Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
702542
label
Uruguay Round 1991
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
702542
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Uruguay Round 1991
citationUrl
identifierLocal
29174-003
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
702542
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b0f5b525d350458e
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F[2]; 2003-1388-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29174
Folder ID Number:
29174-003
Folder Title:
Uruguay Round 1991
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
4
5
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Letter
From Ruud Lubbers to POTUS
11/15/91
(b)(1)
Re: GATT Talks
[SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (3 pp.)
02. Memo
From Stephen Farrar and Warren Maruyama to Roger Porter
11/18/91
(b)(1)
Re: Uruguay Round Subsidies Negotiations (2 pp.)
03. Memo
From Nicholas F. Brady to POTUS
7/3/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (3 pp.)
04. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
7/1/91
P.5
Re: Timing of Uruguay Round and U.S.-Mexico Negotiations (2
pp.)
05a. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
6/12/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Uruguay Round
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
05b. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
6/11/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Last Week's Trip to Europe
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
05c. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
6/12/91
(b)(1)
C-
Re: Uruguay Round
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Pinksheet Number:
KO0935
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
05d Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
6/11/91
(b)(1)
€
Re: Last Week's Trip to Europe
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
06a. Memo
From Carla Hills
6/17/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Negotiating the NAFTA
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (2 pp.)
06b. Outline
Negotiating Groups
n.d.
(b)(1)
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
06c. Timeline
NAFTA and Parallel Cooperation Efforts
n.d.
(b)(1)
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (3 pp.)
07a. Outline
From Carla Hills
6/17/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Uruguay Round Strategy
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (4 pp.)
07b. Attachment 1
Action Plan Uruguay Round Negotiations
n.d.
(b)(1)
C
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (2 pp.)
07c. Attachment 2 Key Contacts
n.d.
(b)(1)
C
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (4 pp.)
08. Memo of
From Roger B. Porter
5/6/91
(b)(1)
C
Conversation
Re: Meeting with European Agriculture Commissioner Ray
MacSherry
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (4 pp.)
Page 2 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Pinksheet Number:
KO0935
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
09a Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
2/21/91
(b)(1)
e
Re: Uruguay Round
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
09b Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
2/20/91
(b)(1)
e
Re: Uruguay Round: Reason for Optimism
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (1 pp.)
10. Outline
Discussion Paper: Expiration Of Fast-Track (9 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(i)
11a. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
1/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
11b. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
1/28/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Meetings with the EC on the Uruguay Round (2 pp.)
12a. Note
From Phillip D. Brady to Ede Holiday
1/31/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: attached memo (1 pp.)
12b. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
1/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
12c. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
1/28/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Meetings with the EC on the Uruguay Round [with
handwritten annotations] (2 pp.)
13. Notes
Handwritten notes on Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
n.d.
PS
Page 3 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Pinksheet Number:
KO0935
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
14. Paper
Uruguay Round (2 pp.)
12/19/90
15. Chart
Possible Scenarios for EC Negotiations (1 pp.)
n.d.
16a. Memo
From Brent Scowcroft
11/28/90
(b)(1)
Re: Meeting. on the Uruguay Round, November 28, 1990 3:00
pm (3 pp.)
16b. Talking Points Meeting On The Uruguay Round (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
16c List
Participants (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
17. Report
France: Benefits from the Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
n.d.
P-5
Page 4 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Pinksheet Number:
KO0935
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
FOIA/Sys Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Letter
From Ruud Lubbers to POTUS
11/15/91
(b)(1)
Re: GATT Talks
[SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
1998-0004-F (11)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Denied in Full
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
12/18/1998
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 18, 1991
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER B. PORTER
By SS NARA, Date 12/1/23
SFF
FROM:
STEPHEN P. FARRAR
WARREN MARUYAMA WM
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round Subsidies Negotiations
As discussed, we have been working with USTR on the
indusrial subsidies portion of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
With pushes from both President Bush and Dutch Prime Minister
Lubbers to resolve differences on agriculture in the next few
weeks, we can expect pressure to build rapidly to resolve other
outstanding Uruguay Round issues. The subsidies issue will be
a critical part of the final package.
The Fundamental Trade-Off
Since 1986, the Uruguay Round negotiators have been
contemplating a fundamental trade-off in GATT subsidies
discipline. The United States is attempting to restrict for
the first time the ability of governments to provide domestic
industrial subsidies. In return, the foreigners are seeking
new constraints on U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) actions
against subsidized imports.
Prospects
While major improvements in international subsidies
discipline appeared unlikely five years ago, it may now be
possible to reach agreement that domestic subsidies exceeding
certain thresholds, e.g., 5 percent, would be presumptively
GATT-illegal. This change would protect U.S. industry against
subsidized foreign competition, and in addition could reduce
the pressure in the U.S. for major industrial bail-outs.
In return, the foreigners want to exempt certain subsidies
-- regional, research and development, environmental, and
structural adjustment subsidies -- from CVD actions, subject to
agreed terms and conditions. For example, environmental
subsidies that qualify for exemption must be generally
available to all firms, non-recurring, provide no production
benefit, and not exceed 20 percent of cost.
This proposal for exempting certain categories of
permitted subsidies involves risks: There will be opposition
to weakening our CVD law; and permitting certain subsidies in
GATT could generate pressure in the U.S. for matching
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
assistance. In our view, however, a significant improvement in
GATT subsidy disciplines is worth pursuing, even if it involves
certain risks. The alternative is to steer toward a minimalist
agreement that involves modest changes in the current GATT
rules.
Proposed Next Steps
If we decide to explore a far-reaching GATT trade-off,
USTR needs guidance on categories of subsidies that could be
exempted from CVDs. We believe that the U.S. should show some
flexibility on three types of subsidies: regional, R&D, and
environmental.
Since the U.S. already provides certain regional and R&D
subsidies, these categories are logical candidates for
exemptions, particularly if there is agreement on credible
conditions and a cap on the maximum level of subsidy,
e.g., 2 percent.
We should consider exempting certain environmental
subsidies by less developed countries (LDCs). This change
could help win support of environmentalists for
Congressional approval of the Uruguay Round package. It
could also win the U.S. some credit internationally
(notably at the UNCED Rio meeting in June) at a minimal
price. Since most LDCs are far behind on environmental
protection, the change is unlikely to pose much of a
threat to U.S. industry.
In our view, a significant improvement in the international
discipline on industrial subsidies can be obtained in exchange
for modest flexibility in some areas. We recommend that USTR
be authorized to begin exploring possible outcomes to the
subsidies negotiations based on the concepts outlined above.
We will continue to work closely with USTR throughout the
negotiations to ensure that each potential area for exemption
is appropriately constrained.
CONFIDENTIAL
AC HAS SEEN
THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER
VVV
RECEIVED
leov. len. copies to Scower
'JUL - 8 1991
19/4
July 2, 1991
Dear Andy;
Your respective bosses are about to take off for the London Economic
Summit. I think it is going to be an interesting occasion.
France is becoming an increasing problem for the United States, mainly
in the trade arena, but also in the regional defense issue. Mitterrand's
party has an election coming along next year or so, and his narrow political
instincts will argue for a typical "to hell with you" posture. If he manages
to play. this game successfully, you can kiss the Uruguay Round good by, say
hello to an independent European defense force unconnected to the existing
broader defense arrangements, and start the ball rolling toward a new
multi polar economic and defense arrangement that will SOW the seeds for
major turmoil in the next century.
In years past, I have had some experience in dealing with the French on
issues where they have taken an independent and anti U.S. position.
I have discovered that the French do not respond to polite requests.
Neither do they respond to public demands. They respond only to a quiet
but very firm and very concrete threat that impacts an interest that they
care about. Right now, France wants to have its cake and eat it too on
the trade front. They wish to appear to be the friend of the third world
but at the same time torpedo the trade round that would be helpful to that
same constituency. Take Taiwan. Right now, there are two massive projects
that the French are interested in: a high speed rail system, and a nuclear
power plant. The French say that they are in favor of having Taiwan enter
GATT, and are acting as Taiwan's most visible sponsor. In return, they
are claiming political rights to these two big projects.
We are not without clout in Taiwan, if we choose to exercise it. Nor are we
without reach in other third world markets of interest to the French.
The French do not hesitate to paint us with dark colors in their efforts to
expand their commercial interests in individual countries. Perhaps the time
has come to have STR carefully review current major French trade interests,
and then map a U.S. campaign to deprive France of some very important
contracts. Perhaps the President should tell Mitterrand at a private meeting
that if France successfully obstructs a Uruguay Round, that he can expect from
the United States a major response that will cost France in the end more than
France will gain by killing the round. He will want to be prepared to talk
about potential U.S. steps, or perhaps better, dispatch a surrogate to deliver
the more detailed message, after he delivers the general message.
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
1000 JEFFERSON DRIVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20560
202:357:2429 TELEX 264729 FAX 202:357:4439
THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER
V
We have very big fish to fry at this point. You will find many of my
former colleagues at the French desk arguing against such measures
because they know that the dust will fly, and State always likes to
avoid confrontations when it can.
The truth is that I don't much like confrontations either. But sometimes
they are unavoidable. If we don't have a successful confrontation with
the French now, we will all regret it ten or twenty years from now
when we have to live with the consequences of today's drift.
Sincerely;
Oich
Richard McCormack
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
1000 JEFFERSON DRIVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20560
202:357:2429 TELEX 264729 FAX 202:357:4439
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Memo
From Nicholas F. Brady to POTUS
7/3/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04. Memo
From Roger Porter to John Sununu
7/1/91
P/5
Re: Timing of Uruguay Round and U.S.-Mexico
Negotiations (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By If (NLGB) on 10/28/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
AC/ER
July 1, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Timing of Uruguay Round and U.S. -Mexico
Negotiations
The recent meetings chaired by Secretary Brady have left
open the question of whether to push to complete the Uruguay
Round and/or the North American free trade agreement (NAFTA)
during 1992. The resolution of this question has important
political and trade policy implications. We should attempt to
resolve it before the London Economic Summit.
USTR wants to finish the Uruguay Round by the end of the
year, although much depends on the European Community's ability
to move on agriculture. We have tentatively agreed with
Canada and Mexico to aim to finish the NAFTA by the end of the
year. However, we also committed during the fast track debate
to take the time necessary to reach a good agreement.
The extension of the fast track procedures gives us until
June 1, 1993 to finish both the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA
negotiations. Under the fast track, Congress has 90
legislative days to vote up-or-down on an Administration
implementing bill. This translates into about 6 months in real
time. This means that, if a NAFTA or Uruguay Round agreement
is reached in December 1991 or in the first few months of next
year, Congressional consideration of the implementing bill
would take place during the 1992 Presidential and Congressional
campaigns. We need to consider the timing and sequence of the
two negotiations:
Uruguay Round. With bipartisan cooperation from the
leadership, it should be possible to secure Congressional
approval of a solid Uruguay Round agreement during 1992,
assuming the Europeans come through on agriculture. The
fast track debate showed that the Uruguay Round has broad
support. From a political perspective, the principal
opponent of a GATT agreement is the textile industry.
(The President opposed textile quotas in 1988.) The other
important consideration is import-sensitive farm
commodities (dairy, sugar, and peanuts).
NAFTA. In contrast, seeking Congressional approval of the
NAFTA during an election campaign could be extremely
risky. While we won the fast track extension, the margins
-2-
were relatively close, particularly in the House. The
agreement will face strong labor union opposition.
Proximity to the elections will complicate the task of
securing cooperation from the Democratic leadership.
Before a decision is made on timing, it might be useful
for the President to seek the advice of Senator Bentsen and
Chairman Rostenkowski, perhaps in a small Oval Office meeting.
If there is bipartisan agreement that the Congress is prepared
to consider a solid Uruguay Round agreement, the President
would be in a strong position at the London Summit. He could
tell the Europeans that he has consulted Congressional leaders
and obtained agreement that a good package is more important
than timing. This would help persuade those in the EC who
persist in believing that the United States will accept a
minimalist package in order to finish the Uruguay Round by the
end of the year and keep the issue out of the 1992 election.
I believe we can avoid the Uruguay Round becoming a
partisan issue. From a political perspective, the President
has been highly successful on trade policy. He has defused the
trade issue and in fact converted it into a positive for the
Republican Party. There is increasing appreciation that U.S.
exports are rising, that we are internationally competitive,
and that open markets are important for future U.S. economic
growth. It is difficult to see how Gephardt or any other
Democrat could gain politically next year by advocating
protectionism and opposing a solid agreement in the Uruguay
Round.
has
6-23-91
THE seen CHIEF of STAFF
Brent/JOhn S/EDE
Re: Meeting on Trade 'rounds"
Yes, I think we should have the
kind of meeting visualized here.
GB
cc: Sec Brady
george BUSH
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
91 JUN 12 PM 12: 12
June 12, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY SHA
Cr
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round
Ambassador Hills is sending you the attached report on her
Uruguay Round discussions at the OECD Ministerial in Paris last
week.
Secretary Brady has discussed with Ambassador Hills the need for
Cabinet-level consideration of our Uruguay Round strategy.
Secretary Brady has indicated to me that once you have heard from
Carla on the OECD he would like in the next several weeks to
convene a small meeting with her and other Cabinet colleagues to
discuss our approach in the Uruguay Round.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR -
7/21/09 zz
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
JUN 1991
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
CAst
SUBJECT:
Last Week's Trip to Europe
On Saturday, I returned from a week in Europe. In Paris I
attended the OECD Ministerial, where our delegation was very ably
led by Nick Brady, and I met with government and business
leaders. I also met with government and business leaders in
London and Bonn. The primary focus of all my meetings was the
Uruguay Round.
At the OECD Ministerial, the general tone of discussions on the
Round was positive. We made clear that the successful conclusion
of the Round remains a top U.S. priority. We declined to set an
explicit deadline for the Round that could force inadequate
results, stressing that real results should create the deadline.
Toward that end, we proposed an action plan whereby the technical
work in key areas of the Round would be completed by the end of
July. Our aim is to achieve tangible benefits in terms of
increased market access for manufactured goods, services,
government procurement, and agriculture, in order to ensure the
participation of a broad range of countries and political support
at home. We persuaded Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands to exert pressure in the coming
weeks on the EC, the Latins, and the Southeast Asians to move the
negotiations.
The LDCs still will not negotiate in all areas of the Uruguay
Round unless there is progress in agriculture. In part, this
progress hinges on the EC's internal reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EC Commission plans to have a
first draft of CAP reform available for discussion by the end of
June. In addition, GATT Director-General Dunkel plans by late
June to table a paper designed to narrow the options for
achieving agricultural reform in the Round. Despite this
activity, German officials cautioned us that the EC may not be in
a position to deal constructively with agriculture until
September or October.
It may be useful for a small group of us to discuss with you the
prospects for the Round before the Economic Summit in July.
Classified by: Gites
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
91 JUN 12 PM 12: 12
June 12, 1991
THE CHIEF of STAFF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
has seen
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY SH
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round
Ambassador Hills is sending you the attached report on her
Uruguay Round discussions at the OECD Ministerial in Paris last
week.
Secretary Brady has discussed with Ambassador Hills the need for
Cabinet-level consideration of our Uruguay Round strategy.
Secretary Brady has indicated to me that once you have heard from
Carla on the OECD he would like in the next several weeks to
convene a small meeting with her and other Cabinet colleagues to
discuss our approach in the Uruguay Round.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
7/21/09 32
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
JUN 1991
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
CAst
SUBJECT: Last Week's Trip to Europe
On Saturday, I returned from a week in Europe. In Paris I
attended the OECD Ministerial, where our delegation was very ably
led by Nick Brady, and I met with government and business
leaders. I also met with government and business leaders in
London and Bonn. The primary focus of all my meetings was the
Uruguay Round.
At the OECD Ministerial, the general tone of discussions on the
Round was positive. We made clear that the successful conclusion
of the Round remains a top U.S. priority. We declined to set an
explicit deadline for the Round that could force inadequate
results, stressing that real results should create the deadline.
Toward that end, we proposed an action plan whereby the technical
work in key areas of the Round would be completed by the end of
July. Our aim is to achieve tangible benefits in terms of
increased market access for manufactured goods, services,
government procurement, and agriculture, in order to ensure the
participation of a broad range of countries and political support
at home. We persuaded Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands to exert pressure in the coming
weeks on the EC, the Latins, and the Southeast Asians to move the
negotiations.
The LDCs still will not negotiate in all areas of the Uruguay
Round unless there is progress in agriculture. In part, this
progress hinges on the EC's internal reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EC Commission plans to have a
first draft of CAP reform available for discussion by the end of
June. In addition, GATT Director-General Dunkel plans by late
June to table a paper designed to narrow the options for
achieving agricultural reform in the Round. Despite this
activity, German officials cautioned us that the EC may not be in
a position to deal constructively with agriculture until
September or October.
It may be useful for a small group of us to discuss with you the
prospects for the Round before the Economic Summit in July.
Classified by: GALIS
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
5/25/10 (Di
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
JUN I 7 1991
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT:
Negotiating the North American Free Trade
Agreement
FROM:
Carla A. Hills CAHEM
I'met Wednesday in Toronto with Jaime Serra Puche and Michael
Wilson. We agreed on a structure for negotiation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a timetable that could
allow us to complete these talks by the end of the year. Within
the USG, we have put in place a mechanism to ensure that the
negotiations are coordinated and our collaborative efforts on
environment and labor issues are moving on the same timetable.
Summarized below are the key elements of our strategy. Attached
is a preliminary timeline tracing a six month program to complete
the NAFTA.
Organization of the Negotiations: We have agreed to negotiate in
16 areas that fall in 6 broad categories: market access; trade
rules; services; investment; intellectual property and dispute
settlement (attached as Tab 1 is the full list of negotiating
groups) The Mexicans remain highly sensitive about energy which
is disguised under the heading "other industrial sectors."
The work of the negotiating groups will be stitched together at
periodic plenary meetings, chaired on the U.S. side by my deputy,
Ambassador Julius Katz.
Serra, Wilson and I have agreed to hold a bimonthly conference
call to review progress and resolve issues as they arise. We
have also agreed to meet on August 20 to review the initial
progress in the negotiations. In the fall, we will likely meet
monthly.
Schedule: All three parties negotiating the NAFTA have a strong
political interest in completing the negotiations soon. However,
we have agreed that we will take "all the time necessary to
conclude a good agreement.' " We have developed a schedule that
would allow us to finish the agreement by the end of the year,
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
@ 5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
2
should we choose to do SO. Attached as Tab 2 is a timeline of
how this might be accomplished, dividing the negotiating process
into three phases: identification of issues; exchange of
negotiating texts; and conclusion of the agreement.
While we and the Canadians have the technical ability to make
this schedule work, we have some worries about whether Mexico has
enough depth on its negotiating team. For us the real challenge
will be to bring along the Congress and worried domestic
constituencies. This may take time and a great deal of
missionary work at all levels.
A Coordinating Structure Within the U.S. Government: We are
establishing a NAFTA Policy Coordinating Group (PCG) to be
chaired by Jules Katz. Membership would be at the Under
Secretary level from all the agencies involved.
The NAFTA PCG will coordinate the development of policy options
for the NAFTA negotiations; oversee the process of consultation
with the Hill and important interest groups that will be vital to
obtaining Congressional approval of an agreement; and coordinate
parallel efforts to make progress on the environmental and labor
action plans. The NAFTA PCG will report to the Economic Policy
Council.
In the case of environment, issues will be considered through the
Domestic Policy Council's Environmental Policy Review Group,
chaired by Roger Porter. The NAFTA PCG will monitor the pace of
implementation of our action plan commitments (for example, the
very important Border Environmental Plan).
Attachments:
1. NAFTA Negotiating Groups
2. Timeline - NAFTA and Parallel Cooperation Efforts
CONFIDENTIAL
Tab 1
NEGOTIATING GROUPS
I
Market Access
a) tariffs/non tariff barriers
b) rules of origin
c) government procurement
d) agriculture
e) automobiles
f) other industrial sectors
II
Trade Rules
a) safeguards, subsidies and trade remedies
b) standards
III Services
a) principles for services
b) financial
c) insurance
d) land transportation
e) telecommunications
f) other services
IV
Investment (principles and restrictions)
V
Intellectual Property
VI
Dispute Settlement
CONFIDENTIAL
Tab 2
TIMELINE
NAFTA and Parallel Cooperation Efforts
Target Date
Event
Purpose
PHASE 1 -- ORGANIZE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, IDENTIFY MAJOR ISSUES
June 12
Trilateral Ministerial, Toronto
Reach agreement
on organization
of negotiations
and schedule.
June 18-21
EPA and Mexican counterparts
Develop agreed
meet in Mexico
draft of Border
Environmental
Plan
June 17-30
Negotiating Groups hold first
Organize work
meetings
identify issues
June 24
Drafting of Environmental Review
Action Plan
begins within USG
item
Early July
Plenary Meeting
Chief
negotiators and
agency leads
review work of
groups
mid July
Labor Statistics meetings, Mexico
Action plan
item
July 8-19
Negotiating groups hold second
Further refine
meetings
basic
principles of
negotiation
July 26
Negotiating groups report back
Identify issues
to plenary
that must be
resolved before
agreement
drafting begins
July 29
Draft Border Environmental Plan
30 day public
released
comment period
begins
Early August
Second Plenary Meeting
Resolve issues
or frame them
DECLASSIFIED
for ministerial
PER E.O. 12958,
consideration
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
CONFIDENTIAL
3r 5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
2
August 5-9
EPA-USPS Public Health Workshop
Action Plan
in Texas
item
August 15
Draft Environmental Review
Action Plan
completed, distributed for
item
public comment
August 15-30
TPSC public hearings on NAFTA
Allows
in Washington and 1 or 2 cities
interested
industries and
other groups to
provide comment
on NAFTA to USG
August 20
Second Trilateral Ministerial
Set guidelines
Meeting, Seattle
for agreement
drafting phase
PHASE 2 -- EXCHANGE OF NEGOTIATING TEXTS
Sept.-Oct.
Negotiating groups meet
Draft agreement
texts are
exchanged and
differences
identified
September 9
Secretary Baker leads US del to
Anticipate
U.S. -Mexico Binational Commission
adoption of
Border
Environmental
Plan and
signing of
agreement
allowing OSHA
to test Mexican
industrial
samples
Sept.-Nov.
U.S. provides training in labor
Action Plan
statistics to Mexicans
item
Early October
Third Trilateral Ministerial
First review
Mexico
of composite
negotiating
text
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
PHASE 3 -- CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT
Oct-Dec
Monthly Trilateral Ministerials,
Development of
bimonthly Plenaries and contin-
agreement text
uing meetings of negotiating
and resolution
groups
of differences
December
High Hazard Industry Conference
Action Plan
(OSHA)
item
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Meeting on Uruguay Round and NAFTA
June 19, 1991
The Roosevelt Room
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
Uruguay Round
What are the realistic prospects for achieving our
objectives in the Uruguay Round by the end of this year?
-
Will the EC agree on reform of its Common
Agricultural Policy in time to move the Round?
-
In what other areas do we face substantial
negotiating problems?
-
Do we need to reformulate or scale back any of our
substantive objectives?
Does the London Economic Summit represent the last chance
for a political commitment to complete the Round by the
end of this year?
What should be our political strategy for building support
within the EC for agricultural reform and a meaningful
outcome to the Uruguay Round?
North American Free Trade Agreement
Based on discussions at Toronto on June 12, what will be
the key negotiating problems?
How long are negotiations likely to take and how will
Congressional views be accounted for?
How will the Administration address U.S.-Mexico issues
that are not part of the trade negotiations, e.g.,
environmental and labor issues?
Fast Track Implications
Can and should we conclude negotiations on both the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA by the end of 1991 in order to
complete the fast track process before the 1992 election
cycle?
If not, what are the implications of slippage into the
post-election period?
UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
OLIN L. WETHINGTON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Meeting on June 19, 1991, 3:45 p.m.
Room 180, Old Executive Office Building
Uruguay Round and NAFTA
Secretary Brady will convene a meeting on Wednesday,
June 19, 1991, 3:45 p.m.-4:45 p.m. in Room 180, OEOB
to discuss Uruguay Round and North America Free Trade
Agreement strategy.
Enclosed please find two background papers prepared by
USTR.
Enclosures
UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
JUN 17 1991
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round Strategy
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
After
I.
STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS
At this time, it is difficult to assess the prospects for
successfully completing the Uruguay Round by year end. Both our
domestic experience in obtaining the extension of "fast track"
and our experience at Brussels demonstrate that agreement on a
critical mass of Uruguay Round issues is required if the Round is
to obtain domestic and international support.
For the United States, a broad package focusing on market access
for goods (including the "zero-for-zero" initiative) and
services, as well as a solid agreement on intellectual property
are essential for building the necessary domestic support for the
Round.
Yet Brussels made it clear that developing countries will not
sign on to agreements in these areas absent an agreement in
agriculture giving them market access, and for some an agreement
giving improved access on textiles. Agriculture, however,
remains the linchpin of a successful Round.
The EC remains the key obstacle to progress on agriculture.
Since Brussels, the EC has begun the internal process of
reforming its Common Agricultural Policy. In addition, in the
three areas of agriculture negotiations it has agreed to
negotiate specific commitments to reduce internal supports,
market access, and export subsidies.
Based on recent soundings in key EC capitals, we do not believe
that it is necessary for the EC to finish its internal CAP reform
before it negotiates constructively on agriculture in the Round.
However, it is believed that the EC needs to be making progress
on CAP reform if it is to have the internal flexibility necessary
to move in the Round.
We expect that a first draft of a CAP reform proposal will
surface in the Commission some time in late June or early July,
with final adoption probably not occurring before year-end. The
Germans and others have indicated that we will probably not know
if the Commission is willing to move on agriculture in the Round
until some time in September or October. To show movement, the
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS 2008-0213-MR AMENDED
Col
5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
2
EC does not need to commit to precise numbers for the reduction
of agricultural barriers, but it must be able to give credible
assurances that those numbers will be large enough to obtain LDC
support.
II. STRATEGY
Once the EC is ready to move on agriculture, it should take about
six months to wrap up Uruguay Round negotiations. To be ready to
complete the negotiation of a broad package in that timeframe,
the United States has proposed an action plan for making progress
on key issues in the Round (see attachment 1). This action plan
focuses on accelerating the pace and number of negotiations in
market access and services, and of having virtually complete
negotiating texts in all areas, particularly intellectual
property.
However, the key question remains how to maximize the probability
that the EC will move on agriculture by this fall. It will not
work to "chase after" the EC, or promise to "pay" it for movement
on agriculture; we are simply too close to our bottom line in the
Round to offer more inducement. Moreover, public confrontation
over agriculture will only fray our relations with the EC.
Instead, (in addition to continuing to engage the EC in Geneva
negotiations) we need to apply quiet pressure on the Community,
and particularly on France, which is the major obstacle to
movement on agriculture. This should continue to be done in
three ways.
First, with the EC Commission: We are working quietly with the EC
Commission in capitals to narrow our differences in areas other
than agriculture. With respect to agriculture, we should
continue to engage both EC President Delors and Agriculture
Commissioner MacSharry on a regular basis, as they are the
crucial players.
Second, with EC Member States: We are working directly with the
member states to persuade them to move President Mitterand on
agriculture, and to urge them to pressure the Commission to move
on non-agricultural issues. At the political level, this means
that U.S. officials need to persuade member states to pressure
the French government in general and Mitterand in particular (see
attachment 2 for contacts). Convincing Chancellor Kohl to
pressure Mitterand will be essential to this effort. Clearly,
there is little point in President Bush inveighing upon Mitterand
if Kohl is not. Our other key allies in the EC are the UK and
the Netherlands.
In addition, we should continue to urge key individuals in the
ministries and the private sectors of the member states of the
stake that their industrial sectors have in a successful Round.
We also need to urge both groups to persuade the Commission not
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
to sacrifice the industrial sector for the sake of agriculture.
Senior level interagency teams are being sent to key member
states -- Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the Netherlands --
during the next several months to build support for U.S.
positions on specific issues in the Round.
Third, with non-EC States: We are in regular contact at the
MInisterial and senior official level with other interested
countries, particularly the Latin and ASEAN members of the Cairns
Group (see attachment 2), to maintain the pressure on the EC in
agriculture, and to secure progress on non-agricultural issues of
interest to us and the EC.
The London Economic Summit provides an opportunity to work
directly on Mitterand, Kohl, and Major, and to convince Delors
that he must intervene if we are to achieve sufficient progress
by July. The focus at the Summit should be on obtaining
political support for meaningful results in the Round as opposed
to an explicit deadline. Setting a deadline risks a repeat of
Brussels or, even worse, it could encourage the negotiation of an
inadequate package that we could not sell domestically. Focusing
on results in the Round's key areas will enable us to generate
progress in negotiations, and helps ensure that when the Round is
completed, the package is broad enough to be domestically
salable.
III. RELATIONSHIP TO U.S. TRADE POLICY
The successful completion of multilateral trade negotiations
should not be abandoned, even if it cannot be accomplished this
year. There is simply no substitute for the economic gains that
can be obtained through multilateral negotiations, both from our
point of view, and particularly from the point of view of the
LDCs, who cannot hope to see liberalization of world agriculture
or textiles outside of the Round. In short, the Round provides
irreplaceable leverage for obtaining trade liberalization in the
developing world.
At the same time, for domestic political reasons we cannot afford
a Uruguay Round conclusion at any cost. And, we know, based on
the reaction to Brussels, that if the United States should decide
to walk away from the negotiating table due to insufficient
results, it would bolster the President's political credibility
on trade issues.
While we are pursuing the above strategy, it is not incompatible
to continue the aggressive pursuit of bilateral and regional
market-opening initiatives with our key trading partners and
groups of trading partners. Thus, we should, for example:
Complete the North American Free Trade Agreement;
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Continue the full pursuit of the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative;
Pursue the accession of Taiwan as a developed country into
the GATT;
Work to have Korea join the OECD; and
Develop closer trade ties with the ASEAN countries, building
upon the ASEAN-U.S. Initiative.
Progress in these market-opening initiatives positions us to more
quickly complete the Round when the EC is able to move forward,
or failing that, at least lock in market liberalization with key
partners. In short, pursuing both multilateral and bilateral
initiatives leaves us in a "win-win" situation, whatever the
immediate outcome of the Uruguay Round.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Attachment 1
Action Plan
Uruguay Round Negotiations
The Uruguay Round negotiating issues are all not at the same
stage of negitiation or agreement. To assure successful
conclusion of the Round by year end, the following near-term
results are being pursued.
Services:
The United States has secured bilateral market access offers
to in services from 31 countries. We are now engaged in
multilateral negotiations with these countries, in order to
broaden their offers and to improve them qualitatively.
We are working to complete and ad ref text on the services
framework.
Market Access:
We are working to complete the interim steel (MSA) text;
We are working to develop a "large" market access package
by addressing tariff peaks and building support for our
"zero for zero" initiatives; and
:
Negotiators are conducting an intensive series of
bilateral and plurilateral negotiating sessions.
Agriculture:
Building on the technical work accomplished under Dunkel's
chairmanship, we are seeking agreement on:
--
a text outlining agreement on the mechanisms to be used
to implement commitments in each of the three areas
(market access, export subsidies and domestic
supports) i
the range of annual reduction commitments in each of
the three areas and the base period from which the
reductions start- to set the stage for the final
negotiations on the exact numbers in the fall; and
--
an ad ref text on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2008 0213-MR
Q1 5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Government Procurement:
--
We are working to complete an ad ref text of the
renegotiated code, recognizing that coverage may remain in
brackets.
TRIPs:
--
We are negotiating improvements to existing text, including
resolution of all remaining technical issues and,
--
seeking agreement on the political issues to be
forwarded to the political level for resolution (e.g.,
GATTability).
Rules:
--
We are working for ad ref or nearly complete texts in all
rules areas; and
--
seeking agreement that OECD countries will press for
draft texts on BOP and TRIMs to be developed as quickly
as possible.
(Note: Ad ref agreements sent for legal drafting as a
result of Brussels for PSI and Origin)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Attachment 2
Key Contacts
The following are the principal countries and persons we have
targeted for approaches, and with whom we continue to build
relationships.
EC Commission
President Delors is the key member of the Commission
especially in view of the ineffectiveness of Andriessen vis-
a-vis MacSharry. President Bush and Secretary Baker have
engaged Delors on the issues, and should do so again,
particularly at the Summit.
Ray MacSharry is dogged in defense of the EC's agricultural
proposal but, in the end, will not wish to bear
responsibility for failure of the negotiations.
Ambassador Hills' continuing relationship with MacSharry
should be buttressed by Secretary Madigan's involvement with
him. Hills and Secretary Mosbacher can also press
Commissioner Bangemann to move the EC on industrial issues
(e.g., zero-for-zero).
Member States
France
:
No one less than President Mitterand will, ultimately,
alter France's position on agriculture. While
approaches by President Bush may later be necessary, we
need to continue to encourage Chancellor Kohl and non-
EC heads of government (Latins and Aseans) to make
approaches.
We should also seek to maintain and build upon
Ministerial level relations, such as those like
Ambassador Hills with PM Cresson and Minister Strauss-
Kahn, Secretary Mosbacher with Strauss-Kahn, a nd
Secretary Madigan with Minister Mermaz.
--
Super Minister Beregovoy reportedly will have an
important voice in the decision making process and
Secretary Brady and Baker could be helpful here.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2008-0213- MR
or
5/25/10
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Germany
Chancellor Kohl has evidently been more active since
his visit to Washington last month, in contacts with
Mitterand and other heads of government. President
Bush and Secretary Baker can keep Kohl's feet to the
fire. Contacts with senior advisors (Ludwig and
Feiter) in the Chancellor's office made by Ambassador
Hills in Bonn should be maintained as channels of
communication to Kohl.
Minister Moellemann, the aggressive new Minister of
Economy appears committed to a successful agreement.
Ambassador Hills' and Secretary Mosbacher's
relationship with him should be further developed.
United Kingdom
While generally supportive of our goals in the
negotiations, the Brits tend to be minimalists and not
very effective either with the French or in EC
deliberations. Nonetheless, because of their role as
G-7 hosts we need to assure that they are on board the
strategy. Thus, President Bush should engage PM Major
at the Summit, and Secretaries Baker and Brady can
press the case with their counterparts Foreign
Secretary Douglas Hurd and Chancellor Lamont,
respectively. Ambassador Hills will continue her
contacts with Peter Lilley, Tristan Garel-Jones and
John Gummer, while Secretary Madigan and Secretary
Mosbacher should work on Gummer and Lilley respectively
as well.
--
The Netherlands
Because they will hold the Presidency in the second
semester of the year, and thus G-7 participants, and
because they generally support our views in the
negotiations, the Dutch are important players.
Ambassador Hills met with Minister Van Rooy at the OECD
Ministerial and will meet her again in Washington in
June.
Non-EC States
--
Australia is the coordinator of the Cairns Group and an
important ally of the U.S. on the agricultural issue.
Ambassador Hills will continue her regular contact with
Neil Blewett.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
New Zealand is also a member of the Cairns Group and an
important ally of the U.S. in agriculture.
Ambassador Hills wiill contuinue regular contact with
Philip Burdon.
Argentina is not only an important member of the Cairns
Group by a leader of Latin American countries.
Ambassador Hills will continue her regular contact with
Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo.
Uruguay Foreign Minister Gros-Espiel is Chairman of the
Trade Negotiations Committee of the UR and influential
among the Latins. He is reportedly seeking to organize
a multi-state, heads of government delegation to visit
President Mitterand. Ambassador Hills will maintain
contact with Gros-Espiel.
Brazil is also a member of the Cairns Group, however it
continues to advocate special and differential
treatment and blocks negotations on reform of balance
of payment provisions. President Bush should press for
Brazilian cooperation in the Round with President
Collor during his State visit, June 18 -20. Secretary
Baker/Ambassador Hills should continue contacts with
Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek and Minister of
Economy Marcilio Moreira, and Secretary Brady as well
with Moreira.
ASEAN: Indonesia is the spokesman for the 18 member
coalition of textile exporters (ITCB) With the
exception of Singapore and Brunei, the ASEANS are
active members of the Cairns group, focusing most
particularly on improved market access for their
agricultural products. To date they have been reluctant
to advance serious negotiations in market access
negotiations for goods and services in the absence of
progress in agriculture.
Ambassador Hills should maintain regular contact with
Siregar (Indonesia), BG Lee (Singapore), Rafidah
(Malaysia), Amaret Sila-on (Thailand), and Garrucho
(Philippines). Secretary Mosbacher should continue
contact with the ASEANs as well, particularly on IPR.
Canada has been working closely with the United States
in the Quad process. Ambassador Hills maintains
regular contact with Minister Wilson.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONT IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
--
Japan has been constructive in the Quad process also.
President Bush should contuinue to stress the Round's
importance with with Kaifu, particularly at the Summit,
while Secretary Baker, Ambassador Hills, and Secretary
Mosbacher continue their contacts with MITI Minister
Nakao and MOFA Minister Nakayama.
The Summit:
--
The Summit offers a unique opportunity to try to influence
Mitterand, both in direct talks and by working on the
British and Germans. It is also important to convince
Delors that he must intervene to assure sufficient progress
by July. The efforts of President Bush, Secretary Brady,
and Secretary Baker will be key in this regard.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 7, 1991
GATT
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER III
NICHOLAS F. BRADY
EDWARD F. MADIGAN
ROBERT A. MOSBACHER
THE CHIEF of STAFF
CARLA A. HILLS
JOHN H. SUNUNU
has seen
BRENT SCOWCROFT
RICHARD G. DARMAN
MICHAEL J. BOSKIN
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Meeting with EC Agriculture Commissioner Ray
MacSharry
I met on May 2 with EC Agriculture Commissioner Ray
MacSharry. A copy of the memorandum of conversation is attached.
Attachment
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08. Memo of
From Roger B. Porter
5/6/91
(b)(1)
C
Conversation
Re: Meeting with European Agriculture Commissioner Ray
MacSherry
[SENT FOR MANDATORY REVIEW] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Document Partially Declassified
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
(Copy By or (NLGB) on 11/17/10
of Document Follows)
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2008-0213-MR (503)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
7/21/2009
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 503 LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
May 6, 1991
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
3r 7/21/09
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
SUBJECT:
Meeting with European Agriculture Commissioner
Ray MacSharry
This memorandum reports on a May 2 meeting with European
Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry.
MacSharry opened the meeting by saying that the European
Community (EC) supports accelerating completion of the Uruguay
Round. As a result of his conversations this week with U.S.
officials, he believes there is tentative agreement to move
forward with technical talks in June and July, with the aim of
finishing the GATT negotiations by the end of the year.
(b) (1)
I responded that the President is very interested in trade
policy and strongly committed to an open world trading system.
It was the President's decision to make the Uruguay Round the
key issue at the Houston Economic Summit. In recent weeks, the
President has invested a great deal of his time and political
capital to secure an extension of the fast track procedures.
He would not be doing this unless he thought that an Uruguay
Round agreement is possible. The President, moreover, views
the Uruguay Round very much as a win-win situation and a
pivotal opportunity to expand trade in agriculture, services,
and intellectual property.
In fashioning a GATT agreement, U.S. political realities
must be taken into account as well. From the standpoint of the
United States, it is essential that any Uruguay Round package
include fundamental agricultural reform. The Administration is
not going to negotiate a Uruguay Round agreement only to have
it repudiated by the Congress. There is no chance that
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Congress will approve a GATT agreement that does not deal with
agriculture.
I said that the U.S. appreciates the political sensitivity
of farm policy in Europe. Change is always difficult to sell
politically. Consequently, a GATT agreement must include
adequate transition mechanisms, so that the adjustment occurs
gradually over time and people are taken care of.
Nevertheless, strong political leadership is needed to push for
change and give a clear direction to future global farm policy.
MacSharry said that he didn't disagree. He noted that it
was nice of hear again about the President's commitment to the
Uruguay Round. Most Europeans accept the need for fundamental
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). But we should
not mix up internal European policies with the GATT.
I noted that we are sympathetic to the EC's political
constraints and understand the need to avoid any appearance
that CAP reform is being imposed externally.
MacSharry responded that he did not want to mislead. The
Uruguay Round has to be finished soon, since there is a
perception that we are "falling down on it."
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
MacSharry said he is equally committed to farm reform.
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
MacSharry expressed the hope that "the necessary solutions
can be found.'
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
MacSharry argued that there has been a sharp change in
European farm policies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the debate was
over how much farm supports would increase. He served as
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
Ireland's Agriculture Minister during this period and was a
hero because he always brought back big increases in dairy and
meat prices. As EC Agriculture Commissioner, his job is to
slash supports.
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
I said that in the 1970s the U.S. had experienced a farm
export boom that drove up farm incomes and land values.
Technology, however, has transformed agricultural production.
China and India have shifted from being major food importers to
major food exporters. The world has structural overcapacity in
the agricultural sector. The U.S. was forced to recognize in
the 1980s that we were not going to export our way out of a
surplus situation. It will be equally hard to get the global
situation into balance, but we need to get the policies and
fundamentals right, so that there is momentum in the right
direction. The longer that change is put off, the harder the
adjustments will be.
MacSharry said that the psychology of the CAP has shifted
dramatically. The EC has begun to convince the politicians of
the need for change. Within the EC, there is extensive
discussion of fundamental agricultural reform. This is
important, since, unlike other European policies, agriculture
is controlled by Brussels. People are beginning to understand
that the majority of CAP benefits should not go to a minority
of European farmers.
MacSharry said that he appreciates that the EC internal
reforms are "delicately linked" with the Community's
international obligations under the GATT. He personally wants
to see progress in the Uruguay Round. The price package should
be finished in the next few months. This will "clear the
decks" for agreement on fundamental CAP reform by the end of
the year.
He said that he doesn't want a "small deal." In his view,
30 percent is a "big deal." If the U.S. keeps raising the
stakes, it will be making the same mistake that was made in
Brussels. And, if the Uruguay Round cannot be completed by the
end of the year, "we will all look rather foolish."
I said that what is large and what is small often depends
on where one is looking from. Thus, 30 percent can be large or
small depending on the baseline. The U.S. saw the Hellstrom
proposal as a constructive effort to bridge the gap, so that
each participant could portray the agreement as a win.
MacSharry said that this was not the EC's impression of
Hellstrom, although the proposal was positive in many respects.
His personal view is that the talks should have continued in
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-4-
(b) (1)
He concluded by saying that a political assessment should
be made at the London Economic Summit. If it appears possible
to finish, the Summit can set a deadline. It would be a
fiasco, however, to set an artificial deadline and fail.
During his discussions with U.S. officials, the atmosphere has
been friendly and cordial. It is important to avoid
confrontations as we work to reach an agreement.
(b) (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
H-148 U.S. CAPITOL
RICHARD A. GEPHARDT
202-225-0100
MISSOURI
MAJORITY LEADER
Congress of the United States
house of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Mashington, DC 20515-6502
March 27, 1991
President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing to respond to your letter seeking my support for renewal of authority
to speed Congressional approval of future trade agreements, the so-called fast track
procedures. Congressman Rostenkowski and Senator Bentsen have already provided you
with the benefit of their expertise on this issue. But, as Majority Leader in the House,
I am designated under the law to introduce the implementing legislation for the GATT
Uruguay Round and a possible U.S.-Mexico agreement. Consequently, I thought it might
be useful to share with you some of my own views on this important issue.
I am prepared to lend my full support to a North American Free Trade Zone if
the agreement fights for American jobs and exports, preserves the world's environment,
and defends the rights of Mexican workers. As one who cares deeply about the effect
of trade policies on working Americans, my concern is that our trade negotiators keep
uppermost in their minds the impact of this Agreement on American jobs, American
companies and American exports.
Therefore, my support for the Administration's proposed North American Free
Trade Area is contingent upon the inclusion of assurances that American jobs will not
be lost in droves.
Like you, I want the Mexican economy to flourish and grow. Relying on low
wages and unsafe working conditions as comparative advantages to lure away high-paying
American jobs will not save the Mexican economy but it will further weaken the
American economy. In order for Mexico to prosper, America must prosper. So for a
free trade agreement to be a meaningful benefit to both nations, it must contain
provisions that will stem any hemorrhage of American jobs across the border.
For that reason I request that you not limit the talks to what used to be
traditionally known as "trade issues" - tariffs, trade-related investment restrictions, dispute
resolution and the like -- but rather that we address North American Free Trade
systematically.
200 PAGE
97:46 16, 22
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 2
To do so will require discussing issues like transition measures, wage disparity,
environmental protection and worker rights. Neither Mexico nor Canada nor America
is benefitted by a system that benignly looks on massive air pollution, poisonous
pesticides and child labor as "comparative advantages." And I cannot imagine that
Congress would approve an agreement that did.
The grant of authority to proceed with negotiations under the fast track procedure
is an extremely important one for Congress to make. I understand the increased
complexity and difficulty of negotiating an agreement with a trading partner or a number
of trading partners without the ability to proceed under the fast track procedure. At the
same time, I am unwilling to support an extension of fast track without assurances that
Congress and the Administration are true partners in these negotiations rather than
adversaries.
Thus, I am writing to outline what I believe we should be seeking to achieve both
in the current GATT Uruguay Round as well as the possibly upcoming U.S.-Mexico-
Canada North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations. Negotiated
properly, these agreements will enhance economic opportunity and growth in this country
and around the world. But negotiated poorly, they could cause U.S. workers and
exporters to suffer grievously in economic terms.
I am hopeful that you will respond specifically to the issues outlined in my letter
so that we can work together towards a GATT and North American Free Trade
Agreement.
GATT Uruguay Round
I believe, as you do, that the GATT Uruguay Round could provide the U.S. and
the world with a vastly improved international trading system. The possibility of
achieving more uniform rules of trade in each of the negotiating areas could provide
enormous benefits to U.S. workers, farmers and businesses.
The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act outlined 16 negotiating objectives for the Uruguay
Round [19 U.S.C. 2901] and requires the Administration to report on your progress in
achieving them. Despite the assurances in reports that your Administration has
forwarded to Congress, I cannot now determine what progress has been made on many
of these objectives.
800'3968
15:46 16. 22 MAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 3
And, based on press reports, discussions with Administration officials and
representatives of our trading partners, I cannot now define what specific actions your
Administration is contemplating in the GATT Uruguay Round to fulfill the Congressional
objectives.
Indeed, in several areas, progress within the GATT Uruguay Round has been less
than anticipated by Congress when it stated its objectives in the 1988 Act. For example,
little or no progress has been made as part of the GATT Uruguay Round in expanding
worker rights or in gaining access to markets for our high-technology products.
We must judge a GATT Agreement as a whole. At the same time, we must be
unwilling to settle for an Agreement that does not enhance the international
competitiveness of our economy, ranging from agriculture to services to manufacturing.
We must reject any efforts to diminish the effectiveness of those U.S. trade laws that
are already on the books.
Upon its completion, we must look at how an Agreement is to be implemented
and enforced based on the possibility of new dispute resolution provisions. In the past,
there has been a dramatic difference between the way that Congress and the
Administration view our trade laws: The Administration views the U.S. as a defendant
while the Congress views the U.S. as a plaintiff.
As a result of these different views, we should be wary of a strong dispute
resolution mechanism if the underlying agreements in each of the 14 negotiating areas
aren't completely acceptable. If a strong dispute resolution mechanism is combined with
weak agreements, a lower standard is locked-in which, in essence, thereby diminishes our
ability to protect the rights of American workers, farmers and businesses.
Finally, I must emphasize that the U.S. should not trade away any provision of our
trade law such as dumping/countervail, Section 301 or the other vital tools that Congress
has provided to work for a more level playing field.
North American Free Trade Agreement
I believe a negotiation with Mexico and Canada that will result in a North
American Free Trade Agreement could be in our country's best interests. At the same
time, I am deeply concerned about what the possible effects of an agreement could be.
The economic studies that have been published on a possible agreement not only
are tentative in their conclusions but are based on assumptions that may have no
connection with reality. It is disturbing that the Administration has yet to produce an
economic impact analysis and, it appears from a number of discussions, has no intention
of producing an impact analysis.
15:47 16. 22 RAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 4
An official analysis by the Administration is really the only way we can truly judge
what the effects of an agreement might be. Unless a study is based on the assumptions
of those who are in fact negotiating the Agreement, the study will not assist us in our
debates.
One of the most comprehensive studies done to date was published recently by
the International Trade Commission. In its study, the ITC indicated:
"(T)he Commission analysis suggests that an FTA with Mexico
will benefit the U.S. economy overall by expanding trade
opportunities, lowering prices, increasing competition, and
improving the ability of U.S. firms to exploit economies of
scale. Since these gains are likely to outweigh the costs. the
U.S. economy will probably gain on net."
This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the idea of proceeding with an
agreement. I truly want to assist Mexico and the Mexican people in terms of expanding
economic growth and opportunity. But I refuse to accept the notion that the American
worker should shoulder the burden of reaching an agreement. For this reason, I
respectfully request that you direct the appropriate officials to provide me with the
economic analysis on which you based your decision to proceed with the negotiations of
a NAFTA. Congress and the American people have a right to know what is at stake
before entering into negotiations under the limitations of the fast track.
I understand that your present intention is to proceed with a negotiation with as
limited an agenda as possible. But, we must not exclude those issues which will help
determine the competitive nature of our future relations or that will help to improve the
quality of life in our countries.
Those issues that appear to be on the agenda are tariffs, intellectual property,
trade-related investment restrictions and dispute resolution. While we must have the
best possible provisions in a final agreement in each of these areas, this list is simply not
sufficiently comprehensive to address the issues that are most important to our bilateral
economic future.
Let me also share with you my thoughts on which issues should be addressed as
part of a negotiation:
500'3005
15:47 16, 22 RAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 5
Escape Clause:
The prospect for potential job loss exists in a number of important industrial
sectors. Because there has been no officially released Administration study of the impact
of a proposed NAFTA, it is difficult to project what impact on jobs and our industrial
base there will be.
Accordingly, it is important that a comprehensive escape clause provision be
included as part of the negotiating framework that can act as a stop-gap measure to
stem the loss of jobs and business opportunities if there is a hemorrhaging in any one
sector. This provision should have an effective trigger that will allow us to ameliorate
any negative impact on a sector and reassess what course of action to take.
I cannot stress strongly enough how important this issue is. We must be prepared
to continuously examine and reexamine the progress of a NAFTA to ensure that the
interests of American farmers and workers are protected.
Rules of Origin:
I assume that the discussion of rules of origin would be included as part of the
NAFTA negotiations. I want to comment specifically, however, on how important I
believe a strict standard for any rule of origin proposal is to a successful agreement.
Our nation faces an historic trade deficit. Industry after industry has faced the
onslaught of fierce foreign competition that has forced many firms to close or request
government help in opening markets and fighting unfair competition at home.
As we enter into negotiations on a NAFTA we must not allow Mexico to become
an export platform for the products of third countries to flood our markets.
Development of business opportunities by third countries that is designed to aid the
Mexican economy rather than fill the coffers of the foreign parent company should be
our goal.
Accordingly, I believe that we must have a very strict rule of origin standard
regarding production in Mexico.
Transition:
Every study that has been done on the effects of a NAFTA recognizes that there
will be dislocations in our labor market resulting from an agreement. I do not believe
that the American worker should have to shoulder the cost of providing economic growth
and opportunity to Mexico and its people.
900'3968
15:48 16. 22 RAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 6
Even in the absence of economic analysis, it is implausible that transition relief
will not be needed by workers in industries harmed by the NAFTA. Accordingly, I
believe that you must make a commitment to providing help to those who might be
disadvantaged as a result of an agreement. This includes not only a commitment to
expanded unemployment insurance for these individuals, but also appropriate training
and retraining programs.
Additionally, transition relief measures should be examined that will allow
companies adversely affected by a NAFTA to receive government help in finding new
markets for their products and converting to new lines of business.
This must be a commitment not only to providing the governmental support
mechanisms that are necessary, but also to funding these programs as well. American
workers and American firms deserve no less.
Additionally, we must recognize that the US-Canada FTA will be phased in over
a ten-year period. It is possible that we may need to allow for as long, if not longer,
a phase in period in the case of Mexico. We may also want to examine the possibility
of phasing in the provisions of a final agreement based on increasing standards of living
in Mexico. This will provide the Mexican government with the incentives to continue
with their liberalization programs as well as providing U.S. workers with a greater
protection against a competitive policy based on wage differentials alone. At the same
time, if we see substantial benefits, as in the US-Canada FTA, we may wish to
accelerate the phase in process.
Wage Disparity:
One of the principal issues that is raised by the NAFTA is the question of how
we address the substantial wage and standard of living disparity that exists between our
two countries. Our goal must be to raise the wages and standard of living of Mexicans,
not lower our own.
I am interested as to what steps might be taken to address this issue perhaps
the most important issue involved in these negotiations.
Environment:
Without a provision on environmental controls, this agreement is likely to increase
pollutants in and from Mexico and drain jobs from the U.S. needlessly.
200 PAGE
15:45 16. 22 RAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 7
Last year, with your help, Congress passed an historic Clean Air Act. In this
legislation we committed ourselves to increasing environmental quality in this country
while striking a balance between environmental quality and economic growth. Similar
legislative action has occurred in the areas of water quality and pesticide residues, and
in many other important areas.
In discussions with members of your Administration as well as Mexican
authorities, I have noted a reluctance on the part of these officials to address important
environmental concerns as part of the scope of these negotiations. I believe that these
concerns must be part of the negotiating agenda. The more than 1700 businesses
currently operating in the maquiladora program are threatening both the environment as
well as the health of countless people on both sides of the border. Additionally, studies
have shown that emissions from industries in other parts of Mexico have affected areas
far beyond our common border.
The Clean Air Act and other U.S. environmental laws do add to the cost of doing
business. In addition to the health and quality of life impact of Mexico's more lax
environmental standards and enforcement, I am concerned that many American
companies may relocate their operations because of this "comparative advantage." We
must not allow this to happen. It would not be in the United States' or Mexico's best
interest.
Indeed, it is tough for U.S. companies to compete against firms that operate
under more lax environmental enforcement schemes. This laxity can, in fact, operate as
a subsidy.
A number of Members of Congress have requested that an environmental
assessment of a NAFTA be conducted. I would also ask that environmental issues be
included on the negotiating agenda.
As part of this, I would hope that the question of pesticide use by Mexican
farmers be given appropriate attention. While our farmers can compete against the best
any country has to offer, they can not and should not have to compete against farmers
who use pesticides that fail to meet U.S. standards. While we certainly can reduce the
risks to our citizens through inspection of all agricultural products crossing our border,
a better approach would be to agree to eliminate the use of these pesticides and harmful
chemicals, thereby protecting the health and safety of our consumers and allowing for a
freer flow of goods. This will help protect the health of the Mexican people as well.
800'396°
15:49 16. 22 MAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 8
Worker Rights:
A final agreement must include provisions that protect the fundamental rights of
workers. Parties to the NAFTA must recognize that all countries have a common
interest in respecting the fundamental rights of workers, in the achievement and
maintenance of fair labor standards, and in the improvement of wages and working
conditions. Among the provisions that a NAFTA should include are:
Respect for freedom of association.
Respect for the right to organize and bargain collectively, including on a
regional basis across national boundaries.
Prohibition of the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor.
Establishment of a minimum age for the employment of children.
Acceptable conditions with respect to wages and hours of work.
We must recognize the role that the NAFTA can play in promoting worker rights.
We must refuse to accept an agreement that fails to provide real economic opportunity
to the Mexican people. We must address both the substantive law and the procedural
safeguards in this important area.
As part of this negotiation, we must also include the provision of proper health
and safety standards for workers. We should seek to establish appropriate health and
safety provisions that will prohibit accelerated development from occurring at the cost
of worker's health and safety.
Labor Mobility:
I believe that the issue of labor mobility must be carefully considered. As we
look to the future, we must understand the pressure that may be exerted on the wages
of lower-skilled workers in this country if the issue of labor mobility is not critically
addressed.
More specifically, I am very concerned about the prospect of substantial numbers
of Mexican workers entering the U.S. labor market, even if only on a temporary basis.
As you know, the U.S.-Canada FTA established procedures for temporary entry of
Canadian citizen business persons into the United States and to facilitate temporary
entry on a reciprocal basis between the U.S. and Canada.
Since the regulations were first issued in this area, there has been a considerable
liberalization of the regulations to allow for new classes of entrants under the agreement.
While the impact has been marginal, the possible impact under a NAFTA is much
greater, if similar rules are applied to Mexico.
600 PAGE
05:51 16. 22 RAR
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 9
Indeed, as part of Mexico's submission in the GATT Uruguay Round, the
government stated "The expansion of the service exports of developing countries and
their increased participation in world trade in services depends on the liberalization of
cross border movements of personnel covering unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled labor,
and that effective access to markets for their service exports can mainly be realized
through this mode of delivery."
Human Rights:
The Salinas government has begun to move against police and government
officials accused of human rights violations. We must commend the Salinas government.
But, we must also use the NAFTA negotiations as a means of support for the Salinas
government to make further efforts to curb human rights abuses.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe strongly in the goal of assisting Mexico and its people in
terms of economic development and opportunity. But, we must not be willing to
sacrifice the jobs and livelihood of American workers.
I believe an agreement can be reached that is in all of our best interests. We
must not rush -- the stakes are too high. But, we must not be reluctant to accept the
challenges.
If the areas I have outlined above are among the issues included in North
American Free Trade Agreement negotiations, I believe that we should proceed. We
must, however, be flexible and recognize that issues such as governmental ownership,
debt relief, transportation regulation, exchange rates, subsidies and many others may arise
that need to be addressed as well.
Ambassador Hills has raised the question of whether it would be acceptable for
certain issues to be raised on a parallel track to the "core" negotiations. This depends
on the commitment and intentions of your Administration and the Mexican Government.
If the intention is simply to allow these negotiations to occur on a parallel track and
allow them to die on the vine, that is unacceptable. If there is a true commitment to
address these issues, then I am open to discussion as to the format under which the
negotiations should occur. While certain issues might be addressed on a parallel track,
Congress must be presented with a single piece of implementing legislation at the end
of the process incorporating final agreements in all areas. We will also be looking for
assurances as to what commitments the Mexican government will undertake. When
Congress votes at the end of this process, it must see tangible results.
PAGE.010
05:51 16, 22 808
President Bush
March 27, 1991
Page 10
Roughly two-thirds of all Mexican exports are purchased in the United States.
Conversely, Mexico purchases only about six percent of our exported products. We must
understand the power of this fact as we enter into negotiations. We both have a great
deal to gain, but we must not rush blindly towards an agreement.
Congress must be a partner in these negotiations. If we are able to agree on the
scope of the negotiations, that will only start, not end the process. I look forward to
working with you and members of your Administration throughout this period and
beyond with the goal of reaching a final agreement.
Yours very truly,
Richard a. Suphards
Richard A. Gephardt
RAG:mrw
PAGE.011
15:51 16, 22 MAR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
02/22/91
I
TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary
The attached has been forwarded
to the President
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
91 FEB 21 PM 5: 14
February 21, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY
MA
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round
The attached memorandum from Carla Hills describes the
announcement yesterday by GATT Director General Dunkel with
respect to the Uruguay Round. The Dunkel announcement may be
helpful to the Administration in its effort to obtain from
Congress an extension of the so-called "fast-track" authority for
congressional consideration of trade agreements which may be
negotiated by the Administration.
The Trade Act of 1988 requires that the President must transmit
to the Congress, by March 1, 1991, a request for a two-year
extension of this authority which expires on June 1, 1991.
Yesterday, the Economic Policy Council met to consider its advice
to you with respect to the fast-track authority and the
Administration's approach to the Congress with respect to the
Uruguay Round. A decision memorandum on fast-track will be
coming to you in the next several days.
The sense of yesterday's EPC meeting was that the Dunkel
statement is encouraging and that there are reasons for optimism,
but, at the same time, the Administration should be somewhat
cautious in its public characterizations of the Dunkel statement.
There is some concern within the Administration that various
European states or members of the European Commission might
undercut the Dunkel announcement. It is important that the
Administration maintain its credibility with the Hill in
characterizing the state of negotiations.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
3r 7/21/09
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0213-MR
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
or 5/25/10
Washington, D.C. 20506
FEB 20 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
CAST
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round: Reason for Optimism
The impasse over agriculture that occurred at the Uruguay Round
Ministerial in Brussels was apparently resolved today in Geneva,
when GATT Director-General Dunkel announced that all participants
had agreed "to conduct negotiations to achieve specific binding
commitments on each of the following areas: domestic support;
market access; export competition " We now have the framework
for agricultural negotiations we have been seeking steadily since
the OECD meeting in Paris in May, the Houston Economic Summit in
July, and the Brussels meeting in December.
Director-General Dunkel is expected to announce formally on
Tuesday, February 26 his plan for resuming the stalled Uruguay
Round negotiations in all areas. Technical talks in agriculture
could begin as early as next week; other negotiations will
follow.
The breaking of the impasse on agriculture should help us with
the difficult battle to extend fast-track authority. Thereafter,
months of hard bargaining lie ahead in agriculture, as well as in
several other areas of the negotiations. There is, however,
reason to believe that the internal agricultural reform program
recently initiated by the EC will ultimately make possible the
kind of agricultural agreement we need in the Round. It is too
early to determine precisely how long this will take, but we now
believe time is on our side.
Dunkel's agriculture agreement was developed in close cooperation
with our allies, particularly the Cairns group and its Latin
members. As for the EC, it was only this morning that the
Commission, chaired by Jacques Delors, finally overrode
objections by Agriculture Commissioner MacSharry and permitted
the Geneva statement to be made without contradiction. While the
Commission showed its leadership, member states may criticize
this action.
I understand that President Delors is expected to call you on
Friday to discuss the Uruguay Round. I recommend that you
welcome this latest development and emphasize that by working
together we can achieve our common objectives. We will work with
the NSC to provide talking points for the Delors call.
CLASSIFIED BY HRE
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED BY: OADR
UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
OLIN OLW L. WETHINGTON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Meeting on Uruguay Round and Fast-track Extension
Secretary's Conference Room, Main Treasury
February 7, 1991 - 2:30-3:30 p.m.
The meeting on Thursday, February 7, 1991, 2:30-3:30 p.m., is to
discuss the status of the Uruguay Round talks and the issue of
extending the "fast track" authority. This meeting is not
intended for decision, but is preliminary to decisions that will
be required by March 1, with respect to the "fast track."
Attached is a paper prepared by USTR dealing with the "fast
track" issue.
Please note that because the usual conference rooms at the White
House are not available at the time of this meeting, the session
will be held at Main Treasury in the Secretary's Conference Room
(which is across the hall from the Secretary's Office, Room
3330).
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
DISCUSSION PAPER: EXPIRATION OF FAST-TRACK
Several important issues surround the impending expiration of the
President's fast-track authority for implementation of trade
agreements. The following summarizes that authority and
highlights some key issues. This memo is intended only as a
discussion paper.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What is Fast-Track?
Most recently re-enacted in the Trade Act of 1988, fast-track
authority is, in essence, a guarantee from Congress that, if the
notice and consultation requirements of the statute are met, the
Congress will provide the President two key protections to
legislation implementing multilateral or bilateral trade
agreements: (1) a vote within a fixed period of time; and (2) no
amendments to that legislation permitted. Some key features:
1.
In order for legislation implementing a bilateral (but not
multilateral) trade agreement to qualify for fast-track
treatment, the President must give the Congress notice of
intent to negotiate. During the next 60 legislative working
days, if either the Finance or the Ways & Means Committee
passes a resolution of disapproval, the implementing
legislation, when ultimately presented, will not be entitled
to fast-track treatment.
a.
The President gave such notice on a Mexico FTA on
September 25, 1990; we expect the full 60 legislative
days to expire by the end of February.
b.
It is possible but unlikely that either Chairman
Bentsen or Chairman Rostenkowski will hold a vote on a
disapproval resolution during the balance of the 60
legislative day period. Finance, however, will hold
hearings on February 6; Ways & Means Trade Subcommittee
will probably hold hearings later in the month.
2. The fast-track statute also requires that the President
notify Congress 90 calendar days before entering into
(signing) any agreement, multilateral or bilateral.
B. Can Congress Revoke or Change the Fast-Track?
Yes, relatively easily. Although embodied in statute, the fast-
track authority is expressly an exercise of the Congress'
internal rulemaking authority. Each house is free to change its
1
PER NSC DECLASSIFIED WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
Classified by folls
By SS NARA, Date 12/1/23
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
own rules, at any time, by majority vote -- without the
concurrence of the other house or the signature of the President.
1.
Thus, the fast-track can be revoked at any time by passage
of a simple resolution in only one house. For example, a
Conrad/Hollings resolution, revoking the fast-track for the
Uruguay Round and introduced at the end of the last Congress
with 37 cosponsors, would have been effective in killing the
fast-track if passed by a simple majority in the Senate.
Hollings is believed to be collecting cosponsors again.
2.
While significant, the jeopardy to fast-track from such
resolutions is limited by the difficulty proponents would
have in obtaining a vote (through threat of filibuster in
the Senate and through leadership power to control matters
voted on in the House). The jeopardy is also somewhat
limited by some Members' view that the fast-track represents
a longstanding commitment by the Congress to the
Administration that should be honored -- at least through
its expiration on June 1, 1991.
C.
Expiration of Current Authority
The statutory June 1, 1991 expiration date for the current fast-
track authority means that in order for legislation implementing
a trade agreement to be eligible for fast-track treatment, that
trade agreement must be signed before June 1.
1.
Because of the 90-day advance notice requirement, the
President must notify Congress of his intent to enter into
any agreement eligible for the current fast-track by March
1, 1991.
2.
The statute does not technically require that Congress be
given final text of an agreement at the time of the 90-day
advance notice. However, Congress plainly expects final
text at the time of the advance notice.
a.
Chairmen Rostenkowski and Bentsen have written that "it
is imperative that the full text" be provided Congress
at the time of the advance notice.
b.
Moreover, the statute now includes a requirement that
our many private sector advisory groups report to the
President and Congress their views of the agreement
prior to the President's notification of intent;
without final (or near final) text, such private sector
reports are unlikely to be possible.
Thus, while it is legally possible for a Uruguay Round
agreement to be notified to Congress without final (or near
2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
final) text on March 1, it would be extremely difficult to
do so without jeopardizing congressional support, even from
our friends.
D.
Extension
The 1988 Trade Act contains a provision permitting the President
to request, by March 1, 1991, a two-year extension of the fast-
track authority, through June 1, 1993. Such an extension will be
necessary at least for legislation implementing a Mexico FTA.
1.
The President's extension request must be accompanied by a
report that includes:
a.
a description of the progress made in trade
negotiations to achieve the purposes of the trade law;
b.
a statement that such progress justifies the
continuation of negotiations; and
C.
a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed
to complete the negotiations.
2.
A similar report is required by March 1 from the Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.
3.
Once requested, the extension is automatically granted --
unless either house passes a disapproval resolution between
March 1 and June 1, 1991. The statute provides a special
fast-track mechanism for such disapproval:
a.
Once reported by Finance or Ways & Means, a disapproval
resolution is itself entitled to fast-track treatment
(time limits and no amendments) on the floor. Thus,
unlike a normal resolution changing a house's rules,
floor consideration could not be blocked by filibuster
threat in the Senate or cooperation of the leadership
in the House.
b.
Although Finance or Ways & Means consideration of a
disapproval resolution are not themselves on a fast-
track, we should not expect either committee chairman
to prevent a floor vote by refusing to report a
disapproval resolution. Neither is likely to feel
comfortable denying his full house an opportunity to
consider the issue. (Indeed, we might not even want
them to bottle up a statutory disapproval resolution,
since that would make it more difficult to keep a
Conrad/Hollings type resolution -- which is more
dangerous because amendable -- off the floors.)
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
In short, fast-track authority will be in greatest jeopardy
between March 1 and June 1. Although we are likely to have
the support of the two key chairmen and a majority of their
committee members, we will nevertheless probably face floor
fights in both houses on extension disapproval resolutions
by late April or May. We should expect those fights to be
difficult -- especially since our opponents will include not
only some who oppose elements of the agreements for which
the authority might be used, but also those who simply don't
like the fast-track because of the substantial cession of
individual prerogative (especially in the Senate) that the
procedure entails.
II. KEY ISSUE: EXTENSION FOR WHAT PURPOSES?
A. Specifying the Uses for Extended Authority
1.
In permitting the President to request a two-year extension
of fast-track authority, the statute does not appear to
contemplate any new limitation on the purposes for which
extended authority might be used.
a.
The nature of the report required of the President
justifying the extension suggests that the Congress
really had in mind only finishing negotiations already
initiated (e.g., report requires description of
progress in negotiations and "statement of the reasons
why the extension is needed to complete the
negotiations").
b.
However, no such limitation appears in the statute.
Unless disapproved by the Congress, the President would
appear to have all the authority after a successful
extension request that he does now.
C.
The language of a fast-track disapproval resolution,
which is set out in the statute, eliminates all fast-
track authority, multilateral or bilateral. The
resolution could not be amended to eliminate fast-track
for only some purposes (e.g., the Uruguay Round), since
the resolution itself is unamendable.
2.
Thus, our view of the statute (shared by counsel to both
Finance and Ways & Means) is that:
a.
as a legal matter, the President's request probably
cannot limit the purposes for which extended authority
might be used -- but the President could of course make
political commitments;
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
b.
because of the statutorily prescribed disapproval
resolution, the Congress' decision is strictly binary:
if a resolution is passed, the authority is disapproved
for all purposes; otherwise it remains for all purposes
presently permitted.
3.
Although the President's request need not specify (and
probably legally cannot limit) the purposes for which
extended authority might be used, the Administration will
certainly be asked what it has in mind. It is likely to be
very useful to work out, by March 1, the Administration's
precise response (and perhaps even include the answer in the
President's report). The Administration's plans will
certainly have to include the Mexico agreement. The issue
is what to say about the Uruguay Round and possible
agreements arising from the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative (EAI).
a.
Note again that, because the Congress' vote on a
statutory disapproval resolution is binary, a vote to
kill the authority for any purpose (e.g., the Round or
EAI) would kill it for all purposes (including Mexico).
b.
Agencies are likely to agree that we should seek to
avoid any limitation (self-imposed or otherwise) on the
purposes for which extended fast-track might be used.
However, extending fast-track -- even only for Mexico -
- is likely to be a tough fight. Attracting Uruguay
Round or EAI opponents to the fight could seriously
jeopardize the entire authority.
C.
Therefore, set out in the succeeding two sections of
this memo (on the Round and EAI) are continua of some
possible self-imposed limitations, listed in rough
order from least to most restrictive. Agencies are
likely to agree that we should strive for the least
restrictive point on each continuum that does not
seriously threaten the disapproval vote.
d.
We have already begun an interagency effort on the Hill
to highlight the merits of fast-track extension in
general. Over the next few weeks, key agencies will
promote the notion of authority with as few limits as
possible -- and gauge as precisely as possible the
position of maximum flexibility for the President that
would not seriously jeopardize the disapproval vote.
5
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
B. Extension for the Uruguay Round?
1.
Continuum. If, as now appears virtually certain, we do not
have even near-final texts of Uruguay Round agreements ready
to send to the Hill by March 1, there will be several
possible expressions of Administration intent regarding the
Round, including:
a.
A statement that, in light of substantial progress, the
Administration plans to use extended authority to
finish and implement the Round.
b.
A statement that the Administration is maintaining its
position that serious negotiations cannot resume until
conditions warrant; and that the Administration will
consult closely with Congress if those conditions
(especially an improved EC position on agriculture)
appear to exist and warrant use of fast-track; or
C.
A statement that, under no circumstances, would the
Administration use extended authority for the Round.
2.
Because the status of Round negotiations is uncertain, it
probably does not make sense to choose an expression of
intent until mid-February or so. However, here are some
factors that should bear on the decision:
a.
Anything less than an unambiguous commitment that the
authority would not be used for the Round is likely to
excite opposition to extension from key opponents of
the Round. Although such opposition may overlap
broadly with opposition to a Mexico FTA (and thus not
result in significantly more votes against fast-track
extension), there are powerful groups (such as textiles
and certain agricultural interests) that consider
themselves much more threatened by a Uruguay Round
agreement than a Mexico agreement.
b.
Conversely, including the Uruguay Round in extension
plans should also excite at least somewhat more support
for extension from business groups who view themselves
as winners from a Uruguay Round result. Our ability to
count on such business community support is likely to
depend heavily on their continuing perception that the
United States is unwilling to sacrifice basic
principles and objectives merely for the sake of
concluding a deal.
C.
Several key members of Congress have said they believe
that persuading Congress to accept an extension for
purposes of the Uruguay Round will be extremely
6
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
difficult without some substantial progress in the
negotiations between now and March 1.
d.
The ideal situation for extension consideration, then,
would be one in which there is a breakthrough and
substantial progress in the negotiations -- without the
U.S. having signalled any significant concessions that
would weaken U.S. business community support.
3.
If the Administration does decide to identify the Uruguay
Round as one of the purposes for which extended fast-track
authority would be used, we will also face a decision on
whether to try to create a new deadline for conclusion of
Uruguay Round negotiations short of the next expiration of
authority in two years.
a.
The statute contemplates only a full two-year extension
of the authority, without any legal mechanism for
shortening that period. However, just as with the
purposes for which fast-track authority might be used,
the President could make a political commitment
concerning deadlines.
i.
For example, in requesting an extension, the
President could state that he would not use the
authority for any agreement signed after June
1992.
b.
While a decision on timing may not be ripe yet, several
factors should bear on the decision, including:
i.
Without a new deadline, talks could well drag on
until the authority expires again in 1993.
ii. A self-imposed political deadline may not prove
entirely credible internationally.
iii. We may need a year or more to complete some of the
difficult lagging negotiations, such as market
access in services and government procurement.
iv. The European Community may need a year or more to
produce a substantial proposal in agriculture.
V.
Current planning calls for legislation implement-
ing the Mexico FTA to be before Congress early in
1992. Unless we want the Uruguay Round agreement
before Congress near the same time or during
campaign season, we are likely to have to either
finish the Round negotiations within a few months
of extension or wait until early 1993.
7
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CON
IDENTIAL
C.
Extension for EAI?
1.
Indicating that extended fast-track authority could be used
for Latin FTAs in addition to Mexico could likewise engender
support for a disapproval resolution that otherwise would
not have existed.
a.
One of the principal arguments likely to be used by
opponents of a Mexico FTA is the threat of 87 million
people willing to work for a fraction of U.S. labor's
wages. With EAI included, opponents of extending fast-
track are likely to raise the more threatening specter
of 350 million cheap laborers competing with U.S.
workers.
b.
While a high priority for the Administration, there is
at this point only limited business community support
for pursuing FTAs beyond Mexico.
C.
Unlike the Uruguay Round and, to some degree, a Mexico
FTA, most members of Congress probably did not have in
mind hemispheric free trade negotiations at the time
they approved the current fast-track authority in 1988.
Chairman Bentsen and others have urged that the
Congress be given an opportunity to consider the
Administration's new hemispheric policy.
2.
Continuum. Possible Administration expressions of intent
regarding EAI that might ameliorate some of the concerns
outlined above include:
a.
An assurance to Finance and Ways & means that no
negotiations of any EAI free trade agreements would
begin before the full running of the 60-legislative-day
advance notice period. [Note that this has been
Administration practice anyway.]
b.
An assurance to Finance and Ways & Means that any
plurilateral negotiations with a group of EAI partners
would be notified to Finance and Ways & Means as though
they were bilateral agreements. This would give the
committees an opportunity to veto the negotiations
during the 60-legislative-day advance notice period.
C.
An assurance to Congress that, prior to notifying
Finance and Ways & Means of our intent to enter any EAI
negotiations, we would present a general statement of
objectives and strategy for EAI trade negotiations and
participate in a comprehensive review of the policy
before any interested committee.
8
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
d.
An assurance to Congress that we would negotiate under
extended authority with only those EAI countries that
meet the strict eligibility criteria contained in our
statement of objectives.
i.
We might add that, at this time, we foresee only
Chile actually meeting the criteria before June
1993, when the extended authority would expire.
e.
An assurance to Congress that while the Administration
might begin negotiations with EAI countries meeting our
eligibility criteria under extended fast-track, only a
Chile agreement might actually be signed before
expiration of the authority in June 1993.
f.
An assurance to Congress that extended fast-track
authority would be used only for a Chile agreement.
g.
An assurance to Congress that extended fast-track
authority would not be used for any EAI agreements.
Rather, the Administration will at some point present
new legislation laying out the policy and objectives of
EAI and seeking an extension of fast-track authority
for that purpose well beyond 1993.
3.
Assurances (a)-(c) involve little more than commitments to
consult closely with the Congress, as we probably would
anyway. While Finance and Ways & Means may be comforted by
such assurances, the rest of the Congress may not -- since
it is only the two committees that actually have the
statutory privilege of vetoing negotiations during the 60-
legislative-day advance notice period.
4.
It should be recognized that, should we be forced to make
commitments like those in (f) or (g) above, we will be
viewed in Latin America as having walked back from the
President's initiative.
5.
Note finally that, even on an optimistic schedule, very few
EAI negotiations could be concluded by March 1993. Thus,
new legislation extending the fast-track beyond 1993 will in
any event be necessary at some point for the Administration
fully to pursue the EAI objective of hemispheric
negotiations. Presenting a live legislative proposal during
congressional consideration of fast-track extension,
however, poses the risk that members might use the
possibility of new legislation as a reason to oppose the
Administration's statutory extension request.
9
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11a. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
1/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
D
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11b. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
1/28/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Meetings with the EC on the Uruguay Round (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile,
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE: 1/31/91
NOTE FOR:
EDE HOLIDAY
The President has reviewed the attached, and it is
forwarded to you for your:
Information
Action
XX
Thank you.
PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)
cc:
Chief of Staff --
FYI
General Scowcroft -- FYI
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
SCS 7/9/15
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12b. Memo
From Ede Holiday to POTUS
1/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a, clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAJ
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12c. Memo
From Carla A. Hills to POTUS
1/28/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Meetings with the EC on the Uruguay Round [with
handwritten annotations] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
El
Lovean
+
103
Sunus
Carn
- - telecom aveation
-mandome
more
Patin
Export AG
IPR (+)
- Pharmacenticals
- chemeal's
access
- 0 for O.
26
37
50
textilis
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13. Notes
Handwritten notes on Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
n.d.
P
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
By If (NLGB) on 10/28/05
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Danble summay on the 15th
andressen /Mac Sharry there 27ᵗʰ
Bertan/catemation if needed 1
but not good to ash Now
3 Senarior
1) Send out a good luch "letter
they came to ans 1/106
2) Begin to magotiate take bank to Benteen
Continue Z Consult
Have by May 1.
"Must give retention Ez 5/1 send Damn 50 dogs claim
Dan A need taxt and and
But
Canada FTA -
megstented after
3). going -
get extension - Benlow View -
If gory Fan personde
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14. Paper
Uruguay Round (2 pp.)
12/19/90
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By
P
(NLGB)
on
10/28/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
December 19, 1990
URUGUAY ROUND
Note: Useful to ensure GB understands the framework we
want for the agriculture result.
-- He knows the three "boxes" or categories:
(1) internal support; (2) market access; and
(3) export subsidies.
-- Needs to know there are also three variables for
each box: (1) amount; (2) over what time period;
(3) from what starting point.
-- Also, can't be offset by "rebalancing" or other
takebacks.
To get Kohl and Mitterrand to move to this framework, we
can say we 11 be flexible on the three variables. But they
need more because ag is a loss for them.
So what can the President tell them they 11 get, especially
Mitterrand, in simple terms, in exchange for movement on
agriculture (other than avoiding a failure)?
This is the critical point we need to develop if
POTUS contacts are going to be useful.
Make the point that our bottom line numbers for each of the
three boxes depends on the other two variables (over what
time period and from what starting point), as well as what
we get in other areas.
What's the political strategy to get: (1) Germans to move
French on agriculture; (2) French to move; (3) Japanese to
move, and (4) resume negotiations with positive momentum.
-- You can note conversation with Genscher; German
coalition talks; Kohl's election on January 17
(close-hold).
-- Press UK Prime Minister Major, at least to get info
to guide negotiating strategy; he didn't do much at
the EC Summit.
Relay Delors conversation.
-- Delors is going to have private meetings with Kohl
and Mitterrand; he sounds like he wants to make a
case to them on the need for the EC to move in
agriculture.
-- He asked for two brief papers: (1) Facts on the
reduction in US ag supports over the past five
years; (2) Best examples we have on our flexibility
in areas that matter to France -- in particular
services, textiles, market access.
- 2 -
-- We should also do a third: (3) How changes in
agriculture can help the LDCs -- and be worth much
more than aid,
What other points of indirect influence can we use?
-- Francophone nation leaders who support our ag
position and who might call Mitterrand?
Can we get the Japanese to flush out the EC by offering a
move (e.g., accepting Hellstrom paper as basis for
negotiation) ?
May want to get a feel for under what conditions Congress
would accept an extension in our negotiating authority
(although I think this is a dead end unless a good deal is
almost complete).
AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
Domestic
Export
Market
Supports
Subsidies
Access Barriers
Houston Summit
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
Goal
Progressive
Progressive
Progressive
Reductions"
Reductions"
Reductions"
United States
75% Reduction
90% Reduction
75% Reduction
Proposal
Over 10 years
Over 10 Years
Over 10 Years
European Community
30% Reduction
No
No
Proposal
From 1986 Baseline
Proposal
Proposal
(Effective Cut: 15%)
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
15. Chart
Possible Scenarios for EC Negotiations (1 pp.)
n.d.
P/S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
Open on Expiration of PRA
WHORM Cat.:
(Document Follows)
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
By W (NLGB) on 10/28/05
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTIÓN CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
POSSIBLE SCENARIO
CONTENT
1. EC STONEWALL ON
AGRICULTURE
SERVICES
IPR
2. REAL NEGOTIATION
AGRICULTURE
ACCESS
RULES
INVESTMENTS
3. MINIMAL PACKAGE
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9358
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 28, 1990
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By 5 NARA, Date 12/1/23
MEETING ON THE URUGUAY ROUND
DATE: November 28, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 3:00 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
I. PURPOSE
To review U.S. strategy for bringing the Uruguay Round to a
successful conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
Trade Ministers from the 96 GATT Contracting Parties will
meet December 3-7 in Brussels with the intention of
concluding the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. Carla
Hills will lead our delegation, which will include Clayton
Yeutter, Bob Mosbacher, Roger Porter and representatives
from State, Treasury, Labor and the CEA.
No one is confident that success can be achieved next week.
Given the important domestic and international ramifications
of a failed Round, we should have a strategy for either
concluding the Round next week with the best deal we can get
or extending the talks to achieve a better deal. A critical
element will be whether we can get the final GATT package
through Congress. Failure to do so would severely tarnish
the Administration's standing on economic and trade issues.
Consequently, our negotiators need your guidance.
Agriculture remains the key sticking point and the obstacle
to concluding agreements in the other important areas such
as textiles, services, investment and intellectual property
rights.
I believe Delors woke up after hearing your strong
dissatisfaction with the EC's agriculture proposal. Jim
Baker hit him hard a few days later during the U.S.-EC
Ministerial. As a result, Delors may clarify the EC offer
to provide for a 30% reduction in each of the three areas
(i.e., internal support, export subsidies and market access)
over five years. If pressed, he might even be willing to
move the base year up from 1986 closer to 1990 (our
proposal), which would make the 30% figure more meaningful.
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
Chief of Staff
OCCURRENTIAL
CUN!
2
However, even such a concession, which the EC would see as a
major move, would be very far from what we and the Cairns
Group are seeking (i.e., 90% cut in export subsidies and 75%
cut in internal supports and market access over ten years).
You need to press Carla Hills and Clayton Yeutter to give
you their best estimate on the minimum agriculture deal we
need (a) to get Cairns and other developing countries to
agree to a comprehensive Uruguay Round package; and (b) to
get the deal through Congress. This assessment will need to
take into account the overall package -- not just
agriculture. Specifically, we must know whether, in the
final analysis, a modest agreement is better than none at
all.
A major unknown is how forthcoming Kohl will be after his
election and how much time he would need to bring other EC
members, especially France, around. You should raise this
again with Kohl when you call him on the election results.
If Kohl wants some additional time to work over his EC
colleagues to bring about a positive agriculture deal, we
should accommodate him as long as you believe he can
deliver. You should ask Hills and Yeutter whether, under
this scenario, it would be possible to have an interim
result in the other GATT sectors (i.e. textiles, services,
etc.), postponing the agriculture deal for several weeks.
The understanding, of course, would be that nothing was
decided until everything was decided.
Two other areas remain contentious -- services and textiles.
On services, several countries have accused us of not being
forthcoming enough on maritime, aviation and banking, which
we want to exclude from GATT disciplines. This is contrary
to our overall approach in these negotiations. You should
press Carla Hills and Nick Brady to see whether we can
improve our offer.
On textiles, we have put forward a proposal to integrate
textiles into the GATT, removing quotas over a number of
years. But some in the Administration believe that our
approach is a step backwards. Developing countries, which
are very competitive in this sector, would like a faster
phase out of quotas. You should ask Carla Hills whether
there is anything more than can be done in this area.
You have invested your personal prestige and time in getting
a significant Uruguay Round result. While the EC would
probably get the blame internationally for a failed Round,
you would feel the heat domestically as protectionist forces
in industry and Congress would maneuver to defend their
interests. Such actions would inevitably affect adversely
our relations with Western Europe, Japan, and key LDCs,
particularly if Congress mandates retaliation in an effort
to achieve by feat what we could not accomplish through
negotiations.
IDENTIAL
CONTRENTIAL
CON IDENTIAL
CONF
HH
IDENTIAL
3
Suggested points to be made are attached at Tab A.
III. PARTICIPANTS
A list of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
White House photo only.
V. SEQUENCE
You should make introductory remarks and then ask the
participants some pointed questions to draw out their frank
views on the outlook for the Round and next steps.
Attachment
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
List of Participants
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
A A T B
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING
ON THE URUGUAY ROUND
Before Carla, Clayton, Bob and the rest of the team leave
for Brussels, I want to get your assessment of where we
stand and what might happen next week.
As you know, I have pushed our views with Andreotti, Delors,
Mitterrand and Kohl recently. I will be speaking with Kohl
again on Sunday to congratulate him on his expected victory.
Even though the EC understands our position on agriculture
better now, I doubt that they are prepared to move as far as
we and the Cairns Group would like.
I have several questions on which I would appreciate your
frank views:
O
Agriculture is key, as we have all made abundantly
clear. But what is our bottom line on agriculture?
What are the prospects for achieving it given the EC's
position to date? What do we need to bring the Cairns
Group, our Congress and others on board?
On services, I understand we are being criticized for
our stand on maritime, aviation and banking. Are we
being protectionist in these areas? Can't we do
better?
On textiles, how forthcoming are we in opening our
markets to the competitive products of developing
countries?
If negotiations stall next week, what do we do? Do we
reconvene after Kohl has worked over his EC colleagues
PER NSC DECLASSIFIED WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
By SS NARA, Date 12/1/23
CONFIDENTIAL
2
(assuming he is willing) ? In short, what is our strategy
for managing the negotiations after next week's Ministerial?
CONFIDENTIAL
ENTIRENTIAL
TAB B
TAB B
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Clayton K. Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture
Richard G. Darman, Director, Office of Management and Budget
Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Michael Boskin, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Roger Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and
Domestic Policy
Ede Holiday, Assistant to the President and Secretary to the
Cabinet
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Rodrick DeArment, Deputy Secretary of Labor
3:00
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
November 27, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY YEUTTER
SECRETARY MOSBACHER
ACTING SECRETARY DEARMENT
ROGER PORTER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY MCCORMACK
JOHN TAYLOR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DALLARA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANE
FROM:
CARLA A. HILLS Cast
SUBJECT:
Uruguay Round Brussels Ministerial
I am delighted that you are going to be joining the U.S.
delegation to the Uruguay Round Ministerial in Brussels. The
purpose of this memorandum is to share with you how we intend to
organize the meeting and how we can maximize our resources.
The meeting will be hectic. We have tough negotiating ahead in
nearly all of the 15 areas, and we will have to manage the vast
number of official and unofficial delegates (the full official
U.S. delegation totals some 280 participants)
The format of the Ministerial will require us to maintain an
intensive process of simultaneous meetings on all subjects, with
the inevitable problems of coordination and communication. The
Ministerial formally opens on Monday, and the senior delegation
will participate in a number of events over the weekend with our
official private sector and Congressional delegation.
GATT Director General Dunkel has advised me that he intends to
run the Brussels meeting on the same basis as earlier meetings in
Punta del Este and Montreal. The plenary will meet most of the
week to hear statements of heads of national delegations. At the
same time, selected Ministers and officials will be asked to
assist the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee,
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Gros Espiel, in chairing working
groups (green rooms) at the official or Ministerial level on
outstanding issues.
Final negotiations on all the issues will culminate in the heads
of delegation green room, which initially will meet concurrently
with issue-specific green rooms and, towards the end of the week,
around the clock.
- 2 -
In addition to the green room sessions, there will be regular
briefings with the press and private sector and bilateral
meetings with foreign representatives requiring the participation
of senior members of the delegation.
At the Cabinet-level, I have already asked Secretary Yeutter and
Secretary Mosbacher initially to lead the U.S. efforts on
agriculture and subsidies and antidumping, respectively. In
addition, I am asking Acting Secretary DeArment to pitch-in with
our team on the services negotiations, and Roger Porter to do the
same on balance of payments and safeguards. Other issues and
assignments will be handled at the subcabinet level according to
my designation. My senior Deputy, Julius Katz and Ambassador
Lavorel will help me to coordinate these arrangements, including
eventual green room participation.
In all areas, I have designated subcabinet-level teams to support
the U.S. effort, and ask your support and cooperation in handling
these assignments. Each of the teams includes one senior
negotiator at ambassadorial or subcabinet level, and will be
supported by the negotiating team (primary interagency staff are
noted on the teams). When issues are finally sent to the heads
of delegation green room, I will ask the appropriate Cabinet or
subcabinet officer or the relevant negotiator to assist me.
We will meet as a senior delegation every morning to review
previous day's events and our strategy for the day, including the
countries and representatives that need attention at high levels.
Ambassador Katz or Lavorel will conduct a daily briefing for the
remainder of the delegation immediately following our sessions.
I also will make assignments of senior USTR officials to lead and
coordinate Congressional, private sector and press briefings.
I look forward to seeing you in Brussels, and very much
appreciate your time and participation.
Attachment
bcc: Governor Sununu
Ambassador Niles
Uruguay Round Teams for Brussels Ministerial
o
Agriculture:
Ambassador Katz/Under Secretary Crowder
Joe O'Mara
Suzy Early
o
TRIPs:
Ambassador Warren Lavorel
Bruce Wilson
Mike Kirk
Cathy Field
Emery Simon
Steve Arlinghaus
o
Services:
Ambassador Rufus Yerxa
Assistant Secretary McAllister
Dick Self
Ken Freiberg
Bonnie Richardson
o
for financial services:
Assistant Secretary Dallara
Jerry Newman
for transportation:
Assistant Secretary Shane
for labor issues:
Shellyn McCaffery
Safeguards:
Ambassador Warren Lavorel
Joseph Papovich
Jorge Perez-Lopez
Subsidies:
Assistant Secretary Eric Garfinkel/ USTR
General Counsel Joshua Bolten
Chris Parlin
Mary Pat Michel
o
Antidumping:
Assistant Secretary Eric Garfinkel/ USTR
General Counsel Joshua Bolten
Tim Reif
Chris Parlin
2
TRIMS:
Assistant Secretary Charles Dallara
Deputy Assistant Secretary Barreda
Dave Shark
O
Market Access:
Under Secretary Mike Farren
CEA Member, John Taylor
Doug Newkirk
Melissa Coyle
Marjorie Searing
O
Rules of Origin
& PSI:
Ambassador Rufus Yerxa
Andy Stoler
Wendy Silberman
O
Govt. Procurement:
Ambassador Warren Lavorel
Bev Vaughn
Josh Bolten
o
Dispute Settlement:
Ambassador Warren Lavorel
A. Jane Bradley
Chris Parlin
o
Textiles:
Ambassador Ron Sorini
Robert Shepherd
Augustine Tantillo
Caroyl Miller
O GATT Articles (BOP) : Assistant Secretary Charles Dallara
Doug Newkirk
Jim Wallar
O
Implementation of
UR Results:
Ambassador Lavorel/Ambassador Yerxa
Andy Stoler
Jane Bradley
3
Global Coherence:
Assistant Secretary Dallara/ CEA Member,
John Taylor
Jim Waller
Andy Stoler
Foreign Bilateral
Meeting Requests:
Under Secretary McCormack
Ambassador Niles
Other members of the senior delegation as appropriate and as
determined by needs.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
17. Report
France: Benefits from the Uruguay Round (1 pp.)
n.d.
P-5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Open on Expiration of PRA
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
(Document Follows)
Subseries:
Issues Files
By IP (NLGB) on 10/28/05
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Uruguay Round 1991
Date Closed:
1/5/2005
OA/ID Number:
29174-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[2]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
FRANCE: Benefits from the Uruguay Round
France's Geopolitical Interest
--
Mitterand -- vocal proponent of aid to LDCs in French
West Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
--
But OECD trade barriers cost LDCs 2 1/2 times all aid
received.
France's Stake in World Trade: France is the 4th largest
world exporter. (1988 exports = $230 billion)
Market Access
--
Uruguay Round target of 33% in barriers would increase
French output by $300 billion over the next ten years
($19,000 per family of four).
U.S. offer -- average depth of tariff cut to French
imports is 57%, covering $8 billion.
Services
---
France is the 2nd largest exporter of services,
exporting nearly $60 billion last year.
:
Major French focus:
--- Financial services: interested in U.S. (repeal of
Glass-Steagall and restrictions on interstate
banking) and Japanese markets.
--
Enhanced telecommunications and engineering
services.
Intellectual Property
--
France benefits from stronger intellectual property
(patent, trademark, and copyright) protection, as a
major exporter of high-technology and brand name goods.
:
Major French focus:
Appellations of Origin: prospective protection
would benefit French wine industry (though it
would prefer rollback.)
Trademarks: Would protect French designer label
industry (Louis Vuitton, etc.).
Agriculture
Services
Telecommunications
Internal Export Barriers to
Supports Subsidies Access
maritime
Aviation
Broadcast- T.V.
Variables
Financial Services
Size of Cut
START 190
Intellectual Property Protection
Length of term
Base yea HELSTROM
86-87 30/58°
Pharmaceuticals
market Access (33% Target)
Domestic Score Card
37 Votes against PEANUTS Round
Investment
DAIRY
TOBACCO
SUGAR
TEXTILES
G
Textiles
AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
Domestic
Export
Market
Supports
Subsidies
Access Barriers
Houston Summit
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
"Substantial,
Goal
Progressive
Progressive
Progressive
Reductions"
Reductions"
Reductions"
United States
75% Reduction
90% Reduction
75% Reduction
Proposal
Over 10 years
Over 10 Years
Over 10 Years
European Community
30% Reduction
No
No
Proposal
From 1986 Baseline
Proposal
Proposal
(Effective Cut: 15%)
Agricultural Support
Internal Supports
O
What the U.S. has done:
--
From 1986-1990: cut agricultural support for major
commodities (grains and dairy) by nearly 50%.
--
From 1991-1995: plan to cut an additional 25%. (except
for dairy).
What the EC has done:
--
From 1986-1990: cut support for grains by about 15%.
--
Future: no additional cuts planned.
Export Subsidies and Barriers to Market Access
o
Cuts in these two areas are essential to the creation of new
opportunities for agricultural exporters.