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John Sununu Issues Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F[1]; 2003-1388-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29174
Folder ID Number:
29174-002
Folder Title:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
4
5
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a Memo
From Ede Holiday to John Sununu
12/04/90
(b)(1)
Re: Update on the Uruguay Round Ministerial--Day One
pp.)
01b. Memo
From Ede Holiday to President Bush
12/3/90
(b)(1)
Re: Update on the Uruguay Round Ministerial: Day One (1 pp.)
02a. Memo w/
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
10/30/90
P-5
attachment
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
02b. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
10/29/90
P-5
Re: Uruguay Round--Update on EC Deliberations on Agriculture
(1 pp.)
03. Memo
From Ede Holiday to John Sununu
10/25/90
(b)(1)
Re: The Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
04a. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/19/90
P-5.
Re: The Uruguay Round (5 pp.)
04b. chart
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/19/90
P-5
Re: Key Uruguay Round Issues (14 pp.)
05. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
8/8/90
P-5
Re: Political Strategy for the Uruguay Round (5 pp.)
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Pinksheet Number:
KO0691
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
06a. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/22/90
P-5
Re: Helms Inquiry on Textiles Negotiations (1 pp.)
06b. Paper
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/22/90
P-5
Talking Points for Conversation w/Senator Helms Regarding
Textile Tariffs (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Pinksheet Number:
KO0691
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 4, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY BAKER
SECRETARY BRADY
GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
RICHARD DARMAN
MICHAEL BOSKIN
ROGER PORTER
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY exts
SUBJECT:
UPDATE ON THE URUGUAY ROUND MINISTERIAL: DAY ONE
Attached for your information please find a report to the
President summarizing the opening day of the Uruguay Ministerial
in Brussels. This report is based on information provided by the
U.S. delegtion in Brussels. I intend to provide daily reports on
Uruguay Round developments during the course of the Brussels
negotiations this week. These reports are being coordinated with
NSC and OPD staff.
Attachment
Confidential Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
M.M 4/1/2019
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 3, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY
SUBJECT:
UPDATE ON THE URUGUAY ROUND MINISTERIAL: DAY ONE
The Uruguay Round Ministerial formally convened in Brussels
today, but U.S. negotiators report no real progress with the
European Community during this first day on the key issue of
agriculture.
However, pressure on the EC seems to be building and support
for bringing the impasse to a head early in the Ministerial
appears to be increasing.
In the session on agriculture this evening European time,
most all delegations pressed the EC on whether it was prepared
to:
O Make specific commitments to reduce internal supports,
barriers to market access, and export subsidies; and
O Drop its "rebalancing" proposal to raise certain
previously bound tariffs.
In response, the EC Agricultural Commissioner MacSharry
simply reiterated the previous EC positions. Thus, no movement
by the EC is evident in the sessions, nor do the negotiators yet
report any encouraging private signals.
Senior officials in the U.S. delegation believe that
tomorrow morning at the Heads of Delegtion meeting it is likely
that the Agriculture Negotiating Group Chairman will formally
declare the agriculture negotiations deadlocked. This will place
additional pressure on the EC either to modify its agriculture
position or risk bearing the burden of a failed Round.
I intend to report to you on a daily basis on Uruguay Round
developments during the course of your Latin American trip. I am
also seeking to keep senior White House staff informed with more
detailed reports. These reports are being coordinated with NSC
staff, but my staff has been serving as the White House point of
contact with the U.S. delegation in Brussels as the EPC has been
coordinating Cabinet policy consideration on Uruguay Round
issues.
PER NSC WAIVER I500 2021-02
CONFIDENTIAL
By SS NARA, Date 11/30/23
AC/ER
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 30, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
IE CHIEF of STAFF
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY
GAA
SUBJECT:
URUGUAY ROUND
I want to apprise you of the mechanism we have established
for regular and coordinated communication on the Uruguay Round
next week between the White House and the U.S. delegation in
Brussels. This mechanism has been agreed to between EPC and NSC
staff.
As EPC has coordinated the development of policy for the
Uruguay Round, the White House point of contact with the U.S.
delegation in Brussels will be Olin Wethington. Wethington will
work closely with Tim Deal (NSC) and OPD to staff issues that may
arise and to bring to the attention of senior White House staff
any matters requiring decision.
The U.S. delegation in Brussels will send to the White House
a daily summary of significant developments in the Brussels
negotiation. This will be delivered to senior officials in the
White House, as well as Secretaries Baker and Brady. In
addition, Wethington, working with NSC and OPD staff, will
prepare a daily status report on the negotiations for transmittal
to the Presidential party on the Latin American trip. Wethington
and Deal will also schedule two telephone conversations, daily,
on a secure line with senior officials in the U.S. delegation in
Brussels in order to stay apprised of developments.
We have asked that any major U.S. statements or significant
press guidance from the Ministerial, particularly at the
conclusion of the Brussels meeting, be circulated to the White
House for quick review prior to release.
CC: General Scowcroft
FACT SHEET ON THE URUGUAY ROUND
"The results of the Uruguay Round of negotiations can be the engine that
drives and the United States and the world economies into the 21st century.
The agreement we reach will be the ultimate competitiveness initiative."
-- President George Bush
August 20, 1990
U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS AND
TRADE (GATT) TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
SERVICES: The United States seeks international rules of fair play
governing trade in service, a sector in which the United States leads the
world with nearly $90 billion in exports annually.
INVESTMENT: In the Uruguay Round the United States seeks an
agreement opening world markets to investment, which contributes $40
billion annually to U.S. net income, and helps generate over $240 billion,
or two-thirds of total U.S. annual exports of goods.
AGRICULTURE: The United States seeks the fundamental reform of
world agriculture in the Uruguay Round of global trade talks, which
could expand world agriculture exports by roughly one-third, or $100
billion.
MARKET ACCESS: We aim to reduce world barriers to trade in goods
by one-third or more in the Uruguay Round, which could increase U.S.
output by over $1 trillion over the next 10 years, meaning an additional
$16,000 for every American family of four.
GLOBAL TRADE RULES: The United States seeks to strengthen the
rules of international trade to expand U.S. access to foreign markets,
and to ensure fair trade in the U.S. market.
DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE: The United States wants to ensure
that international trade rules apply fully to developing countries, whose
complete participation in the global trading system could increase U.S.
exports by as much as 50%, of $200 billion, between now and the year
2000.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: In the Uruguay Round of global
trade talks, the United States seeks international rules to protect the
creativity of American entrepreneurs, who lose over $60 billion annually
from the global theft and counterfeiting of their ideas.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
90NOV13 Pig 29
November 13, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Agriculture in the Uruguay Round
Following our meeting this morning to discuss agriculture
in the Uruguay Round and your upcoming meetings with President
Andreotti, Chancellor Kohl, and President Mitterrand, we have
prepared the attached chart that graphically displays what was
agreed to at Houston and what has happened since with respect
to our proposal and the EC proposal.
Three points are worth noting:
1. Our proposed reductions are on a 1986-88 baseline as
is the deZeeuw text, which was commended to the negotiators at
Houston.
2. The EC proposal is on a 1986 baseline. Since 1986 was
the high point for domestic price support levels, if the EC
proposal (MacSharry) was put on the same 1986-88 baseline it
would represent a 15% reduction.
3. The reductions that we are proposing would be achieved
over a ten year period allowing for an adequate and appropriate
transition. The EC proposal would cut domestic price supports
by 15% from 1986-88 levels over a ten year period, or an
average of 1.5% a year. This can hardly be called fundamental
agriculture reform.
Attachment
AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
Domestic
Export
Market
Supports
Subsidies
Access Barriers
Houston Summit
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
Goal
Progressive
Progressive
Progressive
Reductions"
Reductions"
Reductions"
United States
75% Reduction
90% Reduction
75% Reduction
Proposal
Over 10 years
Over 10 Years
Over 10 Years
European Community
30% Reduction
No
No
Proposal
From 1986 Baseline
Proposal
Proposal
(Effective Cut: 15%)
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02a. Memo w/
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
10/30/90
P-5
attachment
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By If
(NLGB)
on
12/12/07
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM._Removed_as.a.personal.record-misfile
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
90 OCT 30 PM 7:14
October 30, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY GHA
SUBJECT:
URUGUAY ROUND
The Economic Policy Council will be meeting on the
subject of the Uruguay Round this Friday afternoon, November 2.
There is a growing feeling within the Cabinet that we
are reaching a critical point in the negotiations, particularly
on the agricultural issue. Judgments by you as to future
direction may be required shortly.
Attachment
Memo from Carla Hills
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02b. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
10/29/90
P
Re: Uruguay Round--Update on EC Deliberations on
Agriculture (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Open on Expiration of PRA
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
(Document Follows)
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
By of (NLGB) on 12/12/07
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
October 29, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM
Carla A. Hills
CAlt
SUBJECT
Uruguay Round -- Update on EC Deliberations
on Agriculture
At the EC Summit this past weekend, UK PM Thatcher and Dutch
PM Lubbers raised the EC's continuing inability to produce an
agriculture offer -- due October 15 -- to enable the Uruguay
Round negotiations to proceed. After heated discussion, the
Heads of Government issued a declaration that reaffirms the EC
commitment to the Uruguay Round, but failed to agree upon tabling
an agriculture offer.
The Commission and member states have met at ministerial-
level at least six times to consider an EC agriculture offer. At
each discussion, the offer is reduced in scope and ambition, with
the French and Germans leading the effort. The EC offer under
consideration is based on a proposal of EC Agriculture
Commissioner MacSharry, which we considered to be deficient at
the outset. Its most troubling aspects were the absence of a
specific reduction commitment on export subsidies, its inclusion
of rebalancing (raising the protection for soybeans), and no
intention to provide additional market access.
The Commission, along with the Italian Presidency, will
consult with member states for the remainder of the week and
hopes to have a proposal for Ministerial consideration by next
Monday, November 5. We believe the proposal will be unacceptable
to us and to many other nations. The only question is whether
the EC will have any negotiating flexibility.
The other negotiations are suffering from the impasse in
agriculture. Ministers from the Cairns group, our strongest ally
in the agriculture negotiations, will be meeting in Geneva,
November 5-6, to discuss next steps. I presently plan to join
them to assess the prospects for moving the negotiations forward,
and will keep you apprised.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1990
THE CHIEF of STAFF
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
has seen
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY
SUBJECT:
The Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round is approaching a crisis stage, primarily
because of the European Community's inability to agree on a
negotiating position on agriculture. The EC had agreed to
table its offer along with those of other countries in Geneva
on October 15.
The internal EC debate surrounds the plan devised by
Agriculture Commissioner MacSharry, which would cut farm
subsidies by 30 percent from 1986 levels. It would also allow
"rebalancing", raising some duty rates as long as the average
depth of cut is preserved. The U.S. has strongly objected to
the MacSharry plan on the grounds that the proposed cut is
inadequate and the rebalancing idea is aimed at curbing U.S.
exports of corn and soybeans.
Although the French are not blameless, the main problem
within the Community is Chancellor Kohl's insistence that no
agriculture concessions can be made before the German elections
on December 2. There are signals that he may be prepared to
move afterward, but that is not certain and time will be short.
The final Uruguay Round agreement is scheduled to be struck in
Brussels during a December 3-7 ministerial meeting. Our
objective now is to persuade the Community to provide their
negotiator with the flexibility to work in the meantime to
identify possible areas of compromise.
Without some visible movement on agriculture, it will be
nearly impossible to sustain the momentum during the run-up to
Brussels on other issues included in the Round.
Breaking the logjam may take a more aggressive strategy by
the United States. The President may need to become involved
earlier than we had expected. It may be useful to call a
meeting of the Economic Policy Council over the next week or
ten days to discuss our strategy. I believe it would be
important for you to attend.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04a. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/19/90
P-5
Re: The Uruguay Round (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By IP (NLGB) on 5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
THE WHITE HOUSE
AC/ER
WASHINGTON
October 19, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
SUBJECT:
The Uruguay Round
This is an appropriate time to assess the status of the
Uruguay Round negotiations and to consider a strategy for this
fall. The Uruguay Round has the potential to be the Bush
Administration's most important and enduring trade policy
accomplishment. While the GATT negotiations involve major
risks and uncertainties, a successful agreement will open
closed markets, bolster global economic growth, and strengthen
efforts to implement democracy and market-oriented economic
reforms in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia.
While our primary objective should be negotiating a good
agreement, we cannot take Congressional approval of it for
granted. We must start building domestic support for an
agreement now.
1.
The Uruguay Round involves two challenges.
The trade policy challenge is negotiating a strong package
of GATT measures to open markets and liberalize trade in goods,
services, and investment. These issues are analyzed in the
attached spread sheet.
The political challenge is persuading Congress to approve
and implement the agreement.
2.
The key elements of an agreement are likely to be
negotiated at the last minute.
By breaking the deadlock over agriculture, the Houston
Economic Summit succeeded in triggering the final phase of
negotiations.
The GATT Trade Ministers will meet in Brussels in the
first week of December. Given the scope and complexity of the
issues, the final package will not emerge until then. We will
almost certainly go to Brussels with a large number of
important issues unresolved.
-2-
3.
The European Community (EC) is the key to an agriculture
agreement.
The most difficult issue thus far has been agriculture,
and the EC remains the key to agriculture. The EC is likely to
adopt, with a few minor modifications, a proposal by
Agricultural Commissioner MacSharry for a 30 percent reduction
in farm subsidies. This figure is deceptive, since it uses
1986 subsidy levels as a baseline and thus takes credit for
reductions implemented previously because of budgetary
problems. Consequently, it would reduce EC farm supports by
only 10 percent from current levels. In contrast, the U.S.
will propose 75 percent cuts in domestic supports and
protection over ten years and 90 percent reductions in export
subsidies.
There are indications of internal divisions within the EC.
MacSharry's proposal has been criticized by several important
Commissioners on the ground that it does not address export
subsidies adequately. Nevertheless, it is unclear how far the
EC ultimately will be prepared to go.
The importance to the Administration of achieving
substantial farm subsidy cuts in the Uruguay Round has
increased, since the budget agreement will reduce U.S. farm
spending by more than $13 billion over the next five years.
4.
The "new issues" are important from the standpoint of
building U.S. support for an agreement.
Apart from agriculture, the pivotal issue in the round is
expanding the GATT to cover the so-called "new issues" of
services, investment, and intellectual property rights (IPR).
This is a North-South negotiation. The developed nations
generally support new GATT disciplines. The LDCs, led by
Brazil and India, have resisted:
IPR - Our negotiators are relatively optimistic on the
prospects for a good agreement. This is a crucial issue,
since IPR is the major source of manufacturing sector
support in the U.S. and Europe. An agreement could,
however, require certain politically sensitive changes in
U.S. patent and copyright law.
Investment - Our goals in the investment talks are
limited. We are seeking to prohibit governments from
imposing local content and export performance requirements
on foreign investors. If the overall agreement comes
together, the prospects in this area are reasonably good.
-3-
Services - The services negotiators believe that the best
we can expect is a framework agreement with annexes
covering specific sectors, e.g., financial services.
Several politically powerful U.S. industries, e.g.,
maritime and basic telecommunications, are pressing to be
carved out of any agreement, thereby inviting reciprocal
carve-outs by other countries.
5.
The U.S. is under pressure from the developing countries
(LDCs) on textiles and on unfair trade laws.
The LDCs are seeking concessions from the U.S. and other
developed countries on textiles and the unfair trade laws:
Textiles - The LDCs want to phase out the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA). The U.S. industry opposes any
weakening of its protection. While the ostensible goal of
the textile bill is legislated quotas, it is also an
effort to cripple the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties - The LDCs, Japan,
and Canada are seeking a major weakening of the unfair
trade laws. Some changes are desireable. The proposed
reforms, however, face strong resistance from import-
sensitive U.S. industries, e.g., steel, textiles, and
semiconductors. Because the issue involves unfair trade,
it is could present significant problems in the Congress.
Section 301 - The U.S. is isolated on section 301 which is
aimed at removing foreign barriers to U.S. exports. The
key is to strengthen GATT so that its rules can be
enforced effectively making unilateral action under
section 301 unnecessary.
There will be substantial U.S. opposition to any changes
in the unfair trade laws. These issues merit close watching.
6.
Securing Congressional approval of an Uruguay Round
agreement will be a major challenge.
Because of the unprecedented scope of the Uruguay Round,
the Administration is entering new political territory. While
previous GATT rounds focused almost exclusively on trade in
manufactured goods, the Uruguay Round seeks to expand trade in
a new way by extending GATT to sectors where the rules
traditionally have been weak (agriculture and LDCs) or non-
existent (services, investment, and IPR).
-4-
The scope of this round adds some new dimensions in
building domestic support. First, key support for the Uruguay
Round may come from outside the manufacturing sector. Second,
the U.S. is under pressure on steel and textiles, which have
managed in the past to stay outside GATT disciplines. Third,
the trade-offs in an agriculture agreement could affect certain
highly protected (and politically influential) farm groups,
e.g., meat, dairy, cotton, and sugar. Finally, key elements of
the implementing bill are likely to fall outside the
jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees, which traditionally have controlled tariff and
trade issues in the Congress and have extensive expertise in
the area.
It is essential that our ambitious negotiating strategy be
integrated with a political and legislative strategy for
building the requisite domestic political support to get the
agreement through the Congress.
Import-sensitive industries, like textiles and steel,
already are mobilizing Congressional opposition to an
agreement.
We need to take steps both to strengthen domestic support
for an agreement and insure that the agreement is saleable.
7.
A major challenge will be to gauge accurately what we can
achieve in the GATT and in the Congress to reach an
acceptable balance.
Elements of a successful Uruguay Round strategy include
the following:
Coordination with USTR. The White House has coordinated
closely and successfully with USTR on Super 301, steel,
and U.S.-Japan trade issues. I will continue to meet
regularly with Ambassador Hills this fall on the Uruguay
Round and have asked my staff to follow the negotiations
closely.
Presidential Support. The President was personally
responsible for the successful resolution of the Uruguay
Round issue at the Houston Economic Summit. His IMF/World
Bank speech was effective in galvanizing the financial
community. Continued investment of the President's time
and political capital will be required to negotiate a good
agreement and get it approved by the Congress.
Congressional Coordination. Ambassador Hills has worked
effectively with the Ways and Means and Finance
-5-
Committees. The Administration, however, must expand its
contacts with other Congressional Committees that have
jurisdiction over Uruguay Round issues, particularly the
Agriculture, Banking, and Commerce Committees. The White
House also can take advantage of opportunities to make
clear to the Congressional leadership the President's
commitment to a successful agreement.
Business Community Coordination. We must begin mobilizing
the business community, particularly the major
multinationals who have the most to gain from an
agreement. It is also important to gauge accurately the
depth of opposition from key import-sensitive industries
that could pose significant problems, e.g., steel,
textiles, semiconductors, sugar, dairy, and cotton.
Attachment
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04b. chart
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/19/90
P/S
Re: Key Uruguay Round Issues (14 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By of (NLGB) on 5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
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gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Key Uruguay Round Issues
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Agriculture -- GATT rules
Policy-specific
EC -- No major changes
Split. U.S. feedgrains
EC feeling some pressure
on agricultural subsidies
commitments to substan-
in Common Agricultural
exports would increase if
from U.S. and Cairns.
and protection are weak.
tially cut domestic
Policy (CAP). Favor looser
EC export subsidies
Indications of internal
Extensive subsidies and
subsidies, export
approach that leaves
reduced. Subsidized and
divisions, but ultimate
trade barriers distort
subsidies, and protection.
extensive flexibility on
protected commodity
position unclear.
world agricultural trade.
implementation of reforms.
groups are strongly
opposed.
Cairns Group -- Supports
farm trade liberalization.
Similar to U.S.
1. Domestic Subsidies --
75 percent cuts in trade-
EC -- 30 percent cuts in
Support from U.S.
Uncertain. EC proposal is
High support prices
distorting subsidies from
"aggregate supports" from
feedgrains producers and
deceptive, since includes
encourage overproduction
1986-88 baseline over 10
1986 baseline over 5
major farm groups.
cuts that have already
of farm commodities.
years.
years, then reevaluate.
Opposed by heavily
been implemented because
subsidized commodity
of budget constraints.
Cairns -- Similar to U.S.
sectors.
2. Export Subsidies --
90 percent cuts in export
EC -- Has avoided issue.
Strong support for export
Uncertain. Strong internal
GATT allows export
subsidies over 10 years.
subsidy discipline. Key UR
EC opposition, particularly
subsidies to dispose of
Cairns -- Key objective in
selling point domestically.
from the French.
-2-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
surplus commodities.
the UR is cutting export
Subsidized EC competition
Subsidized exports
subsidies. Can't compete
hurts U.S. feedgrain
displace sales by efficient
with EC and U.S.
exports.
farm producers, e.g. U.S.
subsidies.
and Cairns.
3. Trade Barriers -- Many
Convert all farm trade
EC ---- General support for
Split. U.S. exporters want
Uncertain. EC appears to
countries have trade
barriers to tariffs
tariffication and reducing
increased access.
have accepted broad
restrictions designed to
and cut by 75 percent over
barriers, but want
Protected sectors opposed,
principle of tariffication, but
prevent low-priced imports
10 years.
rebalancing and "variable"
e.g. sugar, dairy, meat,
insists on rebalancing and
from disrupting price
element.
peanuts.
flexibility. Concern about
supports.
disruptive effect of imports
Cairns -- Support
on CAP.
reductions in trade barriers,
except Canada on supply
management.
a. Japan Rice --
Liberalize Japanese rice
Japan and Korea --
USTR rejected industry
Some indications of
prohibits rice imports.
market.
Oppose liberalization: food
section 301 petition.
flexibility from GOJ, but
security and culture.
Promised to solve in UR.
farm and Agr. Ministry
opposition is strong. Highly
symbolic.
b. U.S. Barriers
U.S. under pressure in UR.
Sugar program symbolizes
i. Sugar tariff-rate
Prepared to modify no
LDCs -- Strong interest.
U.S. farm protection.
quota.
"unilateral disarmament."
U.S. quota is highly
restrictive.
-3-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Strong opposition from
Hawaii (sugar cane),
Louisiana, Minnesota
(sugar beets), and corn
farmers (high-fructose corn
syrup).
ii. Dairy -- quotas.
Prepared to modify. No
Australia --- Strong
Strong domestic opposition.
Uncertain.
"unilateral disarmament."
interest.
Important issue for Cong.
Sen. Leahy chairs Senate
EC, Austria, Switz. --
Agr. Comm. and has one
highly protected dairy
interest -- dairy.
sectors, but also export
interests.
Japan -- restricts dairy
imports.
Strong opposition to
iii. Peanuts, cotton, and
Prepared to cut. No
liberalization.
tobacco -- subsidies
"unilateral disarmament."
and quotas.
iv. Meat -- Meat Import
Prepared to cut.
Cairns -- U.S. quotas
Industry supports quotas,
Unclear.
Act quotas.
affect Aus., N.Z., and
but exports to Asia are
Canada.
increasing.
c.
EC Rebalancing -
Totally opposed.
EC -- longstanding
Strong domestic opposition.
EC ought to back off
-4-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
As part of overall
objective of farm
Potential deal-breaker.
eventually.
tariff reduction, raise
bureaucracy.
tariffs on soybeans
and corn gluten,
Cairns -- strongly
which currently are
opposed.
duty-free.
Intellectual Property
Strengthen IPR protection,
EC -- top priority, but has
Key domestic constituency
Most promising of new
Rights (IPR) -- GATT
particularly in LDCs.
linked to changes in U.S.
for UR. Coalition includes
issues. Strong developed
does not cover IPR. Major
law (see below).
computers,
country support. Key for
problems in LDCs.
semiconductors, fine
U.S. is minimizing changes
Japan - top priority.
chemicals, films, books,
in U.S. law.
software, and
Developed Countries --
pharmaceuticals. Most
support.
important item in
manufacturing sector.
LDCs -- opposition from
hardliners, e.g. India.
Moderate LDCs moving.
1. Agreed standards for
Strengthen IPR standards
EC -- Supports standards,
Strong domestic IPR
Reasonably good if
patents, copyrights
in all areas.
but wants changes in U.S.
support. Interest could
differences with the EC can
(software), trademarks, and
law (below).
diminish if extensive
be ironed out, so U.S. and
trade secrets. Limits on
changes in U.S. law
EC present common front
compulsory licensing.
Nordics & Swiss
because of belief that can
to LDCs.
-- same.
fall back on section 301 if
no agreement.
Japan -- support IPR stds,
but problems on
semiconductors and
compulsory licensing.
-5-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
2. Enforcement.
GATT sanctions against
EC, Japan, Nordics, and
U.S. industry supports
Key is amending section
Measures to enforce
countries which fail to
Swiss --- Want changes in
effective enforcement
337 in a way that
agreed standards.
provide adequate IPR
section 337, so U.S. ITC
mechanisms. Some
preserves effective remedy,
protection. Authority for
procedures conform to
sectors, e.g.
but is arguably GATT-
IPR owner enforce rights
those used by the U.S.
semiconductors, may bolt if
consistent.
against infringers, including
district courts in purely
extensive changes to
infringing imports. Clarify
domestic IPR litigation.
section 337.
status of section 337,
which authorizes U.S.
International Trade
Commission (ITC) to
investigate and exclude
infringing imports.
3. Changes in U.S. law.
U.S. opposes changes, but
is under pressure.
a. Appellations of
Oppose.
EC -- High priority.
Opposition from U.S. wine
Strong pressure to
Origin -European wine
French and Italians.
industry (California).
compromise with EC.
labels, e.g. burgundy and
bordeaux.
Key EC objective. U.S.
under pressure.
b. Moral rights. Berne
Oppose. U.S. did not
EC, Canada, Japan, and
Strong opposition from U.S.
Unclear. For EC, may be
Convention gives artists
accept Berne moral rights
Nordics --- Support moral
film and media industries.
tied to appellations of
control over use of work,
provisions when signed
rights.
origin.
e.g. prevent colorization of
treaty.
films.
-6-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
c. Patents. U.S. uses
Oppose "first to file."
EC, Japan, and Canada -
Strong opposition from U.S.
Uncertain.
"first to invent," whereas
- support.
patent bar.
many nations use "first to
file."
d. LDC Participation --
Support broad LDC
EC, Japan, Nordics, and
Agreement needs broad
Unclear. If rest of UR
Key issue is whether LDCs
participation with no
Swiss -- same.
LDC participation to get
comes together, including
will accept IPR agreement.
exemptions from
industry support.
textiles and agriculture,
obligations.
LDCs -- Oppose GATT
pressure on LDCs to
agreement. If agreement,
agree.
limit it to "counterfeiting"
and leave rest of IPR to
WIPO.
Services -- GATT does
Agreement to bring
EC, Japan, and other
Mixed. Depends on sector
Poor. USTR believes that
not cover trade in services.
services into GATT.
developed countries
(see below).
framework agreement is
Authority to exclude certain
support services agmt.
most likely outcome. This
sectors.
would disappoint U.S.
LDCs -- opposed. Seek
service industry coalition.
exemptions for developing
countries.
1. Standards.
Substantive rules to govern
Developed Countries --
Important issue is financial
Negotiators believe that
services trade. Questions
support in principle.
services (American
best can be achieved is a
remain as to what
Express et al.).
framework agreement.
obligations are appropriate.
LDCs -- Strong opposition
from India and hardliners.
ASEAN and Korea --
more flexibility, but no
public support.
-7-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
2. Financial Services
Split. Industry and USTR
EC -- Supports financial
Strong support from major
Progress on text. Annex is
Annex.
want financial services in
services discipline. One-
U.S. financial institutions.
quite far along, but unclear
the GATT. Treasury has
way cross-retaliation.
Some concerns from small
whether has any effect if
concerns about
banks, but probably can be
tied to non-binding
implementation, but has
LDCs -- opposed. No
taken care of.
framework. Need to sort
gone along so far. Cross-
cross-retaliation. Also
out cross-retaliation.
retaliation (goods v.
want to water down
financial services) is
Financial Annex to weaker
unresolved. USTR and
standards of generic
industry support. Treasury
services agreement (which
opposed at highest levels.
Treasury opposes.)
3. Initial Liberalization
U.S. wants specific ILCs,
All -- Will have difficulty,
U.S. industry wants specific
Questionable. Negotiators
Commitments (ILCs).
i.e. promises to undertake
because far behind
commitments, so
doubt that ILCs can be
specific sectoral obligations
schedule.
agreement means
completed within UR
within a specified period
something and is not
timetable. If so, status of
after end of UR.
limited to framework.
financial services is
unclear, since dependent
on future talks.
4. Coverage. Scope of
Supports coverage of all
EC and Japan support
Opposition from maritime,
If U.S. seeks carve-outs
agreement in terms of
services for certain
universal coverage.
aviation, and basic
from coverage, other
covered sectors.
obligations, e.g.
telecommunications.
countries will seek similar
transparency, but
carve-outs, gutting the
exclusions from substantive
agreement. One solution is
obligations, including MFN,
broad coverage with
for certain sectors.
minimal obligations for
certain sectors, but this
-8-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
invites weak agreement.
a. Maritime.
Industry wants exclusion
Industry efforts to cover
Unclear. Potentially a
from agreement to
maritime in U.S.-Canada
major problem. MFN
preserve Jones Act
FTA. Strong support on
derogations likely.
restrictions on foreign
House Rules Committee.
shipping.
b. Aviation.
Airlines wants carve-out.
Foreign governments
Strong politically.
Unclear. Potentially a
Believe U.S. has greater
pressing for broad
major problem. MFN
leverage in bilateral
coverage. EC has same
derogations likely.
aviation negotiations,
problem as U.S., but wants
because foreign carriers
derogation from MFN.
need access to U.S.
market.
C. Telecommunications.
Industry seeks carve-out
Foreign governments want
Strong politically.
Unclear. Potentially a
for basic services.
broad coverage.
major problem. MFN
Concerned that GATT
derogations likely.
agreement could lock in
unbalanced situation where
U.S. provides open access
and foreigners do not.
Prefers section 301.
d. Culture.
Strongly oppose a cultural
EC and Canada support
If cultural exception, Motion
Unclear.
exception.
cultural exception aimed at
Picture Association (Jack
limiting U.S. movies and
Valenti) will actively oppose
television.
UR.
-9-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Trade-Related
Support rules prohibiting
EC, Japan, and Nordics
U.S. multinationals want
May be headed toward
Investment Measures
local content and export
-- Support TRIMs rules,
TRIMS rules. Congress is
modest agreement that (1)
(TRIMs) Trade-
performance requirements.
but not a high priority.
indifferent, as long as
prohibits local content
distorting conditions that
agreement does not affect
requirements (already
are imposed on foreign
LDCs -- Oppose
states' ability to attract
GATT-illegal), (2) adds
investors, particularly in
prohibitions on TRIMs.
foreign investors. (Despite
some new discipline over
LDCs.
India and Brazil are most
industry support, Hill tends
export requirements, and
hardline. ASEAN opposes
to see overseas investment
(3) contains some
TRIMs, but has internal
as exporting jobs.)
exceptions for LDCs.
divisions. Mexico and
Korea may be prepared to
deal.
Government Procurement
Expand Code coverage,
EC -- Tabled broad and
Industry has longstanding
Could be a surprise selling
-- Tokyo Round Code
particularly to sectors that
sweeping proposal to
interest in access to EC.
point for UR. Need to work
allows foreign companies
were not covered in Tokyo
expand EC sectoral
USTR believes states may
with states on coverage
to bid on certain govt.
Round, e.g. European
coverage, including
be receptive to inclusion,
issue.
contracts.
telecomm. and heavy
telecomm., transport, and
but may insist on the right
electrical equipment (HEE).
HEE. In return, wants U.S.
to exit the Code in the
to cover state procurement
future.
and public utilities.
Tariff and Non-tariff
Reduce high tariffs and
All Developed Countries
Strong interest in zero-for-
Request-offer is time-
Measures (NTMs) -- tariff
NTMs, particularly in LDCs.
-- support formula cut, e.g.
zero, e.g. semiconductors
consuming. May be
and non-tariff barriers to
Support specific request-
33 percent cut for all
and steel. Strong
headed for formula cut,
trade. Agreement on target
offer approach, e.g. trade
products, with certain
opposition to trading off
which could be negotiated
of 33 percent cuts.
cuts on specific items.
exceptions. Oppose
high U.S. tariffs, which are
more quickly. While not
"Zero-for-zero" proposal
request-offer.
concentrated in agr.,
glamorous, tariff cuts
for certain sectors, where
chemicals, and textiles.
generate surprising
all countries would go to
LDCs -- resistance to
Light truck tariff (25%) is
domestic support, because
zero tariff. Current U.S.
reducing or binding tariffs,
issue for U.S. car
of direct impact on bottom
proposal does not meet 33
which tend to be high.
companies.
line. Some U.S. tariff cuts
-10-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
percent target, in part
Want U.S. textile tariffs.
highly sensitive.
because of exclusion of
agriculture and textiles.
Opportun to weakening people for using
atter pution 301 against Jon.
Dispute Settlement
Supports timely GATT
EC -- opposes automatic
Important issue for
Negotiations center on two
GATT disputes now settled
dispute settlement system
adoption of panel reports.
Congress, e.g. Senator
issues -- automaticity and
by rulings of panels of
that assures automatic
Bentsen. Section 301 was
section 301, which could
impartial experts.
adoption of panel reports.
All -- Support limits on
centerpiece of 1988 Trade
be headed for a trade-off.
Procedures allow losing
Oppose restrictions on 301,
U.S. "unilateralism," i.e.
Act. Support for action
Sensitive political issue that
party to block adverse
but isolated internationally.
section 301.
against foreign unfair trade
depends on perceptions of
findings. Creates pressure
barriers
overall UR package and
to go outside GATT and
limits on using 301 in
use section 301.
Some industries, e.g.
sectors not covered by the
telecomm. and motion
pictures, may oppose limits
GATT. Key to Hil concern
on section 301 if rest of UR
does not address their
is effect # # on efforts to
issues and believe can do
better unilaterally.
open Japanese market
Antidumping -- Trade law
Advocate stronger AD
EC -- similar to U.S.
Steel, textiles,
Negotiating group is
remedy against unfairly
remedies: (1) to address
semiconductors, and other
sharply split. LDCs
priced imports that injure a
circumvention of AD orders
Japan, Korea, Hong Kong,
import-sensitive industries
pushing hard, but U.S. and
U.S. industry. Most widely
and (2) increased penalties
and LDCs -- Support AD
strongly oppose any
EC oppose. Modest
used remedy in U.S. trade
for repeat dumping.
reforms. Want to reduce
weakening of unfair trade
changes possible, but
law. Major issue for LDCs.
Support increased
exposure to U.S. and EC
laws. Sympathy in the
significant weakening
transparency, but oppose
AD measures.
Congress because AD
would generate strong U.S.
most reforms sought by
involves "unfair trade"
opposition. Potential deal-
LDCs and Japan.
Nordics and Canada --
practices.
breaker if mishandled.
Similar to LDCs.
-11-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Subsidies -- GATT
U.S. supports strengthened
EC, Japan, Canada, and
U.S. industry supports
Little progress. Agreement
prohibits export subsidies
GATT subsidies discipline,
LDCs -- Oppose new
discipline over subsidies
likely to reflect status quo,
for manufactured goods
particularly subsidies with
limits on government
and targeting. Opposes
i.e. limited GATT discipline
(but not agriculture).
trade impact. Also
subsidies. Support
trade-offs involving CVD.
over subsidies, but broad
Governments can grant
strengthen rules regarding
exempting certain
Congress will oppose CVD
scope for CVD. May be
domestic subsidies, but
targeting and natural
subsidies, e.g. regional and
changes, particularly if no
some new limits on CVD,
importing country can
resource subsidies.
structural adjustment, from
progress on subsidies.
which will be controversial.
impose countervailing
Oppose weakening of U.S.
CVD. EC insistent on
Broad carve-outs for
If no agreement, UR would
duties (CVDs) on
CVD laws. Red/yellow/
exempting regional and
regional and structural
not be jeopardized.
subsidized imports.
green proposal intended to
structural adjustment
subsidies are non-starters.
create clear categories for
subsidies from CVD.
prohibited and permitted
subsidies.
Japan -- Opposes
targeting discipline.
1. Steel -- As part of VRA
Because of lack of
EC -- Interested in steel
U.S. industry supports
Surprising foreign interest
renewal, President
progress on generic
consensus. Concerned
consensus if it does not
in sectoral steel consensus.
committed to seek to
subsidies discipline
about treatment of past
weaken existing AD/CVD
Negotiators believe may be
negotiate international steel
(above), U.S. proposing
steel subsidies (Italy) under
rights. Will oppose any
possible to finesse AD/CVD
consensus to limit unfair
sectoral agreement to limit
U.S. CVD law.
restrictions on ability to
problem.
trade practices and market
steel subsidies, tariffs, and
pursue AD/CVD after VRAs
access barriers in steel
quotas.
Japan and Korea --
expire in 1992.
sector.
Interested in steel
consensus, but want
protection from steel
AD/CVD actions.
Brazil -- Wants exemption
of past subsidies from
CVD.
-12-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Textiles -- Textiles trade
Support reintegrating
EC -- Supports MFA
Textile quota bill has
Despite LDC support for
is covered by the Multi-
textiles trade into GATT,
reintegration, but strong
passed House and Senate
phasing out MFA, unclear
Fiber Arrangement (MFA),
i.e. phasing out protection
resistance from EC
by large margins.
whether this position will
which authorizes
over transition period.
industry. Unclear whether
Ostensible goal is
stick. Many LDCs benefit
negotiated quotas to
Support global quotas for
serious. Problem with
legislated quotas, but
from the MFA. Negotiation
prevent market disruption.
transition mechanism, but
Greece and Portugal.
secondary objective is to
likely to focus on growth
Textiles is the only type of
prepared to discuss MFA-
disrupt GATT talks. Strong
rates for MFA quotas,
MFN
trade benefiting from this
based transition. Need
LDCs -- Want to phase
opposition to cutting U.S.
duration, and safeguard
special quota protection.
improved market disruption
out the MFA by increasing
textile tariffs.
mechanisms. Could result
rules (e.g., cumulate across
growth rates from current
in something similar to
countries.
rate of 6 percent annually.
MFA, which would not
generate undue Cong.
opposition.
Safeguards -- GATT
Has kept position fuzzy.
LDCs - Support
U.S. Some support for
Negotiations appear
contains "escape clause"
Seeks mechanism that will
safeguards discipline.
greater discipline over
headed toward N.Z.
allowing temporary
reduce tendency to resort
VRAs, but not a high
compromise. Would
protection to facilitate
to VRAs.
EC -- Oppose new limits
priority. Some labor union
increase our ability to use
adjustment to import
on safeguards.
and industry interest in
section 201, which could
competition.
improving section 201,
generate some domestic
which implements GATT
support. Would require
escape clause, but is
phase- out of steel VRAs,
hardly used in U.S.
which we have already
promised to do.
1. MFN -- GATT
Expressed some interest in
LDCs -- Want MFN
U.S. industry opposes
May be headed for MFN.
safeguard measures, i.e.,
MFN.
requirement, which in effect
unilateral selectivity.
tariff increased or quotas,
would prohibit VRAs and
must be applied on MFN
VERs. Reject selectivity
basis to all suppliers.
which would allow them to
be singled out.
Imported
-13-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
2. VRAs -- Many
Concern that GATT
EC -- Proposed amending
U.S. has VRAs on steel
U.S. can live with New
countries going outside
requirements are too hard
GATT to allow selective,
and machine tools and
Zealand proposal. Can
GATT by negotiating VRAs
to meet (e.g.,
non-MFN quotas.
VER with Japan on autos.
also live with status quo
or VERs.
compensation and thus
Steel industry appears to
with no agreement and
encourage "grey area"
New Zealand --
accept VRAs end in 1992.
continued consensual
VRAs.
Compromise would provide
Japan not filling auto VER.
selectivity.
grater flexibility to impose
temporary safeguards
measures, but tighten injury
standards, set firm 2- to 3-
year deadline for
termination, and require
MFN. No compensation.
Balance-of-Payments
Support stricter GATT
Developed Countries --
Industry and Congress are
LDCs playing hardball.
(BOP) -- GATT rules are
review of BOP measures
Support BOP reform.
supportive, but not a high
May come around if
weak and allow LDCs to
and improvements in rules
priority domestically.
concerns on textiles and
maintain long-term import
to prevent abuse.
LDCs -- Strongly opposed.
safeguards are met.
quotas, ostensibly for BOP
Have refused to negotiate.
Outcome, if any, likely to
reasons. GATT BOP
Claim BOP is not subject
be modest. In absence of
Committee, which is
for UR discussion. Brazil,
agreement, might be able
responsible for enforcing
India, and Philippines are
to use GATT dispute
BOP rules, has been
problems.
settlement to go after BOP
captured by LDCs.
abuses.
-14-
Issue
U.S. Position
Foreign Position(s)
Domestic Implications
Outlook
Implementation -- Key
Quad (EC, Japan, Canada,
Industry wants progress
Unclear. Could be EPC
Unclear.
issue in UR is getting LDCs
and U.S.) discussions
with LDCs. Failure of
issue. Might be possible to
to accept new disciplines,
showed common concern
sufficient LDCs to joint key
couple single protocol with
particularly in IPR,
about LDC acceptance and
agreements, e.g. IPR, will
discretionary authority to
services, and investment.
free riders.
create problems and/or
provide (or deny) MFN to
Risk that if allow countries
weaken domestic support.
satisfy State.
to pick and choose, LDCs
LDCs -- Hardliners, e.g.
will opt out of key
India, unlikely to join
No inter-agency
agreements, creating "free
certain agreements absent
consensus. State likely to
HEN
rider" problem. USTR
intervening event.
have foreign policy
exploring "single protocol,"
concerns about denying
i.e., new protocol covering
GATT Secretariat --
MFN to non-signatories
LDC mhets,
all UR results would
Supports some form of
who are U.S. allies.
replace GATT. A country
universal application.
could either sign new
protocol or opt out. No
MFN obligation to provide
trade concessions to non-
signatories, since
supersedes GATT.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
8/8/90
P
Re: Political Strategy for the Uruguay Round (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By If (NLGB) on 5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
AC/ER
+
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
THE CHIEF of STAFF
FREDERICK D. McCLURE
has seen 9/12/90
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Political Strategy for the Uruguay Round
It is important for the White House to develop a political
strategy for the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. We should not take Congressional approval of an
Uruguay Round agreement for granted.
Our objective in the Uruguay Round is a major agreement
that fundamentally reforms the multilateral trading system. By
pursuing an ambitious negotiating strategy, we have also
assumed certain political risks. A major Uruguay Round
agreement could require politically sensitive changes in U.S.
domestic policies, particularly in the farm sector, and in the
levels of protection currently afforded to certain politically
powerful U.S. industries. Domestic opposition groups already
are mobilizing to head off U.S. concessions and, if necessary,
fight a Uruguay Round agreement in the Congress. Consequently,
there is potential for a divisive legislative battle over U.S.
implementing legislation.
We must start building political support for an agreement
now. In deciding to pursue a far-reaching agreement, we also
chose to take on the political challenge of altering certain
trade-distortive domestic policies and trade barriers. It
would not be fair to leave the political burden to USTR, which
needs and expects continued White House support and input. In
short, we must ensure that our ambitious negotiating strategy
is integrated with a comprehensive political and legislative
strategy for building the requisite domestic political support
to get the agreement through the Congress.
The attached paper describes possible elements of a
successful political strategy.
Attachment
August 8, 1990
LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND
It is important for the Administration to develop a
political strategy for securing Congressional approval of a
Uruguay Round trade agreement. This strategy must focus on two
goals: (1) educating the Congress on the potential commercial
benefits of the agreement, and (2) building a domestic
political coalition to get the package approved.
1.
We are pursuing a "big package" trade strategy in the
Uruguay Round.
Our objective in the Uruguay Round is a major agreement
that fundamentally reforms the multilateral trading system. We
are seeking substantial reductions in agricultural subsidies
and trade barriers, areas that have evaded effective GATT
discipline for over 40 years. We want to expand GATT to cover
trade in services, investment, and intellectual property rights
(IPR). We have asked for sharp reductions in tariffs and trade
barriers of less-developed countries (LDCs), a point of high
sensitivity to the LDCs. Finally, we have made it clear that
politically sensitive U.S. policies and trade barriers,
including textiles and sugar, are on the negotiating table.
2.
It is important to develop a political strategy for
securing Congressional approval of an agreement.
We should not take Congressional approval of a Uruguay
Round implementing bill for granted.
By pursuing an ambitious negotiating strategy, we have
assumed certain political risks. Negotiating a major Uruguay
Round agreement could require politically sensitive changes in
U.S. domestic policies, particularly in the farm sector, and in
the levels of protection currently afforded to certain
politically powerful U.S. industries. These industries already
are mobilizing to head off U.S. concessions, and if necessary,
fight the Uruguay Round agreement on the Hill.
Consequently, there is potential for a divisive
legislative battle over U.S. implementing legislation.
3.
We must begin building a political coalition to get the
agreement through the Congress.
We must begin raising the public visibility of the talks
and building a political coalition to get an agreement
approved. As the Senate textile bill vote showed, Congress has
not paid much attention to the Uruguay Round and is skeptical
about its potential to advance U.S. economic interests.
-2-
Potential sources of support for an agreement include the
following:
Agricultural feedgrains. Significant reductions in
European trade barriers and export subsidies would
allow U.S. wheat, soybean, and corn producers to
capture a bigger share of the global market. Strong
support from the midwestern farm states will be
required to defeat sectoral opposition to opening
U.S. agricultural markets.
High-tech, pharmaceuticals, computer software, motion
pictures, sound recordings, and book publishing.
These industries would benefit from an IPR agreement.
IPR is the key source of manufacturing sector support
for the round.
Multinationals. U.S. multinationals, e.g., IBM and
Caterpillar, have a major stake in an open trading
system and can be expected to support a reasonable
Uruguay Round agreement. These companies and their
lobbying groups, e.g., the Business Roundtable and
ECAT, have a lot of clout on trade issues.
Financial Services. The big U.S. banks and financial
services providers, e.g., American Express, want
increased access to foreign markets. The difficulty
is that the services talks are moving slowly and
small U.S. banks oppose increased foreign
competition.
4.
The Administration must handle certain issues with extreme
care.
It is important to gauge accurately how far we can go on
certain issues that could involve politically sensitive changes
in U.S. domestic policy. Key pressure points include:
o
Textiles. The LDCs are pushing hard for
liberalization of textile and apparel trade. It is
possible, however, that the Uruguay Round could lead
to relatively modest changes to the current
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). Many small LDCs
benefit from the MFA and would be pushed aside by
larger suppliers in an unregulated environment.
o
Section 337/Copyrights. We have promised to change
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (which provides
a trade remedy for enforcing U.S. patents and
trademarks) because it was found inconsistent with
-3-
GATT last year. The Europeans are pressing for
changes in U.S. copyright law. Both issues are
sensitive.
Antidumping. The LDCs, Japan, and Canada are seeking
major changes in the U.S. antidumping law, which
provides a remedy against unfairly priced imports.
The antidumping law has strong domestic support,
including steel, textiles, semiconductors, and other
import-sensitive industries. This is a potential
deal-breaker.
Dairy, peanuts, and sugar. As part of an
agricultural agreement, the U.S. could be required to
phase out certain import restrictions and reduce
current price support levels for certain commodities.
Such measures will be opposed by U.S. producers of
dairy, peanuts, citrus, sugar, and possibly meat.
o
Section 301. There will be strong Congressional
resistance to weakening U.S. rights to retaliate
unilaterally against unfair trade practices under
section 301.
If the opposition groups coalesce, they could pose a
formidable obstacle to Congressional approval of a Uruguay
Round agreement.
5.
The White House must continue to coordinate closely with
USTR.
The Administration must integrate its trade and
legislative strategies as the negotiations proceed. It is
important to continue to coordinate closely with USTR. As the
negotiations proceed, USTR will need White House input on key
tactical and strategic decisions, particularly those with major
political implications.
I plan to meet regularly with Ambassador Hills during the
fall. In addition, Steve Farrar and Warren Maruyama have been
working closely with Ambassadors Katz, Lavorel, and Yerxa, and
USTR staff on Uruguay Round issues.
6.
Bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion will
require continued investments of the President's time and
political capital.
The President demonstrated his commitment to the Uruguay
Round in Houston. His leadership was the key to the successful
resolution of the agriculture issue by the G-7. Continued
investments of the President's time and political capital will
-4-
be necessary this fall. The agriculture negotiations, in
particular, may require further Presidential involvement.
The President must convince the Congress that the Uruguay
Round is a personal priority and a key element of the
Administration's market-oriented economic policy. It is
important to address congressional skepticism about our ability
to deliver a good agreement and our willingness to engage in
tough bargaining with foreign governments.
7.
The President can emphasize that a Uruguay Round agreement
will promote U.S. commercial interests and free and fair
trade.
The President might consider using the following themes in
discussions with the Congress:
Benefits to U.S. commercial interests. The President
should emphasize the practical commercial benefits to
American firms and workers of a Uruguay Round
agreement. Congress is always skeptical about
appeals to foreign policy or "free trade" theology.
Direct Presidential involvement. He should reiterate
that he will be the ultimate judge of the agreement
and is personally committed to getting a good one
that promotes free and fair trade and U.S. commercial
interests.
Willingness to walk away. He should emphasize his
willingness to walk away if the agreement does not
measure up. This will enhance our credibility with
the Congress and increase our bargaining leverage
with the foreigners.
In concluding trade agreements, it is often necessary for
the participants to face the possibility of failure. It is
quite possible that the Uruguay Round will reach an impasse
sometime this fall. We should be ready for this possibility.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06a. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/22/90
5
Re: Helms Inquiry on Textiles Negotiations (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Open on Expiration of PRA
Subseries:
Issues Files
(Document Follows)
WHORM Cat.:
By
JP
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
THE CHIEF of STAFF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
has seen
10/22/90
October 22, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
done
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Helms Inquiry on Textiles Negotiations
This memorandum provides additional briefing for your call
to Senator Helms regarding the U.S. offer to cut its textile
and apparel tariffs in the Uruguay Round. Senator Helms is
likely to appeal to you to exclude textile and apparel tariffs
from the GATT negotiations.
The U.S is submitting a revised Uruguay Round tariff offer
today. Because the previous U.S. offer excluded textiles,
agriculture, and other import-sensitive sectors, it fell well
short of the Uruguay Round target of cutting tariffs by 33
percent. Given the lack of time, the U.S. must submit a
credible offer if we are to achieve our objective of
substantially reducing foreign tariffs on U.S. exports.
There has never been any commitment by the Administration
to exclude textile tariffs from the GATT negotiations. The
tariffs have not been included in previous offers for tactical
reasons.
In preparing the latest U.S. offer, USTR worked closely
with the American Textile Manufacturing Institute (ATMI). As a
result, the U.S. offer has been revised significantly to
address industry concerns. In particular, the offer originally
proposed a ten (10) percent cut in certain apparel tariffs and
a 33 percent cut in certain textile tariffs. After
consultations with the industry, the cuts have been changed to
six (6) percent and twelve (12) percent respectively. Also,
the list of tariffs to be cut has been revised to reflect the
industry's views on products that are import-sensitive.
Recommendation
That you tell Senator Helms that the Administration is
committed to going ahead with its tariff offer, which includes
cuts for textiles and apparel. You might emphasize that the
offer has been discussed with ATMI and revised significantly to
address industry concerns. Talking points are attached.
Attachment
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06b. Paper
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
10/22/90
P-5
Talking Points for Conversation w/Senator Helms Regarding
Textile Tariffs (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
If
(NLGB)
on
5/12/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29174-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TALKING POINTS FOR CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR
HELMS REGARDING TEXTILE TARIFFS
(October 22, 1990)
Jesse, I appreciate your calling the Uruguay Round tariff
issue to my attention.
I've discussed your concerns with Carla.
I understand that USTR has revised the proposed Uruguay
Round tariff offer to accommodate the industry's concerns.
In particular:
--
The proposed cut for textiles has been reduced from
33 percent to 12 percent.
:
The proposed cut for apparel has been reduced from 10
percent to 6 percent.
:
The scope of the offer has been revised significantly
to reflect the industry's views on products that are
import-sensitive.
--
The industry has provided some very helpful advice on
products that can be cut to zero. This will be
useful, since we won't have to cut as much for other
products that the industry cares about.
Proposed response if Senator Helms asks for total exclusion of
textile and apparel tariffs from the Uruguay Round.
I'm afraid that total exclusion is not possible. We
cannot achieve our tariff-cutting goals in the Uruguay
Round if we exclude textiles.
There is pressure from other American industries to reduce
foreign tariffs and increase our ability to sell abroad.
We have to balance both sides of the equation.
Jesse, the President is committed to doing everything
within his power to help you. I hope that we can continue
to work together on this textile trade issue in the next
few months.
USTR has revised the offer significantly to accommodate
the industry.
We cannot delay a decision. We have to go forward.