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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F [2]; 1998-0099-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29167
Folder ID Number:
29167-005
Folder Title:
Persian Gulf Working Group
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
3
5
Nov 28
TO:
John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Gates
Andy Card
David Demarest
Deb Amend
FROM:
Richard Haass
RH
Attached are the following for today's 1 pm meeting on public
diplomacy and the Gulf:
1. Public Diplomacy themes
2. List of Administration speakers
3. List of background material for briefing books
(haass/draft 2/Nov 28)
Public Diplomacy Themes
Why are we in the Gulf?
to counter aggression and establish acceptable patterns of
international relations in post-Cold War era
to deny an anti-American, anti-Western tyrant from gaining
control over bulk of world's energy supplies and through them
over world's economy; energy security is national security
to act to protect US citizens and embassies
US asked to assist by Saudi Arabia, and essential that US
demonstrate will and ability to come to aid of its friends lest
friend and foe alike conclude we are no longer reliable
to protect interests considered vital by every President since
Harry Truman
any one of these concerns would be enough to justify our
action; collectively, they make an unassailable case
What are our goals?
immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from all of Kuwait
restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government
security and stability of Gulf region
protection of American lives
What is our policy?
in UN, to gain international support for our goals
with US and other forces, deter additional Iraqi aggression
with sanctions, deny Iraq benefits of aggression
gain a peaceful settlement if possible
act to ensure we have credible options, including military
use force only if necessary to achieve goals at minimum cost
Why not just allow sanctions more time to work?
not certain that with time sanctions will work
no evidence Iraq prepared to give up Kuwait
we pay a price for waiting:
Iraqi forces increase and dig in
Iraq producing more chemical and biological weapons
Iraq developing nuclear weapons
world economy already suffering effects of high oil prices
new democracies at risk
2
hostages denied basic human right
US embassy in Kuwait under siege
Kuwait being destroyed/resettled
Why is the President so worried about the US embassy?
Saddam's attempted closure of our embassy is an effort on their
part to erase Kuwait's sovereignty and must be resisted.
Saddam's treatment of our diplomats, which includes starving
them out, is barbaric. It is inhumane and runs contrary to all
the norms of international law and civilized behavior.
The United Nations has rightly condemned this pressure; we
reserve the right to take steps to come to the aid of our
diplomats and those others held against their will
Aren't we risking the lives of the hostages?
President's concern for hostages deep and personal; we are
doing everything possible to bring about their immediate and
unconditional release
At same time, we cannot allow hostages to determine our policy,
or we would be forced to give in to Saddam and in the process
only encourage more hostage-taking in the future
Although we will not stand in their way, we do not believe that
individuals should travel to Baghdad even for the purpose of
getting hostages released; all of this is a cynical attempt by
Saddam to use the hostages for his purposes of distracting
attention away from his aggression.
Why is the US doing so much/Why aren't others doing more?
from outset, this has been a truly international effort
US one of 27 countries committing military forces
wealthy countries such as Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait paying billions to offset cost of Desert Shield and/or
impact of sanctions/higher oil prices on most affected states
US is taking lead for only US has strength to counter Iraqi
armed forces
US leadership is justified by stakes and what we an accomplish
Why are we getting into another Vietnam?
We are not. The differences are key:
US interests/stakes critical and clear in Gulf
US has support of almost entire international community
US position has strong UN backing
unlike North Vietnam, Iraq is not receiving massive outside
assistance
3
If we must use force, it will be decisive from the outset. We
are here to succeed.
Why isn't the administration giving Congress its fair role?
the administration has been working closely with the Congress
from the outset
--consultations and hearings are frequent
the administration has kept the Congress (or at a minimum the
leadership) fully informed
the administration will continue to act with the Congress as we
proceed
the administration appreciates fully its political and legal
authority as well as obligations under the Constitution
the specific form of cooperation (ie, joint resolution,
declaration of war, etc) will depend upon circumstances
Why is the US working to help corrupt, undemocratic sheikhs?
the US is above all working to keep Saddam from imposing his
domination on the region
--we continue to support steps toward democracy and pluralism in
the region
--we believe the best way to make progress is by working with
existing governments
--it is difficult to see how destroying Kuwait in any way
contributes to democratic prospects in the area
--also difficult to see how brutal, dictatorial Saddam has right
to impose democracy on anyone
Why does the US refuse to negotiate directly with Saddam?
this is not a confrontation between Saddam and the US. It is
between Saddam and Kuwait and between Saddam and the world
10 UNSC resolutions make this clear
these same resolutions spell out for Saddam what is required
for there to be a peaceful settlement
talks -there is no special US agenda and hence no need for special
--we continue to maintain an embassy in Baghdad should Saddam
wish to communicate anything of importance to us
there is no evidence at all that Saddam is prepared to comply
with the will of the international community
Why is US against linking this to the Palestinian problem?
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait demands immediate attention.
-Saddam's attempts to link these two conflicts is only a tactic
4
to distract attention and dilute international pressure on him
--best way to promote new opportunities for peace between Israel
and Arabs is to settle this dispute, as President indicated in
his UNGA speech
--would be understandably difficult to achieve progress on Arab-
Israeli front if aggression shown to pay and if Iraq emerges as
most powerful state in the region
two situations entirely different: Kuwait was peaceful state
invaded by Iraq without cause; Israel has been rejected/invaded
by most Arab states since its inception.
--US goal for Middle East is based upon UNSC resolutions 242 and
338, involving the principles of territory for peace, the right
of all states of the region, including Israel, to live in peace,
and the satisfaction of legitimate political rights for
Palestinians
What will US do if Israel is attacked by Iraq?
--Iraq would be foolish to do so, as it already has more than it
can handle arrayed against it
the US commitment to Israel's security is well-known.
the US would consult with Israel and take the necessary steps
Why is the administration panning to sell more arms to Arabs?
the US has longstanding relations with many of the Arab states
of the region, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia
--Providing means for security is an essential element of an
overall relationship.
--It is also necessary to give our friends the means for
contributing to their own self-defense so that future Desert
Shields less likely/less demanding
--Our friends have a good history of complying with US laws that
arms provided by the US are to be used only in self-defense and
transferred to a third party only with US authorization
Why is the President meeting with Assad?
--It is important to work to bring about the strongest and
broadest possible coalition against Saddam
--Syria is a key Arab country that borders on Iraq and that has
already contributed more than 7,000 troops to Saudi Arabia's
defense with pledges of more
--We do have important concerns with Syrian policy vis-a-vis
terrorism, Lebanon, human rights and the peace process. Meeting
with Assad does not mean we are ignoring these differences but it
does give us a forum for raising them in a constructive manner
5
Why didn't administration do more to prevent Iragi invasion?
--At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the administration sought to
develop an improved relationship with Iraq, one of the key states
of this critical region
-toward this end, the US made available limited economic
assistance
--as it became increasingly clear that Iraq was not prepared to
act with restraint, the administration moved to limit this
already modest relationship
--based upon assurances we had received not simply from Iraq but
from our friends in the region, we did not believe that Iraq
would invade much less occupy Kuwait as it has done
--even had we concluded otherwise, it is not at all apparent that
we could have prevented Iraq's invasion given our own limited
presence in the region at the time and the prevailing view among
our friends
What is our thinking about post-crisis security arrangements?
the US has had a permanent military presence in the region for
more than four decades
--depending upon the nature of the threat we face, we will need
to build security arrangements in the Gulf that are militarily
effective yet politically acceptable to our friends in the region
--the precise nature of these arrangements, as regards such
things as military forces, guarantees, the involvement of outside
states, limits on armaments, and so on, will be a matter for
consultation
Safeguards on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and
ballistic missile programs will be essential
--as the President has said, we are not looking to maintain US
forces in Saudi Arabia any longer than is necessary
Gulf: Selected Background Material
President's speech to marines in Saudi Arabia (Nov 22)
"Why We Are in the Gulf," Newsweek (Nov 26 issue)
Presidential statement of Nov 8 (troop increase announcement)
Sec. Baker speech of Oct 29 (LA World Affairs Council)
President's speech to UNGA, Oct 1
Presidential address to jt session of Congress, Sept 11
President's August 9 Oval Office Address
also:
weekly CIA unclassified sanctions report
updated press guidance
unclassified chronology
GULF SPEAKERS LIST
CABINET LEVEL: Baker, Cheney, Watkins, Powell, Sununu,
Scowcroft, Webster
SUB-CABINET:
Gates, Atwood, Eagleburger, Card, Kerr
OTHER:
-DoD:
Wolfowitz, Rowan, Hadley, DASD Art Hughes, Office
Dir. Fred Smith
State:
Kimmitt, Ross, Kelly, Bartholomew, Clarke, Amb-Des
Gnehm, DAS Covey, Mack, Burns, Office Dir. Edmund
Hull
-NSC/WH:
Haass, Kilberg, Welch, Charles
x2930
THE WHITE HOUSE
AC/ER
WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 3, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
THE CHIEF of STAFF
DAVID DEMAREST
has seen
FROM:
DEB AMEND
RE:
GULF WORKING GROUP STATUS REPORT
Today's meeting included an update from the hearings on the
Hill. Reportedly, Secretary Cheney's testimony went better than
expected. Copies of testimony (Cheney and Powell) were given to
the group for distribution. We'll excerpt key parts for a mass
mailings.
A package of background material -- talking points,
chronology of events, speech excerpts, key clippings -- was
distributed as well. All offices have been instructed to send
mailings with this material to all their groups.
Bill Kristol attended a "principals" meeting at the White
House this afternoon and shared thematic suggestions with the
group, which we will incorporate into our communications efforts.
He emphasized the "patience vs the threat of force" theme which
was articulated on the Hill today, and the need to defend our
objectives in the coming weeks.
Governor Sununu will participate in tomorrow's meeting;
General, we'd like you to meet with us on Thursday. All meeting
participants have been given specific assignments and will be
prepared to report tomorrow.
Action Steps
With your approval, we'd like to get the message out to
religious leaders that the troops will indeed be able to
participate in religious services at Christmas. There is
apparently much confusion on this point. Leigh Ann Metzger will
develop a plan for this.
General, attached is an updated OP/ED for your signature
we'd like to send to the Washington Post tomorrow.
"In the works"
Tomorrow we'll hear an update on our "grass roots" plan, a
communications program to compliment the legislative agenda,
public liaison briefings, OP/ED schedule, and expanded surrogate
media program.
DRAFT OP-ED, PERSIAN GULF
12/03 [GENERAL.DOC]
[Word count: 775]
President Bush's announcement on Friday of direct high-
level talks with Iraq was the extra step needed after the U.N.
Security Council's endorsement of the use of "all means
necessary" against Saddam Hussein should he not leave Kuwait by
January 15. Through eleven resolutions, the U.N. Security
Council has made its position clear: to pursue a peaceful
solution by all means at our disposal, yet to preserve the option
of using "all means necessary" to end Saddam Hussein's occupation
of Kuwait.
Saddam Hussein apparently has not gotten the message. There
should be no mistaking the aim of Secretary Baker's mission: to
take the United Nation's message directly to the leadership in
Baghdad. When Secretary Baker meets with the Iraqi Foreign
Minister, our demands at the table will be the same as those
articulated by the President on the first day of the Persian Gulf
crisis: the unconditional withdrawal of Iragi forces from Kuwait,
the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection
of American citizens abroad, and the security and stability of
the Gulf region.
The President has continued to emphasize his determination
to seek a solution through international diplomacy and economic
sanctions. Throughout, he has emphasized our commitment to
containing aggression that threatens the free world economically,
and potentially militarily through the proliferation of chemical,
biological, and -- ultimately -- nuclear weapons.
2
As the debate here at home unfolds, three points about our
purpose in the Persian Gulf demand more attention.
First, it is important to avoid attempts to force a false
choice between pragmatism and principle. America's interests and
ideals, far from being mutually exclusive, are in fact threads of
the same cloth. There is no single "bumper-sticker" slogan
explaining what's at stake in the Gulf.
The crisis caused by Iraq is in part (but not wholly, as
some cynically suggest) a conflict over oil -- but not for the
sake of big oil companies and lower prices at the pump.
In the hands of Saddam Hussein, oil is not a resource -- it
is a weapon. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait delivers into the hands
of a dictator control of a fifth of the world's proven oil
reserves -- and an additional fourth lies just beyond his reach
in Saudi Arabia. An aggressor's grip over such a substantial
share of the world's oil supply is enough to hold the economies
of the industrialized world hostage indefinitely, and make life
even more difficult for the developing world and struggling
democracies.
Second -- far beyond the truism that energy security is
national security, and quite apart from the cost of oil to the
world -- a more potent threat is the benefit that resource brings
to the aggressions of a dictator. The world cannot afford to
subsidize a war chest of menacing dimensions, and accelerate
development of more sophisticated weapons systems in more
aggressive hands.
3
We must remember Saddam's repeated willingness to turn every
resource at his disposal to military ends. The long and
destructive war with Iran, the invasion of tiny Kuwait, the
willingness to use the most terrible weapons at his disposal not
just in war, but against his own people -- all argue against a
complacent solution that allows him to conclude that aggression
pays.
Third, it is important to resist reductive comparisons to
past conflicts. Columnists and commentators should be as wary as
generals are about "fighting the last war." Rather than focus on
false analogies, far better to recognize the singular
circumstances prevailing now.
The geopolitical world is now moving in an unprecedented and
largely positive direction. The principles that have defined our
history and will determine our future are at stake.
For the first time in the post-war era, regional conflict is
not the linchpin of a larger superpower conflict. The odds of a
Third World clash leading to an East-West conflagration are
remarkably reduced.
Also unique in the post-war era, the strength of the
international community (and in particular, the United Nations)
expands as East-West tensions contract. In fact, in this case,
Iraq's isolation from the rest of the world is virtually
complete, thanks to a remarkable world alliance.
Finally, for the first time in the post-war era, the world
has an opportunity to deliver in practice the long-held promise
4
of a new world order -- where the ruthless resort to force goes
unrewarded, and individual aggression meets collective
resistance.
For that reason, a united response to Saddam's invasion
will be a critical test, crucial to crafting a more stable world
order. His cynical disregard for international norms and the
rule of law must not themselves be rewarded with cynicism. Our
response must stand as a stern warning to any dictator or despot,
present or future, contemplating outlaw aggression.
This is the burden of leadership. America must lead, as we
always have, and as only America can. But equally important,
America must work with an international coalition, turning the
face of the world against aggression, toward an enduring legacy
of peace for generations to follow.
To assure a bright and prosperous future for the
industrialized world and the fledgling democracies; to ensure
that the lion's share of the world's oil resources don't finance
the further aggressions of a tyrant; and to ensure that the dawn
of a more stable world order isn't cut short -- that is why
American men and women are standing firm in the Persian Gulf.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE: November 23, 1990 (Cairo)
FROM THE PRESIDENT
u
To:
John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
How much of this has been done?
What more can be done?
Let's discuss next week.
of
THE WHITE HOUSE
Brank/
John How this been
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1990
90 NOV 14 AM 9:40
what wome does. car
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
PP
be
FROM:
DAVID DEMAREST
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS
sLet week disers
SUBJECT:
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
TELEX
Here is an outline of some possible communications activities
which you and key senior Administration officials could perform
over the next three weeks to strengthen public support for
Operation Desert Shield.
11-24
This communications plan would reassure the American people as to
the objectives and purpose of our deployment, and would revolve
around your Thanksgiving trip to Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the
plan would include three stages: before, during and after the
trip.
PRE-TRIP
Op-ed pieces with leading foreign policy experts in
support of Desert Shield. We are working with
Secretary Cheney (for the Wall Street Journal), General
Scrowcroft (Washington Post), former President Nixon
(New York Times), and possibly General Powell, Henry
Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cy Vance, and Howard
Baker. Op-eds would then be collected and distributed
to our key constituent leaders.
A Q & A with General Scrowcroft for U.S. News & World
Report.
An op-ed for Time magazine.
A bylined article for Newsweek by you.
o
A half-hour interview by CNN, which would be focus on
your personal views of the crisis.
A satellite media tour with the Vice President,
Secretary Cheney, Governor Sununu, General Powell,
General Scrowcroft, and Secretary Baker.
DURING TRIP
All speeches (Europe and Middle East) are clearly
cross-linked with the theme of the new world order.
Press conference in Paris, and press availability in
Egypt, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
You deliver USO-sponsored T-shirt and scroll containing
the names of 14,000 supportive citizens in Los Angeles
to Armed Forces.
Op-eds are recirculated among the largest newspapers
and news wires.
POST-TRIP
A live, 10-minute address to the nation which would be
a personal reflection of the Gulf situation, and would
talk about the troops, and their dedication and sense
of purpose. This would take place immediately upon
your return on Friday, November 23rd, at 9:00 p.m.
A regional reporters briefing, which would include
Secretary Cheney, General Powell, General Scrowcroft,
Bob Gates or other senior Administration officials.
A "White House on the road" concept, which would
involve senior Administration officials working Desert
Shield speeches into existing beyond-the-beltway travel
plans. Possible venues would include local American
Legion and VFW halls, civic and business organizations,
and conferences and conventions.
Several Roosevelt Room briefings for key constituent
leaders to brief them on your trip, and to allow them
the opportunity to express reservations and concerns to
you directly. Various groupings would include
religious, business, labor, and ethnic leaders.
-
NSC
SEND SOMEONG E BRIEF
PRES. HELICOPTER TO NORFOCK-
!
& EX-PLES
XMAS EVE. SERVICE -
SATALITE OUTREACH
December 3, 1990
COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER
Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)
9:00 a.m. -- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committee
9:00 a.m. -- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committee
Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to
surrogates
Op eds updated for distribution this week for the Washington Post
by General Scowcroft, the New York Times by Secretary Baker and
the Wall Street Journal by Secretary Cheney
Tuesday, December 4
Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the
NATO nuclear planning group
General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London
Clippings and background sent out to surrogates
Wednesday, December 5
Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute,
London
Thursday, December 6
Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations
Committee
Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner
Friday, December 7 (Pearl Harbor Day)
Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels
Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and
the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association
Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9
Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows
Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce
Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress
Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio
Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)
The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point
this week)
10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders,
Cabinet Room
Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association,
Pinehurst, North Carolina
Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in
Houston, Texas
Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness
Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)
General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)
Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings
Tuesday, December 11
The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops
The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at the White House
Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club
Wednesday, December 12
The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze
11:30 -- The President addresses Hanukkah Celebration, Room 450
OEOB
Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates
First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National
Press Club
2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional
reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB
Wednesday, December 12 (cont.)
2:00 p.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Second Annual Holiday
Reception with Commanders of 23 veterans organizations
Thursday, December 13
8:30 a.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Annual Secretary's
overview to veterans organizations
4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of
Manufacturers, Dr. Haass as tentative briefer
Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday
celebration
Friday, December 14
Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and
Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)
Saturday, December 15 -- Sunday, December 16
Cabinet members booked for weekend public affairs shows
Presidential interview with David Frost, Oval Office, Sunday
Monday, December 17
Secretary Baker travels to Brussels for NATO Ministerial (thru
Tues. Dec. 18)
General Scowcroft Q and A interview appears in U.S. News and
World Report
Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York
City
Tuesday, December 18
10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members
Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors,
Roosevelt Room
1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research
Institute Conference
December 3, 1990
Completed Activities
Friday, November 30
-- Presidential Press Conference
-- Presidential interview with People Magazine
-- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
-- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans,
Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian
Treaty Room
-- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
-- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News
Hour
-- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
-- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen,
key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill
and key Public Affairs officials
Saturday, December 1
-- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
-- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
-- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN
"Newsmaker"
Sunday, December 2
-- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"
-- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David Brinkley"
-- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"
-- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"
Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt with VA Chaplins, in Norfolk, VA
Friday, December 7
Assistant Secretary John Easton addresses the Annual Meeting of
the Western Regional Conference, Phoenix, Arizona
Deputy Secretary Moore travels to Texas, California, and Arizona
for RNC Eagles Events (thru Dec. 13)
General Alfred M. Gray, CMDT, USMC speaks to Norwich University
Symposium in Northfield, Vermont
Sunday, December 9
Deputy Secretary Moore addresses the Bureau of Wholesale Sales in
Phoenix
December 3, 1990
Communications Timeline Addendum:
Monday, December 3
Assistant Secretary Robert Gentile, (DOE) addresses Interstate
oil Compact Commission, Phoenix, Arizona
David Welch, Director of the NSC office of Near East and South
Asian affairs addresses the Jewish Community Relations Council of
Philadelphia, Room 450, OEOB
Tuesday, December 4
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President (NSC),
addresses the National Realty Committee
Deputy Secretary Atwood (DOD) addresses the National Security
Industry Association in Dallas Texas and appears before the
Dallas Morning News Editorial Board
James Williams, ISA Country Director (DOD) speaks to FEMA in
Emmitsburg, Maryland
Tom Miller, NEA (Dept. of State), speaks to the Mid-America Arab
Chamber of Commerce, Chicago Illinois
Wednesday, December 5
Edward Gnehm, NEA (Dept. of State), address the World Affairs
Council in Portland Oregon
Thursday, December 6
Deputy Assistant Secretary George Helland (DOE) addresses the
American Business Council, Singapore
Administrator Calvin Kent (DOE) addresses the 2nd Session of the
Conference on Business and Economic Policies, Washington, D.C.
and the Conference for Journalists on the oil Crisis, Washington
Journalism Center
Edward Gnehm, NEA (Dept. of State), addresses the World Affair
Council/World Trade Center in Tacoma, Washington
AC/ER
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
withend
THE CHIEF of STAFF
December 2, 1990
has seen
Memorandum for Governor AD Sununu
From: David Demarest
Subject: Presidential participation with outside groups
During the next two years, the time available for the
President to cultivate, thank, listen to, highlight, garner
support from, and reach out to outside groups will be in short
supply. I believe that we need to set some parameters that will
guide our scheduling decisions -- parameters that have your
support, and that of the President's.
The groups listed below would be given the highest priority
for time with POTUS. I would propose that any scheduling request
with a group other than those listed would require initiation by
you or the President. Obviously, more flexibility can be assumed
on simple photo-ops, and exempted from this discussion are
Cabinet, Congressional, and foreign policy events.
Base Groups: Political
Republicans
Conservatives
Republican office holders
Bush Supporters
Base Groups: Ethnic/Demographic
Asians
European 1st-4th generation
Northern Catholics
Younger voters
Base Groups: Geographic
California, Texas, Southern states
Rocky Mountain States
New England (sans R.I.)
Base Groups: Issue-oriented
Law enforcement/drugs/crime groups
Veterans, national defense groups
Teamsters, conservative union members
Social Value Groups, i.e. MADD, Right-to-life, etc.
Small business, entrepreneurs
Corporate and trade association CEO's
Conservationists
Evangelicals
Anti-tax organizations
2
Target Groups: Political
Conservative Democrats
Target Groups: Ethnic/Demographic
Blacks
Hispanics
Seniors
Target Groups: Geographic
Industrial Midwest
Target Groups: Issue-oriented
Parents/students/teachers/education reformers
Service Organizations/Points of Light groups/Celebrities
Disability Community
Farm organizations
Sports/fitness/health groups
Seems ressonable
Agree
Disagree
Discuss
Agree but add/delete the following groups:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 4, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET AND AGENCY CONTACTS
FROM:
MICHAEL P. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
my
AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR CABINET LIAISON
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Policy -- Communications Package #1
Attached for your information and use is a package of background
materials on the Gulf crisis. It includes four items:
1. An "Administration Wire" document that contains
excerpts from pertinent speeches by the President, the
Vice President and Secretary Baker.
2. A chronology of the eleven United Nations Security
Council actions on the Gulf.
3. A four-page "Chronology of Events in the Persian Gulf"
-- a brief overview of key events and dates.
4. Testimony delivered yesterday by Secretary Cheney and
General Powell to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
This package is the first in a series of communications that
Cabinet Affairs will send you during the next weeks to provide
the Cabinet, agency heads and senior Administration officials
with timely information about the Gulf.
Because of the extraordinary importance of these issues, we ask
you to ensure that this package and future installments in this
series are used well and distributed quickly. Please make them
available quickly to your department or agency head and all
senior staff, including all PAS officials.
Administration spokespersons should be encouraged, where
appropriate, to make use of this material in public remarks.
Although we are not trying to mint hundreds of foreign policy
spokespersons, it is important that those who do speak on behalf
of the Administration are apprised of recent developments and are
able, for example, to articulate clearly the four objectives the
international community is pursuing in the Gulf (the President's
summary is reprinted in attached "Administration Wire").
If you need additional information, do not hesitate to ask.
thanks in advance for your help.
Attachments
ADMINISTRATION WIRE
December 4, 1990
PERSIAN GULF
Excerpts from Chairman Powell's statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee
"There can be no doubt that this was one of the largest and most successful
deployment operations on our nation's history. No other country could have
attempted or even contemplated doing what we have accomplished.
"To put it in some perspective, to date, the United States has airlifted over
200,000 personnel and some 210,000 short tons of equipment. This is comparable to
moving the entire city of Richmond, Virginia 8,000 miles to the Saudi desert.
"By the sixth week of Operation Desert Shield, we had already moved by air
the equivalent of the entire Berlin Airlift -- an operation which had taken place over
65 weeks. As of today, we have airlifted enough cargo to equal 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts.
"To provide another comparison, more personnel and equipment were moved in
the first three weeks of Operation Desert Shield that were moved in the first 3
months of the Korean conflict."
"Overall, the message this truly unprecedented multinational force has sent to
Saddam Hussein has been and remains strong and unwavering. With over 200,000
allied troops en route or in place alongside U.S. forces, a credible collective security
force stands ready to defeat Saddam's aggression."
"Our equipment readiness has exceed expectations and thus, must be considered
exceptional, given) the harsh demands of the desert environment."
"Desert Shield presented this nation with the first large-scale practical test of
the Total Force Policy.
.Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early
stages of this operation.
[D]uring the early weeks of August some 10,000 reserve
volunteers per week provided such critical functions as airlift and tanker support. It
is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces
would not have been possible."
"[T]he success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot
be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us
flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10
years to strengthen the Total Force concept."
"I have been very proud of the conduct of our troops -- they have been
diplomats in the truest sense of the word. Senior Saudi officials, as well as Saudi
citizens, have expressed to Secretary Cheney and myself their gratitude and
appreciation for our troops' behavior."
Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990
ADMINISTRATION WIRE
December 4, 1990
PERSIAN GULF
Excerpts from Secretary Cheney's statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee
I firmly believe that without this operation (Operation Desert Shield) Iraqi forces
would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the
liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait."
"The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the
most difficult our nation can make.
.For that reason, it is important that our
citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf."
"The first reason behind the President's policy if the prospect for further aggression."
"Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia,
other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United Sates. Iraq is governed by a regime
that will say and do virtually anything to achieve its ends.
"Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a
culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at
gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized.
"Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It
was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal.
"If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger.
.In the
future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver
them. Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way."
"The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies."
"The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil
is quite real.
There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's
potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.
"First, is his control of supply.
.Consider the impact Iraq could have on the
world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and
actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. The mere ability to
threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.
"The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its
military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue.
.So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil
prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war."
Adminstration Wire 12/4/90
Page two.
"The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the
heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era."
"We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanction are
working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an
embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the
embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand
economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi
people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a
changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.
"So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military
option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of
Kuwait.
"People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the
American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-
five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against
communism was hopeless proves that we can persevere when we must.
"
.But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient
when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that
is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about.
They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously
narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the
President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence."
Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990
For more information, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at the White House
202/456-2483.
December 4, 1990
COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER
Tuesday, December 4
Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the
NATO nuclear planning group
General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London
Clippings and background sent out to surrogates
Wednesday, December 5
Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute,
London
Thursday, December 6
Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations
Committee
Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner
Friday, December 7 (Pearl Harbor Day)
Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels
Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and
the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association and
the Jewish Community Relations Council
Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9
Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows
Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce
Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress
Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio
Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)
The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point
this week)
9:30 a.m. -- The President meets with Mother Teresa in the
Residence
10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders,
Cabinet Room
2:00 p.m. -- The President meets with President Vytautas
Landsbergis of Lithuania, Oval Office
Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association,
Pinehurst, North Carolina
Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in
Houston, Texas
Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness
Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)
General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)
Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings
Tuesday, December 11
The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops
10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at
the White House, Oval Office
Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club
Wednesday, December 12
The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze
11:30 -- The President addresses Hanukkah Celebration, Room 450
OEOB
Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates
First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National
Press Club
2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional
reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB
2:00 p.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Second Annual Holiday
Reception with Commanders of 23 veterans organizations
Thursday, December 13
8:30 a.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Annual Secretary's
overview to veterans organizations
4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of
Manufacturers, Dr. Haass as tentative briefer
Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday
celebration
Friday, December 14
Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and
Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)
Saturday, December 15 -- Sunday, December 16
Cabinet members booked for weekend public affairs shows
9:30 a.m. -- Presidential interview with David Frost, Oval
Office, Sunday
Monday, December 17
3:00 p.m. -- The President participates in a diplomatic
credentialing ceremony, East Room
Secretary Baker travels to Brussels for NATO Ministerial (thru
Tues. Dec. 18)
General Scowcroft Q and A interview appears in U.S. News and
World Report
Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York
City
Tuesday, December 18
10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members
Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors,
Roosevelt Room
1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research
Institute Conference
December 4, 1990
Completed Activities
Friday, November 30
-- Presidential Press Conference
-- Presidential interview with People Magazine
-- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
-- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans,
Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian
Treaty Room
-- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
-- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News
Hour
-- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
-- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen,
key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill
and key Public Affairs officials
Saturday, December 1
-- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
--- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
-- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN
"Newsmaker"
Sunday, December 2
-- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"
-- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David Brinkley"
-- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"
-- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"
Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt with VA Chaplins, in Norfolk, VA
Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)
-- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate Armed
Services Committee
-- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate Armed
Services Committee
-- Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to
surrogates and copies of testimonial statements distributed
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NOVEMBER 28, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
DAVID DEMAREST
S
RE:
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN -- OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
Objective:
O
Reassure the American people as to the objectives and
purpose of our deployment and strengthen public support for
Operation Desert Shield. Ultimately, our goal is broad,
grass-roots support for the President's initiative.
Strategy:
O
Coordinate and focus all the appropriate resources of the
Administration to get our message out to the American
people.
Establish a White House/agency communications working group
to manage a sustained effort, aimed at delivering a
consistent message and developing appropriate events.
(Designed after Souter/S&L working groups.)
Message:
O
Thematically, we need to tell people why we are there and
what we mean to achieve. Specific information on details of
our involvement, purpose, international and UN support,
etc., should be updated regularly and as events dictate.
As time passes, the President's critics will become more
vocal. The message that the President has gone to historic
lengths to avoid war (economic embargo and ten UN
resolutions) and garnered unprecedented international
support should be a fundamental component of all outreach
activity.
Target Groups:
O
Potential surrogates (groups and individuals) who already
support the President should be given immediate priority.
With proper briefing material and talking points, veterans
groups, key business leaders, Members of Congress, foreign
policy experts, friendly columnists, administration
officials and party leaders can give the President's message
resonance almost immediately.
2
Opinion leaders of every stripe should be targeted for
special and appropriate attention. This would include the
"inside the beltway" foreign policy experts, minorities,
veterans, religious and ethnic leaders, the business
community, educators, labor leaders and elected officials.
Media, including editorial boards, national publications,
columnists, regional and specialty press.
Tactics:
Immediately:
O
Keying off the UN vote on Thursday:
-- Offer up key administration spokesmen (Sununu,
Cheney, Baker, Powell) for satellite interviews on
Thursday. Radio interviews as well.
-- Presidential news conference in the briefing room on
Thursday immediately after the UN vote.
-- Roosevelt Room meeting with the President and big
gun foreign policy experts (former Presidents, former
Secretaries of State and Defense, former National
Security Advisors)
-- Presidential meeting with the recently escaped
citizens from Kuwait who are testifying at the UN.
Covering the weekend news:
-- Offer up all senior administration spokesmen for the
various weekend public affairs shows.
Focus on next week's publications and news:
-- A Q & A interview with General Scowcroft for U.S.
News and World Report (Monday).
-- A Q & A interview with General Powell for USA Today
(Monday)
-- Distribute OP/EDs by Secretary Cheney, General
Scowcroft and Secretary Baker to the Wall Street
Journal, Washington Post and New York Times,
respectively, on a timeline. Prepare guest editorials
for LA Times and "Time" Magazine.
-- National Press Club speech by top administration
official.
IMM
Between now and Christmas:
o
Encourage the formation of a major grass-roots effort in
support of the President's efforts in the Middle East.
While the President is in South America, mail and fax out
talking points, favorable clippings and background material
to all potential surrogates, from Cabinet officials to local
interest groups leaders.
3
Once a week for at least the next eight weeks we should send
out appropriate material to what will no doubt be an
extensive list of opinion leaders across the country.
Fred McClure mailing to Members of Congress with appropriate
background material; Presidential briefing with Members
after the South America Trip. We are already lining up
Members of Congress to write OP/EDs. List of potential
surrogates will be provided by legislative affairs.
Pearl Harbor Day will no doubt receive great attention this
year; ABC's Nightline has already announced an expanded
program on December 7th to talk about the Gulf crisis. All
administration spokesmen should be prepared to talk about
our objectives in Saudi Arabia that day.
December 10 is Human Rights Day. Hold a White House event
to sign proclamation and make a statement about human rights
violations by Iraq.
The Vice President is speaking to the annual meeting of the
Republican Governors Association next weekend. He can use
this speech (and other forums) to articulate the President's
objectives in the Middle East.
It should be made clear to all Cabinet members (and other
administration officials) that they should seek out
opportunities to get the President's message across. The
President should meet with the Cabinet the week of December
10 to articulate this.
Schedule regional media luncheon with reporters and editors
from across the country during the week of December 10,
1990. Schedule proposal attached.
Invite Mrs. Thatcher to the White House for a visit.
Schedule her in key foreign policy forums while she is in
the United States.
Schedule both Roosevelt Room and room 450 briefings for a
variety of constituent groups. These would include:
-- Top CEOs from across the country
-- Religions Leaders/Minority Groups
-- Foreign Policy Group/Veterans Groups
-- Business Leaders/oil executives
-- Labor leaders/Educators/Ethnic Groups
4
Target key media markets across the country for exclusive
interviews, OP/EDs by appropriate surrogates and speeches by
administration spokesmen. Suggested "White House on the
Road" concept from original Demarest plan.
The President had Thanksgiving with the troops in Saudi
Arabia; we'd like him to share part of the Christmas season
with the families they left behind by taking a Christmas Eve
trip to a large military base or hosting an event with
military families here at the White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
AC/ER
WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 2, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT AD
FROM:
DAVID DEMAREST
RE:
STATUS REPORT GULF WORKING GROUP
Our Gulf Working Group is up and running, with
representatives of all concerned agencies and the various offices
of the White House meeting daily to coordinate our communications
effort.
Attached is a timeline of confirmed events and activities
related to the Gulf. This will be updated for your use daily.
I'll be on the trip this week. In my absence, Deb Amend will
chair the working group and will write a brief status report for
you every day highlighting actions steps for your approval and
outlining plans in the works but not yet confirmed on the
timeline.
Action Steps
1. We'd like to get the four former President's more
involved. We may need to send NSC representatives out to brief
them, and we'd like to propose that the President invite them
here to the White House for a luncheon meeting before Christmas.
(The President has never met with all the former Presidents at
one time before.)
2. There was unanimity among the members of the group that
the President and Mrs. Bush share part of the Christmas season
with the families of the service men and women in the Gulf. We'd
like to schedule an event of some sort to highlight the
President's concern for the families. Among our ideas: a trip to
a large military base to attend Christmas Eve services or host an
event with them here at the White House.
-2-
"In the Works"
Talking points have been staffed for clearance on Monday.
OP/EDs by Secretaries Cheney and Baker and General Scowcroft are
being updated to include information about Friday's announcement
and will be ready for placement in the major papers next week.
With the President in South America this week, we will focus
on surrogates:
-- We'll schedule high-level administration officials for
interviews, satellite feeds, etc.
-- Highlights of the congressional testimony of Secretary
Baker, Cheney and General Powell will be distributed widely, as
will the assorted briefing material we are assembling.
-- We'll fax and mail material to an extensive list of
surrogates both in and outside the Administration.
-- Fred McClure will mail a package of briefing material to
Members of Congress.
-- We will develop a briefing package for the Republican
Governors meeting in North Carolina next weekend.
Bobbie Kilberg, Sichan Siv and Leigh Ann Metzger will be
working on a proposal for White House constituent group briefings
(presidential and non-presidential) over the next two months.
Leigh Ann Metzger will be working with representatives of
the VA this week to develop a plan for a major grass-roots effort
centered around the veterans organizations across the country.
David Carney and Bill Sittman will be talking with Kuwaiti
representatives here to determine the willingness of the Kuwaiti
officials to make speeches, write OP/EDs, and give media
interviews.
December 2, 1990
COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER
Sunday, December 2
10:30 a.m. -- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"
10:30 a.m. -- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David
Brinkley"
12:30 p.m. -- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"
1:00 p.m. -- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"
Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt with VA Chaplins, in Norfolk, VA
Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)
9:00 a.m. --- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committee
9:00 a.m. -- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committee
Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to
surrogates
Op eds distributed for the Washington Post by General Scowcroft,
the New York Times by Secretary Baker and the Wall Street Journal
by Secretary Cheney
Tuesday, December 4
Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the
NATO nuclear planning group
General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London
Clippings and background sent out to surrogates
Wednesday, December 5
Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute,
London
Thursday, December 6
Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations
Committee
Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner
Friday, December 7 (Pearl Habor Day)
Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels
Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and
the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association
Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9
Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows
Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce
Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress
Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio
Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)
The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point
this week)
10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders,
Cabinet Room
Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association,
Pinehurst, North Carolina
Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in
Houston, Texas
Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness
Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)
General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)
Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings
Tuesday, December 11
The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops
The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at the White House
Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club
Wednesday, December 12
The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze
Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates
First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National
Press Club
2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional
reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB
Secretary Derwinski hosts Commanders Call with Senior Veterans
Officials
Thursday, December 13
4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of
Manufacturers
Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday
celebration
Friday, December 14
Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and
Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)
Saturday, December 15 -- Sunday, December 16
Cabinet members booked for weekend public affairs shows
Presidential interview with David Frost, Oval Office, Sunday
Monday, December 17
Secretary Baker travels to Brussels for NATO Ministerial (thru
Tues. Dec. 18)
General Scowcroft Q and A interview appears in U.S. News and
World Report
Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York
City
Tuesday, December 18
10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members
Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors,
Roosevelt Room
1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research
Institute Conference
December 2, 1990
Completed Activities
Friday, November 30
-- Presidential Press Conference
-- Presidential interview with People Magazine
-- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
-- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans,
Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian
Treaty Room
-- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
-- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News
Hour
-- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
-- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen,
key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill
and key Public Affairs officials
Saturday, December 1
-- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
-- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
-- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN
"Newsmaker"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 3, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE GULF COMMUNICATIONS WORKING GROUP
FROM:
DEB AMEND DA
RE:
BRIEFING MATERIAL ON THE GULF
Attached is a package of background material on the Gulf for
your use and distribution. It includes a fact sheet; the UN
Security Council resolutions; a chronology of events; as well as
recent clippings, editorials, and highlights of recent speeches
by the President, the Vice President and Secretary Baker. This
material will be updated regularly.
Gulf Fact Sheet
The President's goals in the gulf are clear; they are the
goals of the world community. With the backing of twelve
United Nations Resolutions, armed forces from 26 countries,
and 50 countries helping financially, the international
community seeks:
-- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of
Iraq from Kuwait.
-- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
-- The release of all hostages and the free functioning of
all embassies.
-- Security and stability of the Gulf region.
With unprecedented international support, the United Nations
Security Council has authorized the use "of all necessary
means" to. stop Saddam Hussein, as of January 15, 1991.
The stakes in letting Saddam's actions go unchecked are very
high. At a time in history when the rules of the post-cold
war are being written, Saddam:
--
Is a dangerous dictator unafraid of using force to
achieve his political goals.
--
Has weapons of mass destruction and is ambitiously
pursuing development of nuclear weapons technology.
--
Desires to control one of the world's critical
resources--oil.
We must stop Saddam Hussein now or face greater and even
more dangerous challenges from him and those who would
emulate him in the future.
Comprehensive economic sanctions currently in place may not
be enough to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Despite evidence of
economic hardship in Iraq, it is indeterminable whether the
sanctions will achieve the stated goals.
The cost of waiting for the sanctions to achieve our goals
increases as time marches on. With each passing day:
:
Saddam introduces more forces into Kuwait and Southern
Iraq while reinforcing those already there. He is also
producing more chemical and biological weapons.
-- Iraq gets closer to possessing nuclear weapons
capability.
-- The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and
developing countries everywhere are being severely
damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions.
-- And on a human level, Kuwait and its citizens are being
brutally mistreated, hostages remain held, and our
embassy in Kuwait remains under siege.
Any one of these concerns is enough to justify our action;
collectively, they make an unassailable case.
The world wants a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the
Persian Gulf. The best way to get one is to make clear to
Saddam that the alternative is much more threatening.
The time between now and January 15, 1990 provides a real
chance for diplomacy to work so long as it is consistent
with the U.N. Resolutions.
In an extraordinary effort to reach a peaceful settlement--
go the extra mile--the President has:
-- Offered to meet with Iragi Foreign Minister, Tariq
Aziz, in Washington, DC.
-- Announced he will send Secretary Baker to meet with
Saddam in Baghdad.
These meetings will only be conducted within the mandates of
the U.N. resolutions. The purpose is not to negotiate; nor
is it to reward Iraq in any way for its aggression or to
discuss related issues. The purpose is to impress upon
Iraq's leadership the determination of the world that Iraq
withdraw, and the consequences for Iraq if it does not.
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Saddam Hussein:
"We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is
your only sensible option. You can choose peace by
respecting the will of the international community.
But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The
choice is yours."
-- Secretary Baker at the United Nations
November 29, 1990
Chronology
The Gulf Crisis: UN Security
Council Actions
International Community
September 13-Resolution 666. Limits
Condemns Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
humanitarian food supplies to Iraq and occupied Kuwait
and empowers Security Council to determine when such
Within the forum of the United Nations, the international
shipments are justified. Vote: 13 for, 2 opposed (Yemen
community condemned Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait.
and Cuba).
Since August 2, the UN Security Council has passed 11
resolutions condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's
September 16-Resolution 667. Condemns
immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
Iraq for violence against foreign embassies and diplo-
mats in Kuwait. Demands protection for diplomatic
August 2-Resolution 660. Condemns
and consular personnel. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
invasion. Demands unconditional and immediate
withdrawal. Vote: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention
September 24-Resolution 669. Agrees to
(Yemen).
consider exceptions to Resolution 661 for shipment of
humanitarian supplies and authorizes examination of
August 6-Resolution 661. Imposes economic
requests for economic assistance under Article 50.
sanctions. Authorizes non-military measures to
Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
enforce trade sanctions. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions
(Yemen and Cuba).
September 25-Resolution 670. Tightens
embargo on air traffic and authorizes detention of
August 9-Resolution 662. Declares Iraq's
Iraq's merchant fleet. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
annexation of Kuwait null and void. Vote: Unani-
mous (15-0).
October 29-Resolution 674. Holds Iraq
responsible for all financial losses resulting from
August 18-Resolution 664. Condemns Iraq
invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by
for holding foreign nationals hostage and demands
Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the release of third-
their immediate release. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
country nationals and the provision of food to those
being held against their will. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions
August 25-Resolution 665. Outlaws all trade
(Yemen and Cuba).
with Iraq by land, sea, and air. Bars financial.
dealings with all UN members. Vote: 13 for, 2 absten-
November 29-Resolution 678. Authorizes
tions (Yemen and Cuba).
"member states cooperating with the government of
Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the
above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final oppor-
tunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolu-
tions by January 15, 1991. Vote: 12 for, 2 against
(Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention (China).
US Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
November 30, 1990
Office of Public Communication
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
July 18
Saddam Hussein accuses Kuwait of driving down the price of
crude oil and reasserts Iraqi claims to oil in a disputed border
area inside Kuwait.
July 25
Iraq builds-up its military stationed on the border with Saudi
Arabia.
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, meets in Baghdad with
Saddam who asserts his hopes for a peaceful resolution to the
situation with Kuwait through talks, not violence.
August 1
Talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapse.
August 2
Iraqi troops cross the border into Kuwait and gain control of the
country by seizing oil fields and forcing the royal family to flee to
Saudi Arabia.
President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti
Government property, and an Executive Order blocking Iraqi
Government property and prohibiting transactions with Iraq.
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives endorse President
Bush's embargo and condemn Saddam's aggression.
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 660 which condemns
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demands the unconditional, immediate
withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and calls on both
countries to negotiate.
August 6
King Fahd invites forces into Saudi Arabia to reinforce its
defenses.
Iraqi troops gather British and American citizens in Kuwait and
transfer them to Iraq.
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 661 which imposes a
trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait,
establishes a special sanctions committee to implement the
resolution and asks U.N. members to protect Kuwaiti assets in
their country.
August 8
In a nationally televised address to the nation, President Bush
announces the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf,
condemns Saddam's aggression, and sets out the four principles
guiding U.S. policy for the crisis.
2
Iraq announces the annexation of Kuwait.
August 9
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 662 which declares
Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void.
August 10
President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti
Government property and prohibiting transactions with Kuwait.
Twelve members of the Arab League vote to send a peacekeeping
force to Saudi Arabia.
August 16
President Bush orders the U.S. Navy to intercept shipping to and
from Iraq and Kuwait.
August 18
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 664 demanding the
immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait and the
right of diplomats to visit their nationals. This Resolution also
insists that Iraq rescind its order closing diplomatic and consular
missions in Kuwait.
August 25
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 665 authorizing
"measures as may be necessary," such as the use of Western
navies, to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq.
August 28
Iraq officially "designates" Kuwait as its 19th governate.
August 29
President Bush addresses the Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf
by taped radio message.
September 7
The U.S. puts Iraq on list of states sponsoring terrorism.
September 11
President Bush addresses a Joint Session of Congress, reiterating
the message that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait "immediately
and without condition." Twenty nations' navies agree to enforce
the U.N. blockade of Iraq.
September 12
President Bush tapes an eight minute message to the Iraqi people.
September 13
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 666 which reaffirms
Iraq's responsibility for the safety and well-being of all foreign
nationals.
September 16
Iraqi television shows President Bush's videotaped speech to the
Iraqi people explaining the reasons for the world's condemnation
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
3
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 667 condemning
Iraqi aggression against diplomats and diplomatic compounds in
Kuwait. This Resolution also demands the immediate release of
all foreign nationals.
September 24
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 669 emphasizing that
only the special sanctions committee (established by Resolution
661) has the ability to authorize humanitarian aid shipments to
Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
September 25
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 670 which requires
each member state to impose an air transport embargo against
Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
October 1
The Senate passes a resolution supporting President Bush's efforts
"to deter Iraqi aggression."
October 5
Secretary of Defense Cheney announces that 25 nations have
contributed to the air, naval or ground force deployments.
October 25
Secretary Cheney announces that the U.S. may order additional
American troops to the Gulf.
October 29
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 674 aimed at forcing
Iraq out of Kuwait by demanding an end to hostage taking and
calling on Iraq to ensure basic necessities to protect Kuwaitis and
third country nationals. This Resolution also served as a
reminder to Iraq that it is liable for all damages to foreigners or
their property resulting from the invasion and occupation of
Kuwait.
November 2
The White House announces that President Bush will spend
Thanksgiving Day with the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf and
will confer with Saudi, Egyptian and Kuwaiti leaders on the
situation.
November 8
President Bush announces that additional land, sea and air forces
will be deployed to the Gulf.
November 9
The General Committee of the U.N. General Assembly refuses a
request from Iraq to place the U.S. military concentration in the
Gulf as a threat to peace. Instead the members label Iraq as the
threat to peace in the region, brand Iraq as the aggressor and
accuse Baghdad of obstruction of U.N. procedures.
November 22
President and Mrs. Bush celebrate Thanksgiving with the U.S.
forces deployed in the Gulf.
4
November 26
A draft text of a U.N. Security Council resolution giving Iraq "one
final opportunity" to withdraw its forces from Kuwait or face the
consequences of a possible armed conflict was released. This
resolution was drafted due to Iraq's refusal to comply with
previous resolutions demanding the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal from Kuwait.
November 27
Ambassador Mohammed A. Abulhasan, the Kuwaiti Permanent
Representative to the U.N., and six individuals who fled Kuwait
since the Iraqi invasion appeared before the U.N. Security Council
to give eyewitness reports of the atrocities of the Iraqi military.
November 28
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 677 condemning
Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti civil records and Iraq's attempts to
change Kuwait's demographic composition.
November 29
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 678 which gives Iraq
until January 15, 1991 to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face
the possibility of military action by any member states.
November 30
In a nationally televised press conference, President Bush outlines
the Administration's four objectives in the Gulf: "We seek Iraq's
immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek
the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the
release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies;
and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the
world," and announces his willingness to go the extra mile by
inviting Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Washington to meet
with him during the week of December 10th. Additionally,
President Bush announces that he will ask Iraq's President to
receive Secretary of State Baker in Baghdad at a mutually
convenient time between December 15th and January 15th of
1991.
Bush Has Made the Right Moves, So Far
been demonstrations by a few moth-
Saudi Arabia and take the United
another justify a brutal invasion,
The New York Times
Sun December 2, 1990
By Caspar W. Weinberger
eaten relics of the Vietnam peace
Arab Emirates, thereby securing
freedom and the rule of law are dead.
movement, which despite their small
control of at least 70 percent of the
What kind of negotiated settlement
WASHINGTON
size have been given undue promi-
world's known oil reserves.
can we reach with a mass murderer
believe President Bush is do-
nence on TV news.
The troops know why they are in
who suppressed Iraqi Kurds seeking
I
ing what has to be done in the
There are Americans who not only
the gulf even if many opponents pro-
some small measure of freedom?
Persian Gulf and is doing it
support our being in the gulf but want
fess to be "unclear" and "puzzled."
What would be the terms of such a
very well. That was clearly the
us to attack Immediately. There are
The troops appreciate that aggres-
compromise or negotiations?
majority view of the nation
still others who think the embargo
sors cannot be allowed to keep what
Would we let him keep half of Ku-
immediately after Saddam
will not work but content themselves
they steal. By protecting the world
wait? Or "to save Saddam's face,"
Hussein's conquest of Kuwait, but
with saying that and with professing
from continual blackmail and reliev-
which seems to be the goal of some
since then there has been disarray
"profound pessimism" or some
ing It of the incalculable cost of claw-
who talk compromise, would we let
and confusion.
equally helpful analysis.
ing Mr. Hussein out of Saudi Arabia
him retire gracefully from Kuwait,
In sending James Baker to Bagh-
There really is and should be no
and the emirates, we achieve comple-
welcome his generosity, express
dad and inviting Iraq's Foreign Min-
confusion about why Mr. Bush sent
mentary goals: preventing aggres-
gratitude for the return of hostages -
lister to Washington, Mr. Bush has
the troops to the gulf. We are there to
sion from succeeding and from un-
and watch him repeat the whole mur-
struck the right note. It is well that he
prevent a particularly brutal aggres-
dermining the quality of life Amerl-
derous scenarlo when he chooses?
warned Mr. Hussein not to misread
sion that, If successful, would have
cans and millions of others enjoy.
None of this Is to say that we should
our-motives. The trips must not be
badly crippled a large part of the
As for the specious argument that
commit our forces to combat now. I
viewed as Involving standard negotia-
world and left us subject to continual
we should not oppose Iraqi aggres-
believe the economic sanctions, en-
Lions in which both sides give a little
blackmall by one of the world's most
ston because Kuwalt and Saudi Ara-
forced by a tight air and sea blockade
to achieve an agreement. The only
miserable leaders. President Bush's
bia are not as pure as some would
and supported by some 21 other coun-
peace acceptable is a peace under
Thanksgiving speech to our troops in
like, let's remember when we heard a
trles, including every major Arab
which Mr. Hussein gives up what he
Saudi Arabia made that crystal clear.
similar argument: "We should not
country, is succeeding. It will bring
has stolen, makes reparations for his
That we have not always acted with
support the Shah of Iran because his
Iraq to its knees If we and our allies
theft and Is left without the ability to
such dispatch and effectiveness ev-
Government has done repressive
have the patience to keep It tightly in
steal again.
ery time some aggression has oc-
things." But that overlooked the al-
place, and the willingness to wait
Before Mr. Bush's announcement,
curred is beside the point, and hardly
ternative: the Ayatollah Ruhollah
until its full effect is felt.
he had encountered increasing oppo-
an argument for not trying to estab-
Khomeni. So, are we going to let Mr.
Of course we must keep our own
sition and questions, claims that our
lish the rule of law globally now.
Hussein keep Kuwait because Kuwait
military strength, joined by more
goals are not clear, contentions that
To say we are in the gulf only
is not everything its critic want?
than 130,000 allied troops, in place and
Kawait and Saudi Arabia are not wor-
because of oil is to trivialize the great
What is this negotiated peace so
ready to be used if necessary. The
thy of being defended, and cries for a
role we are playing. Of course oil is
many want? Some advocates tip their
objections to President Bush's recent
negotiated peace. There have even
important to our civilization - just
hands when they talk of Iraq's "his-
strengthening of our force make little
how important we'd easily know if
torical claims" to Kuwait. But no one
sense: If we are in the gulf because
Easpar W. Weinberger was Ronald
Saddam Hussein had been allowed to
can contend that Kuwait invaded
we have to be, every military consid-
Reagan's Secretary of Defense.
carry out his plan to march through
Iraq. If some country's claims on
eration dictates that we should be
there with overwhelming power.
I do object, however, to the policy of
no rotation for our troops. It would
help morale if they were rotated
home after some months' service in
the harsh desert. This could be done
without any loss in strength, and with.
out sending any signal to Saddam
Hussein other than that we have the
best Interests of our troops in mind.
I hope this great opportunity to
enforce the rule of law globally is not
watered down, compromised and
weakened. We must preserve the mil-
itary option. But let us see if patience
and strength will give us victory with-
out committing troops to combat.
MEG GREENFIELD
The President
what used to be called slumming and it is a linguistic and
cultural disaster, except for the ever-alert writers of the
late-night gag shows.
Likewise a certain amount of his domestic agenda seems
Rings True
borrowed and not quite comfortable for him, again part of a
political accommodation believed to be necessary to get
where he can do the work that really engrosses him. I am one
of those-it may be terminally naive of me-who still believe
that on civil rights and some of the social issues that come
His speech was on
before him, Bush's instincts are much better than the poli-
cies he eventually espouses. This is not exactly a compliment,
target because he
since it implies a pretty cynical attitude, but not, Isuppose, if
you regard it as the unfortunate price of conducting the
seemed to be
foreign policy you believe is of paramount importance.
voicing his own
Consider the difference between the Bush who dithered
all over the place during the late great deficit-reduction
convictions-not
follies of this autumn and the man who knew what he was
those of others
talking about and what he wanted and why in addressing
the gulf crisis on the 30th. The budget business clearly hurt
him politically. I would argue that that was precisely be-
cause he began to swerve and dodge and trim on what he
have been working on a theory of George Bush for
actually knew to be necessary and that he did this to ap-
about three years now. Each of my provisional conclu-
pease the political gods who, as usual, repaid this kind of
sions has had a shelf life of about two months. After
flip-flopping propitiation with a drop in the polls. The trou-
that it becomes apparent to me that I still don't have
ble began way back when Bush, who has always known
it. Too much about him is unaccounted for; too many
what was voodoo economics, signed on as a practitioner for
odds and ends are still sticking out of the box; the lid won't
the duration of the Reagan administration and then for his
clóse. The president's gulf-policy speech in the White House
own campaign. The twistings and turnings ever since have
pressroom on the morning of Nov. 30 constituted his latest
been political murder. People don't believe him. This is
disruption of my thinking. I found the speech not only right
because he somehow conveys that he doesn't quite believe
in content, but also sure-footed and reassuring. Hey, where
the voodoo himself.
did those sentiments come from? And whatever happened
The right things: Contrast all that with the pressroom
to Mr. Read My Hips? It's back to square one.
speech of the 30th. I don't suggest it was the Gettysburg
If you believe, as I do, that it's a cop-out simply to pro-
Address, but for me it was Bush at his best. He conveyed
claim the existence of a different Bush every few months-
self-confidence and mastery of the material. He said the
a good one, a bad one, a good one, etc.-in the hope that no
right things. He indicated that he also cared about the right
one will notice where you have been, then you have your
things, not just the large principles or interests at stake in
work cut out for you. The question is: how do all these
the gulf, but also the terrible individual anxieties of those
different performances relate to one another? How can they
with kids, spouses or other family serving in the gulf. He
coexist? My December 1990 theory (use before 2/1/91, as
knew what was at stake on every level and gave the strong
they say at the supermarket) is that Bush has great respect
impression that he had worked his way through the thicket
and feeling for one part of his job and something approach-
of competing claims and was prepared to take responsibility
ing contempt for another. The first is the conduct of foreign
for his actions. He was, in short, presidential.
policy, the second is the conduct of politics. In between, all
I don't think anybody-surely not I-is prepared to take
murked up, is the conduct of the nation's domestic business,
on faith whatever Bush recommends be done in the gulf,
which all too often he subcontracts out to his more political-
and no one can feel easy about the situation we have got in
ly minded advisers, asking only that they buy him the
there. But doubts and anxieties are much greater when a
popular approval he needs to get on with the other part of
president is unable to convey (because it is not there to be
the job, the part that interests him and which he is schooled
conveyed) that he has command of the material he is deal-
in and good at.
ing with, that he knows what he is doing and believes his
At best, Bush is not a word guy. The poetry never scans,
own arguments. People can't draw reassurance from him.
and sometimes the sentences can't be parsed; when he
For a president or any public leader will always betray his
reaches for the inspirational, you begin to worry that the
uncertainty and lack of conviction. And people will sense
final note of exaltation is going to be flat, a clinker or a kind
these weaknesses, much as animals-the dog who is growl-
of falling-out-of-the-second-story-window thud. But from
ing at your approach, the bear who has decided to visit your
time to time he achieves true eloquence and authority-a
campsite-are said to sense your fear.
capacity to move. And it seems to me this is almost invari-
You hear that Bush's political gurus, who are so accom-
ably on the subject of international relations, almost never
plished at getting him in trouble, are now gearing up for an
on the subject of domestic policy and absolutely never on
exploitation of the racial tensions that are so prominent, so
politics.
raw these days. They have something clever planned. It
Most of Bush's most infelicitous public statements have
works on paper. I'll bet a dime that after an early success it
been in the political realm and generally they have had an
will blow up in their faces, for it will put Bush in his least
unconvincing, inauthentic tough guy/wise guy edge to
convincing role as a ventriloquist for acquired instincts and
them. This has been true from his pokes at Geraldine Ferra-
not quite believed notions-and all this the public ultimate-
ro to his "read my hips" silliness, with stops in between for
ly discerns and rejects. The president's advisers should
the bravado of the 1988 campaign. When Bush the patri-
understand this. The gulf statement showed him at his
cian seeks to identify with the plebeians and speak what he
most plausible because he was speaking out of conviction-
takes to be their language, it sounds embarrassingly like
his, not theirs.
96 NEWSWEEK DECEMBER 10, 1990
The Washington Post
AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1990
'Going the Extra Mile'
T
O THE NEW U.N. resolution endorsing
tradition where eye-to-eye discourse at the top is
force after Jan. 15 if Iraq does not quit
what counts. For Secretary of State James A.
Kuwait, President Bush has now added the
Baker to go to Baghdad and for his Iraqi counter-
offer of early direct high-level talks with Iraq. By
part to come to Washington enables the requisite
this thoughtfully conceived, skillfully executed
full exchange as the clock ticks down to Jan. 15.
one-two sequence, he has put in place a coherent
strategy, strengthened military and diplomatic
Full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions is
options alike and, we believe, substantially im-
the core American demand that the Bush admin-
proved chances that the crisis will be resolved
istration will take into the talks. Mr. Bush sees
peacefully and on United Nations terms. He has
no reason to compromise, and there is none.
also, we think, gone a good way to allay the
President Hussein, who yesterday accepted the
anxieties of those who had feared his policy was
talks, could not have failed to notice that the call
spinning out of control.
for his removal is not on the short list of U.N.
Until last Friday Mr. Bush had rejected Bagh-
objectives President Bush pledges the United
dad's repeated calls for high-level dialogue, de-
States to achieve and that Mr. Bush's openness
manding prior Iraqi respect for U.N. resolutions.
to eventually discussing "all aspects of the Gulf
He had relied on others to explore (unavailingly)
crisis" points toward a broader regional agenda.
the diplomatic terrain. Even many of those who
accepted the logic of his military buildup won-
Without stepping back, as we read it, the
dered if he was fulfilling his obligation to exhaust
president has moved to solidify both foreign and
all diplomatic possibilities before sending Ameri-
domestic support at a moment when the question
can forces into battle.
of war and peace hangs in the balance. Mr. Bush
Friday, a day after the U.N. had acted, Mr.
has, as he claims, "gone the extra mile." He has
Bush filled this gap. The price is cheap, the
earned broad domestic support, to match the
timing deft. He changed course, Mr. Bush said,
international support he already has, for his
to make sure that an isolated Saddam under-
effort to win Iraqi respect without conditions or
stands what he's up against. Saddam Hussein is
contingencies for the resolutions undertaken at
no doubt isolated, and he comes out of a political
the United Nations.
ADMINISTRATION WIRE
December 3, 1990
THE PERSIAN GULF
Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference
"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression.
And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf
because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator
all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new
ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources -- all at a time in
history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.
"Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's
immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free
functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical
region of the world."
"Yesterday's United Nations Security Council resolution was historic.
Until
yesterday Saddam may not have understood what he's up against in terms of world
opinion. And I'm hopeful that now he will realize that he must leave Kuwait
immediately."
"Let me tell you the things that concern me most. First, I put the immorality
of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage and brutalize its
neighbor.
"I'm deeply concerned about all the hostages -- innocent people held against
their will in direct contravention of international law.
"I'm deeply concerned about our own embassy in Kuwait.
A handful of
beleaguered Americans remain inside the embassy unable to come and go.
I am
determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution 674, be
fully replenished and our people free to come home.
.I'm also deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself. The tales of
rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost
beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of
people must end, and those who violate it -- the Kuwaiti people must be brought to
justice.
"I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device."
"I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if
force is required, we and the other 26 countries who have troops in the area will
have enough power to get the job done. I know that there are fears about
another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not
be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war."
Administration Wire 12/3/90
Page Two.
"I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our
troops to have their hands tied behind their backs.
If one American soldier has
to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win, and then get
out as soon as possible, as soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved.
"I will never -- ever -- agree to a halfway effort.
I repeat that we have no
desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is
necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.
"No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. And,
at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression
reversed."
"However, to go the extra mile for peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz to come to Washington at a mutually convenient time during the
latter part of the week of December 10th to meet with me. I'll invite ambassadors of
several of our coalition partners in the Gulf to join me at that meeting.
"In addition, I'm asking Secretary Jim Baker to go to Baghdad to see Saddam
Hussein."
"
[W]ithin the mandate of the United Nations resolutions, I will be prepared,
and so will Secretary Baker, to discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis.
I am not
suggesting discussions that will result in anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal
from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all
hostages."
Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1990
Excerpts from Vice President Quayle's speech
to Seton Hall University
"
.But there is another strategic American objective in the current crisis that
is not traditional -- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the Cold
War. This objective might be described as strengthening the foundations of world
order."
"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. One
way or another, it is bound to set a precedent -- either on behalf of greater world
order or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it
is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if
he fails -- and believe me, he will fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does
not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.
"That is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community
against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten
resolutions (sic) condemning Iraq.
.This is why scores of nations have agreed to
contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein.
.what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow."
Administration Wire 12/3/90
Page Three.
"The moral and human implications of war -- any war -- are very grave.
II
Consider, for example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day
that passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with Iraq allows Saddam
Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a moral course of action?
"Or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Does
patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a moral
course of action?
"Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. Will continued patience with
Iraq help make the world vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Huusein? And
is so, is this a moral course of action?
"
.I believe that every reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis
peacefully. I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And those limits
are reached when our restraint threatens to undermine other, equally moral goals.
.ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing American casualties in the
event of war; and preventing Saddam Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his
already formidable arsenal of mass destruction."
"
Saddam has shown that he understand no language other than the
language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last and best hope for peace -- for
a genuine peace.
South Orange, New Jersey
November 29, 1990
Excerpts of Secretary Baker's remarks
at the United Nations
"Today's vote marks a watershed in the history of the United Nations.
.The
entire international community has been affronted by a series of brutal acts:
Iraqi forces have invaded and seized a small Arab neighbor.
A once prosperous country has been pillaged and looted.
A once peaceful country has been turned into an armed camp.
A once secure country has been terrorized.
"The nations of the world have not stood idly by. We have taken political,
economic and military measures to quarantine Iraq and to contain its aggression.
"
The twelve resolutions passed by the Security Council have established
clearly that there is a peaceful way out of this conflict: the complete, immediate,
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate
government, and the release of all hostages."
II
.If he (Saddam Hussein) should win this struggle, then there will be no
peace in the Middle East, only the prospect of more conflict and a far wider war."
Administration Wire 12/3/90
Page Four.
"We are meeting here therefore, first and foremost, to dispel Saddam Hussein's
illusions. He must know from us that a refusal to comply peacefully with the Security
Council Resolution risks disaster for him.
"Members of the Council, we are at a crossroads. Today, we show Saddam
that the sign marked "peace" is the direction he should take.
"Today's Resolution is clear. The words authorize the use of force. But the
purpose, I truly believe, is to bring about a peaceful resolution."
"By passing today's resolution -- a cause for peace -- we say to Saddam
Hussein: "We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible
option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community.
But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."
"Members of the Council, we meet at the hinge of history. We can use the
end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or
we can slip into ever more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right.
We can take the high road toward peace and the rule of law, or Saddam Hussein's
path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.
"Simply put it is a, choice between right and wrong."
November 29, 1990
United Nations Security Council
New York, New York
Remarks by the President at Thanksgiving Dinner with
American Troops
"And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's
atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation
and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to
realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why more and more, your
mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.
"You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic
weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this
for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. What we're
confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face
of the world."
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990
Let me again set out our reasons for sending forces to the Gulf:
( (make it concise) )
We are not alone, etc.
U.N. has decreed the international law to deal with this problem.
Can be no compromise with this aggression.
We have forged an historic coalition.
We have used the diplomatic course in an unprecedented way.
Then on to yesterday's resolution
hold,
will nave
the U.N. objectives have been achieved
effort.
Photocopy-GB Handwriting
I have been asked why I ordered more
troops to the Gult.
I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this
crisis. But if force is required we and our 26 (?) allies who
have forces in the area will have enough power to get the job
done. In our country there are fears about "another Vietnam."
Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will
not be another Vietnam. This will note be a protracted,
drawn-out war. The forces arrayed are different, the oppositon
is different, the re-supply of his force would be very different,
the countries united against him in the U.N. are different, the
topography of Kuwait is different, and the motivation of our all
volunteer force is superb.
I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not
permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs.
There will, I pledge to you, be no murky ending. If one American
soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough
force behind him to win, -- win quickly -- and get out as soon as
the U.N. objectives have been achieved.
I will never, ever agree to a half-way effort.
Photocopy-GB Handwriting
Yesterday's U.N. Security Council Resolution was absolutely
necessary, and I am delighted that once again the U.N. Security
Council has enhanced the legitimate peace-keeping function of the
United Nations. Until yesterday, I have been uncertain about
Saddam Hussein's understanding of what he is up against in terms
of world opinion. I am hopeful that he will now realize he must
leave Kuwait in a timely fashion.
I am continually asked: "How effective are the U.N. sanctions
put into effect on
(Date)"
I do not know the answer
to that question. Clearly, the sanctions are having some effect,
but I cannot tell you that the sanctions alone will get the job
done. Thus, I welcome yesterday's U.N. action. Many small
countries are being driven to their knees, already, by the
increases in the price of oil. As Chairman Alan Greenspan
testified the other day, the increase in oil prices resulting
directly from Saddam's invasion are hurting our country too. Our
economy is, at best, in a serious slowdown; and if uncertainty
remains in the energy markets, the slowdown will get worse.
The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe are getting severely
damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions. The Third
World countries of Africa, and in our our hemisphere, are being
victimized by the dictator's rape of his neighbor, Kuwait. Those
who feel that there is no downside to waiting for months & months
must consider the devastating damage being done everyday to the
fragile economies of those countries that can afford it lease.
No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than
I do. At the same time, no one is more determined than I am to
see ALL hostages free; Saddam's aggression reversed; the
legitimate rulers returned to Kuwait; and the establishment of
whatever mechanisms are required to guarantee the peace and
stability of the Gulf and the territorial integrity of all member
states of the U.N.
Let me repeat -- we have no argument with the people of Iraq --
indeed, we have only friendship for the people there. Further, I
repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier
in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the
objectives set out above.
I have spelled out, once again, our reasons for sending troops to
the Gulf. Let me tell you the things that concern me most:
First, the imorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation
should rape, pillage, and brutalize its neighbor. No nation
should be able to wipe a member state of the U.N. and a member
state of the Arab League off the face of the earth.
I am deeply concern about all the hostages -- innocent people
held against their will in direct contravention of international
law. And then there is this cynical and brutal policy of forcing
people to beg for their release -- parcelling out human lives to
families and travelling emissaries like so much chattel. I am
deeply concerned about our own Embassy in Kuwait. Our flag is
still flying. A handful of beleaguered Americans re inside the
Embassy cut off from all foods, all medicines. This violation of
our embassy violates every civilized principle of diplomacy. It
demeans our people. It demeans our country, and I am determined
that this embassy, as called for under Security Council
Resolution
be replenished and our people free to come
home unharmed. What kinds of precedent will this treatment of
our embassy set for the future if Saddam's violation of
international law goes unchallenged. I am deeply concerned about
the future of Kuwait itself. The tells of rape and assasination,
of cold-blooded murder and of rampant looting re almost beyond
belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind
of treatment of people must end and those who violated the
Kuwaiti people msut be brought to justice. I remember the
Nurenburg trials. I wander if Saddam Hussein does.
I am deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors would
he possess a nuclear device. We have seen him use chemical
weapons on his own people. We have seen him take a country that
should be wealthy and prosperous and tun it into a poor country
-- all beacuse of his insatiable appetite for military equipment.
draft 1/haass/ 1350/Nov.29
Presidential Statement on the Gulf
Just eight days ago Barbara and I were fortunate enough to
share our Thanksgiving with some of the finest men and women this
or any country has to offer. We have much to be thankful for.
At desert sites with little more than sandbags for chairs and the
open sky for cover, these Americans in uniform were proud to be
where they were and anxious to get on with the job at hand.
And that is what I wish to speak to you about today, the job
at hand. I refer, of course, to the Persian Gulf. I would like
to address three questions that I know many of you have on your
minds. First, just why are we in the Gulf? Second, why is there
a sense of urgency? And third, where do we go from here now that
the United Nations has again acted?
I want to begin by explaining why we are in the Gulf. The
world must not and can not reward aggression. I recently
travelled to Europe, where I joined with 35 other heads of state
to declare the Cold War to be a thing of the past. But how we
respond to this new act of aggression will go a long ways toward
determining the shape of the world to come. Will it be a future
of might or right? What a waste if we allowed intimidation and
violence, that is, Saddam's way, to become the way of the future.
Our national security is at stake by any measure. Saddam
2
Hussein controls 10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait
doubles his share. And domination of the Gulf, which would
surely follow if this aggression is left to stand, would give him
a stranglehold over the price and availability of a commodity
that is vital to the world's economic health. This we cannot
have.
This is not a concern new to this administration. It was
Jimmy Carter who declared that "any attempt by any outside force
to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force." Iraq may not be an outside force in
the geographic sense, but the threat it poses is no less real.
And let me remind you that every President beginning with Harry
Truman has maintained U.S. military forces in the region.
Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are
at stake. As I speak, Saddam is holding hundreds of our fellow
countrymen hostage and starving out our diplomats. No American
business or tourist, no American embassy or consulate, would be
safe if we capitulated here. And so we cannot.
Any one of these concerns would in my view justify a strong
U.S. response. Together, they make a powerful case that we must
be prepared to act on behalf of interests that are truly vital.
I would expect that many of you would agree with what I've
said, and would agree as well that the United States does have a
huge stake in seeing that Saddam's aggression is neither
3
tolerated nor rewarded. Let me then turn to the second question
posed: Why a sense of urgency?
It is true that we have in place economic sanctions designed
to deny Saddam the fruits of aggression and indeed inflict a
price on him for his violent occupation of Kuwait. Yet it is not
clear that sanctions will ever be able to compel Saddam to
withdraw. Unfortunately, nearly four months since Saddam first
invaded Kuwait, I can point to no evidence suggesting that Iraq
is ready to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations.
To the contrary, and despite the sanctions, he continues to call
up more troops, now numbering more than 450,000 in Kuwait and
southern Iraq alone.
Meanwhile, Saddam is using every day that passes to increase
and fortify his forces in and around Kuwait. He is producing
chemical and biological weapons. He is on a crash program to
produce nuclear weapons. What all of this means is that if
conflict does come, it promises to be more costly in lives and
treasure if we wait the months or years that some suggest.
But even without conflict we pay a real price for allowing
time to pass. Saddam's aggression has increased the price of
oil, in the process threatening economic growth and in some
instances the chances of new democracies. Saddam's holding of
hostages and starving of embassies exacts a terrible cost in
human terms. And his rape and plunder of Kuwait threatens an
entire nation.
So to those who counsel patience I ask only that they
4
consider the real and potential costs of what they are
advocating. The status quo is not acceptable; neither is it
tolerable. That said, there are no inexpensive or painless
courses before us. Being President means being called upon to
make difficult choices. This I am prepared to do.
And now the last question, where do we go from here? The
resolution passed overwhelmingly by the United Nations Security
Council yesterday sends the clearest of messages. It tells
Saddam that he must leave Kuwait without condition lest he face
the combined weight of the world community. Together with the
British, the French, the Soviets and eight (?) other countries,
we supported this resolution not because we want war, but because
we don't. But we know of no better way to let Saddam know that
we are serious and that he must withdraw or face the most awful
of repercussions. It is not a declaration of war, but it is a
declaration of resolve.
So let me say to Saddam that I hope you will take advantage
of the opportunity contained in this twelfth resolution and heed
the words of the world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but do
not assume that one day it will not be.
Our goals are modest but fair. We seek Iraq's immediate and
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all
hostages and the free functioning of all embassies. And we seek
the stability and security of a region critical to us all.
These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals
5
of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have
12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than
50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.
Let me conclude with one last thought. There comes a time
in every generation, just as there comes a time in every
presidency, when unanticipated challenges arise that define us
and our principles. Who we are and what kind of world we seek.
This is one of those times. Yes, it is a time of risk. But it
is also a time of opportunity.
The world conscience has spoken with this latest UN
resolution. The United Nations is beginning to act as a true
force for peace. This did not happen by itself, but in large
part because of American leadership. Leadership brings with it
influence, but also responsibilities. We must show ourselves
willing to bear the costs if we wish to harvest the benefits.
draft 3/haass/0815/Nov.30
Presidential Statement on the Gulf
Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted
overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of
Kuwait. Twelve times the international community has condemned
Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a peaceful
neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.
Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these
resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support,
the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this
terrible crime against a whole people. This was a historic
event, one that holds within it the promise of a new world order
where violence will not be tolerated.
Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in
the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why
is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?
We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not
reward aggression. Appeasement does not work. I recently
travelled to Europe, where I joined 34 other heads of state to
declare an end to the Cold War. At this historic moment, how we
respond to Iraq's aggression can shape the world to come. The
United States should not be the world's policeman. And we won't.
But we will condemn aggression, and when it threatens our vital
2
interests and those of our friends, we will act. Our vital
interests are at stake in the Gulf. We are dealing with a brutal
dictator all too willing to use force, who has weapons of mass
destruction and is seeking new ones, one who desires to control
one of the world's key regions--all at a delicate moment in
history. If Saddam is not stopped now, we will need to stop him
again some day at much greater cost.
Here are the facts: Iraq owns 10% of the world's oil;
control over Kuwait doubles that share. Domination of the Gulf,
of nearly 14
which would surely follow if this aggression is left to stand,
would give Saddam a license for economic blackmail--not just of
the United States, but of poor countries and fragile emerging
democracies as well. This is clearly unacceptable.
The United States must defend its vital interests. That's
why every President beginning with Harry Truman has maintained
U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf. The threat posed by
Saddam Hussein to our vital interests is serious and real.
Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are
in jeopardy. Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals
hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in
hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery. If
we fail to stand up to Saddam's brutality, no American tourist or
businessman, no American embassy or consulate, will be safe.
And then there are the horrors being visited upon Kuwait and its
people. Eyewitness accounts of babies pulled from incubators and
left to die on hospital floors. Children executed in front of
3
their parents. Homes, neighborhoods, factories--all looted.
Saddam is attempting to erase a people and a country from the
earth. Each day, more Kuwaiti men, women and children die by
Iraqi hands--some for the crime of harboring Americans and other
foreigners. By yesterday's vote, the UN has said enough. Enough
brutality. Enough terror. Enough time.
Any one of these concerns justifies a strong U.S. response.
Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to
act. But why a sense of urgency?
It is true that the UN has enacted comprehensive economic
sanctions to deny Saddam any profit from his aggression and
inflict on him a stiff price for his invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. Yet, as effective as they are, it is not clear that
sanctions alone will be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. It
appears that sanctions are hurting Iraq's economy. But there is
no evidence suggesting that Iraq is any more ready than it was
Jone
zone
four months ago to comply with the UN's resolutions. More
important, there is no evidence suggesting that another 6 or 12
months will change Saddam's mind. To the contrary, Saddam seems
intent to endure.
Every day that passes allows Saddam to increase and fort
his forces in and around Kuwait, now numbering more than 45
in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone. He is producing chém
biological weapons. He has a crash program to develor
weapons. This means that if conflict does come, it
be far more costly if we wait the months or years
4
So to those who counsel patience I say we've been patient.
All agree that the status quo is not acceptable. All agree that
there are no easy answers. But being President means making
tough decisions. This I am prepared to do.
So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by
the Security Council sends a clear and precise message. It tells
Saddam that he must leave Kuwait immediately and without
condition or face the combined weight of the world community.
Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight
other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want
war, but because we don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we
know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and
that he must withdraw.
So I say to Saddam: take advantage of the opportunity
contained in this historic resolution and heed the words of the
world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but time is running
out.
Our goals remain what they have been since the outset. We
seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We
seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all
embassies. And we seek the stability and security of a region.
These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals
of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have
12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than
50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.
5
Let me conclude with one last thought. There come times in
life when challenges arise that define us and our principles.
Who we are and what kind of world we seek. This is one of those
times. It is a time of risk. But it is also a time of enormous
opportunity.
The conscience of the world speaks in this latest UN
resolution. The UN is at last acting as a true force for peace.
This happened in large part because of American leadership.
Leadership brings with it influence, but also responsibilities.
Now we must show ourselves willing to bear the costs if we wish
to achieve a better, safer world for ourselves and our children.
I am confident the American people and their representatives are
up to the task.
Denorest
Markup
draft 2/haass/1930/Nov.29
30 moo
0700
Presidential Statement on the Gulf
Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted
overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of
Kuwait. Twelve times now the international community has
condemned Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a
peaceful neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.
Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these
resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support,
the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this
This vote
terrible crime against a whole people. It was a historic event,
one that holds within it the promise of a new world order where
potential aggressors will know violence will not be tolerated.
Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in
the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why
is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?
We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not
Appeasement does not work.
reward aggression. I recently travelled to Europe, where I
andend to
joined 34 other heads of state to declare the Cold War to be a
A
thing of the past At this historic moment, how we respond to
this Irag's new act of aggression will go a long ways toward determining
can
the shape of the world ,to come. What a tragedy it would be if we
allowed intimidation and violence, that is, Saddam's way, to
rewarded the butality and intermidation the of adangerous dictator,
we cannot allow aggression to
2
become the pattern of the future.
The united States should
And we won 0 be.
We cannot and will not be the world's policeman. A But we
will condemn aggression, and when it threatens our vital
must
interests and those of our friends, we will act. And have no
Here arethe facts
doubt: our vital interests are at stake in the Gulf. Iraq owns
10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait doubles that share.
wy Saddam Hussein is a
Domination of the Gulf, which would surely follow If this
license for economic
aggression is left to stand, would give Saddam a stranglehold blackman
not just of the United States but of developing foor countries
over the price and availability of a commodity that is vital to
and emerging democracies as well.
the world' economic health. This is clearly unacceptable.
fraguil
Security of the Gulf is not a concern that began with this
America must defend her vital interests. That's why
administration. Every President beginning with Harry Truman has
the Persian Culf
maintained U.S. military forces in that crucial region.
President Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force
to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force." Iraq may not be an outside force in in>
Let there be no mistake:
Suddam Hussen to Americ
the geographic sense, but the threat poses by DO as less susteus. vital inter
LS ser
Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are
in jespardy.
at stake. Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals
hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in
If we reward
hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery.
Saddam
toorist or businesman
brutahty
no American businessman or tourist, no American embassy or
will That too is unacceptable.
consulate, would be safe. if we capitulated And we won
then there are
And let us not forget the horrors being visited upon Kuwait
Babies palled verified: left accounts from unculators on inspital excented amous. and front neighboure of their trucked storcheack na
paients. Anything Homes Bashdad 3
and its people. Saddam is attempting to erase a people and a
country from the earth. Each day, more Kuwaiti men, women and
children die by Iraqi hands--some for the crime of harboring
Americans and other foreigners. By yesterday's vote, the UN has said
enough. Enough brutality. Enough terror.
indicated the limit of its patience for Saddam's reign of terror.
Any one of these concerns justifies a strong U.S. response.
Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to
act,on behalf of interests that are truly vital. But why a sense
of urgency?
the V.N has enacted
It is true that we have in place comprehensive economic
sanctions designed to deny Saddam the Fruits of aggression and to
any protect from his
onhimiff
invasion
inflict a price on him for his violent occupation of Kuwait.
Yet, as effective as these sanctions are, it is not clear that Senction
they alone will be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. Despite It appears
evidence that sanctions are hurting Iraq's economy, I can point
but there is
to no evidence suggesting that Iraq is any more ready than it was
more importantly, there
four months ago to comply with the UN's resolutions. 1 Nor is
is no
there evidence suggesting that another 6 or 12 months will change
Saddam's mind.
matters. To the contrary, and despite the sanctions, Saddam seems
intent
and
even
appears able to endure, still able to call up ^ more troops, now
numbering more than 450,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone.
allows Saddam
Saddam is using very day that passes to increase and
fortify his forces in and around Kuwait. He is producing
chemical and biological weapons. He has a crash program to
develop nuclear weapons. What all of this means is that if
conflict does come, it promises to be far more costly in lives
4
and treasure if we wait the months or years that some suggest.
But even without conflict we pay a real price for allowing
time to pass Saddam's aggression has increased the price of
oil, in the process threatening economic growth and in the
survival of new democracies. Saddam's plunder of Kuwait, holding
of hostages and starying of embassies exacts a terrible cost.
Isay, we've been patient Now
So to those who counsel patience I ask only that they
consider the real and potential costs of what they are
we agull chat
advocating. The status quo is not acceptable; neither is it or
tolerable. That said, agree there are no inexpensive easy answer. or painless
All that
courses before However us. Being President means being called upon to
tough decisions.
make difficult choices. This I am prepared to do.
So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by
a very andprecise
the Security Council sends the clearest of messages. It tells
immediately or
Saddam that he must leave Kuwait without condition lest he face
the combined weight of the world community. Together with the
British, the French, the Soviets and eight other countries, we
supported this resolution not because we want war, but because we
don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we know of no better way
to let Saddam know that we are serious and that he must withdraw.
It is not a declaration of war, but it is a statement of resolve.
So I say to Saddam that I hope you will take advantage of
the opportunity contained in this historic resolution and heed
the words of the world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but
time is running out.
Our goals are modest but fair. We seek Iraq's immediate and
5
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all
hostages and the free functioning of all embassies And we seek
the stability and security of a region critical to us all.
These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals
of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have
12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than
50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.
And when we succeed, our troops and many others will depart, but
they will leave behind a Middle East more stable and peaceful.
Let me conclude with one last thought. There comes a time
in every generation, just as there comes a time in every
presidency, when unanticipated challenges arise that define us
and our principles. Who we are and what kind of world we seek.
This is one of those times. Yes, It is a time of risk. And But it
is also a time of enormous opportunity. opportunity to do what is right
conscience of the tained in is manifisted in
The ^ world conscience has spoken with this latest UN
resolution. The UN is at last acting as a true force for peace.
ned
This did not happen by itself, but in large part because of
American leadership. Leadership brings with it influence, but
Now
also responsibilities. We must show ourselves willing to bear
responsibility are to achieve a better safer would for our children
thes costs if we wish to reap the benefits. I am confident the
American people and their representatives are up to the task.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
STAFF MEETING AGENDA
FRIDAY, November 30, 1990
I.
Schedule Review
A.
Quick review of trip next week
II. Press Office Report - Marlin
A.
News of the Day
B.
Review of Weekend News Shows
III. Daily Initiatives - Key Remarks - Rogich/Demarest
A.
Gulf Commission Plan update
IV. Legislative Report - McClure
A.
Todays meeting
V.
Economic Report - Boskin
VI. Scowcroft Comments
A.
UN Action
B. Bulgaria
II. Darman Comments
VIII. JHS Comments
A.
DPC/EPC - Holiday
B.
VP Activities - Kristol
draft 3/haass/0815/Nov.30
Presidential Statement on the Gulf
Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted
overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of
Kuwait. Twelve times the international community has condemned
Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a peaceful
neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.
Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these
resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support,
the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this
terrible crime against a whole people. This was a historic
event, one that holds within it the promise of a new world order
where violence will not be tolerated.
Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in
the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why
is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?
We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not
reward aggression. Appeasement does not work. I recently
travelled to Europe, where I joined 34 other heads of state
declare an end to the Cold War. At this historic moment,
respond to Iraq's aggression can shape the world to come
United States should not be the world's policeman. An
But we will condemn aggression, and when it threaten
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interests and those of our friends, we will act. Our vital
interests are at stake in the Gulf. We are dealing with a brutal
dictator all too willing to use force, who has weapons of mass
destruction and is seeking new ones, one who desires to control
one of the world's key regions all at a delicate moment in
history. If Saddam is not stopped now, we will need to stop him
again some day at much greater cost.
Here are the facts: Iraq owns 10% of the world's oil;
control over Kuwait doubles that share. Domination of the Gulf,
which would surely follow if this aggression is left to stand,
would give Saddam a license for economic blackmail--not just of
the United States, but of poor countries and fragile emerging
democracies as well. This is clearly unacceptable.
The United States must defend its vital interests. That's
why every President beginning with Harry Truman has maintained
U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf. The threat posed by
Saddam Hussein to our vital interests is serious and real.
Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are
in jeopardy. Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals
hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in
hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery. If
we fail to stand up to Saddam's brutality, no American tourist or
businessman, no American embassy or consulate, will be safe.
And then there are the horrors being visited upon Kuwait and its
people. Eyewitness accounts of babies pulled from incubators and
left to die on hospital floors. Children executed in front of
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their parents. Homes, neighborhoods, factories-- all looted.
Saddam is attempting to erase a people and a country from the
earth. Each day, more Kuwaiti men, women and children die by
Iraqi hands some for the crime of harboring Americans and other
foreigners. By yesterday's vote, the UN has said enough. Enough
brutality. Enough terror. Enough time.
Any one of these concerns justifies a strong U.S. response.
Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to
act. But why a sense of urgency?
It is true that the UN has enacted comprehensive economic
sanctions to deny Saddam any profit from his aggression and
inflict on him a stiff price for his invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. Yet, as effective as they are, it is not clear that
sanctions alone will be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. It
appears that sanctions are hurting Iraq's economy. But there is
no evidence suggesting that Iraq is any more ready than it was
four months ago to comply with the UN's resolutions. More
important, there is no evidence suggesting that another 6 or 12
months will change Saddam's mind. To the contrary, Saddam seems
intent to endure.
Every day that passes allows Saddam to increase and fort
his forces in and around Kuwait, now numbering more than 45
in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone. He is producing chem
biological weapons. He has a crash program to develor
weapons. This means that if conflict does come, it
be far more costly if we wait the months or years
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So to those who counsel patience I say we've been patient.
All agree that the status quo is not acceptable. All agree that
there are no easy answers. But being President means making
tough decisions. This I am prepared to do.
So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by
the Security Council sends a clear and precise message. It tells
Saddam that he must leave Kuwait immediately and without
condition or face the combined weight of the world community.
Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight
other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want
war, but because we don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we
know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and
that he must withdraw.
So I say to Saddam: take advantage of the opportunity
contained in this historic resolution and heed the words of the
world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but time is running
out.
Our goals remain what they have been since the outset. We
seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We
seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all
embassies. And we seek the stability and security of a region.
These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals
of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have
12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than
50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.
5
Let me conclude with one last thought. There come times in
life when challenges arise that define us and our principles.
Who we are and what kind of world we seek. This is one of those
times. It is a time of risk. But it is also a time of enormous
opportunity.
The conscience of the world speaks in this latest UN
resolution. The UN is at last acting as a true force for peace.
This happened in large part because of American leadership.
Leadership brings with it influence, but also responsibilities.
Now we must show ourselves willing to bear the costs if we wish
to achieve a better, safer world for ourselves and our children.
I am confident the American people and their representatives are
up to the task.