Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
702520
label
Space Council (1990)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
702520
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Space Council (1990)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
29172-001
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
702520
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
074625d9c3f03547
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F[1]
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29172
Folder ID Number:
29172-001
Folder Title:
Space Council (1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
4
3
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memo
From Mark Albrecht to John Sununu
2/20/90
P/5
Re: Dinner at the VP's Residence, February 7, 1990 (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
If
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Space Council (1990)
Date Closed:
12/10/2004
OA/ID Number:
29172-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500
February 20, 1990
THE CHIEF of STAFF
seein seu
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR Hr
FROM:
MARK J. ALBRECHT
SUBJECT: Dinner at the Vice President's Residence, February 7,
1990
1.
The Vice President has asked me to provide you with a brief
summary of the dinner meeting regarding U.S. space policy
held at his residence on February 7, 1990. In addition to
the Vice President and Mrs. Quayle, Dick Darman and Bill
Kristol, there were six prominent space experts in
attendance:
Dr. Bruce Murray, former director of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory
Dr. Fred Seitz
Dr. Gerald O'Neil of the Space Studies Institute of
Princeton
LtGen (ret) Bernard Schriever, former head of Air Force
Systems Command and first project manager of the US
ballistic missile program
Dr. Lou Lanzerotti, Chairman of the Space Studies Board of
the National Research Council
Dr. Allan Puckett, former CEO of the Hughes Aircraft Corp
2.
The Vice President provided a brief overview of the goals
and objectives of the President's space program, an
assessment of the role of the National Space Council in the
formulation and execution of national space policy, and its
role in the development of specific implementation
strategies and general oversight of space programs. He
invited comments from the outside experts.
3.
Although each participant provided his own assessment of the
efficacy and utility of the National Space Council to this
point, there was general agreement with the observation of
Bruce Murray, that the formation and early direction of the
Space Council was a significant and positive development in
the U.S. space program. As he put it, "A year ago, I was
resigned to the conclusion that the U.S. space program was
destined for perpetual mediocrity. The Space Council has
revived my belief that we can recapture our space
leadership."
4.
Murray and others hastened to add that, as promising a new
start as the Bush administration has made, significant and
formidable obstacles remain to be overcome in actualizing a
revival of our space program. As he put it, "the glass is
half full and half empty. The problem is the federal
government is still not really organized to make real
progress in space exploration happen." Each expert cited an
aging and maladapted NASA bureaucracy as the most
significant impediment to progress.
5.
A discussion ensued on means for effecting change in the
system. Darman observed that significant organizational
change in the federal bureaucracy is difficult, time
consuming, and risky in terms of actual program outcomes.
His view was that all things being equal, it is preferable
to accept and isolate certain extant inefficiencies in the
system, and to focus on new initiatives as a means for more
certain and swift program enhancement. This view was
discussed and a general consensus emerged that the best
strategy would be to focus on new initiatives, but that
these new initiatives should specifically include an
emphasis on new management approaches and new organizational
arrangements. A specific proposal was made to mandate the
formation of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) -type organization within NASA with ample resources,
serious organizational clout, and a clear charter to seek
innovative and creative technical solutions to space
challenges.
6.
There was a general agreement that "smaller, faster,
cheaper" ways of conducting space missions, including
Mission to Planet Earth, could be found. There was also
considerable criticism of the past development and present
state of both the Shuttle and Space Station Freedom, with
some disagreement about how radical were the changes that
needed to be made. There was considerable agreement that
the Europeans and Japanese have been smarter in many aspects
of their space program than we have been in the last fifteen
years or SO.
7.
The Vice President initiated a discussion of garnering
public support for a rejuvenated space program. Darman
observed that the American people believed in exploring
frontiers, but also had a strong preference for concrete
results. He therefore concluded that a rejuvenated space
program must demonstrate early and tangible benefits to the
average citizen in order to enjoy significant popular
support. There was general agreement on the need for early
benchmarks of progress and success that will be meaningful
to the American people, and for the need to explain the
space program in terms intelligible to the American people.
For example, one could explain how space will contribute to
key energy, environmental, or defense needs of the American
people in the 21st century.
8.
The Vice President specifically challenged the group to
identify early, high profile projects that would fit into
such an explanation. Dr. O'Neil offered two examples of
space mining arguing that early resource development in
space would dramatically alter the ability to exploit space
energy sources here on earth. Bruce Murray offered several
examples including robotic exploration of craters at the
lunar poles for the existence of ice, mining of asteroids in
near earth orbit, or utilizing the Soviet MIR space station
for U.S. caliber medical research as near term efforts with
potential high public interest. There was agreement that
pursuit and execution of such options in a timely and cost
efficient manner would require substantially different
management approaches than would likely come from NASA.
9.
The Vice President closed the meeting by asking that the
participants continue to come forward with near term
proposals such as those offered by Murray and O'Neil.
N.B. The Vice President has asked Bruce Murray to assemble a team
to meet with him in California during the week of February
25th to add to and deepen the suggestions made at this
dinner.
CC: Ed Rodgers
GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE
PRESS STATEMENT
Embargoed until
Contact: James Frelk
May 1, 1990
(202)328-5470
A Report on the Lunar and Mars Initiatives:
New Directions in Space
Summary of Principal Findings by the Marshall Board:
o Major scientific gains in astronomy and the study of the origin and probability of life
in the Cosmos can be expected from the lunar base and the exploration of Mars.
The two missions - - and especially the Mars mission - are among the most
difficult and challenging technical projects ever attempted.
Alternatives to the NASA plan for implementing these missions, currently under
study in the DOE, claim to hold the promise of major cost reductions and accelerat-
ed schedules relative to the NASA plan. The Marshall Board recommends a solidly
funded program for testing and evaluation of these and other promising alternative
concepts as a prudent investment.
o Under the present management structure, control over decisions on technical
concepts for manned space flight is vested principally in NASA. At the present time
the agency is developing a competing entry, but also will serve as principal judge of
the competition. As a consequence, NASA is both judge and competitor in the
competition for selection of the best technical plan for the moon-Mars missions.
However, relevant expertise today is widely available in the aerospace industry.
It is also available, in many relevant areas, in the laboratories of the DOE and other
government facilities and, to some degree, in universities.
o
In view of the importance of placing the functions of judge and competitor in
separate organizations, the Board recommends that authority for deciding on the
technical plan for manned exploration of the moon and Mars should be vested in a
national commission external to NASA.
o
Members of the Commission will be chosen for outstanding ability in relevant fields
of technology and demonstrated competence in the management of very large
technical programs. The head of the commission will report directly to the President
or the Chairman of the National Space Council.
o The Commission must remain in charge and accept responsibility for the outcome of
the program until the technical concepts are established and the complete
management structure is agreed upon and in place. Thereafter the commission may
dissolve itself, or it may appear to be in the national interest to have the commission
continue to act as an advisory and technical assessment during the implementation
of the program. It is critically important that the Commission and staff do not become
another permanent element of the bureaucracy rather than a force for innovation.
11 DUPONT CIRCLE N.W., SUITE 506
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
ADVANCE COPY
EMBARGOED
UNTIL MAY 1, 1990
NEW DIRECTIONS
IN SPACE
A Report on the
Lunar and Mars
Initiatives
George C. Marshall Institute
Washington, D.C.
NEW DIRECTIONS
IN SPACE
A Report on the
Lunar and Mars
Initiatives
Willis Hawkins
Robert Jastrow
William Nierenberg
Frederick Seitz
George C. Marshall Institute
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 1990
The George C. Marshall Institute
Washington, D.C.
The George C. Marshall Institute provides technical
assessments of scientific developments
with a major public policy impact.
Board of Directors of the Marshall Institute
Frederick Seitz, Chairman
President Emeritus, Rockefeller University, and
Past President, National Academy of Sciences
Willis Hawkins
Former Senior Vice President, Lockheed Corporation, and
Past Chairman of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Robert Jastrow
Founder and Director (retired), Goddard Institute for
Space Studies, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
William A. Nierenberg
Director Emeritus, Scripps Institution of Oceanography
University of California, San Diego
Authors of New Directions in Space
Willis M. Hawkins is Senior Advisor to the Lockheed Corporation, former
Senior Vice President of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, recipient of the
NASA Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, Past Chairman of the NASA
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and former Member of the NASA Advi-
sory Council
Robert Jastrow is founder and past Director of the Goddard Institute for
Space Studies of NASA, first Chairman of NASA's Lunar Exploration
Committee, and recipient of the NASA Medal for Exceptional Scientific
Achievement.
William A. Nierenberg is Director Emeritus of the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography of the University of California, San Diego, first Chairman of
the NASA Advisory Council, and former member of the Defense Science
Board and the National Science Board.
Frederick Seitz is President Emeritus of Rockefeller University, past
President of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Physical
Society, former Chairman of the Defense Science Board, former Science
Advisor to NATO and recipient of the National Medal of Science.
The Executive Officer for the study, James J. Frelk, is Executive Director
of the George C. Marshall Institute, former analyst for the U.S. House
Republican Study Committee, and former Congressional Liaison to the
Office of the National Security Advisor.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
1
PART ONE: THE NEW EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
Introduction
4
Scientific Returns from the Lunar Base
4
Returns from the Mars Mission
6
Other Features of the New Exploration Initiative
7
Institutional Arrangements
8
Budget and Personnel Developments
9
PART TWO: MISSION CONCEPTS
Technical Developments
12
Related Cost Considerations
15
PART THREE: AVENUES TO A COMPETITIVE
SPACE PROGRAM
The Present Management Structure
18
A National Technical Commission
20
Organization of the Commission
23
Commission Tenure of Office
25
Structure of the Competition
25
Utilization of NASA Capabilities
27
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Marshall Institute is indebted to senior management and
technical personnel of NASA and other government and private
organizations, who gave generously of their time in briefings and
discussions ranging over the technical areas that are expected to
play an important role in the proposed lunar and Mars missions.
In particular, we would like to thank Drs. Franklin Martin and
Mark Craig of NASA Headquarters and Clark Covington of the
Johnson Space Center for extensive briefings on the results of the
NASA 90-day study, "Human Exploration of the Moon and
Mars." We are also indebted to Drs. Lowell Wood and Rod Hyde
of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for their report
on alternative concepts for the lunar and Mars missions, and to
Dr. Steve Howe of the Los Alamos National Laboratory for his
presentation of the NERVA and Post-NERVA nuclear propulsion
programs.
Richard DalBello and Peter Sharpman of the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment gave a very informative account of the problems
involved in the reduction of launch operations costs, based on the
detailed OTA study of this problem. Professor Marvin Minsky of
MIT described the potential of robotics and Artificial Intelligence
for reducing the human workload and costs in space operations.
We are indebted to Dr. Jerry Grey, Director of Science and
Technology Policy, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics, for an exceptionally lucid and informative account of the
Advanced Launch System concept in relation to other vehicle de-
velopment programs now in progress or under study, and for his
1
informed and valuable contributions to the discussions in most of
the Marshall meetings on the space program. We are also indebt-
ed to General Bernard Schriever, former Commander, U.S. Air
Force Systems Command, for participating in several meetings
and sharing with the Board his enormous fund of knowledge and
experience in regard to the management aspects of large technical
programs.
Frederick Seitz, Chairman
Willis Hawkins
Robert Jastrow
William Nierenberg
2
PART ONE:
THE NEW EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
INTRODUCTION
This report focuses on one aspect of the current space program:
The establishment of a manned base on the moon and the manned
exploration of Mars. These missions were announced by the Presi-
dent last year as a major U.S. space policy objective to be imple-
mented under the leadership of the Vice President, acting as
Chairman of the National Space Council.
On March 8, 1990, the White House released Presidential
guidelines for the execution of the lunar and Mars programs. The
guidelines stressed the need for new approaches and the develop-
ment of innovative technologies with a potential for major cost,
schedule and performance improvements. They also called for a
competitive environment, with several years allotted to the defini-
tion of at least two significantly different human space exploration
"reference architectures." Selection of the final technical concepts
for the mission is scheduled to occur only after the relative merits
of the competing reference architectures have been evaluated.
SCIENTIFIC RETURNS FROM THE LUNAR BASE
The lunar and Mars missions, together dubbed the Space Ex-
ploration Initiative, have the potential for rich scientific returns.
Astronomy conducted from a lunar base can examine the universe
with 100,000 times more resolution of detail than has ever been
seen before. An optical interferometer - a network of 42 60-inch
telescopes spread across a six-mile area of the moon - will have
sufficient resolution of detail to permit the direct detection of
planets circling other stars. This network of telescopes will even
be able to detect the ozone in the atmospheres of these planets.
Ozone would indicate the presence of an abundance of oxygen in
a planet's atmosphere.
4
THE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
The earth's atmosphere has an abundance of oxygen only be-
cause plants produce it. The presence of oxygen in the atmos-
phere of another planet would be an almost certain sign of the ex-
istence of plant life. On the earth, the appearance of animals
followed the appearance of the first plants within two billion
years. Since this is a relatively short interval of time when meas-
ured against the age of the galaxy and many of its stars and plan-
ets, the existence of animal life, in addition to plants, could be in-
ferred as a likely prospect on planets with oxygen-rich atmo-
spheres.
The lunar telescope network could also peer into the hearts of
distant quasars - remarkable objects that produce the energy of
many billions of suns in a space smaller than our solar system.
Astronomers have reason to believe that this extraordinary out-
put of energy is created by a massive black hole at the center of
the quasar, whose gravitational force tears apart and consumes
the stars circling around it. If this remarkable conjecture is correct,
the resolution of detail possible with the lunar telescope network
should enable it to observe these stars as they spiral into the black
hole and are torn apart by its gravity.
The moon is well suited for the execution of these extremely in-
teresting programs, which would be impossible or prohibitively
costly either on the earth or in earth orbit. On the earth's surface,
the blurring effects of the earth's turbulent atmosphere makes
high-resolution astronomy nearly impossible for all but the
brightest sources. If the telescopes were placed in orbit the effects
of the earth's atmosphere would be avoided. However, that
would mean an array of dozens of separate orbiting telescopes
spread across a six-mile area. The individual telescopes in this ar-
ray would be subject to small but significant variation in gravity
across that distance, and would spoil the relative alignment of the
telescope mirrors. The mirrors must be aligned, and their distanc-
es of separation known, to an accuracy of a fraction of wavelength
of light, or a few thousandths of an inch. Station-keeping to pre-
5
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
serve the alignment to this precision would be extremely complex
and costly. An alternative would be to lace all the telescopes in
one rigid, giant-sized platform six miles in diameter. However,
constructing such a platform would also be prohibitively expen-
sive.
The surface of the moon, however, provides a stable platform
that avoids these difficulties. It also has the advantage of an ex-
tremely low level of seismicity compared to the earth. Ground
motions produced by lunar seismic events typically are on the or-
der of a few 10-millionths of an inch - 100 times smaller than the
maximum relative movement allowable for the telescope mirrors.
RETURNS FROM THE MARS MISSIONS
Valuable scientific returns are also expected from the explora-
tion of Mars. The study of the planet's surface and atmosphere
promises to provide the terrestrial geologist and climatologists
with information on the basic forces governing the evolution of
an earthlike planet and its climate, that could not be obtained
solely from the study of the earth.
Another objective of the Mars missions - the search for Mar-
tian life, or fossilized remains of life - is of equally great interest
to scientists and the general public. In situ exploration of Mars
and the search for Martian life were initiated by the robotic devic-
es on NASA's Viking spacecraft in the 1970s. The consensus of
NASA scientists was that within the limits of the indirect tech-
niques employed by Viking, no evidence for Martian life could be
found. However, a variety of other evidence indicates that in the
past Mars was considerably warmer and moister, and more con-
genial to the evolution and continued support of life as we know
it, than it is today. Life may have evolved on Mars in this Golden
Age. Even if the descendants of that early life did not survive
down to the present, their fossilized remains may still exist, on or
6
THE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
near the planet's surface.
The discovery of traces of fossilized Martian life would be al-
most as significant as the discovery that life still exists there to-
day. Either finding - the discovery of life or the fossilized re-
mains of life - would indicate that in the past nature conducted
experiments on the creation of life out of nonliving matter on two
planets - the earth and Mars - and on both planets the experi-
ments succeeded. It could then be inferred that the chemical evo-
lution of life out of inanimate matter is not a difficult matter for
nature to arrange, but something that can happen readily on any
planet when conditions are favorable.
A variety of recent evidence strongly suggests that planets are
common in the universe, and tens of billions exist in our galaxy
alone. The discover of Martian life, or Martian fossils, would im-
ply that life is a common occurrence on these planets, and that,
consequently, billions of planets in our galaxy alone are inhabit-
ed. This would be perhaps the most portentous scientific finding
ever to emerge from the space program.
OTHER FEATURES OF THE NEW SPACE INITIATIVE
While the exploration of the moon and Mars offers much of in-
terest to the scientific community, these missions also have a great
deal of interest for the general public. Setting foot on an alien
world is a project that appeals to a deeply rooted element in the
human psyche - the desire to explore new environments and
gather new experiences. At the same time, the two missions -
and especially the manned Mars mission - are technically the
most challenging and difficult tasks ever attempted in the space
program. They could also be both lengthy in fulfillment and very
costly. According the initial NASA plan, achievement of the objec-
tives of the lunar and Mars mission will take 25 to 30 years, at a
cost reportedly in excess of $500 billion. The call by the White
7
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
House for innovative approaches, and the intent to select the best
technical plan through a competitive procedure, appear to have
been motivated by the lengthy timetable and high price attached
to the initial NASA estimates.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The moon and Mars missions will build on the successes
achieved by NASA in the lunar landings of the late 1960s and
1970s. The vigor and technical competence of the NASA space
program in that period added luster to the image of the United
States as a can-do nation. NASA achievements in sending men to
the moon and returning them safely are almost universally re-
garded as a triumph of engineering talent and management skill.
The current assignment of responsibilities within the government
for the manned missions to the moon and Mars calls for the con-
tinuation of the institutional arrangements which enabled NASA
to accomplish these earlier tasks with such outstanding success.
The faith of the public and the press in the competence of
NASA management was considerably shaken by the Challenger
disaster. Fortunately, the post-Challenger period has seen a resur-
gence of public and Congressional support for the space agency.
At the same time, it must be admitted that NASA is a somewhat
different institution from the innovative and entrepreneurial
agency of the 1960s. In view of the technical challenges and poten-
tial cost of the moon and Mars missions, as the nation contem-
plates the course set by the President in his call for the new Explo-
ration Initiative, it seems worthwhile to examine some of the
institutional and management trends in the space program in the
two decades since Apollo. This is the task to which the Marshall
Board has addressed itself.
8
THE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
BUDGET AND PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENTS
NASA is a considerably smaller agency than it was in the mid-
1960s. Over the course of 10 to 12 years, the NASA budget fell by
a factor of three, from a peak in 1965 of $27 billion in 1990 dollars
to a low of $8.5 billion (1990 dollars) in the 1970s. Budget levels
started to rise a few years ago, but are still little more than a third
of their peak value in the 1960s.
Drastic reductions in the budgets of federal agencies of this
size are unusual. To our knowledge, the last comparable instance
occurred nearly a century ago, when Congress cut the budget of
the U.S. Geological Survey Agency by a factor of two in one year.
It is reasonable to ask how NASA management has distributed
these Procrustean cuts, and whether the down-sizing of the agen-
cy has preserved the lean and productive character of the earlier
NASA.
If NASA were a corporate entity with a bottom line, these
questions would be addressed by looking at such performance in-
dicators as profit as a percent of sales. Since the NASA program
has no bottom line, other measures of performance must be
sought. One pertinent indicator of performance and cost-effective-
ness is the number of people working for the agency in relation to
the size of its program. As noted, the NASA budget in recent
years has been approximately 1/3 of its peak in the Apollo era.
However, the space agency has 2/3 as many employees. In other
words, the agency employs twice as many individuals per dollar
of program money as it did at the peak of its technical effort.
The ratio of number of employees to size of appropriation var-
ies from one agency or program to another, but within a given
program, the number of people needed to spend an appropriation
effectively would be expected to go up or down roughly in pro-
portion to the size of the appropriation. On this basis, when the
NASA budget was cut from roughly $27 billion to $8.5 billion
over the course of several years, NASA employment should have
9
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
declined from its peak of 35,860 to a number in the neighborhood
of 12,000. Instead the personnel complement dropped to approxi-
mately 22,000. Some economies of scale would be lost in the
down-sizing of the agency, but not enough to explain the approxi-
mate doubling of the people-to-dollar ratio.
These trends in NASA statistics suggest the development of a
certain amount of institutional bloat in the agency as it matured.
Personnel statistics reveal other signs of a mature and aging agen-
cy. In 1963, as the Apollo program moved into high gear, the av-
erage age of NASA employees was 30 - the youngest of any fed-
eral agency at the time. In today's NASA, three-quarters of NASA
middle and senior level management will be eligible for retire-
ment within five years.
10
PART TWO:
MISSION CONCEPTS
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Among the key elements of the initial NASA plan for the moon
and Mars missions are: (1) assembly of the interplanetary vehicles
in earth orbit at the Space Station; (2) after assembly in orbit, an
Apollo-style mission profile with lunar or Mars orbit as an inter-
mediate step prior to descent to the surface; (3) for the Mars mis-
sion, an interplanetary flight followed, on arrival at Mars, by; (4)
aerobraking for deceleration and the drop into Mars orbit; and (5)
descent from moon or Mars orbit to the surface.
Other possibilities exist. A report by the National Commission
on Space suggests the attractive concept of a cycling spaceship for
the Mars mission, shuttling back and forth between the orbits of
the earth and Mars on a transfer ellipse under the pull of gravity
alone, without expenditure of fuel. Crews and cargoes rendez-
vous with the cycler from low-earth orbit or Mars orbit, at the
start and finish of each interplanetary flight.
The NASA plan cites nuclear-powered rockets as an alternative
technology for the lunar and Mars missions, referring specifically
to the advanced technology of gaseous core rockets. The Commit-
tee on the Human Exploration of Space of the National Research
Council (NRC), in its review of the NASA 90-day study, suggests
that this advanced technology for nuclear propulsion, while offer-
ing very large potential gains, is too speculative for consideration
at the present time.
However, the NRC Committee favors a serious study of cur-
rent state-of-the-art nuclear propulsion technologies based on the
NERVA-class technology, whose feasibility was demonstrated by
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the 1960s. The
NRC committee report stresses the capability of nuclear rockets
for completing the interplanetary transfer between the earth and
Mars in one-third to one-half the time required with chemical
rockets.
The LANL nuclear propulsion technology would offer impor-
12
THE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
tant advantages over chemical propulsion in respect to require-
ments for weight lifted into low earth orbit (LEO), in addition to
shortened round-trip travel times to Mars. According to the
LANL proposal, a NERVA-type nuclear propulsion technology
has the potential for: (i) reduction in weight to LEO from 3.5 mil-
lion pounds to 1.6 million pounds; (ii) reduction in launch costs
from approximately $10 billion to $4 billion; and (iii) reduction in
trip time for the Mars mission from 3 years to 1 year, including a
20-day stay on the planet.
The reduction in travel time has the important consequence of
diminishing the adverse biomedical impact of lengthy sojourns in
space under zero gravity, which is discussed below.
To minimize concern over nuclear safety, the interplanetary
nuclear-powered rocket stage would first be boosted by chemical
rockets to an altitude of the order of 600 miles, before the nuclear
reactor was operated at significant power levels. The NRC com-
mittee comments, however, that deployment of nuclear reactors
in space will face formidable barriers of public acceptance.
A concept for the lunar mission developed by the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) omits the intermediate
stop in lunar orbit and calls instead for direct descent to the sur-
face after the earth-moon flight, as the basic mission profile. The
LLNL concept for the Mars mission resembles the NASA plan ex-
cept that on arrival at Mars, deceleration and the drop into Mars
orbit are to be accomplished by a rocket retroburn as a less risky
maneuver than aerobraking.
An alternative approach to the Mars mission, suggested in the
report by the National Research Council committee, would first
establish advanced bases in Mars orbit and conduct extended re-
connaissance from orbit, before the descent to the surface of Mars
is attempted. This approach is viewed by the NRC Committee as
less risky than the NASA plan.
Need for Artificial Gravity. One of the key questions confront-
ing planners of the Mars manned missions is the potentially de-
13
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
structive biomedical impact of zero or reduced gravity on the
crew, during round trips that can last as long as three years. No
element of research in preparation for the missions is more impor-
tant. Enough is already known from Soviet experience with an 11-
month stay in orbit, and American experience with Skylab, to in-
dicate that the effects of lengthy stays in zero gravity can be dele-
terious to health, and possibly fatal.
Experience in Skylab indicates that loss of bone mass could
amount to 20 to 30 percent during the two-year round trip to
Mars, leaving the weight-bearing bones of the skeleton - espe-
cially legs and spine - relatively fragile and liable to fracture on
return to earth or in high accelerations. Exercise helps but appears
not to eliminate the problem. Calcium dissolved out of the bone
also creates a potential in-flight kidney stone problem. Loss of
muscle mass, including cardiac muscle, may also be substantial. A
Soviet cosmonaut lost 15 percent of leg muscle mass during an 11-
month stay in orbit. Knowledge in hand suggests that artificial
gravity will be essential for the Mars mission.
Possible collapse of the key elements of the immune system is
another potentially serious medical problem that may be created
by long stays in zero or deduced gravity.
The report of the National Research Council labels multi-year
exposure to weightlessness an "unacceptable risk" for the Mars
mission. The NASA plan acknowledges the importance of the
problem but does not include artificial gravity in its list of vital
technologies for development and apparently does not include it
in the initial concept for the Mars flight. The risks inherent in this
approach are exacerbated by the proposal for aerobraking on arri-
val at Mars, which will place a load of several times earth gravity
on a crew whose cardiac performance and skeletal structures
have been weakened by 10 months of weightlessness en route.
The alternative plan, adopted in the LLNL proposal and based
on creation of artificial gravity by rotation of the spacecraft in
earth orbit and en route to Mars, holds the promise of eliminating
14
MISSION CONCEPTS
at least one major element of risk in a mission that is certain to in-
volve elements of danger under the best of conditions.
RELATED COST CONSIDERATIONS
The estimated cost of implementing the NASA plan for the
moon and Mars mission has been reported to Congress as totaling
$541 billion over the next 25 to 30 years. This represents an aver-
age annual expenditure of approximately $20 billion, to be added
to existing NASA programs currently budgeted at an annual level
of roughly $12 billion. The total civilian space budget would be in
excess of $30 billion a year over the next 25 to 30 years.
We judge it doubtful that support can be obtained for this pro-
gram, which will require an annual level of expenditure that is
greater than the peak budgets of the Apollo era, continue at that
level for up to 30 years, and does not achieve its major goals dur-
ing the political lifetimes of those who are setting the new course
in space and providing its funding.
In our view, the scientific returns and technological benefits
from the Moon and Mars missions are of the highest value. But
ways must be found to cut costs and accelerate the schedules laid
out in the initial NASA plan, so that the program acquires some
elements of political realism. We strongly endorse the call by the
White House for innovative technologies and unconventional ap-
proaches aimed at major cost reductions and a more timely sched-
ule.
The proposal by LLNL for the use of inflatable structures in
space is an example of innovative technical concepts that involve
major departures from the traditional methods for doing business
in space. Inflatable structures for use on the surface of the moon
were investigated by the NASA Langley Research Center in the
1960s, but put aside by management although preliminary tests
had yielded encouraging results. These structures offered the
15
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
promise of providing large volumes of habitable working and liv-
ing space - in earth orbit, en route to Mars, and for bases on the
surface of the moon or Mars - at substantially reduced cost.
The inflatable space module tested by Langley achieved a
packing ratio or volume compression of 28:1. I.e., the habitable
volume in space would be 28 times the volume of the station
module as a payload packed for launch. The LLNL inflatables are
cylindrical structures 16 feet in diameter, collapsible in one di-
mension only, accordion-fashion, to achieve a somewhat more
conservative packing ratio of approximately 15:1. Cost savings re-
sult from the fact that the large reductions in volume permit the
launch of an entire earth station as a payload on one heavy lift ve-
hicle. The habitable volume of the station when expanded and
outfitted is three times the habitable volume of the Space Station
Freedom (SSF). The large volume of the proposed LLNL station
allows most gear to be stowed internally, and permits outfitting
of the station, and repairs and maintenance, to be conducted in-
ternally in a shirt-sleeve environment, obviating astronaut EVAs
for station repairs and maintenance. Extensive EVA required for
SSF are both costly and dangerous and appear to be a potential
drawback to the SSF design.
Cost savings and reduced risk to astronauts from the substan-
tial deduction of EVAs make the LLNL design an interesting con-
cept, and responsive to the White House appeal for innovative,
cost-cutting procedures. We judge the proposed LLNL develop-
ment of inflatable space structures, and the potential cost savings,
to be well worth a full test program, including tests in orbit.
16
PART THREE:
AVENUES TO A COMPETITIVE SPACE
PROGRAM
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
THE PRESENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Thanks to an enlightened research policy in the United States,
augmented by a vigorous NASA, commercial and military space
programs as well as the commercial aircraft industry, aerospace
technology in the U.S. is in very healthy shape. Already in hand
are many of the tools needed for maintenance of human existence
in space over long periods of time.
Nonetheless, the goal is technically demanding and its realiza-
tion can turn out to be very costly if conventional approaches are
used. Achievement of this formidable capability at acceptable cost
and level of risk is a major challenge. It will require not only a sol-
id base of experience with the existing technologies of manned
space flight, but also the creativity of the technical mind at its
best, applied to the development of innovative procedures for
minimizing cost and risk.
NASA has put forward a relatively detailed plan for achieving
the goals of a lunar base in the first decade of the next century
and the manned exploration of Mars in the second or third. A
competing proposal, put forward by the Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory of the Department of Energy, has been men-
tioned. Other proposals may be forthcoming from the private sec-
tor, and from other government organizations as well.
The DOE proposal differs markedly from the NASA plan in
concept, cost and schedule. It is likely that the proposals submit-
ted by other organizations will also differ from the NASA plan in
greater or lesser degree, since some of the best and most creative
technical minds in the American aerospace industry are apt to be
attracted to this enormously challenging and exciting task.
Under the management structure for space projects that has
been in place up to the present time, NASA develops technical
concepts for the manned lunar and Mars missions, and also pass-
es judgment on the merits of alternative concepts. Thus, NASA is
preparing an entry in the competition for the selection of the best
18
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
technical plan for the Moon-Mars missions, but also will serve as
the judge of the competition.
This management structure is inherited from an earlier period
in the space program, when expertise in the new field of space
flight technology was confined to a small group, and a broad
technical base in the field had not yet been established. The ar-
rangement which gives NASA monopoly power over decisions
on the technical concepts for manned space flight, has not been se-
riously reexamined since the establishment of the space agency
more than 30 years ago. However, the circumstances which made
it appropriate to give NASA this power when it was first estab-
lished have changed markedly in the intervening decades.
Today, the relevant expertise is widely available in the aero-
space industry. It is also available to some degree in universities.
Many relevant areas of high technology are also very well repre-
sented in the laboratories of the DOE and other government facili-
ties.
In view of the changing circumstances which have developed
since the creation of NASA, it is essential, in the Board's view, to
divorce the functions of competitor and judge in the competition
for the best technical approach to the moon and Mars missions,
and place these two functions in separate organizations.
Since NASA is certain to play a major role - probably the
dominant role - in the implementation of the moon and Mars
projects, it cannot reasonably be eliminated as one of the competi-
tors in the competition for design of the final system. This consid-
eration leads us to conclude that the responsibility for judging the
competition - the authority for deciding on the technical plan for
the manned exploration of the moon and Mars - should be re-
moved from NASA, and vested in a national commission of lead-
ers in aerospace technology and the management of large techni-
cal programs.
19
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
A NATIONAL TECHNICAL COMMISSION
It is proposed that a national commission be created with
members from industry, the universities and the ranks of those
who have served the government and understand the complexi-
ties of large technical programs. The director of the commission
will report directly to the President or the Chairman of the Na-
tional Space Council but to no lower level of government. The
members of the commission will be chosen for outstanding ability
in relevant fields of technology, and demonstrated competence in
the management of very large technical programs. Establishment
of manned bases on the moon and human exploration of Mars at
acceptable levels of cost and risk will demand every reserve of
technical genius and management skill that can be attracted to the
project.
Very few programs in recent technical history can serve as
models for the proposed organization. The highly successful
Apollo program comes to mind immediately, but it was not a
clear example of ordered planning. The achievements of Apollo
were more the product of a will to act by an inspired nation, abet-
ted by a large amount of money and talent of some outstanding
technical personnel, attracted to a new and challenging program.
Another highly successful model, more pertinent to the present
situation because it had stronger elements of permanence and
long-term stability, was the Polaris program of the Navy. The Po-
laris program built on a solid base of existing technology but
went far beyond the state of the art at the time, in the develop-
ment of new and highly creative approaches to technical prob-
lems whose solution had never before been attempted. The Pola-
ris project needed new concepts in propulsion, guidance, sub-
marine design and launch systems: The missile was the first en-
tirely solid-fueled ballistic missile developed by the U.S.; it was
the first missile to rely completely on inertial guidance; it had the
first gimbaled solid-rocket engine designed; and it marked the
20
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
first attempt ever at an underwater vertical launch.
It was a formidable task to bring these highly advanced tech-
nologies individually to fruition. Combining the separate technol-
ogies into a smooth working operational system was an even
more formidable task. The result of the effort was a product that
met requirements and came in very close to the roiginal budget
and schedule. These achievements make Polaris one of the best-
known success stories in American technical history. How did the
Navy do it?
The answer is that Navy management removed the responsi-
bility for major technical decisions regarding Polaris from the or-
ganizational units in the Navy that would normally manage the
building of the Polaris submarine, and placed this responsibility
in a new management entity utilizing substantial talent from out-
side the government. The new entity, called the Steering Task
Group, functioned as a board of directors for the director of the
Polaris program. The Polaris Steering Task Group was (and is) an
organizational entity very similar to the proposed National Tech-
nical Commission on Space. The talented individuals who made
up the Steering Task Group understood and respected:
The technical complexities of a major system
The pertinent individual technologies required
The importance of innovation in a pioneering project
The probable demands on national resources
The need for agency support within the government
For the membership of the Polaris Steering Task Group, the
Navy called on individuals of the highest stature in pertinent
fields of technology and technical management. The member cho-
sen for expertise in missile guidance, for example, was Dr. Stuart
Draper, head of the MIT Draper Laboratory. The member chosen
for expertise in warhead technology was Dr. Edward Teller. In-
dustry members were chosen for very strong technical back-
21
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
grounds combined with top-level management experience.
Each unit of the Navy involved in support of the Polaris pro-
gram was represented on the Steering Task Group by its Admiral.
However, the Polaris Steering Task Group did not report to any
of the organizational elements in the Navy that might have been
given responsibility for the entire Polaris program under standard
operating procedures. The Chair of the Steering Task Group, who
was also the Manager of the Polaris Program, reported directly to
the Chief of Naval Operations.
Under direction of the Polaris Steering Task Group, advanced
technologies in many different areas were combined in a brilliant,
highly innovative and successful program to create the weapons
system that most security analysts have regarded for nearly 30
years as the key to American protection from the threat of nuclear
attack.
Another example can be taken from the annals of DOD techni-
cal management. In the early stages of the ICBM program, the Air
Force, faced with a major technical challenge, responded with a
similar solution by creating a technical entity outside the govern-
ment, which later became the Aerospace Corporation. This techni-
cal group was responsible critical technical recommendations on
ICBM development. Subsequently it underwent a major transfor-
mation, but in its earlier form it functioned in a very similar man-
ner to the Polaris Steering Task Group. This management struc-
ture resulted again in a highly successful product which created
the second major leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.
In this instance again, a government agency, faced with a for-
midable technical challenge, met the challenge successfully by
vesting responsibility for major design recommendations in a
new management structure, responsible for definition of technical
concepts, and reporting to only the highest levels. In this way, the
government ensured free play for the competitive forces that
should be at work in the marketplace of ideas. It ensured that
technical innovation would not be smothered by the "not invent-
22
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
ed here" reflex, the "protect your rear" syndrome, and bureaucrat-
ic inertia.
Here are two success stories. What elements do they have in
common? What can be learned from them? In each case, a deci-
sion at presidential level confronted an agency of the government
with a very formidable technical challenge. In éach case, the an-
swer was the creation of an autonomous unit responsible for im-
portant technical decision, and reporting to the highest levels of
government.
ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION
With this preamble, where should the nation start? First, a
highly credible Director or Chairman must be chosen who can as-
sume the task without any historic encumbrances. This leader
must bring to the task a judgment in technologies and responsible
management that has been proven by a long record of successful
achievement in large technical programs. The search committee
for a suitable director should include individuals of seasoned
judgment in technical matters and affairs of government. The
search committee must answer to the President or Chairman of
the Space Council, but to no one lower in the chain of authority.
After appointment of a Chair, the Commission must be assem-
bled from a group of individuals with expertise in the fields listed
below. In addition to the members chosen for individual capabili-
ties, the Commission will provide some members who head or-
ganizations that can provide staff support, either informally or
formally. Such members of the support staff must be chosen from
the rosters of active hands-on agencies. An initial concept of the
structure of the Commission is as follows:
Chair
System Concepts (Technical); serves as Chair of the Board
on Mission Goals (2)
23
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
Propulsion (Technical)
Long-Term Energy (Technical)
Life Support (Food-Sustenance-Social)
Safety (Technical) Chair of the Safety Board (1)
Structure (Technical)
Support Systems (Technical)
Facilities (Technical Planning)
Finance (Management); serves as Chair of the Board on
Program Planning (3)
Government Support (Management); serves as Chair of the
Board on Management Policy (4)
University Support (Technical-Scientific); serves as Co-
Chair of the Board on Mission Goals (2)
Public Relations
Legal Counsel
The work of the Commission should be supplemented by a
full-time support staff and by part-time boards of specialists,
staffed by proven technical leaders. Subjects of the boards of spe-
cialists should include:
1. Mission Goals: Exploration, science, human activity con-
cepts, resource development, earth-based data repository -
distribution - international participants.
2. Program Planning: Facilities demands, cost patterns, af-
fordability, financing mechanisms.
3. Safety Board: Policy, risk posture and monitoring, concept
evaluation, test and simulation for risk assessment.
4. Management Policy: Government-university-industry rela-
tionships; development, certification, operations responsibility
distribution; leadership selection - role of Commission before
and during program activation and during system develop-
ment and deployment.
24
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
COMMISSION TENURE OF OFFICE
The Commission must remain in charge and accept responsi-
bility for the outcome of the program until the technical concepts
are established and the complete management structure is agreed
upon and in place.
Thereafter, the Commission may dissolve itself; or it may be
evident that it would be in the national interest if the Commission
were to continue to act as a governing and assessment body dur-
ing the implementation of the program. It is critically important
to ensure that the Commission and its staff do not acquire a per-
manence that would lead to their becoming another element of
the bureaucracy rather than a force for innovation.
STRUCTURE OF THE COMPETITION
Conduct of a timely but thorough competition is the Commis-
sion's major task and is the crux of this proposal. It will require
that the Commission define how a request for proposals for tech-
nical concepts is to be written, and will describe the steps to be
taken in the evaluation of proposals. The Board recommends that
the competition be conducted to two phases as follows:
Phase I - Broad Concepts
In this phase, the originators of a proposal have maximum
freedom with few constraints, except adherence to the basic objec-
tive of developing a community of human beings as close to self-
sustaining as possible, on the moon and on Mars. The size of the
community, time scale, cost, support requirements, booster con-
cepts, etc., are left to the originators of the proposals.
The time allotted to the competition should be six months. Se-
lection of individuals or organizations to receive the requests for
25
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
proposals (and funding of cost proposals) and is the decision of
the Commission.
The product of the preliminary phase is the selection of three
"winners" by the Commission, who will be asked by the Commis-
sion to prepare detailed final proposals.
Phase II - The Competition
During this phase, the three preliminary "winners" selected in
Phase I will be asked to submit a detailed proposal with estimat-
ed cost and schedules. Each Phase I "winner" will be instructed to
use Commission-directed partners drawn from the roster of com-
petitors in Phase I if promising ideas have been proposed by an
organization in Phase I, but the organization making the proposal
is judged to be unsuitable for management of the total program.
It is suggested that each of the three entities selected in Phase I
should develop a management plan which describes how it
would strengthen its proposal by (i) utilizing partners selected by
the Commission from the Phase I roster of competitors, and (ii)
also incorporating in its planning a subcontractor role for the oth-
er two major competitors in Phase II.
The intent of this procedure is that all the technical elements in
the country that can make a special contribution shall be incorpo-
rated in the program plan. In fact, all three entities chosen for
Phase II are to be part of the final program. However, their roles
change depending on whether or not they are declared the win-
ner of the Phase II competition.
The three lead competitors should also suggest, as a part of
their proposals, how the interface with the federal government
would be established.
Time allotted to Phase II should be no longer than one year.
As Phases I and II progress, the Commission should explore al-
ternative possibilities for managing the ultimately defined pro-
gram, addressing particularly the relationship of the program to
26
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
existing government agencies. A review of COMSAT history
could provide information on the feasibility and likely success of
a similar approach to the organization of the interfacing agency
between the program and the government. Proposals from com-
petitors in Phase II may contain valuable contributions to the defi-
nition of the program-government interface, hence no final deci-
sion should be made on this matter until receipt of reports from
Phase II competitors.
In addition to its responsibilities for the conduct of the techni-
cal competition, the commission will also recommend a manage-
ment structure, or possibly alternative structures, for implementa-
tion of the technical plan.
UTILIZATION OF NASA CAPABILITIES
Establishment of the Commission would recognize that the po-
tential for creative technologies within NASA is no longer as
strong as it was in the 1960s. At the same time, it is clear that indi-
vidual NASA Centers possess a unique capability for implement-
ing various facets of manned space exploration. The NASA Cen-
ters are a national asset comparable in importance to the
laboratories of the DOE or the AT&T Bell Laboratories and other
outstanding research facilities in the private sector. Accordingly,
the Commission must be instructed to recommend means where-
by the experience and talent of these NASA Centers can be ap-
plied, even though they will no longer control concept design and
program management for manned exploration.
A critically important step by the Commission, which must be
taken at an early stage, is to decide which of the existing govern-
ment agencies that have a wealth of talent to contribute, can be
used on this project without aborting the creative process or over-
whelming the program with bureaucratic barriers. A related re-
sponsibility will be the careful use of the nation's scientific talent,
27
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPACE
and particularly the talented university science faculties. This can
only be done by tapping the university pool of talent directly for
inputs to the Commission. Coordination by or representation
through government agencies will blur or smother the contribu-
tions of university scientists.
The functions of the NASA operating units - Kennedy Space
Center, Wallops, and the Space Control and Tracking portions of
Johnson Space Center - should be reviewed with a view to deter-
mining whether it would be beneficial to transfer these entities to
NASA Headquarters. Some NASA field organizations have not
been fully responsive to instructions from NASA Headquarters
and, by and large, have not been under Headquarters control. As
organizational units attached directly to NASA Headquarters, the
operating centers and units are likely to be better coordinated and
more economically managed. It is suggested that Headquarters
control will avoid the "continuing change" style of management
so evident in major space programs, and so costly in time and
money.
The Board recommends that consideration also be given to a
redefinition of the role and organization status of one of the
NASA centers, so that this center assumes the function of an inde-
pendent government certifying agency for any system in the U.S.
space program that involves the presence in space of human be-
ings.
In particular, the function of a government certifying agency
would be appropriate for the Marshall Center. Certain areas of
the Marshall Center possess areas of technical competence that
make them particularly well suited for assumption of certification
responsibilities. The certification of space hardware has been rela-
tively informal within NASA, and carried out by the creators of
technical designs and hardware for manned space flight. This
practice was clearly necessary when only limited numbers of
knowledgeable technical experts were available but now that
such knowledge is widespread, an independent and entirely ob-
28
COMPETITIVE SPACE PROGRAM
jective third-party agency should be created for certification of
manned space flight hardware and operations.
29