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234
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
(1970) "Sociological perspectives on mild mental retardation," in H. C. Haywood
pls file undy
(ed.) Social-Cultural Aspects of Mental Retardation. New York: Appleton-Century-
Politicians and
Crofts.
NYSARC & PARISI V. CAREY, 507 F. 2d 333, 341 (1980)
Social Scientists
Science +
PASSOW, A. H. (1967) Toward Creating a Model Urban School System: A Study of the
Washington, D.C. Public Schools. New York: Teachers College, Columbia Univer-
sity.
An Uneasy Relationship
Technology
President's Committee on Mental Retardation (1976) Changing Patterns in Residential
Services for the Mentally Retarded. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
President's Panel on Mental Retardation (1962) A Proposed Program for National Ac-
WILLIAM G. WELLS, Jr.
tion to Combat Mental Retardation. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
QUAY, L. C. (1963) "Academic skills," pp. 664-669 in N. R. Ellis (ed.) Handbook of Men-
Science Policy Program,
tal Retardation. New York: McGraw-Hill.
American Association for the Advancement of Science
REED, E. W. and S.C. REED (1965) Mental Retardation: A Family Study. Philadelphia:
Saunders.
Report by the Task Force on Children out of School (1970) The Way We Go to School:
The Exclusion of Children in Boston. Boston: Beacon.
This article is part of a debate that has been going on for a long time; the
REYNOLDS, M. C. (1962) "A framework for considering some issues in special educa-
tion." Exceptional Children 28 (March): 367-370.
debate centers on the uneasy relationship between politicians and social
RIVERA, G. (1972) Willowbrook: A Report on How it Is and Why it Doesn't Have to Be
and behavioral scientists. My objective is to make a modest contribution
that Way. New York: Random House.
to this debate by outlining the range of problems and perceptions that
ROGERS, C.R. (1937) "Three surveys of treatment measures used with children." Amer.
impede effective interactions between social and behavioral scientists
J. of Orthopsychiatry 7: 48-57.
and politicians and identifying steps that need to be taken in order for
ROOS, P. (1979) "Custodial care for the 'subtrainable': revisiting an old myth." Law and
Psychology Rev. 5, 1: 1-14.
social and behavioral scientists and politicians to work together more
effectively.
ROSS, S. L., H. G. DEYOUNG, and J. S. COHEN (1971) "Confrontation: special educa-
tion placement and the law." Exceptional Children 38 (September): 5-12.
Social and behavioral scientists have encountered a special set of
SARASON, S. B. (1953) Psychological Problems in Mental Deficiency. New York: Har-
attitudes and problems not common among colleagues in other areas of
per & Row.
science and engineering. These circumstances involve not only individ-
SARASON, S. B. and J. DORIS (1979) Educational Handicap, Public Policy, and Social
History. New York: Free Press.
ual social and behavioral scientists but also their professional organiza-
tions and societies.
(1969) Psychological Problems in Mental Deficiency. New York: Harper & Row.
SCHEERENBERGER, R. C. (1978) "Public residential services for the mentally re-
Physical scientists have often experienced respect, support, and, in
tarded," pp. 187-209 in N. Ellis (ed.) International Review of Research in Mental Re-
certain periods, an unhealthy adulation from politicians and the general
tardation. New York: Academic Press.
public; on the other hand, all too often social and behavioral scientists
TERMAN, L. M. (1923) "The great conspiracy." New Republic 33: 116-120, 201.
have encountered lack of respect, hostility, derision, and conscious
(1919) The Intelligence of School Children. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
(1916) The Measurement of Intelligence. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
distortion of their work by "cheap shot" politicians and "fast buck" hack
TERMAN, L. M., V.E. DICKSON, A. H. SUTHERLAND, R. H. FRAZEN, C. R.
writers.
TUPPER, and G. FERNALD (1923) Intelligence Tests and School Reorganization.
Regrettably, much of the abuse must be accepted-if not with
Yonkers-on-Hudson, NY: World.
detachment, then with grace. Great energy and resources would be
WHITE, T. H. (1958) The Once and Future King. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
WRIGHT, J.S. (1967) "The Washington, D.C. school case." Integrated Education 5, 4:
wastefully diverted to defending against every such attack. I fully agree
46-53.
ZIGLER, E. (1967) "Familial mental retardation: a continuing dilemma." Science 155:
292-298.
Author's Note: This article is based in part on an unpublished paper entitled "The Social
Sciences: A Political View," by William G. Wells, Jr. and Michael E. Breton.
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 26 No. 2, November/December 1982 235-249
© 1982 Sage Publications, Inc.
0002-7642/82/040235-15$1.75
235
236
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
237
with Robert P. Lowman (American Psychological Association) that
There is a rich variety of ideas in the literature-largely from the social
both individuals and organizations should choose their responses carefully
sciences-which illuminate the general interactions between science and
in terms of timing, tactics, and strategies.
social values and the societal impact of such phenomena as technologi-
The purposes of such responses and all interactions with politicians
cal changes.
and the public should be grounded in the following:
An examination of this literature reveals a fundamental challenge for
politicians and social scientists: to understand the substance of science is
enhancing respect and standing as scientists;
not to have a sufficient basis for understanding the impact of science on
furthering communications with other parts of the scientific community;
society or preparing for the inevitable changes to come.
seeking to better inform and educate politicians and the general public about the
Regrettably, the record of the past four decades reveals a terribly
nature and value of the social and behavioral sciences;
ironic finding: Many in the political environment-and in the scientific
and developing effective alliances, personally and professionally, in a variety of ways;
community as well-have been either indifferent or hostile to one of the
most promising means for coping with a vast range of human
fostering support for education and research in the social and behavioral sciences.
problems-the social and behavioral sciences. It is not only the broad,
sweeping impacts that have been of major concern to those in the social
In presenting this array of objectives, a distinction needs to be made
sciences; well-reasoned, documented cases have been prepared on the
between ill-founded attacks and legitimate concerns. Indeed, no
value of the social sciences in solving or attacking a host of individual,
responsible social or behavioral scientist would argue that he or she
organizational, and societal problems.
should be immune from criticism and debate about such matters as
Indeed, it is not really possible to devise effective policies and
methodologies, major research issues, and support policies.
solutions to cope with energy, environmental, industrial productivity,
health, and national security problems-to mention a few minor
concerns now on the national agenda-without recourse to the insights,
research findings, and methodologies of the various social and behav-
SCIENCE AS A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE
ioral sciences. Yet, the social and behavioral sciences have long faced a
Perhaps a good starting point is to remind ourselves about the role of
deep and fundamental set of problems in Washington; gaining wide-
science in today's world. Going to the heart of the matter, in a brief time
spread acceptance and support has been a difficult, uphill battle.
science has proved itself an incredibly powerful revolutionary force
which has swiftly and dramatically affected man's beliefs and values,
created and destroyed industries, revolutionized war, transformed and
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
overturned political social organizations, and modified people's concep-
tion of their place in the universe.
The roots of conflict and hostility run deep. In the mid-1930s, a first
In short, tremendous changes have taken place with bewildering
major attempt by scientists to become involved in the political arena led
speed in political, social, intellectual, economic, international, and
to the establishment of a Science Advisory Board (SAB). The board was
military institutions as science and technology have come to occupy a
dominated by physical scientists, and those in the social-sciences were
central place in the life of the entire planet. And there is little reason not
virtually excluded except for subsidiary subcommittee roles.
to accept Bertrand Russell's view of science: "that we are only at the very
The SAB had limited success, in that good advice was provided to a
beginning of its work in transforming human life" (1951: 3).
number of government agencies and a substantial number of scientists
Scientific knowledge has affected basic beliefs and values, and
and politicians gained experience in working with each other. Yet, the
technology has induced social changes in ways that are little understood
board failed in its larger purpose; President Roosevelt and his senior
despite the great attention devoted to them by a long succession of
officials saw little connection between recommendations for more
philosophers, scientists, and writers-mainly from the academic world.
federal support for university research and the problems they were
238' AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
239
struggling with-massive unemployment, widespread hunger, and
1965, when Herbert Simon was appointed. In more recent years, social
rebuilding a shattered economy.
and behavioral scientists had a very limited role in President Carter's
During the latter half of the 1930s, social scientists-for the only
science advisory organization, and so far, they are totally absent in
period during the past 40 years-superseded physical scientists in
President Reagan's circles. For example, the newly appointed (Febru-
prominent science advisory positions via such bodies as the National
ary 1982) White House Science Council has no social or behavioral
Resources Development Committee. By and large, social scientists were
scientist among its members. One former presidential science advisor
relatively more influential than physical scientists in shaping the New
summed up a not uncommon view by observing: "they haven't
Deal-and this would come back to haunt them.
discovered their Newton's Laws yet."
To this day, the social scientist is seen by many politicians not as a
Although modest support for the social and behavioral sciences by
scientist but as an advocate of social change and government interven-
the NSF actually began in the 1950s, it was not until the 1968
tion of some kind or another. It is no accident that "social engineering"
amendments to the NSF Act of 1950 that the social and behavioral
is used negatively by some to encompass the social sciences and the
sciences acquired a statutory base in the NSF. It is noteworthy that this
legacies of the New Deal and the Great Society.
action was initiated by a small number of politicians and staff members
World War II brought science and technology into the inner councils
in Congress working closely with social and behavioral scientists from
of national government to stay. But in the minds of politicians and the
the academic world.
public alike, it was the physical scientists and engineers-not social
Even with this legislative change, financial support has remained at
scientists-who produced the stunning array of war-winning technolo-
modest levels in NSF budgets. Moreover, in one way or another,
gies and weapons.
political attacks have been made over the years both on the social
In congressional debates from as long ago as the 1940s (when the
sciences in general and on specific projects and programs. For example,
National Science Foundation was established) to as recently as the NSF
during the mid-1970s, slashing, well-coordinated attacks were made on
budget reviews in 1981 and 1982, opponents of the social sciences have
various social science curriculum developments funded by the NSF.
drawn on a variety of notions to build their case for reduction or
These attacks served as the basis for a series of major assaults on the
elimination of federal support.
foundation and were forerunners to the Reagan administration's drastic
In the late 1940s, it was the natural scientists and engineers who
reductions in social and behavioral research budgets.
excluded the social sciences from Senator Warren Magnuson's Founda-
In the 1979 House debate on the fiscal year 1980 NSF budget,
tion Bill (it was drafted by Vannevar Bush). And it was a politician-
Representative John Ashbrook successfully put forward an amendment
Senator Harley Kilgore-who included the social sciences in his version
which had the intent of "gutting" the social science program. Fortu-
of the foundation in collaboration with the Bureau of the Budget. That
nately, defective wording in the amendment applied the cut to the entire
story has been told elsewhere, but the major points are these:
line item of the biological, behavioral, and social sciences-and
ultimately the cut was restored in conference with the Senate. But this
(1) In the final legislation the social sciences were not included.
incident was only a mild example of what lay ahead.
(2) At times the debate was acrimonious about the social sciences.
(3) The scientific establishment was not a friend of the social sciences in the
foundation "affair."
LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Not since the time of FDR have social scientists held prominent
science advisory positions. The physical scientists and engineers who
A review of the record of the past 40 years suggests that a number of
helped build the wide-flung, post-World War II R&D structure saw
factors influence the relationship between politicians and social scien-
little, if any, place for the social sciences in their plans.
tists:
In fact, the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), created
There is the large issue of how science and technology fit into our
by President Truman in 1951, did not have its first social scientists until
society; attitudes of members of the public and politicians have become
240
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
241
increasingly important. Problems of accountability, traditions of
notion is closely related to what Robert P. Lowman (1980) has
scientific freedom, and ethical issues come together in complex ways.
observed: "Because the subject matter of the social sciences often deals
Scientists in all fields-including social scientists-cannot function
with strongly-held belief systems of members of society, or questions
effectively without taking into account the interests and rights of others
their values, behaviors, or convictions, the study of the social sciences is
and the distribution of power between an variety of actors. Politicians
often seen as threatening by members of the public, including elected
must learn to think of science in broader terms than immediate solutions
public officials."
to some problem which troubles them.
Social scientists have not made the kinds of visible contributions
Some think that social scientists are not really scientists. Leigh
that are associated with physical scientists and engineers. Such attitudes
Shaffer has quoted Senator William Proxmire as saying in an interview
persist in spite of the significant and growing contributions the social
with the APA Monitor, "It's too bad they're called sciences, because
and behavioral sciences are making in our society. It is ironic indeed that
they are not quite. I don't know what they are. They're somewhere
technologies arising in large part from the social and behavioral sciences
between science and art." This is a view which spans 40 years of science
are of central importance in today's complex world but are not generally
policy debates; all too often, others in the scientific community have
recognized as such. These include economic indicators, economic
joined Senator Proxmire in his opinion. There is no evading this
forecasting, demographic projects, modeling, management systems,
issue-social scientists must step right up to it.¹
marketing analysis, survey methods, and many others. On the negative
Social scientists-at least some of them-work with subjects of
side, Michael Pallak (1981) has noted that human factors researchers
"common knowledge." Politicians and members of the public often
and engineers have not been used widely in the nuclear power industry.
think they know a great deal about such subjects. In contrast, they are
More to the point, the Kemeny Commission concluded in its Three Mile
often quick to say "I never was any good at math" and feel not the least
Island report that it was primarily "people-related problems and not
embarrassed because they know nothing of nuclear physics. Senator
equipment problems which brought us so close to a major tragedy."
Proxmire, for example, has never identified a high-energy physics
Politicians and the public don't really understand the social
project for a "Golden Fleece" award. Yet, he and others considered
sciences. This perception is directly connected to nearly every one of the
themselves expert in societal problems and thereby "qualified" to pass
above-cited problems. There is an uneasiness among politicians-and
on the merits of specific projects in the social and behavioral sciences.
probably among the general public as well-that social scientists are
It is doubly ironic that many of the outspoken critics of social science
"messing around" with their lives. Never mind that those in the natural
research are the very ones who call most loudly for increased efficiency
sciences and engineering are really "messing around" with our lives—
in government and industry-increases which will depend in large
that is progress. In any event, there is a feeling of disquiet that "we" are
measure on learning how better to operate large human organizations.
being probed and prodded-with just the hint that loss of control over
Henry Ford II noted that the largest pool of untapped resources in the
our lives will result. From such fears arise hostility and slashing attacks.
United States is the American worker. Learning how to "tap this pool"
Politicians often tend to rely on their own intuitions and convictions
will not come out of physics or electrical engineering.
about human behavior in devising major social programs rather than
Yet, it is suggested by Robert Cole that American managers and
call on the social scientists. We have seen this time and again as multi-
engineers, drawing upon their "experience," reject social science models
billion-dollar programs have been launched in public housing, health,
of management. There is an inherent tendency to minimize the
and other social services based more on how politicians "feel" than on
contribution of worker effort and motivation with respect to increased
solid information or good research findings. In short, many politicians
productivity and project quality. The emphasis in the United States, in
consider themselves the experts, not the social scientists.
contrast to Japan, is on the "technological fix," not on securing worker
Barbara Tuchman, in an essay from Practicing History, has pointed
cooperation and participation.²
to a special dimension of the "understanding problem." She argues that
Social scientists are seen by some as social advocates. As noted
there is great creative literary potential in the sciences-and that "this
earlier, such perceptions date back to at least New Deal days. This
writing must come from within the disciplines." However, she goes on to
242
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
243
observe that the example of the social scientists must be avoided at all
manifestations, from the earliest beginnings to projections of future
costs. It is her contention that with their writing and special vocabularies
development.
they "have painted themselves into a corner of unintelligibility" (1981:
But this general common bond is in the intellectual background and
55). Harsh? Yes. But these are views held by many in the political world
does not influence day-to-day reality. Cooperation at the federal level by
as well.
the disciplines involved in presenting a compelling case for public
Another aspect of the social and behavioral sciences which leads to
financing of social and behavioral research has been all too rare. Instead
difficulties is this: These areas of science are anything but unified in
there seems to be a generalized feeling that each area is in competition
concept or in practice-and this troubles politicians as well as natural
with its near associates for truly scarce federal dollars. This feeling has
scientists. The social and behavioral sciences are diverse, and this
some grounding in fact, since in every area priorities must be and are set.
diversity itself leads to confusion. The extreme breadth falling in these
But the limiting factor is in the larger sum available for all.
categories ranges from highly objective experimental disciplines in
I do not plan to discuss views held by some of those in other scientific
psychology or anthropology, through statistical studies in sociology and
disciplines, but they often have not been supportive allies in social and
social psychology, to clinical psychology, which often relies on an
behavioral scientists' dealings with politicians. And it is not far off the
almost anecdotal case history approach. And of course in every area
mark to suggest that on more than one occasion they have been
there are many variations in method being used, such that little
antagonists-overtly and covertly. In short, the disquiet and uneasiness
agreement could be reached, even among practitioners, as to how best to
felt by politicians about social and behavioral scientists have not been
characterize their science. This contrasts sharply with the situation in
alleviated in discussions between politicians and a number of natural
the physical and mathematical sciences.
scientists and engineers.
Just to illustrate the point, we might compare the federal funding
picture in physics to that in the behavioral and social sciences.
According to the Intersociety Preliminary Analyses of R&D in the FY
1981 Budget, published in 1980 by the AAAS, there were exactly two
A NEW ADMINISTRATION: A DRAMATIC CHANGE
major sources of research funding for physics: NSF and DOE. By
contrast, at least 12 cabinet-level departments and 16 independent
The arrival of the Reagan administration brought the portent of
agencies contributed to funding social and behavioral science research.
major changes, but few were prepared for the draconian assaults on the
Even chemistry, which claims to be "ubiquitous in the R&D budget,"
social and behavioral sciences. As the budget plans for revising Carter's
was funded through only six major agencies and departments.
FY 1981 and FY 1982 budgets began to unfold in early 1981, it became
This provides some indication of the problem faced by anyone, even a
clear that a determined, systematic effort was under way to virtually
professional in these fields, in trying to understand the federal posture
eliminate federal support for social and behavioral research.
toward research in social and behavioral science. What emerges from
In retrospect, one can build a case that what happened should not
any examination of these facts is that until the arrival of the Reagan
have been such a surprise. David Stockman and his aides, while in
administration, there was no unified federal posture, just as there is a
Congress, had been among the most adamant opponents of federal
lack of unity within these areas of science. Instead, one finds a pattern of
support for social and behavioral research. Also, a member of the NSF
separate centers of support for more or less isolated specialty and
transition team had been one of the key staff aides to former Repre-
subspecialty areas within the whole range of these sciences. Economists
sentative John Conlon, who led attacks on NSF. in the mid-1970s.
do not often talk to psychologists, but generally they would not say
Although only general instructions were given to various OMB
anything against them. Anthropologists speak to political scientists only
offices on budget levels for hundreds of programs, Stockman issued
at parties. And yet they are all working toward fundamental under-
detailed, specific "guidance" on reducing or eliminating social and
standing of individual and group human behavior in all of its
behavioral research in the NSF and other agencies. In response to
charges that these actions were motivated by ideological consideration
244
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
245
(i.e., "social science equals social advocacy of the kind that we are going
Congressional action led to some restorations of social and
to get rid of"), a parade of administration figures in congressional
behavioral science support in the NSF budget for FY 1982-and is
forums said, "Not true. In a period of fiscal austerity, this kind of
leading to increases in FY 1983. Important observations, I think, are
research is low priority and should not be supported."
these:
In an exceptionally deft manner, the Reagan administration moved
away from the traditional ways of attacking the social and behavioral
-The majority of members who supported the administration in 1981 and 1982 spoke
sciences. No talk of "crazy grant titles" or "social engineering" was in
in terms of budget austerity and the president's economic program; only one mem-
administration statements; instead, they chose their battleground
ber in the 1981 debate returned to the debates of earlier years, brought up "Fat City"
carefully, on terrain where the president is strongest-the budget,
by Donald Lambro, and referred to social scientists as "intellectual ineffectuals."
priorities, and the economy.
-Members of both parties in 1981 and 1982 presented well-reasoned defenses of social
Of course, one would have to be more than mildly skeptical to believe
and behavioral science research in terms of national priorities, the ground chosen by
the administration.
the "low priority" argument. But administration figures would not
budge an inch from it; moreover, they would not even debate the issue.
-The character of the defense was clearly influenced by an extensive lobbying and
They simply asserted their judgment of "low priority" in response to
educational effort by individual universities and their associations, scientific and
professional organizations, and particularly by the Consortium of Social Science
questions and went on to the next subject. On a more positive note,
Associations (COSSA).
limited restorations have been made in fiscal year 1983 budget requests
-Finally, an amendment in 1981 to reduce the NSF budget to the administration
(such as the NSF); but, on the other hand, in other organizations (such
request lost by a vote of 264 to 152. (This was one of the relatively few budget votes
as the National Institute for Mental Health) social and behavioral
that year in which party affiliation was not a major consideration.)
science support remains a "disaster area."
The lesson here is that continuing efforts must be made in the
congressional arena as part of the "salvage" operation. Tight organiza-
tion and close coordination are essential in these endeavors. It is also
STEPS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN
important to remember that this is not really a partisan issue;
In surveying both the record of 40 years and the current scene, one is
Republicans and Democrats have been on both sides.
driven to consider what needs to be done-first in the short term and
then in the longer range.
LONGER TERM
In the longer range, a broad array of activities seems to be called for. I
SHORT TERM
argue that such measures should include the following:
Short-term activities in recent years have necessarily been directed at
Forging stronger links between politicians and social and behav-
"saving" as much as is possible of social and behavioral research
ioral scientists. Allies in the Congress must be chosen with care-both in
programs in various agencies. Primarily these activities have been in the
the Senate and House and in both parties. It is important not to forget
congressional arena; it is too soon to tell what the outcomes will be, but
the new representatives and senators. Another element is the building of
several events are instructive.
a network of staff people in personal as well as committee offices. These
Broad support in the congressional review processes has been
linkages should be thought of as two-way communications channels.
provided by the scientific establishment-for example, the National
An important development in "linkage development" during the past
Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advance-
decade has been the Congressional Science and Engineering Fellows
ment of Science, both in 1981 and 1982.
Program. On behalf of about 20 professional societies and organiza-
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
247
246
tions, the American Association for the Advancement of Science
providing information and resources for Congress in conducting special
forums and seminars.
(AAAS) administers the placement of scientists and engineers with the
Congress for one-year periods of service as legislative assistants either
Focusing more attention on the public understanding of the social
on committees or in individual House and Senate offices.
and behavioral sciences. Such efforts are really part of a much larger
Initiated in the early 1970s by physical scientists and engineers, social
subject-public understanding of science in general. But clearly special
and behavioral scientists began to participate by the mid-1970s. Such
attention must be devoted to ensuring that the National Enquirer is not
the only way the public acquires its information about the social and
fellows have included psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.
The fellows bring to Congress new insights, fresh ideas, extensive
behavioral sciences. A special focus should be placed on improving text
materials used in elementary and secondary schools-which is where it
knowledge, and education in a variety of disciplines. Not only are the
begins.
fellows provided the opportunity to make a significant contribution, but
they also obtain firsthand experience in the legislative and political
Another special focus for reaching out to the public is through the
science museums. The AAAS has cooperated with the Association of
processes. In short, the fellows offer their special knowledge, skills, and
competence for the opportunity to acquire experience and the chance to
Science and Technology Centers in developing a resource program for
science museums. AAAS members are working as volunteer scientists
contribute to the formulation of national policy.
and engineers in a wide variety of activities-helping to design exhibits,
These fellows have been fully accepted in the congressional arena;
training museum staff, giving lectures, acting as "Scientists in Resi-
some stay on as staff members, while others return to the world of
dence" for schools in the areas of the science museums, and so on. Social
science. But whichever way individuals decide to go, the overall result is
and behavioral scientists can play important roles in these outreach
a vital enrichment of the political process and of science itself.
activities with the public.
Expanding educational efforts. The kinds of problems discussed
Considering various forms of political action. Without doubt, the
earlier suggest a strong need for expanding efforts to explain and convey
a better understanding of the social and behavioral sciences. Specific
most controversial aspect of more interactions between politicians and
measures could include one-on-one briefings, seminars/forums on
scientists involves direct political action. I will not attempt to put
forward the pros and cons of such actions, but will only note that some
subjects of interest to politicians which involve the social and behavioral
in the scientific and engineering communities are moving in the
sciences, participation in hearings on key budgets, and the preparation
direction of Political Action Committees (PACs). For example, the
of concise reports directed specifically to politicians. More attention
National Society of Professional Engineers has established both a
must be given to presenting in understandable terms the many
formal lobbying arm and a PAC separate from its other professional
contributions-past, current, and potential-of the social and behav-
activities. Such efforts are based on a fundamental aspect of our
ioral sciences; part of these efforts must also be placed on the negative
political system: It is entirely legal-within specified boundaries-to
implications of not supporting these areas.
help politicians of one's choice with money and other support for
Increasing lobbying activities. The FY 1982 NSF appropriations
elective campaigns. Politicians clearly understand this kind of help.
debate and result can be traced to effective lobbying. This is an entirely
legitimate function to which the scientific and engineering communities
have come only reluctantly. Attempting to influence policy and budgets
SUMMARY
is a "time-tested" method in our government. A number of specific
activities have been undertaken within the past two years by the Con-
In summary, one or even a few such endeavors will not be sufficient to
sortium of Social Science Associations-but more sustained attention is
turn the tide running against social and behavioral research. From
required. COSSA has, however, been quite successful in helping to
where I sit, it would seem that a variety of sustained and coordinated
coordinate a number of activities relevant to the budget process,
efforts is the only approach that might succeed. This is true not only
identifying and obtaining witnesses for congressional hearings, and
248
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
Wells / POLITICIANS & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
249
because the area is diverse and difficult to present in any unified fashion
but because there are determined opponents of federal spending on
RUSSELL, B. (1951) The Impact of Science on Society. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
these efforts who find political profit in exploiting the apparent weak-
TUCHMAN, B. (1981) Practicing History: Selected Essays. New York: Knopf.
nesses these sciences present.
U.S. Congress Hearings, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
Here I can only speculate, but it seems that these attacks are made
sentatives (1981) The Human Factor in Innovation and Productivity. Washington,
possible by a general misunderstanding of the nature and value of social
DC: Government Printing Office.
and behavioral scientific research. If one of these attackers makes an
outrageous statement that is obviously untrue to a professional
observer, it may nevertheless seem perfectly plausible to a large
percentage of the general population. The truth of this reveals a large
gap in the public understanding of science in these areas, and can
account for much of the success that attacks of this kind are able to
generate.
From many sources, it seems that public acceptance of science and
scientists is still at a high level, if no longer at its peak. However, this
acceptance is based on a conception of what is good science. It is all too
easy, it seems, to persuade many people that large areas of behavioral
and social research are bad or, at least, questionable science. As long as
this unfavorable concept of social science continues in the public mind,
politically motivated attacks on research funding will continue to find
support. But ignoring the problem will not solve it, and I would urge the
modest program of action outlined above.
NOTES
1. From "Proxmire Speaks Out," May 1975, page 6, quoted by Leigh S. Shaffer in
"They Wouldn't Get an Answer Anyone Would Believe," September 1980.
2. From a seminar before the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, June 19, 1980, in U.S. Congress Hearings (1981)
REFERENCES
LOWMAN, R. P. (1980) "The role of the APA in responding to public criticism of psy-
chology." Presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation, Montreal.
PALLAK, M. (1981) Memorandum: "Materials of psychology's contributions to national
productivity." March 16.
Technology In Society. Vol. 2. pp. 191-220 (1980)
0160-791X 80 010191-30$02.00/0
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 1980 Pergamon Press Ltd
Science Advice and the Presidency
be
MOTICE:
An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
law protcered 17, This U.S. by copyright Code's material
The
William G. Wells, Jr.
Introduction
One of the most important aspects of the broad subject of science and public policy
has been the convergence of science and technology and a unique political insti-
tution: the Presidency of the United States. Unfortunately. this convergence and its
implications largely have been ignored by most historians and other scholars in their
studies of the Presidency: moreover, with few exceptions and until very recently,
analysts of the broad problem of science and public policy have done little better.
The modern Presidency has evolved into a powerful institution as part of the
changing context of our national life resulting from economic. scientific and tech-
nological progress. This is not to argue that science and technology in themselves
account for the emergence of the Presidency as "our one truly national political
institution however. nuclear and electronic technologies alone have given mid-
20th century Presidents power undreamed of by those of the 19th century. Further-
more. all of the Presidents of recent decades have been faced with major problems
either directly or indirectly related to science and technology.
The convergence of the Presidency with science and technology has led to the
evolution of new functions and organizational forms at the Presidential level which
fall under the rubric of "Science Advice and the Presidency. Intertwined with the
evolution of these new functions and forms has been the emergence of the central
role of science and technology in the modern world. Clearly we must become more
"concerned with the relationship between expert knowledge and political power as
revealed in the advisory function.
William G. Weils. Jr.. 1b. 1923) is Staff Director. House Subcommittee on Science.
Research and Technology. He nas been is member of Congressional staffs for 14 years. with
responsibilities including legislative oversight and budget review of NASA. the NSF. and
other agencies. along with a wide range of science policy matters. Previously, as an officer
in the U.S. Air Force. be was associated with the evolution of the ballistic missue program
and with the central planning, direction. and management of Air Force research and
development activities. This paper draws on the unpublished dissertation of the author.
"Science Advice and the Presidency: 1933-1976. Occasional comments on the Curter
Presidency appear. but in general :he analysis goes only through the Ford Presidency.
191
192
William G. Wells. Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
193
Certain Policy Implications of the Central Role of Science and Technology
so, most of his long discussions with his Science Advisers were devoted mainly to
Many of the most significant issues of contemporary life have arisen from the
specific problems in the space and military areas. Only at the very end of his Presi-
pervasive influence of science and technology. These issues include not only major
dency, and perhaps because he had found the time to think about such ideas, did
clusters of difficult or intractable problems-such as technological change and its
Eisenhower express publicly some of his uneasiness about science and technology in
impact on society-but also many topics of organization, programs, budgets, and
connection with political and social issues.
other science policy matters over which, with varying success, institutions such as
After observing that research had come to play an increasingly crucial role in
the Presidency and the Congress have acquired certain measures of knowledgeability
society and acknowledging that scientific research and discovery should be held in
and control.
respect, Eisenhower warned about the danger that public policy could itself become
Most of the issues arise from this crucial point: In a very brief time science has
the captive of a scientific-technological elite. The thought is strikingly similar to the
proved itself an incredibly powerful revolutionary force which has swiftly and
pessimistic concerns of Victor Ferkiss and Jacques Ellul.5 In Eisenhower's view, "it
dramatically affected society's beliefs and values. created and destroyed industries,
is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other
revolutionized war, transformed and overturned political and social organizations,
forces. new and old, within the principles of our democratic system-ever aiming
and modified man's conception of his place in the universe. In short. tremendous
toward the supreme goals of our free society." This was no small contribution to
changes have taken place with bewildering speed in political, social, intellectual,
the concept of the Presidency as the logical focus in the government where the broad
economic, international and military institutions as science and technology have
problems of science and society should be considered. But occasional Presidential
come to occupy a central place in the life of the entire planet. And there is little
statements, however important they may be, are not enough.
reason not to accept Bertrand Russell's view of science "that we are only at the very
beginning of its work in transforming human life.''
Coming to Terms with the Future
Regrettably, an examination of seven Presidencies from FDR onward reveals less
than wholehearted acceptance at the political level either of the above ideas or of a
It is imperative that the White House extend part of its attention beyond the immedi-
ate array of problems confronting it at any given time. In doing so, it must come to
concept which, it is argued, is central to coping successfully with the problems of a
terms not only with what has happened in the past but also with Russell's view of the
rapidly changing world: science now appears as one of the great social institutions
coordinate with the other major institutions of society-the economy. education,
future. Restating a point made earlier. for better or worse, science and technology are
altering man's life and his world; indeed. it has been observed that to speak of
religion, the family. and the polity.⁴ More regrettably. an evolving series of Presi-
dential science advisory organizations has shown little interest or capability in even
technological change on contemporary life has become almost a cliché.⁷ Unfortun-
ately. this is correct and herein lies much reason for concern: clichés tend to be
considering broad philosophical issues comparable to those raised by Russell.
Yet. there has been consistent support of the concept of science as one of the great
accepted at a superficial level with no effort to examine what lies behind them.
social institutions and the argument that its voice should be heard in the highest
Even more unfortunate. Presidents. the Congress. and American citizens alike
often have been disinclined to act until a developing situation forces decisions and the
political circles. Moreover. there are large numbers of subjects and issues which have
been understood and acted upon. in varying degrees. by Presidents and their staffs
establishment of a policy. Paradoxically, important though may be the general
alike. Examples abound in each Presidency and include the establishment of science-
concept expressed by Russell. it appears most often in disguise-as nuclear energy or
space-which results in limited debates. decisions. and policies. In the context of this
based organizations. the evolution of nuclear energy and its many implications,
analysis. aside from academic studies. only three major endeavors related to techno-
weapons development and major changes in the organization for defense and war.
logical change in a broad sense were undertaken during the nearly five decades
oceanography. support of federal research and development. health research and
covered by this paper: two originated in the Executive Branch, the other in the
organization, and many others. Thus, it seems fair to say that Presidents have, each
Congress.
in his own way. demonstrated a grasp of complicated public policy issues arising from
The first. and only major study dominated by social scientists. was conducted in
or connected to science and technology.
1936 by the Science Advisory Committee of the National Resources Committee.
As representative of the kind of thinking which needs to take place at the Presi-
One of the advisory committee's first comprehensive studies was concerned with the
dential level more frequently one can point to Truman musing at midnight with
social consequences of invention: but there were more urgent problems in the 1930s
John Steelman on what the world would be like as a result of the spectacular sci-
and the report vanished into time with barely a trace that it had ever existed. But
entific and technological advances of World War II and to the far-reaching studies
initiated under Roosevelt and Truman. For a different. but equally important, state-
even if the report had reached the Presidential level. it is not likely that the Roosevelt
White House could have done much with it: the Executive Office of the President
ment on the Presidency and the implications of the growing importance of science
had not yet been created and Roosevelt had only a handful of close aides.
and technology. it is possible to turn to Eisenhower. He-as did Roosevelt-some-
Later. as one of the responses to a series of labor-management disputes involving
what belatedly. it seems. developed a keen interest in science and technology. Even
issues of adjustment to technological change in the late 1950s and 1960s, President
194
William G. Wells. Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
195
Kennedy promised to establish a Presidential Commission to determine the impact of
issues that in the long-run will have first-order impact on society's genuine well-
automation and technological change on the economy. On a less than high priority
being.⁸
basis. Congress took a year to enact the legislation and Johnson six months
Widely divergent views have been held, and continue to be held. about the
appoint the members to the National Commission on Technology. Automation and to
Economic Progress.
effects of science and technology on society. These views range from enthusiastic
By the time its report was submitted in 1966 the original reason for the
optimism to despairing pessimism about the future and it seems clear that the
mission's establishment-unemployment-had gone away. President Johnson com-
effects of the contending views will influence public attitudes and government
said, "thank you," and filed away a report which contained 20 major conclusions
decision-making about science and technology. Presidents, their staffs, and
and recommendations ranging across the entire landscape of American life. They
especially those involved with a Presidential science advisory apparatus must be
involved a complex interweaving of scientific and technological factors with
fully conversant with this new dimension of public involvement and its potential
impact.
political. social, legal and economic factors. The Johnson response, while
depressing, should not be a surprise. At the Executive Office level there has been
In recent years. former Presidential Science Advisers Edward E. David, Jr. and Lee
little decision-making machinery which consistently and effectively could bring
A. DuBridge, among others, have clearly articulated the implications of the
together these diverse factors. Thus. with very good reason. the final third of the
growing public involvement in decisions related in some way to science and tech-
commission's report was devoted to the subject of improvements in decision-
nology, although outside the government the most persistent voices have been
making mechanisms in American society. The absence of strategic ways of coping
those of the public interest groups. There is full agreement with William D. Carey,
with overarching issues-such as technological change-at the Presidential level is
who contends that one of the outstanding features of American science and tech-
evident: the requirement to go beyond the ad hoc and the tactical approach is
nology in recent decades is that "they are being secularized as lay publics partici-
pate in negotiating their right uses.
apparent. Indeed, how to do so is considered to be one of the paramount problems
of government today-here and throughout the rest of the world.
This growing public involvement brings one to another significant public policy
The third endeavor-the technology assessment movement-originated in the
aspect of science and technology. A terrible fear in the scientific community of the
Congress in the late 1960s. How this came to be is beyond the scope of this paper
1930s was that becoming involved with the Federal Government and accepting
financial support would lead to political domination of science. This issue is far too
but Congress took action independent of the Executive Branch by establishing an
Office of Technology Assessment in 1972. Moreoever. there has been little interest
complex to be examined in detail and goes far beyond the scope of this paper, but
in technology assessment at the Presidential level in the broad conceptual and
it is clear that large-scale Federal involvement in and support of science and tech-
organizational sense: only in terms of specific issues such as environmental
nology results in major public policy implications which are at the center of science
advice and the Presidency.
pollution and energy environment trade-offs have Presidents and the Executive
Office become involved.
In a broad. general policy sense. science and technology have come under
As a practical matter. science and technology in general have been seen for the
political domination. It must be of concern at the Presidential level-from a public
most part by Presidents as the means to achieve specific political objectives. And
policy point of view-that the Federal government is the largest provider of
there can be no quarrel with this view per se: it is a logical. pragmatic approach to
research and development funds in the world and is engaged in roles as a per-
the decision-making and conflict resolution which comprise much of the substance
former. a manager. as a stimulus and as a policy and direction shaper. And it is true
of the Presidency. However. it is argued that such a view in itself is less than
that Presidents have intervened directly from time to time in making large
adequate for the long-run. A better understanding must be achieved of the impli-
decisions affecting the use of science and technology for what they perceive to be in
the national interest. However, there seems to be no sound basis for the fears of the
cations of this earlier stated crucial point: in a very brief time. science has proved
itself an incredibly powerful revolutionary force.
1930s that politics would take over and decide entirely what science would do. In
practice. the multitude of decisions made every year on what specific research and
development tasks and projects should be undertaken and how they should be con-
ducted are decided by or strongly influenced by the scientific and technological
A More Sustained Effort
communities-within the broad context of general guidelines and budgets
provided by various Federal agencies. Indeed. Presidential intervention more often
While it is possible to take some encouragement from occasional Presidential
than not has been to make decisions to provide more support for basic research.
attention to the broad. philosophicai aspects of science and society. it is argued that
The type of political intervention at the laboratory level which exists in the Soviet
Union does not occur in the United States. Yet. a different kind of intervention
a more sustained effort must be mounted. A major implication for public policy is
that continued growth and development of the United States and the rest of the
may be emerging as a result of various kinds of public and political interest in areas
world requires the adoption of a strategy of maturity for concentration on the vital
where the potential effects of work in the laboratory are perceived as dangerous
(e.g., the recent controversy over recombinant DNA research).
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
197
196
William G. Wells. Jr.
Shifting Patterns
Moreover. since the 1940s. there have been various new organizational mechanisms
within the President's Office and attempts to bring about an improved central
Further, from a public policy perspective. large-scale Federal involvement has led
perspective involving science and technology-not only for the development of
to broad political domination-as noted above-in the sense that an examination
scientific and technological capabilities but also in terms of relating the R&D
of Federal support of R&D reveals a number of shifting patterns which have
efforts of the various agencies to particular social or other national problems that
resulted from decisions by government. And it is argued that. at the Presidential
transcend the mission of a single agency. Such thinking has not led to the develop-
level, these patterns must be analyzed, understood and adjusted when necessary.
ment of a single, comprehensive American science policy: rather, the literature and
For example, from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s the aerospace-defense-
actual practice reflect a "many policies" approach. And arrival of "The Act" in
military-atomic energy sectors dropped relatively while various civil sectors
1976 did not change this situation in any significant way-landmark legislation
increased relatively and absolutely. On the other hand, an important trend from
though it may be.
the mid-1970s has been that defense and energy R&D have accounted for the
largest increases since 1974. These various trends reflect the durability and high
Evolution of Presidential Science Advisory Machinery: Highlights" 12
priority of defense R&D as well as the emergence of new concerns about energy,
world food production, the quality of the environment, the cost and quality of
Despite varying attitudes about science and technology. about concepts of the
health care delivery, inadequate transportation networks. and an entire array of
Presidency, about political philosophies, about Science Advisers. each President
urban and rural problems-and they often reflect the intervention of presidential
from Franklin D. Roosevelt through Jimmy Carter has made important decisions
decisions beginning with the time of Roosevelt. This is not to say that presidential
affecting science and technology and important decisions affected by science and
decisions alone have determined the patterns-far from it. Many factors and forces
technology. In doing so, the Presidents have drawn upon a variety of sources for
are active in influencing not only policy for science but science for policy.
their advice in making decisions. And while Science Advisers have had at various
Congress has increasingly asserted a greater role in every facet of science and
times and for certain issues much influence, they have had no monopoly on
technology; the organizations of the Executive Branch, often in alliance with the
providing science advice.
Congress or outside interests, exert powerful influence: and in certain areas, the
scientific community and industry groups each have played significant roles in
Roosevelt
decisions.
As a result of analysis similar to that presented here, the Congress made a
The halting steps of Bowman and Compton in the mid-1930s to establish some
strenuous effort to place a "strategic tone" in key provisions of the National
kind of science advisory capability-while not a total failure because of the
Science and Technology Policy, Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 (or "The
experience gained for later use-failed because it was not possible to link the
Act''). The underlying purposes were to exert pressure on the Executive Office and
activities of the Science Advisory Board to the President's perceptions of his major
the Executive Branch to devote more attention to thinking ahead and to urge that
political problems in the mid-1930s. In sharp contrast. Roosevelt swiftly saw the
decisions involving the use of science and technology would be considered in the
connection between his objective of military victory during World War II and
broadest possible context. Unfortunately, the Carter Presidency's performance in
Bush's proposals for harnessing science and technology for the war effort.
this respect has been little better, if any, than that of its predecessors.
Moreover. Bush. along with Conant. designed an organization of extraordinary
A Presidential science advisory office generally will do what the President wants
competence which had the flexibility to shift rapidly not only in meeting the needs
it to do. whatever the Congress may have written into law. And this leads to a
of the President but also in exercising independent judgment on military require-
concern related to the lack of attention to strategic thinking and "horizon
ments if the occasion arose. But. on the whole. Bush used this latter power
scanning." In the high pressure environment of the White House. great value is
sparingly and relied on persuasion in working with the military forces. Bush and
placed on rapid responses and "fire fighting" and one fact is quite clear: the high
Conant had finely tuned political sensitivities and chose to work with the President
pressure environment is a function of the Presidency. not only of the President. It is
primarily through Hopkins: in the tough, but delicate. task of working with the
just that the pressure has been higher under some Presidents-for example,
Congress. Bush decided to handle this himself. Perhaps his only major mistake in
Lyndon Johnson-than under others.
the Roosevelt years was to disregard Harold Smith, the formidable Director of the
In concluding this section. it is suggested that a continuous thread can be seen
Bureau of the Budget, who eventually got the upper hand in science policy matters
throughout the decades of writing and public debate and the operations of seven
during the early part of the Truman Presidency. Indeed. it may be argued that the
Presidencies: science both affects public policy and is affected by it. New adminis-
bureau made an institutional decision of far reaching consequence: it would be at
trative devices and organizational approaches have been required with each sub-
the center of science advice in the future, no matter who else was also providing it.
stantial increase in the size and nature (e.g., atomic energy. space exploration.
What could have been a problem with different people turned out well because
energy research and development) of the Federal research and development effort.
Bush and Conant worked well as a team; still, Conant had his own independent
198
William G. Wells. Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
199
relationship with Roosevelt which in one sense was closer than Bush's. Conant
very much the "political" Science Adviser, who was called upon in later years was for
the traditions of scientific freedom from political interference. Bush always thought
far more than science advice. Indeed. he was more politically attuned to both
he had been "poisoned" by Truman's staff-and there was some of this-but the
Roosevelt and Truman than was Bush, and eventually became High Commissioner
fundamental incompatibilities in outlook were far more important in the dissolution
of the German Occupation for Truman.
of the Bush-Truman relationship.
In one sense, it may not be fair to compare Bush with some of those who were
Truman paid a price for not having a strong Science Adviser more compatible
follow him in the task of providing science advice for Presidents; the looming war to
with his political views. Compounding Truman's difficulties. there was little conti-
created special circumstances and the establishment of OSRD was a special case
nuity; Smith and Price left not too long after the war was over and were unable to
that Bush was both an adviser and a manager. Further, Bush made no pretense of in
carry through on their intention to develop a comprehensive plan for the organiz-
advising Roosevelt on any aspect of science not related to the war. On the other
ation of science in the postwar world. A very busy John Steelman, who became
hand. Bush provided the first significant model of a scientist being able to work in
Truman's senior aide, also became a de facto Science Adviser-aided by a young
a highly successful manner at the right hand of a President and he was instrumental
attorney, Byron S. Miller-and took over from Smith and Price as the architect of
in starting a process that has continued with varying success to the present time:
science policy planning for the White House. In this same time period, two young
Presidential science advising.
Bureau of the Budget officials were beginning to become involved in science policy
matters-William D. Carey and Elmer B. Staats-and they would play active roles
until the mid-1960s.
Truman
One result of the acutely fragmented approach to the use of science advice by
The institutionalization of science advice which had begun to evolve under
Truman was that the single most important policy decision affecting postwar sci-
Roosevelt changed rapidly under Truman with the ending of the war. This was not
ence. other than the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. was decided virtually by default:
because Truman was opposed to the use of science advice or did not appreciate the
as the foundation debate dragged on year after year, the military departments and
powerful role that science and technology had played in achieving victory. Indeed,
the National Institutes of Health-in league with the Congress-established the
this was far from being the case: Truman understood far better than did some of
organizations, the funding patterns, and the management policies which set the
his successors the potential of science and technology for remaking the world. But
major outlines of postwar science organization and Federal funding support for
at a time when Truman was in great need of science advice of the very highest
decades into the future. The irony of this situation is that preoccupations of the
calibre. a break appeared in the closeness of the relationship which Bush had main-
Executive Office and the Congress during these years were the fragmentation of
tained with Hopkins and Roosevelt.
research effort and the necessity to achieve an effective system of coordination for
Slowly at first. then more rapidly. communications began to break down be-
Federal research and development. And. well into the 1950s. the Executive Office
tween Truman and Bush-especially after the ending of the war. Political differ-
-under Truman and then Eisenhower-kept trying to get the infant National
ences and disagreements on the organization and administration of science in the
Science Foundation to take on this task. Fortunately. the foundation chose to sur-
post-war world came to the fore. and Bush was eventually shoved aside by Truman's
vive and resisted the mandate given to it by two Presidents and the Congress.
staff Relations did not break in the Nixon sense and Truman was always willing to
Despite the lack of a broad-gauged Presidential Science Adviser and the absence
see Bush whenever the latter asked. but Truman did not ask to see him: they were
of focus which could have been provided by a science advisory apparatus, several
on opposite sides of the major post-war debates on the National Science Foundation
important steps were taken during the Truman period which would have positive
(NSF) and on the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). However. despite their
results in later years. First, the President's Scientific Research Board-headed by
differences. there appears to have remained a great deal of mutual respect between
Steelman-was established in 1946 and eventually produced the "Steelman
the President and his displaced Science Adviser.
Report." This was a wide-ranging political document on national priorities.
Bush never was fired by Truman: in fact. he staved on as part of the official
resource allocations. policies. organization and directions for science and tech-
White House staff for nearly two years after Truman became President. But Harold
nology. All of its recommendations were eventually adopted-including the
Smith and Don Price of the Bureau of the Budget took on for a time the major task
establishment of the NSF. large increases in support of Federal R&D. the creation
of advising the President on post-war science policy and organization. Another key
of an Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Research. the establishment of a
figure-particularly in the atomic energy area-was a young lawver, James R.
unit in the Bureau of the Budget for reviewing federal research and development.
Newman. The principles of public administration. espoused by Smith. Price. and
and the designation of a member of the White House staff for scientific liaison.
Newman. under which the science organizations of the post-war world would be
Along with Bush's report. Science: The Endless Frontier. the seeds were planted for
responsible to the President and not to the scientific community. clearly appealed
much of the institutionalization of science advice and the growth of federal support
to Truman's sense of his constitutional responsibilities as President. Bush on the
of science which would develop in the years to follow.
other hand. was seeking to protect, as had the scientists of the 1930s, science and
Another institutional contribution by Truman came in 1951 as one response to
the outbreak of the Korean War. There had been demands for the creation of a
200
William G. Wells,
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
201
new OSRD; but those who made such demands did not understand that the
More specifically, Waterman (the first NSF Director) properly resisted any ideas
national capability and organization for science was far different in 1950 than it
that the NSF should undertake such major assignments as "developing policy"
had been in 1940. William T. Golden was the author of a report to Truman which
and "evaluating research programs" for all of Federal R&D. It is easy to conclude
recommended the establishment of the position of a Science Adviser to the Presi-
that these tasks were important in the early 1950s and are still important today; but
dent and a Presidentially appointed Science Advisory Committee. and the prepar-
it is also easy to conclude that Eisenhower and Truman before him-both urged by
ation for standby plans to establish an OSRD-type organization. But Golden's
the Bureau of the Budget-were trying to get the wrong organization to do them.
recommendations, though approved by the President, were modified radically and
As an infant organization in the early 1950s, it very likely would have suffered fatal
the end result was the establishment of a Science Advisory Committee placed
injuries: and today, NSF still would be the wrong choice, even though it is now a
within the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).¹²
Under an ill, ineffective chairman (Oliver Buckley), the committee languished
large and relatively powerful agency.
Despite the lack of organizational initiatives by Eisenhower with respect to
unused during the remainder of the Truman Presidency. Communication channels
science advice during his early years. it seems clear enough that he was willing to
to the President, although technically available, were never used by Buckley; he
use a revived Science Advisory Committee under Lee A. DuBridge who replaced
appears not to have taken a very active role and certainly did not wish to take on the
the ailing Buckley. DuBridge and the other members determined to make it a
forceful General Lucius Clay who headed ODM-and who had insisted that the
more active body. After an abortive attempt to escape from ODM, the committee
committee report to him rather than to the President. Apparently, for more
engaged in a number of important investigations which gradually led to a con-
reasons than one, Truman chose not to enter what had become a major juris-
vergence of their work and the interests of the President in certain urgent defense
dictional battle. The National Science Board was just getting started at about this
time in 1951 and strongly opposed the idea of a Science Adviser to the President or
problems. And the Science Advisory Committee-with its panel on Technological
a committee reporting directly to the President. The board saw such moves as
Capabilities headed by James Killian-eventually came together with two outside
downgrading its role and status. Truman was busy with the war and a host of
"gadflys." Trevor Gardner and General Bernard Schriever, to convince Eisenhower
domestic problems and, aside from the jurisdictional squabbling, there seemed
to undertake an acceleration of the ballistic missile program in the mid-1950s.
little that the committee could do for him; thus, once again, the situation of the
However, this process had required several years to force the ballistic missile
1930s appeared. There was no apparent identity of interest between the committee
decision to the Presidential level. And as a result of a combination of Executive
and the President, so he did not use it. Furthermore, Buckley's approach was
Office timidity and a lack of comprehension of the potential of space, Eisenhower
passive-he saw his role as waiting until the President asked for something to be
was persuaded-over the objections of Nelson Rockefeller, at the time a White
done; this was a far cry from the forceful Bush approaching Roosevelt saying this is
House aide, and a number of leading scientists-to approve only a very modest US
what the scientific community can do for you and the country.
civilian space effort for the 1957 IGY. It is argued that the presence of a strong
And the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Research-launched with
Presidential Science Adviser might have had some effect. first. in bringing the
high hopes in 1947-remained nearly invisible instead of becoming an effective
ballistic missile decision to the White House earlier and. second. in convincing
tool in assisting the Executive Office to manage the far-flung research and develop-
Eisenhower to place a higher priority on the IGY satellite.
ment establishment. Not until 1959. in the post-Sputnik crisis, would the com-
At the time of Sputnik, Eisenhower reacted swiftlv-but not in panic. Among
mittee be pulled from obscurity and be re-established as the Federal Council for
his first steps were to appoint Killian as his Special Assistant for Science and Tech-
Science and Technology. Despite the repeated urgings of individuals such as Carey
nology and to elevate the Science Advisory Committee from the ODM to be the
for greater attention to the problem of managing and coordinating the Federal
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).14 As noted above, in 1959 the
R&D program at the Executive Office level. most of the administrative and
Federal Council for Science and Technology was established. Direct communi-
organizational measures of the 1940s and 1950s were dismal failures or met with
cation channels were established between Eisenhower and his Science Advisers as
very limited success. And the end of the Korean War removed the urgency from
the President took personal charge of the national response to Sputnik-and a close
such matters and there was little inclination in the early Eisenhower years to under-
rapport developed between them. Thus. with the exception of one major change
take any major steps in the direction of further institutionalization of science advice
by Kennedy-the establishment of OST-Eisenhower finished the work started by
at the Presidential level.
Roosevelt and Truman by putting into the Executive Office the basic components of
a science advisory structure which would last for nearly 15 more years. Despite the
Eisenhower
achievement. one is left with this general criticism: more often than not. the nation
The President did. however. express interest in better management and coordi-
reacts in an ad hoc tactical way rather than in a strategic manner. Eisenhower
nation of Federal R&D and, at the urging of the Bureau of the Budget. attempted
himself later reflected that he underestimated the impact of Sputnik and its after-
to give the task to the National Science Foundation. But this did not work out.
math. It is argued that the shock of Sputnik and the charge of a "missile gap" may
well have cost the Republicans the 1960 election.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
203
202
William G. Wells. Jr.
Kennedy
Killian and Kistiakowsky were similar to Bush in that each of them came to the
White House when there was a strongly perceived need for their services by Presi-
The arrival of Kennedy in the White House brought many changes-but not the
dent Eisenhower. The emergency was not as acute as that which had faced
one that Eisenhower had been concerned about (i.e., that the position of Special
Roosevelt, but Eisenhower was experiencing severe political problems over space
Assistant for Science and Technology would not be continued by his successor).
and various military matters following the national state of shock after Sputnik. Al-
Indeed, Kennedy embraced the entire apparatus which had been constructed over
though Eisenhower had placed high value on science and technology in the earlier
the years by Truman and Eisenhower and, working with the Congress, gave it an
years of his Presidency, it was not until highly visible political problems crashed
even more powerful mandate than it had held under Eisenhower.
about him that he fully embraced science and technology as instruments of
From the very beginning of his Presidency, Kennedy saw that science and tech-
national policy. And Killian and Kistiakowsky, each in his own way, responded to
nology were important instruments of national policy which could contribute to
and assisted the President in ways that he and his senior staff considered
the solution of critical national problems. And he was acutely aware of the political
important.
power available to him and the international prestige potentially available in the
Killian and Kistiakowsky were similar to Bush in another way; they had a great
space program. While science advice was an element in Kennedy's thinking, the
deal of influence in the White House and throughout the government because of
Apollo decision was made on political grounds. And while he worried about the
their close connection with the President, although they consciously stayed away
cost of the program, it did not deter him as it had Eisenhower and Kistiakowsky.
from any attempt to "manage" any of the space and military programs under their
The Apollo decision and his deep involvement in negotiating the Limited
purview. Furthermore. they-and especially Killian-went out of their way to
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty underscore Kennedy's style in reaching out in all direc-
work with and through other individuals in the White House even though each of
tions for advice. While most Presidents have been disinclined to tie themselves to a
them had easy access to the President. Another factor which provided under-
single source of advice, Kennedy was more like Roosevelt than, say, Truman, Eisen-
pinning for the high degree of influence and power held by Killian and Kisti-
hower, or Nixon in his insatiable need for information and advice from a variety of
akowsky-as for Bush and Conant earlier and Wiesner later-was that all five of
sources. Indeed. Wiesner saw this as an important part of his responsibility to
the individuals were "old Washington hands" and understood the political aspects
Kennedy and played an active role in insuring that Kennedy was exposed to all
of science advising. By virtue of their long Washington service and outstanding
sides of a problem-and did not appear to be threatened if the President heard advice
records. each of the five had an independent standing in the White House which
which differed from his own.
put them on a peer basis with their respective Presidents' principal assistants.
Clearly a mature and experienced Science Adviser must accept that Presidential
Again putting Bush, Conant. Killian, Kistiakowsky and Wiesner together. it
advisers ply their trade in the highly competitive arena of palace politics-a compe-
would seem that each had. in his own special wav, a close relationship with his
tition which centers on the giving of advice. One of DuBridge's failures was that.
President. This is not mean to convey "closeness" in the sense of friendship. It is
notwithstanding his Washington experience and long years as president of a major
intended to mean that they were part of the inner circle of Presidential advisers
university. he seemed not to understand this important characteristic of White
who have that commodity so precious in the White House-the ability to influence
House life-or chose not to play the game. And the record of the Johnson Presi-
Presidential decision making. Indeed, in no instance was a Presidential Science
dency suggests that Hornig philosophically accepted a secondary role in the White
Adviser part of the President's social circle of friends-except perhaps Conant in
House power structure. Finally, David understood very clearly the power realities in
his relationship with Roosevelt.
the Nixon White House and attempted to reverse the slide downward in influence
The strong roles performed by Bush and Conant for Roosevelt were entirely in
of the science advisory apparatus-but it was already too late by the time he arrived
keeping with Roosevelt's view of the Presidency and the role of the White House
on the scene.
staff in becoming involved in the affairs of the departments and agencies. Not
In the giving-of-advice competition even such towering figures as Bush and
until the time of Kennedy would such an approach be followed again. In contrast.
Conant had to accept Roosevelt's disagreement with them on the matter of sharing
Eisenhower was very disinclined to intervene except on very special occasions when
atomic secrets with Great Britain after they had vigorously pursued their point of
he had a deep interest such as the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. Therefore. Killian
view. The occasional disagreement. especially over fundamental issues such as the
and Kistiakowsky. as noted above. while exercising strong influence on agency pro-
atomic argument. is in the nature of things at the White House level. It is only
grams and budgets. did so by working behind the scenes with the Bureau of the
when the disagreements become and remain persistent and deep-such as with
Budget and department and agency heads. Working with a small staff and PSAC.
Bush and Truman and between Nixon and PSAC-that the advisory arrangement
neither of the two nor the President was interested in pushing the institutional-
becomes untenable. Also, a measure of maturity and responsibility on the part of a
ization too far. Eisenhower did worry, however. that the science advisory role might
President and his senior aides is required in dealing with differing points of view
vanish at the end of his Presidency.
from Science Advisers. And the record and actions of the Johnson and Nixon Presi-
204
William G. Wells,
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
205
compatibility dencies are less of than admirable on this score. It is one thing to suggest that
absolute views is important but it is quite another to demand and general expect
science and technology-perhaps more important than the organizational changes
Not agreement with the political views of the President on every issue.
-the Kennedy Executive Office-including Wiesner, as earlier noted-was very
only were Kennedy and Roosevelt able to handle dissent, their
much inclined to pick up the reins of control for a sprawling scientific and techno-
Eisenhower styles inevitably created it. And Kennedy was much more activist-oriented operating
logical establishment which no other agency could safely grasp-and to look
House before him or Johnson and Nixon afterward; as a result his than
beyond the horizon to new areas such as energy and natural resources. The
ations and staff-including Science Adviser Jerome Wiesner-plunged into the White
presence of a "central scientific organization" at the Presidential level became
control of the management of the Executive Branch. Kennedy was determined to oper-
more broadly apparent than during any period since the days of Bush in World
intent bureaucracy and developed a powerful White House staff with gain
War II; and to the present time no science advisory apparatus has had such visi-
nection. to do so. Wiesner's close relationship to Kennedy, based on their prior the
bility and status.
soon for clear that in many areas related to science and technology, it
became put him in the inner circle of Kennedy's advisers. And in Washington con-
Kennedy has been called a truly modern man and his vision and outlook made it
easy to understand the products and uses of science and technology; and
criticized no inconsiderable amount of power, and Wiesner was both admired fact
invokes spoke the President." The nature of Washington is such that this simple "Wiesner
important, too, was that he understood the social significance of science and tech-
nology. It was-Kennedy who initiated what would become the Commission on
for exercising it. Bush had held a similar power under Roosevelt and and
Technology, Automation and Economic Progress as one of the very few efforts at
diminished "speak for Johnson.' nor did DuBridge and David "speak for Nixon;" not
too, provoked criticism as well as admiration. In stark contrast, Hornig did he,
the Presidential level to cope with such broad issues as technological change. It was
Kennedy's conviction that science provided vast powers for good, and this led to
power and influence of the science advisory machinery in the years and after the
much of his hopefulness about the future. He was forever pressing to put tech-
Kennedy reflected these simple facts.
nology to work: in foreign affairs: for helping other nations (an idea that he had
The consistent Kennedy style of making a vigorous effort to take charge of the bureaucracy
inherited directly from Truman); for insuring national security (in which he
the was with a major advance in the institutionalization of science advice
followed directly in Truman's and Eisenhower's footsteps); and, in seeking
Wiesner White House level. Responding to Congressional initiative, Kennedy at
solutions to major domestic problems. he looked to science for clues.
Presidential were very receptive to a proposal by Senator Henry Jackson to provide and
While new dimensions were added to the science advisory function during the
the science advisory function with a statutory underpinning. By the
Kennedy years for dealing with problems of energy and the environment, civilian
several to establishment of the Office of Science and Technology, Kennedy achieved agreeing
technology. natural resources, water resources, and food and nutrition, the
future -although future events would show that this action did not guarantee either
objectives: first, the science advisory function was further institutionalized
Kennedy science advisory apparatus under Wiesner sustained the high level of
involvement in arms control, space and military problems that had been the case
use or its continuance and that unforeseen problems were created: its
under Eisenhower. Since the major contributions were in the latter categories, it
and pressures from some in the Congress and elsewhere for a Department of second. Science
must be recognized that the new dimensions and new initiatives were only
Technology real were greatly reduced: and third. and very important. one of the
beginnings. However. they represented the beginnings of significant change in the
Executive very and very legitimate grievances of Congress-lack of access to a
agenda facing the apparatus; also. they represented the beginning of change in the
national Office official for matters concerning science and technology and top
nature of the advisory function as the new dimensions brought new complexity
science policy-was removed.
which, it turned out eventually, the science advisory machineries of later Presi-
Thus, with the establishment of the Office of Science and Technology. a
dencies were not able to handle very effectively.
dimension of institution building for Presidential science advice was added new
When Johnson inherited the Presidency, a watershed was crossed in terms of
and Kennedy to the structure and process built incrementally by Roosevelt. by
science advice and the Presidency and the use and influence of the science advisory
further Eisenhower. In terms of structure. the institutionalization was completed Truman, and
apparatus. A decline began regarding both use and influence of the apparatus and
in no changes would be made until the Nixon banishment of 1973: however.
the individuals who served as Science Advisers. Whereas Bush. Conant, Killian.
later. Kennedy. Johnson and even the Nixon years. There is more to be said during about this
terms of process. the institutionalization continued to develop the
Kistiakowsky, and Wiesner were in the inner circles of their respective Presidents
and were essentially on a peer basis with senior White House aides, the situation
changed dramatically under Donald Hornig and his successors Lee DuBridge,
The concerns of Truman and Eisenhower about foreign affairs and
Edward David, and H. Guvford Stever.
but carried forward into the Kennedy Presidency as major, if not dominant, peace were
added were new dimensions related to energy, the environment, concerns; natural
Johnson
mantle resources. and a plethora of social issues-as Kennedy picked the domestic
Frontier worn by Roosevelt and Truman and constructed the programs up of the New
As a political outsider both to Johnson and to Washington, Hornig definitely was
on the building blocks of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. With respect to
not in the inner circle of Johnson's advisers, and was not able to play in the same
league as had his predecessors. Without doubt, Hornig was not a peer of such top
206
William G. Wells.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
207
alliance aides as Bundy, Rostow and Califano; moreover, Hornig did not have an effective
been Adviser. Hornig's relatively low status in the White House could Johnson's not
Science with any of Johnson's top staff over the five years he served as
standing the fact that it was privately, not publicly, expressed. But PSAC came to
be viewed as the embodiment of the academic world's violent and vocal opposition
The a positive influence on the important process of Presidential decision have
to Johnson's (and later Nixon's) war policies. Other factors were at work, too, such
Presidential agenda, while inherited in large part from Kennedy, began making.
as the variety of PSAC's work in diverse fields, and there was much less direct
change under Johnson as he attempted to carry out both the programs of his to
contact with the President. But the war was the crucial factor in the breakdown of a
the Society and to conduct an increasingly major war in Vietnam. While the record Great
long-standing relationship. Inevitably, in combination with the continuing deteri-
understanding of science and technology, it was also a period when R&D
Johnson years suggests a President who expressed support and a sophisticated of
oration of the PSAC relationship with Nixon. this raises the large issue of how
science advice is to be provided if basic political differences are present, and not solely
came be to a virtual halt. It was inevitable that the growth rates of earlier years growth
those related to scientific and technological issues. At the end of the Johnson Presi-
and not sustained. but in what was probably an over-reaction. Congress. Johnson- could
dency. indeed. even to the present time, no good answer has been found to this
Nixon after him-held essentially to a no-growth policy for the rest of
fundamental issue.
1966, 1960s. Johnson placed a very high priority on his Great Society programs and, the by
An apparently unanticipated, but important, result of the establishment of OST
Vietnam began to be a major drain on national resources.
by the Congress and Kennedy was that the Presidential science advisory machinery
This increased only 10% during the Johnson years. basic research increased by
Yet, in the face of such obstacles. while the total Federal R&D allocation
increasingly and inescapably became more institutionalized. In certain respects,
the apparatus took on more and more of the characteristics of a central scientific
indicates kind of anomaly suggests some policy selectivity on the part of Johnson 50%. and
organization-although not as visibly as under Wiesner. The range of problems
that Hornig had a degree of influence. But exerting influence at the Presi-
expanded dramatically, staff was increased and new coordination and evaluation
dential level on behalf of basic research-which was nothing new from the 1940s
functions were performed that had nothing to do with providing science advice to
in onward-would increasingly be seen in the future as performing an advocacy role
the President. While an "institutionalized memory and capability" are important
the White House for science: during the Nixon years it would translate into the
to assist the President, dangers and problems accompanied the increasing insti-
"kiss of death.' Despite the halt in budget increases. Johnson (as had Kennedy)
tutionalization.
was continually pushing to put science and technology to work: in international
In solving one problem-being accessible to the Congress-another one was
cooperation, in health. in environmental quality. in natural resources. and in other
created: requirements to appear before the Congress were extensive and there was
domestic areas. In most of his statements related to science and technology, there
less time to spend on providing advice to the President and working on the prob-
are echoes of the Great Society. but. despite the social sciences' function the
lems which were important to Johnson. and later to Nixon. Also, the requirements
basis of most of the Great Society programs. there is little indication of effective as
for coordination and evaluation placed upon OST by the Congress and accepted by
science advice being provided at the Presidential level in connection with the social
Kennedy in 1962 led to the establishment of an active bureaucracy in the Executive
sciences. or any aspect of the Great Society.
Office which Hornig admitted was difficult to control and manage, along with his
While Kennedy had sought science advice widely. he was inclined have
many other responsibilities. By the time David arrived on the scene in mid-19-0.
Wiesner help him seek out a variety of sources: in contrast. Johnson seems to have
the all-important relationship with the Office of Management and Budget had
have simply ignored Hornig on a number of major issues which one might reasonably to
virtually disintegrated. and one of David's first priorities was to restructure OST
expected a science adviser to perform at least some role: the SST. health
and re-establish working arrangements with OMB.
and research. and the automation-unemployment issue. On the other hand.
Another implication of the growing institutionalization of the science advisory
PSAC played prominent roles in the years that Johnson sought to Hornig delay
machine under Johnson and Nixon was that more and more of its work took place
view development and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. Yet. as an
out of sight of the President and his top aides: in short. beginning in the Johnson
comparison. Hornig definitely did not have the prominent role held by over- Bush
years and continuing into the Nixon years. the apparatus was not seen as being
Wiesner in other national security matters.
ignored on Vietman-nor did he have the influence of Killian. Kistiakowsky, and
under Roosevelt in large strategic matters-and for the most part Hornig was
responsive to the President's needs. Thus. one encounters the ironic situation in
which the science advisory apparatus had become engaged extensively in activities
related to management and coordination of the Federal R&D establishment which
Johnson PSAC's and PSAC and very likely this had no small effect on Hornig. Despite
An important casualty of the Vietnam War was the relationship between
had been so highly desired by Truman. Eisenhower. Kennedy, and the Congress,
only to find itself perceived as not being helpful first to Johnson, and later to
and contributions the in two areas high on the President's agenda (environmental quality
role in the anti-ballistic missile debate (referred to above) and major
Nixon.
Even so, the Congress was not entirely satisfied with the attention given by
world food problem), the relationship between PSAC and the President
Johnson's Executive Office and his science advisory apparatus to a variety of areas.
deteriorated as the war continued and PSAC's opposition increased-notwith-
Beginning in the mid-1960s. Congress became quite involved with various science
policy issues and moved to organize itself more effectively for dealing with science
208
William G. Wells, Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
209
and technology. Hence, Congress became increasingly confident about initiating
dency in problems important to the President: environmental quality (including a
actions when it did not think the administration was performing effectively. A case
major oil spill in California for which Nixon very publicly made a show of giving
in point is the marine sciences: Congress established two separate "science
DuBridge responsibility for reviewing the situation and recommending corrective
advisory" organizations to carry out its mandate because it did not believe that the
actions), the earlier noted Nixon decision on chemical and biological warfare. and
Federal Council for Science and Technology was giving the field proper attention.
the SST.
In effect, the science advisory apparatus was being pressed to do more by the
Unfortunately, initially DuBridge was on the "wrong" side of the SST issue and
Congress along the lines of managing the Federal R&D enterprise at the same time
was opposed to proceeding; subsequently he went to Congress to defend the Presi-
that the President and his senior aides saw it as less helpful in working on their
dent's decision to go ahead. citing, in response to criticism about his earlier views,
problems. Hornig has seen the dilemma more clearly in retrospect but already had
that the President has the total responsibility for a decision while an adviser, as in
begun to think out loud about what should be done about it not long before he
his case, provides only one perspective. But the Nixon White House was not a place
left office. For example, he called tentatively for a new look at a Department of
for dissent-even when it was private, and, when the initial opposition of
Science and Technology. This analysis of the problems of institutionalization is
DuBridge and PSAC became public knowledge (long after the Congress had voted
connected directly to a general analysis of the problems of mixing advisory and
to cancel the program), this was the beginning of the end.
management functions within the Presidential science advisory apparatus at the
More than one individual has voiced the opinion that the DuBridge period
Presidential level (to be discussed later).
actually marked the beginning of the end for a science advisory apparatus in the
Nixon White House. There is good reason to believe that the position of Science
Nixon
Adviser and the associated apparatus would have been abolished upon DuBridge's
departure-if it had been judged politically feasible. But, in 1970-before the
At the beginning of his Presidency, it appeared that Nixon would raise the science
overwhelming 1972 victory-Nixon was still concerned politically about the
advisory apparatus to the former influential status that it enjoyed under Eisen-
academic community and the uproar which such an action would provoke.
hower and Kennedy. Among his very first appointments was DuBridge and among
Before the end came, the President made what was an apparent attempt to
his first press conferences was one devoted to extolling science and DuBridge.
change the nature of the advisory apparatus and, more specifically, the nature of
DuBridge had outstanding credentials: a brilliant record of public service
the role of Science Adviser to the President. The appointment of David. an engi-
extending back to World War II, long service as president of one of the country's
neer from industry, caused no small surprise. Despite his outstanding credentials as
leading universities, and high standing in the scientific community.
a manager, scientist, and engineer. he was not well known in Washington and
But things did not work out. First, as pointed out earlier, DuBridge seemed not
represented a break in the links with the past; he was not a member or protege of
to appreciate the nature of the White House political arena; moreover, he simply
the fairly small group that had dominated the upper levels of government science
was "too nice" to be a member of the Nixon White House. In this respect. he was
advice since 1940. At David's swearing-in ceremony. Nixon gave an indication of
similar to Hornig, who was a "Mr. Nice Guy" in the Johnson White House. One is
just what kind of change he had in mind for the science advisory function: he
forced to the conclusion that both lacked a certain inner toughness which is
expressed strong emphasis on the applications of science and technology and
required of anyone who plays on the "first team" in the White House. While both
referred to David as "a very practical man." Indirectly, Nixon was making it plain
are good. decent men. and performed creditably under trying circumstances. they
that he had had more than enough of the antagonistic scientific community and its
were not very effective in the ferocious competition in the White House which
advocacy of more and more support for basic research. Ironically, David turned out
centers on the giving of advice. Inevitably, DuBridge, as had been the case with
to be a strong supporter of basic research and was successful in arguing for limited
Hornig, was increasingly seen-along with his staff-as being outside the main
increases.
stream and. therefore. as somewhat irrelevant to the principal business of the
David had no personal relationship with the President and dealt primarily with
White House and the President.
Ehrlichman and Kissinger-although occasionally he had access to Nixon when he
DuBridge was the essence of integrity but nevertheless became increasingly in-
thought it sufficiently important. as on such issues as nuclear proliferation, or
effective as time passed. The alienation which took place was due in part to his not
when the President was particularly interested. as on health policy matters and
understanding how the White House worked. to decreasing Presidential access, to
environmental health. The lack of close communications with the President did not
not developing alliances; however. probably as important as all of these factors
deter the energetic David from trying to make the science advisory apparatus work.
combined was that he came to be seen by Nixon and his senior aides as the "repre-
For example, he took swift action-as noted earlier-in repairing relationships
sentative of science." And. as was noted earlier, in the "them-against-us" psy-
with the Office of Management and Budget which was working on the President's
chology of the Nixon White House, this was a fatal perception for DuBridge.
problems. Also. he set out to establish better working arrangements with Ehrlich-
This perception developed on the part of the President and his aides. despite the
man and Kissinger on domestic and national security matters, respectively.
fact that DuBridge was actively involved from the early days of the Nixon Presi-
There seems to be little doubt that David had the inner toughness lacked by
210
William G. Wells.Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
211
DuBridge and Hornig, and, while he did not achieve peer status with Ehrlichman
and Kissinger. he was able to work with them without being intimidated. More-
when decisions were being made that could affect the nation for decades to come.
over, as suggested above. to the extent that any Science Adviser would have been
Roy Ash's theories of management and organization turned out to be of little use
able to communicate with Nixon, David apparently was able to get through when
-perhaps because Ash and his council never really understood an important
necessary. But the tragedy of David's service was that as hard as he tried to turn
characteristic of Presidential decision making: in the public sector the problems are
things around, in all likelihood by the time he arrived (as suggested earlier) it had
fundamentally political and not managerial.
already been decided by Nixon and some of his top aides that the science advisory
It is possible, only possible, despite the increasing paralysis brought on by
apparatus would go after the 1972 elections.
Watergate, that the effects of the ludicrous "revolving door operation of energy
By the early 1970s. Nixon and his top advisers were not really interested in
czars" and the associated "crisis policy making" could have been moderated by
whether or not the science advisory apparatus was performing effectively-and the
the presence of a science advisory capability which had a sense of continuity. history
record shows that David, as well as DuBridge before him, turned in performances
and the politics of the energy area. The science advisory apparatus had been active
that by any objective evaluation would be considered effective in an institutional
in the energy area since the days of Wiesner. but had not been successful in trans-
sense. However, objective evaluations were not what the President had in mind
lating their projections of coming energy problems into action at the presidential
and the studies performed by the Domestic Council and OMB on the value and
level. At least one result of the energy "shambles" in the Nixon White House was
effectiveness of OST and the rest of the science advisory apparatus must be taken
that Congress virtually took away the overall problem of energy organization from
with some skepticism-given the barely concealed hostility of the President and his
the President-including the establishment of the Energy Research and Develop-
senior aides to PSAC and OST. And apparently they were so unaware of the
ment Administration (ERDA).
Federal Council in Science and Technology that it escaped the Nixon "axe" quite
This brings one to an important point about Presidential advising, including
by accident.
advising about science: in large part, Presidents determine the range and quality of
The scientific community, with its strong opposition to the war policies in
the advice they get. A President cannot be forced to take advice-on science or any
Vietnam, and its personification in the form of PSAC, came to be seen. as had
other matter-unless he wants it. On the other hand, in a number of ways, the
been the situation with Johnson to a lesser degree. as the "enemy within." On too
science advisory apparatus of the Nixon White House was not successful; for
many issues, as seen by the President and his senior aides, PSAC opposed the Presi-
example. it seems not to have had a finely-tuned political sensitivity to its environ-
dent. But beyond the opposition, PSAC had become anathema to the Nixon
ment and there were some very real deficiencies in its operations and performance
White House because its opposition on at least two major issues considered vital to
-above and beyond the misperceptions of the President and his top aides.
the President-the SST and the ABM-had become public information. This
After more than a decade of grappling with civilian-oriented problems in the
exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship and permanently damaged the
domestic field. the performance of the apparatus was very mixed and. except in a
relationship between Nixon and his science advisorv apparatus.
few areas such as energy. there was relatively little quality thinking to show for the
The record of the Nixon Presidency is not one that shows the President hostile to
effort. Also, it is important that not only the Science Adviser have good working
science and technology per se. even though he came to hold a hostile attitude
relationships with senior aides but also the staff of the science advisory machinery
toward the scientific community and, hence. his own science advisory apparatus.
have effective working contacts at the mid- and lower-levels of the Executive Office
The evidence suggests he simply was not interested and did not have a very deep
and White House staffs: unfortunately, this was not the case-until David arrived
comprehension of the role of science and technology in modern life: his attention
and attempted to change the situation.
After the abolishment of OST and PSAC and the transfer of certain residual
could be captured only by the occasional technological spectacular such as the SST.
functions to Stever as Director of the National Science Foundation. the science
the cancer crusade. and Magruder's proposed New Technological Opportunities
Program. Even in the vital field of energy. he was not much interested in the
advisory apparatus and the science advisory function at the Presidential level was
important preliminary work accomplished for him bv David before the energy crisis
placed in virtually a caretaker status. In turning to Stever. it is concluded that he
struck: and then the President leaped unknowledgeably. based on idiotic political
did what was possible: he sized up the political realities and performed in a greatly
advice. to such nonsense as "Project Independence" by 1980.
truncated science advisory role by making the best of a difficult situation. He was
It is somewhat ironic that Nixon abolished his science advisory apparatus at just
under no illusions that he was to perform in the conventional Science Adviser's role
the time when it perhaps could have helped him and the White House staff cope
of the preceding 15 years. Therefore. he did his job and publicly defended the
President's decision as does any official who wishes to stay. Finally. he took the
more capably with energy problems which were crashing all about them in early
1973 like boulders from a mountain slide. It is argued. as it was argued in the case
necessary steps to preserve a Presidential science advisory capability for such future
of Truman in the science organization debates of the 1940s, that Nixon impaired
use as it might be called upon to perform. In the meantime, he focused on re-
his own effectiveness and that of the administration by not having a strong, stable,
establishing relationships with OMB, in developing an expanded capability for the
full-time science advisory capability in the Executive office during a critical period
Federal Council for Science and Technology. and in providing a center for energy
R&D programs and policy.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Roosevelt to Ford
213
*212
William G. Wells. Jr.
Ford
tution building, including that at the Executive Office level, the joint, but not
After Nixon's departure, Gerald R. Ford came to the Presidency with a signifi-
always harmonious, efforts of the President and the Congress were highly
cantly different outlook on a large number of issues-including science and tech-
important.
Even as the Ford Presidency was ending, there was taking place a new beginning
nology and science advice. As President, Ford displayed a well-developed sense of
for the support of science and technology and for the re-establishment of a presi-
using science and technology in achieving national goals. He may not have had
dential science advisory apparatus. During the short and troubled Ford years, one
Kennedy's intellectual fascination with science, but he was equal to Kennedy in
could well have expected the affairs of science to take a back seat. Norwithstanding
every way that really counted with respect to science and technology: accessibility to
the fact that Ford's main problems were restoring confidence in the Presidency,
a wide variety of views, strong support of R&D budgets (especially basic research), a
coping with inflation and a stumbling economy, and searching for an appropriate
feeling of ease in dealing with scientists and engineers, and receptivity to science
energy policy for the nation. Ford turned out to be not only a good friend of
advice.
science but also developed a long view of the future and of the role that science and
In another way he was very similar to Kennedy: he was highly receptive to
technology would play in shaping the world.¹³
working cooperatively with the Congress to modify the Presidential science advisory
apparatus which had been placed in the NSF by Nixon. The initiative for change
Observations and Conclusions
may have originated in the Congress-as it did in the Kennedy Presidency-but
Ford soon took over the initiative as "his proposal." One major difference in
A major conclusion is that there is a close and intimate connection between expert
Ford's Presidency from Kennedy's was the receptivity of their respective staffs to
knowledge and political power as revealed in the science advisory function. Not-
working with a science advisory apparatus. Ford, and Vice President Rockefeller,
withstanding periods when Science Advisers and their advice were ignored or were
had to cope with strong opposition-and even some hostility-on the matter of re-
assigned secondary status in the processes of Presidential decision making, this
establishing a science advisory apparatus in the White House. And after it was in
broad sweep of seven Presidencies and nearly five decades demonstrates that
place, there was no Hopkins, no Steelman, no Cutler, no Bundy who could serve
science advice at the Presidential level has been an extremely important feature of
either as an intellectual or administrative coupling for science advice to the Presi-
the modern Presidency. From Roosevelt's decision to develop the atomic bomb to
dent. In the absence of such couplings, except that through OMB, it was fortunate
Ford's far more complicated problem of proposing an appropriate mix of energy
for Stever that Ford's operating style and staff system permitted a high degree of
R&D strategies, Presidential Science Advisers have performed in significant roles.
accessibility.
In varying degrees, Presidential science advice has affected or influenced a great
A very positive aspect of the Ford Presidency is that Ford did not think about
variety of Presidential decisions-in war and in peace, on budgets and
providing support of science and technology in terms of mollifying the scientific
organizations, on domestic and international problems.
community-in the sense that Johnson and Nixon had considered the absence or
However. it also is suggested that the far greater number of the problems and
presence of political support or opposition. And whereas Nixon had expressed
issues which confronted Presidents Roosevelt through Ford were either not directly
himself on occasion in strategic policy terms under David's influence. he acted
involved with science and technology or the degree to which science and technology
strictly in an ad hoc manner or not at all. In contrast. by the end of his Presidency,
were involved was seldom clear. As one moves from problems which involve the
Ford was beginning to think "strategic" and make plans for using science and
physical sciences-for example. the decisions to develop the atomic bomb and the
technology in terms of linking investment in R&D with the future achievement of
H-bomb-to programs arising from the social sciences-the New Deal, the Fair
great long-term national goals. This was no small achievement on the part of the
Deal. the New Frontier. and the Great Society-the scientific and technological
President and he was assisted by an effective working alliance between Stever and
content in Presidential decisions has not been perceived at all or has been assigned
OMB.
minimal weight. This is consistent with observations that the great social and
From time to time. Ford spent a considerable amount of time personally on the
political changes underway in the world, largely in response to the impact of
matter of science advice and the Presidency. His work with the Congress in bring-
science and technology. are not really understood. Moreover. the presidential
ing about enactment of "The National Science and Technology Policy,
science advisory apparatus-from Roosevelt to Ford-was not well equipped to
Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976" represents a detailed example of how
deal with or understand problems of this kind, despite their great importance.
joint Presidential-Congressional lawmaking-particularly in the area of science and
As newly-emerging societal problems moved onto the Presidential agenda and
technology-has become institutionalized during the past several decades. Ford's
that of the science advisory apparatus in the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy
approach was directly descended from the work of Truman, Eisenhower. and
years, it was not as clear-as it was in national security and space matters-just how
Kennedy in building the great postwar science and technology organizational
science advice could perform an effective role. This difficulty persisted throughout
establishment in the United States in the form of new agencies and developing new
the remaining years covered by this paper. Another important point is the absence
capabilities in existing departments and agencies. Through the decades of insti-
of a crisis in problems such as energy and the environment in the early 1960s. say,
'214
William G. Wells,
in comparison with the military crisis of the 1940s, and the space and military crises
environment debates of the 1970s. The closer a President comes to perceiving some
of the late 1950s. Clearly the agenda of the Presidential science advisory machinery
facet of science and technology as being related to the national interest, the more
has changed over the years and former Science Advisers are even today troubled by
likely political considerations will become important and make the task of a
the difficulties in mobilizing the government to cope with the new societal
science advisory apparatus more difficult.
problems.
The formal Presidential science advisory apparatus has not had a monopoly on
Some are pessimistic enough to believe that even with a crisis it may not be
providing science advice. In many respects the Office of Management and Budget
possible to do anything about some of these problems. While an entirely pessi-
(and formerly the Bureau of the Budget) has been more influential than the actual
mistic view is not endorsed, there is agreement that there is substantial cause for
science advisory apparatus. Other important sources of science advice have been the
concern; it arises from the fact that a high degree of political uncertainty and deep
departments and agencies, with the degree of influence varying according to the
divisions of attitude pervade socio-technology. In short, much of the growing
nature of the issue and the style of a particular President. Still other sources
complexity encountered by the Presidency and a series of science advisory
include individuals and organizations outside of the government. This suggests
machineries arises from an increasingly intricate involvement of science and tech-
that a Presidential science advisory machinery must be capable of both cooperating
nology with political and social processes. Major implications for the future are that
and competing with these other sources of science advice; in doing so, it needs to
Presidential science advisory machinery will be required to engage in far more
be concerned with establishing its credibility and reputation by being responsive to
sophisticated analysis than was required in the past. Implicit in this growing
the needs of the President and his principal aides.
involvement with social and political processes is the necessity for the Executive
The lack of a monopoly on providing science advice by the Presidential science
Office to develop better capabilities for interweaving scientific, technical, legal,
advisory machinery is directly related to a general conclusion about the establish-
social, economic. and political factors. How to perform this interweaving process
ment of national policy with respect to science and technology both in the policy
effectively is a major problem facing the Presidency.
for science and the science for policy senses. A science advisory apparatus poten-
The social sciences virtually have been ignored at the Presidential level since the
tially can have an important influence as policy is established through Presidential
time of Roosevelt although a few limited endeavors were undertaken over the
statements, messages and budgets. Numerous examples are available. However, a
years. While PSAC published four or five reports related to the social sciences, and
more general responsibility for a science advisory apparatus is to comprehend and
many New Frontier and Great Society programs were based on the social sciences,
be prepared to react to the emerging of policies from the clash of ideas in the con-
there is little evidence of science advice regarding the social sciences being provided
gressional arena in which various factions have allies-in and out of government:
on any regular, sustained basis by the Presidential science advisory machinery. In
and it must be understood that there are complex interactions between various
fact, it was not until 1968 that a social scientist (Herbert Simon) was appointed to
parts of the government with different elements of the academic, scientific. and
PSAC: a general feeling about the social sciences and social scientists was expressed
technical communities which over the years have resulted in an elaborate network
by one former science adviser: "They haven't discovered their Newton's Laws yet.'
of policies.
Only after the science advisory apparatus had been moved to the National Science
This leads to a conclusion that one must consider the respective powers and roles
Foundation in 1973 did a svstematic study of what was happening in the social
of the Presidency and the Congress in considering and establishing national science
sciences get underway during the Ford Presidency. However. the effort came to
and the constraints of each of the institutions in relation to the other actors in the
naught as the office began to phase down in anticipation of returning to the White
and the constraints of each of the institutions in relation to the other factors in the
House.
science policy arena-the bureaucracy and their allies and enemies in the private
This paper underscores an important aspect of Presidential science advising:
sector. One must understand that the system requires eventually a general con-
there should be at least a general political rapport between a President and his
vergence of views. if the system is to work at all. and this calls for an ability to
Science Adviser. This is not to argue that the post of Science Adviser should be
tolerate the long perspective and a diversity of views.
strictly a political appointment in the sense that many administration posts must
A more specific conclusion, arising from the above. is that the years of inquiry
be. Yet. there is no escaping the reality that the White House is a political place,
and debate. first in the Congress. beginning in the early 1970s. and later including
that the problems of the public sector are primarily political. and that a science
the Ford Presidency, which led to "The Act" should not be considered merely, as
advisory apparatus-especially the President's Science Adviser-must be able to
did many. an examination of the Presidential science advisory system. The
function in an intensely political environment. And while a specific research
evolution of "The Act" is more properly regarded as another. albeit important,
project in a laboratory may be far removed from the political arena and the sci-
episode in the long debate over policy, organization and goals related to science
entists performing the research may be entirely apolitical. in a large sense science is
and technology and their uses which has been underway in this country from its
affected by political outlooks and attitudes. Examples include the NSF and AEC
very beginning, but particularly since the 1880s. Thus. it becomes clear that the
debates of the 1940s. the Apollo decision by Kennedy, the debates on the content
evolution of Presidential science advisory machinery has taken place within the
and directions of health research of the Johnson and Nixon years, and the energy-
context of this larger debate. There is as yet no final answer. and there may never
216
William G. Wells. Jr.
Science Advice and the Presidency: An Overview from Kooseveu 10
be one, to the question of how best to devise an organization arrangement in the
Executive Branch which encompasses providing science advice to the President,
science advisory function as integral elements, and the two concepts have been
assisting the various units of the Executive Office, and providing some kind of
commingled ever since. As one examines the evolution of science advisory organiz-
central managerial perspective for the enormous Federal R&D enterprise.
ation at the Executive Office level, the idea of a Department of Science and Tech-
It is believed that A. Hunter Dupree's concept of a long-term search for a central
nology emerges from time to time-particularly when Congress is in the midst of
scientific organization is a useful analytical tool for examining the above issue and
one of its periodic forays into overall science policy matters and the organization of
the evolution of science-based organizations in the United States. 14 In the
science.
history of American science and technology and their interactions with government
Support of Dupree's concept of the quest for the central scientific organization
and other institutions, the demands of pluralism have had their counterpart in the
must be qualified to this extent: the idea of adapting a predominant agency to take
on the more general business of serving as a central scientific organization does not
quest for some form of central scientific organization. Dupree suggests that two
broad types of effort have been involved in attempts to achieve what many perceive
appear to be useful in explaining what has actually happened in the post-1940
to be a desirable unifying focus: (1) the building of a central scientific organiz-
period. Only the National Science Foundation was singled out unsuccessfully by
several Presidents (Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon) to take on the "general
ation, and (2) the adaptation of a predominant agency to take on the more general
business of serving as a central scientific organization," and by no stretch of the
business of serving as a central scientific organization. Most parties involved call for
coherence, coordination and appropriate relationships between government and
imagination has the NSF ever been a predominant agency. It might be possible to
science; however, disagreement arises because the centralists believe in the need for
argue that for a number of years the Department of Defense was a de facto central
decisive action at the center to attain their ends. while the pluralists see these same
scientific organization. This is because it was the largest supporter of Federal R&D
and established patterns of support and management procedures which have en-
ends accomplished through both cooperation and competition between the
individual institutions themselves.
dured to the present time-with major modifications taking place over the years as
other science-and-technology-based agencies evolved as part of the postwar
It is argued that this disagreement is closely associated with and has had a
creation of a national R&D structure. Finally, there have been some attempts by
marked impact on the evolution of Presidential science advisory machinery. The
the Congress to give the NSF and NASA respectively some of the attributes of a
centralists have argued for and have seen the placement of a science advisory
central scientific organization but these efforts have not been successful-either in
apparatus in the Executive Office as being essential for decisive action at the center.
Moreover. most centralists have endeavored to provide the Presidential machinery
getting out of the Congress in recent years or in being implemented by the NSF in
with appropriate capabilities to provide for "coherence, coordination and
earlier years. In any event, the predominant agency approach does not appear to be
useful as an analytical tool in examining the recent historical record in terms of the
appropriate relationships between government and science." As often as not. the
centralists have pressed upon Presidents more capabilities and responsibilities than
quest for a central scientific organization.
Presidents have preferred.
A major observation on the "quest" concept is that the commingling of the
Presidential science advisory function and the Department of Science and Tech-
Since the early 1940s the power base of the centralists has been the Congress:
however. beginning in the early 1950s, important elements of the scientific and
nology in debates over the years has led to confusion and disagreement about the
technological communities increasingly have allied themselves with the Congress
appropriate responsibilities of the Presidential machinery in terms of how extensive
they should be. And confusion has occurred as a result of mixing the advisory
on the general desirability of establishing a strong science advisory function at the
function with major responsibilities for the management-with frequent special
presidential level. The pluralists have had their power base in the Executive Branch
emphasis on coordination-of the entire Federal R&D enterprise as part of the
-with some assistance from a minority of the scientific and technological com-
munities; there has never been a clamor by the departments and agencies for the
growing institutionalization process of the science advisory apparatus over the
establishment of such a function. Indeed, there has been hostility and resistance
years.
From the early 1940s. when Senator Harley Kilgore pressed for greater coor-
both specifically to the science advisory apparatus and generally to the Presidency
dination of the growing Federal R&D establishment, to the 1970s views of Edward
over the decades. In contrast. and perhaps as part of their efforts to control the
bureaucracy, the Presidents themselves seem to have been more centralist-oriented:
E. David. Jr.. that an effective science and technology presence in the Executive
of seven Presidents. only Nixon displayed an outright hostile attitude and used
Office required statutory management authority. some have argued that, in effect.
an organization with certain attributes of a department should be located in the
pluralist doctrine as his underlying rationale for abolishing the science advisory
Executive Office. Intermediate views earlier led to the establishment of PSAC. the
apparatus from the White House.
Federal Council for Science and Technology, OST and, finally, the evolution of the
Another manifestation of the centralist-pluralist disagreement has been a re-
current Office of Science and Technology Policy. In contrast to these two somewhat
curring debate over a Department of Science and Technology which began in the
oversimplified sets of views, Presidents and most former Science Advisers have held
1880s and continues to the present. Indeed, the initial debate resulting from the
to a more limited view of what functions a Presidential science advisory apparatus
Allison Commission of 1884 contained the department idea and the high level
should perform. Emphasis from this quarter has been on "advice for the
218
William G. Wells, Jr.
President" even as the institutionalization of the apparatus took place over the
Director of OST, Chairman of the Federal Council, and the Chairman of PSAC
years-partly from internally perceived needs but in larger measure as a result of
just happened that way; it turned out to be convenient in the early days and also
pressure from the Congress.
was effective under an activist such as Wiesner. The "four-hatted" arrangement
In the end, one is left with a cruel dilemma which is implicit in the disagreement
was not dictated by law or by Executive Order. Although DuBridge and Nixon
between the centralists and the pluralists. Virtually all parties can agree that good
ended up not making any changes in the structure inherited from Kennedy, it
management and effective coordination of the Federal R&D enterprise
would seem that this subject might be investigated again with the purpose of
desirable, and many can agree that providing science advice to the President are
determining the feasibility of different individuals handling the advisory function
effectively is important. However, on the one hand, a department has never gained
and the "management" functions, but within the purview of the Executive Office.
wide acceptance; and, on the other hand, it would seem that the mixing of
It is not considered feasible to place major policy and management functions
"advisory" attributes with "management" attributes has been inimical to the
related to attaining a central perspective in one of the departments or agencies.
effective performance of Presidential science advisory machinery in carrying out the
The construction of "The Act," while overly cumbersome and loaded with too
central role of advising the President. "The Act" did not satisfactorily resolve the
many responsibilities for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, did set the
dilemma; as Congress often does, when it reaches the limits of the workable
stage for a continuation of the comprehensive debate on science policy and organi-
agreement, it passes the unresolved issues to the future. Thus, a dilemma which
zation which began anew in the early 1970s. It called for the type of concentrated
has been near the center of the pluralist-centralist debate for nearly a century was
analysis by the Executive Branch which would have complemented the earlier con-
passed along to the future virtually intact.
gressional examination. Moreover, it is believed that the studies called for in "The
Contributing to the difficulties arising from this dilemma is that, on the one
Act" would be of crucial value to both the administration and the Congress. No
hand, the President has been and should be involved in establishing broad policy
comparable study of the various complex facets of R&D has been attempted since
and must acquire appropriate information for effective decision making. On the
the Bush and Steelman Reports of the 1940s-and such a study is long overdue.
other hand, it is not easy to distinguish between the types of activities which must
Having said this, it is clear that the Presidential science advisory apparatus
be performed and the kinds of information which must be acquired for the
cannot be considered without reference to the rest of the Executive office. Yet, one
development of Presidential policy and the broad evaluation of programs and
is faced with the dilemma that this paper was not directed at a comprehensive
similar, but more detailed. activities and information gathering which are more
examination of the entire domain of the Presidency. Nevertheless, to avoid a
rectly. properly in the realm of managing the Federal R&D enterprise, directly or indi-
complete impasse. it is a general conclusion that the short-term perspective of the
Executive Office must be modified to permit the attention of some individuals or
As observed earlier, "The Act" side-stepped this issue and settled for continu-
units to be directed beyond the immediate set of problems before the President at
ing the pre-1973 arrangement with these major exceptions: the Office of Science
any given time.
and Technology Policy was given more "managerial" and "horizon scanning"
Without specifying in detail what form such a capability should take, it seems
responsibilities than had been held by the defunct Office of Science and Tech-
reasonably clear that a Presidential science advisory apparatus must be closely con-
nology and a specific mandate was given to the administration to examine once
nected with this kind of institutional capability. The role of the science apparatus
more the division of responsibilities by studying the feasibility of a Department of
would be to assist in performing what many have called the "horizon scanning"
Science and Technology. as well as other organizational and policy issues. President
function. The revolutionary impact of science on society-as discussed earlier-
Carter has. however. for the most part, ignored this latter provision of "The Act";
demands that more attention be devoted to thinking ahead and to insuring that
in fact. he abolished the advisory committee which the Congress and President
decisions involving the use of science and technology are considered in the broadest
Ford had agreed on as being essential to performing the legislative mandate.
possible context.
Notwithstanding the Congressional mandate. it is concluded that Presidents will
This conclusion leads directly to another major point: it is essential that the
devise arrangements which are compatible with their style and concept of govern-
Presidency. assisted by the science advisorv apparatus, be organized in such a way
ment organization: moreover. it is not believed likely that a Department of
as to permit a more strategic outlook on the problems of the nation and the world.
Science and Technology will be established within the next few years so that. as a
The ad hoc "fire-fighting" approach which has characterized the operation of the
practical matter. the real focus will be on what kind of organizational arrangement
Presidency in the past will not be sufficient to cope with the problems of the latter
can be established within the Executive Office to perform the various functions
part of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century-which is now
which have been discussed in this analysis.
closer than 1950. Yet, the Presidency-and the Congress-still act as though it
DuBridge activelv studied an arrangement which generally follows the provisions
were 1950. A vital perspective on the future must be attained. and it is argued that
of "The Act" and the pre-1973 structure but which would allow for a better
a science advisory apparatus is one of the best organizational forms to help achieve
division of responsibilities to offset some of the negative features of increasing
this perspective.
institutionalization. The custom of the Science Adviser to the President being the
Finally. it is possible to state the following overall conclusion. At one time. Bush
was able to say that the value of the position of Presidential adviser turns on who
the individual is, who is the President, and how they get along together. It is
agreed that this remains a fundamental aspect of science advice and the Presidency.
But it is also argued that science advising is a highly complex process which is
affected by a rich variety of influences. some resulting from the nature of the times,
some resulting from the nature of the institutions involved, and others arising from
A Scientist in The White House:
the types of problems facing a President and how he perceives them in terms of the
national interest. It is believed that the function of Presidential science advising has
A Sociological View
proved its worth in the past; how valuable it will be in the future depends upon the
extent to which the problems identified in this paper are solved in the context of
Emanuel R. Piore
preparing for the 21st century.
References
1. Clinton Rossiter. "The Presidency-Focus of Leadership," in The Dynamics of the American Presidency,
The concept of a Science Adviser to the President has been accepted in Washington
Donald Bruce Johnson and Jack L. Walker. eds. (New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc.. 1964). P. 12.
2. Edward S. Flash. Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers
for over three decades. Seven Presidents appointed individuals, a scientist or engi-
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1965). P. 1.
neer, to such positions, with ill-defined functions. Ten distinguished individuals
3. Bertrand Russell. The Impact of Science on Society (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951). P. 3.
served the Presidents in that capacity. Seven or eight of those served on a full time
4. Robert K. Merton. "The Ambivalence of Scientists in Science and Society. Norman Kaplan. ed. (Chicago:
Rand McNallv & Company. 1965). P. 112.
basis. Five of the seven Presidents found the President's Science Advisory Com-
5. Ellul. The Technological Society and Ferkiss. The Future of Technological Civilization
mittee (PSAC) useful. Nixon during his tenure abolished it. Carter never put it in
6. "Farewell Address." US President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington:
place. The Science Adviser traditionally was Chairman of the Committee.
Office of the Federal Register. National Archives and Records Service. 1952-1961). Dwight D. Eisen-
The functions and tasks that the adviser and the committee performed changed
hower. 1960-1961. p. 1039.
- John M. Logsdon. The Decision to Go to the Moon (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1970). P. 5.
during the decade. The changes were gradual. The initial pattern was established
8. Llovd V. Berkner. The Scientific Age: The Impact of Science on Society (New Haven. Conn.: Yale Uni-
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidencies. The interaction between the two
versity Press. 1964). P. 24.
Presidents and their Science Advisers was unique. The Presidents changed, the
9. William D. Carev. 'Thoughts on Reorganization. Science. October 14. 1977. P. 129.
10. Harvey Brooks. The Scientific Adviser." in Scientists and National Policy Making Robert Gilpin and
Science Advisers changed. There were changes in the White House and the other
Christopher Wright. eds. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1964). pp. 76-77.
parts of Washington.
11. Acknowledgment is due David Z. Beckler for a number of discussions and "The Precarious Life of
The White House staff grew, the Science Adviser's staff grew, the National
Science in the White House," Daedalus. Summer 1974.
12. Detlev W Bronk "Science Advice in the White House: the Genesis of the President's Science Advisers
Security Council became operative. the Domestic Council was created. the Bureau
and the National Science Foundation." Science. 11 October 1974. PP. 116-161.
of the Budget became the Office of Management and Budget. The White House
13. William D. Carev. Science in the Ford Years: Last Things." Science. January 21. 1977. P. 251.
staff became more structured. more formal. The concept of completed staff work
14. A Hunter Dupree. "Central Scientific Organization in the United States Government. Minerva. Summer
took hold. Nixon and Carter felt the need to designate a Chief of Staff. The
1963.
Science Adviser was given additional functions. becoming head of the Office of
Science and Technology. This office and new function legislated by Congress
reflected the needs of Congress rather than the operational needs of the White
House. On second thought, the legislation modulated the work of the Science
Adviser and the President's Science Advisory Committee. The staff of the Science
Adviser was increased to comply with Congressional mandate. Administrative
duties increased. deflecting the Science Adviser's attention from concerns that may
Emanuel R. Piore (b. 1908) was 1 member of the President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee (1959 to 1961) and was appointed consultant-at-large in 1963. He was formerly
Vice President and Chief Scientist and 1 Director of International Business Machines
Corporation: be has also been a member of the National Science Board. Chairman of the
Navai Research Advisory Committee. and Deputy Chief and Chief Scientist of the
Office of Naval Research: be is a member of the Council of she National Academy of
Sciences. National Academy of Engineering, American Philosophical Society, and
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
221
ScidTech
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
SUBJECT:
FCCSET Formation
BOTTOM LINE: The Federal Coordinating Council on Science,
Engineering and Technology is in the process of completing the
formation of its committee structure. Actions need to be taken now
to ensure appropriate coordination with the new structure.
BACKGROUND: You will recall that, at the last FCCSET meeting
(March 14), Dr. Bromley asked for the names of suggested
chairpersons for each committee. Since then, the membership and
structure of 7 committees have been created (see attached list).
Charters are being prepared for all the committees, and they
will be sent to Dr. Bromley by the end of the week. There will be
a meeting on April 24 (Tuesday) of all the committee chairmen to
discuss the charters and make any necessary changes. The charters
will then be tabled at a meeting of the full FCCSET on April 30 for
final approval. It is then planned that the charters will be
published in the Federal Register, possibly with the names of the
members.
Staff of FCCSET have stated that the charters will not be made
available for review until the FCCSET meeting. Of course, at that
time there may be no way to make appropriate changes. In addition,
it is difficult to determine whether the activities contemplated
by the FCCSET Committees will overlap or conflict with other
interagency working group activities. Finally, absent any movement
to form or convene the Cabinet Council Science and Technology
Working Group, there may be a natural tendency for the FCCSET
committees to take up the issues more appropriate to the Working
Group.
RECOMMENDATION: The Science and Technology Working Group charter
should be prepared, Dr. Bromley could announce formation of the
Working Group in the FCCSET and other meetings, and meetings of the
Working Group should be started as soon as possible, to show there
is a viable process for taking issues to the Cabinet Councils. In
addition, The EPC and DPC executive secretaries should be able to
participate in the April 24 meeting to ensure adequate coordination
on issues with FCCSET. We should also request copies of the
charters, to ensure they do not inadvertently conflict with DPC and
EPC charters and activities.
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7021 ; 4-11-90 ; 3:12PM ;
2023953462-
CABINET AFFAIRS;# 6
FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL
FOR SCIENCE, ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEES
MARCH 1990
Earth and Environmental Sciences
Chairman: Dallas Peck, Director, US Geological Survey, Department of the
Interior
Vice Chairmen: Erich Bretthauer, Assistant Administrator for Research,
Environmental Protection Agency
Lennard Fisk, Associate Administrator for Space Science and
Applications, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
OSTP Liaison Member: James B. Wyngaarden, Associate Director for Life
Sciences
Education and Human Resources
Vice Chairmen: Ted Sanders, Deputy Secretary, Department of Education
Chairman: Adm. James Watkins (Ret.), Secretary, Department of Energy
Luther Williams, Senior Science Advisor, National Science
OSTP Liaison Member: J. Thomas Ratchford, Foundation Associate Director for Policy
and International Affairs
Food, Agriculture and Forest Research
Chairman: Charles Hess, Assistant Secretary for Science and Education,
Vice Chairmen: David O'Neil, Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals
Department of Agriculture
Management, Department of the
Interior
James Benson, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug
Administration, Department of Health
and Human Services
OSTP Liaison Member: James B. Wyngaarden, Associate Director for Life
Sciences
REVISED 4/4/90
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7021 ; 4-11-90 ; 3:12PM ;
2023953462-
CABINET AFFAIRS;# 7
International Science and Engineering
Chairman: Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology, Department of
State
Vice Chairmen: Fred Bernthal, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation
Philip Schambra, Director, Fogarty International Center,
National Institutes of Health,
Department of Health and Human
Services
OSTP Liaison Member: J. Thomas Ratchford, Associate Director for Policy
Life Sciences and Health
and International Affairs
Chairman: James O. Mason, Assistant Secretary, Department of Health and
Human Services
Vice Chairman: David Galas, Associate Director for Health and Environmental
Research, Office of Energy Research,
Department of Energy
OSTP Liaison Member: James B. Wyngaarden, Associate Director for Life
Sciences
Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Sciences
Chairman: Erich Bloch, Director, National Science Foundation
Vice Chairman: Charies Herzfeld, Director Defense Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense
OSTP Liaison Member: Eugene Wong, Associate Director (designate) for
Technology and Industry
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Chairman: Thomas Murrin, Deputy Secretary, Department of Commerce
Vice Chairman: J.R. Thompson, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
OSTP Liaison Member: William D. Phillips, Associate Director (designate) for
Industrial Technology
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 17, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES
FROM:
KENNETH P. YALE Ky
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the FCCSET Education Committee
A. meeting of the FCCSET Education Committee was held yesterday
on the issue of the Administration position on math and science
education legislation proposed by Senator Kennedy.
Draft testimony, prepared for a hearing scheduled for next
month, was distributed and discussed. There was general consensus
that the testimony was good. It generally highlighted the problem
and noted that the Administration was most concerned about the
trend in math and science education.
There was some interest expressed in additional testimony on
proposed Administration action to address the problem. In
addition, some parties thought it would be appropriate to prepare
a counteroffer for negotiations with Sen. Kennedy on the
legislation. However, it was noted that the group was not sure of
the appropriate policy direction for any Administration action, nor
were they able to decide the appropriate legislative strategy. It
was recommended that the DPC Education working group be asked to
determine how the Administration should be politically and
legislatively positioned on this issue.
Subsequent conversations with Ted Saunders after the meeting
resulted in the recommendation of a small, education strategy group
meeting to address these issues and determine the appropriate
avenue for their resolution.
Document No.
Tip
CA
OFFICE OF CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM
3-20-90
----
Date:
Due by:
Subject:
Comments on Title V -- Science, Tech., and American Diplomacy
From:
Yale/Danzansky
ACTION CONCUR FYI
ACTION
CONCUR
FYI
BATES
JACKSON
DANZANSKY
MCBEE
ADAIR
SCHALL
BUCHHOLZ
WETHINGTON
D'ANDREA
WILLIAMSON
DEWITT
YALE
DUGGAN
EVANS
FARRAR
HEIMBACH
Comments:
The attached changes were agreed upon by Steve D. and Ken
for the Title V report. This was delivered to Cicconi at
7:30 pm. Thanks.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 20, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI
FROM:
KENNETH P. YALE Ky
SUBJECT:
Comments on Science, Technology and American
Diplomacy
Following are some changes suggested by Cabinet Affairs and
the Domestic Policy Council. I must admit that I am not fully
aware of the appropriate tone for this document, and therefore
found it somewhat difficult to determine appropriate changes.
Nevertheless, I have reviewed the document and believe that the
following changes would have the approval of OSTP. I would be
happy to further discuss these suggested changes with anyone,
should there be any questions.
On page 2 or 3, add the following under the environmental
section:
The President also announced an international meeting at the
White House in 1990, for top scientific, environmental, and
economic officials to discuss global change issues. In
addition, he signaled the interest of the United States to
host a conference to begin the steps towards a framework
convention on global climate change, after completion of the
reports by the working groups of the United Nations
sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
On page 7, add, after the sentence with oversight
responsibility for issues related to oceans, science, technology,
and environment." the following:
In response to the increasing importance of the domestic
ramifications of the global change issues, a Global Change
Working Group was formed under the Domestic Policy Council
in October. This group has the lead responsibility to
review, formulate, coordinate, and implement all global
change policy issues that might have an impact on the United
States. The working group has Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level
representation and is chaired by the Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology Affairs.
On page 25, elaborate on the section inserted in page 2 and 3
(noted, supra) on the activities to host a negotiating session
and to convene an international meeting on the science and
economics research related to global change.
on page 39, after a reference to the PCC in the left column, add
the following:
The Global Change Working Group under the Domestic Policy
Council was formed in October to review, formulate,
coordinate, and implement all global change policy issues
that might have an impact on the United States. The working
group has developed policy responses to several
international initiatives that could impact the United
States.
On page 50, under Recommendations, Environment, please add
another recommendation, as follows:
Further our research and understanding of the science and
economics related to global change.
On page 58, at the top of the second column, please delete
"formulation" from the phrase: "U.S. policy formulation, for the
IPCC in general
add the following before that phrase:
Overall U.S. policy formulation and implementation is
coordinated for the President by the Domestic Policy Council
Global Change Working Group. This is a Cabinet and sub-
Cabinet level group that receives materials from the
National Security Council PCC on issues having a domestic
impact.
On page 62, at the bottom of the first column, after " and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and UNEP." Please add the
following:
The CES also provides technical expertise, advice and
information to the Global Change Working Group in the
Domestic Policy Council.
file
PCAST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
February 2, 1990
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
AND INITIATIVES OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
FACT SHEET
The President announced today the appointment of the members of
the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST). This distinguished panel of scientists, engineers and
industry leaders will provide high-level advice directly to the
President on a wide range of important issues concerning science
and technology.
Advances in science and technology are a key to increased
economic competitiveness and improving our quality of life. The
President's action today caps a year of vigorous activity by the
Administration to advance science and technology issues on a
broad front. The three broad areas of activity are summarized
below:
I.
Strengthening Federal Science and Technology Policy
II. Enhancing Federal Research and Development Activities
III. Encouraging Increased Private Sector Research and
Development Investment
I.
Strengthening Federal Science and Technology Policy
Establishing the National Space Council. -- The
President issued an Executive Order on April 20, 1989,
establishing the National Space Council, chaired by the
Vice President. The Space Council provides advice and
assistance to the President on space policy and
strategy and monitors and coordinates the
implementation of space policy among the civil,
national security and commercial space sectors.
Establishing the Administration's Council on
Competitiveness. -- The President established the
Council on Competitiveness, chaired by the Vice
President, to oversee regulatory and other
competitiveness issues, such as reform of product
- more -
2
liability laws. A new Working Group will coordinate
and review Administration policy and regulations, and
will focus on enhancing applied research and on
streamlining risk-based regulation of new biotechnology
products to ensure safety and promote competitive
economic development.
Upgrading the Status of the Science Advisor and
Increasing the Budget for the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. -- The President has raised the
status of the Science Advisor to Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. The Science
Advisor now participates in deliberations of the
Cabinet and of the Domestic and Economic Policy
Councils to ensure that science and technology issues
are fully reflected in Administration policy
development. In addition, the FY 1991 budget proposes
$3.3 million for OSTP, double the FY 1989 level.
Strengthening the Federal Coordinating Council on
Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET) -- The
Science Advisor initiated action to improve the
interagency coordination apparatus for science and
technology by consolidating and enhancing the current
FCCSET committee structure. Building on the successful
experience of the FCCSET Committee on Earth Science,
new committees will be formed to coordinate Federal
efforts in education and human resource development,
materials science, and others.
Reinvigorating the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) -- The President is committed to strengthening
the CEQ and to ensuring that it has the capacity to
serve as an effective source of environmental analysis
and information in the White House. Accordingly, the
President's FY 1991 budget increases CEQ's budget by 90
percent and CEQ's staff by 70 percent.
II. Enhancing Federal Research and Development Activities
A. Increased Investment in Federal R&D
The President has proposed a total of $71 billion
for research and development (R&D), including R&D
facilities, in his FY 1991 budget. This is an
increase of $4.5 billion, or 7 percent, over FY
1990 enacted levels.
Civilian R&D will increase by 12 percent, and
defense-related R&D will increase by 4 percent.
- more -
3
The President has also proposed to allocate $12
billion for basic research, an increase of $1
billion, or 8 percent, over FY 1990. Basic
research is an essential investment in the
nation's scientific and technological future,
including its future scientists and engineers.
B.
Science and Technology Education
The President has moved aggressively to address the
shortcomings in the nation's science and technology
education enterprise. He has set goals for the
nation's schools and students in science and math, and
the FY 1991 budget will provide over $1 billion in
direct spending in five agencies for science,
mathematics and engineering education.
o
National Science Foundation (NSF) -- NSF will
allocate $463 million in FY 1991, a 30 percent
increase over FY 1990, for a wide variety of
education activities to improve the quality of
teachers and students, the numbers of students
choosing science, math, or engineering careers,
and the numbers staying in those fields,
particularly those in traditionally under-
represented groups.
Department of Education. -- The Department will
continue to build on its strong relationships with
State educational entities. The FY 1991 budget
proposes $230 million, an increase of 69 percent,
for the Dwight D. Eisenhower Mathematics and
Science program, which provides funds to States to
implement improved programs for teaching math and
science. In addition, five million is requested
for the new National Science Scholars program to
recognize outstanding high school students by
providing fellowship support for them to study in
the fields of mathematics and science in college.
The Department will also launch an initiative
under its Upward Bound program to provide academic
assistance and encouragement to help disadvantaged
students pursue study in mathematics and science.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) -- NASA will allocate $51 million in FY
1991, an increase of 21 percent, for education
activities including the "Spacemobile" program,
teacher and student workshops and research
experiences at NASA laboratories, and special
efforts to increase minority participation in
science and engineering.
- more -
4
Department of Energy (DOE) -- DOE will provide
$25 million in FY 1991, a 47 percent increase, for
educational activities including support for
graduate and undergraduate students and high
school and university faculty. DOE will implement
a new program, in collaboration with the private
sector, to train high school faculty in the state-
of-the-art science and technology conducted at the
DOE laboratories.
National Institutes of Health (NIH) -- The
research training grant program will be funded at
a level of $292 million, which will support almost
12,000 graduate trainees in research laboratories
throughout the nation.
C.
Doubling the Budget of the National Science Foundation
The President has maintained his strong commitment to
the importance of basic research by proposing $2.4
billion in budget authority, a more than 14 percent
increase, for the National Science Foundation in FY
1991. This will continue progress toward doubling the
NSF budget by FY 1993.
World-Class Research Equipment. -- The President
has also recognized that world-class science and
technology requires world-class research
equipment. He has supported the construction of a
replacement for the important radiotelescope at
Greenbank, West Virginia, and, for FY 1991, has
proposed the initiation or continuation of several
high-priority, specialized research facilities
including the National High Magnetic Field
Laboratory, the Laser Interferometer Gravitational
Wave Observatory, and two 8-meter optical/infrared
telescopes.
Academic Research Facilities Modernization. -- In
addition to research support, the President will
also continue the Academic Research Facilities
modernization program begun by NSF in FY 1990.
Continuing the program will increase management
experience and permit evaluation of its impact on
U.S. science and technology.
O
U.S. Antarctic Program. -- NSF manages the U.S.
Antarctic Program for the government. This
program supports national goals in the Antarctic
and is the principal expression of the U.S.
presence on the Antarctic continent. The FY 1991
- more -
5
budget will expand an important environmental,
safety, and health initiative in the Antarctic to
ensure that this world scientific resource is
preserved and that the safety and health of
scientists working on the continent are assured.
D.
Understanding and Exploring Space
The President is committed to a continuing, active and
exciting American presence in space -- indeed, to
America's leadership in space science and exploration.
Overall, the FY 1991 budget proposes $15.2 billion for
NASA, an increase of $2.9 billion, or 24 percent.
NASA's budget has increased by almost 40 percent over
FY 1989.
o
Space Shuttle. -- The current fleet of three Space
Shuttles are the world's most versatile launch
vehicles. In FY 1989, the Space Shuttle fleet
completed four successful flights. The Space
Shuttle Columbia recently accomplished the
spectacular retrieval of the Long Duration
Exposure Facility. The FY 1991 budget proposes
$4.2 billion, an increase of 22 percent, for Space
Shuttle production and operations. This funding
will allow for a safe build-up to 10 Shuttle
flights, the delivery of the fourth Shuttle,
Endeavor, and enhancements such as the Advanced
Solid Rocket Motor and the Extended Duration
Orbiter capability.
O
Space Station Freedom. -- Space Station Freedom is
the largest international R&D project ever
undertaken. In FY 1989, the program underwent a
reevaluation that has resulted in a more
achievable program and funding profile. The FY
1991 budget continues the President's commitment
to the Space Station by proposing a total of $2.6
billion, an increase of 36 percent. This will
provide for the critical transition from design to
actual fabrication.
o
Moon/Mars Exploration. -- On July 20, 1989, the
President proposed that America undertake an
ambitious mission of manned exploration of the
solar system. This journey will begin with the
first step in the FY 1991 budget towards this new
goal -- nearly $1.3 billion, an increase of 47
percent -- to support robotic science missions and
to develop the pacing and innovative technologies
that will be needed. of particular interest is
the continued commitment of the Administration to
- more -
6
the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) program. In
FY 1989 the National Space Council reviewed and
revised this program in keeping with a more stable
and sustainable pace of technology and funding.
O
Space Science and Applications. -- The U.S. is
committed to maintaining its world leadership in
space science. An exciting new era of discovery
has now begun in unmanned planetary exploration,
astronomy, and Earth observations. In 1989, three
important scientific missions were launched:
Magellan to Venus, Galileo to Jupiter, and the
Cosmic Background Explorer. The FY 1991 budget
proposes $3.3 billion, an increase of 22 percent,
for the continued support of missions planned for
launch in 1990 including the Hubble Space
Telescope, the Gamma Ray Observatory, and the
Ulysses mission to explore the Sun, and
development of future missions such as the Comet
Rendezvous/Asteroid Flyby and the Cassini mission
to Saturn.
E.
Global Environmental Change
O
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) --
The U.S. is the world leader in global change
research. The President has endorsed the USGCRP,
a coordinated, multi-agency research program of
space- and ground-based research and observations
designed to provide a sound scientific basis for
rational policy decisionmaking on global change
issues. The FY 1991 budget proposes over $1
billion for this effort, an increase of 57
percent.
Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) -- On July 20, the
President also affirmed the importance of NASA's
contribution to the USGCRP, Mission to Planet
Earth. The largest part of this initiative
consists of a major new program for FY 1991, the
Earth Observing System, a series of space
platforms and instruments developed by the U.S.,
Europe and Japan, which will collect a broad
spectrum of environmental data related to global
warming, drought, oceans, etc. MTPE will permit,
for the first time, an analysis of Earth as an
integrated system.
O
International Activities. -- The President
believes that continuing U.S. scientific
leadership is needed to address global
environmental issues. In the past year, the
- more -
7
President announced U.S. support for a worldwide
phaseout of chloroflurocarbon (CFC) production to
the extent safe substitutes are available. In
1990, the U.S. will host the Plenary Session of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) in February; a meeting of the world's
economic, scientific, and environmental officials
to discuss global environmental issues in the
Spring; and the first negotiation session on the
Framework Convention on Climate Change in late
Fall.
F.
Environment
O
Clean Air Act. -- The President demonstrated his
commitment to clean air by transmitting Clean Air
Act Amendments to Congress in July 1989. The
President's plan allows for both environmental
protection and economic development and is based
on a commitment to using the best science
available. In support of his Clean Air proposals,
the FY 1991 air research budget of the
Environmental Protection Agency will increase by
$8 million to a total of $95 million.
G.
The Superconducting Super Collider and High Energy
Physics
O
The Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) -- The
SSC will provide an enormous advance in the
capability to explore the secrets of matter and
energy. Over the past year, the Department of
Energy has established the SSC laboratory at a
site near Dallas, Texas. The new laboratory team
is conducting a thorough reevaluation of all
technical systems with particular attention to
magnet design and technical performance of the
accelerator. In FY 1989, research continued on
the design and testing of magnets. Approximately
8,000 magnets will be used in the 53-mile SSC
tunnel. In addition, during FY 1989, DOE
continued work on the site-specific Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). The EIS is necessary
before DOE makes a decision on the "footprint" of
the SSC and starts acquiring land for the project.
O
High Energy and Nuclear Physics. -- The President
supports a robust program of research in the areas
of high-energy and nuclear physics, which offer
the prospects of increasing our knowledge of the
basic constituents of matter. Last year,
- more -
8
scientists discovered and conducted measurements
of the Z-nought particle utilizing the recently
upgraded Stanford Linear Collider. The Z-nought
particle is important because it transmits one of
the basic forces between elementary particles.
The FY 1991 budget provides a funding increase of
8 percent to continue research at Stanford and the
three other large accelerator centers: the
Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island, the
Cornell Electron Storage Ring in New York State,
and the Fermilab National Laboratory.
H.
Life Sciences
O
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS). -- The
Administration remains committed to making
continued progress against HIV and AIDS. Five
therapies have been approved for use, and since
January 1989 over 35 clinical trials have been
initiated in a search for additional therapeutic
drugs. The Administration has recently taken
action to enable State Medicaid programs to cover
the costs of the drug AZT for HIV-infected
individuals who do not yet exhibit AIDS symptoms.
The FY 1991 budget proposes $3.5 billion in total
for HIV/AIDS research, treatment, prevention and
income support, an increase of 18 percent.
Human Genome Project. -- The evolution of genetic
engineering techniques over the last decade has
enabled the initiation of one of the most exciting
science projects ever undertaken -- the
development of a map of the full complement of
human genetic material (the human genome). Such
an undertaking will vastly increase our
understanding of the nature and cause of many
diseases. Over the past year, important advances
have already been made, such as the identification
of the gene that accounts for a large proportion
of all cystic fibrosis cases. The FY 1991 budget
proposes $108 million for the National Institutes
of Health and $46 million for the Department of
Energy to pursue collaboratively this important
project.
O
Biotechnology. -- Recent breakthroughs in
biotechnology, such as recombinant DNA techniques,
cell fusion and gene therapy, offer unprecedented
opportunities for improving the nation's
productivity, health, and well-being. Increasing
Federal investment in basic biotechnology research
- more -
9
will spur further advances, as will initiatives
that improve payoffs on investments. The FY 1991
budget proposes $3.6 billion for biotechnology
R&D, an increase of 6 percent over 1990.
Agricultural Research Initiative. -- American
farmers are among the most productive in the
world. New techniques in genetics, molecular and
cell biology have led to innovative approaches
that will enhance our ability to produce food,
while addressing concerns of safety, nutrition and
the environment. The FY 1991 budget will launch a
National Research Initiative to more than double
the size of USDA's competitive grants program.
This will expand funds for plant and animal
biotechnology to $50 million, with a particular
emphasis on mapping the genome of important crop
plants. Like the Human Genome Initiative, this
effort will create new opportunities to explore
the genetic potential of plants.
I.
Energy
National Energy Strategy. -- The President has
directed Secretary of Energy Watkins to develop a
National Energy Strategy to guide the
Administration's energy policies and programs.
The Department has held two rounds of public
hearings and plans to issue a draft document in
April. A key element of the strategy will be a
blueprint for future energy R&D programs and
activities.
Clean Coal Technology. -- The Administration is
committed to a $2.5 billion program to demonstrate
emerging clean coal technologies. This program
will provide additional cost-effective
alternatives for reducing acid rain.
Solar/Renewables and Energy Conservation R&D. --
The President is committed to assisting the
development of emerging technologies that offer
the potential to provide new sources of energy as
well as new ways to use it more efficiently, while
protecting the environment. On January 26, 1990,
the Department of Energy announced a new 11-point
initiative in this area. The FY 1991 budget
provides an increase of 8 percent in funding for
conservation, solar and other renewable energy
technology R&D.
- more -
10
Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery Research. -- Up to
two-thirds of oil and gas reserves are still left
in the ground with conventional recovery
techniques. In order to stimulate the use of new
technologies to increase production from these
existing fields, the President proposed four new
tax initiatives, including a 10 percent credit for
new tertiary enhanced recovery projects. In
addition, the FY 1991 budget proposes $17 million
to establish oil and gas geosciences research
consortia with industry and universities to
advance the science underlying oil and gas
recovery.
J.
Advanced Technology
O
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). -- The FY 1991 budget proposes $198
million for NIST, a 21 percent increase over the
1990 enacted level, and includes substantial
increases for core NIST research programs such as
robotics, lightwave technology, quality chemical
measurements, and advanced semiconductor
measurement. NIST research programs form the
basis for the development of the measurements and
standards on which U.S. industries depend. The FY
1991 budget also includes increased funding for
improvements to NIST facilities. In addition, the
budget includes funding for two programs to
encourage the development and transfer to the
private sector of a wide range of advanced
technologies.
-- Manufacturing Technology Centers. -- The
budget proposes to continue funding for these
centers, requesting $5 million in FY 1991.
This program provides matching grants to
universities or non-profit organizations to
establish centers for the transfer of
innovative, advanced manufacturing technology
to small and medium-sized businesses.
-- Advanced Technology Program (ATP). -- The
budget requests $10 million in FY 1991, the
1990 funding level, for this program. The
ATP will provide seed money to industry-led
consortia doing generic, pre-competitive
research into promising technologies.
Magnetic Levitation Transportation. -- The FY 1991
budget proposes nearly $10 million for R&D on this
- more -
11
emerging technology, an increase of almost 400
percent. These efforts are being carried out by
both the Department of Transportation (about $6
million) and the Army Corps of Engineers (almost
$4 million). Each agency is pursuing a public-
private partnership designed to facilitate private
development of an operational maglev system in the
U.S.
K.
National Security
DOD Technology Base. -- The President supports a
strong technology base to develop options for
future weapons systems and to guard against
technological surprise by adversaries. The FY
1991 budget includes $3.4 billion for the
technology base (basic and applied research)
funded through the Department of Defense. This
will support programs ranging from basic research
in the physical sciences to development of high-
speed semiconductors for use in advanced
communications systems and computers.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- The SDI
program remains a high priority of the President.
The FY 1991 budget requests $4.5 billion for SDI,
an increase of $0.9 billion over 1990. The SDI
program is developing options for strategic
defenses based on advanced technologies.
Particular emphasis is being placed on promising
new concepts such as the "Brilliant Pebbles" small
space-based interceptor missiles.
III. Encouraging Increased Private Sector R&D Investment
Private sector investment accounts for about 50 percent
of the total national investment in R&D. In addition,
the private sector is the principal performer for R&D
and is ultimately responsible for transforming R&D
results into useful new products and processes. The
Administration has taken a number of steps to encourage
increased private sector R&D investment and
technological innovation.
O
Encouraging Savings and Investment. -- The
President is proposing the Family Savings Account
to stimulate increased savings that provide the
resources needed for investments in the future.
In addition, the President is proposing to lower
the tax on capital gains in order to promote
increased entrepreneurial activity and investment.
- more -
12
Research and Experimentation Tax Credit. -- The
President again proposes to make permanent the 20
percent tax credit targeted specifically to
research and experimentation (R&E) by allowing 100
percent of total research expenses to be used for
the computation of the credit for all years after
December 31, 1989. In 1989, the Congress enacted
a short-term extension in response to the
President's proposal of last February.
Encouraging R&D by Transnational Companies. -- The
President proposes to make permanent the rules, as
modified by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, for the allocation of foreign and
domestic R&E expenditures for companies with
foreign operations. The proposal would also allow
100 percent of U.S. expenditures to be covered
rather than the current 75 percent. This proposal
would apply to all tax years beginning after
August 1, 1990, when the current rules expire.
Intellectual Property. -- The President is
committed to pursuing aggressively improved
international protection of intellectual property.
The current negotiations in the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are an
important forum for this activity.
Tort Reform/New Product Liability. -- The
Administration has endorsed changes in product
liability laws to help restore balance to the tort
system, to increase competitiveness, and to reduce
uncertainty, particularly for new products, while
providing incentives to produce safe products.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Knoxville, Tennessee)
For Immediate Release
February 2, 1990
The President today announced the appointment of the President's
Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST), comprised
of 12 distinguished scientists and engineers. This panel will
provide high-level advice directly to the President on a wide
range of important issues concerning science and technology.
PCAST will be the first Presidential scientific advisory group in
many years to report directly to the President. Its
establishment is a measure of the Bush Administration's high
esteem for science and a recognition that advances in science
and technology contribute in a major way to increased economic
competitiveness. It also reflects the President's desire to
strengthen Federal science and technology policy, enhance Federal
research and development activities, and encourage private sector
involvement in research and development.
The United States scientific community leads the world in
creating new knowledge. Through PCAST, the President is seeking
to provide the best obtainable private sector advice to Executive
Branch decision-making in science and technology.
PCAST will be chaired by Dr. D. Allan Bromley, Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. A list of the members and
their affiliations is attached, along with a fact sheet on
science and technology accomplishments in the Bush
Administration.
PCAST was established January 19, 1990, by Executive Order 12700.
Its members will be sworn in later tcday by the Vice President at
the White House.
-more-
- 2 -
NORMAN E. BORLAUG
Nobel Laureate Borlaug, of Texas, is currently leader of the
Sasakawa-Global-2000 agricultural program in sub-Saharan Africa,
Distinguished Professor of International Agriculture at Texas A&M
University, and a Senior Consultant to CIMMYT. He was Director
of the Wheat Research and Production Program of the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, Mexico, from 1964 until his
retirement in 1979.
Dr. Borlaug's career began in 1935 in the U.S. Forest Service,
and he subsequently worked as an instructor in plant pathology at
the University of Minnesota in 1941, where he received his Ph.D.
From 1942 through 1944 he was a microbiologist with the E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co.. He also served as research scientist in
charge of wheat improvement with the Cooperative Mexican
Agricultural Program, Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and the
Rockefeller Foundation, 1944-60, and later, as Associate Director
of the Foundation assigned to the Inter-American Food Crop
Program, 1960-63.
D. ALLAN BROMLEY, CHAIRMAN
D. Allan Bromley, of Connecticut, is Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology and Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP).
Dr. Bromley carried out pioneering studies on both the structure
and dynamics of nuclei and is considered the father of modern
heavy ion science. He has played major roles in the development
of accelerators, of detection systems, and in computer based data
acquisition and analysis systems. He is currently on leave from
his position as Henry Ford II Professor of Physics at Yale
University, where he was founder and Director of the A.W. Wright
Nuclear Structure Laboratory.
Dr. Bromley has been a leader in the national and international
science and science policy communities for more than 20 years,
serving as a member of the White House Science Council throughout
the Reagan Administration and as a member of the National Science
Board in 1988-89. He received the President's National Medal of
Science in 1988 and the Presidential Medal of the New York
Academy of Sciences in 1989. He has served as President of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the
International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.
Dr. Bromley received the B.Sc. degree in 1948 at Queen's
University, Canada, the M.Sc. degree from Queen's University in
1950, and the Ph.D. degree in nuclear physics from the University
of Rochester in 1952. He has since been awarded 10 honorary
doctorates.
SOLOMON J. BUCHSBAUM
Solomon J. Buchsbaum, of New Jersey, has been Senior Vice
President, Technology Systems, at AT&T Bell Laboratories since
1979. His early career included work at the MIT Research
Laboratory of Electronics. He received his Ph.D. in physics from
MIT in 1957. He joined Bell Laboratories in 1958 as a member of
the technical staff and later became department head and director
of the Electronics Research Laboratory. In 1968, he was named
Vice President for Research at the Sandia Laboratories and served
in a number of different capacities. He returned to Bell
Laboratories in 1971 as an Executive Director. In 1976 he became
Vice President, Network Planning and Customer Systems.
Dr. Buchsbaum is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and
of the National Academy of Engineering. He was the recipient of
the President's National Medal of Science in 1986.
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- 3 -
CHARLES L. DRAKE
Charles L. Drake, of Vermont, has been the Albert Bradley
Professor of Earth Sciences at Dartmouth since 1984 and Professor
of Geology since 1969. Dr. Drake's professional career began at
Columbia University in 1953. He joined the staff at Dartmouth
in 1958 after receiving his Ph.D. in geology from Columbia
University where he has continued his career, including service
as Professor and Chairman of the Department, 1967-69; as Dean of
Graduate Studies and as Associate Dean of the Science Department,
1978-81.
Dr. Drake is a recipient of the G. P. Woollard Award, Geophysical
Division of the Geological Society of America.
RALPH E. GOMORY
Ralph E. Gomory, of New York, is President of the Sloan
Foundation and, until his recent retirement, was Senior Vice
President for Science and Technology, IBM Corporation. He
received his Ph.D. in mathematics from Princeton in 1954.
Dr. Gomory's professional experience includes teaching and
research at Princeton from 1957-59. In 1959, he joined the
Research Division of IBM and was named Director of the
Mathematical Sciences Department in 1965. In 1970 he became IBM
Director of Research and held that position until 1985, becoming
IBM Vice President in 1973, Senior Vice President in 1985, and
IBM Senior Vice President for Science and Technology in 1986. He
has been awarded a number of honorary degrees and prizes,
including the John von Neumann Theory Prize in 1984 and the
National Medal of Science in 1988.
BERNADINE HEALY, VICE CHAIRMAN
Bernadine Healy, of Ohio, is Chairman of the Research Institute
of The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, a position she assumed in
1985, and is a staff member of the Clinic's Department of
Cardiology. Prior to that time, she was Deputy Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House, and
until that appointment had been a Professor at The Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine and Hospital. Dr. Healy received
her medical degree from Harvard Medical School in 1970. Her
medical career continued at Johns Hopkins from 1976 to 1984,
where she was Professor of Cardiology and Medicine, Director of
the Coronary Care Unit, and Assistant Dean for Postdoctoral
Programs and Faculty Development.
Dr. Healy is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences. She is the immediate Past
President of the American Heart Association and a former
President of the American Federation for Clinical Research.
PETER W. LIKINS
Peter W. Likins, of Pennsylvania, has been President of Lehigh
University since 1982. His professional career began as a
development engineer with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, in 1958. In 1964 he joined
the faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles, where
he became Professor of Engineering and later, Associate Dean.
Dr. Likins received his Ph.D. in engineering mechanics from
Stanford in 1965. In 1976 he became Professor and Dean of
Columbia University, serving until 1980, when he became Provost
of the University.
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- 4 -
THOMAS E. LOVEJOY
Thomas E. Lovejoy, of Virginia, is the Assistant Secretary for
External Affairs, The Smithsonian Institution. His previous
experience includes service as a research assistant at the
University of Pennsylvania, 1971-74, after receiving his Ph.D. in
biology from Yale University in 1971; as Executive Assistant to
the Science Director and as Assistant to the Vice President for
Resources and Planning of the Academy of Natural Sciences,
1972-73; as the Vice President for Science of the World Wildlife
Fund-U.S., 1973-87; and as Executive Vice President, 1985-89.
Dr. Lovejoy is President of the Society for Conservation Biology.
WALTER E. MASSEY
Walter E. Massey, of Illinois, has been the Vice President of the
University of Chicago for Research and for Argonne National
Laboratory since 1984. He has also been Professor of Physics at
the University since 1979.
Dr. Massey previously served as a physics instructor at Morehouse
College, 1958-59; and after receiving his Ph.D. in physics from
Washington University in 1966, as a staff physicist with the
Argonne National Laboratory until 1968; as Assistant Professor of
Physics, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1968-70; Associate
Professor of Physics and Dean of the College, Brown University,
1975-79. He is Vice President, and President-elect, of the
American Physical Society and is the Past President and Chairman
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
JOHN P. MCTAGUE
John P. McTague, of Michigan, is Vice President-Research, Ford
Motor Company, and has served in that position since 1986.
In 1983 Dr. McTague was appointed Deputy Director of the Office
of Science and Technology Policy, becoming Acting Science Advisor
to the President and Acting Director of OSTP in 1986. Prior to
that, he was Chairman of the National Synchrotron Light Source
Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1982-83. He was
Professor of Chemistry and a member of the Institute of
Geophysics and Planetary Physics, University of California, Los
Angeles, 1970-82. Dr. McTague began his professional career as a
member of the Technical Staff, North American Aviation Science
Center, on receiving his Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Boston
University, and remained there until 1970. He is U.S. Chairman
of the U.S. Japan Joint High Level Advisory Panel on Cooperation
in Research and Development in Science and Technology.
DANIEL NATHANS
Nobel Laureate Nathans, of Maryland, is Professor of Molecular
Biology and Genetics at The Johns Hopkins University Medical
School and Senior Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical
Institute. He has been on the faculty of The Johns Hopkins
University Medical School since 1962.
After receiving his Medical Degree from Washington University in
1954, he served as Medical Resident at the Columbia-Presbyterian
Medical Center in New York, 1955, 1957-59; as Clinical Associate
at the National Cancer Institute, 1955-57, and Guest Investigator
in biochemistry at the Rockefeller University, 1959-62.
Dr. Nathans received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in
1978 for his research with enzymes that cut DNA into specific
pieces, one of the basic tools of genetic engineering.
- more -
- 5 -
DAVID PACKARD
David Packard, of California, has been Chairman of the Board of
the Hewlett-Packard Co. since 1972. Mr. Packard received his
B.A. and B.S.E.E. degrees from Stanford University in 1934 and
1939, respectively.
His professional experience includes service as an engineer with
the Vacuum Tube Engineering Department, GE Co., 1936-38; co-
founder and partner, the Hewlett-Packard Co., 1939-47; President,
1947-64; and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 1964-69.
Prior to his present position, Mr. Packard served as U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense from 1969-71.
Mr. Packard received the Vannevar Bush Award of the National
Science Board in 1987 and the President's National Medal of
Technology and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1988.
HAROLD T. SHAPIRO
Harold T. Shapiro, of New Jersey, has been President of Princeton
University since 1988.
Dr. Shapiro's previous academic experience has been with the
University of Michigan, after receiving his Ph.D. in economics
from Princeton in 1964, first as an Assistant Professor of
Economics. His career progressed from Associate Professor,
1967-70; Professor, 1970-76; Chairman of the Department of
Economics, 1974-77; Professor of Economics and Public Policy,
1977; Vice President for Academic Affairs, 1977-79.
Dr. Shapiro was President of the University of Michigan from 1980
until 1987. He has served as a member of many industrial,
governmental and academic boards and commissions.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, DC
Date: mard 14
TO:
Holly Williamson
FROM:
Ken you
ACTION CONCUR FYI
ACTION CONCUR FYI
Bates
Jackson
Danzansky
X
McBee
Adair
Schall
X
Buchholz
Wethington
X
D'Andrea
Williamson
X
DeWitt
Yale
Duggan
Evans
Farrar
Heimbach
X
URGENT
BY NOON
C.O.B.
Comments:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 14, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES
FROM:
KEN YALE Ky
SUBJECT:
Second Meeting of the Federal Coordinating Council
on Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET)
The second meeting of FCCSET was held today. In attendance
were Secretaries Cavazos, Lujan, Sullivan, Watkins;
Undersecretaries Herzfield, Murrin, and Principi, Administrator
Reilly, Director Bloch, and Allan Bromley. Various other
agencies and White House offices had staff representation.
Dr. Bromley announced that the Department of Education was
made an official member and that the Presidential Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology had been formed and met at
Camp David last month.
Dr. Bromley next turned to the FCCSET charter. He gave
special thanks to the Cabinet Affairs staff (naming David Bates
and Stephen Danzansky) for their assistance in improving the
draft so as to effectively coordinate activities with the Cabinet
Councils. The revised draft was reviewed and Dr. Bromley asked
that changes be forwarded to OSTP in the near future.
The committees were discussed. A list of the standing
committees is attached. An wide ranging discussion ensued of the
various issues that could be discussed by the committees. Those
present agreed that the agency chairing each committee would be
responsible for its staffing and expenses. He then asked those
in attendance to send the names of suggested chairpersons for
each committee. In response to a question he stated that anyone
could chair, the higher the better, even a Cabinet member. He
also stated that he envisioned membership at the Assistant
Secretary or above.
Potential overlap with other policy councils was also
discussed. Dr. Bromley said that had been worked out with
Cabinet Affairs. Dr. Bromley also mentioned the creation of the
new Competitive Council group on commercialization as an example
of other activities. He indicated that Bill Phillips of his
staff could chair that group.
Listing all working groups in the Administration was
suggested, and Dr. Bromley agreed to develop a list. After the
meeting I told OSTP staff that we had already begun compiling
such a list (the EPC and DPC issues lists), and would meet with
Competitive Council staff to determine issues on their horizon.
CC: Stephen Danzansky
Olin Wethington
Seidtech
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB PELLICCI
FROM:
KENNETH P. YALE Ky
SUBJECT:
FDA Orphan Drug Testimony
Thank you for sending the testimony on Orphan Drugs to us
for clearance. I apologize for the delay in our response,
however we just received a draft at 9:30 this morning.
The comments we have deal with the related issues of
competition in the drug market and the cost of drugs. In order
to expedite your process, we have cleared our concerns with FDA.
They have addressed these issues to our satisfaction in their
question & answer materials. As the issues are indirectly
related to those addressed by the testimony, we do not suggest
any changes at this time. We would, however, like to follow the
progress of this issue.
Again, thank you for your assistance.
CALENDAR OF UPCOMING INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EVENTS
Revised: February 14, 1989
February
-- [Tentative] U.S./FRG Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in Bonn
(OES/N)
February
-- [Tentative] U.S./U.K. Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in
London (OES/N)
February
-- U.S./Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission,
in El Paso (OES/ENV)
Mid/Late
-- [Tentative] Round I of U.S./New Zealand Science and
February
Technology Agreement Negotiations, in Wellington or
Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb 13-15 -- ECE VOC Working Group, First Session, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
Feb 13-17 -- [Tentative] UNEP Meeting on Prior Informed Consent for
Chemicals Trade, in New York (OES/ENV)
Feb 13-17 --- Annual Meeting of the U.S./Canada Pacific Salmon
Commission, in Portland (OES/OFA)
Feb 13-17 -- UNEP Meeting on Prior Informed Consent for Chemicals
Trade, in New York (OES/ENV)
Feb 14
-- U.S./Mexico Fisheries Consultations, in Mexico City
(OES/OFA)
Feb 15-16
-- 6th Annual Meeting of the North American Commission, NASCO
(North American Salmon Conservation Organization), in
Hilton Head, South Carolina (OES/OFA)
Feb 15-17 -- 63rd Session of the OECD Fisheries Committee, in Paris
(OES/OFA)
Feb 16-17
-- NATO Science Committee, in Brussels (OES/SAT)
Feb 20-22 -- Policy and Legal Experts on Climate, in Ottawa (OES/ENV)
Feb 20-24
-- Bilateral Consultations with USSR on Navigation and
Related Law of the Sea Issues, in Washington (OES/OLP)
Feb 21-22 -- February IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, in Vienna
(OES/NTS)
- 1 -
Feb 21-22
-- U.S./Polish Science and Technology Experts Working Group,
in Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb 21-
-- Science and Technology Sub-Committee of the U.N. Committee
Mar 3
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in New York (OES/SAT)
Feb 21-
Mar 3
-- 25th (OES/CP) Session of the U.N. Population Commission, in New York
Feb 23-24
-- International Tropical Timber Organization Experts Meeting
on Forest Management, in Paris (OES/EHC)
Feb 27-
-- Meeting of Contracting Parties to the International North
Mar 1
Pacific Fisheries Commission, in Vancouver (OES/OFA)
Feb 27-
-- CITES Standing Committee, in Lausanne (OES/ENV)
Mar 3
Feb 27-
Mar 3
-- LASCAR (Safeguards For Large Reprocessing Plants) Working
Group I (Spent Fuel Storage), in Sellafield, U.K. (OES/NTS)
Feb 28
-- Yukon River Salmon Negotiations, Government-to-Government
Meeting, in Ottawa (OES/OFA)
Feb 28-
Mar 2
-- OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy,
in Paris (OES/SAT)
Feb 28-
-- ECE Senior Advisors Meeting on Environment and Water
Mar 3
Policy, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
Feb/March
-- [Tentative] Round I of U.S./Thai Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Bangkok or Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb/March
-- Critical Loads Working Group of the Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, in Europe (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- U.S./USSR Bilateral on Climate Change, in Moscow (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- Ad Hoc LRTAP Working Group on Volatile Organic Compounds,
in Europe, (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- ESCAP Expert Working Group to Prepare for the 1990 ESCAP
Ministerial (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- Proposed Foreign Science Counselors' Seminar, in
Washington (OES/SCT)
March
-- [Tentative] Round II of U.S./India Negotiations on IPR in
Science and Technology, in Washington (OES/SCT)
- 2 -
March
-- Safeguards (OES/NTS) Technical Bilateral with Japan, in Tokai Mura
March
-- Review of Physical Protection for Nuclear Material
Criterion, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
March
-- Intergovernmental Steering Committee Meeting on South
Pacific Regional Environment Programs, in Noumea (OES/ENV)
March
-- [Tentative] Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission/National Marine Fisheries Service (IATTC/NMFS)
Meeting on Dolphin Protection in Eastern Tropical Pacific
Tuna Purse-Seine Fishery (OES/OFA)
March
-- Intergovernmental Steering Committee Meeting on South
Pacific Regional Environmental Program, in Noumea (OES/ENV)
March
-- [Tentative] Round III of U.S./ROK Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Washington (OES/SCT)
March
-- U.S./Japan Discussion of Flag Tracking, in Tokyo (OES/NTS)
Mar 5-7
-- U.K./UNEP Ministerial on Substitutes and Alternatives to
Ozone-Depleting Substances, in London (OES/ENV)
Mar 6
-- Executive Committee Meeting of the Board of Governors of
the Binational Science Foundation, in Washington (OES/SCT)
Mar 7-9
-- OECD Chemicals Group/Management Committee Meeting, in
Paris (OES/ENV)
Mar 9-10
-- OECD (OES/ENV) Group on Energy and the Environment Meeting, in Paris
Mar 9-10
-- U.S./Pacific Island States Annual Meeting Under South
Pacific Fisheries Treaty, in Suva (OES/OFA)
Mar 12-17
-- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Marine
Environment (OES/OLP) Protection Committee Meeting, in London
Mar 13-15
-- Caribbean (OES/ENV) Land-Based Sources Protocol Meeting, in San Juan
Mar 13-22
-- UNEP Hazardous Waste Negotiations and Diplomatic
Conference to Sign Convention, in Basel (OES/ENV)
Mid/Late
March
-- [Tentative] Round III of U.S./PRC Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Beijing (OES/SCT)
- 3 -
Mar 19-23 -- Bilateral Negotiations with France on Legal Status and
Preservation of CSS Alabama (to serve as a prototype for
dealing with other historic wrecks within foreign
jurisdictions), in Paris (OES/OLP)
Mar 20-
-- Legal Sub-Committee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Apr 7
Uses of Outer Space, in New York (OES/SAT)
March-
-- [Tentative] Round II of U.S./Thai Science and Technology
April
Agreement Negotiations, in Bangkok or Washington (OES/SCT)
April
-- [Tentative] U.S./Turkey Science and Technology Agreement
Negotiations, in Ankara (OES/SCT)
April
-- [Tentative] U.S./Spain Science and Technology Agreement
Negotiations, in Madrid (OES/SCT)
Apr 3-6
-- OECD Waste Management Policy Group Meeting, in Paris
(OES/ENV)
Apr 3-7
-- Yukon River Salmon Negotiations, in Anchorage (OES/OFA)
Apr 3-7
-- Conference to Negotiate Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, in
Rome (OES/OFA)
Apr 3-12
-- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Marine
Environment Protection Committee Meeting, in London
(OES/OLP)
Apr 5-7
-- Monitoring Committee/Bureau Meeting on Caribbean
Environment Program, in Kingston (OES/ENV)
Apr 9-15
-- U.S./Polish Science and Technology Joint Commission, in
Poland (OES/SCT)
Apr 10-14 -- LDC Scientific Group, in London (OES/ENV)
Apr 10-14 -- FAO Committee on Fisheries, 18th Session, in Rome (OES/OFA)
Apr 10-14 -- SPAW Protocol Negotiating Session, in Kingston (OES/ENV)
Apr 16-28
-- International Conference on Maritime Salvage, in London
(OES/OLP)
Apr 19-21 -- OECD Environment Committee Meeting, in Paris (OES/ENV)
Apr 24
-- Consultative Meeting on Safeguards Termination Criteria
For Waste, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
- 4 -
Apr 24-27 -- LASCAR (Safeguards For Large Reprocessing Plants) Working
Group 2 (Process Areas), in Paris (OES/NTS)
Apr 25-26 -- U.S./Canada Beaufort Sea Environmental Discussions,
(OES/OSP)
Apr 26-29 -- First Meeting Parties to Vienna Convention on Protection
of the Ozone Layer, in Helsinki (OES/ENV)
Apr 27-28 -- OECD/NEA Steering Group Meeting (OES/NTS)
Apr 27-28 -- [Tentative] U.S./Japan Working Level Committee, in Tokyo
(OES/SCT)
Early May
-- [Tentative] Special Executive Secretaries Working Group
Meeting on Umbrella U.S./PRC Science and Technology
Cooperation Agreement, (OES/SCT)
May
-- [Tentative] Interim Meeting of the U.S./USSR
Intergovernmental Consultation Committee on Fisheries, in
Moscow (OES/OFA)
May
-- ECE VOC Task Force, in Karlsruhe (OES/ENV)
May
-- IEA Ministerial (OES/ENV & SAT)
May 2-5
-- First Meeting of Parties to Montreal Protocol on
Ozone-Depleting Substances, in Helsinki (OES/ENV)
May 5-10
-- International Hydrographic Organization Law of the Sea
Technical Workshop, in Monaco (OES/OLP)
May
-- Board of Governors Meeting of the Binational Industrial
(2nd week)
Research and Development Foundation, in Washington
(OES/SCT)
May 8-12
-- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Geneva,
(OES/ENV)
May 8-12
-- Preparatory Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, in
Paris (OES/OSP)
May 10-12 -- Annual Meeting of Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
in Paris (OES/OFA)
May 15-26 -- UNEP Governing Council, in Nairobi (OES/EHC & ENV)
May 16-24 -- 6th Session of the International Tropical Timber
Organization, in the Ivory Coast (OES/EHC)
- 5 -
May 17-24 -- 34th U.S./Yugoslav Science and Technology Joint Board, in
Yugoslavia (OES/SCT)
May 22
-- U.S./USSR Joint Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, in Moscow (OES/NTS)
May 22-
-- U.S./USSR JCM Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, in
June 2
Washington (OES/NTS)
Summer
-- Preparatory Committee Meeting for ECE WCED 1990 Bergen
Conference, in Oslo (OES/EHC)
June
-- ECE VOC Working Group, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
June
-- U.S./U.K. (OES/NTS) Safeguards Technical Bilateral, in Washington
June
-- IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
June
-- [Tentative] U.S./USSR Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in
Moscow (OES/NTS)
June
-- LDC Task Team on Liability, in London (OES/ENV)
June
-- Caribbean Land-Based Sources Protocol Meeting, in Panama
(OES/ENV)
June 5
-- U.S./USSR Joint Coordinating Commission on Civilian
Nuclear Reactor Safety, in Washington (OES/NTS)
June 5-9
-- U.N. Development Program (UNDP) Governing Council Review
of U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) Activities, in New York
(OES/CP)
June
5-17 -- WMO Executive Council, in Geneva (OES/SAT & ENV)
June
13-16 -- North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization Meeting,
in Edinburgh (OES/OFA)
June 19-23 -- LASCAR (Safeguards For Large Reprocessing Plants) Plenary,
in New York (OES/NTS)
June 26-28 -- Board of Governors Meeting of the Binational Science
Foundation, in Jerusalem (OES/SCT)
June 28-30 -- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in Nairobi
(OES/ENV)
July
-- U.S./FRG (OES/NTS) Safeguards Thermonuclear Bilateral, in Washington
- 6 -
July
-- London Dumping Convention Liability Meeting (OES/ENV)
July
-- U.S./France Safeguards Thermonuclear Bilateral, in
Washington (OES/NTS)
July
-- U.S./Euratom Safeguards Thermonuclear Bilateral, in
Washington (OES/NTS)
July 3-7
-- CITES Elephant Working Group, in Botswana (OES/EHC)
July 3-19 -- Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Assembly, in
Paris (OES/OSP)
Aug 14-15 -- Midnight Group Discussions on Deep Seabed Mining, in
Ottawa (OES/OLP)
September -- FAO Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics, in
Rome (OES/EHC)
September -- OECD Chemicals Group (OES/ENV)
Sep 25-29 -- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Legal Committee
Meeting on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, in London
(OES/OLP)
Sep 25-29 -- [Tentative] Science Counselors' Conference, in Washington
(OES/SCT)
October
-- Strategic Trade Officers Conference Asian Post not yet
selected (OES/SCT)
October
-- [Tentative] Joint Commission Meeting, U.S./PRC Science and
Technology Cooperation (OES/SCT)
Oct 9-20
-- CITES Conference of Parties, in Lausanne (OES/EHC)
Oct 23-27
-- International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Meeting, in
London (OES/OLP)
Oct 30-
-- London Dumping Convention Consultative Meeting, in London
Nov 3
(OES/ENV)
OES - T. Snead
- 7 -
CALENDAR OF UPCOMING INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EVENTS
Revised: January 17, 1989
January
-- U.S./Japan Discussion of Flag Tracking, in Tokyo (OES/NEC,
OES/NTS)
Jan 16-18 -- Joint High Level Advisory Panel (U.S./Japan Science and
Technology Agreement), in Tokyo (OES/SCT)
Jan 18-20 -- Tolba Ministerial on UNEP Role and Plans, (OES/EHC)
Jan 24-27 -- Department of State/Department of Interior Meeting on Maritime
Boundaries, in Denver (OES/OLP)
Jan 26-27 -- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I
(Science), in London (OES/ENV)
Jan 30
-- London Dumping Convention Annex Working Group, in London
(OES/ENV)
Jan 30-
-- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Response Strategies
Feb 1
Working Group, in Washington (OES/ENV)
Jan 30-
-- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II
Feb 1
(Impacts), in Moscow (OES/ENV)
Jan 30-
-- UNEP Hazardous Waste Agreement Negotiations, in Luxembourg
Feb 3
(OES/ENV)
Jan 30-
-- Second ASEAN Science and Technology Week, in Manila (OES/SAT)
Feb 4
Jan/Feb
-- [Tentative] U.S./FRG Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in Bonn
(OES/N)
Early Feb -- [Tentative] Round I of U.S./New Zealand Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Wellington or Washington (OES/SCT)
February
-- [Tentative] U.S./Spain Science and Technology Agreement
Negotiations, in Madrid (OES/SCT)
February
-- [Tentative] Round III of U.S./PRC Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Beijing (OES/SCT)
February
-- [Tentative] Round III of U.S./ROK Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Washington (OES/SCT)
- 1 -
February
-- Safeguards Technical Bilateral with Japan, in Tokai Mura
(OES/NTS)
February
-- [Tentative] U.S./U.K. Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in London
(OES/N)
February
-- [Tentative] Preparatory Meeting for First Meetings of Parties
to Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, in Geneva (OES/ENV
February
-- U.S./Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission, in
El Paso (OES/ENV)
February
-- ECE Experts on Fluidized Bed Combustion, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
Feb 6-7
-- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Bureau Meeting, in
Geneva (OES/ENV)
Feb 6-9
-- First Meeting of the U.S./USSR Intergovernmental Consultative
Committee on Fisheries, in Washington (OES/OFA)
Feb 13-15
-- ECE VOC Working Group, First Session, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
Feb 13-17 -- [Tentative] UNEP Meeting on Prior Informed Consent for
Chemicals Trade, in New York (OES/ENV)
Feb 13-17
-- UNEP Meeting on Prior Informed Consent for Chemicals Trade, in
New York (OES/ENV)
Feb 15-16
-- 6th Annual Meeting of the North American Commission, NASCO
(North American Salmon Conservation Organization), in
Hilton Head, South Carolina (OES/OFA)
Feb 15-17
-- 63rd Session of the OECD Fisheries Committee, in Paris (OES/OF)
Feb 20-22 -- U.S./USSR Bilateral on Climate Change, in Moscow (OES/ENV)
Feb 20-22
-- Policy and Legal Experts on Climate, in Ottowa (OES/ENV)
Feb 20-24
-- Bilateral Consultations with USSR on Navigation and Related Lav
of the Sea Issues, in Washington (OES/OLP)
Feb 21-22
-- February IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
Feb 21-22
-- [Tentative] U.S./Polish Science and Technology Working Group,
in Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb 23-24
-- International Tropical Timber Organization Experts Meeting on
Forest Management, in Paris (OES/EHC)
- 2 -
Feb 21-
-- 25th Session of the U.N. Population Commission, in New York
Mar 3
(OES/CP)
Feb 28-
-- ECE Senior Advisors Meeting on Environment and Water Policy,
Mar 3
in Geneva (OES/ENV)
Late Feb
-- Meeting of Contracting Parties to the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission, in Vancouver (OES/OFA)
Late Feb-
-- [Tentative] Round II of U.S./India Negotiations on IPR in
March
Science and Technology, in Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb 28-
-- Yukon River Salmon Negotiations, Government-to-Government
March
Meeting, in Vancouver (OES/OFA)
Feb/March
-- [Tentative] Round I of U.S./Thai Science and Technology
Agreement Negotiations, in Bangkok or Washington (OES/SCT)
Feb/March
-- Critical Loads Working Group of the Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution Convention, in Europe (OES/ENV)
Feb/March
-- CITES Standing Committee, in Lausanne (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- Ad Hoc LRTAP Working Group on Volatile Organic Compounds, in
Europe, (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- ESCAP Expert Working Group to Prepare for the 1990 ESCAP
Ministerial (OES/ENV)
Spring
-- Proposed Foreign Science Counselors' Seminar, in Washington
(OES/SCT)
March
-- Conference on Stratospheric Ozone, in Tokyo (OES/ENV)
March
-- Review of Physical Protection for Nuclear Material Criterion,
in Vienna (OES/NTS)
March
-- Intergovernmental Steering Committee Meeting on South Pacific
Regional Environment Programs, in Noumea (OES/ENV)
March
-- [Tentative] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in
Europe, (OES/ENV)
March
-- [Tentative] Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission/National
Marine Fisheries Service (IATTC/NMFS) Meeting on Dolphin
Protection in Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Purse-Seine Fishery
(OES/OFA)
March
-- ECE LRTAP Working Group on Abatement Strategies, in Geneva
(OES/ENV)
- 3 -
March
-- ECE Task Force on Integrated Assessment, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
March
-- [Tentative] U.S./Turkey Science and Technology Agreement
Negotiations, in Ankara (OES/SCT)
March
-- Intergovernmental Steering Committee Meeting on South Pacific
Regional Environmental Program, in Noumea (OES/ENV)
March
-- UNEP Climate Impacts Meeting, in Boulder (NCAR) (OES/ENV)
Mar 5-7
-- UK/UNEP Ministerial on Substitutes and Alternatives to
Ozone-Depleting Substances, in London (OES/ENV)
Mar 6
-- Executive Committee Meeting of the Board of Governors of the
Binational Science Foundation, in Washington (OES/SCT)
Mar 7-9
-- OECD Chemicals Group/Management Committee Meeting, in Paris
(OES/ENV)
Mar 9-10
-- OECD Group on Energy and the Environment Meeting, in Paris
(OES/ENV)
Mar 9-10
-- U.S./Pacific Island States Annual Meeting Under South Pacific
Fisheries Treaty, in Suva (OES/OFA)
Mar 12-17 -- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Marine Environment
Protection Committee Meeting, in London (OES/OLP)
Mar 13-15 -- Caribbean Land-Based Sources Protocol Meeting, in San Juan
(OES/ENV)
Mar 13-17 -- UNEP Hazardous Waste Negotiations, in Basel (OES/ENV)
Mar 13-22 -- UNEP Hazardous Waste Negotiations and Diplomatic Conference to
Sign Convention, in Basel (OES/ENV)
Mar 19-23 -- Bilateral Negotiations with France on Legal Status and
Preservation of CSS Alabama (to serve as a prototype for
dealing with other historic wrecks within foreign
jurisdictions), in Paris (OES/OLP)
Mar 20-22 -- Diplomatic Conference to Sign Hazardous Waste Convention, in
Basel (OES/ENV)
March-
-- [Tentative] Round II of U.S./Thai Science and Technology
April
Agreement Negotiations, in Bangkok or Washington (OES/SCT)
April
-- Consultative Meeting on Safeguards Termination Criteria For
Waste, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
- 4 -
April
-- First Meeting of Parties to Montreal Protocol, in Europe
(OES/ENV)
Apr 3-6
-- OECD Waste Management Policy Group Meeting, in Paris (OES/ENV)
Apr 3-7
-- First Meeting Parties to Vienna Convention on Protection of the
Ozone Layer, in Vienna (OES/ENV)
Apr 3-7
-- Yukon River Salmon Negotiations, in Anchorage (OES/OFA)
Apr 3-7
-- Conference to Negotiate Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, in Rome
(OES/OFA)
Apr 3-12
-- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Marine Environment
Protection Committee Meeting, in London (OES/OLP)
Apr 10-12 -- First Meeting Parties to Montreal Protocol, in Helsinki
(OES/ENV)
Apr 10-14 -- LDC Scientific Group, in London (OES/ENV)
Apr 10-14 -- FAO Committee on Fisheries, 18th Session, in Rome (OES/OFA)
Apr 16-28 -- International Conference on Maritime Salvage, in London
(OES/OLP)
Apr 17-21 -- SPAW Protocol Negotiating Session, in Kingston (OES/ENV)
Apr 19-21 -- OECD Environment Committee Meeting, in Paris (OES/ENV)
Apr 24-26 -- Monitoring Committee/Bureau Meeting on Caribbean Environment
Program, in Kingston (OES/ENV)
Apr 24-27 -- LASCAR (Safeguards For Large Reprocessing Plants) Working
Group 2 (Process Areas), in Paris (OES/NTS)
Apr 25-26 -- U.S./Canada Beaufort Sea Environmental Discussions, (OES/OSP)
Apr 27-28 -- OECD/NEA Steering Group Meeting (OES/NTS)
Early May -- [Tentative] Special Executive Secretaries Working Group Meeting
on Umbrella U.S./PRC Science and Technology Cooperation
Agreement, (OES/SCT)
May
-- 34th U.S./Yugoslav Science and Technology Joint Board, in
Yugoslavia (OES/SCT)
May
-- FAO Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics, in Rome
(OES/ENV)
- 5 -
May
-- ECE LRTAP Task Force on Exchange of Technology, in Geneva
(OES/ENV)
May
-- ECE LRTAP Workshop on Effects of Water and Soil Acidification
on Materials, in Sweden (OES/ENV)
May
-- ECE LRTAP Workshop on Effects of Water and Soil Acidification
of Alpine Lakes, in Verbania-Pallanza (OES/ENV)
May
-- ECE LRTAP Program Task Force on Forests, in Helsinki (OES/ENV)
May
-- ECE LRTAP Task Force on Exchange of Technology (OES/ENV)
May
-- ECE VOC Task Force, in Karlsruhe (OES/ENV)
May
-- IEA Ministerial (OES/ENV & SAT)
May
-- Board of Governors Meeting of the Binational Industrial
(2nd week)
Research and Development Foundation, in Washington (OES/SCT)
May 5-10
-- International Hydrographic Organization Law of the Sea
Technical Workshop, in Monaco (OES/OLP)
May 8-12
-- Preparatory Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, in Paris
(OES/OSP)
May 15-26 -- UNEP Governing Council, in Nairobi (OES/EHC & ENV)
May 16-24 -- 6th Session of the International Tropical Timber Organization,
in the Ivory Coast (OES/EHC)
May 17-19 -- Annual Meeting of Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, in
Paris (OES/OFA)
May 22
-- U.S./USSR Joint Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, ir
Moscow (OES/NTS)
Summer
-- Preparatory Committee Meeting for ECE WCED 1990 Bergen
Conference, in Oslo (OES/EHC)
June
-- ECE VOC Working Group, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
June
-- IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, in Vienna (OES/NTS)
June
-- [Tentative] U.S./USSR Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, in Moscow
(OES/NTS)
June
-- LDC Task Team on Liability, in London (OES/ENV)
- 6 -
June
-- Caribbean Land-Based Sources Protocol Meeting, in Panama
(OES/ENV)
June 5-9
-- UN Development Program (UNDP) Governing Council Review of UN
Population Fund (UNFPA) Activities, in New York (OES/CP)
June 5-17 -- WMP Executive Council, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
June 13-16 -- North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization Meeting, in
Edinburgh (OES/OFA)
June 26-28 -- Board of Governors Meeting of the Binational Science
Foundation, in Jerusalem (OES/SCT)
June 28-30 -- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in Nairobi (OES/ENV)
July 3-7 -- CITES Elephant Working Group, in Botswana (OES/EHC)
July 3-19 -- Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Assembly, in Paris
(OES/OSP)
Aug 14-15 -- Midnight Group Discussions on Deep Seabed Mining, in Ottawa
(OES/OLP)
September -- ECE Working Group on Critical Loads, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
September -- ECE Working Group on Effects, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
September -- ECE EMEP Steering Body, in Geneva (OES/ENV)
September -- OECD Chemicals Group (OES/ENV)
Sep 25-29 -- International Maritime Organization (IMO) Legal Committee
Meeting on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, in London (OES/OLP)
Sep 25-29 -- [Tentative] Science Counselors' Conference, in Washington
(OES/SCT)
Oct 23-27 -- International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Meeting, in
London (OES/OLP)
OES - T. Snead
- 7 -
Siv of Tech
belo
Language for the President's Science Speech on 3/3/89
Scientific and technological advancement have always been at the
very heart of our Nation's pioneer spirit, pushing the boundaries
of our knowledge, creating economic opportunity, increasing our
standard of living, and making this a healthier and safer world
in which to live. It is scientific advancements that made us
aware of the damage to our Earth's protective ozone layer, and
the need to reduce "CFCs" (chlorofluorocarbons) that deplete our
precious upper atmospheric resources.
As a result of these advancements, the United States and other
nations have led the way through the Montreal Protocol towards
reductions of CFCs. That Protocol will reduce CFCs to 50 percent
of 1986 levels by the year 1998. However, recent studies
indicate that this 50 percent reduction may not be enough.
Thus, I have directed Bill Reilly, our EPA Administrator, to join
with other nations this weekend in supporting the call for
eliminating CFCs by the year 2000 provided that safe substitutes
are available. Of course, such a phase-out must be guided by the
scientific, economic and technological assessments under the
Protocol.
plo file
issues,
science + technology
Mgmt d admin:
Cooperative Production ventures
STATEMENT
OF
CHARLES F. RULE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANTITRUST DIVISION
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATION AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION VENTURES
ON
FEBRUARY 27, 1989
Chairman Wyden, Chairman Eckart, and Members of the
Subcommittees:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
present the views of the Department of Justice on proposals to
encourage and improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in
worldwide markets by clarifying or altering the application of
the antitrust laws to cooperative production ventures.
Cooperative production ventures can frequently increase rather
than diminish competition; thus, the antitrust laws should not
be a barrier to their formation. Recently, the Department has
worked to ensure that its antitrust enforcement policy does not
chill the formation of legitimate cooperative ventures. The
most significant part of that effort has been the recent
publication of the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations, which describe in detail and by way
of example, the Department's analysis of cooperative ventures.
Despite the Department's efforts and the considerable
improvement in the sensitivity that the courts have shown
toward cooperative ventures, there is reason to believe that
the threat of private antitrust challenge may be deterring the
formation of legitimate--perhaps even essential--ccoperative
ventures. There is concern in some parts of the business
community and the government that uncertainty as to the
standard for review of such ventures under the antitrust
laws coupled with the threat of treble damage liability in
private suits can provide a substantial disincentive to such
ventures, even when they promise substantially to increase
production efficiency and promote competitiveness. While the
Administration has not as yet determined whether, or in what
form, legislation in this area is necessary or appropriate, the
Department of Justice wholeheartedly endorses congressional
consideration of this problem at this time.
Scientific and technical advances have been made with
dazzling speed in recent years. U.S. firms and government
laboratories have been in the forefront of the research and
development leading to many of these advances. U.S. strength
in research, however, has not always been matched in bringing
the products made possible by that research to the market.
Today's increased pace of innovation has made it more
imperative than ever that U.S. firms be in a position to
respond quickly with state-of-the-art production facilities if
the U.S. economy is to benefit fully from these technological
advances.
Cooperative production ventures may be one of the most
effective ways for U.S. firms to improve their
competitiveness. The costs of commercializing new technology
may be too high for any one firm to bear. In addition, the
- 2 -
pace of innovation has resulted in short life-cycles for many
products, increasing the risks of investing in short-lived
production facilities and demanding extremely quick reaction
time.
Perhaps even more importantly, the increasing
"globalization" of markets, particularly those incorporating
advanced technologies, dramatically reduces the risk that
cooperative efforts among some competitors will result in
higher prices to American consumers. For example, a venture
among American firms to produce D-RAMS (dynamic-random access
memory semiconductors) would not likely be able to exercise
market power because of the overwhelming capacity of Japanese
and European firms. The presence of foreign competition, then
not only provides the stimulus for cooperative ventures--if
American companies do not at times cooperate, they may find
themselves driven from the market by their more efficient
foreign rivals; foreign competition also often can protect U.S.
consumers from anticompetitive activities that production joint
ventures might otherwise allow.
Antitrust Uncertainty AS A Possible Deterrent
TO Cooperative Production Ventures
U.S. firms may be deterred from the use of cooperative
solutions to their problems by perceived potential antitrust
liability. These firms should have nothing to fear from
- 3 -
federal enforcement of the antitrust laws. As recently spelled
out in the Department's Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations, we have developed a rational and sympathetic
enforcement policy toward joint ventures of all types. Most
significantly, those Guidelines do not automatically condemn
joint production ventures. They require the recognition of
foreign competition where it exists, and ensure that potential
efficiencies will not be ignored. Regardless of the
improvement represented by the Guidelines, however, our
antitrust laws rely on private as well as public enforcement.
The fear of a private action for treble damages (and attorneys
fees) can be an even more powerful deterrent to conduct than
the fear of government action.
The cooperative effort involved in joint production
ventures should not raise any presumptions of antitrust
concern. The antitrust laws were enacted to protect U.S.
consumers from the unilateral or concerted exercise of market
power. Strong foreign challenges in many of today's markets--
including particularly evolving markets employing new,
sophisticated technologies--make it unlikely that cooperative
production ventures among U.S. firms would give those firms the
ability to exercise market power and harm competitors and
consumers.
- 4 -
Indeed, cooperative production ventures often have the
potential for substantial competitive and economic benefits
that promote and enhance competition. The antitrust laws
proscribe only concerted activities that unreasonably restrain
trade. Over the years as those laws have been applied, some
activities, such as price fixing and bid rigging, have been
demonstrated virtually always to result in an unreasonable
restraint and are properly considered unlawful per se. No
procompetitive justifications may be presented in such cases.
Other activities, including particularly joint ventures, often
promote rather than restrain competition, and thus must not be
analysed under a per se standard but rather under the "rule of
reason" which requires consideration of the procompetitive
benefits of any challenged activity.
Cooperative production ventures offer a number of potential
procompetitive benefits: sharing the often substantial risks
inherent in bringing new technology to the marketplace;
realizing economies of scale where an efficient output for a
production facility would be beyond the needs of any one firm;
achieving efficiencies in the purchases of supplies or in
transportation; garnering economies of scope where a joint
facility may produce more efficiently a variety of products to
meet the needs of different producers; utilizing synergies
arising from complementary skills or assets of the parties;
- 5 -
and reducing transaction costs in transferring to the
production process important research information belonging to
the parties. In sum, cooperative production ventures can
capture many of the efficiencies of a merger with the advantage
of preserving the independence of the firms outside the
production process.
These potential benefits should not be lost because of fear
that the risk of antitrust liability is high. As the Attorney
General recently stated, "The U.S. economy can ill afford the
burden of such fear." Therefore, legislation may be needed to
alleviate any chilling effect of the antitrust laws on the
ability of U.S. firms to produce in most efficient manners, and
become or remain effective competitors in evolving domestic and
international markets. We support and commend the
consideration being given throughout the public and private
sectors to proposals to ameliorate antitrust uncertainty in
this regard.
Possible Legislative Approaches
The Department does believe that legislation can be
developed that improves the antitrust legal climate for
cooperative production ventures but at the same time safeguards
the interests of competition. Such legislation would remove
any artificial barriers to procompetitive conduct, but take
- 6 -
adequate care to protect consumers from unreasonable restraints
of trade. Two basic approaches to such legislation recently
have been much discussed. One could provide greater antitrust
certainty for potential venturors through a high level of
government involvement; the other could greatly reduce the
potential risk of an antitrust challenge with minimal
government intervention. These approaches are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and could be complementary.
Under the first approach potential venturors would seek
prior review and approval by the government of their
cooperative production venture. Such a review, conducted by
one or more government agencies, (the Departments of Justice
and Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission have been most
frequently mentioned) would focus on the likely competitive
consequences of the venture using a sound, market power
oriented rule of reason analysis. All relevant information,
including of course the potential procompetitive benefits
discussed above, would be examined. Upon a determination that
a venture would not be likely to affect adversely competition
in the relevant markets, it would be certified.
Certification would insulate the covered conduct from
challenge under the antitrust laws. This approach could thus
provide a great deal of certainty to joint venturors who might
otherwise be inhibited by the potential for costly antitrust
- 7 -
litigation. The price of that certainty is a significant
commitment of time and expense related to the review and
certification process, and to monitoring a certified venture's
competitive effects. Certification might also inhibit the
flexibility of some cooperative ventures in adopting innovative
structures in an attempt to enhance their efficiency, although
care in designing and administering a certificate program might
ameliorate this problem.
Consumers' interests would be protected in two ways under
this approach. First, the careful competitive review by the
government prior to certification should ensure that the
proposed conduct was not anticompetitive. Second, the
government would monitor the actual effect of the venture
through periodic review of its activities to discover and to
ameliorate any emerging threats to competition. Upon finding
that the venture or the surrounding circumstances had changed
so as to threaten a restraint of trade, the government could
modify or revoke a certificate. Subsequent conduct that was no
longer certificated would be subject to antitrust challenge.
This first approach is similar in many respects to that
enacted to encourage export trade activities by U.S. firms as
part of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Under the
ETCA, applicants may receive a certification from the Secretary
of Commerce (with the concurrence of the Attorney General) that
- 8 -
their proposed export trade conduct would not have any adverse
competitive effects in the United States or injure any domestic
export competitor. Conduct certified under the Export Trading
Company Act is not subject to direct challenge under the
antitrust laws. However, the Act does allow private parties to
challenge export trading company conduct that does not comply
with the statutory standards for certification and to obtain
injunctive relief or actual damages. A number of firms have
availed themselves of the provisions of the Act; there are
currently approximately 90 export trade certificates
outstanding. One of the Act's most valuable features for
certificate holders is that it virtually eliminates uncertainty
about possible private antitrust suits that threaten punitive
treble damages. Moreover, I have been informed that the
Department of Commerce believes that management of the ETC Act
has worked smoothly, and that the Act appears quite successful
in achieving its goal of encouraging beneficial cooperative
exporting ventures that business otherwise would decline to
pursue because of antitrust uncertainty.
The second approach would not completely immunize any
activity from challenge under the antitrust laws, but would
reduce the deterrent effect of such potential challenges by
ensuring that the correct antitrust analysis is conducted and
by providing an opportunity for cooperative production
- 9 -
venturors to limit any possible antitrust liability to actual
damages. Under this approach courts would be required to
analyze any challenged joint production venture under the "rule
of reason" rather than the more restrictive per se rule. This
would guarantee that the venture's procompetitive benefits are
given full consideration.
Venturors seeking further protection could notify the
government as to the identity of the parties to the venture and
the nature and objectives of the venture. The outlines of the
venture would become public, and disclosure would reduce the
parties' potential antitrust liability to actual damages plus 11)
reasonable attorney's fee.
Under this second approach, consumers would be protected
because no immunity from the antitrust laws would be conveyed
and both public and private enforcers would retain their
ability to bring suit against a particular venture when they
have adequate proof that the venture actually would have
anticompetitive effects. Moreover, because of the public
notification provision, an antitrust suit seeking injunctive
relief could be brought at the earliest possible time, before
any substantial competitive harm had occurred. Joint ventures
could then proceed with their legitimate business activities
free from the threat of subsequent private treble-damage
- 10 -
suits. In addition, the costs of this approach to both the
government and the venturors would be minimal; virtually nc
government involvement or regulation in the structuring and
supervision of the venture would be required. On the other
hand, this second approach would not provide the same degree of
certainty as a certification program.
This second approach was taken by Congress in 1984 in the
National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) to encourage
innovation through joint research and development ventures.
That Act could be extended with but limited revisions to cover
joint production ventures as well.
The Department has been managing the implementation of the
NCRA and we have found it to be quite successful. More than
125 notifications covering a wide range of research and
development activities have been filed since the Act went into
effect. We presume that an even larger number of ventures were
sufficiently encouraged by clarification regarding the proper
antitrust analysis of joint ventures under the rule of reason
that they found the reduction of any possible damage liability
through notification unnecessary. And as I mentioned earlier,
these positive effects were accomplished without imposing
regulatory burdens on private enterprise or the enforcement
agencies.
- 11 -
To summarize, we have been told that U.S. competitiveness
may be being inhibited by a perception that the antitrust risks
of cooperative production ventures are too great. As I have
discussed here today, most such ventures do not pose risks to
competition and would not be held to violate the antitrust
laws. To the extent that greater reassurance to U.S. firms is
needed, a certification procedure or an extension of the NCRA
could provide more certainty while fully protecting the
interests of the public.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
address any question that the Members of the Subcommittees may
have.
- 12 -
Prepared by Rep Don Ritter for Jim Pinkerton & Bush Campaign.
Leading America to Quality
America still leads the world in many key products and services
based on science and technology. In recent years great
advances have been made in the ability of the American worker
to compete with the best, worldwide. The American people
have witnessed turnarounds of whole factories, whole
companies and whole communities. But they also know that
there is something wrong when the VCR, Compact Disc and now
the remarkable advance in television, High Definition TV (HDTV),
are wholly owned by the Japanese.
In so many cases the answer to foreign success, and ours too, is
an abiding focus on Quality. Such Quality is within the reach of
the entire American enterprise. It's part of a revolution that's
already begun
a human resources revolution that changes
the American workplace by placing new value on workers as
important, thinking, caring, contributing human beings
That's is quite a change for corporations and management in
America. The former president of Notre Dame, Rev. Theodore
Hesburgh, intimated at what's needed to make Quality work
when he said, "It's always struck me that there is only one letter
difference between quality and equality."
This is an industrial revolution with emphasis on people, not
machines
where worker training, education and teamwork
lead to unprecedented mastery over the job to be done.
It is estimated that 25% to 30% of our work product is waste,
scrap, mistakes and so on. Those are enormous losses in all
walks of life
public as well as private. Reduce those losses,
and gains follow naturally
tremendous gains.
By empowering American workers with the proper tools and
training them in a work process that systematically reduces
mistakes and constantly improves, we give them a tremendous
boost to be creative and productive. We give them
2
responsibility, recognition and reward
a new lease on work
life -- union and non-union alike. And in SO many instances, our
workers have responded with striking enthusiasm and
performance. When it's all said and done, remarkable gains are
made at the bottom-line.
The movement towards Quality entails constant improvement
as a way of work and as a way of life. "Be all that you can be"
may apply far more to the job-site than to the U.S. Army as
people in unprecedented ways take part in the success of the
team, the group, the company, the institution. People given the
chance to fulfill their God-given potential is what it's all about.
With respect, recognition, the right training and the right tools,
the American worker is second to none. But even more
encouraging, there are signs that if Quality principles are
followed and teamwork and training serve as the base, the
rugged individualism of the American worker propels him
beyond even his vaunted Japanese counterpart. That's exciting!
Just like certain managers have motivated their sports teams
to win championships or their companies to be the best in the
world, political leaders must begin to do the same for this
country. I believe the political leaders who lead America to
Quality will ultimately lead America. That's what I'd like to do
as the next President of the United States.
As President, I will bring this Quality message, that has made
believers out of workers and top executives alike, to the entire
nation
not just to business, but to education and government
as well.
And, what about government? Can anyone think of a better
place to apply Quality principles? The federal government
spends over one trillion dollars a year and given the nature of
bureaucratic inefficiency, we're talking about a raw potential of
hundreds of billions in savings! Realistically, potential savings
are a lot less but we could be talking about tens of billions, plus
3
better service to the people plus a reformed reward system
that makes government workers not only more productive but
happier as well.
In sum, we Americans need not shrink from competition. We're
up there in the economic Olympics and competition is good; it
has brought us better cars, TV's, computers, homes and SO much
more that contributes to the standard of living we enjoy.
Competition has shown us the need for Quality. And, it is
through a commitment to Quality that we will improve our jobs,
our standard of living and our future.
America, let's go get it done!
For more information please contact Congressman Don Ritter (202) 225-6411
Quality Plank for GOP Platform
A new industrial revolution is sweeping the American
workplace, a revolution that involves people more than
machines. It's the Quality revolution and it places new value on
workers as important, thinking, caring, and contributing
participants. Through proven road maps to Quality, employees,
at all levels, constantly improve the way work is done. Errors
are reduced and the work process is made more efficient, more
productive and more enjoyable. The result is a higher quality
product and service that is also less costly. In short, a Quality
emphasis makes American workers more competitive and
provides better places to work. We are committed to
encouraging American business and government to adopt
Quality principles. Through Quality, our nation can become
more competitive and government services can be improved and
made less costly. The potential is enormous for "Made in the
USA" to be the label of choice worldwide. Through Quality, we
strengthen our nation.
Hardin County Chamber of Commerce
Elizabethtown, Kentucky March 20, 1989
Keynote Address
U.S. Rep. Don Ritter
Quality and American Competitiveness - Create a Revival in Your
Community.
Introduction
It is a great pleasure to be here as the keynote speaker for Community Quality Kick-Off Day and to talk
about Quality. As most of you know, the term Quality refers to a whole new management and work
philosophy, based ultimately on common sense and a belief in the value of individual workers fulfilling
their potential as members of a larger team.
What is Quality ?
Quality is part of a new industrial revolution which emphasizes people as more important than
machines and which gives people real power to use technology to its fullest--an industrial revolution
where worker involvement, training, education, teamwork, and reward can lead to unprecedented
mastery over the job to be done and satisfaction from doing it well. Workers become more their own
managers and automation or technology simply expands their power. That is a revolutionary idea.
Quality puts less emphasis on directly cutting costs to increase profits and instead focuses on improving
the whole process by which a product is manufactured or a service is delivered. Perfecting the process
perfects the product--a simple but stunning conclusion. The prime goal is to empower people to be
active players, not cogs in a machine. Constant improvement is built into the process which delivers
products or services that more and more meet customers' needs and expectations.
What Does Quality Mean to Us ?
Experts estimate that from 25% to 40% of the average company's resources are wasted in "production"
or on correcting mistakes. That means vast billions of dollars down the drain. Companies that focus on
Quality gain the advantage because, through improvements in the way they work together to produce or
to service, they waste fewer resources. They do things right the first time.
Not enough Americans understand that the main driving force behind Japan's success is its almost 40-
year commitment to continuous improvement and Quality. VCRs, compact discs, Toyotas, and now HDTV
didn't just happen by dumb luck in Japan. Quality principles originating in America and refined in
Japan had a lot to do with it.
Quality, then--in services as well as in manufacturing--gives us an opportunity to make our workers
happier and more productive, our nation more competitive and our government more efficient.
The Lehigh Valley
Quality is particularly important to me because I represent one of the most manufacturing-intensive
districts in the nation. The Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania has been heavily dependent on manufacturing
since the days of the industrial revolution, when the Lehigh Canal carried coal to America's emerging
iron and steel industry.
My district is the home of big companies like Bethlehem Steel, Mack Trucks, AT&T, plus Bell Labs, Air
Products and Chemicals and cement firms. There's still plenty of basic manufacturing like Fuller
Company for cement equipment and Stanley Vidmar for industrial storage. We make Crayola crayons
3
Since its founding, Quality Valley, USA has had four major accomplishments.
The first is to organize some 40 top executives from business and leaders in education into a Leadership
and Policy Group to provide commitment, resources, and guidance to the overall efforts. The members
of the Leadership and Policy Group include the chairmen of such diverse companies as Air Products &
Chemicals, Fuller, Pennsylvania Power and Light, and the Lehigh Valley Bank, to name just four. This
diverse membership demonstrates that Quality is important to all sectors of the economy, not just
manufacturing.
The second is to establish periodic quality familiarization meetings for representatives from local
businesses and other institutions. Associated with this is a "self help" group of executives and quality
managers who seek to share, pool, and learn from their counterparts. Group members meet to compare
quality programs and to learn from each other's experiences, their successes and mistakes. Nationally
recognized speakers, including Tom Peters, author of In Search of Excellence. have shared their
expertise with local leaders. Specialists from industry have presented programs on technical topics
such as "process cost driver accounting." The 3M Company, who were originally responsible for
getting Air Products going on Quality, put on a workshop titled "Managing Total Quality." Local
executives organized a workshop on "Top Management Commitment to Quality Improvement." Training
activities and opportunities have begun out of Quality Valley.
We have also increased the quality consciousness of local educational institutions so that they
themselves could begin to offer coordinated quality training This tied in nicely with the emerging
interests of Northampton Community College and of Lehigh University, which developed a new training
program in response.
The fourth (which is still in process) is to begin working to establish a Quality Valley, USA
headquarters to serve as a focal point for nurturing and expanding this effort. Working through the
larger Chambers of Commerce, this headquarters will be responsible for extensively communicating
the quality message to the Lehigh Valley. It has created bumper stickers and decals for windows to be
distributed to advertise Quality and Quality Valley, USA. This group will become the regional
operations arm, continuing to conduct the lecture series with important speakers.
Most interestingly, the group will have the responsibility for coming up with a panel to pass judgment
on Lehigh Valley Quality programs so as to give the "Quality Valley" seal of approval to Lehigh Valley
products and services "shipped" locally, over the USA, and the world (another product/service from
Quality Valley!).
Chambers of Commerce Can Initiate Similar Regional Movements to Accelerate the
Onset of Quality Principles in the U.S.
If our nation is to compete effectively, we'll need regional movements to accelerate the broad societal
acceptance of quality improvement. Our focus on the region is based on the contention that competition
requires American business to learn about Quality quickly, and that work with educational institutions,
local governments and private groups can help. Business, by itself, cannot offer all the educational
support or marshal the community's diverse leadership to promote a culture of Quality.
To compete effectively in the world market we must find more ways to work together as a community
toward common goals with common means. Chambers of Commerce and their members can play a role
in encouraging and facilitating such movements. Allow me to offer some advice as to how to make such
an effort successful.
How To
2
and Lutron dimmers. Our area incorporates some of America's leading industrial parks for an area its
size, replacing job contraction with job expansion. It is the home of one of the most industry-oriented,
research and engineering universities in America, Lehigh University, and the nationally recognized,
State-sponsored, program of smaller business support, the Ben Franklin Partnership. It is the home
of a dynamic new, state-initiated, public-private effort, the manufacturing services extension center
(MSEC). Both the Ben Franklin Partnership and MSEC are getting deeply involved in Quality.
The Origin of Quality Valley, USA
Like much of the rest of the country, the traditional industries in the Lehigh Valley have been hard hit
by international competition. While government policies relating to budgets, taxes, investment and
regulation can all play important roles in helping American business in the Lehigh Valley and
elsewhere meet this competition, it has become obvious to a lot of people that the first answer to the
problem of competition is in the Quality of the work product. On this, our jobs, our standard of living,
and our future all depend.
That means the work product from the chairman to the janitor
from the president of a company to a
file clerk in the mail room
and each and every worker in between. The value of each job, of each
worker, to the team is much more important than we ever used to think or were taught.
In 1987 I and a number of CEOs set out to initiate a movement in the Lehigh Valley to promote quality.
Borrowing on California's "Silicon Valley," we dubbed the effort in the Lehigh Valley "Quality Valley,
USA". I thought of it as an experimental laboratory where, if it was successful in accelerating a
broad-based quality movement, it would not only help existing companies turn to Quality but also help
to attract the best jobs and the best companies to the area, and it could be a model for other regions to
follow. Its mission is "to promote Quality in the Lehigh Valley as a way of work and as a way of life, and
to have the Valley recognized for this commitment."
Quality Valley's Goals.
Our idea in forming Quality Valley, USA was that the organization would have an impact on people as
individuals in their workplaces, in government, in education, and in the community. Specifically it
would do these things:
First, provide an organized community approach to stimulate institutions to adopt total Quality
management.
Second, provide a mutual support system for individuals and companies involved in Quality.
Third, provide a central bank of information and resources for people involved in Quality.
And fourth, build a sense of community purpose for economic strength and continued growth.
To
have the Lehigh Valley recognized regionally and nationwide for Quality (Quality Valley, USA).
These goals are expressed in Quality Valley's formal statement of principles:
"We believe dedication to the quality principles of continuous improvement, satisfying customer
expectations, using the insights and strengths of employees, and measuring conformance with stated
product or service goals, will improve the quality of work-life and work-product in the Lehigh Valley,
making area workers, businesses, and educational institutions more competitive in national and
international markets."
What Quality Valley Has Done
5
carefully with whom you work. Get yourself some additional CEO or community leader champions and
help them get out front.
Involve the media. Publicity won't educate in-depth, but it will attract interest while you attempt to
sell the message. Some media themselves will wish to participate. That's what happened to the largest
news medium from our region, the MORNING CALL newspaper.
Big events that people enjoy attending, and publicizing of key successes, will help attract others to your
effort. Should meetings be open to the press? It's a judgment call, and we didn't do it initially, but
looking back on our experience, I'd say yes. This is something that, in large part, belongs to the
community and that only the community can accomplish.
Rewarding Quality The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Awards
It is extremely important to reward and promote outstanding Quality work in your own company.
Reward and recogntion are mother's milk to Quality achievement. Beyond internal reward is the
reward that society places on Quality. The outstanding example is the new Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award. Named for the late Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce from 1981 until 1987,
this award recognizes businesses which have achieved excellence in manufacturing or in services.
Jointly administered by the federal government and the private sector, the Baldrige Award is America's
highest recognition for achieving Quality. It could in time rival the Nobel Prize in capturing the
imagination of the American people. In former President Reagan's words, the Baldrige Award .offers
a vehicle for companies, large and small, in manufacturing and in services, to examine their own
approaches to Quality. It offers companies a standard with which to compare their own progress to that
of the country's very best. "
Baldrige Awards were first made in 1988--the first winners were Motorola, Westinghouse's
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division, and Globe Metallurgical. Motorola was recognized for a highly
successful program that began in 1981 to achieve a tenfold improvement in the Quality of its products
and services. Its target was what is called "Six Sigma Quality," a statistical term that translates into no
more than 3.4 defects per million products, including customer service.
Westinghouse Commercial Fuel Division took as its objective to be recognized as the world's best
supplier of nuclear fuel. It adopted a policy of making every action by every employee a Quality
initiative. The guiding principle was customer satisfaction, whether the customer was the ultimate
recipient of the product or the next person in the process. The payoff has been truly impressive. At a
time when the nuclear power industry is widely perceived as declining, the values of Westinghouse's
new orders in 1987 were the highest in a decade.
Globe Metallurgical decided to become the lowest cost and highest quality producer of ferroalloys and
silicon metal in the U.S. They did this at a time when most of their domestic competitors were closing
plants. The entire company joined in an improvement system called Quality, Efficiency, and Cost.
Quality committees were established at all levels. The result was a dramatic rise in sales and market
share and the return of profitability to a company that could have been part of an overall decline in its
industry.
Quoting former President Reagan again, each of these corporations reflects
"American industry's dedication to Quality. Each of them and thousands of others help keep America
strong by making American products the best products available. They and others like them exemplify
the belief that Quality counts first, foremost, and always. The one trait that characterizes these
winners is a never-ending process, a company-wide effort in which every worker plays a critical
part. They realize that customer satisfaction through better Quality is the goal. They know that
America's economic strength and future depend more and more upon the Quality of its products
4
From the outset, make the goals and implications of quality improvement understandable and
meaningful to the average person. Most people in our communities don't understand quality the way we
do, as a way of work, a way of life. And they are very wary of catchy terms that promise big results.
Words and phrases like "quality," and "new and improved," are to many people just another way of
providing some kernel of truth for a marketing campaign or a new exhortation of the workers to
achieve higher productivity.
Start to organize your community efforts with assistance from the other top leaders from your local
industry. Many of them will know what you're talking about and some will actually be doing it. Then
they can help to recruit educational leaders from different levels of the education system to, at the
least, expose them. Enlist the leaders and resources of local business groups, trade associations, and
educational institutions. Certain elected officials on your advice or urging may wish to adopt a Quality
approach for their jurisdiction.
Develop meaningful ways for people to take action within their respective institutions. Make certain
the groups you are trying to reach have action options. Be ready to answer the question, "So, I'm
interested; what can I do?"
Have realistic expectations. It may take years before people understand what Quality improvement is
all about. Air Products & Chemicals, for example, has trained thousands of employees. It took them
over two years just to get everyone to understand what the company wanted to do. Be prepared for the
long haul. What we're talking about is culture change, attitude change. Those don't come easily, if ever.
Don't lose hope. Remember, the Japanese, in their own way, have been at this for more than 30 years
and they're still moving ahead. Some U.S. companies have been at it for a decade. You never really get
there; it's a process, a way of life. Unrealistic expectations will rob you and the people you're trying to
reach of the kind of commitment necessary to make a community-wide effort successful. This process
is tough
This process doesn't have an end, just a series of beginnings
.and continued follow-up.
You need to convey to your target audience that the key to competitiveness through quality is the
understanding that the job must be continuously improved. As long as companies and their employees
just do their jobs, they will not be viewed for long as quality performers in the market place. The
workplace must allow workers to contribute, to create, to bettter manage themselves.
Institutionalization of this concept is perhaps the greatest challenge American industry faces with
respect to quality.
There is also a pervasive notion that quality has something to do with a particular level of performance
or goodness of product or service when, rather, it has to do with continuously and incrementally
improving from wherever you happen to be today.
That's how we got the better stereos, better color televisions sets, and better automobiles. whatever.
And the only thing we can be sure of is that all of them will a lot "better" (that is better as the customer
defines better) in 1995, and in the year 2000. The companies that will enjoy a share of those markets
in the future will be those who are now learning to institutionalize the process of continuous
improvement--from the board room to the janitorial staff.
Some U.S. firms are making great progress with systems which institutionalize the process of
continuous improvement throughout every operation in the company. To the extent we can broaden the
understanding of these principles among others, we will be able to keep our American markets supplied
by American manufacturers and service providers. We will be able to export.
Try and organize your efforts in a quality way. If efforts are disorganized and unprofessional it can
speak volumes about the idea being sold. Nevertheless, evolving a big new idea across a whole
community is no small task. And, be prepared for turf battles, setbacks, and other obstacles. Consider
7
elected officials at all levels who will promote Quality movements. With your visibility and your
management expertise, you have the capability to encourage the expansion of successful private sector
programs out to various levels of government. It's happened in Kingsport, Tennessee, Madison,
Wisconson, and it's starting in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. If the direction is towards a regional
program, then it is important to focus first on those officials in the region who are personally
interested and can make a commitment to follow through
and to seek success stories and build on
them.
If people across the length and breadth of this country can convince state, local and federal government
officials and elected representatives to put "quality first," the results would be phenomenal. Taxpayers
would benefit from improved services and less expensive government, while the morale and
performance of government employees would be vastly improved.
Those political leaders who help lead the nation to quality will ultimately lead the nation. Period.
The Bush Administration has already begun a commitment to Quality in government and its tie to
competitiveness for American industry. Preeminent among its efforts is the Commerce Department's
support for the Baldrige Award, which I discussed earlier, and which, as I said, I hope in time will
rival the Nobel Prize in public perception. Commerce Secretary Mosbacher is committed to improving
the competitiveness of American industry, and his department could play an important role in
coordinating government-wide Quality efforts. The recently announced Competitiveness Council, headed
by Vice-President Quayle, could also play a major role in this movement. It will join efforts already
underway in other federal government agencies like the Office of Management and Budget and the
Departments of Defense and Agriculture.
This U.S. Congressman will do all in his power to make it happen. Convincing government at all levels
to pursue quality is going to take more than talk; it's going to take action. I'm issuing a call to action to
the Chamber of Commerce membership. Let's get to work!
6
You may, in the future, like to involve your own companies in the competition for the Baldrige Awards.
As my brief descriptions of the first winners indicate, competition for the Baldrige Award is open to
several different kinds of companies. There are three categories: (1) manufacturing companies or
subsidiaries, (2) service companies or subsidiaries, and (3) independently-owned small businesses
with no more than 500 full-time employees. No more than two awards can be made each year in each
category. Only three out of a possible six awards were made last year, indicating the truly high quality
of the program.
Applications for this year's awards are due on May 5. I hope that some of your companies will consider
applying and that you will encourage other companies with noteworthy Quality achievements to apply.
My office will be pleased to help you obtain the necessary materials. It is a chance to recognize and
reward true Quality. Just applying or getting ready to apply is a helpful, uplifting experience.
Quality in Service Industries
Two of the first group of Baldrige Award winners are manufacturers and the third delivers a product
- nuclear fuel--even though its business has more of a service aspect than the other two. But let me
turn now to Quality in service industries and in the biggest service industry of all, government.
The American Society for Quality Control commissions an annual Gallup survey of consumers'
perceptions of the Quality of American products and services. The published results of the 1988
survey contain some interesting comments about Quality in the service industries that I would like to
quote here. First, "when it comes to evaluating services, Americans are more concerned with attitude
and courtesy, promptness, and having a general feeling that their basic needs are satisfied than they are
with price, personal attention, accuracy, or convenience. Banks, hotels, and hospitals receive the
highest satisfaction ratings among seven types of service rated by respondents. Auto repair and local
government service receive the lowest ratings. Using a gauge the frequency of service problems
recently encountered, auto repair and local government show improvement compared to 1985, while
airlines decline by this measure."
Some segments of the airline industry--to give just one example--are actively working to reverse
this trend. One of these was highlighted in the Summer 1988 issue of The Quality Review. British
Airways has undertaken a program called "Putting People First". Quoting its chief executive, Sir Colin
Marshall, "The purpose was to get all of us to understand that our first obligation was to our customers,
not to a series of practices and rules laid down in a manual. We had to persuade ourselves that we were
there as a service business, not just an airline--that we had to be concerned with making passengers
feel that they would enjoy their travel with us more than they would with any other airline." As part of
this program, experienced employees called "hunters" have been trained to roam Heathrow Airport,
finding and helping people who need assistance. You can imagine what this has done for the airline's
reputation and for its customers' satisfaction.
Quality in Government
The same Gallup survey that I quoted earlier showed that we have some Quality problems in government
services. Quoting directly from the survey results,
"Satisfaction with the quality of government services is wide but neither deep nor enthusiastic. While
57% say they are somewhat satisfied, only 8% report they are very satisfied. And when a direct
comparison can be made--comparing local government service with other types of services--
government service quality comes out at or near the bottom by nearly every manner of comparison.
The competence of government at all levels is a matter of concern to the public."
Obviously there are great opportunities out there to apply Quality principles to all levels of
government. I think it's important for Chamber of Commerce members to support and encourage
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The Honorable Robert A. Mosbacher
U.S. Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I'd like very much to congratulate you on your appointment as Cabinet
Sucretary for the Department of Commerce. I have followed your public
pronouncements and am a proponent of the policies you propose. As a
former scientist, engineer and veteran of the global competitiveness debate,
I'm convinced that with a Team America approach and with forceful
leadership from people like yourself, America can do better.
As the new ranking Republican on the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness
(C,CP&C), and as a member of the Telecommunications and Finance, and
the Science, Research and Technology (SR&T) Subcommittees, I look
forward to working with you and the Bush Administration to further your
agenda in the Congress.
For example, I and my colleagues seek to create interest in some non-
traditional issues crucial to U.S. economic success. Our Republican Task
Force on High Technology and Competitiveness first brought what I call
the "Quality Revolution" to Capitol Hill (see the enclosed report). Also,
I've spoken on this issue a lot in my district, which is known as" Quality
Valley, USA", around the country and in Washington.
During the presidential campaign, Jim Pinkerton and Craig Helsing really
came to understand Quality, not only for its ability to drive the economy
but also for its potential to influence politics. The Malcolm Baldrige Award
is, as yet, an untapped vehicle for communicating this issue to the public.
I'll be introducing the 1989 National Quality Month Resolution shortly.
This resolution has the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC)
legions active across the country; both the resolution and the Baldrige
Award can serve as vehicles. There's SO much we could do with the Bush
Administration committed to actively pursuing the Quality issue. Once
again, I think Craig Helsing understands this very well.
100m FUROPE
HELSINE COMMISSION
BANK HOUS! MIN BITY MEMBER
I, along with my Subcommittee Chairman, Jim Florio (D-NJ), had the first
amendment on Sematech - when it was in the Commerce Department - in
our C,CP&P Subcommittee. Financial considerations have lately moved
the debate to Arme I Services and DoD, which unfortunately is the way all
major civilian collaborative arrangements have gone, including high
temperature superconductors and HDTV. Perhaps we can evolve some
other kind of civilian-oriented modus operandi. I was the person who
originally authored the bill creating the National Bureau of Standards and
Industrial Competitiveness (NBSIC), which was a precursor to subsequent
legislation in the Senate, on the SR&T Subcommittee, and on the full
Space, Science, and Technology Committee creating NIST, and then it was
reworked to create the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) in NIST.
Could the ATP be more widely used as a vehicle in the future ?
HDTV is another area where, would you believe, three subcommittees on
which I serve are involved. I got Markey fired up and have worked closely
with the American Electronics Association in creating an HDTV agenda.
I've also started a bipartisan HDTV Caucus with Mel Levine (D-CA); please
see our enclosed "Dear Colleague" letter. The Department of Commerce
should definitely be the facilitator on any collaborative strategy we might
develop. I'd be pleased to know what you're thinking on HDTV.
Finally, the trade issue is of very pointed interest to the Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness Subcommittee, including both an
overall review of the historic Trade Bill in general and then a focus on
semiconductors, telecommunications, and the Kansai Airport controversy.
Then there's Europe 1992, and most of us don't have a clue about its
eventual meaning. What I do know from discussions with business people
and parliamentarians from the European Community is that if we don't have
a reasonably co-ordinated Team America approach, we'll be in hot water.
That also would be a good topic for a C,CP&C Subcommittee hearing.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to help out in any way I can to ensure the success of
our President. I'd very much appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
in the near future. I realize it's late notice, but I'll be in D.C. on Tuesday
February 14 and could meet either mid-morning or late afternoon or early
evening.
I look forward to meeting you, and to a long and productive working
relationship.
Doa Sincerely, Biller
DON RITTER
Member of Congress
DR/cwb
Enclosures
DON RITTER
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
15TH DISTRICT. PENNSYLVANIA
(202) 225-6411
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ROOM 705
SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY
ALPHA BUILDING
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
February 23, 1989
EASTON, PA 18042
(215) 258-8383
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
The Honorable John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500
Dear John:
This is a brief note regarding the task of getting more private sector,
market-oriented steering and focus for the federal R&D economy. This
week, CBS Evening News is reporting from Japan with the ostensible news
hook, the Hirohito funeral. Actually, they're just trying to be first out of
the gate on the really big story, Japan's incredible economic success. The
most striking thing about the news was the blase way both the Japanese and
Rather and Kuralt referred to Japan, not only as a superpower, but as
"Number One, the number one industrial power", "having a higher per
capita income than the U.S.", etc. It was shocking, and it will continue to
be reported on by the media, with justified emphasis. Repeated over time,
this is political bad news for a U.S. presidency.
John, the U.S.A. has done well against models of industrial democracy
similar to our own (Europe et al.), but the Japanese are doing better
because (there are lots of reasons and some we can learn from) they work
smarter ("Quality") and they (MITI/ The Science and Technology Ministry/
CEOs/ Workers) set their sights higher, over the long term. They've
integrated R&D into an accelerated product cycle like nothing we've seen
and thus they're hitting first with new technology in new products across
the length and breadth of high-value added manufactures.
I came away from watching the news convinced more than ever that
President Bush has a golden opportunity NOW to better use the federal
science and technology billions to underpin U.S. global competitiveness.
That means we need to, at least, begin a systemic change. Our system can
be modified so as to optimize our R&D strengths and our vast R&D
investments. The President can also "lead America to Quality" at the
workplace and in education. The political leaders who can lead America to
Quality will lead America.
I enjoyed meeting Andy Card and sharing some of these ideas. It's
heartening to know you've got a backup who understands some of these
issues. Andy asked "Who's the political constituency for all this?" My
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
CHAIRMAN-REPUBLICAN TASK FORCE
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY
(HELSINKI COMMISSION)
AND COMPETITIVENESS
RANKING HOUSE MINORITY MEMBER
answer was, "IRI, the Industrial Research Institute, representing U.S.
global competitors with $1.5 trillion in annual sales." But, in thinking
"inside the Beltway," I neglected the most important political constituency
of all: workers, managers, families, and communities whose livelihoods
and futures are tied to America's success against the Japanese powerhouse
and other competition.
The CBS Evening News is doing us all a favor this week. They're making
our task of changing the status quo a lot easier. Changes outlined in the
"draft" I shared with Andy are do-able and do-able now.
I hope all is going well for you "out on point" and that you are enjoying the
mighty task. I wish you Godspeed, energy, patience, and fortitude. Your
sense of humor is your ultimate defense and offense. Keep it!
Sincerely
DON Don RITTER
Member of Congress
DR/cwb
P.S. I've had the good fortune to be working with a young fellow
formerly with the transition team named Brad Mitchell (works for Roger
Porter) who has done a lot of homework on these subjects and shares some
of the same visions we do. He has helped get key players talking to one
another and he helped me through the maze as well. Hopefully, you and
Andy can make use of Brad's understanding of these issues, his
independence from those jockeying and his ability to quietly navigate in
mined waters.
(Rough Draft)
Proposal for Improved Federal Science and
Technology Contribution to the Economy
I
i) Science Advisory Leadership should come from someone who is a
private sector combat veteran of the global competitive wars, not an
academician or an administrator of academic enterpreneurial activity.
Academia is currently very healthy as the existing Federal R&D
economy works well for them. The Science Advisor should have
some portfolio (i.e., turf and staff), the minimum being OSTP.
ii) Federal Science and Technology Cohesiveness should originate in
some kind of advisory body, chaired by the Science Advisor,
reporting to the President, and including private sector "stars" and
workers, joined by the Undersecretary of Commerce for Technology,
the NSF Director, the R&D chiefs of DoE and DoD, the Director of
DARPA, the Administrator of NASA, and the head of NIST.
Obviously these groups do not act in in a convergent manner since
they're not asked to.
iii) Long-Range Science and Technology Policy: I agree with
Keyworth et al., that we will always be driven by the momentum of
past issues - DoE by AEC and the "Labs", NSF by the needs of the
university community, etc. Global competitiveness and the creation
of national wealth and well-being will not be the primary driving
forces until some hard changes are wrought systemically. It's
probably time to think of a science/technology department (ministry)
or someone with a lot of authority who could accomplish the same
thing without going through the pain of "reorganizing" - which in
D.C. usually means chaos. Until we are better organized, DoD will
continue to make all big decisions on technological competitiveness
as in Sematech and the recent DARPA initiatives on High
Temperature Superconductors and HDTV.
One way to start this ball rolling is to select a Science and
Technology Advisor and have him or her interact with the White
House to help select the key players for the team - the new NSF
Director, the new NIST Chief, (working with the Secretary) the new
Undersecretary of Commerce for Technology, the new DoE R&D
head, etc. If such an attempt is made it will be the first time ever that
a science and technology leadership team is formed with allegiance to
goals other than those set by respective agency constituencies.
Attempts at evolving reorganization later would be a lot easier if such
a serial personnel selection process were followed at the outset.
II Quality: Japanese success with technology is very much a function
of a whole new way of managing enterprise to ensure "continuous
improvement." Where U.S. firms have done this, results are
stunning. The quality revolution is underway in the U.S.A. and the
Bush Administration can help further it. I've gone through this with
the Bush campaign team for the last six months. Jim Pinkerton
understands the substance and the politics completely, and I hear that
Darman is interested (save money, improve services, etc.) This can
work for the Administration, both in its role as a cheerleader for
American efforts and inside the Federal Government agencies
themselves. Bridgeheads already exist. Science and technology are
not separate from the quality revolution. Just look at VCRs, compact
discs, and HDTV as examples of where "continuous improvement"
incorporated the very latest technological advances rapidly and over
relatively long periods of time (decade plus). This helps put science
and technology in context with the broader goals of health, well
being of the U.S. economy, and global competitiveness.
III Create a Vehicle for Long-Range or "Patient" Capital Investment:
Nowhere in our private system can the ten-year-plus project be
pursued. Doing this fits right in with Bush Administration thinking
on capital gains tax and fits right in with the quality revolution /
continuous improvement strategies (the keys to Japanese success).
IV Foster U.S. Industry Collaborative Approaches: Loosen anti-trust
restrictions to go beyond traditional R&D joint ventures to product
and process development. (HDTV is a prime current example.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
THROUGH:
KEN YALE Ky
FROM:
DEAN SCHULTHEISS
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Gilbert Fayl
The Counselor for Science and Technology to the Delegation
of the Commission of the European Communities, Gilbert Fayl,
requested a meeting with Ken Yale to discuss technology transfer
and other policy issues.
For the record, I spoke with Richard Barth of the NSC at the
suggestion of NSC's secretariat. Mr. Barth is NSC's staff person
responsible for technology transfer issues. I asked whether
there was any problem with Ken meeting Mr. Fayl. Mr. Barth said
that if the discussions were very general or broad in nature,
there should be no problem.
tech transfer tech transfer
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Testimony by
Philip S. Chen, Jr., Ph.D.
Associate Director for Intramural Affairs
and Chairman, Patent Policy Board
National Institutes of Health
Public Health Service
Department of Health and Human Services
On the Commercialization of
Federal Laboratory Technology
Before the
Subcommittee on Regulation, Business
Opportunities and Energy
Committee on Small Business
United States House of Representatives
October 5, 1989
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony on the implementation by the
NIH of its technology transfer program under the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986
(FTTA). Acting under a broad Congressional mandate to encourage commercial
development of Government inventions, NIH created a policy-making and administrative
structure to transfer technology and to collaborate with industry on appropriate research
projects. My testimony will describe the organizational development of our program,
discuss key elements of this program, provide examples of interactions with small and large
business and summarize selected issues that affect the implementation of technology
transfer programs at NIH and other Federal agencies.
The FTTA authorized and provided incentives for Government laboratories to enter
into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with outside
collaborators. Under a CRADA, Federal laboratories and private sector companies
conduct research jointly and the collaborating company acquires an option from NIH at
the outset of the collaboration to negotiate for exclusive patent rights. As an incentive and
a reward, the FTTA also provides for the sharing of royalties with Government inventors
from the licensing of inventions developed under CRADAs and from inventions made
through an agency's "intramural" (i.e., independent, non-CRADA) research program. The
licensing of intramural inventions is authorized by the patent law in Title 35 of the United
States Code.
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In addition to the responsibilities and opportunities for collaboration under the
FTTA, NIH also develops and transfers technology to the private sector in several ways
other than CRADAs and invention licensing, including training programs, published
scientific literature, presentations at meetings, including Consensus Development
Conferences, and informal scientific contacts. Certain guidelines for our implementation
of the FTTA reflect numerous other policy objectives. For example, the review process
for CRADAs, discussed in more detail below, requires careful attention to the mission of
the institute involved and its approved research agenda -- CRADAs will be appropriate for
some projects and not for others. Moreover, in order to maintain an independence from
reliance on industry funding, the NIH does not view CRADAs as a general outside funding
source or a mechanism for sponsored research.
The NIH/ADAMHA Patent Policy Board:
Following enactment of the FTTA in October, 1986, and delegation of authority
from the DHHS Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Health, the NIH/ADAMHA
Patent Policy Board was established on April 7, 1987 by the Director of the NIH (and later
endorsed by the Administrator of ADAMHA) to make recommendations on policy and
model agreements, and to develop the administrative framework needed to implement the
patent and CRADA process at the NIH/ADAMHA. I chair the Board, and its voting
membership is composed primarily of senior scientists and administrators. Nonvoting
members include the NIH and ADAMHA Legal Advisors, the Chief of the PHS Patent
Branch and representatives of the other PHS agencies. Reference to the following, general
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aspects of technology transfer at NIH should also be understood to apply to ADAMHA,
which is developing its technology transfer programs jointly with NIH.
The Board has established several working subcommittees to address specific issues
and tasks:
The CRADA Subcommittee reviews all CRADAs involving exclusive patent
rights, and assesses their scientific acceptability and conformity with overall NIH and
ADAMHA research policies. This Subcommittee also makes policy
recommendations regarding CRADAs to the Board.
The Royalty Distribution Subcommittee recommends policies on royalty
distribution to the Board, as well as on the uses of royalty income as incentives for
additional technology transfer.
The Data Systems Subcommittee evaluates overall data management
requirements for technology transfer matters, and vendor-supplied software for
purposes of tracking and docketing PHS patent applications, CRADAs and licenses.
The Training Subcommittee develops materials and programs to educate the
NIH/ADAMHA community on the technology transfer process.
The Technology Development Coordinators Subcommittee meets monthly with
the Director of the Office of Invention Development (discussed below) to review
procedures for implementing the FTTA and to share experiences. These
Coordinators generally are responsible for the day-to-day activities under the FTTA
within their respective Institutes.
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Statement of Policy on CRADAs and Licensing
A key element of the Patent Policy Board's technology transfer program is the
"Policy Statement on Cooperative Research and Development Agreements and Intellectual
Property Licensing." This policy statement (previously submitted to Subcommittee staff)
defines the agencies' missions in terms of conducting basic biomedical and behavioral
research. It affirms our commitment to transfer technology within an overall framework
that promotes the free exchange of ideas and information. For example, our investigators
are free to publish the results of their research, and every attempt is made to safeguard
the collegiality and integrity of, as well as public confidence in, the NIH/ADAMHA
research programs.
Specific sections of the "CRADA/Licensing Policy Statement" treat questions of "fair
access" by outside companies to the NIH/ADAMHA laboratories, and the handling of
confidential or proprietary information. Also covered are our intentions to grant royalty-
bearing exclusive or nonexclusive commercialization licenses in order to stimulate
commercial development, and to grant nonexclusive, royalty-free licenses for research
purposes in order to stimulate further basic research. These provisions are significant
because they balance a number of competing policy requirements. The Policy Statement
applies to inventions made through our intramural research programs as well as through
cooperative research and development projects under the FTTA.
4
The Office of Invention Development
The Office of Invention Development (OID) provides staff support to the Patent
Policy Board, and centrally coordinates and champions technology transfer activities at the
NIH and ADAMHA. The OID primarily serves a management function as the "technology
portfolio" manager for NIH and ADAMHA. Other major OID responsibilities include the
development of technology transfer policy and procedures as recommendations to the
Patent Policy Board or to implement Board decisions. In conjunction with the Training
Subcommittee, the OID plays an active role in training and educational activities and hosts
a regular speaker series.
The OID drafts model CRADAs, model material transfer agreements, model license
agreements, and policy guidelines, and takes the lead in developing licensing strategies for
all NIH/ADAMHA intramural inventions. The OID also serves as the principal conduit
of information, advice and instructions between the NIH/ADAMHA and the Office of
Federal Patent Licensing of the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), which acts
as the licensing agent for most of the NIH and ADAMHA intramural inventions. The
OID itself handles the licensing of inventions developed under CRADAs, and is presently
involved in the first such negotiations.
A key element of the OID activities are the "Technology Management Team
Meetings," convened to develop licensing strategies for intramural inventions on a case-
by-case basis. These teams consist of a permanent nucleus of the OID Director, OID
Technology Management Branch Chief, Patent Branch Chief and NTIS licensing specialists,
5
joined by the appropriate Institute's Technology Development Coordinator and the
involved inventors. These meetings seek to evaluate the fields of use in which patent rights
might be granted, and possibly to "package" together related inventions for licensing as a
unit.
The CRADA Approval Process
In accordance with NIH/ADAMHA policy guidelines, a CRADA generally is
considered to be a basic research project rather than a commercialization project. The
CRADA itself consists of a legal boilerplate section, and several appendices including a
research plan. A separate appendix contains any modifications to the CRADA that may
be negotiated with the collaborator.
The essence of a cooperative research and development project is its "Research
Plan" which forms Appendix B to NIH/ADAMHA CRADAs. Use of the model CRADA
in conjunction with the policy guidelines discussed above has reduced significantly both
negotiation and review time for CRADAs. These documents have made it possible for our
scientists to communicate clearly NIH/ADAMHA policies to potential collaborators.
The model CRADA was adopted by the Director of NIH and the Administrator of
ADAMHA following internal development, discussions and review, and informal external
review and extensive comments from academia, the pharmaceutical and biotechnological
trade associations and several companies. As a result, the approval of CRADAs by
collaborators and by NIH/ADAMHA has become a smooth and rapid process.
6
Equal Access
The Assistant Secretary for Health has promulgated a PHS policy on the
development of CRADAs, which states that the process should ensure fairness and
implement the preferences established by the FTTA, such as giving special consideration
to entering into CRADAs with small business firms and preference to businesses located
in the United States that agree to manufacture substantially in the United States. A basic
objective is to ensure that all potentially interested organizations are given the opportunity
to participate in a CRADA. Because of the large number of research projects underway
in the laboratories of the NIH and ADAMHA and the relatively smaller number of
CRADAs in effect or under negotiation, only rarely have multiple companies proposed an
identical research effort. In some cases, however, comparable research has been
undertaken by different companies under CRADAs with laboratories in different institutes.
In other cases, such as where a substantial number of companies are likely to be interested
or where the project lies in a previously unannounced research area, NIH/ADAMHA have
sought or plan to seek collaborators competitively. For some cooperative projects, where
the development and commercialization potential is of more immediate importance relative
to the basic research aspects, NIH/ADAMHA considers and may seek (through Federal
Register notice) a collaborator that has both the requisite scientific expertise and
commercialization capability.
Many of the existing NIH/ADAMHA CRADAs appear to have resulted from the
usual scientist-to-scientist contacts that occur at conferences and other places.
7
NIH/ADAMHA also have several formal mechanisms in place to notify the business and
scientific communities of ongoing projects and research opportunities. For example, the
NIH/ADAMHA publishes an annual directory (the "CRISP Intramural Research Index")
of all intramural research projects, cross-referenced by key word and by principal
investigator. Additionally, earlier this week, NIH/ADAMHA hosted the second annual
NIH/ADAMHA-Industry Collaboration Forum. About 80 industry representatives were
preregistered to attend the Forum and inspect posters of NIH/ADAMHA investigators who
are seeking corporate collaborators. A special FTTA Directory, entitled "The
NIH/ADAMHA-Industry Collaboration Directory" is being published in connection with the
Forum and will be revised and updated annually.
Conflicts of Interest
The PHS recognizes that interactions with industry, the intentional absence of a
formal competitive process under the FTTA for selection of collaborators, and the sharing
of royalties with inventors, create a potential for conflicts of interest. The PHS fair access
policies, mentioned above, and the NIH/ADAMHA policy of not performing product
market analysis and negotiating royalty rates in advance under CRADAs help to avoid
some real or apparent conflicts.
In order to evaluate and treat the resultant potential for conflicts of interest, the
NIH/ADAMHA Patent Policy Board convened a "Retreat on Conflict of Interest in
Collaborations with Industry" last December (1988) that was attended by senior PHS
scientists and administrators and representatives from several corporations, foundations and
8
universities. A summary of this retreat has been disseminated by the Board. Based in part
on the discussions at the retreat, as well as a comprehensive review of legal authorities,
legislative histories and guidelines from many Federal agencies, the OID has drafted a
Manual Chapter for NIH and ADAMHA employees dealing with CRADA conflict of
interest matters. This draft is undergoing internal review by my office and the OID and
we expect to disseminate the draft in the near future for wider review.
Distribution of Royalties
Under NIH/ADAMHA policy, inventors share 25 percent of the first $50,000 of
cumulative gross royalties on a licensed invention, 20 percent of the second $50,000, and
15 percent of the royalty income over $100,000. A portion of the royalties is used to pay
for NTIS licensing services and to support the staff of the OID. Remaining royalty funds
are distributed to the Institutes of the inventors named on a given patent application or
patent. These royalties may be used for technology development purposes such as training,
travel or cash awards to laboratory personnel.
Technology Transfer from NIH to Industry
Following are highlights of several of the most successful interactions of NIH with
industry in the areas of collaborative technology transfer under the FTTA and the licensing
of intramural inventions. In sum, NIH currently has over 100 CRADAs in effect, virtually
all with U.S. companies, and about 100 additional CRADAs in various stages of negotiation
with their submission and approval rates increasing dramatically. Of this total, about one-
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third of the CRADAs are in effect with small businesses.
At the present time, about 150 PHS patent(s) and patent applications have been
licensed through the NTIS and earn royalties. According to the NTIS, which acts as the
licensing agent for most of the PHS intramural inventions, only a few small businesses have
obtained exclusive licenses to NIH inventions. Many of the PHS intramural inventions
seem to require major expenditures of commercial expertise and development capital, and
licenses appear to have been awarded to larger, more established companies that often
submit more competitive license applications. These circumstances underscore the
potential value that CRADAs will hold for small businesses since, under a CRADA, NIH
promises options to negotiate exclusive invention rights in advance, without the requirement
for a competitive licensing process. For all licenses to CRADA inventions, NIH and
ADAMHA will require the submission of a commercial development plan and will closely
monitor the efforts of their licensees.
The following cases illustrate several of NIH's successes in technology transfer
interactions with industry.
Human Gene Therapy and CRADAs
Perhaps the most exciting clinical project at NIH at this time is the use of gene
transfer techniques to mark a patient's antitumor cells in order to monitor the progress of
an experimental cancer treatment. This project is conducted under one of NIH's first
CRADAs. Gene therapy, which involves a technically similar transfer, but of therapeutic
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rather than marker genes, ultimately may revolutionize the practice of medicine. For
example, a genetic disease caused by the absence of or defect in a gene coding for a
necessary protein might be curable if properly functioning genes could be transferred into
the patient's own cells. Through a group of CRADAs with the National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute and the National Cancer Institute, Genetic Therapy, Inc. (GTI) is helping
to explore the frontiers of medicine in clinical gene transfer and in product development
for use in human gene therapy.
As a result of this collaboration, GTI, a two-year old Gaithersburg, Maryland,
biotechnology company of 30 employees, is the only company producing the vector
approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the present gene transfer
experiments. GTI contributed substantially to these CRADAs in terms of intellectual
expertise, as well as by providing essential materials and financial support for laboratory
personnel. Several patent applications on inventions made under these CRADAs recently
have been filed by NIH that relate to various aspects of human gene therapy.
Diagnosis of Sexually Transmitted Disease
While Chlamydia trachomatis (CT) may not be well known by name to the general
public, it causes the most common sexually transmitted disease in the United States,
causing an estimated ten million cases each year. Often producing asymptomatic infections,
CT is further associated with 65 percent of the cases of pelvic inflammatory disease (PID),
progressing sometimes to scarring of the fallopian tubes and sterility. Industry sources
estimate that 85,000 women in the United States become sterile each year due to CT
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infections. Moreover, screening studies at major medical centers have shown that from 3-
8 percent of pregnant women are CT positive, and CT can be transmitted during delivery
to neonates to cause eye infections and pneumonia.
Even though CT is easily treated, only about one million diagnostic tests are
conducted each year, in part because diagnostic testing has been difficult to perform.
Recently, a 20-employee Texas company, Fairleigh Dickinson Laboratories, Inc., has
developed, under a nonexclusive patent license on monoclonal antibodies reactive against
CT, a new CT diagnostic test, invented by investigators at the NIH Rocky Mountain
Laboratories. The license has been in effect since September 1988, and diagnostic test kits
are currently being manufactured with product introduction scheduled for the last quarter
of 1989. Fairleigh Dickinson also is discussing the private label manufacture of CT test
kits, and joint developmental work for use of the licensed reagents in an alternative
diagnostic format also is being conducted.
An important advantage of the diagnostic test is that it does not cross-react with
other vaginal bacteria, a shortcoming that limits the clinical utility of conventional
monoclonal antibody tests. The licensed monoclonal antibody also recognizes both CT
as well as Chlamydia psittaci, which primarily infects birds, particularly imported birds;
therefore, the test kit may have application to veterinary as well as human diagnostics.
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Treatment of Leukemia
Hairy cell leukemia accounts for about two percent of all leukemias, and is treatable
by interferon produced through recombinant DNA techniques. Based on a discovery made
at NIH, T Cell Sciences, Inc., an emerging 95-employee pharmaceutical product company
headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has licensed patent rights to a kit for
monitoring the clinical progress of hairy cell leukemia patients. The FDA recommended
approval of the test kit in November 1988, and final FDA approval is expected shortly.
Hairy cell leukemia is a malignant overgrowth of lymphocytes, or white blood cells.
Lymphocytes themselves are a type of white blood cell covered with thousands of surface
protein molecules that act as receptors for the body's chemical messengers, enabling
lymphocytes to respond to various immune system stimulants. The test kit is based on an
NIH discovery that the cancerous lymphocytes in hairy cell leukemia shed into the
bloodstream large quantities of a receptor compound for interleukin-2, an immune system
growth hormone. Quantifying the number of such molecules shed into the blood provides
valuable information to aid oncologists in monitoring and evaluating the treatment of hairy
cell leukemia patients.
This leukemia monitoring kit will be the first FDA-approved product based on the
measurement of receptors released by lymphocytes into the blood stream. This device was
developed under a nonexclusive license on an NCI invention.
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Treatment of Pneumocystis
Pneumocystis carinii is a ubiquitous, infectious sporozoal parasite that occurs in
epidemics in developing countries, primarily in malnourished infants and children. In the
industrialized countries, such as the United States, pneumocystis is limited almost entirely
to immunocompromised patients including those with congenital immunodeficiency,
immunosuppression therapy (such as with steroids) for organ transplants, a malignancy
(such as leukemia) in remission after treatment, and particularly AIDS.
Since 1981, the inherent susceptibility of individuals with AIDS has significantly
increased the prevalence of pneumonia caused by pneumocystis. Current projections
indicate that by 1991, at least 100,000 cases of pneumocystis pneumonia will have occurred
in patients with AIDS. The rapidly growing incidence of this infection has led to a
dramatic increase in demand for techniques to establish this diagnosis. Now, a licensed
NIH invention will greatly enhance the speed and efficiency by which pneumocystis
organisms can be detected.
Currently, a clinical diagnosis of pneumocystis is based on radiologic evidence and
direct microscopic observation of respiratory tract specimens using nonspecific staining
techniques. These techniques are complex and require highly trained technicians to
conduct them. However, in 1986, two NIH scientists developed a monoclonal antibody that
can be used in an indirect immunofluorescent assay, thereby greatly simplifying the
diagnosis of pneumocystis.
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Nonexclusive licenses under the patent application were awarded to three small
companies -- Disease Detection International, International Cardiovascular Medicine, and
Meridian Diagnostics, Inc. Of these companies, Meridian Diagnostics, an 88-employee
Cincinnati business, has had the greatest success in commercializing the invention.
Meridian has a product commercially available for the detection of pneumocystis in
respiratory tract fluids and tissue.
Animal Models for AIDS Research
Another CRADA is presently underway between Dr. Thomas J. Kindt of NIH, in
collaboration with Transgenic Sciences, Inc. of Worcester, MA. Their research will attempt
to create transgenic rabbits that express the human CD4 protein, an important component
of the normal immune response, but which also acts as a receptor for the AIDS virus. If
successful, the research will produce another animal model for AIDS that should be highly
useful in testing drugs and therapeutic strategies based on blocking the interaction between
the AIDS virus. and human CD4.
Treatment of AIDS
In response to the need for additional AIDS therapeutics, the Bristol-Myers
Company was awarded an exclusive license to explore and possibly commercialize a method
of treating AIDS utilizing a promising drug called dideoxyinosine, or ddI, initially developed
by the National Cancer Institute. Clinical trials are now underway and the FDA is also
permitting ddI to be made available more widely under a treatment IND and open safety
15
protocol. This product inhibits replication of the AIDS virus by means of a chemical
"Trojan horse" approach. The drug inserts an incorrect building block into the growing
strand of viral DNA, thus halting viral replication.
National Cancer Institute officials have recently stated that ddI appears to be safe
to use, noting that the drug prompted an early but statistically significant rise in immune
system cells accompanied by a fall in levels of virus. Moreover, ddI appears to have a
therapeutic effect on patients who no longer respond to AZT. Clinical efficacy studies are
expected to determine whether ddI is as effective as these preliminary studies suggest.
Impediments to Technology Transfer
1. Copyright/licensing of software: Although the FTTA encourages the licensing
of educational software, no mechanism is provided for the creation of copyright in software
on the part of Government employees. In some cases, software may be patentable but,
as a general proposition, copyright is viewed as the primary mode of software protection.
Thus, although PHS scientists and administrators develop a substantial amount of
commercially valuable software -- from molecular modeling to computer based expert
systems in support of clinical decision-making to financial/accounting management -- no
intellectual property right is available that would provide a "licensee" with a right to
exclude others from copying such software. This tends to make the collaborative
development and licensing of software from the Government less attractive to the
commercial sector. The Department of Commerce recently reported to Congress on the
first two years of the implementation of the FTTA, and concluded that the protection of
16
software through copyright by the Department of Energy's Government-owned Contractor-
operated laboratories illustrates the importance of copyright protection in technology
transfer.
2. Strengthening of internal organizations:
Soon after passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act, we recognized that a
strengthened management structure would be necessary for full and effective
implementation of the various functions that would be needed: training, patenting, industry
liaison, licensing and overall technology management.
o The Office of Invention Development was created in January 1988, and performs
the technology transfer functions noted above. A full-time director for the OID, Mr.
Reid Adler, Esq., was hired in January 1989 from the private sector, and working
plans have been proposed for expanding the technology management and licensing
staff within the OID.
o A similar staffing increase has begun for our Patent Branch. Presently, a Patent
Branch Chief (and attorney), Ms. Glenna Hendricks, Esq., formerly of the Patent
and Trademark Office, and one patent agent serve the patent prosecution needs of
all PHS agencies in conjunction with outside contract attorneys. We are planning
to hire an additional patent attorney and additional patent agents.
o
Within the various NIH institutes, the Technology Development Coordinator,
discussed above, is responsible for a growing number of technology management and
CRADA-related assignments. Typically, these personnel are also responsible for
17
various other assignments within the institute. As technology transfer programs at
NIH mature, our experience to date has shown the importance of the institutes
retaining the ability to handle certain aspects of the program on a decentralized
basis.
In order responsibly to discharge our technology transfer obligations, we must go
outside of the agency to hire technology management and patent professionals. Recruiting
for patent attorney and technology transfer positions is hampered by the relative scarcity
of highly trained and experienced technology transfer professionals and by the Government
salaries which are low relative to those of the private, corporate and university departments
with which we compete in hiring.
Concluding remarks
NIH encourages continued Congressional support for technology transfer efforts. We
believe that the FTTA and the technology management program implemented at NIH have
begun to play a vital role in the transfer of Government inventions to the private sector
for commercial evaluation and development. In the critical area of biomedical and
behavioral research, this process is an essential component of caring for the public health.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to try to answer any questions
that you or the other members of the Subcommittee may have.
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