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Persian Gulf War 1991 [11]
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Persian Gulf War 1991 [11]
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F [2]; 1998-0099-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29167
Folder ID Number:
29167-004
Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [11]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
3
5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1991
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ED ROGERS 3dR
SUBJECT:
RECENT POLLING DATA - GULF
I met with Sam Zakhem today. He is very enthusiastic and
energetic, and is motivated, I believe, in large part by his
affection for you.
Attached please find a copy of a poll that his new organization,
The Freedom Task Force, commissioned last month. Unlike other
data that we've seen lately, this sample is composed of likely
voters only (as opposed to all adults). Also, Tony Fabrizio is
well-known as a good pollster. In short, the poll offers some
very encouraging information. They plan to publicize these
results starting next week.
Zakhem has abandonned his former group, and Citizens for a Free
Kuwait is now defunct, but he has kept David Keene and Craig
Shirley as his consultants.
FYI: Zakhem is working closely with Representative Stephen
Solarz, and has provided funding for much of Solarz's committee's
operations.
Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM:
TO :
AMBASSADOR SAM ZAKHEM, CHAIRMAN
THE FREEDOM TASK FORCE
FR :
TONY FABRIZIO
RE :
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL VOTER SURVEY:
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE MIDDLE EAST
DATE :
DECEMBER 21, 1990
OVERVIEW:
On December 11, 1990, Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates were
commissioned by The Freedom Task Force to conduct a national
survey of voter attitudes regarding current U.S. policy in
the Middle East. Following the methodology statement is a
summary of these findings.
METHODOLOGY:
This survey of political attitudes was administered to
voters who are registered and intending to vote in the
November 1991 elections. A single report was tabulated of
800 general election voters nationwide. Interviews were
conducted between December 12 and 14, 1990.
All interviews were conducted by professionally trained
interviewers. Interview selection was random within
predetermined election units structured to statistically
correlate with actual voter distributions in national
elections.
This survey of likely general election voters has an
accuracy of +/- 3.46% at the 95% confidence interval.
SUMMARY:
At present, public attention is clearly focused on the
Iraq/Kuwait situation. When asked to cite the most
important issue facing the country today, over one third
(35.9%) name the Iraq/Kuwait situation.
801 North Fairfax Street. Suite 312 Alexandria, VA 22314. 703/739-2160 Fax 703/739-0664
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Two
December 21, 1990
"What is the single most important issue facing the United
States today?"
All
Voters
Iraq/Kuwait
35.9%
Budget
12.3
The Economy
11.1
War/Peace
8.5
Don't Know
4.0
Drugs
3.6
Homeless
2.8
Environment/Pollution
2.4
Education
2.4
Taxes
2.0
In fact when coupled with those respondents who cited
"War/Peace" concerns, the total Middle East related mentions
total 44.4% of the overall responses.
"Please tell me whether you have a favorable or unfavorable
opinion of George Bush. If you have no opinion or have
never heard of him just say so. (If said favorable or
unfavorable ask: And would that somewhat
favorable/unfavorable or very favorable/unfavorable?)'
Approve
Disapprove
Bush
Bush
All
Handling
Handling
Voters
Mid East
Mid East
Very Favorable
37.9%
49.5%
6.1%
Somewhat Favorable
35.9
37.6
28.3
Somewhat Unfavorable
10.5
5.5
26.7
Very Unfavorable
9.0
2.8
29.4
No Opinion
6.6
4.5
9.4
Never Heard of
0.1
0.2
0.0
Clearly, President Bush's handling of this situation has
significantly bolstered voter opinion of him. President
Bush is viewed favorable by 73.8% and unfavorably by 19.5%
of all voters. Among those respondents who approve of the
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Three
December 21, 1990
way President Bush is handling the Iraq/Kuwait situation,
the President's favorability increases to 87.1%. Conversely
among those who disapprove of his handling of the
Iraq/Kuwait situation, the President's favorability rating
plummets to 34.4% while his unfavorability rating soars to
56.1%.
"Do you approve or disapprove of George Bush's handling of
the Middle East crisis involving Iraq and Kuwait? (If said
approve or disapprove ASK: And would that be strongly
approve/disapprove or somewhat approve/disapprove?) "
All.
Voters
Strongly Approve
37.3%
Somewhat Approve
35.3
Somewhat Disapprove
11.8
Strongly Disapprove
10.8
Don't Know/Refused
5.0
"Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's recent
decision to send additional troops to the Middle East? (If
said approve or disapprove ASK: And would that be strongly
approve/disapprove or somewhat approve/disapprove?)"
All
Voters
Strongly Approve
35.1%
Somewhat Approve
24.9
Somewhat Disapprove
12.3
Strongly Disapprove
21.9
Don't Know/Refused
5.9
Coupled with his broad popularity, the President currently
enjoys wide support for his Middle East policies. At
present, 72.6% of the respondents approve of the President's
handling of the Middle East situation with only 22.6%
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Four
December 21, 1990
disapproving. Further, by slightly less than a two to one
margin the respondents approve (60.0%) of the President's
recent decision to send additional troops to the Middle East
over those who oppose (34.2%) this action.
"In your opinion, was President Bush too cautious, just
about right, or not cautious enough in his response to the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait?
All
Voters
Too Cautious
16.1%
Just About Right
56.3
Not Cautious Enough
19.5
Don't Know/Refused
8.1
Further, by a decisive margin the respondents feel the
President's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was
"just about right".
"Overall, would you say that you support or oppose current
U.S. military involvement in the Middle East? (If said
support or oppose ASK: And would that be strongly
support/oppose or somewhat support/oppose?)"
All
Voters
Strongly Support
44.5%
Somewhat Support
28.0
Somewhat Oppose
9.4
Strongly Oppose
13.6
Don't Know/Refused
4.5
Presently 72.5% of all the respondents support the "current
U.S. military involvement in the Middle East" with 23.0%
opposed to our involvement.
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Five
December 21, 1990
"As you may have heard, the U.N. recently passed a
resolution demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by January
15th. At that time, President Bush has three options.
Which option do you personally favor?"
All
Voters
Act Militarily
37.8%
Continue Diplomatic
Negotiations
45.0
Withdraw from the
Region Completely
11.0
"Some people want to appease Saddam Hussein by giving him
some Kuwaiti territory now under his control to avoid war.
Others feel we should confront Saddam Hussein and force him
to completely leave Kuwait, even if it leads to war. Which
statement comes closest to your opinion:?"
All
Voters
Avoid War by giving
Hussein some Kuwaiti
Territory
22.6%
Force Hussein to leave
Kuwait even if it leads
to War
65.0
Don't Know/Refused
12.4
A slim plurality (45.0%) of respondents favor continuing
diplomatic negotiations after the January 15th U.N. deadline
versus 37.8% of the respondents who favor U.S. military
action. Further, when asked whether we should "appease"
Saddam Hussein or Force him out of Kuwait even in the face
of war, a commanding majority (65.0%) favor forcing Hussein
from Kuwait even if it leads to war.
"If the election for President were held today, and the
candidates were George Bush, the Republican, and Mario
Cuomo, the Democrat, for whom would you vote?"
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Six
December 21, 1990
All
Voters
George Bush
53.1%
Mario Cuomo
27.3
Undecided
19.6
"If the election for President were held today, and the
candidates were George Bush, the Republican, and Sam Nunn,
the Democrat, for whom would you vote?"
All
Voters
George Bush
52.3%
Sam Nunn
21.8
Undecided
26.0
Presently, President Bush defeats both of the leading
Democrats tested in our survey. He defeats Mario Cuomo and
Sam Nunn by a 25.8% margin and 30.5% margin respectively.
CONCLUSION:
At this juncture, it is clear that President Bush enjoys a
wide base of support for his policies regarding Iraq and
Kuwait. Further, this support has positively impacted the
voter's overall opinion of the President. While economic
concerns such as "Budget" and "The Economy" combined
represent nearly a quarter of the overall open-ended issue
responses, they are not as great a short term concern to
these respondents. Their immediate concerns revolve around
the Iraq and Kuwait situation.
While the respondents aren't eager to fight a war with
Saddam Hussein, they will support military action,
particularly if all diplomatic channels have been exhausted.
Given the choice between appeasing Hussein or forcing him
out of Kuwait, these respondents cite forcing him out as
their overwhelming choice.
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Seven
December 21, 1990
The short term issue agenda clearly favors President Bush.
The Iraq/Kuwait situation presents an opportunity for the
President to solidify his base well into 1992 and beyond.
Even without the benefit of a resolution of this conflict,
the President easily defeats two of his leading Democratic
opponents, Mario Cuomo and Sam Nunn.
APPENDIX - KEY DEMOGRAPHICS:
Party Affiliation:
Democrat
37.5%
Republican
35.8
Independent
20.9
Other
1.8
Don't Know/Refused
4.1
Annual Income:
Under $10,000
7.5%
$10,000 - $20,000
13.5
$20,001 - $30,000
16.6
$30,001 - $40,000
15.1
$40,001 - $50,000
12.4
Over $50,000
18.6
Don't Know/Refused
16.3
Ancestry:
German
22.8%
Polish
4.3
Italian
6.3
English
14.0
Russian
1.8
Irish
16.6
French/French Canadian
2.5
Hispanic
2.6
Greek
0.6
Afro-American
7.0
Asiatic
0.8
Other European
10.6
Other
2.8
Don't Know/Refused
7.6
Survey Summary - President Bush and the Middle East
Page Eight
December 21, 1990
Religion:
Protestant
57.3%
Catholic
26.1
Jewish
3.1
Atheist/Agnostic
6.0
Other
1.9
Don't Know/Refused
7.6
Age:
18 to 24 years
5.5%
25 to 34 years
17.1
35 to 49 years
32.4
50 to 54 years
7.9
55 to 64 years
16.4
Over 65 years
19.0
Refused
1.8
Race:
White
86.9%
Black
8.1
Hispanic
1.5
Other
2.0
Refused
1.5
Gender:
Male
48.3%
Female
51.7
Region:
Northeast
21.9%
Midwest
26.9
South
30.9
West
20.4
PRIME TIME
1
Demarest
Draft one
1/10/91
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT
When I sent our troops to Saudi Arabia to stop Iraq's
aggression, I knew America's sons and daughters were at the
doorstep of harm's way. That's why I wanted to be with our brave
men and women this past Thanksgiving -- before I made a decision
to order them into battle. I wanted to break bread with them,
laugh with them, listen to their stories, pray with them -- I
wanted to look them in the eye.
I don't think what I saw will surprise you. I saw
tremendous pride -- in themselves and in their mission. I saw
anxiety and I saw some fear. But I also saw remarkable hope,
optimism, and faith -- faith in our country, and faith in God.
They wanted straight talk. I gave it to them. They wanted
to know why we were there. I told them. They wanted to know
when they were going fight. That I couldn't tell them, then. I
did tell them that we would exhaust every opportunity for peace
before resorting to war. And we have.
War is a dirty, bloody business -- I know because I've seen
it -- I've been there. In the name of religion, it can be man
at his most profane. In the name of peace it can be man at his
most violent. In the name of civilization it can be man at his
most savage. We're not kidding ourselves about the glory of war.
2
Our men and women in the Saudi desert are under no illusions, and
neither am I. No one is in a rush to send young Americans into
battle. I know -- war is brutal and unforgiving.
I've always known that the decision to go to war is the most
fateful decision any President can make. Every President hopes
it is a decision never made.
Tonight [today, yesterday] I have made such a decision.
Under the authorization of the United Nations, Units of the [AF,
Army, Marines] and the armed forces of [ 26 ] other nations have
[action TBD].
Their mission is clear and precise, as it has been every day
since August 7th -- the day the extraordinary international
coalition joined together to stop Iraq's aggression.
First, their mission is to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
Second, we will restore Kuwait's legitimate government. Finally,
we will ensure the security and stability of the Gulf region, and
eliminate the threat of future aggression.
I believe most Americans understand why our troops were
called upon to perform this mission, and why they are standing
shoulder to shoulder with forces of so many other nations
in the sands of the Persian Gulf. The reasons are simple and
straightforward.
We Americans don't like bullies. We don't like the idea of
a country brutalizing its weaker neighbor. Now that the Cold
War is over, we can see Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as the first
assault on the new world order. This new world order is founded
3
upon the rule of law, not the law of the jungle. It is committed
to the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations, with a
profound respect for human rights. Appeasing Iraq is absolutely
senseless, if we really believe that we can create a better world
for our children to inherit.
The United Nations, invigorated with a new sense of purpose,
is in full agreement. The U.N. Security Council has endorsed
twelve resolutions to condemn Iraq's unprovoked invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, to implement tough economic sanctions to
stop all trade in and out of Iraq, and to authorize the use of
force to restore the Kuwait's legitimate government and re-
establish the stability of the Persian Gulf region.
Saddam Hussein has tried every way he knows how to make this
a fight between Iraq and the United States. He has failed.
Forces of twenty-six other nations -- XXX thousands of troops,
tanks and planes are in Saudi Arabia side by side with our
forces. Many countries are also sharing the financial burden of
this commitment.
of course, the United States has always borne a
disproportionate share, not only of costs but of leadership as
well. And that's how it should be. The United States is unique.
Only the United States of America can bear this responsibility.
Not Europe, not the Soviet Union, not Japan. We are the one
nation on this earth that can stand between the forces of
aggression and the forces of peace. Among the nations of the
4
world only the United States of America has both the moral
standing and the means to back it up.
However, this does not alter the fact that it is not the
United States against Iraq, it is Iraq against the world. There
has never been a clearer demonstration of a world united against
appeasement and aggression.
Americans also don't like to be blackmailed. It angers me
when I hear talk about 'blood for oil', as if this was about
Americans paying a nickel or a dime more at the gas pump. You
and I both know that's not what America is about.
Let me remind those who hold that cynical view that when oil
prices doubled, and redoubled in the 1970's we didn't go to war -
even though our economy suffered severe damage. Instead we began
to focus on energy conservation, we developed alternative energy
sources, we tried to increase our domestic energy production.
To be sure, there's a lot more we need to do to ensure that we
cannot be held hostage to unreliable suppliers of energy. But
back in those days of oil price shocks we tightened our belts and
took our economic lumps, and it was tough on all Americans --
damn tough: Remember the elderly whose heating bills tripled?
Whole industries lost their competitive edge. Thousands of
workers lost their jobs when economic growth slowed to a crawl.
still, through it all, America kept her powder dry.
Today, however, we are facing a brutal dictator who seeks to
seize control of a huge proportion of the world's oil supply by
force. That is simply unacceptable. Already the skyrocketing
5
oil prices are choking the most fragile economies -- economies in
those newly emerging democracies around the world -- where
freedom is just now beginning to take hold. For many of them,
and for us, energy security is national security. And once again
it is the world demanding an end to Saddam Hussein's outrageous
attempt at economic blackmail.
The irony here is that the beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's
appetite for economic and military domination of the Middle East
are not the Iraqi people. Iraq with its own oil resources should
be a wealthy country. But it's not. For Saddam Hussein, oil is
not a resource, it's a weapon. That's because the cash from
Iraqi oil sales has gone straight into the Iraqi military machine
-- now the sixth largest in the world -- and most ominously into
Saddam's crash program to develop nuclear weapons.
To protect his military, to shield his efforts to build
these horrible weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein
brought the cold-hearted horror of hostage-taking to a shameful
and callous depth. You know, Americans more than any other of
the world's citizens, perhaps, have been victimized by terrorism.
When Iraq used human beings as pawns, forcing innocent civilians
to be shields for potential military targets, and cynically
manipulating their anguished families through the media --- all of
this violated even the most basic norms of civilized behavior.
But because of America's resolve and that of so many of our
coalition partners, Saddam's hostage-taking didn't pay off, and
6
now there are no foreign nationals held against their will in
Iraq or Kuwait.
Unfortunately that has not signalled an end to the brutality
in Kuwait. Nor can it redress the brutality already inflicted on
the Kuwaiti people. The report of Amnesty International
documents in tragic detail the horror: babies pulled from
incubators, left dead on hospital floors; children executed in
front of their parents; men, women, and children by the hundreds
subjected to unspeakable forms of torture. Homes and
neighborhoods torched. Anything of value shipped back to
Baghdad. And it is still going on. A defenseless, sovereign
nation systematically sacked and swallowed whole. Iraq has
committed the rape of Kuwait.
Some have suggested, 'give the sanctions more time to work.
In time Saddam Hussein will come to his senses and withdraw'. To
them I say, it's been five long months since Iraqi tanks rolled
across the Kuwaiti border, and Saddam has done nothing but dig in
deeper. To them I say, think about the children of Kuwait and
the terror being visited upon them and the terror being visited
upon their parents and their homeland. To those who counsel
further patience, I say, think also about those new democracies
now struggling mightily under the weight of rising oil prices.
Finally, not once has there been any sign of conciliation
coming forth from Bagdad. There has been none, none whatsoever.
The conclusion is obvious: sanctions alone will not drive Saddam
Hussein out of Kuwait.
7
Some others have suggested a different course, they say
'give Iraq the islands of [ Bubayo? ] or some of Kuwait's oil
fields, some concession to allow Saddam Hussein to save face'.
In other words, appease him -- reward his aggression. Let there
be no doubt about the consequence of such a course: appeasement
would mean the end to our hope for a new world order; it would
mean the end of the peacekeeping function of the United Nations,
and it would signal the end the American leadership and
credibility around the world.
Still, some will ask, maybe the mother of one of our kids in
the Gulf, is it worth it? Is it worth one American life? How
many casualties are acceptable? Let me tell you, those are the
toughest questions of all. It's a painful, wrenching search to
find an adequate answer. All I can say is that it is a decision
only the President can make. And once it's made, it is my
responsibility to do everything in my power to guarantee every
one of those kids over there the best chance to come home safely.
I promise you tonight that I have fulfilled that trust. (PAUSE)
This century has been marked by violence of proportions
never before seen by mankind. Every decade has been marked by
the carnage of civil war -- from the frozen steppes of Russia to
the sweltering rice fields of China, across the great plains and
jungles of Africa to the once peaceful villages of Central
America. Each with its own imprint -- each with its own
justification, all with a tremendous toll in human suffering.
We've witnessed small and great conflagrations between sovereign
8
nations as well: the slaughter in the muddy fields of World War
I, the blitzkrieg and the holocaust, Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Korea, and Viet Nam. And in the last twenty years we've
witnessed a new kind of war -- a war against the most innocent
among us -- a war called terrorism.
But perhaps in this last decade of this violent century,
perhaps we can see the outline of a new century -- blessed by
peace. Millions born into tyranny now live in freedom. The Cold
War has ended. Superpower competition is giving way to
superpower cooperation. The United Nations is beginning to
fulfill the visions of its founders as a catalyst for peace.
This is a profound moment in history. We cannot allow
ourselves to become numb to brutality and terror. We cannot
allow ourselves to turn our eyes away because of the horror we
have already seen. We have come too far, suffered too long,
sacrificed too much along the way for us to surrender our hopes
for a better world.
I can assure the American people and her friends around the
world as Winston Chuchill did on Christmas eve in 1941, when he
said that "no greed for the land or wealth of any other people,
no vulgar ambition, no morbid lust for material gain at the
expense of others, [ has ] led us to the field
[ that our ]
children shall not be robbed of
their right to live in a free
and decent world.' "
This President and the American people, the principled
nations who have joined in this unprecedented coalition standing
9
against aggression, and most of all the brave soldiers, sailors,
airmen, coastguardsmen, and marines in the Persian Gulf -- we
stand together against aggression. Our mission is clear, and
with God's help we will complete it.
I ask you tonight for your support. I ask you tonight for
your prayers. Good night and God bless the United States of
America.
#
#
#
Short announcement for
Press room or daytime Oval.
McGroarty
January 9, 1990
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: XXXX
XXXX
X hours ago, American troops -- along with members of the
multi-national forces stationed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf -- took action against Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait,
and military installations inside Iraq. //
Tonight, I come to you to report on the situation -- to lay
out the reasons for this action; our aims, and our objectives.
The reasons trace back to a single act and its bloody
aftermath: the aggression of August 2nd --- Iraq's unprovoked and
unwarranted invasion of Kuwait -- and its systematic assault on
that nation and its people. //
The world has met Iraq's invasion with a chorus of
condemnation: Twelve resolutions in the United Nations. 28
nations -- not just the United States, but countries from 5
continents: Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League -- sent
forces to the region, to serve side by side in the Gulf, as a
clear signal of international solidarity and commitment.
Finally, in recognition of the ultimate limits of diplomacy, the
UN Security Council approved the use of all means necessary to
end Iraq's illegal occupation.
Today, after more than five months of close and continuous
consultations with our allies and with the Congress -- I
determined that circumstances would permit no further delay --
2
that the time had come to use all means necessary to drive Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait. //
On November 29, the UN set a deadline of January 15 for
Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal. That date has come
and gone -- and still we waited, anxious to achieve our objective
without resort to arms. //
The United States, together with the United Nations,
exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a
peaceful end. In every case, Saddam Hussein -- a tyrant whose
chosen tools are force and terror -- took this striving for peace
as a sign of weakness. //
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped,
pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. //
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein made hostages of
thousands of men, women and children -- turned them into
bargaining chips -- human pawns in an inhuman game. //
While the world waited, Saddam tightened his grip on Kuwait,
and continued his quest to acquire an arsenal of infinitely more
dangerous weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons. //
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of
peace with open contempt. //
For five months, the world waited -- in vain. Now, the
waiting is over. The world is acting -- in unison -- against a
dictator unmoved by human decency. Against an aggression that
cannot stand. //
3
Vital interests are at stake -- for America, and for the
world. Every President beginning with Eisenhower has made clear
that -- as a matter of American policy -- the dominance by a
hostile power of such a significant source of the world's energy
supply constitutes a direct and indisputable threat to our
national security. We know that in the hands of Saddam Hussein,
oil is not a resource -- it is a weapon. //
We know as well the lessons of history -- lessons written in
our lifetimes in blood, suffering and sacrifice -- that
aggression feeds on appeasement -- and that the man who rules
Iraq, responsible for so much death, destruction and deprivation,
has not exhausted his capacity to create human misery. //
But what is ultimately at stake goes beyond these vital
interests -- and points the way forward to a chapter in the
history of human endeavor bright enough to eclipse even this
century's darkest days. After four decades of Cold War and
conflict -- after more than forty years of armed and uneasy peace
between East and West -- we have in this past year made great
progress towards ending the tensions that for so long divided a
world in two. We have before us the opportunity to forge, for
ourselves and for future generations, a new world order -- a
world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs
the conduct of nations. //
This vision -- the vision that has guided America's conduct
in the world from the days of Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan --
is now threatened by the actions of Saddam Hussein. // We will
4
not allow one man to deny the dream so many millions share -- of
a world's best prospect for peace. //
None of us -- not the American people, and certainly not
this President -- welcomes war. // I believe it is clear to all
that responsibility for this conflict does not rest with America,
with its friends, or with any of the forces acting together under
UN auspices. Nor does responsibility rest in any real sense with
the people of Iraq. Responsibility for the current conflict
rests with one man, and one man alone: Saddam Hussein -- and the
forces who follow his dictates. ///
As President of a people who cherish peace, I held out hope
the past five months for a way to end this crisis without further
conflict. That hope of peace proved the ultimate victim of a
dictator bent on war. //
Now, having determined that force is necessary -- I am
equally determined that force will be decisive. //
Many times during this crisis, I promised that I would never
send American servicemen and women in harm's way with anything
less than total support. As Commander in Chief -- as one of many
millions of Americans who has seen first-hand the face of battle
-- I will use all means at my disposal to achieve our objective
as quickly as possible -- to keep our own casualties to an
absolute minimum -- and to ensure the swift and complete defeat
of Saddam Hussein and the forces under his command. //
As we meet, our forces fight. // There is no joy in the
victory of war -- but there would be untold tragedy in defeat.
5
In the operation now underway, there is no room for hesitation,
or half-way solutions. We will settle for nothing short of
success -- and we shall not stop until all of our objectives are
achieved. Let me say to all of you: The operation is unfinished
-- but the outcome is not in doubt. ///
Tonight, I ask all Americans to set aside whatever
differences divide us -- to call to mind the bravery, the courage
and the dedication of our sons and daughters. And to support
with a single voice not just the United States -- but all nations
united in defense of shared ideals and interests that remain
mankind's best hope for peace.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 6, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
C. BOYDEN GRAY own
SUBJECT:
War Powers Resolution
Attached is the copy of the War Powers Resolution that you
requested. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are the heart of the Resolution.
On August 9 the President provided a report "consistent with" the
War Powers Resolution notifying Congress of the introduction of
U.S. forces into the Persian Gulf region, and on November 16 the
President provided an additional report updating Congress on the
situation. As is customary, neither report specified the
relevant section of the Resolution, but the first report was
consistent with section 4 (a) (2) (concerning introductions of U.S.
forces into foreign countries), and the second was consistent
with section 4 (c) (concerning periodic reports to Congress).
We have consciously avoided notifying Congress consistent with
section 4 (a) (1) that hostilities in the region are imminent,
because this would trigger the Resolution's 60-day clock under
section 5 (b). Once the clock was triggered, the President would
be required by the Resolution to terminate the deployment of U.S.
forces to the region unless Congress passed legislation
specifically authorizing the deployment within sixty days.
We believe that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional
insofar as it purports to allow Congress to compel the withdrawal
of U.S. forces through inaction, but no President has wanted to
jeopardize congressional support for his actions by defying the
Resolution. It often falls to Executive branch lawyers to
develop a legal theory permitting the President to avoid
triggering the clock. Congress also has been reluctant to permit
the President to act in defiance of its interpretation of the
Resolution. In the only case where the President's legal
interpretation could not be reconciled with Congress's (Lebanon
in 1983), Congress enacted legislation specifically authorizing
the U.S. deployment, but subjecting that authorization to
numerous restrictions designed to limit the President's freedom
of action.
2
In the current situation, the Resolution would not require notice
to Congress prior to the initiation of hostilities. While we
could choose to provide prior notice, I would counsel against
doing so. Such notice would trigger the 60-day clock, and set an
unwelcome precedent for future military operations.
Attachment
Tab A
War Powers Resolution
1. War Powers
a. War Powers Resolution
Public Law 93-148 [H.J. Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548, passed over
President's veto November 7, 1973
JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
Section 1.¹ This joint resolution may be cited as the "War
Powers Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the
intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to
the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own
powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a na-
tional emergency created by attack upon the United States, its ter-
ritories or possessions, or its armed forces.
CONSULTATION
Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostil-
ities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have
been removed from such situations.
1 50 U.S.C. 1541.
(841)
842
REPORTING
Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in
which United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace of waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which
relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such
forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
1
nation;
e
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the
r
Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-
0
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
S
United States Armed Forces;
01
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
u]
such introduction took place; and
n
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or in-
m
volvement.
m
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Fc
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional re-
CO
sponsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to
the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
St.
(c) Whenever United. States Armed Forces are introduced into
of
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this
rai
section, the President shall, SO long as such armed forces continue
be
to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Con-
rei
gress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as
well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation,
but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once
every six months.
S
10),
tior
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 2
sixt
Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall
Con
be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the
to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar
be,
day. Each report SO transmitted shall be referred to the Committee
bill,
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Com-
cale
in S
the
2 See also sec. 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985
(Public Law 98-164, 97 Stat. 1062) which read as follows:
911
(b)
djry
ing h
"EXPEDITED PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN JOINT RESOLUTION AND BILLS
Head
time
"Sec. 1013. Any joint resolution or bill introduced in either House which requires the removal
of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States,
and
its possessions and territories, without a. declaration of war or specific statutory authorization
days
shall be considered in accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the International Secu-
yeas
rity Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that any such resolution or bill
shall be amendable. If such a joint resolution or bill should be vetoed by the President, the time
(c)
for debate in consideration of the veto message on such measure shall be limited to twenty
refer
hours in the Senate and in the House shall be determined in accordance with the Rules of the
House."
(a) an
For text of sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
befor
of 1976, see vol. I, page 476.
5(b).
843
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action.
If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine
die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar
days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if peti-
tioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective
Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in
order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action
pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is
earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States
Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or
required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war
or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United
States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period,
or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for
not more than an additional thirty days if the President deter-
mines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed
Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the
course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory
of the United States, its possessions and territories without a decla-
ration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall
be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concur-
rent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR
BILL
2
Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in such section, shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may
be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or
bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified
in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill SO reported shall become the pend-
ing business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the
time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents
and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar
days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section
5(b). The joint resolution or bill SO reported shall become the pend-
844
ing business of the House in question and shall be voted on within
three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such res-
olution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expira-
tion of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report
back to their respective House in disagreement. Notwithstanding
any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference re-
ports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of
such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not
later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent
resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with
its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such
House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pend-
ing business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the
time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents
and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar
days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be re-
a
ferred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)
and shall be reported out by such committee together with its rec-
ommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon
become the pending business of such House and shall be voted
upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall other-
wise determine by yeas and nays.
first
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such con-
current resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is
referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule
in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in
the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such re:
th
ports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than
de.
six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report
an
back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
bus
5401
in
ena
845
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including
any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such
provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and
states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory author-
ization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless
such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authoriz-
ing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostil-
ities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning
of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require
any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of
United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of
the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquar-
ters operations of high-level military commands which were estab-
lished prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and
pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by
the United States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of
United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment. of members
of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the
movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces
of any foreign country or government when such military forces
are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces
will become engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the
Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing trea-
ties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-
dent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which
authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint
resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remain-
der of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to
any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its
enactment.
Governor-
this mught
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
be of interest
January 9, 1991
INFORMATION
49 you As
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST
FROM: DAN MC GROARTY Dher
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS -- 4 CRISES
The following takes a look at four instances since 1950 when
American forces were introduced into combat operations, and
examines the form and timing of Presidential statements or
speeches on those operations.
The general pattern that emerges is that initial comment
takes the form of a statement -- whether televised (Pres.
Johnson) or in written form -- on or within the first day of
operations, followed at some remove by a televised speech.
In the four instances examined here, the televised speech
takes place on Day 1, 2, 4 and 23 of hostilities. In the case of
the Lebanon operation of 1958, Eisenhower's televised address
takes place the first evening of the operation, with a second
radio address 4 days later. In the case of the Korean War,
Truman's televised speech follows his initial statement by 23
days, and the introduction of American troops by 19 days.
In comparing these instances to the present case of Iraq,
several facts must be recognized:
In no case was the warning time or run-up to hostilities as
long as in the present case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
In each case, the need to protect American lives (Grenada,
Lebanon and Dominican Republic) or respond to immediate attack
existed (Korea).
With the exception of Korea, each operation examined here
was of small scale and short duration -- with the prospect of
early success and an end to hostilities in view even as the
President delivered his TV speech.
Several observations:
In no case did the President deliver his "first word" on the
hostilities in a major, set-piece speech.
The advent of the "information age" may make the initial written
statement obsolete. In the event of hostilities with Iraq, it is
hard to imagine President Bush issuing a short written statement
as Eisenhower and Truman had done, and then retreating into
silence. To take the most recent case, even in a small-scale
operation like Grenada President Reagan delivered in person an
early public statement.
Likewise, it is impossible to imagine a lag of 23 days, as
in Truman's case, before the President shares with the Congress
and country a full exposition of his views on the conflict.
In the present case, the long build-up since August 2 and the
high level of press and public attention on the crisis argues for
an early, short but still substantial statement after the onset
of hostilities (whether in the Oval Office or the Press Room),
followed by a lengthier TV speech on the evening of the first or
second day of the conflict.
KOREA
North Korea invades: June 25, 1950.
June 26 -- Truman issues short statement (200 words).
June 27 -- Truman issues second statement (350 words).
June 30 -- Truman orders U.S. troops from Japan to Korea.
July 19 -- Truman issues written report to Congress and delivers
radio and TV address.
LEBANON
July 14, 1958 -- Lebanese Government requests U.S. assistance.
July 15 -- Eisenhower issues statement (approx. 500 words),
notifying Congress and public that troops have been sent.
July 15 -- Eisenhower sends Special Message to Congress (800
words)
July 15 -- Eisenhower records a statement for TV and radio,
broadcast on July 15 (1400 words).
July 19 -- Eisenhower records a statement on film and tape,
broadcast over Armed Forces Radio, July 19.
**No U.S. Servicemen died in the action.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Coup attempt begins, Apr. 24, 1965.
Apr. 28, 1965 -- U.S. puts troops ashore to protect/evacuate
American citizens. Ultimately, 19,000 troops take part.
Apr. 28 -- Johnson reads televised statement (approx. 250 words)
from White House Theater reporting that U.S. troops have been
dispatched.
Apr. 30, 1965 -- Johnson delivers televised statement (450 words)
from Theater.
May 1 -- Johnson releases two statements (175 and 400 words).
May 2 -- Johnson delivers evening TV address.
**27 U.S. Servicemen died in the action.
GRENADA
U.S. Forces begin operation Oct. 25, 1983.
Oct. 25 -- Reagan makes statement (750 words) at press conference
with Dominica's Eugenia Charles.
Oct. 25 -- Reagan releases letter (800 words) to the Speaker of
the House.
Oct. 27 -- Reagan delivers televised address on
Lebanon and Grenada. (Barracks bombing in Beirut had occurred
Oct. 23, 1983.)
All "major combat operations" completed on Oct. 27.
**18 U.S. servicemen died in the action.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1991
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST
FROM: DAN MC GROARTY Amer
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND SPEECH
A few thoughts, given the 8 hour time difference with Saudi
Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait.
1 a.m. to 4 a.m. Saudi time = 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. EST.
If the most likely window for action falls at this time, and
we build a two to three hour delay into any initial statement we
might wish to make, our "window" puts us in the evening: 7 p.m.
to 11 p.m. EST.
That creates the possibility for an initial statement,
followed 24 hours later by a more detailed speech.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
2/6/91
TO:
Governor Sununu
FROM:
Bobbie Kilberg
Jeff Vogt on
For your information restamantsm CEOSUPPORT
Faot oferation food Desert
letter-
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
February 5, 1991
President George W. Bush
THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We, the undersigned, stand united in support of our American men and women who have
dedicated themselves to upholding the United States' commitment to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 678.
We believe it is vitally important for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice.
Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, violations of the Geneva Prisoner of War Accords,
and intentional attacks on civilian populations have been condemned by the world
community. We want the Iraqi regime to understand that countless Americans are united
behind our men and women and your leadership in stopping this aggression and establishing
stability in the Persian Gulf.
In honor of all those who have given the last full measure of devotion in upholding their
Nation's commitment, we urge you to remain steadfast and resolute.
Sincerely,
Charles Bernstein
Editor
NATION'S RESTAURANT BUSINESS
Norman Brinker
Chairman of the Board
CHILI'S, INC.
President George W. Bush
Pebruary 5, 1991
Page Two
(Signatories Continued)
M. Michael Casey
President & CEO
EL TORITO RESTAURANTS, INC.
Clinton A. Clark
President & CEO
JERRICO
Ralph Erben
President & CEO
LUBY'S CAFETERIAS, INC.
Walter J. Ganzi, Jr.
President
PALM MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
Fred P. Gonzales
President
JB'S RESTAURANTS, INC.
Jackson W. Goodall, Jr.
Chairman, President & CEO
FOODMAKER, INC.
Carl Hays
President
AL COPELAND ENTERPRISES, INC.
Richard K. Herzer
Chairman & President
IHOP CORPORATION
Frederick R. Hipp
President
GILBERT/ROBINSON, INC.
J. Michael Jenkins
President & CEO
METROMEDIA STEAKHOUSES, INC.
President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
Page Three
(Signatories Continued)
Louis I. Kane
Co-Chairman & CEO
AU BON PAIN
Donald Karcher
President
CARL KARCHER ENTERPRISES, INC.
John B. Lahourcade
Chairman of the Board
LUBY'S CAFETERIAS, INC.
Steven R. Leipsner
President & CEO
SERVICE AMERICA CORPORATION
Raymond W. Lindstrom
President
RESTAURANTS UNLIMITED, INC.
Carl D. Long
President
THE KRYSTAL COMPANY
James C. Malmberg
President & CEO
PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
James H. Maynard
Chairman & CEO
GOLDEN CORRAL CORPORATION
Craig Miller
President
UNO RESTAURANT CORPORATION
Dennis B. Mullen
Chairman, President & CEO
FAMOUS RESTAURANTS
Robert J. Nugent, Jr.
President
JACK IN THE BOX
President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
Page Four
(Signatories Continued)
Michael P. O'Donnell
President & CEO
THE GROUND ROUND, INC.
James L. Peterson
President
WHATABURGER, INC.
William E. Prather, Jr.
President & CEO
HARDEE'S FOOD SYSTEMS, INC.
Mitchell E. Rhodes
Chairman, President & CEO
LE PEEP RESTAURANTS
Richard Rivera
President & CEO
TGI FRIDAY'S
Leonard H. Roberts
Chairman & CEO
SHONEY'S INC.
Robert M. Rosenberg
President & CEO
DUNKIN DONUTS OF AMERICA
John J. Russell, Jr.
President
COLONY HOTELS & RESORTS
Donald J. Slater
President
S & A RESTAURANT CORPORATION
Hal W. Smith
President
CHI-CHI'S, INC.
Frank H. Steed
President & CEO
COUNTRY KITCHENS INTERNATIONAL
President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
Page Five
(Signatories Continued)
Michael A. Valerio
Chairman
PAPA GINOS OF AMERICA, INC.
Jane Y. Wallace
Vice President & Publisher
RESTARUANTS & INSTITUTIONS
Charles D. Way
President & CEO
RYAN'S FAMILY STEAK HOUSES, INC.
Richard B. Berman
President
BERMAN & COMPANY, INC.