological conditions.
In all scenarios, airborne pollutants created by burning oil are not expected to
significantly affect major population centers. Oil spilled over the ground will kill
vegetation and is a threat to shallow aquifers and coastal wells. Most vegetation is
expected to recover within a year. Oil (77 times the amount of the Exxon Valdez
spill) discharged from tankers, pipelines, or on-shore storage tanks into the Gulf will
cause major damage to the marine ecology, to the fishing industry, and to
desalination facilities in four countries. Detailed quantitative aspects of the damage
are uncertain.
Extensive, irremediable losses due to reservoir damage are not expected. However,
oil losses due to uncontrolled flow could amount to as much as 7 - 10 Mbbl/day in
the worst-case scenario and 5 - 6 Mbbl/day in the base-case scenario. Uncertain is
the number of wells affected as well as the time required to regain control of them.
Given the Iraqi Pipeline to Saudi Arabia (IPSA) as the only source of oil, anti-tank
trenches may not be fillable based on current estimates of oil seepage. If not, IPSA-
limited burning is expected to take place in trench-bottom feeder lines at about one-
sixth the intensity of oil-filled trenches, resulting in still significant concentrations of
pollutants and degradation of visibility. Most uncertain are soil properties (seepage
rates) from the trenches and the potential for use of added sources of oil (e.g.,
Southeast Field).
iii
encountered in the vicinity of the trench. Downwind dispersion estimates for a
trench burn reveal that soot concentrations in excess of 10 mg/m³ could be
encountered at points 5 to 30 km downwind from the trenches. Such soot
concentrations would clearly constitute IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) conditions at
lower altitudes, and would undoubtedly adversely impact the performance of various
electro-optical weapons systems. It is not unlikely that the plumes from the burning
trenches would superimpose on the downwind plume from the West oil field further
reducing visibility downwind from that region.
The most dramatic optical effect expected, however, is not visibility degradation in
the horizontal. It is sunlight extinction in the vertical. One finds that the optical
depths of some of the plumes for the base-case scenario may be greater than 20.
That corresponds to an attenuation of sunlight by a factor of 4.8 X 10⁸. At noon,
light levels under the plumes may be as low as 1/1000th that of a moonlit night.
Even if the optical depth were only half as large, the light levels would still be not
much greater than a moonlit night. Thus corridors of darkness tens of kilometers
wide can be expected downwind of the major oil fields in the base-case scenario and
downwind of the trench system in all scenarios (see Figure III-1). In scenario #1,
the effect would be considerably less severe, with light levels perhaps being
comparable to twilight. Because of low light levels, artificial light sources
(flashlights, etc.) might be used, but even with these, extinction in the horizontal
would limit the visual range.
An additional source of visibility-reducing aerosol could arise from breached, non-
burning wellheads in the various oil fields of interest. Droplet size analysis of the oil
exiting from the pipe reveals that oil droplet size would be in the range of under 5
microns for the higher pressure wellheads (Appendix A, Section 2). As a result,
these small particles would remain suspended and would be found in a low-level
plume very close to the ground since, in the absence of combustion and heat release,
no significant plume rise would occur. On an equal mass basis the light extinction
efficiency of oil mist is about 3 times less than that of soot. Large sources of oil
mist, particularly in the vicinity of non-burning, venting high pressure wells in the
Southeast field could contribute to a local visibility problem. However, the problem
would be localized in the vicinity of the breached non-burning wellheads because of
droplet evaporation. The effects of the vaporized organic species on extinction in
the infrared region, however, would be widespread.
It is important to note that all optical effects would be reduced by high winds
especially downwind of burning pools or trenches.
LONG-TERM CLIMATIC EFFECTS
An estimate of the total weekly smoke yield from all combined burning oil fields,
trenches, and oil storage facilities for the four burn scenarios considered in this
III-9
analysis is given is Table III-3. The base-case burn scenario results in a weekly
release of about 0.34 Tg (10¹² g) of smoke from the uncontrolled burning wells in
the various oil fields. If the assumption is made that the wells burn uncontrolled for
PROBABLE JANUARY WIND
NORTH
OOD
KUWAIT CITY
WEST
TRENCH
SOUTHEAST
DILFIELD
DOWNWIND
PLUME
0
18
30
APPROXIMATE KM
Figure III-1. Map of Kuwait showing location of principal oil fields and trenches
of interest. Modeled line sources are shown superimposed on the
smoke sources and oriented normal to the expected wind direction.
Expected plume dimensions are shown with dotted lines. Note that
the plumes are artificially terminated here, but would actually
continue on until completely dispersed. It is also important to note
that on any given day, the expected wind direction may not occur.
Hence, the areas affected may be quite different from those shown
here.
III-10
Table III-3. Total Smoke Injection for Burn Scenarios
Burn Scenario
Total Smoke Production (Tg)
All Fields
Trench
Storage
Total Release
per week
for 8 weeks
No. 1
0.09
0.21
0.31
1.3
No. 2
0.34
0.21
0.31
3.2
No. 3
0.11
0.21
0.31
1.4
No. 4
0.49
0.21
0.31
4.5
Notes:
All calculations assume a constant release rate over an 8-week interval with no drop-off
in wellhead pressure.
The smoke release from trench and storage burning is added into the final column.
a period of 8 weeks, the total smoke yield is about 2.7 Tg. Adding in the smoke
release from the trench and storage facility burning (0.5 Tg) results in a total smoke
release of about 3.2 Tg over the 8-week interval. This calculation assumes that the
oil and gas flow rate at the wellhead remains constant over the 8-week period. The
result would clearly be less if the well pressure drops off over the period of
uncontrolled venting. A similar calculation for the worst case scenario results in a
total release about 4.5 Tg which includes emissions from burning trenches and oil
storage facilities. Total smoke injection into the atmosphere resulting from all
combustion activities on earth is estimated to be about 200 Tg/yr (Seiler and
Crutzen, 1980).
Thus, for as long as the fires burn at the estimated rates, they would add about 10%
to the world's smoke production during the same period. The climatic effect of this
smoke would be roughly doubled by the fact that crude oil smoke absorbs light very
efficiently in comparison to most urban, industrial and agricultural burning smokes.
A recent assessment of the potential for climatic change that would arise from
smoke injection into the atmosphere from mass fires following a 1,000 megaton
nuclear exchange between the Superpowers established a baseline smoke injection
mass of 180 Tg (National Academy of Sciences, 1985). This assessment further
III-11
assumed that intense urban fires would result in smoke injection heights up to and
beyond the tropopause (10-15 km above ground), where the smoke would persist
and ultimately be dispersed over the northern hemisphere. For an 8-week burn
interval at constant well production rates, the worst-case smoke-release scenario
examined in this analysis is below the baseline nuclear winter assessment by about a
factor of 40. The majority of the smoke produced from the Kuwait oil fires would
be injected into the lower atmosphere where such atmospheric phenomenon as
cloud formation and precipitation would facilitate smoke removal. In light of these
differences in total mass release and injection height, it is reasonably clear that
major long-term climatic effects would not result from Kuwait oil fires. Prolonged
burning for up to a half year at the rates used in Table III-3 would still not inject
enough smoke to cause major climatic changes on a global scale because
atmospheric removal processes in the lower atmosphere would significantly reduce
the total mass of smoke injected into the atmosphere over the release interval.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that measurable climatic effects would be created
at least on a regional, if not on a global scale.
ECOSTRESSES
Oil releases from damaged Kuwaiti oil fields, storage tank farms, and offshore
tankers can potentially disrupt both terrestrial and marine ecology. Unburned oil,
flowing over and pooling on the ground, will have toxic effects on native desert
vegetation near the oil fields; it can pollute nearby shallow freshwater aquifers
which are important to Kuwait's agriculture (which is quite limited); and the
hydrogen sulfide release can have toxic effects on people and animals near oil fields.
If the oil is burning, it can affect vegetation, humans, and animals because of SO2,
CO, soot, and heavy metals in the combustion products. Unburned oil released near
the coast can damage salt marshes and the marine ecology.
TERRESTRIAL EFFECTS
Oil discharged across the desert's surface will kill vegetation by smothering and
poisoning. The destruction will be limited to areas immediately around the oil
fields. Some recovery is expected over time because seeds will survive the oil and
germinate when conditions become favorable. In most places, the oil will not
penetrate to deep aquifers because of hard pan (gatch); however, shallow coastal
wells fed by percolating rainwater could be polluted by releases from the Burgan
field or coastal storage tanks. The huge groundwater field at Raudhatain has a
nearby main, shallow, freshwater aquifer at a depth of 30-60 ft, which is partially
recharged annually by rainfall and which could become polluted by oil flow from the
northern oil field. Also, large areas of beach sand marshes southeast of the Burgan
oil fields would be destroyed by an oil covering.
III-12
For short-term exposure (hours or days), SO2 from burning wells would be expected
to cause visible damage to vegetation up to a distance of 20 km from the source.
For long-term exposure (years), SO₂ from as few as 60 burning wells would be
expected to cause some damage up to a distance of 100 km. Thresholds for
destructive effects are difficult to quantify, but assuming that long term SO2
concentrations of 0.5 mg/m3 and above are destructive, then as few as 100 burning
wells would be expected to produce destructive effects up to at least 20 km. The
nature of desert vegetation tends to minimize air pollution damage. The most
sensitive vegetation would be irrigated crops and city landscaping. Little or no
effect would be expected from acid rain. Kuwait does have some irrigated
agriculture, east of the Burgan Field and in the north, mostly dates with some
vegetables. The agriculture is not extensive, and Kuwait imports most of its food.
Based on our airborne concentration analyses and toxicity data, the effects of
airborne contaminants are expected to be small. Carbon monoxide, carcinogens
and heavy metals are not expected to have a significant effect. The largest effect is
expected from SO2. Some increased mortality in a small sensitive population is
expected, and will be most severe at 10 km from a burning field. The largest effect
will come if the wind is from the south, putting Kuwait City in the path of
combustion products from the Burgan Field. Winds from the south occur
infrequently. Even with winds from the south, SO2 concentrations are not expected
to be large enough for a serious effect on nonsensitive people in Kuwait City.
Hydrogen sulfide is expected to have a negligible effect since its concentrations are
toxic only in the immediate vicinity of the oil fields.
MARINE EFFECTS
Based on information we have received, a twenty million barrel crude oil spill to the
Persian Gulf is possible near Kuwait's coast. Ten million barrels could be released
in the first 24 hours followed by another ten million in the next 36 hours. The
potential source is a combination of tankers and on-shore storage tanks located near
Kuwait's coast. The magnitude of this potential oil spill is 77 times that of the
Exxon Valdez. Such an oil spill could disrupt the important fishing industry in the
gulf, shut down water desalination plants in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
Qatar which supply a large share of the area's water, and cause long term damage to
the gulf's ecology.
The Nowruz spill, tied for the world's largest, put 4 million barrels into the Persian
Gulf over several months in 1983. We have been unable in the short term of this
project to obtain accounts of scientifically determined quantitative effects from this
spill, but news articles reported a paralyzed shrimp industry and suspended
operation of two Saudi desalination plants. Damage from this spill was probably
minimized because it was in the northeastern part of the gulf and a combination of
III-13
northwesterly wind and currents carried the oil down the Iranian coast away from
the Saudi coast.
We estimate that a 20 million barrel spill off Kuwait can spread to cover an area 50
miles wide and will probably travel south along the Saudi coast due to natural Gulf
circulation patterns. It will probably interfere with the operation of several
desalination plants along the Saudi coast and in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. These
areas are dependent on desalinated water.
An oil spill in the Persian Gulf will have relatively serious effects on marine life
because the gulf is small, shallow, has slow circulation, and is very biologically
productive. The Arabian Sea, which includes the Gulf, is the highest marine life
productivity area in the world. Much of the oil will degrade by biodegradation or
photochemical reactions relatively quickly (over a few days) because of warm
temperatures. Oil sediments, on the other hand, will persist for a long time and will
enter the food chain through species such as shrimp which feed on the gulf bottom.
Thus, there is the potential for long term fishing industry as well as general
ecological disruption.
It is possible that the oil spill will be ignited. Burning the oil is probably better for
marine ecology than not burning it because burning helps remove the most volatile
oil compounds which are the most soluble in water and hence the most toxic.
Dispersants, while effective in deep water, should not be used in the shallow Gulf
water or over reefs because they are more toxic than the oil.
III-14
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 12-10-90 : 1:40PM ;
2024566422-
2024562397:# 2
White House News Summary
Monday, December 10, 1990
ABC's GOOD MORNING AMERICA
excerpts on Iraq/hostages
7 a.m.
MIKE SCHNEIDER: For more than 160 Americans who have been trapped
in Iraq and occupied-Ruwait, the ordeal is finally over. They're
coming home. They stopped in Frankfurt, Germany, where they
changed planes and told reporters of life as they have known it for
the past four months, life under Saddam Hussein's regime.
(HOSTAGE MAN: "Kuwait City does no longer exist, for all practical
purposes. The buildings are still there, the greenery and
everything is gone. The people mostly are gone."
REPORTER: "Do people assume there's going to be a war, sir?"
HOSTAGE MAN: "People are waiting, they're hoping to God that
somebody's going to come in help them out.")
(HOSTAGE MAN: "We're welcoming a military invasion. Please, do
something. Just don't vacillate back and forth.")
(REPORTER: "The Kuwaitis want the United States to come in and save
them?"
HOSTAGE MAN: "Without 21. doubt, to a man and to a woman and to a
child."
REPORTER: "Even if it means the destruction of their country?"
HOSTAGE MAN: "Even if it means they're under a rain of bombs, just
like we would have been.")
SCHNEIDER continues: Those people are only part of the first wave.
In Baghdad this morning, hundreds of other hostages are gathering
at the airport, fighting their way through the Iraqi bureaucracy
and hoping to be on one of the other flights that are planned for
later this week.
KAREN BURNES reports on those left behind: This morning, the
British are getting their exit visas, preparing to board a plane
for London. Nearly 200 Americans and over 1,000 detainees have
left this country in the last two days, swept up by the heady sense
of imminent freedom. But in their wake are still hundreds more.
Some chose to stay behind.
(HOSTAGE MAN: "I'm not: leaving because, a humanitarian request.
I have to go back to Kuwait to sell a -- make a decision about my
future with this lady in Kuwait who has helped me through a crisis.
I need to help her through a crisis now.")
Officials estimate that several hundred Americans have become
integrated into Iraqi society and will remain here. But there are
those still tangled in bureaucracy, like this American who is
married to a Kuwaiti woman and cannot obtain exit visas for his
family. Officials believe people are still hiding in Kuwait,
having not heard the news that it was safe to leave. They hope to
fly them out by Wednesday. In the meantime, the U.S. Government
will pay all the air fares of American hostages leaving, which
means paying the Iraqi government to fly them out.
-
BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 :12-10-90 ; 1:40PM ;
2024566422-
2024562397:# 3
White House News Summary
Monday, December 10, 1990 -- 2
7:30 a.m.
SCHNEIDER: More than 160 former American hostages are now on their
way out of Iraq and headed back home. But during a stopover in
Frankfurt, Germany, they told grim stories about life in hiding
after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Some say the Kuwaitis who helped them
were executed, and that thousands of Kuwaitis are being held in
prison camps. Others say the Kuwaitis are praying now for a U.S.
military invasion to save them and their country.
8:00 a.m.
ABC's BARRIE DUNSMORE reports from the airport at Frankfurt: If
there had been a war at any time in the past four months, almost
certainly these people would have been among America's first
casualties. Whether in hiding in Kuwait or held as human shields
at Iraqi military sites, their chances of survival would have been
approved the use of force.
slim to none. It was notable, then, that so many of this group
(HOSTAGE MAN: "The people are waiting. They're hoping to God that
somebody's going to come in and help them out.")
Michelle Richards worried about what was happening to the Kuwaitis.
(RICHARDS: "They have been murdered, brutally murdered. Women have
been raped. There are thousands still in POW camps.
threatening force.
Dennis Mosher (sp?) strongly supported the President's policy of
(MOSHER: "I'm saying President Bush did a hell of a job, and I
doubt seriously if the United States could have gotten a better
Americans died. He did a great job.")
person to do -- he got me out of here, okay? I'm alive, no
simply on sanctions.
Ernest Alexander said it was demoralizing to hear talk of relying
them?" (REPORTER: "The Kuwaitis want the United States to come in and save
ALEXANDER: child. "without a doubt, to a man and to a woman and to a
REPORTER: "Even if it means the destruction of their country."
ALEXANDER: "Even if it means they are under a rain of bombs, just
like we would have been.")
After an elaborate breakfast this morning, most of the Americans
will be returning home later today, happy to have survived and
hoping that Americans at home do not now think the crisis is over.
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1991
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
FROM:
Boyd Hollingsworth/Rob Portman
RP
SUBJECT:
Senate Consideration of a Persian Gulf Resolution
Senator Mitchell has cleared an agreement on his side of the
aisle, allowing debate for the remainder of today and pro forma
sessions next week, with the Senate returning in full session on
January 14. Under the agreement, simple Senate Resolutions which
are not binding could be introduced today but would be referred
to committee. These Resolutions would have to deal with the
Persian Gulf. On January 14, the full range of legislation could
be introduced.
Mitchell's proposed agreement essentially trades an afternoon and
evening of debate today for ten more days without any Senate
action. It is probably as good a deal as we can get. If
Republicans object, Mitchell could simply allow debate today
anyway and there is nothing we can do to stop it.
Senator Dole has been asked for his concurrence, and has said he
wants to talk to the President first (at lunch today?).
Central Intelligence Agency
CERTINAL INTELLICE ALEXCY
Washington, D C 20505
10 January 1991
Gulf
The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of January 9, 1991, in
which you ask for an updated assessment of the impact of
sanctions on Iraq and on the policies of Saddam Hussein
subsequent to my testimony before your committee in December. In
that testimony, as you accurately noted, I observed that the
sanctions were effective technically and that they were being
felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some
areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that
sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and
that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him
out of Kuwait.
You now ask me to: (1) address the impact of the sanctions
on the economy and populace of Iraq and on the operational
effectiveness of its military if left in place for another six to
12 months; (2) address the question of how Iraq's defensive
abilities might be affected by the sanctions on the one hand and
by having additional time to prepare on the other if sanctions
are allowed to work for another six to 12 months; and (3) address
the likelihood that sanctions, again if left in place for another
six to 12 months could induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
UN sanctions have shut off nearly all Iraq's trade and
financial activity and weakened its economy, but disruptions in
most sectors are not serious yet. The impact of sanctions has
varied by sector. The most serious impact so far has been on the
financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad
to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or raise even
small amounts of foreign exchange. For the populace, the most
serious impact has been inflation.
The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and
southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the
next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions can be
maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a
coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's infantry
and artillery forces--the key èlements of Iraq's initial defense-
-probably would not suffer significantly as a result of
sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple
Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can
produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces
domestically. Moreover, these forces will have additional
opportunity to extend and reinforce their fortifications along
the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength.
Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat
from continued sanctions. The number of inoperable Iraqi armored
and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their
crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training
activities. Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other
supplies, however, which will ameliorate the effect of these
problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in
Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the
simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications. While
the military, especially the army, has been protected from the
impact of sanctions by stockpiling and minimal usage, during a
military action the impact would be more profound as equipment
and needed parts are expended.
Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are likely to be hit far
more severely than its Army, if effective sanctions are
maintained for another six to twelve months. This degradation
will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic assets from
air attack and reduce its ability to conduct similar attacks on
its neighbors. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's
ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is
not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.
In December, during my appearance before the House Armed
Services Committee, I noted that while we can look ahead several
months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi
economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these
conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. Our
judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced
for an additional six to 12 months, economic hardship alone is
unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-
threatening popular discontent in Iraq. The economic impact of
sanctions is likely to be increasingly serious, with conspicuous
hardships and dislocations. Nevertheless, Saddam currently
appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a
continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to
maintain the sanctions, especially if the threat of war recedes
significantly. He probably continues to believe that Iraq can
endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will
hold and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a
settlement more favorable to him.
We have seen little hard evidence to suggest that Saddam is
politically threatened by the current hardships endured by the
populace. Moreover, Saddam has taken few actions that would
indicate he is concerned about the stability of his regime.
Assessing the populace's flash point is difficult, but we believe
it is high because Iraqis have borne considerable hardship in the
past. During its eight-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq
endured a combination of economic difficulties, very high
casualties, and repeated missile and air attacks on major cities
without any serious public disturbances.
Sincerely,
William
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
GM
JAMES D. JOHNSTON
VICE PRESIDENT
INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
January 10, 1991
TO
The Honorable John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
Office of the President
I believe you will be interested in the
attached GM statement which says that: "GM
is fully supportive of, the President and
will do whatever is necessary to support
national security requirements."
James D. Johnston
JDJ/clh
Attachment
SUITE 401
1660 L STREET, N.W.
(202) 775-5090
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
ROOM 13-137
GENERAL MOTORS BLDG.
(313) 556-4671
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48202
GM SPOKESPERSON STATEMENT IN REPLY TO MEDIA QUERIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S
ISSUANCE OF AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ON NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS,
OR THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON GM OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
President Bush's issuance Wednesday of an executive order on National
Security Industrial Responsiveness is a reasonable and prudent move by the
Administration to set priorities for key strategic materials, such as food,
energy, steel, tires, and construction materials, in the event they would be
needed for national security. The order has no immediate impact on GM
operations.
We remain hopeful that that there will be a peaceful resolution to the
Middle East crisis and we have urged the Administration to use all diplomatic
means available to accomplish this. We are not going to speculate on how GM
operations might be impacted in the event of war. GM is fully supportive of
the President and will do whatever is necessary to support national security
requirements.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
91 JAN 10 PH 8: 19
January 10, 1991
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDA MAA
SUBJECT:
Veterans Groups Support of Gulf Policy
I wanted to provide you with four additional expressions of
support for your Gulf strategy from some of the nation's veterans
groups. Included among these is a letter from the National
Commander of the American Legion--the largest veterans service
organization--addressed to each member of the House.
Attachment
CC: David Demarest
Fred McClure
Deb Amend
SENT BY: AMERICAN LEGION
01-10-91 10:03AM
2023612786->
CCITT G3 # =
The
American
Legion
WASHINGTON OFFICE
1608 "K" STREET. N. W.
WASHINGTON, 0. c. 20006
OFFICE or THE
NATIONAL COMMANDER
January 10, 1991
Dear Representative:
The American Legion urges you to vote for legislation authorizing the Presi-
dent to take any necessary actions to resolve the crisis in the Persian
Gulf.
As an organization of three million men and women who have experienced first-
hand the pain and sacrifice of wartime service. The American Legion hopes
that a peaceful solution can be found. However, we know that diplomacy
cannot succeed if our nation's leadership is divided.
Any failure by Congress to offer its full bipartisan support to the President
could have catastrophic consequences. We are convinced that Saddam Hussein,
the world community and other members of the multinational force in Saudi
Arabia would see such disunity as a lack of U.S. resolve.
Additionally, a divided national leadership would produce a serious morale
problem among our own troops who have been deployed in Saudi Arabia. I
had the privilege ten weeks ago to visit those men and women, and I was
impressed by their patriotism. confidence and resolve. They accept the
potential risks of their mission, but they need to be assured that the
Congress and the American people fully support them in carrying out that
mission.
This international crisis is clearly a test of our national will. The up-
coming congressional debate will be scrutinized by the entire world. It
is critical that the decisions Congress reaches show the world, particularly
the Iraqi aggressors and all potential aggressors, that the United States
is willing to set aside partisan interests to endorse the President's author-
ity as our nation's Commander-in-Chief.
We urge you to vote for legislation authorizing the President to take any
necessary actions to deal with the crisis at hand and supporting the implemen-
tation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, for which
the United States has already expressed its support.
Sincerely,
Robert S. Turner
ROBERT S. TURNER
National Commander
The Retired Enlisted Association VOICE, January 1991
TREA RECEIVES WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING
TREA Deputy Executive Direc-
Men and Women if in fact we do
career military men and women.
tor for Government Affairs.
go to War with Iraq. The Presi-
we are very much aware
John Adams. attended a brief-
dent believes that the American
that should we eventually go to
public is behind his actions and
war with Iraq. each day we
ing on Operation Desert Shield
at the White House on Friday.
will share those views with their
delay, allows Iraq that much
December 14. 1990. Presenta-
Members of Congress. Con-
more time to strengthen their de-
tions were made by Mr. Haass.
gress must uphold all United
fensive position."
Ph.D. of the National Security
Nations Resolutions passed
Council, followed by President
thus far. After being briefed on
Bush.
the current Desert Shield situa-
tion, TREA National President
In attendance were: Secretary
George Smith stated. "TREA
Derwinski. D'Wayne Gray.
supports world opinions as ex-
Allen Clark and Ed Timperlake.
pressed in the twelve UN Resolu-
representing the Department of
tions, including the UN Counsel
Veteran Affairs. General P. X.
Resolution 678 of November 29,
Kelly. USMC (Ret) and repre-
1990. Furthermore, TREA sup-
sentatives from the DAV. VFW.
ports our Commander-In-Chief
American Legion. NCOA,
as elected by the American Pub-
MOPH, BVA. TROA. Gold Star
lic. To handcuff the Commander-
Mothers, American Ex-POW's,
In-Chief in such perilous times
Army-Navy Union. Legion of
could well result in unnecessary
Valor and Vietnam Veteran's
loss of life and limb and would
Association.
undermine the morale and well
In addition to giving specifics on
being of the outstanding Men
atrocities in Kuwait. President
and Women of our Armed Forces.
Bush pointed out that although
Although TREA does not have
he may be criticized for sending
total access to the intelligence
additional troops and hardware
and diplomatic communities, we
to Saudi Arabia at great ex-
do believe that the best inter-
pense. it is worth it if even one
est of the armed forces would
life is saved in the event of hos-
not be served if the 535 mem-
tilities. President Bush stated
bers of Congress were to en-
that he wants to ensure that he
gage in a lengthy debate over
has done everything possible to
whether or not they agree
protect the lives of our Service
with World opinion. As former
WASHOL
TEL NO: 202/289-6040
#360 P02
11
American Ex-Prisoners of War
CONGRESSIONALLY CHARTERED
NATIONAL CAPITOL OFFICE
OFFICE (202) 208-1800 / FAX (202) 289-6040 / FTS 268-1800
941 NORTH CAPITOL STREET Room 9109 Washington. DC 20421
December 19, 1990
TO:
SVC KREJCI, JVC BEARISTO, MINIETTA, AND CHOMA,
NATIONAL DIRECTORS, AND LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
FROM:
FRANCIS w. AGNES, COMMANDER
SUBJECT:
Francis DESERT SHIELD When
Within the last week, the President of the United States, two
Cabinet members and one of our supporters in the House of Representative
have approached us asking that we support the Administration in Desert
Shield.
To my knowledge, Veterans Service Organizations universally support
the Administration in Desert Shield and I believe we should let those
in authority know we are behind them. Our thoughts and prayers are
with the loved ones and the families of those service men and women
in the desert during this difficult time.
I would like you to immediately contact all Department and Chapter
Commanders in your area, and to ask them to contact each member.
Letters of support should go from every member to the President,
both Senators, and your Representative. Letters should be in your
own words and make it clear that the President has your support.
I appreciate the level of support each member can give to this
important matter.
"WE EXIST TO HELP THOSE WHO CANNOT HELP THEMSELVES"
3014599600
Dec 19.90 8:44
National Headquarters
AMVETS
4647 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, Maryland 20706 9961
(301) 459-9600
VACCHN L. BROWN. SR.
NATIONAL COMMANDER
December 18, 1990
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President,
I would like to take this opportunity to inform you the
AMVETS wholeheartedly supports the actions you have take
concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf. As veterans, 1
recognize--perhaps better than most--the necessity to dete
aggression where and when it arises. The challenge our countr
faces today is no exception.
I applaud your resolve to seek a peaceful solution to the
crisis and am hopeful that it can be attained. If, however, the
only option left is the use of force, then AMVETS stands behind
you.
We fully support our brave men and women serving in the Middle
East and trust in your promise that their service will not parallel
the prolonged agony of Vietnam. When our forces return home,
AMVETS will work to ensure that they receive every entitlement
their dedication deserves. We are confident that you will pursue
with equal vigor the preservation of these entitlements.
Meanwhile, our national service officers stand ready to assist
their families during this trying time.
Because of your commitment to freedom, America continues to
be a beacon of hope for oppressed people everywhere. The decisions
you have made underscore that and will contribute to a future where
we all may know true peace on earth.
Sincerely yours,
25 Vaughn L. Brown, Sr.
National Commander
American Veterans of World Was II, Korea, Visinam and Those Serving Thereafter
Fwd'd to P COS
THE WHITE HOUSE by Staff Seey Office
WASHINGTON
400
91 JAN 11 PM 4: 04 1/11/91
TO: THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF of STAFF
FROM: FRED McCLURE 7m
has seen
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
FYI
Comment
Action
Pressler called me before sending
and asked that you see it in-
mediately which + promised
to do. GST & told him & thought
you would find the content
okay and promised to get
back to him after you review.
Please let me know as soon
as possible.
RCV BY:The TICKET CENTER
; 1-11-91 ; 4:47PM ;
2022245344-> LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS:# 2
CLAIRORNS FALL, SHOOE ISLAND, CHANKIAN
JOSEPH a INDEL JL DELAWARE
Just HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
PAIR & SARBANS, MARYLAND
RICHARD C. LUGAR INDIANA
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
NANCY KARSHAUM. KANSAB
CHRISTOPHER J. 0000, COMMECTICUT
RUDY BOSCHWITE MINNESOTA
JOHN F. KEBRY, MASSACHUSETTS
LARRY PRESSLER, SOUTH DAKOTA
PAUL SIMON, ILLINOIS
FRANK M. MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
TERRY BANFORD. NORTH CAROLINA
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY
Hnited States Senate
DANNEL P. MOYNIMAN, NEW YORK
GORDON & MUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE
CHARLES 8. ROBB, VIRGINIA
CONNER MACK. FLORIDA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
GERYLD B. CHAISTIANSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES P. LUCIER, MINORITY START DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8225
January 11, 1991
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I will vote to support you on the upcoming Persian Gulf resolution because I
strongly oppose going to war with Iraq. I reach this decision with strong
reservations, however, which I would like to share with you in advance of the
vote.
First, I would oppose a Declaration of War at this point. I believe that the
use of military force would be premature, and that it would be a grave mistake
to engage in military action on January 16. Please do not interpret my vote as
support for prompt military action. I do not think the people of this nation
would support such action. I certainly do not. But I think it is essential to
let Saddam Hussein know you have that authority if he continues his brutal,
lawless actions. I am convinced he understands your resolve. Unfortunately,
however, I think the wrong signal from Congress now would not only strengthen
his hand, but would make loss of life a more likely consequence later.
Assuming the two options will be the current Solarz-Michel Resolution you asked
for and the Mitchell-Numn Resolution, I have come to believe that the Mitchell
option presents the greatest possibility of combat and the loss of life. My
conclusion is based largely on my faith in your leadership and belief in your
strongly worded public statements expressing your desire to avoid the use of
force. I believe your commitment to exhaust all alternatives before you would
examise such an extreme option. It is for that reason I felt it necessary to
convey to you the premise for my conclusion.
The Mitchell Resolution makes very clear that "Congress is firmly committed to
reversing the brutal and illegal occupation of Ruwait." But it relies
exclusively 6 "international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure
Imq," and reserves "authorising the use of force at a later time." But it is
wholely ambiguous as to when or under what conditions the use of force would be
authorized. I interpret the "firmly committed" Language at face value. If
"international senctions and diplomatic efforts" fail, force will be authorized.
My problem with this language is that by its "no possibility of force now"
language it gives Saddem exactly what he wants - the comfort of not feering
further reprisals and a commitment that he will have ample notice before WB give
him yet another deadline. And by its ambiguity as to when or under what
conditions force will be authorized, the resolution undercuts the ability of
"sanctions and diplomatic efforts" to work. It assures Iraq that it need not
RCV BY:The TICKET CENTER
; 1-11-91 ; 4:48PM
2022245344-> LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS:# 3
fear until a public, time certain Act of Congress. Thus assured, it most
definitely will not withdraw and will continue to stonewall any diplomatic
efforts to resolve the crisis. That is the clear history and stated policy of
Iraq. In short, the Mitchell resolution will only delay - not avoid - use of
force if it is required.
By voting to give you the option and thus eliminating Saddam's certainty and
peace of mind concerning force, my opinion is that Congressional authorization
now is more likely to convince him of America's resolve than if we delay it. My
vote is to remove that certainty and protection for Saddam. It is meant. as a
vote for strengthening your diplomatic hand, and that of the United Nations
General Secretary a any other intermediary.
Having said that, let me make it very clear that I strongly oppose using force
on January 16 given present circumstances. I am not convinced that all
diplomatic options have been exhausted. I do not believe it is possible to
fully exhaust them without this authorization. Saddam Hussein's actions and
words throughout this crisis convince me that the only possibility of successful
diplomacy requires giving George Bush a strong hand. George Bush's actions and
words throughout this crisis convince me that he will use that strength only if
it is truly a last resort.
I do not believe George Bush will commit this nation to military action on
January 16 because I think he recognizes that all diplomatic options have not
been exercised. You have not yet had the full opportunity to negotiate from a
position where Saddam Hussein knows you have the authority to use force. One or
two days is not enough time to do that. I have faith in your judgment on this.
I will be bitterly disappointed if my calculation is incorrect, and urge you in
the strongest possible terms to continue diplomatic efforts to resolve this
crisis after January 16 to find the political solution I believe can be found as
long as Saddam Hussein knows you have the authority to match your resolve.
You have my support on this vote, and my prayers for a successful diplomatic
solution.
Larry Larry Pressler
Sincerely
United States Benator
LP:ks
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE CHIEF of STAFF
WASHINGTON
91 JAN 11 P1112: 09
has seen
JANUARY 11, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DAVID DEMAREST M ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
THROUGH:
COMMUNICATIONS
BK
FROM:
BOBBIE KILBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
JEFF VOGT MASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC LIAISON
SUBJECT:
BUSINESS LEADERS' SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S
GULF POLICY
Attached are three letters from association officials, business
leaders and attorneys, each voicing support for the
Administration's Gulf policy. The business community is actively
working on the Hill on our behalf.
The first letter to you represents over 130 association and
business leaders, spearheaded by the five signatories as listed
on the front page which include: Wayne Valis, Dirk Van Dongen,
Jerry Jasinowski, Red Cavaney and David Parker. In addition to
the letter to you, every Member of the House and Senate received
an individualized letter last evening. Jasinowski simultaneously
issued a press release with the letter which is also attached.
The second is a letter to Congress from the Business Roundtable's
Chairman, Drew Lewis, on behalf of the 200 member corporate CEOs,
and an accompanying release, expressing the Roundtable's support
for your Gulf policy. The letter and press statement encourages
Members of Congress to show American resolve and unity through
support of the bipartisan Joint Resolution. Every Member of the
House received this letter and they pledge to do the same in the
Senate as it takes up the Resolution.
Also, a letter to you from over 175 attorneys is attached voicing
similar support for your stand in the Gulf. This was also
released to the press.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
BUSINESS GROUP EXECUTIVES SUPPORT PRESIDENT ON GULF
Washington, D.C., January 10, 1991 -- The top executives of
about 120 business organizations today issued a statement of
support for U.S. efforts to "halt aggression in Kuwait."
"We agree that letting aggression go unchecked merely
encourages more aggression, " the letter (attached) said.
"Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international
economic blackmail are a threat to the international community
and to America's national security," the letter continued.
"Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy,
particularly those developing nations around the globe."
Speaking for those who signed the letter, National
Association of Manufacturers President Jerry Jasinowski said, "We
feel very strongly, as we wrote here, that 'the Iraqi regime
should understand that Americans are united' and that the United
States is fully prepared to 'use the means necessary to expel
their troops from Kuwait.
"We must not forget that people around the world are
suffering from Saddam's brutal and immoral actions," he said.
"Needless human hardship and economic strains are being felt, not
only in our country, but, just as important, in the Third World
countries and newly born democracies," Jasinowski said.
"Saddam Hussein has damaged this life-supporting fabric with
naked aggression. We support the international efforts to restore
Kuwait, and we applaud the President's leadership in helping
January 10, 1991
President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We, the undersigned, pledge support for your courageous
action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is vitally important
for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice and
your plan to halt aggression in Kuwait. Your work in creating an
historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression is an
important first step in creating a new, post-Cold War structure
for peace.
We agree that letting aggression go unchecked merely
encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's reprehensible
efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the
international community and to America's national security.
Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy,
particularly those developing nations around the globe.
Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder,
torture, imprisonment and looting, has been condemned by
the world community. We believe the various United Nations
Resolutions must be fully carried out. The Iraqi regime should
understand that Americans are united behind your leadership and
are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops
from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.
We urge you to continue your efforts toward peace and
stability in the Gulf and we pledge our support to you.
Sincerely,
Red Cavaney
Jerry Jasinowski
American Paper Institute
National Assoc. of Manufacturers
(212) 340-0676
(202) 637-3106
Dave Parker
Dirk Van Dongen
The Aluminum Association
National Assoc. of
(202) 862-5100
Wholesaler-Distributors
(202) 872-0885
Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates
1747 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, #850
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 833-5055
Paul C. Abenante
American Bakers Association
Donald G. Agger
DGA International
Jack Albertine
Albertine Enterprises, Inc.
E. T. "Bill" Altman
Hardwood Plywood Manufacturers Association
Wendy Baer
International Hardwood Products Association
A. William Bailey
Independent Insurance Agents of America
Joe M. Baker
Association of Wall & Ceiling Industries
William Ball
National Soft Drink Association
Robert G. Bartlett
National Stone Association
John Bauer
Basic Industries Coalition
James C. Barr
National Milk Producers Federation
J. Carter Beese, Jr.
Alex Brown & Sons, Inc.
Judy Black
International Council of Shopping Centers
Steven H. Blackwell
Management Consulting Services
John R. Block
National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association
Jack E. Bobo
National Association of Life Underwriters
Walter G. Bohrer
Amusement & Music Operators Association
Lawrence W. Bory
American Consulting Engineers Council
G. Stewart Boswell
American Apparel Manufacturers Association
Joseph W. Bow
Foodservice and Packaging Institute
J. Patrick Boyle
American Meat Institute
Glenn E. Braswell
Flexible Packaging Association
James N. Burroughs
National Propane Gas Association
Nicholas J. Bush
Natural Gas Supply Association
James H. Carrington
Seasonair, Inc.
Brian E. Cartier
National Shorthand Reporters Association
Henry C. Cashen
Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin
Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute
Robert Cave
American Public Gas Association
Anna C. Chennault
TAC International
Phillip R. Chisholm
Petroleum Marketers Association of America
W. Dewey Clower
National Association of Truck Stop Operators
Kent W. Colton
National Association of Home Builders
James D. Cope
Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association
Derrick Crandall
American Recreation Coalition
John P. Cregan
U.S. Business and Industrial Council
Richard C. Creighton
American Cement Alliance
E. J. Criscuoli, Jr.
American Society for Industrial Security
James B. Currie
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Group
John M. Damgard
Futures Industry Association
Regis Delmontagne
National Printing Equipment & Supply Association
Gary W. Donnelly
National Lumber & Building Material Dealers Association
John A. Doyle
National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities
Stephen Driesler
National Association of Realtors
R. Hartley Edes
Insulation Contractors Association of America
Bernard H. Falk
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
William Farrell
American Hardware Manufacturers Association
Don Fuqua
Aerospace Industries Association
Walter E. Galanty, Jr.
National Association of Brick Distributors
John Paul Galles
National Small Business United
Kristine Garland
Composite Can & Tube Institute
Joseph G. Gerard
American Furniture Manufacturers Association
Brian W. Gill
Master Printers of America
James D. Gormley
General Aviation Manufacturers Association
John M. Grau
National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc.
Malvern J. Gross, Jr.
National Aeronautic Association
Paul T. Haluza
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
Clifford J. Harrison
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
Charles E. Hawkins
Associated Builders and Contractors
John T. Healy
National Wooden Pallet & Container Association
Steven B. Hellem
United States Advanced Ceramics Association
Fred H. Holt
Animal Health Institute
Hal W. Howes
Aerojet
Walter C. Hunt
Institute of Certified Business Counselors
Charles C. Irions
American Movers Conference
Philip J. James
National Glass Association
Jerry Jasinowski
National Association of Manufacturers
Frank L. Jensen, Jr.
Helicopter Association International
Carl T. Johnson
Compressed Gas Association
Jonathan L. Kempner
National Multi Housing Council
John A. Knebel
American Mining Congress
Tom Kuhn
Edison Electric Institute
Richard L. Lawson
National Coal Association
Richard L. Lesher
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Jim Mack
National Machine Tool Builders Association
John M. Martin
Dairy & Food Industries Supply Association
Wm. H. McCredie
National Particleboard Association
M. Richard Melliand
Melliand Associates
Albert W. Moore
NMTBA--The Association for Manufacturing Technology
Allen Moore
National Solid Wastes Management Association
Robert M. Moore
International Banana Association, Inc.
William C. Morrison
Meat Importers Council of America, Inc.
Russell N. Mosher
American Boiler Manufacturers Association
L. Manning Muntzing
Doub, Muntzing & Glasgow
Roy W. Muth
International Snowmobile Industry Association
Philip Nowers
Association of Reproduction Materials Manufacturers, Inc.
Paul T. O'Day
American Fiber Manufacturers Association
Tom O'Day
Alliance of American Insurers
Karl Ottosen
U.S. Federation of Small Business, Inc.
Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association
Robert D. Pavey
National Venture Capital Association
Gus Pede
Oakton, VA
James C. Pennington
National Association for Uniformed Services
J. Wm. Peterson
Construction Industry Manufacturers Association
Gilbert G. Pollock
American Amusement Machine Association
Thomas W. Power
Foodservice and Lodging Institute
Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.
Atlantic Research Corp.
Robert A. Roland
Chemical Manufacturers Association
Robert M. Reeves
Institute of Shortening & Edible Oils
Richard Richards
Washington, DC
Ray Roper
Printing Industries of America
Samuel R. Sacco
National Association of Temporary Services
Ronald A. Sarasin
National Beer Wholesalers Association
Robert C. Schwarze
National Food Brokers Association
John Thomas Sheehan
Sheehan Associates, Inc.
Hal Shoup
American Association of Advertising Agencies
David Stahl
Urban Land Institute
E. P. Stansbury
Composite Can & Tube Institute
Bud Stiles
Independent Bakers Association
Chris Stinebert
American Subcontractors Association
John J. Stocker
Shipbuilders Council of America
Robert Strawn
Recreation Vehicle Dealers Association
R. William Taylor
American Society of Association Executives
Larry Thomas
Society of the Plastics Industry
C. Richard Titus
Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers Association
Kenneth R. Tobin
National Aggregates Association
George Troutman
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.
Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates
Dirk Van Dongen
National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors
Joseph Volpe, Jr.
The Parsons Corporation
Herbert C. Wamsley
Intellectual Property Owners
Richard S. Ward
ITT Corporation
George D. Webster
Webster, Chamberlain & Bean
Steven A. Wechsler
National Realty Committee
John C. Whitaker
Union Camp Corporation
Frank E. Wilcher, Jr.
Industrial Safety Equipment Association
Laurence D. Wiseman
American Forest Council
Bob Woodson
National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise
Hugh Young
Garrett Allen
James H. Burnley IV
Potts, Pittman, Shaw & Trowbridge
(affiliations listed for identification purposes only)
January 10, 1991
The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Mikulski:
We, the undersigned, have sent the enclosed letter to President Bush
pledging support for his courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe
it is important for all Americans to unite behind the pursuit of justice and
the President's efforts to halt aggression in Kuwait. We applaud the
President's efforts to create an historic international coalition against Iraqi
aggression and we urge the Congress to join the President in helping to
create a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.
We believe that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more
aggression. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder,
torture, imprisonment and looting has been condemned by the world
community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be
fully carried out.
We hope you will join the President in making the Iraqi regime understand
that Americans are united behind the President's leadership and are
prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and
to establish stability in the Gulf.
Thank you for considering our views on this vital issue.
Sincerely,
The Undersigned
(see enclosed list)
January 10, 1991
The Honorable Bill Emerson
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Representative Emerson:
We, the undersigned, have sent the enclosed letter to President Bush
pledging support for his courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe
it is important for all Americans to unite behind the pursuit of justice and
the President's efforts to halt aggression in Kuwait. We applaud the
President's efforts to create an historic international coalition against Iraqi
aggression and we urge the Congress to join the President in helping to
create a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.
We believe that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more
aggression. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder,
torture, imprisonment and looting has been condemned by the world
community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be
fully carried out.
We hope you will join the President in making the Iraqi regime understand
that Americans are united behind the President's leadership and are
prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and
to establish stability in the Gulf.
Thank you for considering our views on this vital issue.
Sincerely,
The Undersigned
(see enclosed list)
JAN 10 '91 15:01
The
DUDII
-
new
PAGE 004
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE URGES CONGRESS TO SUPPORT BIPARTISAN
RESOLUTION ON USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAO
Washington, D.C. -- January 10, 1990 -- In a letter delivered
today to the Speaker and to the Republican Leader of the House of
Representatives, Business Roundtable Chairman Drew Lewis urged
support for President Bush's policy in the Gulf. The letter
specifically urged support for the bipartisan resolution introduced
by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others which would empower
the President to use military force, if necessary, in order to get
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
Excerpts from the letter follow:
"The chief executives of The Business Roundtable believe that
the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign
minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans
speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.
"In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is
critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up
to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having
mobilized the international community behind a policy of
unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed
in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such
resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a
peaceful solution to this crisis.
"Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the
bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell,
Michel and others.
"We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war,
and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave
U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own
employees and their family members.
"But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands
for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East
JAN 10 '91 14:27
202 457 8193 PAGE.002
JAN 10 '91 15:01
PAGE 005
but around the world, would be harmed were the United States
Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at
this time.
"For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to
support the bipartisan resolution."
The Business Roundtable is an association of 200 major
corporations whose chief executive officers examine public issues
and develop positions which seek to reflect sound economic and
social policy.
###
Contact: Dick Anthony, 212-682-6370
JAN 10 '31 14:28
202 457 8193 PAGE.003
PAGE. 002
JAN 10 '91 15:00
The Business Roundtable
New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370 FAX (212) 662-0194
William L. Lurie
Drew Lewis
President
Chairman
Richard W. Anthony
James T. Lynn
Executive Director-Public Information
Cochairman
Richard F. Kibben
James D. Robinson III
Executive Director-Construction
Cochairman
January 10, 1991
Washington
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington. D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1260 FAX (202) 466-3509
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director
Speaker of the House
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker,
The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that
the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign
minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans
speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.
In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is
critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up
to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having
mobilized the international community behind a policy of
unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed
in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such
resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a
peaceful solution to this crisis.
Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the
bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell,
Michel and others.
We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war,
and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave
U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own
employees and their family members.
But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands
for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East
but around the world, would be harmed were the United States
Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at
this time.
For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to
support the bipartisan resclution.
Very Drew truly yours,
Drew Lewis
JAN 10 '91 15:00
PAGE. 003
The Business Roundtable
New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10168
(212) 682-8370 FAX (212) 682-0194
William L. Lurie
Drew Lewis
President
Chairman
Richard W. Anthony
James T. Lynn
Executive Director-Public Information
Cochairman
Richard F. Kibben
James D. Robinson III
Executive Director-Construction
Cochairman
January 10, 1990
Washington
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1260 FAX (202) 486-3509
Honorable Robert H. Michel
Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Michel,
The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that
the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign
minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans
speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.
In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is
critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up
to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having
mobilized the international community behind a policy of
unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed
in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such
resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a
peaceful solution to this crisis.
Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the
bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell,
yourself and others.
We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war,
and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave
U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own
employees and their family members.
But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands
for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East
but around the world, would be harmed were the United States
Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at
this time.
For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to
support the bipartisan resolution.
Very Drew truly yours,
Drew Lewis
January 10, 1991
President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We, the undersigned attorneys-at-law, wish to express our
support, in the strongest terms, for your responsible and
courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We are unequivocally united
behind you in your determination to halt and reverse the Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait consistent with the United Nations
resolution. Your success in forming a coalition of the nations of
the world in opposing the aggressive posture of Saddam Hussein is
precedent-setting. It begins a structure of peace following the
Cold War era.
The events that led to World War II proved that aggression
unchecked merely encourages further aggression. Saddam Hussein's
heinous international blackmail is not only a threat to the
international community, but also to America's security. The
illegality of the Iraqi invasion is underscored by the ruthlessness
of Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror against the people of
Kuwait. Appeasement in the form of delay will only prolong the
horrors of occupation, including murder, torture, imprisonment and
looting, that have been reported from Kuwait on almost a daily
basis.
We firmly support your leadership and are convinced that we
represent a majority of our colleagues in the legal profession and,
indeed, a majority of the American people as well. Sadly, we do
understand the implications of the use of force; however, we are
united behind you and are prepared to support America's use of all
appropriate means necessary to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
We pledge our support and commend your determination to
exercise every effort to achieve peace and stability in the Persian
Gulf and in the Middle East.
Sincerely,
Bruce D. Goodman
Robert J. Horn
Jim Burnley
Contact: Bruce Goodman
(202) 775-7169
Charles Ablard
Paul L. Friedman
John Austin
Roger P. Furey
Sheila C. Bair
W. Payton George
John W. Barnum
Gerald E. Gilbert
John H.C. Barron, Jr.
Nicholas D. Giordano
Michael J. Bartlett
Robert Glaser
Walter Bates
Allen B. Green
Peter L. Baumbusch
David A. Hartquist
George Beall
Edward Hayes, Jr.
Bruce A. Beam
Laurence F. Henneberger
Glen A. Bellinger
Michael Hoffman
Arthur Lee Bentley, III.
James H. Hulme
Jerome K. Blask
John Irving
Thomas Hale Boggs, Jr.
R. Christian Johnson
Gary Born
Neil B. Kabatchnick
Edmund C. Brickfield
Craig M. Kabatchnick
Jon A. Brilliant
Donald Kaufman
Raymond J. Briscuso, Jr.
Roger Kephart
Edward Brown
William J. Kilberg
E. Edward Bruce
Elizabeth Kluger
Christopher H. Buckley, Jr.
Conrad N. Koch
Bobby R. Burchfield
Harvey Koch
Geoffrey Calkins
James A. Koerner
Daniel Q. Callister
Andrew Kulick
John Carbone
Stephen Kurzman
Mike Casale
Nick Laird
Henry C. Cashen, II.
James Laurenson
Charles Catrillo
Dennis J. Lehr
Robert P. Charrow
Morris I. Leibman
Roger A. Clark
Gerard Leval
Ty Cobb
Seth Levine
J. Marshall Coleman
Timothy Lockhart
Sterling D. Colton
Coralyn G. Mann
William J. Cople, III.
Nancy Manougian
Mark D. Cowan
Bruce Markowitz
William Dabaghi
Margot Bester Markowitz
Rhett Dawson
April McClain-Delaney
Jill B. Deal
Robert McDowell
David DeBari
Donald C. McLean
William D. DeGrandis
Mary Martha McNamara
Joseph F. Dennin
Laurence G. Meyer
Tracey Dinese
Laurie L. Michel
Mark S. Dreux
Warren L. Miller
G. Richard Dunnells
John A. Mintz
Samuel Efron
Luke Mitti
Saad S. El-Fishawy
Joseph Mitti
Lewis A. Engman
Joseph A. Morris
John R. Erickson
R. Crawford Morris
Clark Kent Ervin
Scott Muller
Robert S. Faron
L. Manning Muntzing
Gregory Feldman
Karen L. Neal
Douglas A. Fellman
Nancy Nord
Baruch A. Fellner
Edward P. Nordberg, Jr.
Andrea Fischer
Kevin P. O'Brien
James W. Fonteno
Gerald E. Oberst
Antonio R. Franco
Deanna Tanner Okun
Robert E. Freer, Jr.
Theordore B. Olson
Stephen F. Ornstein
Robert F. Stankey
George J. Pantos
Benjamin Stanziale
Martha Priddy Patterson
Allan R. Swendiman
Donald H. Pearlman
Daniel J. Swillinger
Tim L. Peckinpaugh
Richard P. Taylor
Vincent A. Pepper
Joseph R. Thornton
Matthew S. Perlman
Kenneth P. Troccoli
Jeffry L. Perlman
James U. Troup
Matthew S. Perlman
Albert W. Turnbull
Howard Pyle, III.
Wayne Vance
Patrick M. Raher
David J. Vandermeulen
John Reinartz
James William Walker
R. Randall Ricardo
Donald Wallace, Jr.
Timothy A. Riedel
George D. Webster
Gregory Romano
Eric R. Weiss
Eugene P. Rossides
Arnold R. Westerman
Arthur J. Rothkopf
Alexander W. Whitaker
Robert Ruggeri
Beth Whitmore
Thomas Salley, III.
Richard K. Willard
Eric A. Von Salzen
Ronald J. Wiltsie, II.
Ralph F. Scalera
Susan Wing
Richard D. Siegel
Hugh F. Young, Jr.
Mark E. Solomons
Lynne K. Zusman
Steven M. Sprenger