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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
foia Number:
1998-0004-F[1]; 2008-0422-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29173
Folder ID Number:
29173-002
Folder Title:
Trade/Textiles (1989)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
4
4
Imports Versus Textile Orders
Volumes
Billion '82 $
Billion SYE
16
3.8
IMPORTS
3.6
15
3.4
14 -
3.2
3.0
13
ORDERS
2.8
12
2.6
11
2.4
1986
1987
1988
1989
Quarterly
Source: Departments of Commerce and Labor
(O-N 89)
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memo
From Carla Hills to John Sununu
1/29/90
P-5
Re: Your January 30 Meeting with Senator Helms on
Textiles (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By
of
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
January 29, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
CARLA A. HILLS
CA15
SUBJECT:
Your January 30 Meeting with Senator Helms on
Textiles
We have been working with various industry groups on our Uruguay
Round goal to develop a mechanism to eliminate special protection
for textiles and apparel in ten years. We are considering three
basic options:
A continuation of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in
some form;
Global-type quotas (the quotas would not be universal
because at least Canada and Israel would be excluded
due to our free trade arrangements) ; and
Tariff-rate quotas, which most economists, including
Mike Boskin, favor.
- Ron Sorini will be discussing all three options on February 5 in
Geneva. Although Senator Helms does not object to our putting
forward the tariff-rate quota for tactical reasons, he wants the
Administration to commit itself to supporting a global quota.
Both Helms and Senator Sanford have said that if we do not
support a global quota, they will take steps to try to block the
Uruguay Round results.
We do not believe that now is an opportune time to narrow our
options. Virtually all other countries strongly support a
continuation of the MFA. Hence, removing the tariff-rate quota
option at this stage would simply polarize the negotiations
against the global quota. Moreover, at the end of the day we may
have to accept a continuation of the MFA as the only viable
option.
Thus, at this meeting we should try to persuade Helms et al. that
we are looking favorably at a global quota, but that it is
tactically preferable to leave all options on the table in order
to retain our flexibility. Below are suggested talking points:
A global quota approach appears to have merit and is
one of our top options for textiles in the Uruguay
Round negotiations. We will be giving all three
options an intensive review within the Administration,
with all relevant private sector groups, and in Geneva.
For tactical reasons it does not make sense to discard
any options or show our hand at this stage in the
negotiations.
If we eliminate the tariff-rate quota option at this
stage, other domestic forces will push us to eliminate
the global quota approach. We do not want this to
happen.
We will not negotiate a tariff-rate quota in the
Uruguay Round if the domestic industry, after analysis,
is adamantly opposed. However, we will discuss this
option in general terms, along with a global quota
proposal, next week in Geneva.
You must understand that the Uruguay Round will take at
least the remainder of this year. I know that you are
anxious to have us commit to the global quota approach.
However, since this issue is so important, complicated
and controversial, we are going to need more time to
determine if global quotas can and should be the final
outcome. Many of our trading partners are pushing
hard for a continuation of the MFA in some form, which
is also a possible outcome.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date! 11/30/23
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
CARLA A. HILLS CAH
SUBJECT:
Your Upcoming Meeting with Senator Helms on
Textiles
Ron Sorini of my staff has held extensive discussions with
industry representatives following your two previous meetings on
textiles. I understand that the industry, and thus Senator
Helms, is pleased with the discussions held to date. The
industry is confident that we will implement our textile import
program under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) in a satisfactory
manner. Also, it appears that the industry accepts our long-term
goal on textiles (i.e. to eliminate special protection for the
textile and apparel industries by the year 2001).
The industry group has asked us to consider global quotas
(growing at an annual rate of only one percent) as the
transitional mechanism from the MFA, which expires on July 31,
1991, to normal GATT rules (their proposal is attached). It
is
safe to say that global quotas growing at only one percent will
not be accepted internationally and would tag the Administration
as favoring protectionism. Whether any global quota scheme is
negotiable options. remains to be seen. We are also exploring two other
As this is a very complicated issue, I believe that we should
meet for 15 minutes to talk in more detail before the next
meeting with Senator Helms.
In line with our discussions to ensure a balanced perspective of
the textile and apparel industries at this meeting, we suggest
that the following individuals be invited:
Fred Dent,
Former USTR and Chmn Mayfair Mills
Robert Hauss,
CEO of Levi Strauss
William Farley,
Farley Industries and Chmn of Westpoint
Pepperell
Lawrence Puge,
CEO of Vanity Fair Corporation
Howard Cooley,
CEO of Jockey, International
Donald Hughes,
V. Chmn and CFO of Burlington Industries
Daniel Frierson, Chmn, Fiber, Fabric and Apparel
Coalition for Trade (FFACT)
Linda Wachner,
Chairman of Warnaco
Roger Milliken, President of Milliken & Company
Classified
Declassify on: BADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
It is possible that Senator Helms may resent Mr. Farley's
attendance because of his outspoken support of open trade.
However, Mr. Farley, who owns the largest textile company in the
country, would be helpful to us precisely because he is an
outspoken supporter of the Administration's open trade policy.
Still, it would be prudent to provide Senator Helms with a list
of proposed invitees and judge his reaction.
Ron Sorini and I will plan on attending the meeting with Senator
Helms. We have supplied below some suggested talking points for
the meeting.
-- We want to proceed with our dialogue on textile and apparel
trade policy. Since this issue is critical to our Uruguay
Round negotiations, I would ask Ambassadors Hills and Sorini
to continue to coordinate this effort.
--
I know that you are anxious to hear the Administration's
response to your proposal for global quotas. However, since
this issue is so important and complicated we are going to
need more time to develop our position on textiles in the
Uruguay Round.
-- There are three basic options we are considering at this
time; a continuation of the MFA in some form, global quotas
and tariff-rate quotas. I would ask USTR to discuss all
three of these options with the textile and apparel
industries. We, of course, also will have to consult with
importers and retailers.
--
I would guess that this is the first time that an
Administration has considered your request for global
quotas, and you can be assured that we will give your
proposal fair and thorough consideration. However, we must
keep in mind that any solution on textiles must be
negotiated internationally and compatible with our overall
objectives in the Uruguay Round.
--
We hope to have a decision made by the end of the year. But
as this issue is so important, we will take more time if
needed.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/19/89
P-5
Re: Senator Helms' Request for a Meeting on Textiles (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By
of
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Unclassified with a CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Senator Helms' Request for a Meeting on
Textiles
This follows up on my memorandum of October 13 and
Ambassador Hills' memo of October 17 (copy attached) on the
same subject.
Since the earlier memos were written, USTR has been
contacted by representatives of Bill Farley of West Point/
Pepperill. Farley has learned of the earlier Helms/Sununu
meetings and wants to be included in future ones. Senator
Helms would likely oppose Farley's participation strongly,
since Farley favors liberalization of import restrictions on
textiles.
This information reinforces my reservations about holding
a meeting attended by only one industry representative, who
is an advocate of tight import controls. The Administration
could be attacked for providing special treatment to the
protectionist side of the industry.
Therefore, I believe that the best step would be a call
from you to Senator Helms. In such a call, you could:
--
Explain that the Administration does not yet have a
firm answer on the global import quotas issue;
-- Explain why any meeting should include all parts of
the industry; and
--
Urge that a meeting not be scheduled at this time.
Since Senator Helms wants a meeting during the October 24-26
timeframe, your call would need to be made before the weekend.
Recommendation
That you call Senator Helms as soon as possible, using
the talking points at Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Hills Memo
Unclassified with a CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
TELEPHONE CALL TO SENATOR HELMS
ON TEXTILES
Talking Points
O
Senator, our two staffs have had several discussions over
the past few weeks concerning your interest in meeting
again to discuss the status of the Administration's
review of its textiles trade policy.
The meeting would be a follow-up to the one we held
in early August.
Our staffs had agreed to explore the possibility of
scheduling a meeting during the middle of next week,
in the October 24-26 timeframe.
I am told you had in mind a small meeting -- perhaps
Ambassador Hills, Roger Porter, and myself meeting
with you and Don Hughes of Burlington Industries.
I have two concerns about scheduling a meeting next week.
First, I am not sure that the meeting would meet
expectations or that there is all that much to discuss.
The key outstanding issue is the industry's request
for Administration support for global import quotas.
I understand from Carla Hills that the Adminis-
tration does not have a position on the quota issue
and may not have one for some time. The issue ties
directly to the U.S. position on textiles in the
Uruguay Round, which we are in the middle of
developing.
The key textiles issue in the Uruguay Round is what
transition rules should apply while we work toward
the goal -- which the industry accepts -- of
eliminating special protection for the textile and
apparel industries by the year 2001.
00
USTR is taking a close look at the global quota
option for the transition period. There are
also two other options. USTR is discussing all
of these with industry representatives and all
other concerned parties (e.g., importers and
retailers).
00
We hope to meet the Uruguay Round target of
tabling a proposal by the end of the year. But
this issue is so important that we will take
more time if needed.
-2-
Given the lack of anything definitive, I doubt
that a meeting would accomplish much or meet
expectations. It might be better for the industry
to keep working with USTR, since I understand that
process is going quite well.
Second, I am concerned about excluding key segments of
the industry from a meeting.
--
While Don Hughes is an important industry spokesman,
there are others who probably will want to be
included if he comes.
00
The apparel producers, for example, represent
an important part of the industry and should be
there.
00
We have also heard from Bill Farley (of West
Point/Pepperill), who wants to attend.
My preference is to put off a meeting until we have
something substantive to discuss.
|
If you wish, I am sure Ambassadors Hills and (Ron)
Sorini would be pleased to visit you to provide a
status report on their deliberations.
However, if you would like a meeting, I suggest a small
meeting with NO industry representatives. We could use
that opportunity to provide you with a status report from
USTR.
If you are absolutely committed to a meeting that
includes industry representatives, I believe we need to
include all of the key people.
-- This would be unwieldy and would do little to
advance the Administration's thinking on the issue.
Such meetings are best chaired by USTR.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
9/13/89
P/S
Re: Phone Call from Senator Helms Regarding Textiles (3
pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 13, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Phone Call from Senator Helms Regarding
Textiles
Issue
Senator Helms may call you to request another meeting to
discuss textile and apparel trade policy. We have told his
staff that a meeting toward the end of October might be more
useful than an earlier meeting.
Discussion
At a meeting with Senators Helms and Thurmond on
August 2, you directed USTR and the Department of Commerce
to meet with the textile and apparel industry to see if
agreement could be reached on Administration policy. You
indicated that you would be prepared to meet with Senator
Helms in a month.
Since that meeting, staff level discussions with the
industry have accomplished our initial objective of reaching
agreement with the industry on certain short-term
administrative actions relating to U.S. implementation of the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). These actions are consistent
with our international obligations and will address some
industry concerns regarding textile and apparel imports.
There is, however, no immediate prospect of agreement on
long-term U.S. textiles trade policy and the Administration's
objective of eventually integrating textile and apparel trade
into GATT disciplines in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. The U.S. is not scheduled to table a
position on textiles in the Uruguay Round until late this year
or early next year. The industry has asked us to consider a
system of global quotas on textile and apparel imports, with a
maximum of one percent annual growth. This proposal is not
acceptable and President Reagan twice vetoed legislation to
this effect.
The industry appears divided on its strategy. Some
hardline elements would like to push another textile quota
bill, but will probably hold off until next year, when the
prospect of elections will increase the pressure on Congress.
-2-
While a bill would probably pass, the President would almost
certainly veto it. The apparel manufacturers are less
committed to a bill and appear interested in a renewal of the
MFA.
USTR and Commerce want to continue to discuss long-term
policy with the industry. Subject to the constraints of
overall Administration policy, they are prepared to review
all options, including those proposed by the industry. While
this process may not be completed by the end of October, we
could be in a position to provide a substantive status report.
Recommendation
If Senator Helms calls you about scheduling another
meeting on textiles that you use the attached talking points
to urge a delay until the end of October.
Attachment
TEXTILES
Talking Points for Discussion with Senator Helms
While I will schedule a meeting if you insist, I think
that there would be more to discuss if we wait until
later this year, perhaps the end of October.
I understand that discussions between USTR and Commerce
and the textiles and apparel industry have resulted in
agreement on certain short-term measures to improve our
implementation of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA)
This should address some of the concerns you raised at
our last meeting.
The industry has asked us to focus on issues relating to
long-term U.S. policy with respect to the eventual
integration of textiles and apparel trade into GATT
disciplines. This process will take some time, in part
because of its complexity and in part because it is
driven by the Uruguay Round Timetable.
We will continue to consult. We want to work with the
industry to see what can be accomplished.
As for a meeting, it might be best to wait until later
this year, when we have something concrete to talk about.
We might aim for the end of October.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
5/5/89
P/5
Re: Upcoming Presidential Decisions on Trade (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By If (NLGB) on 5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Upcoming Presidential Decisions on Trade
The President will need to decide on implementation of the
so-called Super 301 authority by the statutory deadline of May
30. To create the framework for that decision, he should also
approve and announce his overall trade strategy.
Super 301
Last year's trade act contains a requirement that, by May
30, the U.S. Trade Representative submit to the Congress lists of
the most serious foreign trade barriers (called "priority
practices") and the countries maintaining the most restrictive
barriers ("priority countries"). Investigations must be
initiated on all priority practices in priority countries.
Unless the barriers are removed, retaliation could occur in 12 to
18 months.
The Super 301 provision has tremendous potential for
creating major foreign policy problems, not to mention a trade
war. Almost without exception, other countries resent the
potential use of a heavy unilateral club, especially concurrent
with the Uruguay Round negotiations. The European Commission,
for example, has already declared its unwillingness to negotiate
should the EC be designated under Super 301.
The sub-cabinet Trade Policy Review Group is now reviewing
options for designating countries and practices. USTR plans to
have the issue ready for review by the Economic Policy Council
beginning May 12, with recommendations ready for the President by
May 19. This would leave him a week to make a decision before
departing for Europe.
Trade Strategy
On Tuesday, May 2, the EPC reviewed a paper on the U.S.
trade strategy that was requested by Secretary Brady on behalf of
the President. The paper provides a solid, concise, statement of
our trade strategy. With the Super 301 issue about to capture
headlines, I believe that the President should use the trade
strategy paper as the basis for a public statement on trade
-2-
policy. This would give him a solid foundation to rebut any
charges of protectionism that may arise during his trip to
Europe. A good occasion for a trade speech would be his May 17
address to the American Retail Federation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That time be reserved on the President's calendar during the
week of May 22 to review the Super 301 issue.
Approve
Disapprove
2. That the May 17 address to the American Retail Federation be
used to make a major statement on the President's trade strategy.
Approve
Disapprove
Trade Protection and Higher Interest Rates
Trade protectionism could cause a significant drop in
Japanese and other foreign investment in the U.S.
-- Japanese and other foreign net capital investment
comprise a significant share of the funds available
for new investment in the United States.
-- Any sharp decline in this capital inflow could
seriously shake financial markets and send interest
rates higher.
Over the past year, net interest costs paid by business
have risen by $62 billion.
-- Roughly 60 percent of this rise was due to an 84 basis
point rise in interest rates paid by business.
If the pace of foreign investment in the U.S. slowed
enough to cause interest rates to rise by only 10 basis points,
it would cost American business roughly $4.4 billion, and a 20
point rise roughly $8.8 billion, etc.
-- Higher interest costs of this magnitude would not only
significantly exceed the estimated cost of the unfair
trade practices we are trying to address, but would
likely lower investment and hurt our future
productivity and competitive position.
Saving, Investment, and Capital Inflow
[As a Percent of GNP]
19.0%
Investment
18.0%
17.0%
16.0%
Percent
15.0%
Capital
14.0%
Inflow
13.0%
National Saving
12.0%
69
71
73
75
77
79
81
83
85
87
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
3/14/89
P-5
Re: Free Trade Zones (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By
gp
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Trade
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 14, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Free Trade Zones
This is in response to your inquiry about whether there
are any Japan-U.S. Free Trade Zones, and, if not, whether
there are any plans to have them.
While there are no "free trade zones,' there has been
some mild interest in the possibility of a U.S.-Japan Free
Trade Area (like the Free Trade Agreement recently negotia-
ted with Canada). Last year the International Trade Commis-
sion reviewed the prospects for such a trade agreement with
Japan at the request of Senator Robert Byrd. There is, how-
ever, little support at the present time for such an agree-
ment. We have preferred to concentrate on opening markets
through the Uruguay Round. Resorting to further bilateral
agreements is considered by USTR and others as something
of a fallback position if the multilateral approach fails
to produce adequately.
There are "Foreign Trade Zones" in the United States,
some of which benefit Japanese-owned firms. For example,
Toyoto has a Foreign Trade Zone for its assembly plant in
Georgetown, Kentucky. Toyota can import parts duty-free,
then pay duty on the assembled automobile when it is shipped
to dealers elsewhere in the U.S. This helps Toyota, since
duties on parts tend to be higher than those on finished
automobiles. The use of Foreign Trade Zones, however, is not
limited to Japanese-owned firms.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
6/1/89
Re: Textiles (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By
JP
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Textiles
As you may have been told by Senator Helms or others, the
textiles industry believes that in your early April meeting
with them you agreed to support legislation on textiles
imports. While White House participants at the meeting are
emphatic that no such commitment was made or implied, you are
likely to face continuing pressure for a quick decision at the
political level to resolve the industry's concerns.
USTR's textiles negotiator (Ron Sorini) has met several
times over the past six weeks with industry representatives,
with the declared objective of better understanding the
industry's perceived problem and proposed solution. The
industry has promised to provide USTR with a definitive paper
laying out its position by next week.
I believe that, in order to contain industry expectations
it is important to establish a clear process within the
Administration for review of the textiles industry's concerns.
The model should be the process now being used for the steel
industry to examine whether to extend VRA's on steel--
subcabinet review by the USTR-chaired Trade Policy Review
Group and subsequent consideration by the Economic Policy
Council.
The industry appears willing to accept this approach, but
wants to schedule a meeting with you on or about June 29. I
believe that the internal Administration review is unlikely
to be completed by then.
Recommendation
That, if requested by the industry, you agree in
principle to meet with them during the summer, but defer
setting a date until timing for completion of the
Administration's internal review is clearer.
CC: Fred McClure
David Bates
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
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and Type
08. Memo
From Carla Hills to John Sununu
4/27/89
P/5
Re: Follow-up to Your April 6 Meeting on Textiles (3 pp.)
Collection:
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Bush Presidential Records
Office:
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Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
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By
of
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on
5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
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Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
April 27, 1989
Rec'd COS
APR 27 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
FROM:
CARLA A. HILLS,
CAH
SUBJECT:
Follow-up to Your April 6 Meeting on Textiles
Attached is a summary of the textile industry's analysis of the
Multifiber Arrangement and past U.S. textile policy. The paper
was presented to us on behalf of the fiber/textile/apparel
industry coalition. The industry hopes that this will form the
basis for discussions with us. The industry will provide us a
specific proposal within the next week. I do not believe you or
I should meet with the industry again until we have a better idea
of what they really want.
Ron Sorini, who attended your earlier meeting, tells me that the
industry will not press for a quick follow-up meeting with you.
Instead, the industry has requested that Ron organize a working
group to explore areas of common interest. The industry will
want to meet with you after this group has concluded its work,
probably sometime in early June.
As Ron knows the issue well and the industry is comfortable
working with him, I will ask him, in coordination with Roger
Porter's office, to establish an interagency working group
composed of the relevant EPC agencies. Upon receipt of
recommendations from the working group, we could then decide when
to schedule the follow-up meeting with Senators Helms, Thurmond,
Lott and industry representatives.
We will attempt to maneuver this process so that the more
moderate, less protectionist elements of the industry will frame
their positions. I view this exercise as an opportunity not only
to satisfy some of the industry concerns so we can avoid
confrontation with them, but also to move the industry in a
direction consistent with our long-term strategy of opening
markets and expanding trade.
Attachments
CC: Roger Porter
Summary: Textile Industry's Analysis
of the Multifiber Arrangement & U.S. Policy
Shortcomings of the Multifiber
Shortcomings of U.S. Textile Policy
Arrangement (MFA)
and Procedures
Growth rates envisaged are
Ill-defined, ambiguous textile
generally 6% or greater.
policy has hindered U.S.
ability to act effectively.
Flexibility permits negotiated
growth rates to be exceeded.
Outcomes have become subject to
geopolitical influences.
Unilateral controls by country on
first 12 of prior 14 months
Outcome depends on negotiating
encourages surges to build
ability and willingness to be
quota bases.
tough.
No effective mechanism to control
CITA process subject to
import surges resulting from
bureaucratic delay -- either
intentional or institutional.
unfilled quotas.
If overhang is reduced, must pay
No response to inequities in
conditions of competition in
compensation.
supplying countries.
Dropped quotas which are
subsequently reinstated are
No linking of reciprocal market
set at original levels
access.
regardless of market
conditions.
Side letters and secret agreements
have undercut bilateral
Textiles Surveillance Body can
process.
interfere in bilaterally
negotiated deals.
No adherence to concept of
cumulative disruption.
No negative growth or flexibility
Lack of expertise in preparation of
permitted.
market disruption statements.
Special treatment for new entrants,
small suppliers and least
developed.
No teeth in quota fraud and
circumvention provisions.
Expires and must be renegotiated
every 4-5 years.
MFA under attack in Uruguay Round.
Principle Objections to the Previous Textile Bill
O The quotas would have been unilateral, automatic and
permanent.
O The bill did not distinguish between fair and unfair trade
practices.
-- it would have established quotas even if trade was
"fair".
-- it would have provided a disincentive to, rather
than an incentive for, foreign countries to open their
markets.
-- the remedy for dumping and countervailing duties
still would have been available.
O The quotas would have been established indiscriminately.
The bill would have placed quotas on all textile and apparel
products:
-- whether or not they are like or competitive with
products made in the U.S.
-- whether or not domestic producers are being damaged
by imports.
O The bill was incompatible with our international
obligations:
-- it was not consistent with the principles of the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).
-- the U.S. would have abrogated nearly 40 bilateral
agreements.
-- it was not consistent with the GATT or our Uruguay
Round "standstill" commitments.
PROPOSAL from
enclusiver and enions
4/27/89
In order to prevent further injury or threat of injury to the
U.S. textile and apparel industry and its workers, the following
must be implemented:
(1) A trigger-point mechanism that establishes
comprehensive product category quotas based on specific
measures of import sensitivity;
mechanism
(2) A provision to drop or add quotas as the trigger point
requires;
^
(3) Quota growth rates consistent with the long-term growth
of the U.S. market;
(4) Comprehensive quota levels based on 1988 data;
(5) A provision to authorize limited compensatory tariff
reductions in cases where principal supplying countries
have been demonstrably affected adversely;
The following must be implemented if the above provisions are to
be effective:
(1) A provision to require date-of-import for quota
administration purposes;
(2) A provision to permit countervailing duty petitions to
be filed against non-market economies;
(3) A provision to add enforcement resources to the U.S.
Customs Service for implementation of this program;
(4) A provision to establish a private right of action for
customs fraud and to establish penalties which decrease
the access to the U.S. market for countries engaging in
customs and quota fraud.
This approach provides the Administration flexibility in
establishing specific quotas. It is consistent with Article XIX
of the GATT. It can be implemented to accommodate existing MFA
agreements, either by continuing the agreements or by allowing
them to expire without re-negotiation.
These legislation. provisions can be best established and implemented through
Analysis of the Multifiber Arrangement
and U.S. Textile Policy
The cornerstone of the U.S. textile import program for the past
quarter century has been the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and its
predecessor international agreements. These arrangements have
had a limiting effect on the growth of textile and apparel
imports but they have been far from effective in preventing
market disruption and job losses, and have clearly been unable to
limit the growth of imports to anywhere near the growth of the
U.S. market. Charts I and II, (attached), show the growth of
textile/apparel imports and the resulting textile/apparel trade
deficit over the past fifteen years. Chart III also shows the
impact of this import growth on job losses in the U.S. textile
and apparel industry. Chart IV shows an example of the
ineffectiveness of the quota system by showing that in 1986,
textile and apparel imports which were subject to the MFA
controls grew by 17 percent -- precisely the same growth rate of
imports of textile and apparel not subject to MFA controls.
Ineffective control of textile and apparel imports is due both to
shortcomings in the Multifiber Arrangement itself and to
shortcomings in the U.S. government's textile and apparel
policies and procedures. These shortcomings are summarized in
Table I, attached. Several important conclusions can be drawn
from this list:
The MFA was never designed to produce import growth
equal to market growth. It was a compromise between
opening markets and disruption of those markets. While
growth rates in the early arrangements and the MFA were
linked to market growth rates, they obviously no longer
are.
While the MFA does envisage a growth rate of six
percent, the arrangement is so seriously flawed that
this growth rate has been and will continue to be
exceeded over time.
Its flaws include the extreme difficulty for an
importing country to take emergency action should
special circumstances develop; required flexibility
permitting growth rates at least 5 percent above
negotiated growth rates; the recognition that special
treatment must be paid to the least developed countries
and new suppliers which are often the major causes of
market disruption; a process for adding new quotas
which encourages exporting countries to accelerate
shipments to increase quota bases; an inability to deal
effectively with import surges caused by unfilled
quotas for prior years since compensation must be paid
if actions are taken; no meaningful provisions to
penalize countries engaging in quota fraud and
circumvention and a process through which bilateral
2
circumvention and a process through which bilateral
agreements subject to increasing through the Textile
Surveillance Body challenge.
Even given its flaws, the MFA can be made to work more
effectively for the developed countries if proper policies and
administrative procedures are implemented. The MFA will never be
able to produce with certainty an overall import growth rate at
or even close to the one percent growth of the U.S. market. The
only successful use of the MFA to get import growth rates close
to that of the importing country market was in the early 1980's
by the European Community (EC). This was accomplished by:
A policy decision by member countries that import
penetration (over 50%) had reached the point where
strong, effective action was needed to prevent further
penetration.
The member countries, acting through the Council of
Ministers, enacted a mandated set of global product
quotas covering most of the important textile and
apparel import categories. This had the essential
effects of legislation
This mandate was given to the EC Commission and the
Commission's Chief Textile Negotiator was instructed to
implement it and could not exceed its limits.
The negotiating technique used was particularly
effective in producing the desired result:
3
-
All major MFA bilateral countries were contacted
more or less simultaneously.
-
Negotiations were undertaken with all of them
within a very short time frame.
-
The mandated global quota was explained to each
supplying country.
-
Each country was told that the sooner it came to
terms bilaterally, the better the chance of
maintaining its share of the European Community
market.
-
The countries that came to terms last were, in
fact, rolled back because the mandated overall
limits had already been reached.
-
This clearly showed that the EC adhered to its
policy and was able to implement it within the
framework of the MFA.
This produced an incentive for countries to negotiate and to
accept terms required by the mandate. The result was that import
growth under this approach from MFA countries into the European
Community was only 2 percent per year during 1980 to 1985, versus
the 20 percent per year growth experienced by the U.S. over the
same time span.
It is therefore possible that the proper set of policies,
mandates and negotiating procedures can achieve slowed growth
under the MFA. However, even the EC experience was not
4
completely satisfactory because other non-MFA suppliers entered
the market and had to be dealt with outside the global limits.
In addition, the EC's preferential arrangements were not subject
to global quotas and have produced excessive import growth. The
global quotas were also not applied to developed country exports
into the EC. Thus, EC import penetration (measured in volume
terms), while slowed, has continued to grow through the 1980's.
The major flaw in U.S. textile policy during this period has been
the absence of such a policy. What we have experienced is
"textile policy by default" or a minimalist approach aimed at
"keeping the industry and unions on the reservation." There have
been only one or two instances (the Dec. 16, 1983 announcement
and the Baker Report) in this decade which were a positive
expression of U.S. textile policy. Neither of these directives
had a significant impact on slowing import growth. For example,
six months after the Dec. 16 White House announcement, import
growth was at a 26 percent annual level. The Baker Report
produced some improvement in the origin regulations concerning
sweaters made in China and Hong Kong but did little or nothing to
slow overall import growth. Most of the U.S. chief textile
negotiators have indicated that they operate essentially on their
own under very broad guidelines without any coherent policy
guidance. They are told to do what is necessary under the MFA to
avoid creating major problems either with the industry, the
unions, or the importers and retailers in the United States.
5
The result of this has been an average annual import growth of
over 15 percent during the 1980's. We are thus experiencing and
are impacted by the worst of all outcomes -- the perception that
the industry is highly protected and the "evidence" that it is
not protected very much at all.
The Office of Technology Assessment reported in 1987 that the
U.S. market has been the relatively most open market of the major
importing countries and in spite of significant efforts by the
industry to remain competitive and modern, strong government
action is needed if the industry is to survive into the future.
Yet we continue to face a textile policy which is to have no
policy. This situation is characterized by outcomes dictated
more by geopolitical considerations than the impact on domestic
industry and workers, by an administrative process within the
government that is subject to bureaucratic delay and indecision,
by an analytical process within the government which is ill-
prepared and unable to provide effective market disruption
determinations and by a failure of our government to adjust its
negotiating objectives to the continued unfair conditions of
competition which exist in textile trade worldwide.
It is doubtful whether policies can be formulated which would
produce the necessary slowdown in textile and apparel imports
under the current provisions of the MFA. But it is a certainty
that the absence of a coherent, committed textile policy can
never produce an effective slowdown in import growth.
6
CHART I
U.S. IMPORTS OF TEXTILE MANUFACTURES
(millions of equivalent square yards)
14,000
MISC
APPAREL
12,000
FABRIC
YARNS
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
O
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
MADE-UP &
3 FIBER **
YEAR
YARKS
FABRIC
APPAREL
MISCELLANEOUS
TOTAL
1978
972.5
1463.9
2905.4
398.1
5739.9
1979
438.2
1116.0
2671.1
412.9
4638.2
1980
380.2
1217.2
2884.2
402.8
4884.4
1961
442.7
1705.7
3135.9
490.4
5774.7
1962
496.0
1477.6
3382.4
579.1
5935.1
1963
867.8
1870.7
3874.7
1093.3+
7706.5+
1984
1279.5
2546.5
4707.2
1674.1
10207.3
1985
1321.4
2477.6
5116.9
1877.8
10793.7
1986
1833.3
3121.1
5866.6
2053.9
12874.9
1967
1815.9
3079.1
6126.1
2134.0
13155.1
1968
1590.3
2841.4
5969.3
1973.4
12374.3
SOURCE: Compiled by ATMI's TEXTILINE trade data system using U.S. Census Bureau data.
+ Total and Miscellaneous categories include flat goods beginning 1983 and subsequent years.
Without flat goods 1983 Miscellaneous imports were 789.7 million SYEs and Total imports
were 7402.9 million SYES.
** Data exclude silk rich blends and vegetable fibers other than cotton.
CHART II
U.S. TEXTILE AND APPAREL TRADE
C.I.F. IMPORT VALUES, F.A.S. EXPORT VALUES
CALENDAR YEAR TOTALS
Millions of Dollars
32,000
28,000
IMPORTS
24,000
20,000
16,000
12,000
DEFICIT
8,000
4,000
EXPORTS
O
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
TEXTILES
APPAREL
TEXTILES & APPAREL
TRADE
TRADE
TRADE
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
BALANCE
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
BALANCE
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
BALANCE
F.A.S VALUES
1971
1,392
632
-760
1,521
204
-1317
2,913
836
-2077
1972
1,526
779
-747
1,883
240
-1643
3,409
1,019
-2390
1973
1,568
1,225
-343
2,168
278
-1890
3,736
1,503
-2233
C.I.F. VALUES
1974
1,752
1,795
43
2,517
400
-2117
4,269
2,195
-2074
1975
1,336
1,625
289
2,826
403
-2423
4,162
2,028
-2134
1976
1,791
1,970
179
3,938
510
-3428
5,726
2,480
-3246
1977
1,939
1,959
20
4,493
608
-3885
6,432
2,567
-3865
1978
2,400
2,225
-175
6,108
677
-5431
8,508
2,902
-5606
1979
2,399
3,189
790
6,291
931
-5360
8,690
4,120
-4570
1980
2,676
3,632
956
6,849
1,202
-5647
9,525
4,834
-4691
1981
3,250
3,619
369
8,008
1,232
-6776
11,258
4,851
-6407
1982
3,000
2,784
-216
8,703
953
-7750
11,703
3,737
-7966
1983
3,460
2,368
-1092
10,292
818
-9474
13,752
3,168
-10584
1984
4,874
2,382
-2492
14,513
807
-13706
19,387
3,169
-16218
1985
5,274
2,366
-2908
16,056
755
-15301
21,330
3,121
-18209
1986
6,151
2,570
-3581
18,554
900
-17654
24,705
3,469
-21236
1967
6,918
2,900
-4018
21,960
1,132
-20828
28,885
4,089
-24796
1st 0
1,628
673
-955
5,100
240
-4860
6,728
913
-5815
2nd 0
1,736
771
-965
5,378
296
-5082
7,114
1,067
-6047
3rd 0
1,757
690
-1067
6,443
274
-6169
8,209
964
-7245
4th e
1,797
766
-1031
5,039
322
-4717
6,835
1,089
-5746
1988
6,748
3,651
-3097
22,877
1,575
-21302
29,625
5,227
-24398
1st 0
1,704
847
-857
5,387
331
-5056
7,019
1,178
-5841
2nd 0
1,691
912
-779
5,188
397
-4791
6,951
1,309
-5642
3rd 0
1,672
936
-736
6,665
424
-6241
8,337
1,360
-6977
4th a
1,681
956
-775
5,637
423
-5214
7,318
1,380
-5938
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Convence, 71-135, FT-140, SITC Classification 65 & R&. Date are in willions of dollars.
CHART III
IMPORTS TAKE AWAY U.S. JOBS
FIBER, TEXTILE,
APPAREL JOBS (Millions)
IMPORTS (Billion SYE)
2.8
14
JOBS
IMPORTS
11
2.4
8
5
2
2
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
SOURCE: U.S. Departments of Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture
CHART IV
TEXTILE & APPAREL IMPORTS -- 1986
% CHANGE FROM 1985
PERCENT CHANGE
20
+17%
+17%
+17%
15
10
5
0
TOTAL
"CONTROLLED" "UNCONTROLLED*
(62% OF TOTAL) (38% OF TOTAL)
SOURCE: Maior Shippers Report. U.S. Dept. of Commerc
Principle Objections to the Previous Textile Bill
O The quotas would have been unilateral, automatic and
permanent.
o The bill did not distinguish between fair and unfair trade
practices.
-- it would have established quotas even if trade was
"fair".
-- it would have provided a disincentive to, rather
than an incentive for, foreign countries to open their
markets.
-- the remedy for dumping and countervailing duties
still would have been available.
O The quotas would have been established indiscriminately.
The bill would have placed quotas on all textile and apparel
products:
-- whether or not they are like or competitive with
products made in the U.S.
-- whether or not domestic producers are being damaged
by imports.
O The bill was incompatible with our international
obligations:
-- it was not consistent with the principles of the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).
-- the U.S. would have abrogated nearly 40 bilateral
agreements.
-- it was not consistent with the GATT or our Uruguay
Round "standstill" commitments.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
09. Memo
From Roger Porter to POTUS
4/12/89
Re: Textiles (2 pp.)
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Open on Expiration of PRA
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By
If
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on
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Date Closed:
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OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
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Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
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THE WHITE HOUSE
1989 APR to
Information
WASHINGTON
April 12, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Textiles
This memorandum responds to the three questions you asked
about textiles.
1. Are we enforcing existing law on textiles?
It is difficult to measure objectively the effectiveness of
executive branch enforcement of existing law on textiles.
Congress has not enacted legislation specifying import levels.
Instead, it has provided the President broad authority to
negotiate textile agreements which set the actual import
levels. The domestic industry tends to look at two measures of
"tough" enforcement.
The first measure is the restrictiveness of bilateral agree-
ments. The Multifiber Agreement (MFA) provides a framework
for countries to negotiate bilateral textile agreements.
Within this framework, we have about 40 bilateral agreements
which limit textile and apparel imports into the United
States.
In general, the domestic industry has argued that the execu-
tive branch has not negotiated strict bilateral agreements.
That is, these agreements allow for too much import growth or
do not cover enough textile products.
The Reagan Administration claimed that it did negotiate tough
bilateral agreements. For example, even though the MFA states
that the appropriate level of annual import growth for
bilateral agreements should be 6 percent, the agreements with
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China limited annual import
growth to less than 3 percent.
These bilateral agreements helped in reducing total U.S.
textile imports by about 6 percent last year (from 13.7
billion square yards equivalent in 1987 to 12.9 billion SYEs
in 1988).
The second measure is the number of "calls" made. The MFA
permits an importing country to determine that an exporting
country is disrupting the domestic market for a particular
textile product. After making this determination, the impor-
-2-
ting country can "call" the exporting country to stop this
disruption by establishing a quota. The domestic industry has
argued that the executive branch has not made enough calls in
recent years. Following is the actual number of calls in
recent years.
1982
38
1986
146
1983
110
1987
58
1984
112
1988
37
1985
129
The number of calls declined in 1987 and 1988 as import growth
slowed due to the lower dollar, and the strictly negotiated
bilateral agreements.
2. Since I have become President, has any action been
taken on the new agreements worked out by Yeutter
last year?
The USTR constantly renegotiates bilateral agreements, since
most of the 40 bilateral agreements last about three or four
years. Last year, the USTR renegotiated four bilateral
agreements with Brazil, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and the Dominican
Republic. Since you became President, the USTR has
renegotiated three bilateral agreements with Bangladesh, Costa
Rica, and Peru.
The USTR plans to renegotiate about a dozen more bilateral
agreements this year. The most important negotiations will
involve Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
3. What does the legislation talked about by Roger
Milliken et al, do?
Roger Milliken has been a major supporter of textile quota
legislation in recent years. In 1987 and 1988, Senators
Thurmond and Hollings pushed a textile quota bill that would
have established a global quota for each textile and apparel
category, of which there are about 150. The global quota
would have equalled 101 percent of the prior year's imports
and allowed for one percent annual growth thereafter.
In recent years, the domestic industry has had enough support
in Congress to pass textile quota legislation, but not enough
to override a Presidential veto. It appears that the industry
would still like to have some version of a textile quota bill,
but recognizes that it probably does not have enough support
to enact such a bill. Domestic industry supporters have not
yet introduced a major textile bill in this Congress, in part
because they want to see if they can work out some kind of
arrangement with the Administration.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No.
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Class.
and Type
10. Memo
From Roger Porter to POTUS
4/5/89
5
Re: Textiles (3 pp.)
Collection:
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Open on Expiration of PRA
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(Document Follows)
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WHORM Cat.:
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File Location:
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Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Information
WASHINGTON
April 5, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Textiles
The subject of textiles has come up twice in the last week, once
in the EPC discussion of the Uruguay Round, and once in your
Friday press conference. This memorandum provides additional
background.
1.
The textiles story illustrates the high cost of
opposing market forces and the difficulty of stopping
protectionist actions once they are begun.
While the U.S. textile industry had high tariff protection in the
19th century, the first "voluntary" quota arrangement was
negotiated with Japan in 1936. Post-war curbs against Japanese
textiles and apparel made from cotton encouraged production in
Hong Kong and elsewhere. This resulted in the Short Term
Arrangement in 1961 and the Long Term Arrangement in 1962.
Curbs on cotton textiles and apparel encouraged the production of
man-made fibers. This resulted in the Multi-Fiber Arrangement in
1974. Through periodic renewals, some 60 percent of world trade
is now restricted. The fourth MFA renewal expires in 1991.
2.
The U.S. industry is now doing well.
As the attached charts show, the textiles and apparel industry
has done well in recent years. Shipments in 1988 were up 12
percent over 1985, while employment levels held steady. Over
that same period, capacity utilization in the textiles industry
was well above the average for all manufactures. Also, textiles
profits as a percentage of equity compared well with the average
for all manufactures.
3. But at a heavy cost to consumers.
Quotas on textiles and apparel are equivalent to tariffs of about
40-60 percent. They cost U.S. consumers an estimated $20
billion annually. Moveover, the quotas are highly regressive.
They hit consumers in lower income groups hardest, since
clothing takes a larger share of their income. The benefits of
protection mostly go to the owners of firms, who tend to be in
the upper income groups.
-2-
4.
The Uruguay Round represents a chance to begin moving
the textiles industry toward market principles.
U.S. negotiators hope to be able to reach agreement on a
mechanism for a gradual phase-out of protection for the textiles
industry. We have suggested that, as a first step, quotas should
be converted to tariffs. The protective effect of barriers would
then be more measurable, and a phase-out plan would be easier to
negotiate.
Attachment:
Charts on textiles industry
U.S. TEXTILES AND APPAREL INDUSTRY
KEY INDICATORS
Employment has held steady.
Shipments have been rising.
1,200
Apparel
64
Apparel
Textiles
Textfles
1,100
62
1000
60
THOUSANDS
900
$ IN BILLIONS
58
800
56
700
54
600
52
'85
'85
'87
'88
'85
'85
'87
'88
EMPLOYMENT (000)
SHIPMENTS ($B)
Capacity utilization
Profits as a share of
is above average.
equity are strong.
94
Textiles
18
Textlee
92
All Manufactures
All Manufactures
16
90
88
14
PERCENT
86
PERCENT
12
84
82
10
80
78
8
'85
'86
'57
'88
'85
'86
'87
'88
CAPACITY UTILIZATION
PROFITS AS A % OF EQUITY
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11. Memo
From Carla Hills to John Sununu
4/4/89
5
Re: Your April 6 Meeting w/Textile Industry Leaders (7 pp.)
Collection:
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Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
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Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
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H
(NLGB)
on
12/12/07
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
April 4, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
FROM:
Carla A. Hills CAH
SUBJECT: Your April 6 Meeting with Textile Industry Leaders
This memorandum provides some background information for your
April 6 meeting with Dan Frierson, President of the American
Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and other textile industry
leaders. As we discussed Friday, Ron Sorini, Ambassador-desig-
nate and Chief Textile Negotiator, is quite familiar with the
people and the subject matter, and will attend the meeting.
The textile industry's overriding trade policy objective is to
obtain new restrictive legislation or, at a minimum, a more rigid
textile trade policy. My view is that the Bush Administration
can work with the industry on some issues, but cannot support a
more restrictive policy or legislation for the following reasons.
First, aside from the obvious need to resist protectionist
legislation, the industry itself is not united in wanting such
legislation. The labor unions would vocally support it, but the
apparel segment of the industry probably would not, and the
cotton growers and man-made fiber producers would be unenthusi-
astic.
Second, we already have a complicated system of controlling
textile and apparel imports under the international Multifiber
Arrangement (MFA), which allows us to restrict imports to prevent
market disruption. Pursuant to the MFA, we have negotiated
bilateral agreements with 39 countries. This system provides
adequate protection, particularly in light of the robust health
of the industry: total textile and apparel imports may rise this
year, but that follows a 6.5% decline in 1988; factories are
operating at 89.5% of capacity; and profits remain at very high
levels.
Additional information is provided in the attached draft memoran-
dum to the President from Secretaries Brady and Mosbacher and
myself. This memorandum, which will shortly be transmitted to
the President, is in response to suggestions from Governor
Carroll Campbell and former USTR Fred Dent for more restrictive
practices. Suggested talking points for your meeting are also
attached.
Attachments
Suggested Talking Points For Meeting With Textile Industry
I appreciate the opportunity to establish a dialogue with
the textile industry, and I hope that we can develop a
constructive working relationship over the coming
years.
We recognize that there are several significant policy
issues that will be addressed over the next year that
will have an impact on your industry.
I also appreciate the importance of the textile and
associated industries to the U.S. economy and to
international trade.
While I can not forsee this Administration supporting
legislation, we will want to have a very thorough study
of our policies to see if there are areas of common
ground with the industry.
USTR will coordinate this effort. In the meantime, I
would hope that you will refrain from introducing
legislation.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
SUBJECT:
TEXTILE TRADE
As requested, we have prepared an analysis of the eight-point
program for addressing textile trade given you by Governor
Campbell and Former-Secretary Dent (copy attached). They are
correct in their belief that most of their proposals could be
adopted administratively. You have great discretionary authority
in the textile trade area. Although there may be no current
industry consensus on their proposed program, we believe most
domestic producers would support it.
The proposals address the industry's principal criticisms of
current trade law, as well as implementation of textile
agreements, textile trade policy, and fraud enforcement. The
Campbell/Dent proposals would, however, unduly restrict necessary
Administration discretion in the implementation of the current
textile import control program, increase import protection for
the textile industry, and foreclose future policy changes.
We believe that less restrictive alternatives are available for
addressing industry and Congressional criticisms. We are under
pressure from many of our trading partners who want to liberalize
textile trade. Adoption of proposals to increase textile
industry protection would subject us to criticism from those
nations as well as U.S. importers and retailers. However,
liberalization in the textile area would draw criticism from
domestic producers and many members of Congress. Such proposals
should be considered only after a thorough review.
Accordingly, we have instructed our staffs to commence a formal
Administration review of these issues. Pending completion of
that review, we recommend that you maintain your commitment to
"enforce current law" providing special treatment for the textile
and apparel industries. All other options available under your
discretionary authority should be kept open.
CURRENT SITUATION
The textile import control programs relies principally on a
system of forty existing bilateral agreements. More than ninety
percent of imports from countries accounting for three-fourths of
total textile product imports are restrained by such agreements.
About one-half of the remaining unrestrained imports come from
the EC and Canada which we do not cover under bilateral agree-
ments.
-2-
Profits, employment and shipments in the domestic industry all
increased in 1986 and 1987. Although imports rose in both years,
the restraining effect of the program limited that growth, thus
contributing to the industry's solid performance. That perfor-
mance appears to have continued in 1988, and imports declining
over six percent. Current consensus estimates project that
imports will rise in 1989 about eight to twelve percent, however,
well below the over thirty percent growth possible under existing
bilateral restraint agreements.
The textile import control program began more than thirty years
ago as a temporary measure to assist our cotton textile and
apparel producers to adjust to rising imports which threatened
disruption of our domestic markets. Each President has faced
strong pressure from domestic producers. Over time, the program
has been extended and expanded to cover almost all textile items.
Consequently, we are left with an industry that could not exist
in its present form without protection. The Campbell/Dent
program would result in even greater protection for the industry.
Attachment
ANALYSIS OF CAMPBELL/DENT PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL 1: Extend the MFA; no adverse impact from Uruguay
Round.
While recognizing the special problems inherent in inter-
national textile trade, we believe it is premature to make a
commitment now to extend the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), which
expires in 1991. It would also be counterproductive to guarantee
the Uruguay Round will not affect the MFA. Movement on textiles
in the Uruguay Round will depend in part on progress in other UR
groups, including safeguards, tariffs, and intellectual property.
PROPOSAL 2: Issue an Executive Order: (a) to establish a
CITA call criteria to be followed by the Committee for the
Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) in issuing "calls" to
limit market disruptive imports of textile products; and (b) to
provide instructions on upcoming bilateral textile agreement
renegotiations.
An Executive Order has the force and effect of law absent a
statutory provision to the contrary. It is an inappropriate
mechanism for ensuring that Administration textile policy is
followed. It would only serve to limit the discretion necessary
in applying broad policy to specific circumstances.
(a) Establishing set criteria for issuing "calls" for consulta-
tions to foreign governments for the purpose of restricting
textile imports is not desirable. CITA currently considers
criteria for a presumption of market disruption as outlined
in a White House statement in December 1983.
(b) Establishing U.S. negotiating objectives through an
Executive Order is an inappropriate and dangerous strategy.
It would virtually eliminate U.S. flexibility, evoke a
negative reaction from those opposed to the publicly
announced goals, and subject the Administration to criticism
if the objectives prove unattainable.
Textile and apparel imports from countries with whom our
bilateral expire in 1989 make up about one-fourth of total U.S.
imports of these products. The specific recommendations of the
Campbell/Dent program related to group/aggregate limits, growth
rates and flexibility, and spacing of unused quotas are measures
domestic producers will likely seek in upcoming negotiations with
major Asian suppliers. Whereas they may be appropriate in some
cases, their general application would restrict import growth and
limiting the flexibility of foreign exporters to the U.S.
2
PROPOSAL 3: Establish an import licensing system.
The problems that would arise from an import licensing
system far outweigh any benefits. These problems include the
difficulty in allocating licenses equitably, administrative costs
and burdens, and adverse international reaction, including
possible retaliation. Such a system would likely be highly
disruptive to existing trading relationships. It would be far
preferable to consider enhancing Customs enforcement resources
(e.g. proposal 7 below) as a means of addressing concerns about
fraud and circumvention.
PROPOSAL 4: Support legislation to extend application of CVD law
to nonmarket economies.
In 1988 the Administration successfully opposed extension of
countervailing duty law to nonmarket economies during Congres-
sional consideration of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill. Congress
did amend the antidumping duty law to provide for more effective
enforcement with respect to nonmarket economies. Because of the
difficulties inherent in attempting to apply the concept of
subsidies to a nonmarket economy, we believe the amended anti-
dumping law represents the best means to deal with unfairly
traded imports from such countries.
PROPOSAL 5: Reduce duties on certain apparel assembled in Mexico
and CBI countries; but reduce quotas of other countries.
We expect a provision providing duty-free treatment for
apparel products assembled from U.S. components in Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries to be included in
legislation soon to be introduced to extend the program. We
support the concept. Mexico is not a CBI beneficiary country,
and the granting of such status to Mexico would undercut
intended benefits to the others.
Based on the assumption that the Administration will support
efforts to enhance benefits provided to CBI beneficiary
countries, the Campbell/Dent proposal would condition those
benefits on the adoption of a strategy to reduce quotas
elsewhere, presumably through upcoming negotiations with major
Asian suppliers such as Korea and Taiwan. This would create a
more restrictive program requiring a greater percentage of total
U.S. apparel imports to be assembled from U.S. produced fabric.
3
PROPOSAL 6: Support legislation to establish a private right of
action for Customs fraud.
The proposal is also strongly supported by domestic steel
producers. It is opposed by major importers and retailers, who
are concerned that it will lead to frivolous law suits. A
similar provision was included in the Senate version of the 1988
Omnibus Trade Bill, but deleted from the final version.
PROPOSAL 7: Maintain textiles as a high Customs Service program
and increase enforcement resources.
There are no objections to instructing the Customs Service
to continue to designate textile trade as a high priority to
prevent fraud. Increasing the number of Customs personnel
working on textiles would both improve enforcement of the textile
program and facilitate entry of legitimate imports. However, it
would require additional budget outlays or transfer of people
away from other Customs priorities.
PROPOSAL 8: Designate the Commerce Secretary to conduct the
textile program, which is to be coordinated through meetings with
the industry.
Presidential authority to negotiate and implement textile
agreements has been delegated by an Executive Order (E.O.) to
CITA. CITA is chaired by Commerce and also includes State,
Treasury, Labor and USTR. Directing the Secretary of Commerce to
personally conduct the textile program would be a misallocation
of resources and would result in a diminishing of the important
role of other agencies. Absent policy changes, neither this nor
coordination of the program through trimester meetings with
industry representatives would significantly alter the industry's
posture in the political process.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
May 16, 1989
TO:
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM: JAMES W. CICCONI
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Information
Action
Let's Discuss
The attached has been forwarded
to the President.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12a. Memo
From David Bates to POTUS
5/12/89
Re: Textile Trade (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
(NLGB)
on
12/12/07
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
Information
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 12, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
DAVID Q. BATES, JR.
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Textile Trade
The Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury and the United
States Trade Representative have responded (Tab A) to your
request for an evaluation of proposals on textile trade made
early this year by Governor Campbell and former Secretary of
Commerce Dent.
The three cabinet officers unanimously oppose the
Campbell/Dent proposals, all of which would increase protection
of the textile industry. The cabinet officers propose instead
that less restrictive alternatives be developed, especially ones
that are consistent with U.S. objectives in the Uruguay Round.
A USTR-chaired interagency group is now reviewing
alternative approaches to the textile trade issue and will
provide recommendations to the Economic Policy Council.
Attachment:
Tab A
Memorandum on Textile Trade
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12b. Memo
From Secretary of Commerce to POTUS
5/8/89
P/S
Re: Textile Trade (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
&
(NLGB)
on
4/10/08
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230
UNITED
AMERICA
STATES
OF
May 8, 1989
MAY
0
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
27A
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE COH
SUBJECT:
TEXTILE TRADE
As requested, we have prepared an analysis of the eight-point
program for addressing textile trade given you by Governor Campbell
and former Secretary Dent (copy attached). They are correct in
their belief that most proposals could be adopted administratively.
You have great discretionary authority in the textile trade area.
Although there may be no current industry consensus on the proposed
program, we think most domestic producers would support it.
The proposals are aimed at addressing the industry's principal
criticisms of current trade law, as well as implementation of
textile agreements, textile trade policy, and fraud enforcement
activities. However, the Campbell/Dent proposals would unduly
restrict necessary Administration discretion in the implementation
of the current textile import control program, increase protection
for the textile industry, and foreclose any future policy changes.
We think less restrictive alternatives are available for addressing
industry and Congressional concerns. We are under pressure in the
Uruguay Round from many of our trading partners who desire a
liberalization of textile trade. Adoption of proposals to increase
textile industry protection would subject us to criticism from those
nations as well as U.S. importers and retailers. Similarly,
liberalization in the textile area would subject us to criticism
from domestic producers and many members of Congress. Such
proposals should be considered only after a thorough review.
Accordingly, we have instructed our staffs to commence a formal
Administration review of these issues. Pending completion of that
review, we recommend that you maintain your commitment to "enforce
current law" providing special treatment for the textile and apparel
industries. All other options available under your discretionary
authority should be kept open.
CURRENT SITUATION
The textile import control program relies principally on a system of
forty existing bilateral agreements. Over ninety percent of imports
from countries accounting for seventy-five percent of total textile
product imports are restrained by quota agreements. About one-half
of the remaining unrestrained imports come from the EC and Canada
which we do not cover under bilateral agreements.
-2-
Domestic industry profits, employment and shipments all increased in
1986 and 1987. Although imports rose in both years, the restraining
effect of the program limited import growth contributing to the
industry's positive performance. Industry performance in 1988
appears relatively good, while imports declined more than six
percent. Current consensus estimates, however, project that imports
will rise in 1989 eight to twelve percent, which is well below the
over thirty percent growth possible under existing bilateral
restraint agreements.
The textiles import control program began more than thirty years ago
as temporary measure to assist our cotton textile and apparel
producers to adjust to rising imports which threatened disruption of
our domestic markets. Each President has faced strong pressure from
domestic producers to increase protection. Over time, the program
has been expanded to cover almost all textile items. The
Campbell/Dent proposal would further tighten the program resulting
in greater protection for the industry.
Attachment
ANALYSIS OF CAMPBELL/DENT PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL 1: Extend the MFA; no adverse impact from Uruguay Round.
While recognizing the special problems in international textile
trade, we think it is premature to make a commitment now to extend
the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) which expires in 1991 and that it
would be counterproductive to guarantee the Uruguay Round will not
affect the MFA. Movement on textiles will depend in part on
progress in other Uruguay Round negotiating groups including
safeguards, tariffs and intellectual property.
PROPOSAL 2: Issue an Executive Order: a) establishing a CITA call
criteria to be followed by the Committee for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements (CITA) in issuing "calls" to limit market
disruptive imports of textile products; and, b) providing
instructions on upcoming bilateral textile agreement renegotiations.
An Executive Order has the force and effect of law absent a
statutory provision to the contrary. It is an inappropriate
mechanism for ensuring that Administration textile policy is
followed. It would only serve to limit the discretion necessary in
applying broad policy to specific circumstances.
(a)
Establishment of set criteria for issuing "calls" for
consultations to foreign governments for the purpose of
restricting textile imports is not desirable. CITA currently
considers criteria for a presumption of market disruption as
outlined in a December, 1983 White House Press release.
(b)
Establishment of U.S. negotiating objectives through an
Executive Order is an inappropriate dangerous strategy. It
would virtually eliminate U.S. flexibility, evoke a negative
reaction from those opposed to the publicly announced goals
and could subject the Administration to criticism if the
objectives prove unattainable.
Combined imports from expiring bilateral agreement countries
amount to 30 percent of total U.S. imports of MFA textiles.
The specific recommendations of the Campbell/Dent program
(i.e., group or aggregate limits, growth rates and
flexibility, and methods of spacing unused quotas) are
measures domestic producers will likely seek in upcoming
negotiations with major Asian suppliers. They are means of
restricting import growth and limiting the flexibility of
foreign exporters to the United States.
PROPOSAL 3: Establish an import licensing system.
The problems that would be associated with an import licensing
system (allocation of licenses, costs, administrative burden,
international reaction) far outweigh any benefits. Such a system
could be highly disruptive to existing trading relationships. It
would be better to consider strengthening Customs enforcement
resources (e.g. Proposal 7) as a means of addressing concerns about
fraud and circumvention.
-2-
PROPOSAL 4: Support legislation to extend application of CVD law to
nonmarket economies.
In 1988 the Administration successfully opposed extension of
countervailing duty (CVD) law to nonmarket economies during
Congressional consideration of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill.
However, Congress did amend the antidumping duty (A/D) law to
provide for more effective enforcement with respect to nonmarket
economies. Because of the difficulties inherent in attempting to
apply the concept of subsidies to a nonmarket economy, we think the
amended AD law represents the best means to deal with unfairly
traded imports from such countries.
PROPOSAL 5: Reduce duties on certain apparel assembled in Mexico
and CBI countries; but reduce quotas of other countries.
We expect a provision providing duty free treatment for apparel
products assembled from U.S. components in Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries to be included in soon to be
introduced legislation to extend the program. We support the
concept. Mexico is not a CBI beneficiary country, and the granting
of such status to Mexico would undercut intended benefits to the
others.
Based on the assumption that the Administration will be supportive
of efforts to strengthen benefits provided CBI beneficiary
countries, the Campbell/Dent proposal would condition those benefits
on the adoption of a strategy to reduce quotas elsewhere presumably
via the upcoming negotiations with major Asian suppliers. This
would be a more restrictive program requiring a greater percentage
of total U.S. apparel imports to be assembled from U.S. produced
fabric.
PROPOSAL 6: Support legislation to establish a private right of
action for Customs fraud.
The proposal is also strongly supported by domestic steel
producers. It is opposed by major importers and retailers, who are
concerned that it will lead to frivolous law suits. A similar
provision was included in the Senate version of the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill; but deleted from the final version.
-3-
PROPOSAL 7: Maintain textiles as a high priority Customs Service
program and increase enforcement resources.
There are no objections to instructing the Customs Service to
continue to designate textile trade as a high priority to prevent
fraud. Increasing the number of Customs personnel working on
textiles would both improve enforcement of the textile program and
speed up entry of legitimate imports. However, it would require
additional budget outlays or transfer of people away from other
Customs priorities.
PROPOSAL 8: Designate the Commerce Secretary to conduct the textile
program, which is to be coordinated through meetings with the
industry.
Presidential authority to implement textile agreements has been
delegated by an Executive Order (E.O.) to CITA. CITA is chaired by
Commerce and also includes State, Treasury, Labor and USTR.
Directing the Secretary of Commerce to personally conduct the
textile program would be a misallocation of resources and would
result in a diminishing of the role of other agencies. Absent
policy changes, neither this nor coordination of the program through
trimester meetings with industry representatives would significantly
alter industry posture in the political process.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13. Memo
From Secretary of Commerce to POTUS
5/8/89
Re: Textile Trade
[same as doc 12b] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
If
(NLGB)
on
4/10/08
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230
UNITED
AMERICA
STATES
OF
May 8, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
272
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
COH
SUBJECT:
TEXTILE TRADE
As requested, we have prepared an analysis of the eight-point
program for addressing textile trade given you by Governor Campbell
and former Secretary Dent (copy attached). They are correct in
their belief that most proposals could be adopted administratively.
You have great discretionary authority in the textile trade area.
Although there may be no current industry consensus on the proposed
program, we think most domestic producers would support it.
The proposals are aimed at addressing the industry's principal
criticisms of current trade law, as well as implementation of
textile agreements, textile trade policy, and fraud enforcement
activities. However, the Campbell/Dent proposals would unduly
restrict necessary Administration discretion in the implementation
of the current textile import control program, increase protection
for the textile industry, and foreclose any future policy changes.
We think less restrictive alternatives are available for addressing
industry and Congressional concerns. We are under pressure in the
Uruguay Round from many of our trading partners who desire a
liberalization of textile trade. Adoption of proposals to increase
textile industry protection would subject us to criticism from those
nations as well as U.S. importers and retailers. Similarly,
liberalization in the textile area would subject us to criticism
from domestic producers and many members of Congress. Such
proposals should be considered only after a thorough review.
Accordingly, we have instructed our staffs to commence a formal
Administration review of these issues. Pending completion of that
review, we recommend that you maintain your commitment to "enforce
current law" providing special treatment for the textile and apparel
industries. All other options available under your discretionary
authority should be kept open.
CURRENT SITUATION
The textile import control program relies principally on a system of
forty existing bilateral agreements. Over ninety percent of imports
from countries accounting for seventy-five percent of total textile
product imports are restrained by quota agreements. About one-half
of the remaining unrestrained imports come from the EC and Canada
which we do not cover under bilateral agreements.
-2-
Domestic industry profits, employment and shipments all increased in
1986 and 1987. Although imports rose in both years, the restraining
effect of the program limited import growth contributing to the
industry's positive performance. Industry performance in 1988
appears relatively good, while imports declined more than six
percent. Current consensus estimates, however, project that imports
will rise in 1989 eight to twelve percent, which is well below the
over thirty percent growth possible under existing bilateral
restraint agreements.
The textiles import control program began more than thirty years ago
as temporary measure to assist our cotton textile and apparel
producers to adjust to rising imports which threatened disruption of
our domestic markets. Each President has faced strong pressure from
domestic producers to increase protection. Over time, the program
has been expanded to cover almost all textile items. The
Campbell/Dent proposal would further tighten the program resulting
in greater protection for the industry.
Attachment
ANALYSIS OF CAMPBELL/DENT PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL 1: Extend the MFA; no adverse impact from Uruguay Round.
While recognizing the special problems in international textile
trade, we think it is premature to make a commitment now to extend
the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) which expires in 1991 and that it
would be counterproductive to guarantee the Uruguay Round will not
affect the MFA. Movement on textiles will depend in part on
progress in other Uruguay Round negotiating groups including
safeguards, tariffs and intellectual property.
PROPOSAL 2: Issue an Executive Order: a) establishing a CITA call
criteria to be followed by the Committee for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements (CITA) in issuing "calls" to limit market
disruptive imports of textile products; and, b) providing
instructions on upcoming bilateral textile agreement renegotiations.
An Executive Order has the force and effect of law absent a
statutory provision to the contrary. It is an inappropriate
mechanism for ensuring that Administration textile policy is
followed. It would only serve to limit the discretion necessary in
applying broad policy to specific circumstances.
(a)
Establishment of set criteria for issuing "calls" for
consultations to foreign governments for the purpose of
restricting textile imports is not desirable. CITA currently
considers criteria for a presumption of market disruption as
outlined in a December, 1983 White House Press release.
(b)
Establishment of U.S. negotiating objectives through an
Executive Order is an inappropriate dangerous strategy. It
would virtually eliminate U.S. flexibility, evoke a negative
reaction from those opposed to the publicly announced goals
and could subject the Administration to criticism if the
objectives prove unattainable.
Combined imports from expiring bilateral agreement countries
amount to 30 percent of total U.S. imports of MFA textiles.
The specific recommendations of the Campbell/Dent program
(i.e., group or aggregate limits, growth rates and
flexibility, and methods of spacing unused quotas) are
measures domestic producers will likely seek in upcoming
negotiations with major Asian suppliers. They are means of
restricting import growth and limiting the flexibility of
foreign exporters to the United States.
PROPOSAL 3: Establish an import licensing system.
The problems that would be associated with an import licensing
system (allocation of licenses, costs, administrative burden,
international reaction) far outweigh any benefits. Such a system
could be highly disruptive to existing trading relationships. It
would be better to consider strengthening Customs enforcement
resources (e.g. Proposal 7) as a means of addressing concerns about
fraud and circumvention.
-2-
PROPOSAL 4: Support legislation to extend application of CVD law to
nonmarket economies.
In 1988 the Administration successfully opposed extension of
countervailing duty (CVD) law to nonmarket economies during
Congressional consideration of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill.
However, Congress did amend the antidumping duty (A/D) law to
provide for more effective enforcement with respect to nonmarket
economies. Because of the difficulties inherent in attempting to
apply the concept of subsidies to a nonmarket economy, we think the
amended AD law represents the best means to deal with unfairly
traded imports from such countries.
PROPOSAL 5: Reduce duties on certain apparel assembled in Mexico
and CBI countries; but reduce quotas of other countries.
We expect a provision providing duty free treatment for apparel
products assembled from U.S. components in Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries to be included in soon to be
introduced legislation to extend the program. We support the
concept. Mexico is not a CBI beneficiary country, and the granting
of such status to Mexico would undercut intended benefits to the
others.
Based on the assumption that the Administration will be supportive
of efforts to strengthen benefits provided CBI beneficiary
countries, the Campbell/Dent proposal would condition those benefits
on the adoption of a strategy to reduce quotas elsewhere presumably
via the upcoming negotiations with major Asian suppliers. This
would be a more restrictive program requiring a greater percentage
of total U.S. apparel imports to be assembled from U.S. produced
fabric.
PROPOSAL 6: Support legislation to establish a private right of
action for Customs fraud.
The proposal is also strongly supported by domestic steel
producers. It is opposed by major importers and retailers, who are
concerned that it will lead to frivolous law suits. A similar
provision was included in the Senate version of the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill; but deleted from the final version.
-3-
PROPOSAL 7: Maintain textiles as a high priority Customs Service
program and increase enforcement resources.
There are no objections to instructing the Customs Service to
continue to designate textile trade as a high priority to prevent
fraud. Increasing the number of Customs personnel working on
textiles would both improve enforcement of the textile program and
speed up entry of legitimate imports. However, it would require
additional budget outlays or transfer of people away from other
Customs priorities.
PROPOSAL 8: Designate the Commerce Secretary to conduct the textile
program, which is to be coordinated through meetings with the
industry.
Presidential authority to implement textile agreements has been
delegated by an Executive Order (E.O.) to CITA. CITA is chaired by
Commerce and also includes State, Treasury, Labor and USTR.
Directing the Secretary of Commerce to personally conduct the
textile program would be a misallocation of resources and would
result in a diminishing of the role of other agencies. Absent
policy changes, neither this nor coordination of the program through
trimester meetings with industry representatives would significantly
alter industry posture in the political process.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14. Memo
From Carla Hills to John Sununu
5/17/89
5
Re: Update on Textiles (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
JP
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
MAY 17 1989
Rec'd COS
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
MAY 7 1989
FROM:
Carla A. Hills CAH
SUBJECT: Update on Textiles
Following your meeting on textiles, Ron Sorini has been working
to determine if there are areas of common interest between us and
the industry. The industry's initial proposal called for global
quotas, to be enacted through legislation or the issuance of an
Executive Order. Ron has told the industry group, which they
have expanded to include representatives from the fiber and
apparel industries as well as the unions, that we are not
prepared to explore such an approach. Rather, we are prepared to
consider ways the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) can be used more
effectively.
Progress in the working group has been slow, primarily because
the industry itself is not united. While the apparel industry
supports our approach, the textile industry, particularly Don
Hughes of Burlington and Roger Milliken, is still pushing for
legislated global quotas. Nevertheless, we expect the industry
group to give us a proposal next week on how U.S. policy can be
"improved" under the MFA.
Those in the textile industry that want legislation have
expressed their concern to Senator Helms. Senator Helms has told
?
Ron that his understanding from the meeting with you was that the
Administration and the textile industry would try to reach
agreement on legislation. The Senator also said that President
Bush agreed, in a meeting which took place in December, to look
at legislation. Senator Helms may contact you in an effort to
persuade the Administration to support protectionist legislation.
I understand that the apparel industry, working through Senator
Heinz's office, may try to meet with you. Given the apparel
industry's more reasonable views on trade, I would recommend that
you meet with them. Should Senator Helms or others decide to
introduce legislation, which now seems likely, the apparel
industry's support will be very helpful.
I do not think that we can or should attempt to satisfy the more
protectionist elements in the textile industry. The economics
simply do not warrant a more restrictive system such as global
quotas. Also, if we were to move in this direction, the Uruguay
Round would be placed in serious jeopardy.
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
15. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
6/1/89
P/5
Re: Textiles (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By If (NLGB) on 5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Trade / Textiles (1989)
Date Closed:
12/3/2004
OA/ID Number:
29173-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Textiles
As you may have been told by Senator Helms or others, the
textiles industry believes that in your early April meeting
with them you agreed to support legislation on textiles
imports. While White House participants at the meeting are
emphatic that no such commitment was made or implied, you are
likely to face continuing pressure for a quick decision at the
political level to resolve the industry's concerns.
USTR's textiles negotiator (Ron Sorini) has met several
times over the past six weeks with industry representatives,
with the declared objective of better understanding the
industry's perceived problem and proposed solution. The
industry has promised to provide USTR with a definitive paper
laying out its position by next week.
I believe that, in order to contain industry expectations
it is important to establish a clear process within the
Administration for review of the textiles industry's concerns.
The model should be the process now being used for the steel
industry to examine whether to extend VRA's on steel--
subcabinet review by the USTR-chaired Trade Policy Review
Group and subsequent consideration by the Economic Policy
Council.
The industry appears willing to accept this approach, but
wants to schedule a meeting with you on or about June 29. I
believe that the internal Administration review is unlikely
to be completed by then.
Recommendation
That, if requested by the industry, you agree in
principle to meet with them during the summer, but defer
setting a date until timing for completion of the
Administration's internal review is clearer.
CC: Fred McClure
David Bates