Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
446394405
label
General Background for Southeast Asia Trip 1967-1968 [1]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
446394405
contentType
document
title
General Background for Southeast Asia Trip 1967-1968 [1]
citationUrl
identifierLocal
25857-005
collections
George H. W. Bush Papers
Congressional Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
446394405
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1968-12-31
year
1968
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1967-01-01
year
1967
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
dcf5999e3d11a214
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection: Donated Historical Materials
Collection/Office of Origin: Bush, George H.W., Collection
Series:
Personal Papers
Subseries:
Congressional File, General - Vietnam
OA/ID Number:
25857
Folder ID Number:
25857-005
Folder Title:
General Background for Southeast Asia Trip 1967-1968 [1]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
5
1
4
7
Congressman George Bush's
Vietnam Christmas Party
1967
RICE HOTEL
GRAND BALLROOM
DECEMBER 23, 1967
A
Message
from the
Congressman
I want to thank each family attending this Christmas party. It is
somewhat sad for you - and for me also - that your loved one cannot
be home for this holiday season. But we want to honor these men by
making their children and brothers and sisters happy here this afternoon.
One of the most important aspects I have learned about Vietnam
during my first session of Congress in Washington is the tremendous
dedication and professionalism of the American marines, soldiers, sailors
and airmen now serving the cause of freedom.
The day after Christmas I will be leaving for a short visit to
Vietnam and the combat zone. I hope to see many of the men whose
families are here today.
Much time and effort on the parts of many people - individual
volunteers, local businessmen and merchants, and entertainers- - has been
expended to make this party a real success. There is plenty of food for
all and gifts for the children. And Santa Claus is waiting to see every
youngster.
A Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to each of you.
Sincerely,
aug Blu
ENTERTAINMENT
m
Arabia Shrine Temple Clown Jewels
Houston Astros
Rusty Staub
4
Jimmy Wynn
Joe Morgan
Don Wilson
HOUSTON HIGHLANDERS
Pete and Steve Landry
Balancing Act
SING-OUT HOUSTON
WEST FAMILY Y.M.C.A.
Tumbling Act
CONTRIBUTORS
American Bank and Trust
Houston Astros Baseball Club
Company
Houston Highlanders
American Cryogenics,
Incorporated
Houston Novelty Company
The Ant and the Grasshopper
Humble Oil and Refining Company
Arabia Shrine Temple Clown
Joske's of Houston
Jewels
Pete and Steve Landry
Associated Transfer & Storage
Company
Dossett McCullough
Lawrence Marcus
Bank of the Southwest
Braniff International
Mayflower Transit Company
Morton Foods
Capital National Bank
Playhouse Toys, Incorporated
Cargo Houston, Incorporated
Rice Food Markets
Carnation Company
San Lorenzo Nursery
Continental Oil Company
Sears Roebuck and Company
Delta Air Lines
Sinclair Oil & Gas Company
Eastern Airlines
Sing-Out Houston
Fidelity Printing Company,
Inc.
Southline Equipment Company
First City National Bank
Texaco, Incorporated
Gulf Waterproofing Company
Texas National Bank of Commerce
H. F. Haemisegger
Trans-Texas Airways
Harris Moving & Storage
West Family Y.M.C.A.
Company
J. Weingarten, Incorporated
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT -
Houston news media - newspapers and radio and television stations -
have been extremely generous in promoting the Vietnam Christmas Party
on a public service basis. A hearty thanks goes to them.
BAN DO DÖ-THÀNH
Useful books on
VIETNAM
SAIGON
Do vans Minh
VIETNAM Where East and West Meet
Nguyen van Khon
VIETNAMESE FOR YOU.
ENGLISH VIETNAMESE
DICTIONARY
BAN DO THUC DUNG
GOM NHIEU DUONG MO'l TRONG DO THANH
VIETNAMESE, ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
VOI DIACHITCAC BO, NHA, SO, SU QUAN,
CO so VAN HOA, TRUONG HOC, BENH VIEN,
Vu-van
I SPEAK VIETNAMESE
KHACH-SAN, TIEM AN, NGAN-HANG, QUAN
CANH SAT, TOA HANH.CHANH, BEN XE, DUONG
Nguyen phut- Tan
MOT CHIEU, BANG CHI DUONG BO
VIETNAM PAST AND TODAY
A MODERN HISTORY OF VIETNAM
Le-huy Hap
VIETNAMESE LEGENDS
MAP
Le-xuan Thuy
KIM VAN KIEU,
OF
These can be obtained from
KHAI- TRI Bookshop, 62 Le Loi st Saigon
SAIGON
K.D. so 561/KD ngay 14-3 1966 - 30$VN
17
- 18
--- 19 -
20 -
D|A CHI CÃN BIET
CÁC NHA, so
Ngan kho Saigon,
37 Nguyen-Huê
Nguyen tir hrc cuoc,
291
Phan-thanh-Gian
Bien 1y cuoc,
131 Cong.Ly
Phong Thurong mãi,
36 Nguyen-Hué
BUONG MÔT CHIÈU
CÁC BO
Buu dien,
Cong
trurong Hoa-Binh
Quan thué,
2I Bach-Dang
Cai cách Dien dia,
72 Mqc-dinh-Chi
Quan thu Dien dia.
141 Yên.Do
Curu chien binh,
Canh.Nong,
58 Nguyen.bink-Khiem
129 Doàn-thi-Dièm
Quy Bù trir P.C.G.D.,
14 Phan-van-Dat
Trong khoan và theo chieu
Chieu hoi,
20 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Tan Dao,
II5 Vō-di-Nguy
Công-Chánh,
94 Cong.Ly
Chira lira,
Toa án Saigon,
131 Cong-Ly
An-Diem,
258 Tran-hurng.Dao
Tan-Da - Ng8-Quyèn
Gião-Dac,
70 Lê thánk-Tôn
Churong khe,
92 Nguyen.Du
Toa phá án,
76 Hong-thap-Tw
An-Binh,
Ham-Tir - Nguyen-Hoang
Du lich,
59 Gia-Long
25 Bén Bach-Dang
Toa hoa giài
II5 Nguyen-Hue
Bùi-hiru-Nghia,
Dao-Tan - Nguyen-Trai
Kinh-Té.
Dien Dia,
86 Hai Bà Trung
Toa án Hanh chanh,
76 Hong.thap-Tir
Bà Huyen Thanh-Quan, Ky-Dong - Hong-thap-Tv
Lao-Dong,
459 Tran-hung-Dao
Dia phurong quân,
126 Hong Bang
Tòa án Lao dong,
150 Pasteur
Cao-bá-Quát,
Don Dat - Hai Ba Trung
Ngoai.Giao,
6 Alexandre de Rhodes
Dong vien,
38 Gia-Long
Thuy Cuc (Saigon),
86 Nguyen.Thông
Châu-vân-Tiép,
Dong-Khanh - Nguyen-Trai
Noi-Vu,
164 Tir Do
Dien here Viet-Nam,
12 Hong-thap-Tw
Thuy Nong, II Hien-Virong (Thi-Nghe)
Chu-van-An, Truang-tén-Biru - Nguyen-văn-Thành
Quoc-Phong,
Hang khong dân Str.
175 Hien-Vuong
Thurong cang,
I Ham-Nghi
Cô Bsc,
Huynh-quang-Tien - Nguyen-théi-Hoc
63 Gia-Long
Hoa xa,
2 Cong Truding Hoa-Binh
Thue VU,
85 Ham.Nghi
Cô Giang, Nguyen-thái-Hoc - Huynh-quang-Tien
Tài-Chanh,
158 Hong-thap.Tw
Hoi doái.
7 Bén Chrong-Durong
Thuy dien Saigon,
72 Hai Bà Trung
Calmette,
Hō-van-Nga - Ben Chrong-Durong
Tam-lý-Chien, 79-81-170 Phan.dình-Phùng
Hong-thip-tur V.N.,
201 Höng-thâp-Tur
Thuy vân,
94 Cong-Ly
Cong-Ly,
Hien-Vurong - Ben Churang-Durang
Thanh-Nien The-Thao, 272 Hien-Virong
Kbi turong,
8 Mac-dinh-Chi
Trube ba,
229 Tu-Do
Dinh-tiên-Hoang,
Thong-Nhirt - Hien-Vuong
Tir-Phap,
Kien thiet,
29bis Phan.dinh-Phùng
Trung Tam Dien Anh,
47 Thong-Nhirt
15 Thi.Sách
Doàn-thi-Dièm,
Hong-thap-Tir - Ky-Dong
Lâm vu,
29ter Phan.dình.Phùng
Trung Tâm khuech trurong ky nghê
Dong-Khánh,
Xay-Durng Nong.Thôn, IIC Cong-Trurung
Nguyen-tri-Phurong - Hoc-Lec
Mai dich,
163 Chi-Lang (Gia-dinh)
40 Nguyen-Hue
D6-van-Siru,
- Ven-Kiep
Lam-Son
M5 than Nong Son,
3I Han-Thuyen
Trung Tam Tieu cong ngh&, 90 Tw-Do
Gie-Long,
Muc súc,
Le-van-Duyet - Curong-De
Xa.Hoi,
64 Nguyen-Du
29 Phan.dinh-Phing
Vien Due Anh,
185 Vō-Tánh
Nong VII,
Hien-Vuong,
Dinh-tien-Hoang - C.T. Dan-chi
Y-TE,
281-Mac-dinh-Chi
59 Hong.thap-Tw
Viet Tan Xa,
II8 Höng-thäp-Tur
Ngu nghiep,
Hong-Bang,
II6 Phan-dink-Phing
Ng8-Quyen - Nguyon-tri-Phurong
Xo só kien thiet,
17 Thong-Nhãt
Hoc-Lac,
Trang-Tir - Hong-Bang
BAN DO ĐÖ-THÀNH
- 25
26
- 27 -
SAIGON
TRUONG DAI HOC
No Hoc-Sinh (Quoc-Gia).
co-so VAN-HÓA
284, Cong-Quynh
Duoc-Khoa,
41 Curòng-Dè
Phu-Tá Thi-Nghiem Y-Khoa, 167 Pasteur
Khoa-Hoc,
227 Công-Hòa
Sinh-Hoc Y-Khoa,
Tai viên Pasteur
MACH
Bo Giáo.Duc,
78 Le-thánh-Tôn
Luat-Khoa,
17 Duy-Tân
Su-Pham (Quōc-Gia).
4 Thành-Thái
Nha.Khoa,
Phan-thanh-Gian
Viet-Nam Hang-Hai,
Nha Hoc-Vu,
Nguyên-vän-Thoqi
7 Nguyen-binh-Khiem
Str-Pham,
229 Cong-Hoa
Nha Trung-Hoc,
7 Nguyên-binh-Khiem
Van.Khoa, Goc Gia-Long Nguyen-trung-
VÓI GOM DIA.CHI MÓI TRONG DO
BAN DO THUC DUNG
Nha Tieu-Hoc,
True
7 Nguyen-binh-Khiem
Y Khoa,
28 Tran-quy-Cáp
coso VAN CÁC BÔ, NHA SO, SÚ THANH
Nha Ky-Thuat,
48 Phan-dình-Phùng
Vien Dai-Hoc,
3 Cong-Trurong Chien-Si
TRUONG TRUNG-HOC
KHACH-SAN HOA TRUONG BENH QUAN,
CANHS TIÊM AN ENGAN-HANG VIÊN,
Nha My-Thuat,
35 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Gia-Long (Nu),
275 Phan-thanh-Gian
TRU'ONG CHUYEN KHOA
Hō-ngoc-Cân,
2 Chi.Lang (Gia-Dinh)
MÔT TOA HANH CHÁNH, BÉN DUONG QUAN
Nha Van-Hóa,
89 Lë-văn-Duyet
Ky-Thuat Cao. Thang 65 Hitynh-thuc-Khang
CHIEU, BANG HI DUONG BÔ
Nha Van-Kho,
64 Lè.thánh-Tên
Am.Nhac (Quóc-Gia),
II2 Nguyen-Du
Ky-Thuat Nguyên-truròng-Tô,
Bach-Cong Phú-Tho,
Nguyen-vãn-Thoai
25 kép Höng-thäp-Tur
So Hoc-Lieu,
240 Trän-binh-Trong
Buru-Dien (Quoc-Gia), 48 Phan-dinh-Phing
Le-văn-Duyet, (No) dai 16 Lê-văn-Duyêt
Cao-Dang Công-Chánh, Nguyen-văn-Thoqi
(Gia-Dinh)
MAP
Thu-Vien Quoc-Gia,
34 Gia-Long
- Diên.Hoc,
-
Mac-dinh-Chi,
durong Luc-Tinh
Tong Thu-Vien
Trän-binh-Trong
--
Kien-Trúc,
6bis Phan.dinh.Phàng
Nguyen.Trai, 25 durong Xóm-Chieu (Khanh
OF
Vien Khio-Co,
66 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Day nguròi mù,
I Nguyen-Träi
Hoi)
Hoc-Vien Quoc-Gia
Trang-Tri My-Thuat, 119 Chi-Lang (Gia
SAIGON
Vien Bão. Tang, tai Thào-câm-Vien (Só-thú)
Hành-Chanh,
IO Tran-quoc-Toan
Dinh)
Trung-Vurong (Nir) 3 Nguyen-binh-Khiem
Ky-Su Cong-Ngh& (Quoc-Gia),
Trurong-vinh-Ky,
235 Cong-Hoa
Nguyen-vãn-Thoqi
V5-trurong-Toan, II Nguyen-binh-Khiem
MAP of SAIGON
3
- 4 -
-
Saigon's history dates back only 200 years when
million are of Chinese origins and the remainder
During Street (Durong Tu do: To do Street)
SAIGON
it was just B cluster of thatched huts of fishermen.
represent races from East and West (Europeans,
uodres EUN
Dails Avenue (Dai la La Loi: Lê Loi Avenue)
Now, this growing city is well developed and has be-
Americans, Indians, Cambodians, etc...).
Ben : Quay (Ben Bach Dang Bach Dang Quay)
BACKGROUND
come the heart of the country and the hub of its
Cong trurong : Square (Cong truding Lam Son
industry and commerce as well.
CLIMATE
VIÉT-ANH TU-DIEN
Lam
Son
Square)
Saigon, the charming political and cultural ca.
Tinh Province (Tinh Gia-dinh Giadinh Province)
pitel of the Republic of Viet Nam, is among the
CHOLON
The climate here is pleasant with two main
hai ANH-VIET TU-BIEN
X5 Village (Xa An-Khanh : An-Khanh Village),
most attractive cities in the Orient formed by Hong
seasons : the rainy and the dry seasons. The average
Kong, Manila, Bangkok and Singapore. This < Pearl
Only three miles from the center of Saigon is
temperature in Saigon is 75°F. low end 90°F. high
TO FIND A STREET
ol the East , DS often called by sea merchants from
quep
the city of Cholon or the "Chinatown", a separate
with alternate rain and sunshine from May to Otober.
Buen
The map is divided into squares. Each side of
the Occident, is now growing and moving forward.
city, but forming part of the Metropolitan area of
From November through April, the climate in Saigon
TU HOC TIENG ANH
these squares is designated by a letter for the
Saigon. One is hardly aware of the subile changes
is much milder than that in Manila, Bengkok, Sin.
height and a figure for the width. The indicator
Also, Saigon is the cleanest, most fascinating city
85 you ride along the main street, Tran Hung Dao,
gapore or Diakarta, with a cool day whenever there
determines the square into which one can find a
among Oriental capitals, with wide streets shaded by
into Cholon. It is only when you reach the center of
is 8 depression in nearby area.
street. In fact, each street name is followed by a letter
tall trees. There are numerous public parks and im.
Cholon that you realize you are truly in a <Chinatown>.
and a figure.
pressive public buildings. Tu Do, the city's main bou.
The residents of Cholan are primarily from Southern
THE BOTANICAL GARDENS
we
levard, runs from the river-tront past blocks of lashio-
ueid
China, and the primary dialect used is Cantonese,
2042
For instance Tv do The indicator give B 5
nable shops and sidewalk cafés to the Catholic Ca-
although Mandarin, the official Chinese dialect, is
At the east end of the Thong Nhut boulevard,
situation of the square into which is the street.
thedral, facing the Kennedy Square. The city boasts
usually understood, as are the Fukkien, Hokien and
the Botanical Gardens are particularly interesting.
woud-ug^ ugos (Bung
numerous Vietnamese and Chinese pagodas, a fabulous
Hakka dialects
They possess one of the most important collections
TU HOC TIENG CAP TOC
CÁCH TIM MOT CON DUONG
flower market, botenical gardens with one of the
of orchids and of equatorial plants, besides 8 wide
world's richest collections of orchids and equatorial
Cholon must be visited at night to see the crowd
variety of game.
Ban do nay dugc chia ra turng a vuong.
plants, and the National Museum, containing ancient
overflowing the streets and the multitude of dazzling
VA
Moi 8 bè dong có ghi só (1 - 2..) và ba
Indochinese masterpieces.
neon signs.
THE NATIONAL MUSEUM
nam có ghi chir (A B...).
People who, for the first time, visit Saigon
00057
Moi tên durong ghi theo the tu A.B.C... & phía
PEOPLE
Located in the left-hand side of the entrance of the
would doubtless be struck by numerous rather curious
Botanical Gardens, the National Museum, inaugurated
duói deu có chis va só. Chir và so two la a vuong
practices and customs which have not even the faintest
001
The city of Saigon, including Cholon, covers
on January 1. 1929, is now a best organized among the
mà trong ay có ten during dó.
resemblance with those in Western countries and al.
an estimated area of 51 square kilometers and has
five museums throughout the country. Objects found
ANH-VAN BAM-THOAI
The du : Muon tim during La Lgi.
ways charmed by the friendliness and gaiety of the
an estimated population of about two million to date.
from this National Museum are, for the most part,
Vietnamese people, the loveliness of nice girls, the
antiques donated by the Society for Indochinese
"NEN MUA BO:
Trong ban tim durding de BS, 0 vuong nam nguy
delicious and elmost overabundent food, the fairytale
Of Saigon's these two million people, one and
Studies, created in 1897, which has its library within
theo chu va só mà trong dó có ten during.
utmosphere of the surrounding countryside, etc....
a quarter million are Vietnamese ; more than hall a
the Museum itsell.
AND
- 9
- 10
- 11
12
AIRLINES
BANKS
EMBASSIES-CONSULATES
Netherlands Embassy, I47 Phan dinh-
Bank of China,
II Chrong-Durong
Phùng
Air Viet-Nam,
116 Nguyen-Huê
New-Zeland Embassy,
Bank of Communications, 87 Hàm-Nghi
Lam-Son Square
American Embassy,
39 Ham-Nghi
Norwegian Consulate,
Japan Airlines,
7 Hàn-Thuyen
-
B. F. A.
21 Chrong-Durong
Australian Embassy.
Lam-Son Square
Philippines Embassy,
42
Doàn-thi-Diùm
Royal Air Cambodge,
-
B. F. C.
32 Ham-Nghi
British Embassy,
25 Thong-Nhirt
Portuguese Consulate, 35A Chrong-Durong
Northwest Airline,
-
Bank of East Asia,
6 Vō-Di-Nguy
Belgian Embassy,
26 Gia-Long
Swedish Consulate,
35 Chirong-Dirong
Air India,
-
B. N. C. I.
Swiss Consulate,
36 Tôn-Thát-Dam
Chinese Embassy,
26 Gia-Long
47 Pasteur
Thai Embassy,
Air France,
130 Ty-Do
77 Trurong-minh-Gidng
Chartered Bank,
3 Vō-Di-Nguy
Danish Consulate,
I5 Nguyen-công-Trir
Royal Air Laos,
IO Ngo-dirc-Ke
Viet-Nam Commercial Credit
French Consulate,
216 Phan-dinh-Phùng
Civil Air Transport,
16 Tir-Do
Bank,
17 Churong-Durong
German Embassy.
106 Nguyen-Hui
Pan American,
Commercial & Industrial
HOTELS
23 Ng6-dirc-Ke
Bank of Viet-Nam,
S.A.S.,
100 Ty.Do
93 Ham-Nghi
Greek Consulate,
3 Vō-di-Nguy
Astor Hotel,
70 Tyr-Do
Hong-Kong & Shanghai
Italian Embassy,
135 Pasteur
Caravelle Hotel,
Swissair,
23 Lam-Son Square
-
Banking Corporation, 9 Chrong-Durong
Indian Consulate,
213 Tir-Do
Catinat Hotel,
69 T(r-Do
Thai International,
-
National Bank of
Japanese Embassy,
13-17 Nguyen.Hue
Continental Hotel,
Lam-Son Square
K. L. M.,
140 Tyr-Do
Viet-Nam,
17 Chirong Durong
Embassy Hotel.
Korean Embassy,
109 Nguyen-Du
35 Nguyên.trung.Truc
Tokyo Bank,
Grand Hotel Des Nations, 70 Nguyen.Hue
I2 22 Ham-Nghi
Laotian Embassy,
93 Pasteur
Majestic Hotel,
I Tu-Do
Viet-Nam Ngân-Hang,
117
Nguyên-Hue
Malaysian Embassy,
IfI bis Công-Lý
Royal Saigon,
72 Nguyen.Huê
- 5
6
- 7 -
- 8
Documents and objects relating to the history
Between the two entertainment sites, numerous
and evolution of Viet Nam as well as of a number of
find here a well laid-oud covered-in building, that
concrete benches shaded by vinecovered bowers dot
houses a maze of crowded stalls and alleyways that
such Asian countries as Japan, China, Tibet, Cambo-
the riverside. The lights from ships tied up at the
sell every conceivable article under the sun. Here
dia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia and Malaya, are now
port in Khanh Hoi sprinkle the river with reflections
TRANSPORTATION
is truly everything from a candlestick to sealing-wax
exhibited in the Museum to make it one of the most
and give a carnival note,
via an over-ripe Durian to possibly a King. It is all
attractive spots in Saigon.
this that makes Saigon a shopping center that is lit-
Since Saigon is situated at the crossroads of
In the darkness, the faint lights from the oppo-
the known, and rich in bargains.
main air routes in Southeast Asio, a stopover can be
THE SAIGON RIVER
site bank and the lamps of motoboats slowly breas-
arranged at no extra fare if you are travelling through
ting the current inevitably induce a reverie in the
THE WORLD FAMOUS DRESS OF THE
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Djakarta,
Saigon is one of the rare sea-ports in the world
sentimental-
Bangkok, Calcutta or Rangoon. Many steamship lines
where oceanliners have to travel some 40 miles
VIETNAMESE WOMEN
calling at these ports also stop at Saigon.
up river in order to reach the docks offering to the
traveller the most fascinating three hour sightseeing
SHOPPING
Perhaps the first thing that strikes foreign visi-
in his life. All ships up to 10.000 tons are apt to
tors at time when they set loot on this country is the
In the city of Saigon, common transportation
loveliness of Vietnamese women in their < ao dai, »
facilities include taxis, buses, push-bikes (cyclos) and
pass between banks lined with mangroves or areas
covered with luxurious vegetation, water-palm-trees
Shopping in Saigon is fascinating, 100. The
Cyclo móy, a 3-wheel motor driven vehicle.
and ricetields. Sampans and river junks, filled with
main shopping area in Saigon are the following bou-
or Vietnamese women's dress. According to many
levards or streets Tu Do, Le Loi, Nguyen Hue, Le
tourists, the áo dài is something unique in the world
rice, lish, sand or wood, glide by, guided by men
Thanh Ton, and Dong Khanh in Cholon, and of
that it is sexy without being in the least vulger. So.
Taxis are psinted by distinctive light blue and
using poles or oars,
course, the Saigon Central Market.
me find the áo dài very becoming. Here again is a
cream in Salgon, and are all licenced. All carry me-
grand opportunity to buy the traditional áo dai, with
ters and the minimum legal lare payable is VN86,
The Bach Dang Quay on the Saigon River is
it close fitting bodice, and long flowing slit-sided
and thereafter the fare increases by fifty per cents
not only a wonderful place where have-nots of all
Vietnamese handicraft articles, specially souvenirs,
tunic, worn with the pantaloans, which today are
for every hundred yards. And fares are increased by
ages can enjoy its beautiful view and fresh breere,
such IS tortoise shell and ivory goods, pottery, blinds,
regretably getting tighter in the leg and loosing
filty per cents between 10 PM to 6 AM. For long
but also B rendez-vous spot for young couples or
wi andscreens, conical hats... are available at the Han-
their inherant sllure and grace that is the charm
rides outside town, including Tan Son Nhut Airport,
wind-lovers and even an interesting place for gour-
dicralt Development Center, 86 Tu Do St... Lacquer-
of the Vietnamese feminine attire.
the driver should be given the return fare back to
mets to taste some unusual snacks.
wave and objects of art can purchased at Thanh Le,
town.
159 Tu Do St. Thanh My, 82 Nguyen Hue Boule-
LANGUAGE
vard ; Nguyen Oanh, 86 Nguyen Van Thinh St.. Sty-
To its habitual visitors, Bach Dang Quay is
lish shoes are sold at the shops along Le Thanh Ton
Taxis are not generally used or recommended
English and Chinese are spoken in particularly
above all a relaxing place. The most frequented
St., Chic Tailors, shirtmakers and jewellers can be
for sightseeing trips. Travel agents suggest the hire
all hotels, stores and travel agencies while French is
sections of the quay stretch from the end of Tu Do
lound along Tu Do St., and in the Eden arcade. But
of a chauffeured limousine for independent sight
common among the Vietnamese aristocracy and in
Street to the c Pointe des Blagueurs (Bullslingers'
the Saigon Central Market is a most interesting shoo-
seeing. U-drive cars are also available. Visitors
many luxury shops. You will find interpreters avails-
Point) neer the National Bank of Viet Nam.
ping place where everything is sold, Visitors could
should cousult their travel egents or The Caravelle
ble from all the travel agencies.
Hotel.
- 13 -
- 14 -
- 15
- 16 -
RESTAURANTS
ENTERTAINMENT
HOSPITALS
USEFUL BOOKS ON VIETNAM
VIETNAMESE THEATER
FRENCH
Grall Hospital, 14 Gia-Long
HUNG-DAO,
DÔ.VÁN-MINH
130 Trän-hung-Dao
Saint Paul Clinic, 280 Phan.thanh-Gian
Caruso,
I25 Vō-di-Nguy
QUOC-THANH,
VIETNAM Where East and West Meet.
271 Vō-Tánh
Crazy Cow,
44 Dinh-tiên-Hoùng
Adventist Hospital 120 Vō.Tánh Phú-nhuan
OLYMPIC,
Höng-thäp-Tw
NGUYEN-VAN.KHON
Duy Tan Clinic,
Guillaume Tell,
32 Trinh-minh.The
5I Duy-Tân
VIETNAMESE FOR YOU.
MOVIES
Koutiki,
20 Phan-thanh.Gian
REX,
147 Nguyen-Huê
PHARMACIES
ENGLISH VIETNAMESE
La Cigale,
I8 Dinh-tiên.Hoùng
La Thanh,
DICTIONARY.
EDEN,
183 Tu-Do
195 Tw-do
Pharmacie Normale,
VIETNAMESE ENGLISH
DAI-NAM,
VIETNAMESE
79 - 9I Trän-hung-Dqo
II9 Ty-do
Pharmacie de Saigon,
DICTIONARY.
CASINO,
Lê-Loi - Pasteur
I20 Lê-Loi
Le Calypso,
67 Pasteur
VU-VAN-LE
NIGHT CLUBS
AFTER HOURS PHARMACIES
I SPEAK VIETNAMESE.
CHINESE
Arc en ciel,
52 Tdn.Dà
Nguyen-thi-Hai,
35 Lê-Loi
Van Canh,
184 Calmette
Bong-Lai,
I Nguyen-trung-Truc
NGUYEN-PHUT.TAN
Baccara,
BARBER SHOPS
165 Tran-quý-Cáp
VIETNAM PAST AND TODAY.
ITALIAN
Caravelle,
23 Lam.Son Square
Lê-Loi,
59 Lê-Loi street
A MODERN HISTORY OF VIETNAM.
Pizzeria,
76c Le-thánh-Tôn
International,
9I Cong-Lý
Viet Anh,
47 Lê.Loi
LE-HUY-HAP
SPANISH
Kim-Son,
2 Tran-hurng-Dqo
Matignon Royal,
213 Tw-do
VIETNAMESE LEGENDS.
Paprika,
136bis Building A Yên-Do
My-Phung,
5 Mê-Linh Square
BOOK STORES
Ma Cabane,
LÉ-XUAN-THUY
108 Trurong-công-Dinh
Khai.Tri,
62 Lê-Loi
JAPANESE
KIM-VAN-KIEU.
Tour d'Ivoire,
I2 Tran.hurng-Dqo
Bookshop,
33 Passage Eden
These can be obtained from
Fuji,
96 Hung-Vurong
Tu-Do,
So Tu-Do
Xuan Thu,
185 Tw.do
KHAI-TRI Bookshop, 62
- 21
22
23
24
BÊN XE SAIGON
Huyah-man-Dat,
Nguyen-Hoang Ham-To
Pasteur,
Ben Charge Disong Hien-Vurung
BANG CHI BUONG BÔ
18-thánh-Tón
Cuòng-De - Pham-hong-Thai
Pham-phú-Tién,
Ham-Tir Dong-Khanh
DI MIÈN DÓNG
TÙ' SAIGON
Luong-nhir-Hoc,
Hong-Bang Lê-quang-Liem
Pham-Dôn,
Dong-Khanh Ham-Tv
Ben NGUYEN-CU-TRINH, xe di :
Luru-xuan-Tin,
Dong-Khenh Khöng-Tù
Phan-huy-Chú,
Le-quang-Liem - Trãn-quang-Phyc
Biên-Hoa, Long-Thành, Phuroc-Le, Vüng-
Lý-thành-Nguyen,
Trang-Tu Tràn-hoang-Quan
Phùng-Hung,
Hong-Bann Lê-quang-Liêm
Tau, Long-Dien, Long-Hai, Xuyên-Moc.
Ang Kor
560 CS
Long-Thanh
88
Le-dai-Hành,
Trän-hoàng-Quan - Tran-quoc-Toin
Be-Rja
99
Lac-Ninh
135
Phó-co-Dièu,
Tran-quoc-Toin Tràn-hoang-Quan
Mac-dinh-Chi,
Phan-thanh-Gian Thong-Nhirt
Ben PHAN-VAN-HUM - LÊ-LAI,
Bec-Lieu
276
My-Tho
71
Phú-Giso,
Trang-Tir - Höng-Bang
Manh-Tir,
xe di Thu-Dirc, Di-An, Bien-Hoa, Xuan-
Banmethuot
353
Trãn-hoang-Quan Trang-Tir
Nam-Vang
240
Phú-Hiru,
Hong-Bang Trang-Tir
Nguyen-dinh-Chièu, Hai Ba Trung Tr.-minh-Giang
Loc, Long-Khanh, Binh-Tuy, Hàm-Tan,
Ben-Tre
86
Nha-Trang
446
Pham-dình-Hò.
Truong-tän-Beru Lyc-Tinh
Lái-Thieu, Binh-Durong, Binh-Long,
Bien-Hoa
30
Phan-Thiet
196
Ng6-tüng-Chau,
Le-van-Duyet Bui-thj-Xuan
Trän-quý-Cáp,
C.T. Chien-si Cao-Thang
Phuoc Long, Go-Dau, Trang-Bang, Tay-
Binh-Tuy
172
Phan-Rang
319
Nguyen-Sieu,
Hai Ba Trung Don Dat
Thái-lap-Thành,
Ty-Do Thi-Sach
Ninh.
Ca-Mau
344
Pleiku
536
Nguyen-van-Thinh,
Hai Be Trung Nguyen-Hu
Tôn-that-Thiep,
Nguyen-Hue Pasteur
Can-Tho
169
Ngô-Júc-Ké,
Bén HAM-NGHI xe di : H6c-Môn.
Qui-Nhon
675
V8-di-Nguy Nguyen-Hue
Chau-Doc
245
Nguyen-công-Trú,
Tan-that-Dam Nguyen-thói-Hoe
Ton-that-Dam,
Ton-thät-Thip Ham-Nghi
Cho-Lón
5
Rach-Gia
248
Nhà-Bè, Phú-Xuan.
Trifu-quang-Phyc,
Le-quang-Liem Hong-Bang
Sa.Dec
130
Nguyen-van-Sam,
Ky-Con Cong-Ly
Dà-Nang
970
Tan-Da,
Nguyen-Trai Ham-Tir
DI MIÈN TAY
Da.Lot
300
Soc-Trang
231
Nguyen-Trai, Nguyan-tri-Phurong
Tran-Hoe,
Dong-Khanh Khong-Tin
Ben PÉTRUS KY : Ca-Mau, Can-
Tan-An
47
Gia-Djnh
5
Nguyen-huýnh-Déc,
Tràn-hirng-Dao Ham-To
Tho, Bac-Lieu, Trà-Vinh, Long-Xuyen,
Tay-Ninh
96
Nguyen-Trai Hong-Bang
Tran-Dien,
Dong-Khanh Khong-Tir
Go-Cong
58
Neuyen-day-Duong,
Châu-Dóc, Vinh-Long, Tân-An, Cái-Bè,
Trà-Vinh
198
Trãn-thanh-Can La-quang-Liem
Trän-turóng-Cóng,
Trieu-a.-Phyc Luong-nhur-Hoc
Ha-Noi
1758
Ng6-nhãn-Tinh,
Sa-Déc, My.Tho, Gd-Công, Ben-Tre,
Thi-Dire
15
Hué
1077
Phan-dình.Phùng,
Dinh-tien-Hoang Ly-thai-To
Vo-Tánh,
Cong-Hòa La-van-Duyet
Rach-Gia, Ha.Tiên.
Thu-dau-Mat
30
Hà-Tien
338
Phan-thanh-Gian,
Ly-thái-To Dinh-tiên-Hoang
Vō-di-Nguy,
Ham-Nghi - Ton-thät-Thiep
Hón-Quan
124
Vinh-Long
136
Vo-Tánh,
Cang-Hoa Le-van-Duyet
DI TRUNG-VIET
Vüng-Tau
121
Pham-viet-Chánh,
Cong-Quýnh Hong-thop-Tv
Kontum
597
Pham-dang-Hung, Nguyan-v-Giai Phan-dình-Phùng
Xóm Voi,
Hong-Bang Trang-Tir
Ben PÉTRUS KY: Phan-Thiet, Nha-
Long-Hai
114
Vientiane
1260
Phó-dúc-Chính, Ben Chuong Durong Hδ-van-Nga
Yet-Kieu,
Hong-Bang Hung-Vurong
Trang, Bio-Loc, Da.Lat, Banmêthuot.
Long-Xuyen
190
Xuan-Lac
80
29
28
-- 30
31
sú QUÁN
Sú-quan Hoa.Ky, 39 Ham-Nghi
25 251
QUÂN CÁNH-SÁT
TRUONG TIÊU HOC
- Pháp, 27 Hong-thap-Tu
31.442
VIÊN
Nhe Tong Gtám-Dôc Canh-Sat Quoc.gie, 266
-- Anh, Thong-Nhirt
23.341
Canh-Sat Do-Thanh
269 Trän-hung-Dao
Binh Dong,
3 Bén Phú-dinh
-
Thái-Lan,
Benh-vien Cho-Quán,
Ty Canh-Sat Quan I
11 Mac-dinh-Ch;
77 Trurong-minh-Gidng
20.172
178 Gia-phú
152 Bén Ham-Tir
-
Binh Tay,
II
73 Bác-si Yersin
- Phi-luat-Tân, 213 Tu-Do
22,869
Binh-Dan,
-
III
Chi Hoa,
- Dai-Han, 107 Nguyen-Du
243 Lê-vän-Duyêt
493 Lê-văn-Duyêt
23 146
21.732
371 Phan-thanh.Gian
-
IV
14 Doàn-nhû-Hài
Chq Quán,
844 Trän-hurng-Dao
- Trung-Hoa, 47 Pasteur
-
V
-
-
Cho.Ray,
359 Dong-Khanh
Khánh-Hoi,
Tôn-thät-Thuyet
Nhàt-Ban,
-
VI
147 Phan.dình-Phùng
23.545
42 Thuan-Kieu
114 Pham-vãn-Chi
-
VII
Ly-thai.To, Bén Nguyên-ngirgc-Thi (Binh
184 Bén Nguyen-Duy
- Úc, Nhà hang Caravelle
21.442
-
Nhi.Dong,
-
VIII
dong)
143 Tüng-thien-Verng
- Y, Pasteur
23.451
2 Sur-van-Hanh
- Cong-La
341 Trän-hurng-Dao
Phan-dinh-Phung, 491/7 Phan.dinh-Phùng
- Ai-Lao, 93 Pasteur
21.340
-
Hong.Bang,
So Canh-Sat Cap-Ciru
268 Tran-hung-Dao
Phú-Lâm,
6 Tân-Hòa Dong
- Hoa.Lan, 16 Duy-Tân
24 222
Toa Länh-sur Bi, 26 Gia-Long
32 Hùng-Vurong
23.345
QUÂN HÀNH-CHÁNH
Phú.Tho,
Tôn.thät-Thiep (Cho-Lón)
- Tay-Dirc, тоб Nguyên-Huê
21.069
- Saigon,
125 Lê.Loi
Su-pham thurc hanh, duròng Tran.binh-
Tòa D8-chanh,
86 Le-thanh-Tan
An, 213 Ty-Do
21.340
Chan-y viên Trung-wong.
Trong
Tòa Hanh-chanh Quan I
8 Bên Bach-Dang
- Thuy-Si,
8 Hō-xuán-Hurong
-
II
6 Trän-hung-Dao
Tân-Dinh
40 Huynh-tinh-Cha
35 Bén Chrong-Durong 22 396
Bào-Sanh viên Tir-Da,
-
III
299 Phan-thanh-Gian
-
Tràn-hung-Dao,
83 durong Phát-Diêm
Dan-Mach,
284 Cong-Quynh
-
IV
5 Doàn-nhû-Hài
I5 Nguyên-công-Trir 23.441
Trãn-quy-Cáp,
6 Tran-quy-Cáp
- Bo.dão.Nha,
Hung-Vurong,
-
-
V
203 Hong Bang
36 Hung-Virong
-
VI
X6m Cui, 253 Tüng-thien-Vwong Cholón
107 Ben Lê-quang-Hièn
39 Ben Churong-Durg 20.464
-
- Hy-Lap, 3 Vō-di-Nguy
20.775
Benh-vien Grall.
If Gia-Long
VII
184 Bên Nguyen-Duy
-
VIII
144 Tüng-thiên-Vurg
- Thuy-Dien,
-
Saint Paul
35 Ben Chrong.Durong 22,695
280 Phan-thanh-Gian
K. D. sõ 561/KD ngay 14-3-1966
be
Take to Licymay
As
ANNUAL REPORT
COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,1967
ANNUAL REPORT
COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,1967
WITH BY-LAWS AND LIST OF MEMBERS
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE
FIFTY-EIGHT EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK
1967
Photo by G.D. Hackett
WALTER H. MALLORY
Executive Director, 1927-1959
Editor, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1928-1967
CONTENTS
PAGE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
6
STANDING COMMITTEES
7
STAFF
8
SUMMARY OF COUNCIL WORK
10
"FOREIGN AFFAIRS"
18
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
22
American Foreign Policy and the
Search for World Order
24
America and Europe
26
Strengthening the World Economy
28
Asian Upheavals and Enigmas
30
North-South Tensions: The African Case
32
Economic Aid
34
America and the Communist World
36
Serial Publications
37
SPECIAL FELLOWSHIPS
38
Edward R. Murrow Fellowship
38
Military Fellowships
38
THE THOMAS J. WATSON MEETINGS
39
COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
56
CORPORATION SERVICE
59
FOREIGN RELATIONS LIBRARY
62
FINANCES
64
MEMBERSHIP
71
BY-LAWS
85
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS-FROM FOUNDING TO PRESENT
88
PUBLICATIONS
90
OFFICERS
STANDING COMMITTEES
1967-1968
1967-1968
JOHN J. McCLoY
Chairman of the Board
STUDIES
HENRY M. WRISTON
Honorary President
GRAYSON KIRK, Chairman
GRAYSON KIRK
President
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
WALDEMAR A. NIELSON
FRANK ALTSCHUL
Vice-President & Secretary
CHARLES F. BARBER
JAMES A. PERKINS
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
Vice-President
BYRON DEXTER
LUCIAN W. PYE
GABRIEL HAUGE
Treasurer
CARYL P. HASKINS
RAYMOND VERNON
GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.
Executive Director
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
DAVID W. MACEACHRON
Deputy Executive Director
JOHN TEMPLE SWING
Associate Executive Director
DIRECTORS
MEMBERSHIP
ARTHUR H. DEAN, Chairman
Term Expires 1968
J. RICHARDSON DILWORTH
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
FRANK ALTSCHUL
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, JR.
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
GRAYSON KIRK
PORTER MCKEEVER
CARROLL L. WILSON
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
HENRY R. LABOUISSE
ALFRED C. NEAL
ARTHUR H. DEAN
BILL D. MOYERS
Term Expires 1969
DOUGLAS DILLON
WALTER H. MALLORY
ALLEN W. DULLES
JOHN J. McCLoY
WILLIAM C. FOSTER
PHILIP D. REED
FINANCE & BUDGET
CARYL P. HASKINS
ROBERT V. ROOSA
FRANK ALTSCHUL, Chairman
Term Expires 1970
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
PHILIP D. REED
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
LUCIAN W. PYE
GABRIEL HAUGE
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
GABRIEL HAUGE
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
ALFRED C. NEAL
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
JAMES A. PERKINS
CARROLL L. WILSON
Directors Emeriti
ELLIOTT V. BELL
JOHN H. WILLIAMS
NOMINATING
LEWIS W. DOUGLAS
HENRY M. WRISTON
GRAYSON KIRK, Chairman
THOMAS K. FINLETTER
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
6
7
STAFF
as of 9/19/67
EXECUTIVE STAFF
MILITARY FELLOWS
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.
CoL. SIDNEY B. BERRY, JR., USA.
Editor of "Foreign Affairs"
Executive Director
COL. KEMPER W. BAKER, USAF.
DAVID W. MACEACHRON
JOHN TEMPLE SWING
Deputy Executive Director
Associate Executive Director
MEETINGS
HARRY BOARDMAN (Director of Meetings); JUDY COLEMAN (Assistant);
"FOREIGN AFFAIRS"
PEGGY PAPADAKIS, LINDA GROSSMAN.
PHILIP W. QUIGG (Managing Editor); JOHN G. STOESSINGER (Book Review
Editor); MARY H. STEVENS (Assistant to the Editor); JENNIFER SEYMOUR
(Editorial Assistant); RICHARD H. BROWN (Director of Advertising);
COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
MACLEAN HOGGSON (Advertising Manager); SHEILA Low-BEER, PAGE
ROLLAND BUSHNER (Director); BRENDA HIRSCH.
CUDDY, JEAN GUNTHER, MARGARET MORGAN. PHYLLIS MORSE (Fulfillment
Manager); AIDA DE NIEVA, ROSA GRANT, ROSEMARIE GRIGSBY, ANGELA
FOREIGN RELATIONS LIBRARY
RAIA, JUDITH TURITTO.
DONALD WASSON (Librarian); JANET RIGNEY (Assistant Librarian); TIBOR
STUDIES
BANHEGYI, KORNELIA DORMIRE, VIRGINIA ETHERIDGE, JANIS KRESLINS,
PEGGY LLOYD, AGNES T. MCPARTLAND, SARAH PARSONS.
CHARLES W. Yosr (Senior Fellow); JOHN C. CAMPBELL (Senior Research
Fellow); WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. (Senior Research Fellow); ROBERT W.
VALKENIER (Editor); LORNA BRENNAN (Administrative and Membership
ADMINISTRATIVE
Secretary); SYLVA SINANIAN (Research Associate); HELENA STALSON
RICHARD H. BROWN (Business Manager and Director, Corporation Serv-
(Economist); HELEN BALKIN, SUZANNE BAUM, HELEN CARUSO, ALBA AMOIA,
ice); RUTH C. WITHERSPOON (Comptroller); GRACE DARLING (Publications
JANICE FARLOW, HENRIETTA KOLBORG, CAROL RICHMOND, PATRICIA SMITH.
Promotion Manager); ZELIA RUEBHAUSEN (Special Consultant to the Exec-
utive Director); CROWELL JACKSON (Administrative Assistant); JUDITH
ANNUALS
GUSTAFON (Secretary to the Executive Director); LOUISA WILLIAMS (Head
WALTER H. MALLORY (Editor, "Political Handbook and Atlas of the
Bookkeeper); JOAN BOREMAN, BITA DOBO, ANA FIGUERAS, DORIS ELIZABETH
World"); RICHARD P. STEBBINS (Senior Research Fellow; Editor, "The
FOREST, NATALIE LAURITANO, ELVIRA H. LAWRENCE, JEAN LONDON, LISBETH
United States in World Affairs," and "Documents on American Foreign
NUZZI, ROSANN RAIA, MILDRED ROFEY, MARGARET D .SHULTZ.
Relations"); ELAINE P. ADAM (Assistant to the Editor); JEAN FIELD.
HOUSE
VISITING FELLOWS
VIVIAN KARDARAS (House Supervisor); MANUEL CID (Steward); ARNALDO
WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN (Senior Fellow-African Issues); WILLIAM J.
GALLARDO (Superintendent); SALVATORE PECORARO (Porter).
BARNDS (Southeast Asia in World Politics); C. FRED BERGSTEN (The Inter-
national Role of the Dollar); MIRIAM CAMPS (European Integration and
American Policy); ROBERT D. CRASSWELLER (United States Policy in the
MAIL, MESSENGERS, AND REPRODUCTION
Caribbean).
JOSEPH CUCOLO (Supervisor); WILLIAM BUTLER, MARY D'AGATA, EMILIO
MESA, JOHN W. ROBSON, ERNESTINE SIEGEL.
EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP
FOR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS
SoL W. SANDERS (1967-68).
8
9
SUMMARY OF
SUMMARY
COUNCIL WORK
Associate Executive Director, will be in charge of the program. Although the
program will not be fully in operation until the fall of 1968, the first Inter-
national Affairs Fellowship was awarded for the coming year to Ernest Preeg. He
has been granted a year's leave by the Foreign Service upon returning from
D
URING THE TWELVE MONTHS covered by this report, the Council continued
Geneva, where he participated in the Kennedy Round negotiations, and he plans
to pursue its four basic objectives-aiding its members to deepen their
to devote his fellowship to writing a history of the negotiations.
understanding of international affairs; seeking new insights into American
foreign policy; disseminating knowledge about America's foreign relations
THE WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON
through its publications; and providing a meeting place for leaders in inter-
SENIOR FELLOWSHIP
national affairs from the United States and abroad. As the number of institutions
concerned with international affairs grows, including many with specialized
The many friends of Whitney H. Shepardson will be gratified that his memory
interests, the Council is increasingly finding its particular role less in individual
and his tremendous contribution to the Council-Mr. Armstrong has written
country studies or analyses of one aspect of national policy and more in those
that he "can be called in many respects 'the' founder"-will be perpetuated by
studies and activities which relate the problems of various regions and broad
the establishment of a Senior Fellowship in his name. It was made possible by
segments of policy one to another.
the creation of a $500,000 fund, which was initiated by a gift of $250,000 from
one of Mr. Shepardson's warm friends and admirers. The first holder of the
new Fellowship will be Willard Thorp, who will be making an appraisal of the
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FELLOWSHIP
United States foreign aid program. In the vast experience, academic and gov-
A most significant development at the Council this year was a grant by the
ernmental, which he brings to his project, Mr. Thorp was most recently the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund to enable the Council to launch a new fellowship
Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.
program offering outstanding younger men and women-four to eight a year-
an opportunity to broaden their experience and develop their thinking in the
"FOREIGN AFFAIRS"
field of international affairs. The program will be directed, on the one hand, to
giving a small group of the most able younger scholars an opportunity to test
The influence of Foreign Affairs continues to increase with its expanding circu-
their thinking in a policy-oriented environment, perhaps a government or
lation, which has now reached 70,000. The widespread use of Foreign Affairs
international agency, while, on the other hand, providing a few of the more
articles for teaching and similar purposes has been a source of special satisfac-
promising younger government officials with the possibility of thinking through
tion. The articles in Volume 45 covered a wide range of issues facing the United
some of their problems in a scholarly environment free from the pressure of
States, with notable attention being devoted to the problems of East and South-
east Asia.
day-to-day decisions. It is hoped that this program will make a continuing
contribution to that small reservoir of leaders of diverse experience and multiple
talents who will play a critical part in directing the nation's energies in the
THE CHINA AND ATLANTIC STUDIES
future. The Council itself expects to benefit from the infusion of new ideas
The two most ambitious study projects ever undertaken by the Council were
which this group should bring.
The United States and China in World Affairs and the Atlantic Policies Studies,
Fellowships will be awarded, ordinarily for a year, on the advice of a high-
both of which were begun in 1962 with the aid of a $900,000 grant from the
level Advisory Committee. One or two Fellows will be in residence each year at
Ford Foundation. Each of the projects was intended to bring together a group of
the Council while the others will be working elsewhere. John Temple Swing,
specialists who would produce a series of studies together covering the key
10
11
SUMMARY
elements of concern to American foreign policy in its relations with China and
STUDIES AND PUBLICATIONS
in its relations with the other nations of the North Atlantic. Each project was
Two study groups and four discussion groups held meetings during the year.
directed by its own steering committee. Alan W. Dulles was the chairman of the
In addition, there were special review meetings for two other volumes and two
Steering Committee for the China project and Charles M. Spofford for the
review meetings for short Policy Books. Basic reappraisals of American foreign
Atlantic Studies. Each had its own full-time director: Harold van B. Cleveland,
policy from two different perspectives were underway. Hans J. Morgenthau,
for the Atlantic Studies and Robert Blum, until his death, for the China project,
Visiting Senior Fellow, continued his re-examination of American foreign policy,
which Lucian W. Pye then directed on a part-time basis during its final year.
working with a study group of which Joseph E. Johnson, President of the
The first books published in the Atlantic Policy Studies were The Troubled
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was chairman. Charles W. Yost
Partnership, by Henry A. Kissinger, and Alternative to Partition, by Zbigniew
completed his study of foreign policy, and this was reviewed at a special
Brzezinski, both of which appeared in 1965. These were followed by John O.
meeting with Henry M. Wriston serving as chairman. Louis Henkin completed
Coppock's Atlantic Agricultural Unity in 1966.
a manuscript on the influence of law on the behavior of nations, which was
During the year of this report the remaining manuscripts for the Atlantic
reviewed at a special meeting over which Philip C. Jessup presided. William J.
project were completed and by June 30, 1967, all but two were in print. During
Barnds, aided by a study group with Kenneth T. Young as chairman, pursued
the year the following were pubished: The Atlantic Idea and Its European
a study of South Asia as a new arena for world politics. The Council had review
Rivals, by Harold van B. Cleveland; European Unification in the Sixties: From
meetings for John W. Evan's Policy Book on U.S. trade policy and for John S.
the Veto to the Crisis, by Miriam Camps; The Conflicted Relationship: The
Badeau's volume on U.S. policy toward the Arab states; the chairmen were
West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America, by Theodore
Alfred C. Neal and Richard Nolte, respectively. Other books in process during
Geiger; Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations, by John
the year were a reappraisal of American foreign ecenomic policy by William
Pincus; and Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and
Diebold, Jr., a study of the role of the military in the Middle East by J. C.
Alternatives, by Bela Balassa. At the printer are Stanley Hoffmann's volume,
Hurewitz, a volume on the changing nature of Soviet society, of which Allen
Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy and Richard N.
Kassof is the editor, and an analysis of divided Germany by Hans Speier.
Cooper's study, The Economics of Interdependence: National Economic Policy
During the year, there were the following discussion groups: The Politics of
in the Atlantic Community.
Private Investment with Walter B. Wriston as chairman and William Diebold,
During the winter and spring of 1966 the first of the volumes in The United
Jr., as secretary; Military Stability and Political Evolution in Europe with
States and China in World Affairs series appeared. They were: The American
Marshall Shulman as chairman and Harry Boardman as secretary; Foreign Aid
People and China, by A. T. Steele; Policies Toward China: Views from Six
Policy Reconsidered with Carl Kaysen as chairman and Kenneth M. Kauffman
Continents, edited by A. M. Halpern; and Communist China's Economic Growth
and Foreign Trade, by Alexander Eckstein.
as secretary; and two meetings on African issues over which Waldemar M.
Three more volumes in the series were published during 1966-67: The United
Nielsen presided. The latter two meetings were oriented to a subsequent
States and China in World Affairs, by Robert Blum, edited by A. Doak Barnett;
conference held in conjunction with Chatham House at Ditchley Park in England.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army, by Samuel B. Griffith; and The Future
In addition to the eight China and Atlantic books previously mentioned as
of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, by Lea A. Williams. During the year
having been published in 1966-67, eight others were published during the year
as follows:
of this report Kenneth T. Young finished his study which will appear under the
title, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The U.S. Experience and Fred
Greene's volume, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia was also sent to the printer.
Walter H. Mallory (Editor)
Political Handbook and Atlas of the World,
Two final studies are still in preparation.
1966
13
12
SUMMARY
Richard P. Stebbins
The United States in World Affairs, 1965
THE THOMAS J. WATSON MEETINGS
Richard P. Stebbins (Editor)
Documents on American Foreign Relations,
Endowed by the splendid gift of the children of Thomas J. Watson, the program
1965
of ad hoc meetings provided a panorama of the important issues facing the
United States in the past year. It also provided the members with an oppor-
Henry Aubrey
Atlantic Economic Cooperation: The Case
tunity to meet with a group of leading statesmen and foreign affairs experts
of the OECD
from this and other countries.
During the year, 108 meetings were held, and the effort to encourage more
John C. Campbell
Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugo-
intense discussion through smaller meetings was continued.
slavia in World Politics
The problems of Southeast Asia were considered in a number of meetings,
John W. Evans
including those for General Harold Johnson, General William C. Westmoreland,
U.S. Trade Policy: New Legislation and the
Harrison Salisbury, and the Foreign Minister of Viet Nam. Developments in
Next Round
Europe and their significance to the United States were discussed authorita-
John Hohenberg
Between Two Worlds: Policy, Press and Pub-
tively by men such as the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany,
lic Opinion on Asian-American Relations
the Finance Ministers of Britain and France, and the newly-elected Chairman
of the Commission of the European Economic Community.
James Reston
The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on
African affairs were covered in a number of meetings, including those for
American Foreign Policy
the Emperor of Ethiopia, the President of Zambia, Sir W. Arthur Lewis, and
Charles Burton Marshall. Those who spoke on problems in the Middle East
Seven of the sixteen books published in 1966-67 also appeared in paperback
included the President of Turkey, while the Argentine Foreign Minister was
editions.
among those who addressed the Council on Latin American affairs. The relations
Of particular note was the Fortieth Anniversary edition of The Political
of the United States with the Soviet Union were considered at a number of
Handbook, the forerunner of which was The Political Handbook of Europe, 1927,
meetings, and the speakers included Foy Kohler and Nikolai Inozemtsev.
edited by Malcolm W. Davis. The reception for this initial effort was encourag-
ing, and led the following year to the first Political Handbook of the World,
ELIHU ROOT LECTURES
edited by Mr. Davis and Walter H. Mallory. Beginning with 60 countries in
Francis T. P. Plimpton delivered the Elihu Root Lectures in May 1967 on the
192 pages, the volume has grown with the international community to include
subject of peace-keeping through the United Nations. Since the Middle East
reference information on 134 countries and the United Nations in a volume of
crisis had just become critical and the United Nations was being severely tested,
366 pages.
he departed from his prepared text to give the members an analysis of the
Walter Mallory, as Executive Director from 1927 to 1959, made an invalu-
existing situation.
able contribution to the Council's growth and development. After his retirement
he continued his service as Editor of The Political Handbook and Atlas of the
COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
World, which has been 50 particularly his own creation and which has been
The past year was the most active ever in the history of the associated Com-
over the years the Council's best-selling volume. His coming retirement as Editor
of The Political Handbook is a source of deep regret to his colleagues and his
mittees on Foreign Relations. Together they held 257 meetings, of which the
many friends.
Council arranged, or played a part in arranging, about seventy per cent.
American experts on foreign affairs addressed 140 of the meetings, whereas
14
15
the remainder were addressed by foreign nationals. Council members led 45
of the meetings.
SUMMARY
Southeast Asia and China figured very prominently in the Committees'
program of meetings, accounting for 73 of them during the year. Fifty-four
meetings dealt with Western Europe, and from 15 to 20 meetings each were
CORPORATION SERVICE
devoted to Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Among the prominent
This past year, as before, two series of meetings were offered to the nominees of
individuals addressing the Committees were Assistant Secretary of State Wil-
the corporations which participate in the Corporation Service. The first series
liam Bundy, General Harold Johnson, Harrison Salisbury, Ambassadors Edwin
dealt with the problems of Europe, West and East; the second considered
Reischauer and John K. Galbraith, Chief A. S. O. Adebo, General Sir John
economic development and American foreign aid.
Glubb, and Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan in Washington.
Richard M. Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed
On June 2 and 3, the Twenty-ninth Annual Conference of the Committees
the annual dinner for corporation presidents and board chairmen on the subject,
was held on the theme, "The Problems of Southern Africa and their Significance
"Intelligence in the American Society."
to the United States." The evening session on June 2 was addressed by Joseph
Palmer, II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
CAPITAL FUND PROGRAM
During the past year the Capital Fund drive, which is seeking to raise a
MILITARY FELLOWSHIPS
$5,000,000 endowment for the Council, was brought close to completion, due
in great part to the unstinting and most effective efforts of its General Chair-
In 1966-67 for the first time the Council had two Military Fellows since the
Army has now joined the program. The first Army Fellow was Colonel Michael
man, Malcolm Muir. As a result of the income derived from the new funds,
J. L. Greene, who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Viet Nam and
the Council was enabled to end the fiscal year with a surplus.
who had previously had experience with the U. N. assistance program in the
Congo. The Air Force Fellow in 1966-67 was Colonel Frederick C. Thayer, Jr.,
As always, the strength and value of the Council has rested heavily on the
whose immediately prior service had been in the Directorate of Plans of the
dedicated support of its officers, directors and members. The Council is a
Air Force Headquarters. Both Military Fellows were members of study and
unique community of leaders in many different fields of national life, united
discussion groups and participated actively in other Council activities.
by their common interest in international affairs. The active participation of
many members gives the organization its special quality as an institution
which combines a practical orientation to foreign affairs with a scholarly prob-
EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP
ing for greater understanding.
The first Edward R. Murrow Fellow in the program for foreign correspondents
recently endowed by the CBS Foundation was Malcolm W. Browne. Prior to
George S. Franklin, Jr.
Executive Director
undertaking the Fellowship, Mr. Browne had spent five years reporting from
Viet Nam for the Associated Press and as a free-lance correspondent, and he
David W. MacEachron
had been awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his work there. During his year at the
Deputy Executive Director
Council he devoted himself primarily to the study of China and the Chinese
language.
16
17
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
from Columbia to Dartmouth, is being succeeded by John Stoessinger, Profes-
sor of International Relations at Hunter College and a member of the U.N.
HE CIRCULATION of Foreign Affairs has continued its upward trend during
Secretariat, who among other books has written The Might of Nations, which
T
the past year despite an increase in the subscription rate from $6.00 to
won the Bancroft Prize in 1963.
$8.00, effective with the January 1967 issue. With the close of Volume 45, our
Richard H. Brown, formerly Advertising Manager of Foreign Affairs, and
circulation was about 70,000.
afterward Business Manager of the Herald Tribune's "Book Week," has re-
Because of the American commitment in Viet Nam, Foreign Affairs has
turned as Business Manager and Director of Advertising of Foreign Affairs. He
given special attention in the past year to the situation in East and Southeast
is assisted by MacLean Hoggson as Advertising Manager. Jennifer Seymour
Asia. The list of contributors in that field includes the late Bernard B. Fall,
replaced Carolyn Kelley as Editorial Assistant.
whose article was one of the last things he wrote, as also, many think, one of
The contents of Volume 45 are shown on the following pages.
the best; Kenneth T. Young, who gave for the first time a comprehensive picture
of the U.S.-Chinese talks that have continued, off and on, for more than a
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
decade; former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, who on his return from
Editor
Tokyo reported on U.S.-Japanese relations; Father L. La Dany, who for many
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
years has analyzed Chinese events from the vantage point of Hong Kong; and
Roderick MacFarquhar, Lucian W. Pye, Raul S. Manglapus, Mark Gayn, Guy J.
Pauker, and C.P. Fitzgerald.
Among other articles which attracted special attention were Charles Yost's
appraisal of the United Nations, which he observed at close hand as a member
of the U.S. delegation for five years; McGeorge Bundy's balanced examination
of American obligations both abroad and at home; Secretary Freeman's striking
picture of the power and responsibilities of the United States as the world's main
agricultural producer; and Irving Kristol's controversial critique of the role of
American intellectuals in formulating foreign policy.
The use of Foreign Affairs articles for teaching purposes appears to be in-
creasing steadily. As one example, The National War College alone repro-
duced for class-room use no less than 48 Foreign Affairs articles during the
academic year 1966-67.
To our great regret, Henry M. Wriston has resigned from the Editorial
Advisory Board of Foreign Affairs, after having been a stimulating and most
valued member for over 24 years.
With the last issue of the current volume, Professor Henry L. Roberts, who
for seventeen years has edited the Foreign Affairs quarterly bibliography,
"Recent Books on International Relations," concluded his outstanding service
in that capacity. For all but the last few years of that term he annotated the
current books unaided; only recently was he assisted by a group of area and
functional experts. Mr. Roberts, whose resignation is necessitated by a move
18
19
VOLUME 45
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NO. 1-OCTOBER 1966
NO. 3-APRIL 1967
Viet Nam in the Balance
Bernard B. Fall
1
"Europe" versus "Détente"?
Marshall D. Shulman 389
The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence and Will
Charles W. Yost 19
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate
J.I. Coffey 403
The South West Africa Case: What Happened?
Ernest A. Gross 36
Human Rights Treaties: Why Is The U.S. Stalling?
William Korey 414
U.S. Policy and the "New Europe"
Frank Church 49
To Intervene or Not to Intervene
Hans J. Morgenthau 425
What Is French Policy?
André Fontaine 58
URGENCIES IN LATIN AMERICA
American Dealings with Peking
Kenneth T. Young 77
The Alliance That Lost Its Way
Eduardo Frei Montalva 437
Reports of Britain's Death
lain Macleod 88
Last Chance for a Common Market
Jacob K. Javits 449
The Rise and Fall of "Scientific Socialism"
Arthur P. Mendel 98
Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization
Eldon Kenworthy 463
Mao's Last Revolution
Roderick MacFarquhar 112
Bonn Changes Course
Theo Sommer 477
Computers, Program Management and Foreign Affairs
John Diebold 125
The Political Ocean
E. W. Seabrook Hull 492
New Perspectives Behind the Wall
Welles Hangen 135
Toward a New Order in Indonesia
Guy J. Pauker 503
Quebec Changes Governments
Claude Ryan 148
New Perspectives on Trade and Development
Isaiah Frank 520
Recent Books on International Relations
Henry L. Roberts 162
The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History
Winthrop W. Aldrich 541
Source Material
Donald Wasson 182
Recent Books on International Relations
Henry L. Roberts 553
Source Material
Donald Wasson 571
NO. 2-JANUARY 1967
NO. 4-JULY 1967
The End of Either/Or
McGeorge Bundy 189
Malthus, Marx and the North American Breadbasket
Orville L. Freeman 579
Policy-Making in a World Turned Upside Down
Thomas L. Hughes 202
American Intellectuals and Foreign Policy
Irving Kristol 594
Our Dialogue with Japan
Edwin O. Reischauer 215
Mao's China: The Decline of a Dynasty
L. La Dany 610
China in Context
Lucian W. Pye 229
Punta del Este Revisited
Lincoln Gordon 624
China Convulsed
Mark Gayn 246
The Politics of Private Foreign Investment
Leo Model 639
Cuba, Castro and the United States
Philip W. Bonsal 260
India Adrift
Khrishan Bhatia 652
Planning Our Military Forces
Harold Brown 277
Nuclear Fuel-for-all
Leonard Beaton 662
New Horizons in Foreign Trade
William Diebold, Jr. 291
Relativity in Foreign Policy
Thomas L. Hughes 670
The Rights of Primitive Peoples
Margaret Mead 304
Tension on the Sino-Soviet Border
C.P. Fitzgerald 683
Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union
Marshall I. Goldman 319
Economic Necessities and Atlantic Communities
Alfred C. Neal 694
The Shackled Historian
Herbert Feis 332
Turkey: Emerging Democracy
Aydin Yalçin 706
Asian Revolution and American Ideology
Raul S. Manglapus 344
U.S. Assistance to Less Developed Countries, 1956-1965
Non-Crisis in Italy
E. A. Bayne 353
Kenneth M. Kauffman and Helena Stalson 715
Recent Books on International Relations
Henry L. Roberts 363
Recent Books on International Relations.
Henry L. Roberts 726
Source Material
Donald Wasson 382
Source Material
Donald Wasson 745
20
21
THE STUDIES
PROGRAM
for revision of the manuscript and publication. The aim is to fit together
significant subjects and the best obtainable authors, in order to produce over the
years a flow of books of high quality and, equally important, to stimulate the
thinking of the able men who comprise the advisory groups. In addition to these
projects with study groups, the Council organizes each year some half dozen
I A YEAR in which the United States has been engaged in large-scale military
discussion groups to explore current international problems thoroughly and
operations in Southeast Asia, in reassessment of its relationship with Europe
to consider topics which may be suitable for further study.
and the Soviet Union, and in a crisis of unknown dimensions in the Middle East,
Through its Policy Books series and the published Elihu Root Lectures, the
questions of foreign relations have been in the forefront of American concern.
Council has sought more flexibility and timeliness in its publications by bringing
Indeed, the directions and structure of America's foreign policy over the past
out in a relatively short time books in which recognized authorities present the
years, the extent of its commitments and means of meeting them, and the al-
fruits of their own experience and thinking in brief and readable form. The
locations of resources among international and domestic interests have been
twelve Policy Books published since the series was begun in 1962 include broad
subject to exceptionally much debate. A nonpartisan, private organization
general subjects in their relation to American interests and policy (e.g., Ernest A.
engaged in the study of international affairs has a responsibility to devote its
Gross on the United Nations, Adolf A. Berle on Latin America, Arthur H. Dean
energies to sober investigation and discussion of these problems, making what
on disarmament) and special topics of current interest (e.g., Waldemar A.
contribution it can to consideration of them by both government and the
Nielsen on U.S. policy in southern Africa, John W. Evans on new legislation to
informed public.
follow the Kennedy Round). The most recent volume of Elihu Root Lectures
The Council, from its beginnings, has seen the function of its studies program
was that of James Reston on the relations between the press and the government
and publications in that light. In the past year it has continued its pattern of
in the field of foreign policy.
combining the research and analysis of experts with the thinking and advice of
In any given year there will be in residence at the Council a visiting Senior
members of the Council from the business, official, and academic communities.
Fellow, two visiting fellows from the Air Force and the Army respectively, a
Most timely among the products of this process have been the principal volumes
foreign correspondent holding the Edward R. Murrow Fellowship, and a number
of the Council's recently completed major projects on the Atlantic community
of research fellows on leave from positions in universities, government, busi-
and on the United States and China in world politics, especially the books
ness or journalism. All take part in the study and discussion groups and other
written by the respective directors of the two projects: The Atlantic Idea and Its
activities of the Council in close association with members of the permanent
European Rivals by Harold Van B. Cleveland, and The United States and
staff. The new International Affairs Fellowship Program, endowed by the
China in World Affairs by Robert Blum, completed and edited by A. Doak
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, will also associate several outstanding younger
Barnett. To carry on from these two projects following a joint meeting of their
people with the Council's program. Thus, on the professional side, as well as
steering committees, the Council will organize a special discussion group this
among the membership of the Council, there is a continuing infusion of varied
coming year to re-examine the basic approaches of American foreign policy
experience and fresh points of view.
under the changing world conditions of the coming decade. Charles W. Yost will
The following pages describe the work completed or in progress in 1966-67
have charge of the work of this group.
under a number of headings chosen to show the scope of the studies program,
The studies program, as it develops from year to year, is intended to provide
the interrelationship of its different projects, and the continuity of its work
a balanced coverage of the major problems of American foreign policy without
from one year to another. Each section mentions, in addition to current study
specializing in any area or topic. The undertaking of a study for publication,
and discussion groups, the books published in the past two years as well as
with a visiting scholar or permanent staff member as author, generally involves
studies that are in the intermediate stages prior to publication.
some time for advance planning, a year of concentrated work at the Council
during which meetings are held with an advisory study group, and a final period
John C. Campbell
Kenneth M. Kauffman
William Diebold, Jr.
Charles W. Yost
22
23
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
AND THE SEARCH
FOR WORLD ORDER
was the chairman. It will be published in 1968 under the title, How Nations
Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. In this study Mr. Henkin demonstrates that
international law exercises a much more profound influence over the behavior
The crucial position of the United States in international affairs has been pain-
of nations than is generally recognized and examines the effect of international
fully driven home in the past two decades. This country no longer has the
law in several specific crises.
luxury of abstaining from the central world struggles since inaction by the
United States can be just as decisive in determining the course of events as
action, and America finds itself importuned to take sides in disputes, large and
VISITING SENIOR FELLOW
small, in all parts of the world. Illustrative of the profound influence of the
Hans J. Morgenthau
United States on the rest of the world and the acute interest of others in this
A Re-examination of American Foreign Policy
country is the extensive reporting on America in the press abroad which is
Chairman of Study Group: Joseph E. Johnson
documented in a recent volume published by the Council, International Political
Communication by W. Philips Davison. Events of recent years have also raised
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
with increasing insistency the question of whether or not the United States has
THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS, by James Reston (1966)
overextended itself in the world.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, by W.
Considerations such as these have caused the Council to welcome opportu-
Phillips Davison (1965)
nities to have several basic reappraisals of American foreign policy undertaken
from different points of view. During 1966-67 Hans J. Morgenthau, on leave
from his position as Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign
Policy at the University of Chicago, held meetings with a study group of which
Joseph E. Johnson was the chairman. Professor Morgenthau is completing his
book for publication sometime in 1968. In his study he probes the underlying
assumptions on which American foreign policy has functioned for the past
twenty years. The very success of that policy has created conditions which
demand a new response in his view. In particular, he is concerned with what he
considers an excessive and anachronistic American propensity for equating all
revolutions with threats to this nation.
Another examination of American foreign policy was carried on during the
year by Charles Yost. Written from the point of view of a practitioner of many
years standing, Mr. Yost's study, The Insecurity of Nations, was discussed with
a special review group with Henry M. Wriston presiding. Mr. Yost relates
foreign policy to the nature of man and modern society and contrasts the dark
tragedies into which humanity could fall with the bright promise which is pos-
sible if men will exercise more reason and restraint.
Still another approach to the problem of world order was reflected in a volume
prepared by Louis Henkin, Professor at the Columbia Law School. This manu-
script was also considered by a special review group of which Philip C. Jessup
24
25
AMERICA AND EUROPE
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
Though the Atlantic Policy Studies are formally over, two of the Council's
perspective that took account of the evolution of the cold war, changes in the
principal publications during the past year are fruits from that orchard.
balance of forces in the world, and political alterations within the Eastern and
The Director, Harold van Buren Cleveland, drew on all the work done for
Western groupings of countries. At three of the four meetings the discussion
the Atlantic Studies-including several studies not yet published-for a book
that in short compass makes a comprehensive re-examination of American
focused on ideas put forward by the Chairman and other members of the group
while at one session the discussion leader was Max Kohnstamm, Vice Chairman
policy toward Europe. He takes a hard look at the changes in American-Euro-
of the Committee for a United States of Europe, who assessed the state of Euro-
pean relations from the late 1940s when the Marshall Plan and NATO were in
pean integration and the relation of its future to the possibilities of détente,
the center of the stage, to the early 1960s marked by strains on the Alliance
within Europe and between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
and a shifting balance of economic and political power. Translating trade,
finance and other specific issues into the terms of broad power relations, Mr.
DISCUSSION GROUP
Cleveland suggests the lines of future American policy that will take account
Military Stability and Political Evolution in Europe
of these changes and permit the United States to pursue its major aims which-
Chairman: Marshall Shulman
ever way they develop.
Secretary: Harry Boardman
In another Atlantic Policy Study, Miriam Camps looks back to the crisis in
the European Community that set the French government, the other five and
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
the Commission at odds over agriculture, money and the distribution of power.
ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: The Case of the
Examining critically the compromises that were reached, she assesses the limited
OECD, by Henry G. Aubrey (1967)
possibilities of further integration in the next few years, distinguishing between
THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS, by
the probability of completion of the customs union and the taking of other
Harold van B. Cleveland (1966)
related steps, and unlikely further major cessions of national sovereignty.
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIES: From the Veto
Optimistic about Britain's entry into the Community in the long run, Mrs.
to the Crisis, by Miriam Camps (1966)
Camps recommends continued American support for Western European integra-
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Re-Appraisal of the
tion accompanied by a realization that American policy will not be a major
Atlantic Alliance, by Henry A. Kissinger (1965)
factor influencing its course in the next few years.
NATO IN TRANSITION: The Future of the Atlantic Alli-
Outside the Atlantic Studies but closely related in subject matter is Henry
ance, by Timothy W. Stanley (1965)
Aubrey's pioneer work on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the one body that brings together the Common Market Six, the
EFTA Seven, other Western European countries, the United States, Canada,
and Japan. What these industrial nations can and cannot accomplish through
the OECD, and how its work influences national policies and how OECD relates
to other international organizations are key elements in Mr. Aubrey's analysis.
Not an organizational study, the book emphasizes the substance of financial,
trade, aid and other policies.
Picking up, in a sense, where the Atlantic Policy Studies left off, a discussion
group under the chairmanship of Professor Marshall Shulman of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy explored the relation between military stability
and political evolution in Europe. Recent developments, such as the negotiations
about a nonproliferation treaty and changes in Germany, were looked at in a
-26
27
STRENGTHENING
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
THE WORLD ECONOMY
Company, Emilio G. Collado of Standard Oil Company (N.J.), and Hart Perry
In a year that saw the culmination of the hard negotiations of the Kennedy
of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. At the second
Round, trade was in the forefront of attention. Two quite different but neatly
meeting Anthony Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
complementary books make up the Council's most recent contributions to a
spoke of how these problems appeared from his vantage point. The third meet-
subject in which it has had an old and sustained interest.
ing was devoted to a discussion of the difficulties involved in the application of
One of the Atlantic Policy Studies, Bela Balassa's Trade Liberalization Among
United States laws to the conduct of American-owned companies abroad. The
Industrial Countries is the culmination of extensive investigation both by the
discussion leaders were Alexander Aranyos of the Fruehauf Corporation and
author and by a number of other economists who were commissioned to prepare
Milan C. Miskovsky, Assistant General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury. At the
special studies for him. At the core of the book is Mr. Balassa's statement of the
final session, Professor Raymond Vernon of the Harvard Graduate School of
results of elaborate statistical analysis of the probable effects on products and
Business Administration raised a series of questions about whether the emer-
countries of the removal of tariffs, while other chapters deal with related
gence of multinational corporations would not alter the role and scope of
matters such as investment. To draw the policy implications of his analysis,
national sovereignties and future government-business relations as well.
Mr. Balassa puts the trade issues in the perspective of political relations between
the United States and Western Europe.
DISCUSSION GROUPS
Writing, as did Mr. Balassa, before the Kennedy Round was over, John W.
The Politics of Private Investment
Evans explored the possible next steps for the United States in one of the
Chairman: Walter B. Wriston
Council's short Policy Books. Tracing clearly the basic issues with which future
Secretary: William Diebold, Jr.
trade policy will have to deal-such as the remaining tariffs, nontariff barriers,
the special problems of agriculture, and the claims for preferential treatment
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
for the exports of less developed countries-Mr. Evans outlines alternatives and
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES:
shows why he favors one approach rather than another. He takes full account
Objectives and Alternatives, by Bela Balassa (1967)
of the lessons of the Kennedy Round, in which he participated before leaving
U.S. TRADE POLICY: New Legislation for the Next
the Foreign Service at the end of the a long career of work on trade problems
Round, by John W. Evans (1967)
that included a number of years as head of the U.S. delegation to GATT.
ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY: Is It Possible?, by
Private foreign investment, another staple of Council discussion was looked
John O. Coppock (1966)
at from a fresh angle during the year by a group under the chairmanship of
MONETARY REFORM FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, by
Walter B. Wriston, who, just after the series closed, was named President of
Robert V. Roosa (1965)
the First National City Bank. The discussions focused on the political problems
arising from the relation of American-owned companies abroad to foreign
governments. The issues were looked at from the point of view of business and
government. Running through much of the inquiry were such basic questions
as: Who owes what obligation to whom? Is an American company abroad
better off calling on the United States government for help or handling matters
by itself? Where does the protection of business interests come in the gamut
of things the United States government has to pursue abroad?
At the first meeting several members of the group sketched the experience
of their companies: Charles F. Barber of the American Smelting and Refining
28
29
ASIAN UPHEAVALS
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
AND ENIGMAS
between India, Pakistan, and the great powers have become increasingly com-
plex over the years, and the problems the United States has encountered in trying
Recent years have brought a series of violent upheavals that have affected Asia
to further its national interests in a changing environment have been extremely
from the China Sea to the Mediterranean. The list of such events is long and
difficult. During the past year a Council study group with Kenneth T. Young,
varied and includes the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, the war in Vietnam,
Jr., as chairman and William J. Barnds as research secretary examined these
the Indonesian struggle, the Indo-Pakistan war, the Yemen imbroglio and the
problems in a series of meetings, and Mr. Barnds is preparing a study that
related struggle in Aden, and the third Arab-Israeli war. These events have
focuses on the changing pattern of such relationships and the issues facing the
overshadowed but not obscured the area's economic problems; they have forced
United States in South Asia.
the United States to re-examine and sometimes to revise its policies toward Asia
The recent conflict between the Arab states and Israel not only demonstrated
in the light of unexpected changes. The American people are again in a period
the extent of Israel's military superiority, but also raised questions about future
of intense debate about our foreign policies in general and toward Asia in par-
developments in the Arab states and their relations with outside powers. With
ticular, and the Council has devoted considerable attention recently to Asia.
decision-making power concentrated in the hands of military officers, the study
The most dramatic and enigmatic of the many upheavals is the Great Cultural
being prepared by Professor J. C. Hurewitz of Columbia University will be
Revolution which currently dominates Chinese life. The origins and implications
especially useful. His study examines the political role of the military in each
of this revolution are still far from clear to Western observers and will require
Middle Eastern country, and relates this to the national policies of the countries
further study and reflection. Fortunately, the volume of studies on China has
and to the policies and military aid programs of outside powers.
increased substantially in recent years, and the Council has played a prominent
role in this development. Its project on the United States and China in World
STUDY GROUP
Affairs has already led to the publication of three books in 1965-66 and three
South Asia in World Politics
more during the past year. The volume by Professor Lea Williams of Brown
Chairman: Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
University, The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, analyzed the
Study Director: William J. Barnds
position of the overseas Chinese in the various Southeast Asian countries, their
relationship to the Chinese Communist and Nationalist governments and their
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
significance to U.S. policy. Robert Blum's book, The United States and China in
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY by Samuel B.
World Affairs, which was completed by Professor A. Doak Barnett after Dr.
Griffith, II, (1967)
Blum's untimely death, was widely praised as setting forth a coherent long-range
BETWEEN Two WORLDS: Policy, Press and Public
plan for U.S. policy toward China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, by
Opinion in Asian-American Relations, by John
Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.), a man with long experience
Hohenberg (1967)
in analyzing Chinese military doctrine, was immediately hailed as providing
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, by
much needed understanding of Chinese military affairs and thought at a time
Robert Blum; edited by A. Doak Barnett (1966)
when the military are assuming a key political role in China. A study by
THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTH-
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., on the lengthy bilateral negotiation between the United
EAST ASIA, by Lea E. Williams (1966)
States and Communist China will soon be published, as will the study by Pro-
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN
fessor Fred Greene of Williams College on American security interests and
TRADE, by Alexander Eckstein (1966)
arrangements in Asia. The China project has contributed greatly to public think-
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA, by A. T. Steele
ing at a time when an understanding of China is of paramount importance.
(1966)
There are few if any regions of the world in which all of the major powers
POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: Views from Six Continents,
are as deeply involved as they are in South Asia. The evolving relationships
edited by A. M. Halpern (1965)
30
31
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS:
THE AFRICAN CASE
line, and two earlier discussion groups on Africa over which he presided. It is
expected that the level of Council attention to African problems in the coming
The disparities between the rich, industrialized nations and the poor, traditional
year will be markedly increased.
societies appear not only as economic differences with which foreign aid pro-
DISCUSSION GROUP
grams attempt to cope, but also as racial and political tensions. The Council has
Southern Africa and the United States
regularly given attention to these problems since the publication in 1954 of
Chairman: Waldemar A. Nielsen
Eugene Staley's The Future of Underdeveloped Countries. One of the volumes
in the Atlantic Policy Studies published during the year, Theodore Geiger's The
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
Conflicted Relationships, reviewed in historical depth the encounter of Western
THE CONFLICTED RELATIONSHIP: The West and the
civilization with Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the present implications
Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America
of this transforming relationship for the policies of the western countries.
by Theodore Geiger (1966)
During 1966-67 that portion of the Council's attention which was directed to
AFRICAN BATTLELINE: American Policy Choices in
relationships between developed and less developed per se was largely given to
Southern Africa, by Waldemar A. Nielsen (1965)
Africa where the racial conflict is particularly acute and the potential for poli-
REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: The End of Colonialism, by
tical disorder appears great. In April 1967 the Council and the Royal Institute
David W. Wainhouse (1965)
of International Affairs held at Ditchley Park in Oxfordshire the third in a series
of Anglo-American dialogues on the problems of Southern Africa with Ken-
neth Younger of Chatham House and Waldemar A. Nielsen of the African-
American Institute serving as co-chairmen. As were the earlier conferences, this
one was financed by a special grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The most
recent conference concentrated on the policy issues presented by the situation in
Rhodesia and on the probable repercussions of that crisis on the several adjacent
countries. The frank exchanges produced a vivid awareness of the political and
emotional obstacles to effective action by either Britain or the United States.
Two evening discussions were organized at the Council in advance of the
conference to consider issues which were discussed there. At the first of these
William B. Buffum, Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations, and
Thomas McElhiney, State Department, led a discussion of the status of southern
African problems at the United Nations and the effects of U.N. sanctions on
Rhodesia. The second meeting explored the position of southern African issues
in American foreign policy priorities, with Mr. Nielsen and James T. Harris as
discussion leaders. The annual conference of the Committees on Foreign Rela-
tions was also devoted to the problems of southern Africa.
During the year arrangements were made for Mr. Nielsen to take part-time
leave from his position as President of the African-American Institute in order to
devote much of his time during 1967-68 as Visiting Senior Fellow to stimulating
and leading the Council's work on Africa. This extends a relationship that has
included the Council's publication in 1965 of Mr. Nielsen's book, African Battle-
33
32
THE STUDIES PROGRAM
ECONOMIC AID
For more than two decades economic assitance has been an important element
The Rich and Poor Nations, one of the Atlantic Policy Studies. Written by John
of American foreign policy. At the same time U.S. aid policy has undergone a
Pincus, a RAND Corporation economist, this work is a significant contribution
continual evolution. As a consequence, the criteria used to determine aid levels
to the literature. It examines critically the interests of the developed nations in
and recipients, the institutional arrangements for dispensing aid, and the coun-
the economic advance of the poor nations, reviews theories of trade and devel-
tries receiving assistance have changed. Twenty years ago the Marshall Plan
opment, explores commercial policy issues, and weaves these strands into a
spurred European recovery. Today aid is directed to the poorer nations of Asia,
proposed set of policies for the developed countries.
Africa and Latin America and increasingly has been designed to promote their
economic development. While European recovery was easily linked with U.S.
DISCUSSION GROUP
economic and security interest as well as humanitarian ideals, the relationship
Foreign Aid Policy
between the economic development of the less-developd countries and U.S. vital
Chairman: Carl Kaysen
interests is more difficult to establish. Since economic development for most of
Secretary: Kenneth M. Kauffman
these countries is a long and tortuous process, frequently it is difficult to estab-
lish even the connection between foreign aid and economic betterment. This is
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
unquestionably the basis for a considerable part of the widespread dissatisfac-
TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: The Rich and Poor
tion with U.S. aid programs. But the aid programs remain the primary means
Nations, by John Pincus (1967)
available for addressing the problem of extreme economic inequalities among
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH NATIONS: The Develop-
nations.
ment Assistance Committee and the Common Aid
Because of aid's importance in U.S. foreign policy and because the problems
Effort, by Seymour J. Rubin (1966)
associated with aid are again being widely debated, the Council's program and
publications during the year naturally gave attention to this topic. One principal
activity was a discussion group on foreign aid policy, of which Carl Kaysen,
Director of the Institute for Advanced Study and a former Presidential Assistant,
was chairman. John Pincus of the RAND Corporation led one meeting of the
group in which the rationale for aid was explored. David E. Bell, Vice President
of the Ford Foundation and formerly Administrator of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, served as discussion leader for a session on the role of
aid in the economic development of India, Pakistan, and Taiwan. The following
session, led by Hollis Chenery, Professor of Economics at Harvard and formerly
an Assistant Administrator of the A.I.D., continued and developed the theme of
aid's role in the economic development of the poor nations. The final meetings
of the group were led respectively by Charles S. Dennison of the International
Minerals & Chemicals Corporation and Abram Chayes, Professor of Law at
Harvard and formerly Legal Counsel of the State Department. These sessions
explored possible new modes for participation of private enterprise in the devel-
opmental process.
The Corporation Seminar in June also dealt with the role of aid as well as that
of private enterprise in the economic development process.
In the spring of 1967 the Council published Trade, Aid and Development:
35
34
AMERICA AND
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SERIAL PUBLICATIONS
This is a time of continuing reassessment of the West's relations with Com-
The three Council annuals for a number of years have served as basic reference
munist China, with the Soviet Union, and with the Communist states of Eastern
documents for those concerned with American foreign policy. In April the
Europe. The completion of the Council's major project on the United States and
fortieth edition of the Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1967 was
China provides no reason to discontinue even temporarily the attention it has
published. As with all previous editions of this work, the editor was Walter H.
given to this general subject, although the degree of concentrated effort must
Mallory. Walter Mallory was for thirty-two years the executive director of the
inevitably diminish. The triangular relationship involving the United States, the
Council, and this useful handbook, begun in the first year of his term of office,
Soviet Union, and mainland China will undoubtedly loom large in the future.
has been his responsibility ever since.
The study currently being undertaken by William Barnds on South Asia as a
Richard P. Stebbins wrote his sixteenth volume of the series United States in
focus of world politics pays particular attention to the interaction of Chinese,
World Affairs, 1966 which was published during the summer of 1967. Mr.
Soviet and American policies in that area.
Stebbins has again produced an account which is outstanding in its historical
As to the possible evolution of Soviet policy, the volume in which several
balance although published only a few months following the events described.
expert authors consider the prospects for Soviet society is now being completed
The supplementary volume, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1966,
under the editorship of Professor Allen Kassof of Princeton. Covering the whole
edited by Mr. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam, conveniently
range of Soviet politics and life, it will be not a series of unrelated essays but a
assembles the principal international agreements, treaties, diplomatic notes,
well-knit and ordered volume unique among surveys of the Soviet scene.
policy statements and speeches relating to the events of the year. The two
The states of Eastern Europe continue to go each in its own way; their rela-
volumes, carefully cross-referenced and annotated, provide a concise record of
tions with each other, with the Soviet Union, and with the West have been sub-
America's foreign relations in 1966.
ject to continuing and sometimes surprising change. A discussion group devoted
As an outgrowth of the extensive bibliographical notes in Foreign Affairs the
to military strategy and security in Europe, with Marshall D. Shulman as chair-
Council has published Foreign Affairs Bibliography every ten years, which
man, took up some of the problems involving Eastern Europe. Two recent
compiles annotated entries of the important writings on international affairs.
Council books, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's Alternative to Partition and John C.
Campbell's Tito's Separate Road, a Policy Book, examine different aspects of
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
the present and future role of those states.
POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1967,
edited by Walter H. Mallory (1967)
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1966, by
Tiro's SEPARATE ROAD: America and Yugoslavia in
Richard Stebbins (1967)
World Politics, by John C. Campbell (1967)
DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1966,
TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: The Path of Negotia-
edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance
tion, by Arthur H. Dean (1966)
of Elaine P. Adam (1967)
ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: For a Broader Conception
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1952-62, by Henry L.
of America's Role in Europe, by Zbigniew K.
Roberts (1964)
Brzezinski (1966)
36
37
SPECIAL FELLOWSHIPS
THE
THOMAS J. WATSON
EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP
MEETINGS
T
HE EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP, endowed by a generous grant from
the CBS Foundation, enables a foreign correspondent to combine partici-
pation in the Council program with study at a nearby university. During 1966-
E
INDOWED by a magnificent gift from the children of Thomas J. Watson, the
67 the fellowship was held by Malcolm W. Browne, who had served previously
program of meetings continues to be one of the most important activities
for several years with the Associated Press and on a free-lance basis in Viet
of the Council. Inevitably Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, received substantial
Nam where his reporting earned him a Pulitzer Prize in 1964. He was selected
attention, but European affairs also were discussed in many meetings reflecting
on a competitive basis by an Advisory Committee composed of Edward W.
the importance of the region and the significance to this country of efforts to
Barrett, Gardner Cowles, Emanuel R. Freedman, Frank Stanton, and Theodore
find a new balance and organization in Europe. All the major foreign problems
H. White. During the year Mr. Browne studied at Columbia and also took
of the United States and all regions of the world were considered during the
intensive instruction in Chinese. Upon completion of his fellowship he went to
course of the year.
the Middle East as a correspondent for The New York Times.
Council members were again provided an authoritative review of the develop-
The Edward R. Murrow Fellow for 1967-68 is Sol Sanders, Southeast Asian
ments in Viet Nam and United States policies there. General William C. West-
correspondent for U.S. News and World Report.
moreland and General Victor Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific, reported directly upon the military progress and problems. Earlier
in the year, the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson, returned to the
Council to review the military prospects at a general meeting and afterwards,
MILITARY FELLOWSHIPS
at a small dinner, engaged in further discussion with a group of members most
particularly concerned with United States conduct and policies in Viet Nam.
Harrison Salisbury, whose articles in The New York Times on North Viet Nam
T
HIS WAS THE first year in which the Army as well as the Air Force had a
drew world-wide attention, spoke on the conclusions he reached as a result of
Fellow at the Council. Colonel Michael Greene, USA, who had recently
his trip there. The Foreign Minister of Viet Nam, His Excellency Tran Van Do,
returned from a tour of duty in Viet Nam which included service as an advisor
provided rewarding insights into Vietnamese thinking on the political and social
to Vietnamese forces and as Secretary of the Joint Staff, U.S. Military Assist-
issues of the war. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, following the
ance Command Headquarters in Viet Nam, participated in many meetings and
Manila Conference, analyzed significant factors in Southeast Asia which pro-
spoke to eleven Committees on Foreign Relations. He has been assigned as an
vide the larger context for policies in Viet Nam. Concern for the issues of the
aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after his year at the Council.
war in Viet Nam affected other meetings, for example those with the Prime
The sixth Air Force Fellow was Colonel Frederick C. Thayer, Jr., who had
Minister of Australia, the President of the Philippines, and the Foreign Minister
served just prior to coming to the Council in the Directorate of Plans of the
of Thailand.
Air Force Headquarters. Colonel Thayer holds a Ph.D. from the University
Council members continued to be deeply concerned with the changing politi-
of Denver. He likewise participated actively in the Council's program. His next
cal and economic conditions in Europe and with the appropriate United States
assignment is with the Air Transport Wing stationed in Hawaii.
response to these developments. The dramatic reshaping of relations among the
The Army Fellow in 1967-68 will be Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., and the Air
nations of Europe-east and west-was the theme of contrasting analyses pro-
Force Fellow will be Colonel Kemper W. Baker.
vided Council members by a wide range of pre-eminent European government
38
39
THE ELIHU ROOT
LECTURES, 1966-67
and political leaders. While the identity of national interests was under renewed
THE HONORABLE FRANCIS T. P. PLIMPTON
scrutiny, the interaction of the national state with the European institutions
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States
remained clearly vital; British entry into the European Economic Community
to the United Nations, 1961-65
and the contribution this would make to strengthening the European institu-
Douglas Dillon
tions was frequently discussed. Notable among these meetings were those for
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Finance Ministers
The Honorable John J. McCloy
of Britain and of France and the Minister of Economics of Germany; the newly
Presiding
elected Chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, Jean Rey;
the leader of the Conservative Party in Great Britain, Edward Heath; and the
"REFLECTIONS ON A GLASS HOUSE"
leader of the French Independent Republican Party, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.
"The United Nations and Peace:
American perspectives on these developments were provided by, among others,
Producing It, Preserving It,
Ambassadors Bohlen, Schaetzel, and Tyler.
and Paying for It"
Implicit in many discussions of developments in Europe and of relations with
I. "Reflections on Peace and the Past"
May 11, 1967
the United States, and explicit in a number, was the ambiguous state of affairs
II. "Reflections on Peace and its Price"
May 18, 1967
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Council members met on
III. "Reflections on Peace and the Future"
May 24, 1967
several occasions during the year with members of the Soviet government and
intellectual community, and benefited by the analysis of current Soviet attitudes
by both Ambassador Foy Kohler, immediately upon conclusion of his tour of duty
in Moscow, and by Marshall Shulman, shortly after a visit to the Soviet Union.
The Elihu Root Lectures this year were delivered by the Honorable Francis
T. P. Plimpton. Mr. Plimpton's second lecture occurred on the day of the Egyp-
AFRICA
tian request for the removal of the United Nations troops in Egypt, and the
third lecture occurred shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. On both occa-
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
sions, Ambassador Plimpton abandoned much of his prepared text in order to
TYPE OF MEETING
talk, with great benefit for those present, upon the developing crisis in the
Middle East and its implication for the United Nations.
DR. K. A. BUSIA
Waldemar A. Nielsen
During the year 108 meetings were held. The listing below is, of course,
Vice-Chairman, Political Committee of the
October 5, 1966
arbitrary in the rubrics used. There were 32 general afternoon meetings, and
National Liberation Council, Ghana
Roundtable Meeting
following 11 of these there were small dinners for groups of members who had
"Ghana After Nkrumah"
indicated a special interest in the subject being discussed. There were 11 large
dinners and 1 large luncheon, and 29 roundtable luncheons and dinners. In
DAVID PIETER DE VILLIERS
George S. Franklin, Jr.
addition to these meetings there were 35 smaller meetings on subjects of more
Senior Counsel, Republic of South Africa
June 20, 1967
specialized interest.
"Aspects of the South West Africa Case"
Roundtable Meeting
Harry Boardman
WILLIAM R. DUGGAN
Philip W. Quigg
Member, Policy Planning Council
Director of Meetings
June 14, 1967
"Alternatives for U.S. Policy in Southern Africa"
Roundtable Luncheon
40
41
AFRICA (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
ROBERT C. GOOD
Waldemar A. Nielsen
United States Ambassador to Zambia
June 6, 1967
JOSEPH PALMER, 2ND
David Rockefeller
"Zambia: Its Prospects-and the Price of
General Meeting and
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
June 2, 1967
Confronting Rhodesian U.D.I."
Roundtable Dinner
"The United States and Southern Africa"
General Dinner
HAROLD K. HOCHSCHILD
Waldemar A. Nielsen
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HAILE SELASSIE I
Arthur J. Goldberg
Honorary Chairman, American Metal Climax, Inc.
February 9, 1967
Emperor of Ethiopia
February 15, 1967
"Perspectives on Zambia and Rhodesia"
Roundtable Luncheon
"The Modern Role of Ethiopia"
General Meeting
SIMON M. KAPWEPWE
Ernest A. Gross
GUENNADI S. STACHEVSKI
Waldemar A. Nielsen
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Zambia
November 4, 1966
First Secretary, Permanent Mission
April 6, 1967
"Zambia and Rhodesia"
Roundtable Luncheon
of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations
Roundtable Meeting
and
VALENTIN N. BEREZOVSKY
KENNETH D. KAUNDA
Charles W. Yost
Attaché, Permanent Mission
President of the Republic of Zambia
November 16, 1966
of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations
"Zambia and Rhodesia"
General Meeting
"Problems of Southern Africa: A Russian View"
EDWARD KORRY
Charles W. Yost
HELEN SUZMAN
United States Ambassador to Ethiopia
February 20, 1967
Member of Parliament, Progressive Party,
William Diebold, Jr.
"Ethiopia and Tropical Africa"
Roundtable Luncheon
South Africa
December 19, 1966
"South African Developments"
Roundtable Luncheon
SIR W. ARTHUR LEWIS
Philip W. Quigg
Professor of Economics and International Affairs,
April 4, 1967
FRANKLIN H. WILLIAMS
Ernest A. Gross
Woodrow Wilson School
Roundtable Luncheon
United States Ambassador to Ghana
November 22, 1966
"Nigeria"
"Prospects in Ghana"
Roundtable Meeting
CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL
William A. Hance
Professor of International Politics
January 26, 1967
THE AMERICAS
School for Advanced International Studies
General Meeting
Johns Hopkins University
RALPH A. DUNGAN
Charles W. Cole
"An Appraisal of the Realities in Southern Africa
United States Ambassador to Chile
December 28, 1966
and their Implication for United States Policy"
"Prospects in Chile and an Appraisal
General Meeting and
of the Last Two Years"
Roundtable Dinner
FRANCIS NWOKEDI
William Diebold, Jr.
Unofficial Representative
June 19, 1967
PAULO EGYDIO MARTINS
John W. Tuthill
The Government of Enugu (Biafra)
Roundtable Luncheon
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Brazil
"A Case for Eastern Nigeria"
February 7, 1967
"Economic Problems and Progress in Brazil"
Roundtable Luncheon
42
43
THE AMERICAS (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
ERIC KIERANS
August Maffry
MORDECHAI M. BAR-ON
Minister of Revenue,
May 15, 1967
Province of Quebec, 1963-65
Chief of Education, The Israel Defense Forces
J. C. Hurewitz
General Meeting
"Canadian Economic Nationalism"
"Israel and Its Arab Neighbors:
December 12, 1966
The Security Outlook"
General Meeting
ISRAEL KLABIN
G. A. Costanzo
Head, Klabin, Rimaos and Company, Brazil
KHODADAD FARMANFARMAIAN
December 1, 1966
David E. Lilienthal
"Aspects of Political and Economic
Roundtable Meeting
Deputy Director, Central Bank of Iran
May 4, 1967
Progress in Latin America"
"Economic Conditions and Development in Iran"
Roundtable Meeting
NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ
Francis T.P. Plimpton
RAYMOND A. HARE
Joseph E. Johnson
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Argentina
September 26, 1966
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
January 9, 1967
"Political Structure and National Objectives
Roundtable Meeting
South Asian Affairs, 1965-66
General Dinner
of Argentina Today"
"Trends and Problems in the Middle East"
LT. GEN. BRUCE PALMER
Edmund A. Gullion
CEVDET SUNAY
Commanding General,
October 26, 1966
Grayson Kirk
XVIII United States Army Airborne Corps
President of Turkey
Roundtable Dinner
April 13, 1967
"Lessons to be Learned from the Dominican Republic"
"Turkey and the West"
General Luncheon
ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE
George S. Franklin, Jr.
CHARLES W. Yosr
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
President-elect of Nicaragua
March 22, 1967
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
June 13, 1967
"Political and Economic Prospects in Nicaragua"
General Meeting
"The Middle East Crisis"
General Meeting
JOHN W. TUTHILL
Adolf A. Berle
MIDDLE EAST SEMINAR
United States Ambassador to Brazil
George W. Ball
June 1, 1967
"The Middle East Crisis"
"Brazil and the Road to Monticello"
June 22, 1967
General Meeting
Roundtable Meeting
and Dinner
MIGUEL S. WIONCZEK
William Diebold, Jr.
Head, Information Department,
May 31, 1967
Center for Latin America Monetary Studies
ASIA
Roundtable Meeting
"The Present and Future of Economic
and Dinner
Integration in Latin America"
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
November 21, 1966
for Far Eastern Affairs
MIDDLE EAST
General Meeting and
"Perspectives on the Manila Conference"
Roundtable Dinner
JAMSHID AMUZEGAR
David E. Lilienthal
MARSHALL GREEN
Minister of Finance, Iran
September 22, 1966
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
"Economic and Social Prospects in Iran"
United States Ambassador to Indonesia
October 3, 1966
Roundtable Meeting
"Prospects in Indonesia"
General Meeting
44
45
ASIA (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
A. Doak Barnett
Deputy Director, Office of Research and Analysis
May 1, 1967
FERDINAND E. MARCOS
John D. Rockefeller, 3rd
for Far East, State Department
General Meeting
President of the Republic of the Philippines
September 21, 1966
and
"The Philippines and the Prospects for the Continuing
General Meeting
PAUL H. KREISBERG
Evolution of National States in Southeast Asia"
Officer in Charge for Mainland China Affairs,
State Department
"Perspectives on the Chinese Cultural Revolution:
GRAHAM A. MARTIN
George F. Gant
Events on the Mainland and Their Impact Upon
United States Ambassador to Thailand
May 2, 1967
U.S. and Soviet Interests"
"Thailand and Southeast Asia"
Roundtable Meeting
HAROLD E. HOLT
George S. Moore
NOBUMOTO OHAMA
Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
Prime Minister of Australia
June 9, 1967
President, Southern Nationals Assistance Association
April 19, 1967
"Australia and Its Role In World Affairs,
General Meeting
"The Status and Welfare of Okinawa"
Roundtable Meeting
With Special Reference to Southeast Asia"
HARRISON E. SALISBURY
Lucian W. Pye
THANAT KHOMAN
Grayson Kirk
Assistant Managing Editor, The New York Times
February 14, 1967
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
October 11, 1966
"A Report from Viet Nam"
General Meeting and
"New Asian Steps Toward Security"
General Dinner
Roundtable Dinner
NOBUSUKE KISHI
Thomas E. Dewey
SOEDJATMOKO
Walter J. Levy
Prime Minister of Japan, 1957-60
March 21, 1967
Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia
December 15, 1966
"A Conversation about Developments in
Roundtable Meeting
to the United Nations
Roundtable Meeting
Japan, China, and Asia
"Recent Developments in Indonesia"
LEONID NIKOLAEVICH KUTAKOV
A. Doak Barnett
TRAN VAN Do
Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
Senior Advisor to the Mission of the
March 6, 1967
Foreign Minister of Viet Nam
April 25, 1967
U.S.S.R. to the United Nations
Roundtable Meeting
"Viet Nam"
Roundtable Luncheon
"Problems of East Asia"
EIJI WAJIMA
MOHAMMAD HASHIM MAIWANDWAL
Douglas W. Overton
Fowler Hamilton
Executive Director,
Prime Minister of Afghanistan
October 18, 1966
April 6, 1967
Kajima Institute of International Peace
"Political and Social Transformation in Afghanistan"
Roundtable Meeting
Roundtable Dinner
"Japan's International Role"
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Philip W. Quigg
C. K. YEN
Senator, Republic of the Philippines
Lucian W. Pye
November 17, 1966
Vice President and Premier
"Reflections on the Problems of the
May 16, 1967
Roundtable Meeting
The Government of the Republic of China
Philippines and Southeast Asia"
Roundtable Dinner
"Taiwan and the Mainland of China"
46
47
ASIA (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
BARRY ZORTHIAN
William Attwood
JAMES CALLAGHAN
United States Counselor of Embassy
John J. McCloy
July 20, 1966
Chancellor of the Exchequer, United Kingdom
for Public Affairs, Viet Nam
September 23, 1966
General Meeting
"The British Economy: Present and Future Prospects"
"The Problem of Communicating about Viet Nam"
General Meeting
MICHEL DEBRE
William A. M. Burden
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, France
September 27, 1966
"French Economic Development: Its Prospects and
General Dinner
Role in Europe"
WESTERN EUROPE
VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
David Rockefeller
Minister of Finance, France,1962-66
December 8, 1966
Deputy and Leader, Républicain-Indépendani
General Meeting and
"France: Its Politics and Its Relations in the Alliance"
Roundtable Dinner
ROBERT ANDERSON
Ben T. Moore
Country Director, France and Benelux, Bureau
February 20, 1967
of European Affairs, Department of State
DESMOND DONNELLY
Roundtable Meeting
Shepard Stone
"The Significance of French Legislative Elections"
Labour Member of Parliament for Pembroke, Wales
April 13, 1967
"A Perspective on the Politics of West Europe"
Roundtable Meeting
GEORGES BERTHOIN
Ben T. Moore
JACQUES DUHAMEL
August Heckscher
Deputy Chief, Delegation of the High Authority
April 27, 1967
Deputy and Member, Council of State, France,
July 25, 1966
of the Coal and Steel Community in the
Roundtable Meeting
Representing the Department of Jura and Member,
Roundtable Meeting
United Kingdom
Central Committee, Centre Démocratique Party
"The Politics of Britain and the Community"
"The Political Evolution in France Since the
Presidential Election"
ERIK BLUMENFELD
Shepard Stone
PIERRE EMANUELLI
Chairman, Christian Democratic Union, Hamburg
Harold van B. Cleveland
February 28, 1967
"Political Issues in Germany"
Executive Director, The French Association
November 9, 1966
Roundtable Dinner
for the Atlantic Community
Roundtable Meeting
"The French Public and Europe"
CHARLES E. BOHLEN
Douglas Dillon
Ben T. Moore
United States Ambassador to France
February 7, 1967
HENRI FAYAT
November 7, 1966
"France and Its European and Atlantic Relations"
General Meeting and
Minister of European Affairs, Belgium, 1961-66
Roundtable Meeting
Roundtable Dinner
"The European Community: Prospects in the
Near Future"
WILLY BRANDT
John J. McCloy
PIERRE-EUGENE GILBERT
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor,
Philip E. Mosely
February 9, 1967
Candidate for Parliament,
Federal Republic of Germany
January 19, 1967
General Dinner
Centre Démocratique Party, France
"Germany, Europe and the Atlantic Community"
Roundtable Meeting
"A Perspective on the Future for France and Europe"
48
49
WESTERN EUROPE (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
KARL GRUBER
Robert D. Murphy
Staatssekretaer, Federal Chancellery, Austria
April 18, 1967
GUSTAV PETREN
Harold van B. Cleveland
"Austria: Between East and West"
Roundtable Dinner
Secretary General, Swedish Delegation
June 15, 1967
to the Nordic Council
Roundtable Meeting
LOUIS J. HALLE
Charles W. Yost
"The Dilemma of the Nordic Nations
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
October 19, 1966
Regarding European Integration
"De Gaulle and the Future of Europe"
Roundtable Meeting
JEAN REY
Robert R. Bowie
EDWARD HEATH
John J. McCloy
Member of the Commission of
June 8, 1967
Leader of the Opposition, United Kingdom
March 20, 1967
the European Economic Community
General Meeting and
"Britain and Europe"
General Dinner
"The Current State of European Problems"
Roundtable Dinner
Roy JENKINS
Robert R. Bowie
J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL
Philip E. Mosely
The Secretary of State for the Home Department,
September 29, 1966
United States Ambassador to the
June 5, 1967
United Kingdom
Roundtable Dinner
European Communities
General Meeting
"The Common Market: After the Kennedy Round
MAX KOHNSTAMM
Henry A. Kissinger
and into British Negotiations"
Vice President, Action Committee for a
December 6, 1966
United States of Europe
Roundtable Dinner
"Germany and Europe"
KARL SCHILLER
Gabriel Hauge
Minister for Economics, Federal Republic of Germany
June 16, 1967
ROBERT MARJOLIN
Alfred C. Neal
"The Problems and Prospects of
Roundtable Luncheon
Vice President, Commission of the
September 30, 1966
the West German Economy"
European Economic Community
Roundtable Luncheon
"A Conversation About the European Community"
HELMUT SCHMIDT
Shepard Stone
Leader of the Parliamentary Faction,
May 15, 1967
ROBERT MARJOLIN
George W. Ball
Social Democratic Party,
Roundtable Dinner
Vice President, Commission of the
June 13, 1967
Federal Republic of Germany
European Economic Community
Roundtable Dinner
"Profile of the German Détente Policy"
"The European Community: Accomplishments
and Prospects"
JEAN-LOUIS TIXIER-VIGNANCOUR
August Heckscher
President, Alliance Républicaine, France
January 24, 1967
REGINALD MAUDLING
Robert V. Roosa
"Political Prospects in France"
Roundtable Meeting
Deputy Chairman, Consultative Committee
June-22, 1967
of the Leader of the Opposition
Roundtable Dinner
United Kingdom
LUJO TONCIC-SORINJ
Philip E. Mosely
"Foreign Policy Issues for the West"
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Austria
October 3, 1966
"Europe: Towards Diversity or Unity?"
Roundtable Meeting
ROBERT MITTERRAND
Shepard Stone
Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Federation
October 24, 1966
WILLIAM R. TYLER
Waldemar A. Nielsen
de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste
Roundtable Meeting
United States Ambassador to the Netherlands
May 5, 1967
"Politics in France"
"A Conversation About Political Issues in Europe"
Roundtable Luncheon
50
51
MEETINGS
WESTERN EUROPE (CONTINUED)
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
ERNST VAN DER BEUGEL
Harold van B. Cleveland
SHEPARD STONE
Emilio G. Collado
June 6, 1967
Advisor to the President of the Ford Foundation
April 26, 1967
Honorary Secretary of The Bilderberg Meetings
on International Activities
"A Conversation About Europe"
Roundtable Luncheon
Roundtable Meeting
"Impressions in Eastern Europe"
PETER E. WALKER
Charles M. Spofford
Conservative Member of Parliament,
September 13, 1966
Spokesman on Transport
Roundtable Meeting
ECONOMIC
"Britain's Economy and Labour's
New Wage/Price Legislation"
OTTINO CARACCIOLO DI FORINO
William Diebold, Jr.
Director, Field Liaison Division, OECD, Paris
November 2, 1966
"The Evolution of Economic Relations Among
Roundtable Meeting
U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE
Atlantic Nations"
JOHN C. CAMPBELL
John Richardson, Jr.
Senior Research Fellow,
January 10, 1967
ORVILLE L. FREEMAN
Carroll L. Wilson
Council on Foreign Relations
Roundtable Meeting
Secretary of Agriculture
February 15, 1967
"Report on Yugoslavia"
"American Agriculture and World Economic Change"
General Dinner
LASZLO HAMBURGER
Antonie T. Knoppers
WILLIAM S. GAUD
Hart Perry
Director General, MEDIMPEX, Hungary
September 27, 1966
Administrator, United States Agency
June 12, 1967
"East-West Trade and Hungary"
Roundtable Meeting
for International Development
General Dinner
"New Developments in AID"
NIKOLAI NIKOLAIEVICH INOZEMTSEV
Joseph E. Johnson
Director, The Institute of World Economy
November 14, 1966
and International Relations, Moscow
Roundtable Dinner
CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON
William Diebold, Jr.
"A Russian Perspective on International Affairs"
Foreign Editor, The Financial Times, London
March 27, 1967
"Britain and Europe: Political and Economic Issues"
Roundtable Luncheon
Foy D. KOHLER
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
January 17, 1967
AUBREY JONES
Robert V. Roosa
United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1962-66
General Meeting and
Chairman, The National Board for
November 3, 1966
"Current Soviet Attitudes in Perspective"
Roundtable Dinner
Incomes and Prices
Roundtable Meeting
"The Wage and Price Freeze and the British Economy"
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Charles W. Yost
Professor of International Politics,
December 13, 1966
General Meeting and
PIERRE-PAUL SCHWEITZER
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
John J. McCloy
"A Report on Attitudes Perceived in the
Roundtable Dinner
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
May 22, 1967
"International Monetary Reform"
General Dinner
Soviet Union on Foreign Policy Issues"
53
52
ECONOMIC (CONTINUED)
MEETINGS
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
SPEAKER AND TOPIC
PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING
TYPE OF MEETING
ANDREW SHONFIELD
Robert V. Roosa
ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG
Director of Studies, Royal Institute of
John J. McCloy
September 20, 1966
United States Permanent Representative to
International Affairs
January 26, 1967
Roundtable Meeting
the United Nations
General Dinner
"The British Economy and the World Economy"
and Dinner
"Issues Before the Twenty-first General Assembly"
MILITARY
PAUL G. HOFFMAN
Marshall D. Shulman
Administrator, United Nations Development Program
June 7, 1967
"Peace Building: Stepchild in Foreign Policy"
Roundtable Luncheon
GEN. HAROLD K. JOHNSON, USA
Lucian W. Pye
Chief of Staff, United States Army
November 15, 1966
"Viet Nam"
General Meeting and
VLADIMIR P. PAVLICHENKO
William C. Foster
Roundtable Dinner
Deputy Director, External Relations Division,
October 5, 1966
United Nations Office of Public Information
Roundtable Dinner
"A Conversation about Nuclear Proliferation"
GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, USMC
Arthur H. Dean
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
January 30, 1967
"The Many Faces of the Viet Nam War"
General Meeting
DUNCAN SANDYS
Hans J. Morgenthau
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom
November 22, 1966
"Nuclear Proliferation"
Roundtable Meeting
GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, USA
John J. McCloy
Commander, United States Military Assistance
April 24, 1967
Command, Viet Nam
General Meeting
SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOETTER
Philip W. Quigg
"Viet Nam"
Permanent Delegate of the
April 14, 1967
Federal Republic of Germany
Roundtable Luncheon
to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference
"German Perspectives on the
POLITICAL
Disarmament Negotiations"
LEONARD BEATON
John G. Palfrey
Editor, The Round Table
November 10, 1966
"Nonproliferation: Treaty Prospects
General Meeting and
and Related Issues"
Roundtable Dinner
THE LORD CHALFONT
Henry M. Wriston
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
December 15, 1966
"Obstacles to, Arguments and Prospects
General Dinner
for a Nonproliferation Treaty"
54
55
COMMITTEES ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ernest A. Gross; Raymond A. Hare; Gabriel Hauge; Gen. Harold K. Johnson,
USA; Hans Kohn; George Loft; Edwin O. Reischauer; Roger Revelle; Arnold
Rivkin; Robert V. Roosa; Harrison Salisbury; John Scott; Francis X. Sutton;
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.); George L-P Weaver; Clifton R. Wharton,
Jr.; and Charles W. Yost.
N
ATIONAL concern about the continued war in Viet Nam and the role of
Other Americans who met with the Committees included: John Hans Adler;
China in East Asia were reflected in the high proportion of Committee
Ward P. Allen; Arriold C. Brackman; Miriam Camps; Raul H. Castro; Ransom
meetings devoted to these and related subjects during the season. Thus 62
Cook; Philip Davidson; Olcott H. Deming; Alex N. Dragnich; Donald A.
meetings focused on Southest Asia, including Viet Nam, and China was the
Dumont; Francis J. Galbraith; Marshall Green; Col. Michael J. L. Greene, USA;
theme at 11 meetings. Eight meetings centered on India, 3 on Japan, and 1 on
Immanuel C. Y. Hsu; William Leonhart; Covey T. Oliver; Juan de Onis; Joseph
the South Pacific territories. "Asia After Britain" was the topic of 3 meetings.
Palmer, 2nd; I. Milton Sacks; John Scali; C. Hart Schaaf; Neil Sheehan; Carlton
Interest in Eastern Europe and East-West relations was also high, and 19
Skinner; William H. Sullivan; Seymour Topping; and T. Graydon Upton.
meetings were held on these topics. Soviet foreign policy, Sino-Soviet relations,
Experts and statesmen of other nationalities who led Committee discussions
and Yugoslavia were discussed at 7, 4, and 5 meetings, respectively.
included: Chief S. O. Adebo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the
Multinational European organizations and European unity were discussed at
United Nations; Jean Beliard, Director, Press and Information Division, French
15 meetings and the Atlantic Alliance at 2. Sixteen meetings centered upon the
Cultural Services, French Embassy; Max Beloff, Gladstone Professor of Govern-
closely related matter of French foreign policy. The conditions and international
ment and Public Administration, All Souls College, Oxford University; Sigis-
attitudes in other European countries were taken up at 21 meetings.
mund von Braun, Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to
Twenty-one meetings were devoted to different countries or parts of Africa,
the United Nations; Count Ottino Caracciolo di Forino, Head, Organization
16 to various developments in Latin America, and 14 to Israel and the Middle
for Economic Co-operation and Development Information Service, Paris; Jan
East. In addition, 12 meetings focused on technical and economic assistance
Chowaniec, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of the Polish People's Republic,
and related economic matters involving the developing countries.
Washington, D.C.; William Clark, Director, Overseas Development Institute,
Meetings were also held to discuss such varied matters as international
London; Henri Fayat, Minister for European Affairs (1965-66), Brussels; José
monetary problems and reform proposals (4), food and population problems (2),
Figueres, former President of Costa Rica; Héctor García Godoy, Ambassador of
labor in international affairs (2), strategy, propaganda, nationalism, world
the Dominican Republic, Washington, D.C.; Gen. Sir John Glubb, former Com-
revolution, neutralism, arms control, the United Nations and the Antarctic.
mander, Jordan Legion; J. M. Greenfield, former Minister of Home Affairs,
The Committees held 257 meetings during the season, a record number, at
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Alfred Grosser, Director, Studies and
which the over-all average attendance was 28. The Council arranged or played
Research, National Foundation of Science and Politics, Paris; Karl Gruber,
a part in arranging about 70 per cent of these meetings, while the Commit-
State Secretary, Federal Chancellery, Vienna; Avraham Harman, Ambassador
tees secured the speakers for the remainder. Meetings were addressed by a
of Israel, Washington, D.C.; Georgiy F. Kalinkin, Assistant Legal Counsel,
total of 144 statesmen or other experts on foreign affairs, of whom 91 were
Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat; Ernst Lemberger, Ambassa-
Americans who spoke at 140 meetings. The remaining 53 were of other nation-
dor of Austria, Washington, D.C.; Chief Michael Lukumbuzya, Ambassador
alities, and spoke at 117 meetings. Current Committee membership is 2,325.
of the United Republic of Tanzania, Washington, D.C.; Lord Nathan, 2nd Baron,
Forty-five meetings were led by Council members: namely, A. Doak Barnett;
F.R.S.A., F.R.G.S., London; Hans Nord, Secretary General, European Parlia-
Frank R. Barnett; Whitman Bassow; William P. Bundy; Col. Donald S. Bussey,
ment; Peter Parker, M.V.O., Chairman, Bookers Engineering and Industrial
USA; Robert Byrnes; John C. Campbell; L. Gray Cowan; William B. Dale;
Holdings, Ltd., London; Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Undersecretary of State for
Douglas Dillon; Thomas L. Farmer; Fulton Freeman; Roswell L. Gilpatric;
Economic Affairs, United Kingdom (1964-66); Andrew Shonfield, Director of
56
57
CORPORATION
Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Vojislav Stanovcic, Editor,
Socialism, Belgrade; Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan; Barbara Ward,
SERVICE
Assistant Editor, The Economist; S. Y. Wu, former Cabinet Minister, Republic
of China; and Shunichi Yamanaka, Counselor, Embassy of Japan.
On June 2 and 3 the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference of Committees was
held at the Council. The theme was "The Problems of Southern Africa and Their
Significance to the United States." Together with a number of experts on the
T
HE CORPORATION SERVICE has become one of the Council's more important
activities since it was instituted fourteen years ago. The number of partici-
subject, Committee Representatives and other members considered the imme-
pating and contributing companies now taking part in the program is 114.
diate and long-term issues facing the United States in southern Africa, and the
Subscribers, who pay $1,000 or more annually, receive the following benefits:
possible effects upon the American interest-interpreted broadly-of the various
1. Invitations to name an executive to participate in the Council's Seminars
alternatives that have been urged upon United States policy-makers.
for Business Executives, held twice yearly.
A number of Council members took leading roles in the daytime sessions on
2. An annual off-the-record dinner limited to chairmen and presidents of
June 2. John T. Ryan, Jr., and William Diebold, Jr., were chairmen, and Ernest
member companies.
A. Gross, John Davenport, George Loft, James T. Harris, Jr., and Waldemar
3. Free consultations with members of the Council's staff on international
A. Nielsen spoke on various aspects of the subject. Gwendolen M. Carter of
political and economic affairs relating to activities of the member company.
Northwestern University discussed the situation in South Africa.
4. Use of the Council's outstanding specialized library on international affairs.
The speaker at the dinner meeting of the Conference the same day, which
5. Six subscriptions to Foreign Affairs for company executives and copies of
was attended by a substantial number of Council members in addition to
all other Council publications.
those mentioned above, was Joseph Palmer, 2nd, Assistant Secretary of State
This year's Corporation Service Dinner on April 17 was addressed by the
for African Affairs. David Rockefeller was chairman. On June 3, Committee
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard M. Helms, who spoke on
Representatives met in regional groups to exchange ideas on ways of strength-
"Intelligence in the American Society." Fifty-six board chairmen, presidents and
ening the programs of their Committees. After this, Waldemar Nielsen moder-
senior partners of member firms attended.
ated a discussion of the major policy problems relating to southern Africa.
The first of this year's Seminars was held on February 6 and 7, and was
successfully completed in spite of disrupted travel as a result of heavy snows.
Rolland H. Bushner
It followed the two-day format established a year ago, to make participation
Director, Committees on Foreign Relations
easier for companies located at a distance from New York. There were six
formal meetings in all, plus a discussion session. The subject was "Europe and
the United States, 1967." The program concluded with the participation of
AFFILIATED COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
various corporate representatives at a regular Council dinner for the Vice-
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Willy Brandt.
ALBUQUERQUE
ATLANTA
AUSTIN
BILLINGS
BIRMINGHAM
The spring Seminar was held on June 12 and 13. The program dealt with
BOISE
BOSTON
CASPER
CHARLOTTESVILLE
DENVER
"New Developments in Aid" and consisted of six formal meetings and two
DES MOINES
DETROIT
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
LITTLE ROCK
divided discussion sessions.
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
NASHVILLE
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
A breakdown of the topics and speakers presented in the two Seminar pro-
PORTLAND, Me.
PORTLAND, Ore.
PROVIDENCE
ROCHESTER
grams held this past year is listed on the following pages.
ST. LOUIS
ST. PAUL-MINNEAPOLIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN
FRANCISCO
SANTA BARBARA
SEATTLE
TUCSON
TULSA
Richard H. Brown
WICHITA
WORCESTER
Director, Corporation Service
58
59
CORPORATION SERVICE
WINTER 1967 SEMINAR
SPRING 1967 SEMINAR
"EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1967"
"NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN AID"
I. "The U.S.S.R. and the Atlantic Community"
I. "A Case for Aid"
Speaker: Marshall D. Shulman, Professor of International
Speaker: David Rockefeller, President, Chase Manhattan Bank
Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
II. "International Approaches to Aid"
II. "The United States and Europe 1967"
Speaker: Michael L. Lejeune, Director of Administration,
Speaker: Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
III. "Political Issues Inside Europe"
III. Discussion Groups:
Speaker: Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of Government,
Discussion Leaders: William Diebold, Jr., Senior Research
Center for International Affairs, Harvard
Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
David W. MacEachron, Deputy Executive
Director, Council on Foreign Relations
IV. "The European Communities"
Speaker: J. Robert Schaetzel, United States Ambassador to the
IV. "The United States and Aid"
European Communities
Speaker: William S. Gaud, Administrator, United States
Agency for International Development
V. "East-West Relations"
Speaker: John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations
V. Discussion Groups:
Discussion Leaders: Thomas Farmer, General Counsel, United States
VI. Discussion Group on "European Communities"
Agency for International Development
Discussion Leader: Mrs. Miriam Camps, Policy
John Burnett, Executive Vice President,
Planning Council, Department of State
Development and Resources Corporation
VII. "France and its European and Atlantic Relations"
VI. "World Population and Food"
Speaker: Charles E. Bohlen, United States Ambassador to France
Speaker: Lester R. Brown, Administrator, International
Agricultural Development Service; U.S. Department
of Agriculture
VII. "Aid as an Instrument for Development"
Speaker: David Bell, Vice President, The Ford Foundation
VIII. "Aid and the Private Sector"
Speaker: Carl Kaysen, Director, The Institute for Advanced Studies
60
61
FOREIGN RELATIONS
LIBRARY
As a result, plans are being made to enlarge stack space by introducing new
shelving equipment in vacated areas and by replacing older equipment.
Now that the task of sorting and arranging the Council archives has been
almost completed, the Foreign Relations Library will assume responsibility for
their continuing indexing and maintenance.
O
N DECEMBER 1, 1966, the Council Library began operations as the Foreign
Relations Library, a separate corporation under a charter granted by the
Cooperation with other libraries and other organizations continued actively
Regents of the University of the State of New York. Affiliated with the Council,
in a number of ways. Advice was given to a number of organizations on admin-
the Library continues to function as it has before, with much the same policies
istrative matters and collections policies, and the Foreign Relations Library has
become a supporter of METRO, a system of Greater New York libraries which are
and staff. Since members continue to be interested in the work of the Library,
the officers of the Council have included this description of the Foreign Rela-
discussing various means of coordinating services and acquisitions. Seven hun-
dred and fifty-two copies of Council publications were sent to institutions with
tions Library's activities for the period ending June 30, 1967. Officers of the new
corporation are: President, Grayson Kirk; Executive Vice-President, George S.
which the Library maintains exchange relations, and in return a large quantity
of valuable material was received.
Franklin, Jr.; Vice-Presidents, David W. MacEachron and John Temple Swing;
Treasurer, Ruth Witherspoon; Secretary, Donald Wasson.
Donald Wasson
Reference use of the Library during the period covered by this report con-
tinued at the same high level as in the previous two years, with circulation up
Librarian, Foreign Relations Library
slightly over the past year. Since the Atlantic and China projects had added
significantly to the Library's work load, the continuing rise in use after the
completion of these projects shows a strong upward trend in the demand for
the Library's services.
The total number of bound volumes, including books, documents and period-
icals, now stands at 48,500, an increase over last year. The collection of United
Nations documents increased to a total of more than 116,000. Documents of the
European Communities and other international organizations continue to form
an important part of the collections. Increased purchases of new books, revised
editions of older works and new periodicals have enhanced the value of the
resources of the Library and kept them thoroughly up-to-date. Attention is being
given to purchase of multiple copies of certain periodicals which are in heavy
demand.
The filing of clippings rose slightly over last year, with about 31,000 pieces
having been added to this unique collection.
A start has been made on micro-filming the clipping file with a first shipment
to the processor, and completion is expected in about six months. Although the
original intention was to cover only the period from 1946-1956, it has now been
decided to put the files on microfilm from their beginning in the 1930s through
1956.
File space is expected to be reduced by one-half because of the microfilming.
62
63
FINANCES
increasing production and promotion costs. The decline in income from the
T
HE MOST IMPORTANT financial event of the Council year just ended was the
sale of books is primarily in the gross figure rather than the net, even though
virtual completion, under Malcolm Muir's leadership, of the Council's drive
the number of books published was one of the largest in the Council's history.
to raise a $5,000,000 endowment fund from individual members. This brings
Direct book production expenses declined by nearly the same amount as gross
almost to a close the first phase in raising the funds necessary to finance the
income from books, reflecting the transition to having the Council's publishers
Council's ten-year plan approved by the Board in 1963. During the year, more
rather than the Council itself produce the books, with the Council receiving
than $1,000,000 dollars in new gifts and pledges was received, bringing the
royalties while bearing none of the direct production costs.
total to $4,972,700 by June 30. Of these, perhaps the most welcome was the
Expenses during the year for the most part remained relatively stable. In the
pledge of $250,000 by a close friend of Whitney H. Shepardson, not himself a
area of regular program expenses, an increase in the studies program of nearly
Council member, which, in conjunction with other gifts from Mr. Shepardson's
$70,000, due in large part to the addition of Charles W. Yost and Kenneth
friends, made it possible for the Council to endow its Senior Fellowship in his
Kauffman and their secretaries to the permanent studies staff, was largely
name. Another gift of special meaning for the Council was received from Mr.
offset by the incorporation under a Regent's Charter of the Council library as
and Mrs. Edward Pulling and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company to endow
the Foreign Relations Library, which in turn assumed all direct library expenses,
a series of lectures similar to the Elihu Root Lectures, to be delivered approxi-
beginning December 1, 1966. Increased costs of Foreign Affairs production and
mately every two years by a distinguished citizen of a foreign country.
promotion also were more than offset by the decline of special project expenses
Contributions and grants to the capital fund received in cash or its equivalent
through the virtual completion of the United States and China in World Affairs
rose by $1,773,100. Income received from funds in hand rose to $119,000,
and the Atlantic Policy Studies.
compared to $60,800 for the fiscal year 1966 and $18,000 for 1965. With roughly
Several figures included under the heading, Transfers from other funds, are
$1,000,000 still to be paid in on pledges made to the drive, the income can be
worthy of note. The decline under the heading of Special Purpose Funds is due
expected to increase steadily during the next few years before leveling out at
entirely to the expenditure during 1965-66 of the last $140,200 remaining in
approximately $200,000. This important new and continuing source of income
the Ford Foundation grant for the Atlantic and China projects. The figure of
not only helped make it possible for the Council to maintain a balanced budget
$40,000 listed under Special Purpose Funds in 1966-67 represents the first
for the fourth consecutive year, but also permitted it to spend $30,000 less of
transfer of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation grant to defray the expenses
the Ford Foundation ten-year grant than in the previous fiscal year. Thus, the
incurred during the year in maintaining the Senior Research Fellowship in the
unexpended balances built up in this fund will be available to defray the larger
economics of the developing countries, and from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
expenses projected for the later years of the Council's ten-year program because
grant for the new International Affairs Fellowship Program, mentioned above.
of increases in costs due to expected inflation.
The Council's financial statements, as audited by Price Waterhouse & Co.,
Special note should also be taken of the receipt during the year of the first
follow. More detailed information is available to any member on request.
$100,000 of a generous $300,000 grant made by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
to enable the Council to undertake a program of annual fellowships for a select
John Temple Swing
group of younger scholars and government officials. This project is described
Associate Executive Director
on p. 10.
General fund income during the year increased in several categories, with
both corporate subscriptions and contributions and Foreign Affairs subscrip-
tions and sales reaching new highs. The latter was due in part to an increase in
the regular subscription rate of Foreign Affairs from $6.00 to $8.00 a year (the
first increase in sixteen years), which was made necessary in turn by steadily
64
65
FINANCES
OPINION OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND CHANGES
IN GENERAL FUND BALANCE (continued)
1967
1966
PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co.
60 BROAD STREET
Expenses:
NEW YORK 10004
General administrative expenses:
AUGUST 9, 1967
Executive Director's office
107,300
94,100
To the Board of Directors of
Business office
117,500
121,100
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Maintenance of house
76,000
69,100
Staff medical, disability and life insurance
10,900
11,700
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and the related statements of
Less: Charges to Foreign Relations Library (Note 1)
(5,600)
I
income, expenses and changes in General Fund and other fund balances present fairly
306,100
296,000
the financial position of Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., at June 30, 1967, and its
income, expenses and changes in funds for the year, in conformity with generally
Regular program expenses:
Studies program
316,900
248,500
accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding
Meetings programs for members and corporations
79,700
87,000
year. Our examination of these statements was made in accordance with generally
Serial publications-editorial
38,300
39,300
accepted auditing standards and accordingly included such tests of the accounting
records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circum-
Book production and promotion
80,300
123,300
Committees on Foreign Relations
47,700
43,600
stances. It was impracticable for us to extend our examination of contributions and
Library (Note 1)
34,600
76,700
grants received beyond accounting for amounts so recorded.
Reproduction and mail
26,600
23,700
International Affairs Fellowship program
12,000
-
1,200
Price Ro.
Donation to Foreign Relations Library (Note 1)
-
637,300
642,100
Foreign Affairs
481,700
427,500
Special projects:
Atlantic Policy Studies
11,900
92,300
United States and China in World Affairs
17,600
60,300
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
Chatham House Conference
7,600
-
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND
37,100
152,600
CHANGES IN GENERAL FUND BALANCE
Total expenses
1,462,200
1,518,200
For the year ended June 30,
Excess of expenses prior to transfers from other funds
312,900
384,100
1967
1966
Transfers from other funds:
Income:
$ 154,800
$ 153,600
Capital Drive Fund
119,000
60,800
Membership dues
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation Funds
157,300
187,300
Contributions from members
101,900
97,000
Corporate subscriptions and contributions
Special Purpose Funds
40,000
140,200
194,100
177,600
50,000
Restricted Investment Funds
1,200
-
Foundation grants
42,600
317,500
388,300
Investment income, net
145,300
137,500
Foreign Affairs subscriptions and sales
349,200
317,800
Excess of income and transfers over expenses
4,600
4,200
Foreign Affairs advertising
76,600
69,900
Fund balance, beginning of year
2,228,400
2,165,300
Sales of books and royalty income
84,800
130,700
Realized gain on sales of securities
25,700
58,900
Total income
1,149,300
1,134,100
Fund balance, end of year
$2,258,700
$2,228,400
67
66
FINANCES
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
BALANCE SHEET
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND
CHANGES IN OTHER FUND BALANCES
June 30,
For the year ended June 30, 1967
1967
1966
Assets
Ford
General Fund:
Foundation
Cash
$
75,600
$
98,600
Capital
Restricted
Special
and Carnegie
Deposits in savings banks
70,800
64,000
Drive
Investment
Purpose
Corporation
Investments at cost or market value when donated
Fund
Fund
Funds
Funds
(approximate market value: 1967-$3,449,000;
(Note 2)
(Note 3)
(Note 4)
(Note 5)
1966-$3,458,000)
2,240,700
2,192,400
Income:
Accounts receivable
84,900
79,300
Contributions and grants
$1,773,100
$100,000
Inventories, at lower of cost or market
66,400
67,800
Investment income
119,000
$ 1,700
23,100
$ 43,700
Prepaid expenses
8,500
11,000
1,892,100
1,700
123,100
43,700
Land, building and equipment, at nominal amount
100
100
Expenses:
2,547,000
2,513,200
Fund-raising expense
2,800
Other funds:
1,889,300
1,700
123,100
43,700
Deposits in savings banks
216,200
145,500
Transfers to General Fund
119,000
1,200
40,000
157,300
Investments at cost or market value when donated
Transfers between other funds
75,000
(75,000)
(approximate market value: 1967-$5,548,100;
194,000
(73,800)
40,000
157,300
1966-$3,637,490)
5,498,400
3,777,200
Excess (deficit) of income and
Due from General Fund
-
58,600
transfers in, over expenses
5,714,600
3,981,300
and transfers out
1,695,300
75,500
83,100
(113,600)
$8,261,600
$6,494,500
Fund balance, beginning
of year
2,273,100
106,800
526,500
1,074,900
Realized gain (loss) on
Liabilities and fund balances
sales of securities
(9,200)
700
1,500
General Fund:
Fund balance, end of year
$3,959,200
$182,300
$610,300
$ 962,800
Accounts payable and accrued expenses
$
26,900
$ 28,200
Due to other funds
-
58,600
Note 1:
Deferred subscription income and other
261,400
198,000
On December 1, 1966, the library of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. commenced
Fund balance
2,258,700
2,228,400
operations as a separate corporation and the Council donated its library books
2,547,000
2,513,200
carried at no value on the Council's records to the new corporation, Foreign Relations
Other fund balances:
Library. Since that date all direct costs of the Library have been borne by the Foreign
Capital Drive Fund
3,959,200
2,273,100
Relations Library and are not included in the accompanying financial statements. The
Restricted Investment Fund
182,300
106,800
Foreign Relations Library is charged its pro rata share of occupancy costs and a fee
Special Purpose Funds
610,300
526,500
for administrative services. During the year ended June 30, 1967, the Council received
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation Funds
962,800
1,074,900
an endowment fund of $50,000 (included in the restricted investment fund), the
5,714,600
3,981,300
income on which can only be used to purchase library books. Accordingly, the income
$8,261,600
$6,494,500
earned on this fund has been donated to the Foreign Relations Library.
68
69
MEMBERSHIP
Note 2:
Contributions to the Capital Drive Fund, created in 1964, may be used at the discretion
T
HE COUNCIL'S membership has been virtually at its limit in recent years,
of the Council. The present intention of the Council is to use only the income earned
despite several changes in the By-Laws to raise the ceiling on the number
from Capital Drive Fund investments to help meet operating expenses.
of members permitted in both the resident and non-resident groups. Recognizing
Note 3:
that further increases in the existing membership would not only be infeasible
The Restricted Investment Fund is an endowment fund consisting of four funds.
Income from two of these funds is restricted as to use, while income from the remain-
with the Council's present facilities and staff, but might also tend to dilute the
ing two funds is available for general operations of the Council and is included in
quality of membership and limit the activities available to individual members,
investment income in the general fund.
the Board of Directors felt that a study should be made of the over-all member-
Note 4:
ship situation to be sure that the criteria for election to membership are ap-
Special Purpose Funds consist of two funds of which one is restricted to financing the
propriate, the procedures for election effective, and membership participation
International Affairs Fellowship and the other may be used to support program studies
satisfactory. A subcommittee of the Board was appointed this winter to consider
in Asian, African and Latin American affairs up to a maximum of $75,000 per year.
these problems, and its recommendations will serve as guidelines in the future.
Note 5:
The need to maintain a diverse membership with a balance among the various
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation funds can be used for general purposes
relevant occupational groups was reaffirmed by the subcommittee. The finding
over fixed periods of time.
that was of the most immediate concern was the fact that the average age of
the Council's membership is higher than is desirable. It recommended that in
general no new member should be elected who is over the age of 60 and that
during the course of each year the average age of newly elected members, insofar
as this is possible, should not exceed 45. This subcommittee also recommended
that the Membership Committee appoint a small committee of Council members
under 40 years of age to seek out and suggest especially promising candidates
under 40, and to advise on all candidates under 40 who are coming up for con-
sideration before the Membership Committee. Such an advisory committee has
been formed and will begin its work in the fall.
Membership figures at the end of this fiscal year as compared with last year's
are as follows:
July 1, 1967
July 1,1966
Resident
721
717
Non-Resident
744
728
TOTAL
1,465
1,445
Lorna Brennan
Membership Secretary
71
70
RESIDENT MEMBERS
RESIDENT MEMBERS
as of 9/1/67
A
BELL, DANIEL
BURKHARDT, FREDERICK
COOLIDGE, NICHOLAS J.
DOUGLAS, PAUL W.
FRASCHE, DEAN F.
ABRAM, MORRIS B.
BELL, DAVID E.
BURNETT, JOHN G.
COOMBS, CHARLES A.
DUBINSKY, DAVID
FREDERICKS, J. WAYNE
AKERS, ANTHONY B.
BELL, ELLIOTT V.
BURNS, ARTHUR F.
COOPER, FRANKLIN S.
DUBOIS, J. DELAFIELD
FREEDMAN,
ALDRICH, WINTHROP W.
BENJAMIN, ROBERT S.
BUSH, DONALD F.
CORDIER, ANDREW W.
EMANUEL R.
ALEXANDER, HENRY C.
BENNETT, JOHN C.
BUSHNER, ROLLAND H.
COSTANZO, G. A.
E
FRELINGHUYSEN, PETER H. B.
ALEXANDER, ROBERT J.
BENTON, WILLIAM
BUTLER, WILLIAM F.
COUGHRAN, ToM B.
BEPLAT, TRISTAN E.
EAGLE, VERNON A.
FRENCH, JOHN
ALLEN, CHARLES E.
BUTTENWIESER, BENJAMIN J.
COUSINS, NORMAN
BERLE, ADOLF A.
EATON, FREDRICK M.
FREUDENTHAL,
ALLEN, PHILIP
COWAN, LOUIS G.
DAVID M.
ALLEY, JAMES B.
BESSIE, SIMON MICHAEL
C
EBERLE, W. D.
COWLES, GARDNER
ALLPORT, ALEXANDER W.
BEVIS, HERMAN W.
CABELL, RICHARD A.
EBERSTADT, FERDINAND
FREUND, GERALD
CREEL, DANA S.
CAIN, CHARLES, JR.
EDELMAN, ALBERT I.
FRIELE, BERENT
ALPERN, ALAN N.
BIENSTOCK, ABRAHAM L.
CUMMINGS, ROBERT L.
BINGHAM, JONATHAN B.
EDELSTEIN, JULIUS C. C.
FRIENDLY, HENRY J.
ALTSCHUL, ARTHUR G.
CALDER, ALEXANDER, JR.
CUSICK, PETER
BLACK, JOSEPH E.
EDER, PHANOR J.
FRYE, WILLIAM R.
ALTSCHUL, FRANK
CALHOUN, ALEXANDER D.
BLACK, PETER
CAMP, HUGH D.
EICHELBERGER, CLARK M.
FUERBRINGER, Orro
AMES, AMYAS
AMMIDON, HOYT
BLAKE, NORMAN P.
CAMPBELL, H. DONALD
D
ELLIOTT, L. W.
FULLER, C. DALE
ANDERSON, ROBERT B.
BLOUGH, ROGER M.
CANFIELD, CASS
ELLIOTT, OSBORN
FULLER, ROBERT G.
DALLIN, ALEXANDER
CANFIELD, FRANKLIN O.
ELSON, ROBERT T.
FUNKHOUSER, E. N., JR.
ANGELL, JAMES W.
BLOUGH, Roy
DARLINGTON, CHARLES F.
ARMOUR, NORMAN
BLUM, JOHN A.
CAREY, ANDREW G.
EMMET, CHRISTOPHER
DARRELL, NORRIS
G
ARMSTRONG,
BLUMENTHAL, W. MICHAEL
CARROLL, MITCHELL B.
ENGEL, IRVING M.
DAUM, EARL C.
BOARDMAN, HARRY
CARSON, RALPH M.
ERPF, ARMAND G.
GALLATIN, JAMES P.
HAMILTON FISH
DAVENPORT, JOHN
ASCOLI, MAX
BOGDAN, NORBERT A.
CARY, WILLIAM L.
ESTABROOK, ROBERT H.
GAMBLE, SIDNEY D.
DAVIS, JOHN A.
ATTWOOD, WILLIAM
BOLTE, CHARLES G.
CASE, EVERETT N.
EVERTON, JOHN Scorr
GARDNER, RICHARD N.
DAVISON, DANIEL P.
BONSAL, DUDLEY B.
EWING, SHERMAN
GARRETSON, ALBERT H.
AUBREY, HENRY G.
CASE, JOHN C.
DAVISON, W. PHILLIPS
EWING, WILLIAM, JR.
GARRISON, LLOYD K.
AULT, BROMWELL
BOORMAN, HOWARD L.
CATES, JOHN M., JR.
DEAN, ARTHUR H.
EXTER, JOHN
GASTON, GEORGE A.
BOWERS, JOHN z.
CATTIER, JEAN
DEAVER, JOHN V.
GATES, SAMUEL E.
BOWLES, FRANK
CHAMPION, GEORGE
DEBEVOISE, Eu WHITNEY
B
GATES, THOMAS S.
Boyd, HUGH N.
CHASE, W. HOWARD
DE CUBAS, JOSE
F
GENEEN, HAROLD S.
BACKER, GEORGE
BRADEN, SPRUILLE
CHEEVER, DANIEL S.
DE LIMA, OSCAR A.
FENN, WILLIAM P.
GERHARDT, MAJ. GEN. H. A.
BADEAU, JOHN S.
BRAXTON, CARTER M.
CHITTENDEN, GEORGE H.
DE Rosso, ALPHONSE
FIELD,
GEVERS, MAX E.
BAKER, EDGAR R.
BRECK, HENRY C.
CHUBB, HENDON, 2ND
DE VRIES, HENRY P.
WILLIAM Oscood, JR.
GIDEONSE, HARRY D.
BALDWIN, HANSON W.
BRINCKERHOFF, CHARLES M.
CHUBB, PERCY, 2ND
DEWEY, THOMAS E.
FINLAY, LUKE W.
GILLESPIE, S. HAZARD
BANCROFT, HARDING F.
BRITTENHAM, RAYMOND L.
CHURCH, EDGAR M.
D'HARNONCOURT, RENE
FINLETTER, THOMAS K.
GILPATRIC, ROSWELL L.
BARBER, CHARLES F.
BRONK, DETLEV W.
CLAY, GEN. LUCIUS D.
DICKSON,
FINNEY, PAUL B.
GOLDBERG, ARTHUR J.
BARBER, JOSEPH
BROWN, COURTNEY C.
CLEVELAND,
R. RUSSELL, JR.
FISCHER, JOHN
GOLDEN, WILLIAM T.
BARKER, ROBERT R.
BROWN, FRANCIS
HAROLD VAN B.
DIEBOLD, JOHN
FISK, JAMES B.
GOLDSTONE, HARMON H.
BARLOW, WILLIAM E.
BROWN, IRVING
CLINCHY, EVERETT R.
DIEBOLD, WILLIAM, JR.
FLECK, G. PETER
GOODRICH, LELAND M.
BARNES, JOSEPH
BROWN, JOHN MASON
COFFIN, EDMUND
DILLON, CLARENCE
FLEISCHMANN, MANLY
GORDON, ALBERT H.
BARNETT, FRANK R.
BROWN, WALTER L.
COMEN, JEROME B.
DILLON, DOUGLAS
FORD, NEVIL
GRACE, J. P., JR.
BARRETT, EDWARD W.
BROWNELL, GEORGE A.
COLLADO, EMILIO G.
DILWORTH, J. RICHARDSON
FORKNER, CLAUDE E.
GRAFF, ROBERT D.
BARZUN, JACQUES
BRUCE, JAMES
COLLINGS, L. V.
DODGE, CLEVELAND E.
FORRESTAL, MICHAEL V.
GRAZIER, JOSEPH A.
BASTEDO, PHILIP
BULLOCK, HUGH
COLWELL, KENT G.
DONNER, FREDERIC G.
Fox, JOSEPH C.
GRIFFITH, THOMAS
BEAL, GERALD F.
BUNCHE, RALPH J.
CONANT, JAMES B.
DONOVAN, HEDLEY
Fox, WILLIAM T. R.
GRIMM, PETER
BECKER, LOFTUS E.
BUNDY, McGEORGE
CONANT, MELVIN
DORR, GOLDTHWAITE H.
FOYE, ARTHUR B.
GRONDAHL, TEG C.
BEDARD, PIERRE
BURDEN, WILLIAM A. M.
CONNOR, JOHN T.
DORWIN, OSCAR JOHN
FRANKLIN,
GROSS, ERNEST A.
BEEBE, FREDERICK S.
BURGESS, CARTER L.
COOK, HOWARD A.
DOUGLAS, LEWIS W.
GEORGE S., JR.
GROVER, ALLEN
72
73
RESIDENT MEMBERS
RESIDENT MEMBERS
GUGGENHEIM, HARRY F.
HOLLAND, KENNETH
KANE, R. KEITH
LILIENTHAL, DAVID E.
MAY, A. WILFRED
NICHOLS, THOMAS S.
GUNTHER, JOHN
HOLMES, ALAN R.
KEEZER, DEXTER M.
LILLEY, A. N.
MAYER, GERALD M., JR.
NICHOLS, WILLIAM I.
GURFEIN, MURRAY I.
HOLT, L. EMMETT, JR.
KEISER, DAVID M.
LINDQUIST, WARREN T.
MEAGHER, ROBERT F.
NICKERSON, A. L.
HOMER, SIDNEY
KEMPNER, MAXIMILIAN W.
LINDSAY, GEORGE N.
MENKE, JOHN R.
NIELSEN, WALDEMAR A.
H
HORN, GARFIELD H.
KENEN, PETER B.
LINDSAY, JOHN V.
MERZ, CHARLES
NORSTAD, GEN. LAURIS
HAGER, ERIC H.
HORTON, PHILIP C.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
LISSITZYN, OLIVER J.
METZGER, HERMAN A.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
HAIDER, MICHAEL L.
HOTTELET, RICHARD C.
KENNEY, F. DONALD
LOCKWOOD, JOHN E.
MEYER, JOHN M., JR.
NOYES, CHARLES PHELPS
HAIGHT, GEORGE W.
HOUGHTON,
KERN, HARRY F.
LOCKWOOD,
MICKELSON, SIG
HALABY, NAJEEB E.
ARTHUR A., JR.
KETTANEH, FRANCIS A.
MANICE DEF., 3RD
MIDTBO, HAROLD
HAMILTON, FOWLER
HOUSTON, FRANK K.
KEYSER, PAUL V., JR.
LOEB, JOHN L.
MILLAR, D. G.
HAMMOND, CAPT. PAUL
HOWARD, JOHN B.
KIAER, HERMAN S.
LOFT, GEORGE
OAKES, JOHN B.
MILLARD, MARK J.
HOWELL, JOHN I.
O'BRIEN, JUSTIN
HANCE, WILLIAM A.
KING, FREDERIC R.
LOOMIS, ALFRED L.
MILLER, EDWARD G., JR.
HARARI, MAURICE
HUGHES, JOHN CHAMBERS
Loos, REV. A. WILLIAM
O'CONNOR, RODERIC L.
KIRK, GRAYSON
MILLER, PAUL R., JR.
HARRAR, J. G.
HUREWITZ, J. C.
KLEIMAN, ROBERT
LOUCKS, HAROLD H.
OGDEN, ALFRED
MILLIS, WALTER
HARRIMAN, E. ROLAND
HYDE, HENRY B.
KNIGHT,
LOUNSBURY, ROBERT H.
MILLS, BRADFORD
OLMSTEAD, CECIL J.
HYDE, JAMES N.
ROBERT HUNTINGTON
LUBAR, ROBERT A.
MODEL, LEO
O'NEILL, MICHAEL J.
HARRIS, JAMES T. JR.
HASKELL, BRODERICK
KNOKE, L. WERNER
LUBIN, ISADOR
MOE, SHERWOOD G.
OSBORN, EARL D.
I
LUDT, R. E.
OSBORN, FREDERICK H.
HAUGE, GABRIEL
KNOPPERS, ANTONIE T.
MONAGHAN, THOMAS E.
KNOX, WILLIAM E.
LUKE, DAVID L., 3RD
OSBORN, WILLIAM H.
HAYES, ALFRED
INGLIS, JOHN B.
MOORE, BEN T.
HAYES, SAMUEL P.
IRWIN, JOHN N., 2ND
LUNT, SAMUEL D.
OSBORNE, STANLEY DE J.
KOENIG, ROBERT P.
MOORE, EDWARD F.
OSTRANDER,
HAZARD, JOHN N.
ISELIN, O'DONNELL
MOORE, GEORGE S.
F. TAYLOR, JR.
HEALD, HENRY T.
ISSAWI, CHARLES
L
M
MOORE, MAURICE T.
OVERBY, ANDREW N.
HEATH, DONALD R.
LABOUISSE, HENRY R.
MOORE, ROBERT A.
OVERTON, DOUGLAS W.
J
MCCANCE, THOMAS
HECKSCHER, AUGUST
LACY, DAN B.
McCARTHY, JOHN G.
MOORE, WALDEN
HELM, HAROLD H.
JACKSON, ELMORE
LA FARGE, FRANCIS W.
McCLoY, JOHN J.
MOORE, WILLIAM T.
P
HENDERSON, WILLIAM
JACKSON, WILLIAM E.
LAMB, HORACE R.
McCLoY, JOHN J., 2ND
MORGAN, D. P.
HENKIN, LOUIS
JAMES, GEORGE F.
LAMONT, PETER T.
MCDANIEL, JOSEPH M., JR.
MORGAN, HENRY S.
PACE, FRANK, JR.
HEROD, W. ROGERS
JAMIESON, J. K.
LARMON, SIGURD S.
MORRIS, GRINNELL
PAGE, HOWARD W.
McDERMOTT, WALSH
HERRING, PENDLETON
JARETZKI, ALFRED, JR.
MOSELY, PHILIP E.
PAGE, JOHN H.
LAROCHE, CHESTER J.
McGRAW, JAMES H., JR.
HERTER, CHRISTIAN A., JR.
JASTROW, ROBERT
MOYERS, BILL D.
PAGE, ROBERT G.
LARY, HAL B.
MCKEEVER, PORTER
HERZOG, PAUL M.
JAVITS, JACOB K.
LAUKHUFF, PERRY
MUIR, MALCOLM
PAGE, WALTER H.
MACEACHRON, DAVID W.
HESS, JEROME S.
JAY, NELSON DEAN
LEBARON, EUGENE
MACGREGOR, IAN K.
MUNROE, GEORGE B.
PALEY, WILLIAM S.
HESTER, JAMES M.
JESSUP, ALPHEUS W.
LEE, ELLIOTT H.
MUNROE, VERNON, JR.
PALFREY, JOHN G.
MACINTYRE, MALCOLM A.
HICKEY, WILLIAM M.
JESSUP, JOHN K.
PARKER, PHILO W.
LEHMAN, JOHN R.
MACIVER, MURDOCH
MUNSON, HENRY LEE
HILL, FORREST F.
JOHNSON, EDWARD F.
PASSIN, HERBERT
LEHMAN, ORIN
MADDOX, WILLIAM P.
MUNYAN, WINTHROP R.
HILL, JAMES T., JR.
JOHNSON, HOWARD C.
PATTERSON, ELLMORE C.
LEHMAN, ROBERT
MALLORY, WALTER H.
MURDEN, FORREST D., JR.
HILL, JOHN A.
JOHNSON, JOSEPH E.
PATTERSON, FREDERICK D.
LEHRMAN, HAL
MARK, REV. JULIUS
MURPHY, GRAYSON M. P.
HILLS, ROBERT C.
JOHNSON, LESTER B.
PAYNE, FREDERICK B.
LEONARD, JAMES G.
MARKEL, LESTER
MURPHY, J. MORDEN
HOCHSCHILD, HAROLD K.
JONES, DAVID J.
PAYNE, SAMUEL B.
LEROY, NORBERT G.
MARSHALL, CLIFFORD B.
HOCHSCHILD, WALTER
PAYSON,
LESLIE, JOHN C.
MARTINO, JOSEPH A.
CHARLES SHIPMAN
HOFFMAN, PAUL G.
K
LEVY, WALTER J.
MARVEL, WILLIAM W.
N
HOGLUND, ELIS S.
PEARSON, JOHN E.
KAHN, HERMAN
LEWIS, ROGER
MASTEN, JOHN E.
NEAL, ALFRED C.
PEDERSEN, RICHARD F.
HOGUET, ROBERT L., JR.
KALINSKI, FELIX A.
LIEBERMAN, HENRY R.
MATHEWS, EDWARD J.
NELSON, CLIFFORD C.
PENNOYER, PAUL G.
HOHENBERG, JOHN
KAMINER, PETER H.
LIGHTNER, MILTON C.
MATTISON, GRAHAM D.
NEWTON, QUIGG, JR.
PENNOYER, ROBERT M.
74
75
RESIDENT MEMBERS
RESIDENT MEMBERS
STACKPOLE, STEPHEN H.
TOWNSEND, EDWARD
WHIPPLE, TAGGART
PERKINS, ROSWELL B.
ROBBINS, DONALD G., JR.
SCHILTHUIS, WILLEM C.
STAMAS, STEPHEN
TOWNSEND, OLIVER
WHITE, FRANK X.
PERRY, HART
ROBERTS, GEORGE
SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR, JR.
STANTON, FRANK
TRAGER, FRANK N.
WHITE, H. LEE
PETERS, C. BROOKS
ROBERTSON, CHARLES S.
SCHMIDT, HERMAN J.
STEBBINS, JAMES H.
TRAPHAGEN, J. C.
WHITE, THEODORE H.
PETERSEN, GUSTAV H.
ROBINSON, GEROID T.
SCHMOKER, J. BENJAMIN
STEBBINS, RICHARD P.
TRAVIS, MARTIN B., JR.
WHITNEY, JOHN HAY
PETSCHEK, STEPHEN R.
ROCKEFELLER, DAVID
SCHWARTZ, HARRY
STEINIGER, EDWARD L.
TRIPPE, JUAN TERRY
WHITRIDGE, ARNOLD
PHILLIPS,
ROCKEFELLER, JOHN D., 3RD
SCHWARZ,
STERN, FRITZ
TRUMAN, DAVID B.
WIGHT, CHARLES A.
CHRISTOPHER H.
ROCKEFELLER, NELSON A.
FREDERICK A. O.
STERN, H. PETER
TWEEDY, GORDON B.
WILHELM, HARRY E.
PICKER, HARVEY
ROCKHILL, VICTOR E.
Scott, JOHN
STEVENSON, JOHN R.
WILKINSON, THEODORE L.
PICKERING, JAMES V.
RODRIGUEZ, VINCENT A.
Scorr, STUART N.
STEWART,
U
WILLIAMS,
PIEL, GERARD
ROGERS, LINDSAY
SEAGRAVE, NORMAN P.
ROBERT McLEAN
LANGBOURNE M.
SELIGMAN, EUSTACE
UZIELLI, GIORGIO
PIERCE, WILLIAM C.
ROOSA, ROBERT V.
STILLMAN, CHAUNCEY
WILSON, DONALD M.
PIERCY, GEORGE T.
ROOT, OREN
SEYMOUR, WHITNEY NORTH
STILLMAN, RALPH S.
V
WILSON, JOHN D.
PIERSON, WARREN LEE
ROPER, ELMO
SHARP, GEORGE C.
STINEBOWER, LEROY D.
WINGATE, HENRY S.
ROSENMAN, SAMUEL I.
SHARP, JAMES H.
VILA, GEORGE R.
PIFER, ALAN
STODDARD, GEORGE D.
WINSLOW, RICHARD S.
PIKE, H. HARVEY
ROSENSTIEL, LEWIS
SHEA, ANDREW B.
VON KLEMPERER, ALFRED H.
STOKES, ISAAC N. P.
WOOD, BRYCE
PLACE, JOHN B. M.
ROSENTHAL, A. M.
SHEEAN, VINCENT
VOORHEES, TRACY S.
STONE, SHEPARD
WOODMAN, HERBERT B.
PLIMPTON, FRANCIS T. P.
ROSENWALD, WILLIAM
SHEELINE, PAUL C.
STRAKA, JEROME A.
WOODWARD, DONALD B.
Ross, EMORY
SHEFFIELD, FREDERICK
W
POLK, JUDD
STRATTON, JULIUS A.
WOOLLEY, KNIGHT
POTTER, ROBERT S.
Ross, T.J.
SHEPARD, DAVID A.
STRAUS, DONALD B.
WAGLEY, CHARLES W.
WRIGGINS, W. HOWARD
POWERS, JOSHUA B.
ROUSE, ROBERT G.
SHEPARD, FRANK P.
STRAUS, JACK I.
WALKER, A. LIGHTFOOT
WRISTON, HENRY M.
PRAEGER, FREDERICK A.
ROYCE, ALEXANDER B.
SHERMAN, IRVING H.
STRAUS, OSCAR S.
WALKER, GEORGE G.
WRISTON, WALTER B.
PRATT, H. IRVING
RUEBHAUSEN, OSCAR M.
SHIELDS, W. CLIFFORD
STRAUS, RALPH I.
WALKER, JOSEPH, JR.
PROBST, GEORGE E.
RUSH, KENNETH
SHIRER, WILLIAM L.
STRAUSS, SIMON D.
WALKOWICZ, T.F.
Y
PULLING, EDWARD
RUSSELL, FRANK F.
SHULMAN, MARSHALL D.
STREIBERT, THEODORE C.
WALLACE, SCHUYLER C.
YOST, CHARLES W.
RUSSELL, T. W., JR.
SHUTE, BENJAMIN R.
STRONG, BENJAMIN
WARBURG, ERIC M.
YOUNG, EDGAR B.
RUSTOW, DANKWART A.
SILVERT, K. H.
SULZBERGER,
WARBURG, FREDERICK M.
YOUNG, JOHN M.
Q
SIMONS, HANS
ARTHUR HAYS
WARBURG, JAMES P.
YOUNG, KENNETH T., JR.
S
SULZBERGER,
WARD, F. CHAMPION
QUIGG, PHILIP W.
SIMS, ALBERT G.
YOUNGMAN, WILLIAM S.
SLATER, JOSEPH E.
ARTHUR OCHS
WARD, THOMAS E.
SACHS, ALEXANDER
SLAWSON, JOHN
SUTTON, FRANCIS X.
WARFIELD, ETHELBERT
Z
SACHS, HOWARD J.
R
SWING, JOHN TEMPLE
WARREN, JOHN EDWIN
SALISBURY, HARRISON
SMITH, CARLETON SPRAGUE
WASSON, DONALD
ZURCHER, ARNOLD J.
SMITH, DATUS C., JR.
SWINTON, STANLEY M.
RABI, ISIDOR I.
SALTZMAN, CHARLES E.
WATSON, ARTHUR K.
SAMUELS, NATHANIEL
SMITH, DAVID S.
SWOPE, GERARD, JR.
RAMBIN, J. HOWARD
WATSON, BURL S.
RATHBONE, M. J.
SARGEANT, HOWLAND H.
SMITH, HAYDEN N.
T
WATSON, THOMAS J., JR.
REBER, SAMUEL
SARGENT, NOEL
SMITH, W. MASON,
TANNENBAUM, FRANK
WAUCHOPE,
REED, PHILIP D.
SARNOFF,
SOMMERS, DAVIDSON
THOMAS, EVAN
VICE ADM. GEORGE
REID, OGDEN R.
BRIG. GEN. DAVID
SONNE, H. CHRISTIAN
THOMAS, H. GREGORY
WEAVER, SYLVESTER L., JR.
REID, WHITELAW
SCHACHTER, OSCAR
SORENSEN, THEODORE C.
THOMPSON, EARLE S.
WEBSTER, BETHUEL M.
RHEINSTEIN, ALFRED
SCHAFFNER, JOSEPH HALLE
SOUBRY, E. E.
THOMPSON, KENNETH W.
WELCH, LEO D.
RICHARDSON,
SCHAPIRO, J. SALWYN
SPANG, KENNETH M.
TIBBY, JOHN
WERNIMONT, KENNETH
ARTHUR BERRY
SCHERMAN, HARRY
SPENCER, PERCY C.
TINKER,
WHARTON, CLIFTON R., JR.
RICHARDSON, JOHN, JR.
SCHIFF, JOHN M.
SPENCER, WILLIAM C.
EDWARD LAROCQUE
WHEELER, WALTER H., JR.
RIEGELMAN, HAROLD
SCHILLER, A. ARTHUR
SPOFFORD, CHARLES M.
TOMLINSON, ALEXANDER C.
WHIDDEN, HOWARD P.
RIPLEY, JOSEPH P.
SCHILLING, WARNER R.
SPRAGUE, MANSFIELD D.
77
76
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
as of 9/1/67
A
BAYNE, EDWARD ASHLEY
BRONWELL, ARTHUR
CLEVELAND, HARLAN
DEUTCH, MICHAEL J.
FAIRBANK, JOHN KING
BEAM, JACOB D.
BROOKS, HARVEY
CLOUGH, ERNEST T.
DEXTER, BYRON
FAIRBANKS, DOUGLAS
ABELSON, PHILIP H.
BECHTEL, S. D.
BRORBY, MELVIN
COFFEY, JOSEPH IRVING
DICKEY, JOHN S.
FALK, RICHARD A.
ACHESON, DEAN G.
BECKHART, BENJAMIN H.
BROSS, JOHN A.
COHEN, BENJAMIN V.
DODDS, HAROLD WILLIS
FARMER, GARLAND R., JR.
ACHILLES, THEODORE C.
BECKLER, DAVID z.
BROWN, SEVELLON
COLE, CHARLES W.
DOMERTY, WILLIAM C., JR.
FARMER, THOMAS L.
AGAR, HERBERT
BEER, SAMUEL H.
BROWN, WILLIAM O.
COLES, JAMES S.
DOLLARD, CHARLES
FEER, MARK C.
ALBRECHT-CARRIE, RENE
BEHRMAN, JACK N.
BROWNELL, LINCOLN C.
COLLBOHM, F. R.
DONHAM, PAUL
FEIS, HERBERT
ALEXANDER, ARCHIBALD S.
BELL, HOLLEY MACK
BRUCE, DAVID K. E.
COLLINGWOOD, CHARLES C.
DONKIN, MCKAY
FERGUSON, JOHN H.
ALLAN, F. ALEY
BENDA, HARRY J.
BRUNDAGE, PERCIVAL F.
CONLON, RICHARD P.
DONNELL, JAMES C., 2ND
FIFIELD, RUSSELL H.
ALLEN, RAYMOND B.
BENNETT,
BRUTON, HENRY J.
CONRAD,
DONNELLY,
FINKELSTEIN, LAWRENCE S.
AMORY, ROBERT, JR.
MAJ. GEN. DONALD V:
BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW
BRIG. GEN. BRYAN
LT. GEN. HAROLD C.
FIRESTONE,
ANDERSON, DILLON
BENNETT, JACK F.
BUNDY, WILLIAM P.
CONSIDINE,
DORR, RUSSELL H.
HARVEY S., JR.
ANDERSON,
BENNETT, MARTIN TOSCAN
BUNKER, ELLSWORTH
REV. JOHN J., M.M.
DOTY, PAUL M., JR.
FISHEL, WESLEY R.
ADM. GEORGE W., JR.
BERGSON, ABRAM
BUNNELL, C. STERLING
COOMBS, PHILIP H.
DOUGLAS, DONALD W.,
FISHER, ADRIAN S.
ANDERSON, ROGER E.
BERNSTEIN, EDWARD M.
BURCHINAL,
COPELAND,
DOWLING, WALTER
FISHER, EDGAR J.
ANDREWS, JOHN S.
BETTS,
LT. GEN. DAVID A.
LAMMOT DU PONT
DRAPER, WILLIAM H., JR.
FLEISCHMANN, JULIUS
ARMSTRONG,
BRIG. GEN. THOMAS
BURGESS, W. RANDOLPH
CORSON, DALE R.
DREIER, JOHN C.
FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T.
COL. DEWITT C., 3RD
BILLINGTON, JAMES H.
BUSSEY, COL. DONALD S.
COSTELLO, WILLIAM A.
DRUMMOND, ROSCOE
FOLSOM, VICTOR
ARMSTRONG, JOHN A.
BISSELL, RICHARD M., JR:
BYRNE, JAMES MACGREGOR
COTTING, CHARLES E.
DUCAS, ROBERT
FORD, THOMAS K.
AUSTIN, VICE ADM. B. L.
BLACK, CYRIL E.
BYRNES, ROBERT F.
COWAN, L. GRAY
DUKE, ANGIER BIDDLE
FOSDICK, RAYMOND B.
BLACK,
BYROADE, HENRY A.
COWLES, JOHN
DULLES, ALLEN W.
FOSTER, AUSTIN T.
B
BRIG. GEN. EDWIN F
CRANE,
DURDIN, F. TILLMAN-
FOSTER, WILLIAM C.
BABCOCK,
BLACKIE, WILLIAM
C
WINTHROP MURRAY, 3RD
FOWLER, HENRY H.
MAJ. GEN. C. STANTON
BLAKE, ROBERT o
CABOT, JOHN M.
CROSS, JAMES E.
E
FRANK, ISAIAH
BAIRD, CHARLES F.
BLISS, C.
CaBoT, LOUIS W.
CROTTY, HOMER D.
ECKSTEIN, ALEXANDER
FRANK, JOSEPH A.
BAKER, GEORGE P.
BLOOMFIELD, LINCOLN P
CABOT, THOMAS D.
CROWE, PHILIP K.
EDWARDS, A. R.
FRANKEL, CHARLES
BALL, GEORGE W.
BOESCHENSTEIN, HAROLD
CALDWELL, ROBERT G.
CURRAN, JEAN A., JR.
EDWARDS, WILLIAM H.
FRANKEL, MAX
BALLOU, GEORGE T.
BOHLEN, CHARLES E.
CALKINS, HUGH
CURTIS, EDWARD P.
FREE, LLOYD A.
EINAUDI, MARIO
BARCO, JAMES W.
BONESTEEL,
CAMPBELL, JOHN C.
D
FREEMAN, FULTON
EISENHOWER,
BARGER, THOMAS C.
GEN. C.H., 3RD
CARAWAY,
BARGHOORN, FREDERICK C.
DALE, WILLIAM B.
DWIGHT D.
FULLER, CARLTON P.
BONSAL, PHILIP W.
LT. GEN. PAUL W.
ELLIOTT, BYRON K.
FURBER, HOLDEN
BARKER, JAMES M.
BOOTHBY, ALBERT C:
CARPENTER,
DANGERFIELD, ROYDEN
BARKIN, SOLOMON
BORTON, HUGH
W. SAMUEL, 3RD
DAVID, DONALD K.
ELLIOTT, RANDLE
BARNETT, A. DOAK
BOWIE, ROBERT R.
CARTER, WILLIAM D.
DAVIDSON, ALFRED E.
ELLIOTT, WILLIAM Y.
G
BARNETT, ROBERT W.
BOWLES, CHESTER
DAVIES, FRED A.
EMENY, BROOKS
CARY, MAJ. GEN. JOHN B.
BARNETT, VINCENT M., JR.
DAVIES, RODGER P.
EMERSON, E. A.
GALBRAITH, J. KENNETH
BRADEN, THOMAS W.
CASE, CLIFFORD P.
BARROWS, LELAND
DAVIS, NATHANAEL V.
EMERSON, RUPERT
GALLAGHER, CHARLES F.
BRADFIELD, RICHARD
CATER, DOUGLASS
EPPERT, RAY R.
GALLAGHER, JOHN F., JR.
BARTHOLOMEW, DANA T.
BRADFORD, AMORY H.
CHAPMAN, JOHN F.
DEAN, EDGAR P.
GANT, GEORGE F.
DECKER, WILLIAM C.
ERNST, ALBERT E.
BASS, ROBERT P., JR.
BRAISTED, PAUL J.
CHENERY, HOLLIS B.
GARDINER, ARTHUR Z.
BASSOW, WHITMAN
BRAMSTEDT, W. F.
CHERRINGTON, BEN M.
DE GUIGNE,
EVANS, JOHN K.
GARDNER, JOHN W.
BATEMAN, WILLIAM H.
BREWSTER,
CHILDS, MARQUIS
CHRISTIAN, 3RD
EVANS, ROGER F.
GARNER, ROBERT L.
BATES, MARSTON
KINGMAN, JR.
CHILDS, THOMAS W.
DE KIEWIET, C. W.
GARTHOFF, RAYMOND L.
BATOR, FRANCIS M.
BRIGGS, ELLIS O.
CHURCH, FRANK
DEMING, FREDERICK L.
F
GAUD, WILLIAM S.
BAUMER, WILLIAM H.
BRINTON, CRANE
CISLER, WALKER L.
DESPRES, EMILE
FAHS, CHARLES B.
GAYLORD, BRADLEY
BAXTER, JAMES P., 3RD
BRISTOL, WILLIAM M.
CLARK, RALPH L.
DEUEL, WALLACE R.
FAINSOD, MERLE
GEIER, PAUL E.
78
79
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
GERHART, GEN. JOHN K.
HAMMONDS, OLIVER W.
HORTON, ALAN W.
GIBNEY, FRANK B.
HANES, JOHN W., JR.
HOSKINS, HAROLD B.
KAUFFMAN, JAMES LEE
LAYLIN, JOHN G.
McCRACKEN, PAUL W.
GIFFIN,
HANSELL,
HOUGHTON, AMORY
KAUFMANN, WILLIAM W.
LEDDY, JOHN M.
McCUTCHEON, JOHN D.
BRIG. GEN. SIDNEY F.
GEN. HAYWOOD S., JR.
HOVDE, FREDERICK L.
KAYSEN, CARL
LEE, CHARLES HENRY
McDouGAL, MYRES S.
GIL, PETER B.
HARBISON, FREDERICK
HOVEY, ALLAN, JR.
KEMPNER, FREDERICK C.
LEGHORN, RICHARD S.
MCFARLAND, Ross A.
GILBERT, CARL J.
HARE, RAYMOND A.
Hoyr, EDWIN C., JR.
KENNAN, GEORGE F.
LEICH, JOHN F.
MCGEE, GALE W.
GILBERT, H. N.
HARRIMAN, W. AVERELL
Horr, PALMER
KERR, CLARK
LEMNITZER, GEN. LYMAN
McGHEE, GEORGE C.
GILCHRIST, HUNTINGTON
HARRIS, IRVING B.
HUGHES, THOMAS L.
KILLIAN, JAMES R., JR.
LESLIE, DONALD S.
McKAY, VERNON
GILPATRIC, CHADBOURNE
HARSCH, JOSEPH C.
HUGLIN, BRIG. GEN. H. C.
KIMBERLY, JOHN R.
LE SUEUR, LARRY
MCKINNEY, ROBERT M.
GINSBURGH,
HART, AUGUSTIN S.
HUMPHREY, HUBERT H.
KING, JAMES E., JR.
LEVINE, IRVING R.
McKITTRICK, THOMAS H.
COL. ROBERT N.
HARTLEY, FRED L.
HUNSBERGER, WARREN S.
KING, JOHN A., JR.
LEVY, MARION J., JR.
MCLAUGHLIN, DONALD H.
GLEASON, S. EVERETT
HARTLEY, ROBERT W.
HUNT, JAMES RAMSAY
KINTNER,
LEWIS, WILMARTH S.
MCLEAN, DONALD H., JR.
GLENNAN, T. KEITH
HASKINS, CARYL P.
HUNTER, CLARENCE E.
CoL. WILLIAM R.
LINCOLN, CoL. G. A.
McQUADE, LAWRENCE C.
GOHEEN, ROBERT F.
HAUCK, ARTHUR A.
HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P.
KISSINGER, HENRY A.
LINDBLOM, CHARLES E.
MACARTHUR,
GOODHART, ARTHUR L.
HAVILAND, H. FIELD, JR.
KISTIAKOWSKY, GEORGE B.
LINDER, HAROLD F.
DOUGLAS, 2ND
GOODPASTER,
HAYS, BROOKS
KITCHEN, JEFFREY C.
LINDLEY, ERNEST K.
I
LT. GEN. ANDREW J.
HEFFELFINGER,
KNIGHT, DOUGLAS
MACCHESNEY,
LINDSAY, FRANKLIN A.
A. BRUNSON, 3RD
GOODRICH, CARTER
TOTTON P., 2ND
ISAACS, NORMAN E.
KNORR, KLAUS
LINDSAY,
GORDON, KERMIT
IVERSON, KENNETH R.
KOHLER, For D.
MACDONALD,
HEILPERIN, MICHAEL A.
LT. GEN. RICHARD C.
GORDON, LINCOLN
HEINTZEN, HARRY L.
KOHLER, WALTER J.
J. CARLISLE
LINGLE, WALTER L., JR..
GORNICK, ALAN L.
KOHN, HANS
MACVEAGH, LINCOLN
HEINZ, H. J., 2ND
J
LINOWITZ, SoL M.
GORTER, WYTZE
HENDERSON, L. J., JR.
KORBEL, JOSEF
LIPPMANN, WALTER
MACHOLD, WILLIAM F.
JAFFE, SAM A.
GRANT, JAMES P.
HENDERSON, Loy W.
KOROL, ALEXANDER G.
LIPSON, LEON
MAFFRY, AUGUST
JANSEN, MARIUS B.
GRANT,
HENRY, DAVID DODDS
KORRY, EDWARD M.
LITTLE, HERBERT S.
MALLINSON, HARRY
JENNEY, JOHN K.
MAJ. GEN. U.S., 3RD
HESBURGH,
KOTSCHNIG, WALTER M.
LITTLE, L. K.
MALLORY, GEORGE W.
JESSUP, PHILIP C.
GRAUBARD, STEPHEN R.
REV. THEODORE M., C.S.C.)
KRAFT, JOSEPH
LOCKARD, DERWOOD W.
MANN, THOMAS C.
JOHNSON, GEN. HAROLD K.
GRAY, GORDON
HILL, GEORGE WATTS
LOCKE, EDWIN A., JR.
MANNING, BAYLESS
JOHNSON, HOWARD W.
L
GRAY, WILLIAM LATIMER
LOCKWOOD, WILLIAM W.
MANNING, ROBERT J.
HINSHAW, RANDALL
JOHNSTON, HENRY R.
LADEJINSKY, WOLF
LODGE, GEORGE CABOT
MARCUS, STANLEY
GREEN, JOSEPH C.
HIRSCHMAN, ALBERT O.
JOHNSTONE, W. H.
GREENE, JAMES C.
HITCH, CHARLES J.
LAING, R. STANLEY
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
MARCY, CARL
JONES, PETER T.
GREENEWALT, CRAWFORD H.
HOFER, PHILIP
LAMPERT, LT. GEN. JAMES B.
LONG, FRANKLIN E.
MARSHALL,
JONES, THOMAS V.
GREENWOOD, HEMAN
HOFFMAN, MICHAEL L.
LAMSON, Roy, JR.
LONGSTREET, VICTOR M.
CHARLES BURTON
JORDAN,
GRIFFITH, BRIG. GEN.
HOFFMANN, STANLEY
LANG, ROBERT E.
LOOMIS, HENRY
MARTIN, EDWIN M.
COL. AMOS A., JR.
SAMUEL B., 2ND
HOLBORN, HAJO
LANGER, PAUL F.
LOVESTONE, JAY
MARTIN,
JORDEN, WILLIAM J.
GRIFFITH, WILLIAM E.
HOLLAND, WILLIAM L.
LANGER, WILLIAM L.
LUITWEILER, J. C.
WILLIAM McC., JR.
GROVE, CURTISS C.
HOLMES, JULIUS C.
LANGSAM,
LYFORD, JOSEPH P.
MASLAND, JOHN W.
GRUENTHER,
HOLST, WILLEM
K
WALTER CONSUELO
LYNCH, EDWARD S.
MASON, EDWARD S.
GEN. ALFRED M.
HoLT, PAT M.
KAHIN, GEORGE McT.
LANHAM,
LYON, E. WILSON
MATHEWS, WILLIAM R.
GRUSON, SYDNEY
Hook, GEORGE V.
KAISER, PHILIP M.
MAJ. GEN. CHARLES T.
MAY, ERNEST R.
GULLION, EDMUND A.
HOOPES, TOWNSEND W.
KAMARCK, ANDREW M.
LANSDALE,
MAY, OLIVER
M
HOOVER, CALVIN B.
KATZ, MILTON
MAJ. GEN. EDWARD G.
MAY, STACY
H
HOOVER, HERBERT W., JR.
KATZENBACH,
LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
McCABE, THOMAS B.
MAYER, FERDINAND L.
HALL, JOHN W.
HOOVER, LYMAN
EDWARD L., JR.
LATOURETTE, KENNETH S.
McCLINTOCK, ROBERT M.
MAYER, GERALD M.
HALLE, LOUIS J., JR.
HOPKINS, D. LUKE
KATZENBACH,
LAWRENCE, DAVID
McCoNE, JOHN ALEX
MECK, JOHN F.
HAMILTON, THOMAS J.
HOPPER, BRUCE C.
NICHOLAS DE B.
LAWRENCE, WILLIAM H.
McCoRMACK,
MERCHANT,
LAYBOURNE, LAWRENCE E.
MAJ. GEN. JAMES, JR.
LIVINGSTON T.
80
81
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
MERILLAT, H. C. L.
NOLTE, RICHARD H.
POOL, ITHIEL DESOLA
Rosrow, EUGENE V.
SONNENFELDT, HELMUT
TANNENWALD,
MERRIWETHER, DUNCAN
NOLTING, FREDERICK E., JR.
POOR, J. SHEPPARD
Rosrow, WALT W.
SONTAG,
THEODORE, JR.
METCALF, GEORGE R.
NOVER, BARNET
POSVAR, WESLEY W.
ROWEN, HENRY S.
RAYMOND JAMES
TAYLOR, GEORGE E.
MEYER, ALBERT J.
NOYES, W. ALBERT, JR.
POWER, THOMAS F., JR.
RUBIN, SEYMOUR J.
SOTH, LAUREN K.
TAYLOR,
MEYER, CHARLES A.
NUVEEN, JOHN
PRANCE, P. F. A.
RUINA, J. P.
SOUTHARD, FRANK A., JR.
GEN. MAXWELL D.
TAYLOR,
MEYER, CORD, JR.
PRICE, DON K.
RUSK, DEAN
SPAATZ, GEN. CARL A.
MILBANK, ROBBINS
PRIZER, JOHN B.
RYAN, JOHN T., JR.
SPAETH, CARL B.
WAYNE CHATFIELD
O
MILLER,
PROCHNOW, HERBERT V.
SPAIN, JAMES W.
TELLER, EDWARD
OELMAN, R.S.
PUSEY, NATHAN M.
S
COL. FRANCIS P.
SPENCER, JOHN H.
TEMPLETON, RICHARD H.
OPPENHEIMER, FRITZ E.
MILLER, J. IRWIN
PUTZELL, EDWIN J., JR.
SALOMON, IRVING
SPIEGEL, HAROLD R.
TENNYSON, LEONARD B.
OSBORNE, LITHGOW
MILLER, WILLIAM J.
PYE, LUCIAN W.
SATTERTHWAITE,
SPRAGUE, ROBERT C.
THAYER, CHARLES W.
OSGOOD, ROBERT E.
MILLIKAN, MAX F.
JOSEPH C.
SPROUT, HAROLD
THAYER, ROBERT H.
OWEN, GARRY
MILLIS, JOHN S.
SAWIN, MELVIN E.
STALEY, EUGENE
THOMPSON,
OWEN, HENRY
R
MINOR, HAROLD B.
SAWYER, JOHN E.
STANLEY, TIMOTHY W.
LLEWELLYN E.
MLADEK, JAN V.
RADWAY, LAURENCE I.
SCALAPINO, ROBERT A.
STANTON, EDWIN F.
THORP, WILLARD L.
MOLINA, EDGAR R.
P
RAVENHOLT, ALBERT
SCHAETZEL, J. ROBERT
STASON, E. BLYTHE
TIMBERLAKE, CLARE H.
MONTIAS, JOHN M.
PAFFRATH, LESLIE
RAY, GEORGE W., JR.
SCHELLING, THOMAS C.
STASSEN, HAROLD E.
TREZISE, PHILIP H.
TRIFFIN, ROBERT
MOORE, HUCH
PALMER, NORMAN D.
REEVES, JAY B. L.
SCHIFF, FRANK W.
STEIN, ERIC
MORAN, WILLIAM E., JR.
PANTZER, KURT F:
REINHARDT, G. FREDERICK
SCHMIDT, ADOLPH W.
STEPHENS, CLAUDE O.
TROWBRIDGE,
MORGAN, CECIL
PARK, RICHARD L.
REISCHAUER, EDWIN O.
SCHNEIDER, HUBERT A.
STERLING, J. E. WALLACE
ALEXANDER B.
MORGAN, GEORGE A.
PARKER, BARRETT
REITZEL, WILLIAM
SCHORR, DANIEL L.
STEVENSON, WILLIAM E.
TURKEVICH, JOHN
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
PARKHURST, GEORGE L.
RENNIE, WESLEY F.
SCHUYLER, GEN. C. V.R.
STEWART,
TUTHILL, JOHN W.
MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
PARSONS, JOHN C.
RESOR, STANLEY R.
SCHWAB, WILLIAM B.
ROBERT BURGESS
TYLER, WILLIAM R.
MORLEY, JAMES WILLIAM
PATTERSON, GARDNER
RESTON, JAMES B.
SCHWEBEL, STEPHEN M.
STILWELL,
MORSE, DAVID A.
PAUL, NORMAN S.
REUSS, HENRY S.
SEABORG, GLENN T.
MAJ. GEN. RICHARD G.
U
MORTON, LOUIS
PAUL, ROLAND A.
REUTHER, WALTER
SEDWITZ, WALTER J.
STONE, DONALD C.
ULMER, ALFRED C., JR.
MUDD, HENRY T.
PEARDON, THOMAS P.
REVELLE, ROGER
SEYMOUR, FORREST W.
STOWE, LELAND
UPGREN, ARTHUR R.
MULLER, STEVEN
PELL, CLAIBORNE
REYNOLDS, LLOYD G.
SHARP, WALTER R.
STRAUS, ROBERT KENNETH
SHEARER, WARREN W.
STRAUS, R. PETER
V
MUNGER, EDWIN S.
PELZER, KARL J.
RICH, JOHN H., JR.
MUNOZ MARIN, LUIS
PENFIELD, JAMES K.
RICHARDSON, DAVID B.
SHERBERT, PAUL C.
STRAUSS, LEWIS L.
VALENTINE, ALAN
MUNRO, DANA G.
PERERA, Gumo R.
RICHARDSON, DORSEY
SHIELDS, MURRAY
STRAUSZ-HUPE, ROBERT
VANCLEVE, THOMAS C.
MURPHY, FRANKLIN D.
PERETZ, DON
RIDGWAY,
SHISHKIN, BORIS
STRAYER, JOSEPH R.
VAN DUSEN,
MURPHY, ROBERT
PERKINS, COURTLAND D.
GEN. MATTHEW B.
SHUSTER, GEORGE N.
STRUBLE, ADM. A. D.
REV. HENRY P.
MYERS, DENYS P.
PERKINS, JAMES A.
RIEFLER, WINFIELD W.
SIMPSON, JOHN L.
SULZBERGER, C.L.
VAN SLYCK, DEFOREST
PETERSEN, HOWARD C.
RIES, HANS A.
SISCO, JOSEPH J.
SUNDERLAND, THOMAS E.
VAN STIRUM, JOHN
PHILLIPS, WILLIAM
RIPLEY, S. DILLON, 2ND
SKOLNIKOFF, EUGENE B.
SURREY,
VERNON, RAYMOND
N
PHLEGER, HERMAN
RIVKIN, ARNOLD
SLOCUM, JOHN J.
WALTER STERLING
VINER, JACOB
NASON, JOHN W.
PIEROTTI, ROLAND
ROBERTS, HENRY L.
SMITH, GERARD C.
SWEETSER, ARTHUR
VON MEHREN, ROBERT B.
NATHAN, ROBERT R.
PIQUET, HOWARD S.
ROGERS, JAMES GRAFTON
SMITH, HORACE H.
SWIHART, JAMES W.
NELSON, FRED M.
PLANK, JOHN N.
ROMUALDI, SERAFINO
SYMINGTON, W. STUART
W
SMITH, ROBERT W.
NELSON, MERLIN E.
PLATIG, E. RAYMOND
ROOSEVELT, KERMIT
SMITHIES, ARTHUR
WAIT, RICHARD
NEUSTADT, RICHARD E.
PLIMPTON, CALVIN H.
ROOSEVELT, NICHOLAS
SMYTH, HENRY DEW.
WALKER, GEORGE R.
NEWMAN, RICHARD T.
POGUE, L. WELCH
ROSENGARTEN,
SNYDER, RICHARD C.
T
WALLICH, HENRY C.
NICHOLS, CALVIN J.
POLETTI, CHARLES
ADOLPH G., JR.
SOLBERT, PETER O. A.
TALBOT, PHILLIPS
WALMSLEY, WALTER N.
NITZE, PAUL H.
POLK, WILLIAM R.
Ross, ROGER
SOLOMON, ANTHONY M.
TANHAM, GEORGE K.
WANGER, WALTER
83
82
NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS
BY-LAWS
WARD,
WRIGHT, THEODORE P.
REAR ADM. CHESTER
WYZANSKI,
I
The membership shall be divided into resident, non-resident, and
WARREN, SHIELDS
CHARLES E., JR.
honorary. All members shall be elected by the Board of Directors.
WASHBURN, ABBOTT M.
Resident members shall be limited to seven hundred and fifty in num-
WASSON, R. GORDON
Y
ber, who shall have their residences or places of business within fifty
WATKINS, RALPH J.
YARMOLINSKY, ADAM
miles of City Hall, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and
WEAVER, GEORGE L. P.
YNTEMA, THEODORE O..
who shall be citizens of the U.S.A.
WEEKS, EDWARD
YOUNG, T. CUYLER
Non-resident members shall be limited to seven hundred and fifty,
WEISSKOPF, VICTOR F.
YUDKIN,
who shall neither reside nor have places of business within the said
WELLBORN,
BRIG. GEN. RICHARD A.
specified distance from City Hall, and who shall be citizens of the U.S.A.
VICE ADM. CHARLES, JR.
The Board of Directors in its discretion may elect honorary members.
WELLS, HERMAN B.
Z
A member may be dropped or suspended from membership by a unani-
WEST, ROBERT LEROY
ZIMMERMAN, EDWIN M.
mous vote of those attending a regular meeting of the Board of Directors
WESTMORELAND,
at which a quorum is present and voting, for any violation of the By-Laws
GEN. W. C.
or rules or regulations of the Board of Directors, or for any conduct even
WESTPHAL, ALBERT C.F.
though not in actual violation of a By-Law or rule which, in the opinion
WHEELER, OLIVER P.
of the Board, is nevertheless prejudicial to the best interests, reputation
WHIPPLE,
and proper functioning of the Council.
BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM
WHITAKER, ARTHUR P.
II
It is an express condition of membership in the Council, to which con-
WHITE, GILBERT F.
dition every member accedes by virtue of his membership, that unless
WHITEFORD, WILLIAM K.
expressly stated by an Officer of the Council to the contrary, all proceed-
WHITING, ALLEN S.
ings at the Council's afternoon and dinner meetings as well as study and
WIESNER, JEROME B.
discussion groups are confidential; and any disclosure or publication of
WILBUR, C. MARTIN
statements made at such meetings or attribution to the Council of in-
WILCOX, FRANCIS O.
formation, even though otherwise available, is contrary to the best inter-
WILCOX, ROBERT B.
ests of the Council and may be regarded by the Board of Directors in its
WILD, PAYSON S.
sole discretion as ground for termination or suspension of membership
WILDE, FRAZAR B.
pursuant to Article I of the By-Laws.
WILDS, WALTER W.
III
Resident members shall pay $250 per annum, except that those mem-
WILLIAMS, HAYDN
bers who are thirty-five years of age and under shall pay $125 per annum,
WILLIAMS, JOHN H.
and that those who are regular members of the faculty of any university
WILLITS, JOSEPH H.
or college, who are in the public service, who are on the staff of voluntary
WILMERDING, LUCIUS, JR.
organizations or who are accredited writers or newspapermen may pay
WILSON, CARROLL L.
$50 per annum (any member not in one of these occupations who had not
WIMPFHEIMER, JACQUES
reached forty-one years of age on May 27, 1964, and who had thus been
WINTON, DAVID J.
entitled to pay at the rate of $100 per annum shall be entitled to continue
WOHL, ELMER P.
to pay at this rate until he shall have attained the age of forty-one); non-
WOHLSTETTER, ALBERT
resident members shall pay $75 per annum, except that those members
WOLF, CHARLES, JR.
who are regular members of the faculty of any university or college, or
WOLFERS, ARNOLD
accredited writers or newspapermen, may pay $20 per annum. All dues
Wood, HARLESTON R.
shall be paid semi-annually-in equal installments-in advance. Default
WOODBRIDGE, HENRY S.
in the payment of any dues for a period of sixty days shall be equivalent
WRIGHT, ADM. JERAULD
to resignation.
WRIGHT, QUINCY
85
84
BY-LAWS
BY-LAWS
IV
There shall be a Board of not more than twenty-four Directors, divided
into three classes, each class to serve for three-year terms and until their
be responsible for the initiation of research projects. The Committee on
successors are elected. At each annual meeting of the Council, Directors
Studies shall submit a report of its activities in writing at the annual
shall be elected to replace the outgoing class. The Board shall have power
meeting of the Board.
to fill any vacancy in its own body. A Director absent from meetings of
VII
The officers of the corporation shall be a Chairman of the Board, a
the Board for a period of two successive years shall be considered to have
President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, and a Treasurer, who
submitted his resignation from the Board.
shall be elected annually by the Board of Directors.
The Chairman of the Board, or in his absence the President, shall
V
The Annual General Meeting of the Council shall be held in New York
preside at all meetings of the Board of Directors.
City on the second Wednesday of October. At this meeting the Board of
The President may call meetings of the Board, and shall have general
Directors shall present a report of the activities of the Council during the
executive direction of the corporation.
past year; candidates shall be elected to fill vacancies on the Board of
The Vice-Presidents in order of seniority shall discharge the duties of
Directors of the Council in accordance with regulations laid down by the
the President in his absence, and shall perform such other duties as from
Board; and such other business shall be considered as shall be brought
time to time shall be assigned them by the Board of Directors.
forward by or with the sanction of the Board of Directors, and which
The Treasurer shall have custody of the funds of the corporation.
shall have been stated in the notice convening the meeting.
The Secretary shall conduct the correspondence of the corporation, and
A majority of the members of the Council shall constitute a quorum for
shall keep its records.
the transaction of business. Members may be represented by proxy.
VIII
The Board shall annually appoint an Executive Director and such other
staff officers as in its judgment may be required. The Board shall fix the
VI
The Board shall constitute such committees of the Council as may from
compensation and assign the duties of these officers.
time to time be required, including an Executive Committee, a Finance
IX
The funds of the corporation and of Foreign Affairs shall be invested
and Budget Committee, a Membership Committee, a Nominating Com-
by the Finance and Budget Committee or shall be deposited with trust
mittee, and a Committee on Studies.
companies or banking institutions designated by either the Board of Di-
The Finance and Budget Committee shall be composed of five members
rectors or the Finance and Budget Committee. Disbursements shall be
of the Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. It
made only upon checks or vouchers approved by the Treasurer or the
shall have general supervision of the investment of the funds of the
Comptroller and any one of the following: the Executive Director, the
Council and of its financial affairs, and shall present the budget at the
Editor of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Executive Director, or the Associate
annual meeting of the Board. In connection with the preparation of the
Executive Director; and in the absence of both the Treasurer and the
budget, it shall be the duty of this Committee to allocate charges to the
Comptroller, by any two of these officers.
various departments and activities of the Council.
The Membership Committee shall be composed of five members of the
X
The annual meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held after the
Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. The Com-
annual meeting of the Council and not later than November 15th. One-
mittee shall have power to co-opt not to exceed four additional members
third of the number of Directors authorized in By-Law IV, above, shall
who need not necessarily be members of the Board of Directors. It shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any regular or
report at each regular meeting of the Board on all nominations for
special meeting of the Board of Directors.
membership.
XI
These By-Laws may be amended at any meeting of the Board of Direc-
The Nominating Committee shall be composed of three members of the
Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. It shall
tors, provided notice of the proposed amendment shall have been given
at a previous meeting or circulated in writing to the members of the
present names for directors, officers and committee members.
Board not less than five days in advance.
The Committee on Studies shall be composed of five members of the
Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. The Com-
mittee shall have power to co-opt not to exceed five additional members,
who need not necessarily be members of the Board of Directors. All sug-
gestions relating to matters of research shall be referred to it, and it shall
86
87
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
-FROM FOUNDING TO PRESENT
Original Board of Directors
Honorary Presidents
ELIHU Roor
1921-1937
HENRY M. WRISTON
1964
ISAIAH BOWMAN
1921-1950
DAVID F. HOUSTON
1921-1927
ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE
1921-1928
OTTo H. KAHN
1921-1934
Chairman of the Board
PAUL D. CRAVATH
1921-1940
FRANK L. POLK
1921-1943
R. C. LEFFINGWELL
1946-1953
JOHN J. McCLoY
1953
JOHN W. DAVIS
1921-1955
WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON
1921-1966
NORMAN H. DAVIS
1921-1944
WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD
1921-1927
Presidents
STEPHEN P. DUGGAN
1921-1950
PAUL M. WARBURG
1921-1932
JOHN W. DAVIS
1921-1933
ALLEN W. DULLES
1946-1950
JOHN H. FINLEY
1921-1929
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM
1921-1936
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM
1933-1936
HENRY M. WRISTON
1951-1964
EDWIN F. GAY
1921-1945
NORMAN H. DAVIS
1936-1944
GRAYSON KIRK
1964
R. C. LEFFINGWELL
1944-1946
Succeeding Directors According to Beginning of Term of Office
ALLEN W. DULLES
1927
WINFIELD W. RIEFLER
1945-1950
Vice Presidents
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
1949
PAUL D. CRAVATH
1921-1933
ISAIAH BOWMAN
1945-1949
R. C. LEFFINGWELL
1927-1960
GEORGE O. MAY
1927-1953
W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
1950-1955
NORMAN H. DAVIS
1933-1936
HENRY M. WRISTON
1950-1951
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
1950
EDWIN F. GAY
1933-1940
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
1950
WESLEY C. MITCHELL
1927-1934
OWEN D. YOUNG
1927-1940
GRAYSON KIRK
1950
FRANK L. POLK
1940-1943
FRANK ALTSCHUL
1951
R. C. LEFFINGWELL
DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS
1951-1958
1943-1944
DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS
1951-1952
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG 1928
ALLEN W. DULLES
CHARLES P. HOWLAND
1929-1931
ELLIOTT V. BELL*
1953-1966
1944-1946
WALTER LIPPMANN
1932-1937
JOHN J. McCtor
1953
CLARENCE M. WOOLLEY
1932-1935
ARTHUR H. DEAN
1955
Secretaries
FRANK ALTSCHUL
1934
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
1955
EDWIN F. GAY
1921-1933
FRANK ALTSCHUL
1944
PHILIP C. JESSUP
1934-1942
ADLAI E. STEVENSON
1958-1962
ALLEN W. DULLES
1933-1944
HAROLD W. DODDS
1935-1943
WILLIAM C. FOSTER
1959
LEON FRASER
1936-1945
CARYL P. HASKINS
1961
Treasurers
JOHN H. WILLIAMS*
1937-1964
JAMES A. PERKINS
1963
EDWIN F. GAY
1921-1933
DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS
1951-1952
LEWIS W. DOUGLAS*
1940-1964
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
1964
WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON
1933-1942
ELLIOTT V. BELL
1952-1964
EDWARD WARNER
1940-1945
GABRIEL HAUGE
1964
CLARENCE E. HUNTER
1942-1951
GABRIEL HAUGE
1964
CLARENCE E. HUNTER
1942-1953
CARROLL L. WILSON
1964
MYRON C. TAYLOR
1943-1959
DOUGLAS DILLON
1965
Executive Directors
HENRY M. WRISTON*
1943-1967
HENRY R. LABOUISSE
1965
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
1922-1928
WALTER H. MALLORY
1927-1959
THOMAS K. FINLETTER*
1944-1967
ROBERT V. ROOSA
1966
MALCOLM W. DAVIS
1925-1927
GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.
1953
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
1945
LUCIAN W. PYE
1966
WALTER H. MALLORY
1945
ALFRED C. NEAL
1967
PHILIP D. REED
1945
BILL D. MOYERS
1967
*Directors Emeriti
88
89
PUBLICATIONS
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, by Samuel B. Griffith, 2nd (1967).
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (quarterly), edited by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.
THE CONFLICTED RELATIONSHIP: The West and the Transformation of Asia,
THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932 and
Africa and Latin America, by Theodore Geiger (1967).
1933, by Walter Lippmann and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-1935, 1936,
TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: The Rich and the Poor Nations, by John A.
1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O.
Pincus (1967).
Scroggs; for 1945-1947, 1947-1948 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell;
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: Objectives and Alterna-
for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954, by Richard P. Stebbins; for
tives, by Bela Balassa (1967).
1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957, 1958, *1959, *1960, *1961,
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, by Robert Blum and A. Doak
*1962 and *1963, by Richard P. Stebbins; for *1964, by Jules Davids; for
Barnett (1966).
1965 and 1966, by Richard P. Stebbins.
THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Lea Williams
DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (annual). Volume for 1952 edited
(1966).
by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins; for 1953 and 1954, edited
*THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS, by Harold van B. Cleveland
by Peter V. Curl; for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959, edited by Paul E.
(1966).
Zinner; for 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, edited by Richard P. Stebbins;
*EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIES: From the Veto to the Crisis, by Miriam
for 1964, edited by Jules Davids; for 1965 and 1966, edited by Richard P.
Camps (1966).
Stebbins.
*THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH NATIONS: The Development Assistance Committee
POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD (annual), edited by Walter H.
and the Common Aid Effort, by Seymour J. Rubin (1966).
Mallory.
ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY: Is It Possible? by John O. Coppock (1966).
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY, Volume for 1919-1932, by William L. Langer
*TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: The Path of Negotiation, by Arthur H. Dean
and Hamiton Fish Armstrong; for 1932-1942, by Robert G. Woolbert;
(1966).
for 1942-1952, by Henry L. Roberts; for 1952-1962, by Henry L. Roberts.
*POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: Views from Six Continents, edited by A. M. Halpern
*FROM ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC: A New Interocean Canal, by Immanuel J. Klette
(1966).
(1967).
*COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE, by Alexander
*AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: (Revised Edition), by William A. Hance
Eckstein (1966).
(1967).
*THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA, by A. T. Steele (1966).
ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: The Case of the OECD, by Henry G. Aubrey
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, by W. Phillips Davison (1965).
(1967).
*MONETARY REFORM FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, by Robert V. Roosa (1965).
*Trro's SEPARATE ROAD: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics, by John C.
*AFRICAN BATTLELINE: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa, by Walde
Campbell (1967).
mar A. Nielsen (1965).
*U.S. TRADE POLICY: New Legislation for the Next Round, by John W. Evans
NATO IN TRANSITION: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance, by Timothy W
(1967).
Stanley (1965).
BETWEEN Two WORLDS: Policy, Press and Public Opinion in Asian-American
ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: For a Broader Conception of America's Role ir
Relations, by John Hohenberg (1967).
Europe, by Zbigniew Bzrezinski (1965).
*THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy, by
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, by Henry
James Reston (1967).
A. Kissinger (1956).
*REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism, by
*Also in paperback edition.
David W. Wainhouse (1965).
90
91
PUBLICATIONS
*THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN TRADE: A Study in Atlantic Eco-
*THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Political Implications of Economic
nomics and Policy, by Randall Hinshaw (1964).
Development (Revised Edition), by Eugene Staley (1961).
*THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY: Educational and Cultural Affairs,
*SPAIN AND DEFENSE OF THE WEST: Ally and Liability, by Arthur P. Whitaker
by Philip H. Coombs (1964).
(1961).
AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Fifth Edition), com-
*SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY: Its Implications for United States
piled by Donald Wasson (1964).
Policy, by Richard N. Adams, John P. Gillin, Allan R. Holmberg, Oscar
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD TRADE, by Warren S. Hunsberger
Lewis, Richard W. Patch, and Charles W. Wagley (1961).
(1964).
*FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEXT PHASE: The 1960s (Revised Edition), by Thomas K.
*THE DOLLAR IN WORLD AFFAIRS: An Essay in International Financial Policy,
Finletter (1960).
by Henry G. Aubrey (1964).
*DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: Problems of American Policy (Revised Edition),
*THESE ARE THE COMMITTEES, by Joseph Barber (1964).
by John C. Campbell (1960).
*ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD, by George F. Kennan (1964).
*COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA: Challenge to American Policy, by A. Doak Barnett
*FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Edward S. Mason (1964).
(1960).
*THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS, by Caryl P. Haskins (1964).
*FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY: DeGaulle's Heritage and Prospects, by Edgar S.
*AFRICA: A Foreign Affairs Reader, edited by Philip W. Quigg (1964).
Furniss, Jr. (1960).
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: Problems of Partnership, by George
THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959, by William
Diebold, Jr. (1959).
E. Taylor (1964).
*SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES POLICY, by Russell H. Fifield (1963).
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped
Countries, by Joseph S. Berliner (1958).
*UNESCO: ASSESSMENT AND PROMISE, by George N. Shuster (1963).
RAW MATERIALS: A Study of American Policy, by Percy W. Bidwell (1958).
THE PEACEFUL AToM IN FOREIGN POLICY, by Arnold Kramish (1963).
NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, by Ben T. Moore (1958).
*THE ARABS AND THE WORLD: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy, by Charles D.
INDIA AND AMERICA: A Study of Their Relations, by Phillips Talbot and S. L.
Cremeans (1963).
Poplai (1958).
*TOWARD AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, by Christian A. Herter (1963).
*NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Henry A. Kissinger (1957).
*THE SOVIET UNION, 1922-1962: A Foreign Affairs Reader, edited by Philip E.
CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS, by Douglas H. K. Lee
Mosely (1963).
(1957).
*THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: American Experience in Southeast Asia, by
WHAT THE TARIFF MEANS TO AMERICAN INDUSTRIES, by Percy W. Bidwell (1956).
John D. Montgomery (1962).
UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICY, by Wytze Gorter (1956).
SPEARHEADS OF DEMOCRACY: Labor in the Developing Countries, by George C.
*RUSSIA AND AMERICA: Dangers and Prospects, by Henry L. Roberts (1956).
Lodge (1962).
STERLING: Its Meaning in World Finance, by Judd Polk (1956).
*LATIN AMERICA: Diplomacy and Reality, by Adolf A. Berle (1962).
JAPANESE AND AMERICANS: A Century of Cultural Relations, by Robert S.
*THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS, by John
Schwantes (1955).
C. Dreier (1962).
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: Problems in Cooperation, by Henry L. Roberts
*THE UNITED NATIONS: Structure for Peace, by Ernest A. Gross (1962).
and Paul A. Wilson (1953).
THE LONG POLAR WATCH: Canada and the Defense of North America, by
THE UNDECLARED WAR 1940-1941: The World Crisis and American Foreign
Melvin Conant (1962).
Policy, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason (1953).
*ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Revised Edition), by Edwin Lieuwen
*THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION 1937-1940: The World Crisis and American
(1961).
Foreign Policy, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason (1952).
92
93
FORM OF BEQUEST
I bequeath to the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
a New York non-profit corporation, the sum of
a. for its general purposes (or)
b. to become part of a general
endowment fund.
Bequests to the Council on Foreign Relations are deductible for tax purposes.
SECOND CONFERENCE
ON
THE
UNITED NATIONS
OF 1975
Sponsored by the STANLEY FOUNDATION
SECOND CONFERENCE
ON
THE
UNITED NATIONS
OF 1975
July 24-28, 1967
Bürgenstock, Switzerland
Sponsored by the STANLEY FOUNDATION
1
FOREWORD
meeting those needs, to determine its competence to discharge them,
and finally to recommend steps which would enhance the effec-
By C. Maxwell Stanley
tiveness of the United Nations.
We came forward with proposals to increase the effectiveness of
The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 is a
the United Nations. We considered several approaches which the
continuation of an examination that was started in San Francisco in
conference of two years ago did not recommend. It centered its
1965. We held a conference there on the eve of the Symbolic Session
attention on Charter revision. We considered also the better use of
of the United Nations which commemorated the twentieth anniversary
the United Nations as it is. What capabilities have the Secretariat, the
of the signing of the Charter. It was called to study the United Na-
Security Council, the General Assembly or the specialized agencies
tions' Role in the Next Decade.
that are not adequately utilized? What changes can come about by
The 1965 conference came to one specific conclusion and made
an evolutionary process? Are Certain Charter changes desirable -
several general recommendations regarding the United Nations. The
and possible - perhaps less extensive than those proposed in the
primary conclusion was that the United Nations, while rendering
1965 conference? Two Charter changes have been made regarding
many useful and valuable services, was not equipped under its pres-
the membership of the Economic and Social Council.
ent Charter to deal effectively with the continuing arms race, the
We considered the attitudes of nations. Is the United Nations to
spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the growing danger of
be a major element of foreign policy for more countries, including
accidental war, and the pressures of population and poverty.
mine, or is it a crutch to be used when other efforts fail?
The recommendations of the 1965 conference, adopted unani-
We followed a very unique format with an unstructured conference.
mously, called for changes that could be accomplished only by
We were not there to listen to speeches. We were not there to
Charter revision. These changes were major ones, giving the United
dissect papers. We were not there to vote aye and nay on specific
Nations the ability to achieve complete and enforced disarmament in
proposals. We met as individuals, not governments. Our mission
carefully controlled stages and with effective safeguards, a perman-
was to think and brainstorm. We wanted to explore new ideas and
ent peace force, changes in the General Assembly and the Security
exchange views. We confirmed sound concepts with respect to the
Council so that the United Nations would have legislative capability,
United Nations, but we proposed some new ones. We were not con-
a strengthened International Court of Justice with systems of regional
cerned with complete agreement. Where consensus was evident, the
courts, a sizeable world development program, a reliable and ade-
rapporteur SO indicated. Otherwise he indicated opposing views. At
quate revenue system, safeguards to prevent abuse of power by such
tribution to individuals was not made in the conference statement.
a strengthened United Nations, and eligibility for all nations for mem-
My charge to the participants was: "As we approach the task, I
bership. (See page 13)
urge that we be practical, but also visionary; predictive, but also
As one looks back over two years and evaluates the proposals of
prescriptive; cautious, but with a sense of urgency; and responsible,
the 1965 conference, one can only say that they were bold and
but bold and courageous. Let US be fully aware of the differences
substantial ones. Many people would term them unrealistic. Many
separating nations. Let US be even more aware of the broad interests
would say that the United Nations was not in jeopardy, and the
and needs, the service of which will unite people if given a chance.
changes proposed were too visionary, too far down the line. Never-
May we together chart a route to a more effective United Nations.
theless, the conference considered that nothing else would succeed.
May we issue a challenge to thinking men. Thus hopefully may we
With each new crisis crowding on the heels of its predecessor,
contribute to those universal desires of men throughout this world
these two years reinforce the major conclusions of the FIRST CON-
for peace, security, and a fuller life."
FERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975: that there is urgency
and that the United Nations must be made more effective.
Our concern at the Second Conference was to look at the world's
Unexcooll Stanley
President, The Stanley Foundation
needs, to select the roles the United Nations should discharge in
3
2
STATEMENT by MEMBERS
of the
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS OF 1975
Bürgenstock, Switzerland
July 28, 1967
MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO THE SECOND CONFERENCE
We continue the work begun by the Conference on the United
Nations of 1975, held in June 1965, which called for major changes
OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975
in the United Nations to make it capable of maintaining peace and
freedom under law.
Bürgenstock, Switzerland
This is a time of growing danger and great opportunity. There
is a trend toward more centers of power in the world. The threat of
July 24 - 28, 1967
nuclear war grows as the armaments race enters a new round and
nuclear weapons spread to more nations. Too often the nations fail
to use the United Nations to solve international disputes, and rely
I am glad to see that the Stanley Foundation has organized the
instead on force and intervention. Painfully slow development and
"Second Conference on the United Nations of 1975." The subject is
rapid population growth in developing countries lead to increased
an important one, and the list of participants includes several dis-
violence and non-democratic regimes.
tinguished statesmen and students of international affairs. I have no
The United Nations is caught in a vicious circle. Lack of confidence
in the United Nations discourages its use and limits its performance.
doubt that this Conference will lead to a better understanding of the
This makes it difficult to achieve the support of nations for the
problems which the United Nations faces and the prospects for peace
basic changes in the United Nations which are necessary. Yet only
a strengthened United Nations can provide the successful perform-
and progress in the coming years. I wish the Conference every
ance which is needed to build confidence.
success.
We propose that this vicious circle be broken by taking specific
steps toward a more effective United Nations. These steps will strength-
en the ability of the United Nations to achieve its purposes. Speaking
U THANT
solely as individuals, we propose these steps:
Secretary-General of the United Nations
1.
In order to make any major progress toward general and
complete disarmament, the United Nations security system must
be strengthened so that all nations can rely on it, and means for the
just settlement of international disputes must be provided and used.
The armaments race should be stopped as soon as possible. Specific-
ally, it is in the self-interest of all nations to make realistic agree-
(Delivered personally on the Secretary-General's behalf by the Honor-
ments (including necessary safeguards) to prohibit all nuclear weapons
able Gabriel M. d'Arboussier, Executive Director of the United Nátions
tests, to limit the quantities of both nuclear and conventional weapons,
to require that all transfers of weapons from one nation to another
Institute for Training and Research, on July 25, 1967.)
5
4
be reported to and published by the United Nations and to prevent
that disputes arising under the treaty shall be determined by the
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
International Court. The judicial independence of the International
Court, free from national or other interference, must be assured by
2.
In the important field of peacekeeping, the United Nations must
all suitable means. Increased efforts to develop and codify contem-
be given the capacity to act promptly, rather than having to
porary international law are needed. All these efforts should tend to
improvise after trouble begins. All nations should be invited to
strengthen the authority of the United Nations to maintain a just
earmark and train units of their national armed forces and police
peace under law.
forces for United Nations duty when needed. United Nations cap-
ability should also be strengthened by creating a permanent United
Nations staff for peacekeeping operations and by adopting clear
7.
The critical situation of the developing countries is a grow-
ing threat to peace. This great and urgent challenge requires
but flexible rules for peacekeeping. It is further essential that agree-
a vastly expanded and dynamic effort under United Nations leader-
ment be reached as soon as possible to create a permanent United
ship to attack the problem on many fronts. The developing countries
Nations peace force, recruited by and for the United Nations and
have the primary responsibility for their own development, includ-
effectively backed by its members. In particular, the United Nations
ing the full mobilization of their human and natural resources and
needs without delay its own units to perform specialized tasks such
the economic, social and structural changes which are necessary for
as communications, logistics and police duty.
growth. But in order to allow the developing countries to assume
full responsibility for their development, it is the duty of the world
3.
The Security Council has primary responsibilities for peacekeep-
community to remove obstacles to development and promote an ex-
ing, but the General Assembly should be able to act when
panding world economy which will benefit all peoples regardless
there is no reasonable possibility of Security Council action.
of their present degree of development. Among the measures re-
quired are these: increased financial and technical assistance, both
4.
A determined effort should be made to implement Chapter
bilateral and multilateral, on terms which will encourage develop-
VII of the Charter to enable United Nations peace enforcement
ment; trade policies, including temporary trade preferences, which
action by the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee should
will enable the developing countries to build their own economies
be reactivated. Member nations should make agreements to provide
through increased exports; a serious attack on the population prob-
forces on call of the Security Council. Organization and planning for
lem, including aid to nations willing to accept it; and better coor-
effective economic sanctions under Article 41 is needed, including
dination of all United Nations development and trade programs.
creation of a staff to administer economic sanctions.
5.
Parallel to the United Nations peacekeeping activities, the United
8. It is imperative that the United Nations should move toward
universal membership. In the opinion of most but not all the
Nations and its members should make more determined and
participants, the People's Republic of China should promptly be
unrelenting efforts to find solutions to international conflicts and to
seated. The presence of France and China in disarmament negotia-
persuade the parties to accept reasonable solutions in conformity
tions is essential.
with the principles of the Charter. The conflict resolution role of the
United Nations is vitally important, and the mediation services of the
9.
A comprehensive study should be made of all factors in-
Secretary-General and his staff should be supported and expanded.
volved in granting greater authority to the United Nations
General Assembly, including the process of decision-making.
6.
All nations should voluntarily accept without reservation the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the kinds of
international disputes listed in Article 36 of the Statute. All treaties
10.
A start should be made toward giving the United Nations re-
liable sources of revenue independent of national contribu-
which do not specify other methods of settlement should provide
tions. For example, the United Nations might be authorized to col-
6
7
lect fees for the use of international communications, outer space,
and resources in or under the international seas.
Many other steps would be helpful. We stress the need for all
member nations to honor their Charter commitments and make greater
use of the United Nations to solve international problems. More re-
search is needed on the hard problems of war and peace and on the
effectiveness of existing United Nations programs.
The steps listed above can be taken by 1975 if the peoples of
the world and their governments will contribute enough leadership,
imagination and hard work.
This is a time for realism and boldness. The task of strengthen-
ing the United Nations is difficult and demanding.
We must build a more effective United Nations in the interest
of survival.
CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975 July 24-28, 1967 Bürgenstock, Switzerland
Left to right: Manton (Director); D. Stanley (Rapporteur); Boyd, Great Britain; Morse, U.S.A.; d'Arboussier, Senegal;
Burns, Canada; Bhutto, Pakistan; Swai, Tanzania; Romulo, Philippines; C. M. Stanley (Chairman); Rossides, Cyprus; Fraser,
U.S.A.; Haekkerup, Denmark; Nehru, India; Nielsen, Norway; Stambuk, Yugoslavia; Mayobre, Venezuela. Not pictured
Rahnema, Iran.
8
9
PARTICIPANTS
NOTE ON THE SEMINAR
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975
July 24-28, 1967
In preparation for the Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NA-
Bürgenstock, Switzerland
TIONS OF 1975, a seminar was held in May. It discussed and re-
The Honorable Gabriel M. d'Arboussier of Senegal, Executive Director
fined background papers for the Conference. The subjects and authors
of United Nations Institute for Training and Research
of these papers are listed on the following page. These papers, com-
The Honorable Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan
piled under the title THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's, were
Mr. Andrew Boyd of Great Britain, Foreign Affairs Editor of "The
distributed in advance to the Bürgenstock participants.
Economist"
General E. L. M. Burns, Adviser to the Government of Canada on
The participants agreed that study on the United Naions in the
Disarmament
1970's must be made within the framework of a projection of pres-
The Honorable Donald M. Fraser, Foreign Affairs Committee, House
ent trends in the international system. These trends indicate a less-
of Representatives, U.S.A.
ening of the dominant position of the two super-powers which have
The Honorable Per Haekkerup, Leader of the Social Democratic Party
controlled the world scene since World War II. The seminar partici-
(Government Party) in the Danish Parliament and former For-
pants did not agree as to whether this trend was decentralization,
eign Minister of Denmark
polycentrism or multipolarism. They did agree that the trend would
The Honorable Jose A. Mayobre of Venezuela, Minister of Mines and
create greater need and opportunity for the United Nations to be
Petroleum
more useful in coping with international political, economic, and
The Honorable F. Bradford Morse, Foreign Affairs Committee, House
social problems.
of Representatives, U.S.A.
His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India to the United States
The seminar participants judged that future United Nations political
The Honorable Sivert A. Nielsen, President of Bergens Privatbank, for-
operations will be more varied than the past. Pragmatic attempts at
mer Ambassador of Norway to the United Nations
solutions will be the pattern in the political field. Growth will not
His Excellency Dr. Majid Rahnema, Ambassador of Iran to Switzer-
be systematic but sporadic until national interests of the members
land and Vice President of the United Nations Economic and
demand a more ordered development of the United Nations polit-
Social Council, 1967
ical arena.
General Carlos P. Romulo, President, University of the Philippines,
and President of Fourth Session of the United Nations General
In the economic and social areas there seem to be greater prospects
Assembly
for more orderly growth of United Nations involvement. The United
His Excellency Zenon Rossides, Ambassador of Cyprus to the United
Nations is now playing a crucial role in the formulation of develop-
Nations
ment plans in many of the developing countries. The United Na-
The Honorable Zdenko Stambuk of Yugoslavia, Chief Editor of "Re-
tions development program could act as a catalytic agent around
view of International Affairs" and Member of the Federal
which and through which the progressive forces within the develop-
Parliament
ing countries can mobilize their power and influence.
The Honorable A. Z. N. Swai of Tanzania, Minister of Economic Af-
fairs and Development Planning
Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman, President of the Stanley Foundation
Mr. David M. Stanley, Rapporteur, lowa State Senator and Candidate
for the United States Senate
Dr. Thomas B. Manton, Conference Director, Executive Director of the
Stanley Foundation
11
10
Statement by members of
FIRST CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975
THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's
Compiled by Dr. Thomas B. Manton
June 19, 1965
Foreword
By C. Maxwell Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation
Twenty years after the signing of the United Nations Charter in
San Francisco, we have come together as friends of the United Na-
The United Nations and the International System
tions who are deeply concerned about its future. Our conference in-
By Dr. Oran R. Young, Assistant Professor of Politics
cludes citizens of 13 nations from four continents, who speak solely
as individuals.
Princeton University
United Nations Political Action in the 1970's
We have studied the changes in the UN which are needed in the
By Dr. Urban Whitaker, Professor of International Relations
next ten years, rather than concentrate on immediate crises or uto-
San Francisco State College
pion proposals.
Arms Control and the United Nations in the 1970's
We have unanimously reached the following conclusions, and have
By Dr. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Associate Professor of
also discussed and noted many detailed steps which will be necessary
Government, Boston University
to implement these conclusions.
Development Assistance and the United Nations
Need for a Strengthened United Nations. The UN is rendering many
By Mr. William 1. Jones, Former Editor of
useful and valuable services. However, under its present Charter
DEVELOPMENT DIGEST
the UN is not equipped to deal effectively with the continuing arm-
aments race, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the
The View from the Third World
growing danger of accidental war, and the pressures of population
By Dr. Noel J. Brown, Political Affairs Officer
and poverty.
United Nations
Peace and freedom depend upon law and law enforcement. No
The View from Africa
city or nation could survive without laws, police, and courts. The
By Dr. James O. C. Jonah, Political Affairs Officer
UN and the world community cannot survive without enforceable
United Nations
world law, world police, and world courts for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
The View from Asia
By Mr. Ejaz Husain, Special Correspondent
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
Unless drastic changes are made in the UN Charter, there is grave
danger that the UN may not survive the next ten years. Like an in-
dividual who delays needed surgery until his condition becomes
(These papers are available from The Stanley
desperate, the world has delayed the major operation which is es-
Foundation upon request.)
sential to save the UN. If the surgery waits too long, the patient
will die.
12
13
THE STANLEY FOUNDATION
The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 at
Bürgenstock was sponsored by The Stanley Foundation. A primary
interést of The Foundation is to further study and research in the
field of foreign relations toward the achievement of a secure peace
with freedom.
In addition to the First and Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED
NATIONS OF 1975, The Foundation sponsors annually a discussion on
United States foreign policy through the STRATEGY FOR PEACE CON-
FERENCE. This "Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace" explores
off-the-record and in depth urgent foreign policy concerns of the
United States. It brings together over one hundred leaders from the
professions, business, universities and government to exchange ideas
and make recommendations. The Strategy for Peace Conference at-
tracts individuals from a wide spectrum of opinion and belief.
For three years The Foundation has sponsored the GRENVILLE CLARK
EDITORIAL PAGE AWARD, given in "recognition to the publication of
vigorous and thought-provoking editorial opinion in articles and car-
toons on international affairs as to the effect of law and order on
the achievement of a secure peace in freedom." A new and related
project is the UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR FOR EDITORS AND ED-
ITORIAL WRITERS to be held in November, 1967, in New York. This
Seminar will bring together a limited number of editorial page writ-
ers from throughout the United States to learn first-hand about the
work of the United Nations.
The Stanley Foundation is a tax exempt organization, and contri-
butions to it are deductible for income tax purposes. The Foundation
welcomes contributions to its several programs.
THE STANLEY FOUNDATION
Stanley Building, Muscatine, lowa 52761
-16
Necessary Changes in the United Nations. The UN must be greatly
and a clear reservation to the member states and their peoples of
strengthened to provide these essential requirements for peace:
all powers not granted to the UN under the revised Charter.
1. Complete and enforced disarmament of all nations, in carefully
8. Eligibility of all nations for membership in the United Nations.
controlled stages. When the disarmament process is complete, each
Disarmament will not be possible unless all nations are subject to
nation would retain only strictly limited and lightly armed police
the enforcement system.
forces for internal order. Significant progress in disarmament will not
be possible without parallel progress toward the provision of inter-
Charter Review Imperative. Because most of these changes require
national security through the United Nations.
Charter revision, a United Nations Charter Review Conference must
be called at the earliest possible date under Article 109 of the Char-
2. A permanent UN peace force to maintain international peace
ter, to adopt the necessary Charter amendments for submission to the
and security; and an effective UN inspection system to supervise dis-
member nations.
armament.
Human Rights. The draft UN covenants on human rights, including
3. A General Assembly empowered to adopt binding rules and
necessary implementation provisions, should promptly be adopted by
regulations in respect to the peace-keeping functions of the strength-
the General Assembly and ratified by all nations.
ened UN and implementing the disarmament plan; a revised Security
Council, responsible to the General Assembly; and, in the opinion of
Appeal for Action. We appeal to the peoples and governments of
most but not all of the conferees, a revised voting system appropri-
the world to face the present crisis and act while there is still time.
ate to the strengthened UN, including abolition of the present "veto
Every citizen and every nation should press for a Charter Review
power" in the Security Council.
Conference until the demand becomes irresistible. The smaller nations
now have the opportunity to lead the way. National governments,
4. A strengthened International Court of Justice empowered to
private organizations, and individuals should immediately begin in-
interpret the UN Charter and decide all international legal disputes;
tensive study of UN Charter revision and formulation of proposed
a system of regional courts; and other tribunals and agencies to settle
changes.
international disputes which are not capable of decision upon legal
principles. Membership in the UN should carry with it the accept-
Nothing Less Will Succeed. We confine our recommendations to
ance of the jurisdiction of the International Court in all international
the minimum essentials for peace. Nothing less than enforceable
disputes.
world law can succeed. The strengthened United Nations which we
advocate will not change the nature of man or solve all the world's
5. A world development program. As a matter of human survival,
problems, but it will keep the human race from committing suicide.
the world must use a substantially larger share of its resources to
promote the economic and social advancement of the less-developed
It Must Be Donel The difficulties of building enforceable world law
nations. Expansion and better coordination of existing development
are great, but the hazards of a world without enforceable law are
programs are urgently needed. A major part of the savings from
greater. We have heard all the reasons why it cannot be done, but
disarmament should be used for a large-scale development program
we know that it must be done. We speak for an idea whose time
administered by the UN.
has come.
6. A reliable and adequate revenue system for the strengthened UN.
7. Safeguards to prevent abuse of power by the strengthened UN,
14
15
DoD GEN-20
DA Pam 360-518
NAVPERS 15214
AFP 190-3-3
NAVMC 2608
Know Your Enemy:
THE VIET CONG
STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENT
ENITED STATES 114 ANIMA
ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
TRACHES:
Viet Cong Means Trouble
Literally translated, the phrase Viet Cong (VC)
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam,
means Vietnamese Communist, and those who are Viet
or NFLSVN). To its deluded followers the Front
Cong employ the whole Communist arsenal of deceit
is the government they serve-but to the vast majority
and violence. A Viet Cong is a man, woman, or child—
of South Vietnamese it is an instrument of terror and
a tough fighter, with words or weapons, for what he is
oppression manipulated by the Communists of North
taught to call the "liberation" of South Vietnam-the
Vietnam.
Republic of Vietnam. Viet Cong also applies to the
The Viet Cong, the Communist "Liberation Army"
military and civilian components of the "Front" (the
within the Republic of Vietnam, has expanded its
2
3
numbers enormously, despite increasingly heavy casual-
ties. Its so-called main force has grown from about
10,000 men in 1960 to over 65,000. Several regiments
REDICHINA
of the North Vietnamese Army have been sent by
Hanoi into South Vietnam as part of the Communist
buildup of forces in the south. As befits "regulars,"
many are armed with late-model imported weapons and
NORTH
wear uniforms, helmets of wicker or steel, and even
scarves for unit identification. From isolated companies
VIETNAM
their formations have grown to battalions and regiments.
Dien Blen Phu
HANOI
The strength of the Viet Cong guerrillas has not
Halphong
increased as rapidly. The estimated more than 100,000
Nam Dinh
Gulf of
guerrillas and militia, mostly based in the vicinity of
LUANG PRABANG
Nich Binh
Tonkin
their home villages and hamlets, are essential to the
success of the main force and to the whole Viet Cong
effort. Better armed and trained than before, the
irregulars still wear the "calico noir," the traditional
black pajamas of the Vietnamese peasant (worn also
VIENTIANE
by the regulars as fatigue uniforms). They guide,
support, reinforce, and provide recruits for the "libera-
Dong Hol
tion" movement. They also make possible the rule of
DEMARCATION LINE
the Communist Party in the countryside, enforcing the
Quang Tri
dictates of the local puppet Front organizations.
O
There are substantial areas in which the Front is the
Hue
THAILAND
Da Nang
only effective government. It operates schools and
REPUBLIC
hospitals, clothing factories and arsenals. Millions of
Vietnamese support the Front out of friendship or fear,
OF
most often the latter. Due largely to the militia and the
VIETNAM
secret agents of the Party, an estimated one-fourth of
Pleiku
the people of South Vietnam pay taxes to the Front,
Qui Nhon
even though they may also pay taxes to the legitimate
Government. This is an impressive record for a shadow
government.
CAMBODIA
Ban Me Thuot
Initial Resources
Nho Trang
What makes the Viet Cong and their way of warfare
Da Lat
so significant is that they started with so little in material
PHNOM RENH
Phan Rang
assets, although they had a belief in a well-proven
Tay Ninh
&
doctrine (of subversion), a thorough knowledge of its
Bien Hoa
tactics, and the moral support of their fellow Com-
SAIGON
munists throughout the world. They had no industrial
Can The
Vung Tou (Cop St. Jacques)
capacity. They had no substantial armed forces, only a
few thousand experienced guerrillas, and perhaps
100,000 supporters-mostly in remote areas seldom
Khanh Hung
visited by Government representatives.
On the other hand, the Viet Cong had hidden stores
of weapons and ammunition left over from the war
against the French. They had many trained and dedi-
cated Communists to provide leadership, and access to
the resources of the Communist regime in the North.
4
Vietnam and the Vietnamese
Vietnam as a whole is very nearly ideal for the
to hard work, meager rations, and an absolute mini-
type of warfare the Viet Cong is waging. On one
mum of material comforts. Their philosophy is
side of this long, narrow strip of mountains, plateau,
essentially fatalistic and undemanding. They do not
river delta, and seacoast is the South China Sea.
like war or soldiers, yet Vietnam has known far
On the other are the rugged, undeveloped, and
more war than peace in the 2,000-plus years of its
largely mountainous frontiers with three other
history. Vietnamese are known in Southeast Asia
countries-Communist China, Laos, and Cambodia.
as energetic and aggressive, capable of great sacrifice
Substantial areas of the interior are covered with
for an ideal (even the false ideals of communism).
These qualities make them excellent fighting men.
dense tropical rain forest, giving ideal concealment to
The Vietnamese people-North and South, Com-
secret installations and troop movements. Much of
munist and non-Communist-share the same basic
the coastline is swamp or mountain, mangrove or for-
racial background. For this reason it is extremely
est, equally useful to those who would overthrow a
difficult to identify an enemy unless he is in uni-
government. The delta produces an abundance of rice
form or shooting at you. Moreover, this makes
and is crisscrossed by myriad canals and streams.
recognition of friends (or non-enemies) most im-
Modern ground transport must use the single coastal
portant, for mistaking one for an enemy makes him,
railroad or the limited basic network of highways,
his relatives, and his friends your enemies. The
all very easy to sabotage or ambush.
child on the water buffalo may be a Viet Cong spy-
The people are equally well suited to this kind
but it is better to treat him as a friend in case of
of war-most of them are rice farmers, accustomed
doubt.
5
9
{LI
Finally, the Vietnamese Communists-North and
South-were united in their determination to use what-
ever means were necessary to bring the whole country
under Communist domination. Without massive U.S.
and free world support, South Vietnam might already
have been added to the list of lost countries.
As in conventional wars, each side expanded its
armed might after the war had started. When it be-
came obvious that the Republic of Vietnam in the
South could not be taken without military force, Hanoi
began sending a growing stream of infiltrators, arms,
and supplies into South Vietnam by land and sea. The
infiltrators were trained in the North to assume key
positions of leadership. Communist China and other
Communist countries have supplied weapons and ammu-
nition, primarily through North Vietnam, the so-called
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).
The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF),
whose fight for freedom we support, have increased
their numbers and improved their equipment at a pace
far greater than have the Viet Cong. However, while
the Front was experiencing its greatest growth, in
1963 and 1964, the free Government of South Vietnam
was undergoing great political stress and frequent
changes of administration. These factors have undoubt-
edly facilitated the growth of the Front, but they have
not stunted the growth of the RVNAF, nor shaken
their determination to resist Communist aggression and
preserve the freedom and independence of the country.
The success of an unconventional army and a shadow
government build up by Communist direction, largely
from the people and the resources of a state they seek
to destroy, is cause for concern. We must understand
the reasons for this, and learn how to defeat such at-
tacks, or they will be repeated again and again. The
Viet Cong fighting man is not "10 feet tall," either
figuratively or literally, being actually on the average
only five feet three inches in height. Nor is he an
incredible fanatic-many thousands of Viet Cong desert
or go over to the side of the Government every year.
His effectiveness cannot be attributed entirely to the
outside support he receives-the RVNAF have received
far more assistance from abroad.
Yet the Viet Cong has developed into a kind of
fighting man who is capable of waging an unconven-
tional war under conditions that would seem hopeless
to the average orthodox soldier. To understand the Viet
Cong and his way of warfare one must first know some-
thing of his country and his background.
7
The Growth of the Viet Cong
Roughly 40 years ago, the Communists under Ho
Chi Minh, now president of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam in the North, began planning their cam-
paign to take over Southeast Asia. Their first step
in Vietnam was to seek to seize the leadership in the
opposition to French rule. Vietnam was a part of
French Indochina at the time. When the Japanese
moved in after the fall of France in 1940, dominating
the French and occupying all of Indochina, Communists
and nationalists alike believed that the time for Viet-
namese independence was near. Under Communist
leadership and later Communist control, a coalition
independence force was formed. This was the Viet
Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam),
which launched an eight-year struggle against the
French soon after they returned in 1945.
Like the later Viet Cong, the Viet Minh grew from
a modest start-but they became larger and much more
formidable than the Viet Cong are today. By mid-1954
the Viet Minh had nearly 160,000 regulars and perhaps
an equal number of militia. The French, stunned by
defeats in conventional battles such as that at Dien
Bien Phu and unable to solve the problems of the
new kind of war waged by the Viet Minh, were ready
to negotiate. At an international conference in Geneva
in the summer of 1954, presided over by representatives
of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, war-torn Viet-
nam was divided at the 17th parallel. The northern
half, controlled by Communists, became the so-called
Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the free southern
half became the independent Republic of Vietnam.
Under the terms of the armistice agreement, Com-
munists and anti-Communists were given an opportunity
to move to whichever half of the divided country they
preferred. Nearly a million from the North were able
to move south to freedom during the brief period al-
lowed. Some 90,000 people, mostly men and boys of
the Viet Minh army, or future recruits, went north.
Tens of thousands of Communists and sizable stocks
of arms and ammunition were left in the South to assure
an ultimate Communist takeover.
8
The 17th parallel was not intended to be a permanent
political, for the struggle to achieve a "political solu-
"political or territorial boundary." The delegates at
tion." Such a solution, which the Communists would
Geneva agreed on a "free general election by secret
still welcome, means replacing the strongly anti-Com-
ballot" to be held throughout Vietnam at the end of
munist Government with a controlled neutralist coali-
two years. This would allow the people to decide for
tion. Occasional assassinations and other acts of terror-
themselves their political future, and it would reunify
ism seemed necessary and proper, but initially the main
the country. The Communists in the more populous
emphasis had been on a campaign of subversion and
North, with their police state control, were confident of
propaganda to undermine the legal Government. It
winning the election. The election was not held because
is difficult to say how much their decision to act more
the South doubted the possibility of an honest vote in
vigorously and openly was influenced by the impatient
the North and because the election would not have been
Communists in the South and how much by their
held under proper international supervision.
comrades in the North who were alarmed and em-
barrassed by the obvious contrast between the prosperity
Hanoi Adopts Stronger Measures
of the South and their own impoverished dictatorship.
Viet Cong terrorism was intensified in 1958, and
After 1956 the Communists began to prepare for
by the end of that year the Viet Cong had an armed
a stronger effort in the South. This meant reorganizing
force of more than 2,000 regulars supplemented by
and expanding their personnel there, both military and
militia. In 1959 it was decided that the political struggle
9
must be aided by a major armed effort. Open warfare
In December 1960, a group of individuals claiming
began in 1960, with the overrunning of an RVNAF
to represent virtually all walks of life and all major
regimental headquarters at Trang Sup on 20 January.
ethnic and religious groups of South Vietnam met
in the forest northwest of Saigon. There they an-
Hanoi Creates a Screen
nounced the formation of the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam, a shadow government,
The Lao Dong (Communist) Party of Vietnam held
its Third Congress in Hanoi in September 1960. At-
which faithfully issued the manifestoes already decreed
tended by Party representatives from all over Vietnam,
by the Communist Party Congress in September.
the Congress acted to establish the appearance of a local
Another act of Communist deception was the crea-
rebellion in the South, while at the same time simplify-
tion of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in
ing and formalizing control of it.
the South. The object of this was to screen the extent
To give the whole Viet Cong operation the necessary
of Communist domination of the Front and make it
appearance of being a true struggle for liberation by
appear that the Front is composed of several organiza-
an oppressed people, to impart the illusion of legitimacy
tions. The original members of the PRP were all
to actions taken and about to be taken, and to represent
Communists, but qualifications for admission were made
the movement in public activities, the Communists
less strict than for the PRP's counterpart in the North,
decided to set up a "National Liberation Front."
the Lao Dong Party.
Hanoi's Political-Military Machine
The Communist regime in Hanoi directs, controls,
The Front's national central committee sets policy and
and supplies the entire Viet Cong political and military
also is responsible for planning and organization build-
effort to conquer the Republic of Vietnam. All control
ing. The next level in the Communist-dominated Front
-political and military-comes ultimately from the
hierarchy consists of the 3 interzone headquarters, which
Central Committee of North Vietnam's Lao Dong
determine agitprop (persuasion and propaganda) policy
(Communist) Party, which maps out broad strategy.
guidance and which are responsible for political indoc-
The Reunification Commission of the Northern govern-
trination and training. Under the interzone headquarters
ment controls the National Front for the Liberation of
are 7 zone headquarters, which are their sub-offices.
South Vietnam, and the Military High Command in the
Next in the Front's structure are the approximately
North is responsible for the military training of the men
30 provincial committees-its chief operating units.
who infiltrate into the South. In addition, a central
Intelligence organization in Hanoi-the Central Research
Agency-maintains an elaborate intelligence network
in South Vietnam and directs the extensive undercover
activities of the Viet Cong.
The two Communist administrative headquarters in
the South, inherited from the Viet Minh, have been
merged into the Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN). This central "brain" coordinates all Com-
munist activity in the South and all relations with the
highest Communist Party and government echelons in
North Vietnam.
In South Vietnam itself, the Communists have created
a show of legitimacy through the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam. At the national head-
quarters level, the Front has a central committee and
presidium, which take their orders from the control
Rude
is
Vat
committee of the People's Revolutional Party (PRP)-
It's
full
the Communist Party in South Vietnam.
vc.prissiver
10
These committees direct the "liberation associations"
the Communists use to spread their indoctrination and
propaganda and to gain the often-unwitting support of
the South Vietnamese people. The committees, of course,
also transmit to subordinate levels the orders sent down
from the central committee. In addition-and this
is a major role for the provincial-level Communists—
they assign military duties to the Viet Cong units
operating in their provinces.
The Front's committees and cells in South Vietnam's
districts, towns, and villages make up the largest part
of the Communist spiderweb spread like an evil shadow
over the land. In the "liberated," or Viet Cong-
dominated areas of South Vietnam, they are in the open,
free of Government interference as they carry out their
so-called political struggle, recruit and train men for
their local Viet Cong units, and carry out the military
or guerrilla tasks they are assigned.
In the areas controlled by the legitimate Government,
of course, the Communists and grass-level front members
must remain under cover and work in secret in their
efforts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam.
Since the Communists are using the National Libera-
tion Front to camouflage their anti-Government activi-
ties, their People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party
organization parallels the Front structure, and that
action, that the army is united, and that the people
Communist apparatus keeps a tight control on the Front
are closely united with the army.
from the top-level central committee to at least the
To insure continuous political orientation of the army
provincial level.
and maintain political control over the army's officer
The military arm is completely integrated into the
Front structure from the very top to the lowest level,
corps, political officers, or commissars, are assigned to
all Viet Cong units. They are the political watchdogs
with military representatives found at all organizational
and indoctrinators of the Front's Liberation Army.
levels of the Front. Since the Vietnamese Communists
consider the war in South Vietnam to be primarily a
The Viet Cong, the so-called Liberation Army, in
South Vietnam is about one half of the total Communist
political struggle, the primary duty of the Viet Cong
armed forces in all Vietnam. The other half comprises
military forces is to support that political aggression
being conducted by the Communists in the name of the
North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
National Movement to Liberate South Vietnam.
The Viet Cong forces consist of two basic elements,
A 64-page Front indoctrination booklet on the or-
the paramilitary, and the full military. The paramilitary
ganization of its armed forces declared that organization
Viet Cong is generally a local civilian who is a part-
must conform to political lines; that the Liberation Army
time soldier or guerrilla, whose military duties do not
(Viet Cong) is a fighting army and therefore must be
take him far from his community. In addition, he is
highly centralized with inferiors obeying superiors-
not highly indoctrinated politically.
there must be discipline; and that the army's political
The Front's name for its paramilitary force was
tasks are fundamental, maintaining unity between cadres
originally the Popular Army. However, since this force
and men, and between the army and the people.
is engaged almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare, the
The booklet pointed out that these three principles
name has been expanded to Guerrilla Popular Army
insure that military action is subordinated to political
(GPA). At the hamlet level, the GPA unit is either
11
a cell, a half-squad, or a squad-3, 6, or 12 men. The
GPA unit at the village level (a village consists of
village defender. He has little training and is armed
several hamlets), is the platoon, made up of 3 or 4
with scanty or primitive weapons. The second is the
squads-36 to 48 men. There are two basic classes
combat guerrilla, who is younger and better trained and
of GPA members. The first is the village guerrilla,
armed. He is frequently called upon to aid guerrilla
frequently an older man, who is generally used as a
mobile columns or full military units in their operations
in the vicinity of his village or hamlet. The combat
12
formed, and rely primarily on guerrilla tactics. Since
they are dependent for much of their logistical support
on local populations, their commanders can't simply for-
ward supply requisitions to a depot. Instead, when they
need weapons, ammunition, or other military hardware
they attack a Government base or unit and try to cap-
ture what they want.
The Regional Forces, also called Territorials or Re-
gionals, are units established by Front district commit-
tees, which provide their leadership and direct their
activities. A Regional Force operates pretty much in one
general area.
The elite units of the so-called Liberation Army are
the battalions of the Main Force. They have acquired
the name of "Hard Hats" because of the metal or
fiberboard helmets that distinguish them from the Re-
gional Forces and the paramilitary guerrillas. These
battalions are directed by the Front committees at the
provincial level and range farther afield in their mili-
tary operations than do the units of the Regional Forces.
As members of the Main Force, the "Hard Hat" Viet
Cong don't have to perform non-military work, such as
producing food or transporting supplies. By the end of
1965 there were over 65,000 of these Hard Hats fight-
ing in South Vietnam.
This organization seems cumbersome and the chain
of command indirect and slow, in contrast to orthodox
military practice of establishing a direct military chain
of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet
Cong's political and military structure conforms to the
classic Communist pattern of strong central authority
at the top and operations at lower level decentralized,
with Communist Party control over the government at
all levels, and political control over the military at all
levels.
The Cadre-How He Operates
Although few, except those immediately affected,
realized the war was on in the late 1950's and early
1960's, those who were the victims of the savage cam-
paigns of terrorism, assassination, and kidnapping in
rural Vietnam were well aware of it. So too were the
thousands of cadres-trained, dedicated, hard-core Com-
munist leaders and military officers-who fanned out in
guerrilla units also serve as manpower pools for the
the countryside to win support for the insurgent forces.
Viet Cong's full military units.
A cadre's role can be described as a combination priest,
The Viet Cong's full military element also is divided
policeman, and propagandist. He is the Party and the
into two types-the Regional Forces and the Main
Front in the countryside hamlets and villages. How they
Force. They are not set up or operated like orthodox
operate is graphically described by one of them, Captain
army units. Their units are self-contained, not uni-
Lam.
13
"We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a
wedge between the people and their government-to
make the people hate their government, and the Ameri-
cans. Our second objective is to get people to join our
(VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them
to increase their production of food, and give the in-
crease to us.
"Our cadre go into each village to study the situa-
tion and the people. Once they know the people and
their problems, our cadre can explain how these prob-
lems are the fault of the government, and how the
people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In
this way we make the people hate their government, and
can destroy the government in their village. Then we
guide them in forming their own government (under
our control) and in organizing their own armed forces,
which of course are our auxiliaries.
"Of course we cannot do this right away in those
villages and districts where the government is strong.
There we concentrate on educating people politically
to hate their government, and on forming both open
and secret organizations which can support us, or em-
barrass the government. Every little bit helps. Any
voluntary action of the people, from organized protests
to simply slowing down on work ordered by the gov-
ernment, is a clear gain for us.
"Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe,
very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism,
and the emotions of each individual according to his
situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a per-
son is arrested by government forces we try to contact
him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him,
arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him.
Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village
so that the people may see how we are suffering for
them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every
possible way to create hatred for the government and
the Americans, to separate the people from the gov-
ernment and to make them see that we are their only
hope."
Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more
emphasis is placed on terror and murder ("destroying
imple
Suple
the village government") and less on persuasion. Or-
ganizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum
effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still em-
phasized as essential to Viet Cong success.
14
The Diversity of the Viet Cong
The nearly half million men and women who make
ordered to go to help liberate the South. After nearly
up the civil and military components of the Viet Cong
six months' travelling I reached my destination and
army and its shadow government, the National Front,
became at first a political member of the Province Com-
are as diverse and divergent in origin and in motiva-
mittee and later a District Commissar [Secretary of the
tion as those of any army and government anywhere.
District Committee]. We were very successful in or-
Perhaps the most important thing that sets them apart
ganizing and expanding the Viet Cong, but after two
from their fellow Vietnamese is the way in which they
years, and the change in governments, I began to see
are incessantly told, and caused to repeat, the reasons
the real difference between the way the people live in
for everything they do, including supporting the Viet
the North and the way they would live in the South if
Cong. The best illustrations of their diversity, and their
it were not for this war. I lost my faith in the Com-
common knowledge, is found in some of their own state-
munist claim that we were fighting for the people, and
ments.
decided that the only right thing was to join the forces
Consider the story of Captain Lam. One of the real
of the Republic of Vietnam, so I did."
"hard core," the backbone of the movement, he took
By way of contrast, consider the words of Sergeant
advantage of the Government's Chieu Hoi program
Vo Anh Long, a 31-year-old squad leader in a main
which welcomes the return to loyalty of those misled
force battalion: "I was a farmer until May 1960. The
by the Communists.
Government controlled my village, but the Viet Cong
"I left my village in Central Vietnam in 1947, when
used to come at night and collect taxes. They would
I was eighteen years old, to join the Viet Minh. Two
tell us, and we believed them, that they were good men
years later, because they said that all leaders in the
who loved and wanted to defend the poor people like
struggle against the French should, I joined the Com-
us, that they struggled and sacrificed even their lives
munist Party. As its Political Officer, I went North
to give rights to the poor people.
with my company in 1954, after the division of the
"Finally they told me, and five other young men,
country.
that if we stayed in the village the Government would
"In 1960, I was promoted to Senior Captain, and
take us away for the army, but that if we came with
VIET CONG OATH OF HONOR
1. 1 swear 1 am prepared to sacrifice all for Vietnam. I will
6. 1 swear if taken by the enemy I will not reveal any in-
fight to my last breath against imperialism, colonialism, Viet-
formation even under inhuman forture. I will remain faithful
namese traitors, and aggression in order to make Vietnam
to the Revolution and not be bribed by the enemy.
independent, democratic and united.
7. I swear in the name of unity to love my friends in my
2. 1 swear to obey absolutely all orders from my command-
unit as myself, to work cooperatively with them in combat and
ers, executing them wholeheartedly, promptly, and accurately.
at all other times,
3. I swear to fight firmly for the people without complaint
8. I swear to maintain and protect my weapons, ensuring
and without becoming discouraged even if life is hard or don-
they are never damaged or captured by the enemy.
gerous. 1 will go forward in combat without fear, will never
retreat regardless of suffering involved.
9. I swear that in my relationships with the people I will
4. I swear to learn to fight better and shape myself into a
do three things and eschew three things. I will respect, pro-
true revolutionary soldier battling the Invading American im-
tect, and help the people; [ will not steal from, threaten, nor
perialists and their servants, seeking to make Vietnam demo-
inconvenience the people. 1 will do all things to win their
cratic, wealthy, and strong.
confidence.
5. 1 swear to preserve organizational secrecy, and to keep
10. I swear to indulge in self-criticism, to be a model sol-
secret my unit's plans, the name of my unit commander, and
dier of the Revolution, and never to harm either the Liberation
all secrets of other revolutionary units.
Army or Vietnam.
15
them for a week of training we could become local
"I am from North Vietnam. I was an officer of the
guerrillas and defend our village. We went with them,
PAVN. I was ordered to come to the South, so of
but then they told me that because of my ability I must
course I came."
go to a long training course. We marched for months
"I was a village guerrilla. The Viet Cong hamlet
to reach the training camp, where I studied for six
chief told me I must watch for the Government troops.
months and then was graduated as a squad leader.
One night the district force came and attacked the
"I soon realized that the life of a Viet Cong was
Government outpost. I had to help them. After the
hard, but the cadre kept emphasizing that we were
battle they gave me a gun, and said that now I must
living gloriously, that we must be prepared to die
fight to save my life. When a RVNAF company came
splendidly. Although I knew that I had been fooled,
I tried to hide but they found me."
I accepted this. We studied and had self-criticism ses-
sions almost every day. Each of us belonged to a
Viet Cong Discipline
three-man cell, so that every man was watched by two
Scholar or street urchin, professional officer or farm
others.
boy, they all tell the same story of relentless indoctrina-
"I stayed with them for four years, fighting in many
tion-of discipline playing on every human emotion,
battles. Eventually I could no longer stand being away
constantly applied. The soldier is required to memorize
from my family, and so I ran away and joined the
basic codes of conduct (a 10-point oath of honor and a
Government side."
12-point code of discipline) which put him in the po-
A few more statements further illustrate the diver-
sition of a hero, a patriot, a friend, and protector of the
sity.
people. He is never allowed to forget this role. Per-
"My uncle told me that I must join the district
haps the most effective reminder is his unit's daily
force, because otherwise the Viet Cong might burn down
indoctrination and self-criticism session. In this, his
my mother's house."
indoctrination is continued and reinforced, his sup-
"I was farming in the North, but last year when
posed motives are reviewed and discussed by the group,
I was 20 the PAVN [People's Army of (North) Viet-
and he is told by his leader what his future actions will
nam] drafted me, gave me six weeks' training, asked
be. After this, he must explain his reactions, and he
my group if it would not help to liberate the South,
must publicly confess and criticize his own shortcomings
and marched us down here. Now I am in a transporta-
and weaknesses in thought and deed.
tion unit and have to carry 32 kilos of rice for 12 miles
After every fight there is an almost immediate cri-
every day. I want to go home."
tique, with no holds barred, which gives every man a
"I did not want to become a soldier but the Viet
chance to let off steam. It also lets the cadre know
Cong came and took me. Then I was ashamed to desert,
what his men are thinking. This contributes to the
because it would disgrace my comrades in the cell. But
effectiveness of the constant surveillance program,
I used to get drunk and sleep too late, and after I was
maintained primarily through the cell system (usually
criticized several times and did not reform I was ban-
three-man) which is applied to every possible unit.
ished from my unit."
Appeals to the mind and the heart are the principal
VIET CONG CODE OF DISCIPLINE
1. 1 will obey the orders from my superiors under all cir-
8. I will follow the slogan: All things of the people and for
cumstances.
the people.
2. I will never take anything from the people, not even a
9. [ will keep unit secrets absolutely and will never disclose
needle or thread.
information even to closest friends or relatives.
3. 1 will not put group property to my own use.
10. I will encourage the people to struggle and support the
4. I will return that which is borrowed, make restitution for
Revolution.
things damaged.
5. I will be polite to people, respect and love them.
11. I will be alert to spies and will report all suspicious
6. I will be fair and just in buying and selling.
persons to my superiors.
7. When staying in people's houses I will treat them as I
12. I will remain close to the people and maintain their
would my own house.
affection and love.
16
way in which the Viet Cong seeks to control its members.
extra duty, and brief confinement do not bring reform,
Regular units employ standard forms of military cour-
the penalty is often discharge, in terms that make the
tesy, and strict obedience is always expected, but em-
man feel a traitor and an outcast from the human race.
phasis is placed on making compliance with regulations
The fear of corporal punishment or death seems to be
appear to be voluntary. For those who fail in their
of less importance although either may be visited on
duty, if such normal punishments as public criticism,
the individual or his relatives.
at on toide u", a
Say Have Riders
17
Tactical Planning and Doctrine
It has been said that the Viet Cong soldier probably
shows the almost incredible effort to make sure that
is told the reason for everything that he does more fre-
everyone "gets the word" and performs his assigned
quently and in greater detail than any other soldier in
duties.
the world. Almost certainly he is required to explain
"After studying the proposal, I report it to the head
the reasons for his actions more than any other soldier.
of the Provincial Military Affairs Committee. He then
Every proposed action is discussed from all angles before
studies it from all points of view, considering especially
it is taken-and by everyone concerned except the
the political effects, and the relative capabilities of our
targets and the innocent bystanders. Concerning the
forces and those of the RVNAF. If he approves of
bystanders, one Viet Cong commented on the bombing
the proposed operation he presents it to the Secretary
of the U. S. Embassy, "If a few people get killed from
of the Provincial Committee of the Party. The Secre-
a blast it is a risk of the war.
The Front is the
tary studies it and if he thinks it sound he calls a meet-
benefactor of all the people."
ing of the whole Party Committee to study, discuss, and
Captain Lam's description of what happens after
perhaps approve the proposal.
action against an RVNAF outpost is recommended
"Once the proposal is approved by the Party Com-
18
Friedem)
Junes
haps directs some additional action. The Party Com-
mittee will approve the attack only if all conditions-
political, military, and logistic-appear favorable.
"After this is accomplished all units begin prac-
ticing for the attack, either on a sandtable or an actual
stake-and-string replica of the target. This practice will
take from five days to a month, depending on the
difficulty of the target, until every man knows just what
he is supposed to do, how he is supposed to do it, and
when. Every detail of the action will be planned out,
including when and where the main force units will
meet the local force and militia units. The militia are
always necessary to guide the troops and to provide
laborers to carry supplies, to carry off the booty and
our dead, if any. We always try to carry away all our
dead, to give them proper burial, which will comfort
their families and strengthen the morale of the rest."
Such detailed preparation seems fantastic, but account
after account bears it out. Any planned operation,
whether an attack, an ambush, or a raid on a hamlet, is
planned and rehearsed in great detail-and then often
called off at the last moment when some factor has
changed.
Viet Cong tactical doctrine is explicit. It is sum-
marized in four words: Four Fast, One Slow. This
means Fast Advance, Fast Assault, Fast Clearance of
the Battlefield, and Fast Withdrawal-all based on Slow
Sargon
Preparation.
There it little that is new or unusual in Viet Cong
mittee, the Military Affairs Committee divides the pre-
tactical doctrine, once the basic principle of careful,
liminary tasks among its three staffs. The Military Staff
thorough preparation for any contingency, followed by
sends a reconnaissance unit to study the objective from
swift action, is grasped. Attacks on strongpoints almost
a military point of view, and to prepare a sandtable
always feature maximum use of explosives on a primary
mock-up. The Political Staff sends a cadre to contact
and a secondary objective, usually mutually supporting,
the civilians in the area, to learn their reaction to the
and a careful deployment of forces to intercept or
[proposed] attack. It also studies the morale of the
ambush any reinforcements that may be brought in. In
troops to see if they are mentally and emotionally pre-
several recent battles there have been indications of
pared. If they are not, the Political Staff must take the
deliberate efforts to entice and ambush helicopter-borne
necessary measures to prepare them. The Rear Services
troops.
[logistics] Staff finds out if the civilians can furnish
In the past the Viet Cong have usually sought to
the necessary food and labor, including that needed for
avoid defensive combat unless they had the battlefield
removal of the dead and of any booty.
so organized that it was essentially an ambush. Never-
"When all this is done, the Military Affairs Commit-
theless they carefully prepare for defense, with alternate
tee holds another meeting. This will be attended by
and switch positions, in case they do decide to make
the leaders of all the units that will be involved in the
a stand. Frequently these positions are incorporated
attack. If the majority of the Committee believes that
into existing dikes separating rice fields so that em-
the attack should be made, they report to another meet-
placements seem to be merely breaks in the walls, and
ing of the Provincial Party Committee, which again
even trenches look like canals. Where the water level
reviews the proposed problem and the solution and per-
will permit, especially in the so-called secret base areas,
19
elaborate tunnels are often constructed, both for cover
seems to produce the fastest results, but it eventually
and for concealment from ground and air forces. Like
reacts against those who use it unless they succeed in
the Japanese in World War II, the Viet Cong are tire-
seizing complete power. Today, in many areas, the
less diggers.
Viet Cong are faced with the administrative problems
Controlled land mines, buried in highways and
that afflict any government in time of war-and are
detonated when a Government target is over them,
losing voluntary support as a result.
have long been a favorite and an economical Viet Cong
The Viet Cong have, from the beginning, made
method of destroying or at least discouraging their
every effort to secure the support of members of the
opponents. Occasionally nonmilitary targets are mined,
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as well as the sup-
usually by mistake or for some specific political or
port of the civilians. Generally similar tactics have
psychological purpose, such as warning uncooperative
been used, emphasizing always the benefits to the in-
civilians. Homemade booby traps, ranging from simple
dividual and the high moral and patriotic worth of
deadfalls and "spike-boards" to explosive foot-mines
such a shift in allegiance. "Serve your country against
are often used in preparing for a battle or an ambush,
the American imperialists," they say. "Don't be fooled
being placed in the covered areas the ambushees would
because the Americans are more clever than the French;
naturally seek.
the Americans' motives are the same, but they use you as
Like the elaborate trench-works often seen, the hun-
puppets."
dreds of booby traps around "liberated," meaning Viet-
The general preference for the "soft-sell" does not
Cong-controlled, villages have some value if a Viet
keep the Communists from killing, often by torture,
Cong unit decides to fight there. Their most important
whole garrisons of small posts they overwhelm when it
function, really, is to implicate the civilians in anti-
seems appropriate to punish determined resistance or
Government actions. Government forces are likely to
to frighten others in the area. Not infrequently one
treat them as Viet Cong. The villagers fully anticipate
or two leaders will be brutally murdered as an example
this, so they feel forced to support the Viet Cong as
to the others. The dependents of the men may meet the
their only hope. Secondarily, the trenches and the dug-
same fate. Threats of reprisals against families are some-
outs do provide protection for the civilians if the com-
times used as well.
munity is bombed or shelled by Government forces.
Within the last 6 years the Viet Cong's Binh Van
Even though these attacks are provoked by the Viet
program-"proselyting," as they call it-has become a
Cong, the people are often grateful to these same
major program. A favored practice is the use of girls
provocateurs for "helping us to protect ourselves."
and women, speaking as sisters or mothers, to serenade
The Viet Cong's emphasis on carefully planned, dis-
small garrisons, calling to them to save their precious
cussed, and rehearsed actions has its disadvantages. If
lives for their families' sake, and imploring them to
such an action fails, if losses are heavier than expected
have mercy on civilians. None of these programs has
or not in proportion to benefits achieved, there is a
had noticeable success. Homesickness has been a major
corresponding drop in morale and combat effectiveness.
cause of desertion in the RVNAF, and this has plagued
An unexpected serious attack by Republic of Vietnam
the Viet Cong as well.
forces, especially when the resistance is unsuccessful,
Prisoners, to the Viet Cong, are objects to be ex-
indicates poor planning by Viet Cong leaders and seri-
ploited, primarily for political and psychological pur-
ously impairs effectiveness for weeks or months, longer
poses. Thus, prisoners are often held-and treated as
than the actual damage inflicted would warrant. Only
well as could be expected by the standards of an Asian
a quick, successful counteraction can overcome this
guerrilla army-for two or three months' reeducation
effect.
and then, if not notoriously anti-Communist or brutal,
Viet Cong "Persuasion"
released. There have been instances in which American
Much is said about the Viet Cong use of terror, which
prisoners were held for some six months, exhibited in
seems to be increasing. This is natural as the pace of the
villages and hamlets, put under pressure to get them
war steps up and support requirements grow faster than
to sign documents that could be used for worldwide
voluntary contributions. Taxes have been raised re-
propaganda, and then released. One American prisoner
peatedly in some areas. "Draftees" must fill in as volun-
was reported executed in June 1965 in reprisal for the
tary recruiting proves inadequate. Terror-punishment
execution of a Viet Cong terrorist.
20
Viet Cong Capabilities and Liabilities
In little more than five years the Viet Cong armed
Vietnam by land and sea, as well as 8,000 to 10,000
forces have grown from an essentially guerrilla army
North Vietnamese soldiers in the year 1964 alone.
to one that includes regiments of uniformed, well-
The Communist buildup in the South is continuing.
equipped, highly foot-mobile regulars capable of engag-
As Viet Cong resources and capabilities have grown,
ing in conventional operations of limited duration. Con-
so have their liabilities. They have been forced to draft
currently, their civil organization has grown from a
teenagers directly into their regular units. They have
mere shadow to one of considerable substance, which
felt obliged to redouble their rates of taxation and in-
in some provinces collects almost four times as much
crease their other demands on the civilians in areas
taxes as does the Republic of South Vietnam. The
under their influence. Logistics requirements for food
Communist Party, under its cover name of the People's
as well as weapons have greatly increased. Even regular
Revolutionary Party, has expanded the control it ex-
units spent much of their time in producing their own
ercises on behalf of North Vietnam-the so-called
food until 1964, a practice which increased air sur-
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Substantial quantities
veillance may render unprofitable.
of portable war materials have been brought into South
Most significant, and most dangerous for both sides,
21
the Viet Cong pretense of being truly a South Vietnam
fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-
"people's army" is rapidly being destroyed by the
nam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal
introduction on a growing scale of North Vietnamese
is to conquer the South, to defeat American power and
forces and equipment-and by their own stepped-up
to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism."
actions as well. If this effort to achieve a quick victory
The Viet Cong is a tough enemy, but no tougher
fails, as our increasing support of the free Vietnamese
than his opponents. He is not a superman, nor is he
is intended to assure, they say they are quite prepared to
invincible. It is impossible to predict how long it
continue for 10 or 20 years if necessary and possible.
The war in Vietnam "is a different kind of war,"
will take, but the Republic of Vietnam and the United
said President Johnson on July 28, 1965. "There are
States are committed to stopping his aggression.
no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some
Our military effort in Vietnam is an essential element
citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable
in achieving the objectives of freedom, peace, and
grievances, have joined in the attack on their own Gov-
progress in that war-torn country which has fought
ernment. But we must not let this mask the central
so long and valiantly for those goals.
22
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington
March 8, 1966
KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE VIET CONG (DoD Gen-20)-
This official Department of Defense publication is for the use of
personnel in the military Services.
By Order of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force:
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Official:
Chief of Staff.
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.
B. J. SEMMES, JR.,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Personnel.
J. P. McCONNELL,
General, U.S. Air Force,
Official:
Chief of Staff.
R. J. PUGH,
Colonel, USAF,
Director of Administrative Services.
H. W. BUSE, JR.,
Lt. General, U.S. Marine Corps.
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and
Programs).
Distribution:
Army: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-4 requirement for TROOP TOPICS.
Air Force: X: One for every six active duty military members.
Marine Corps: MARCORPS: Table 4, plus 7000-140 (5)
7130/7150/7352/7587 (1)
23
Victure anime lought
tiper Be Phur
# U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966 0-206-305
BLUEPRINT FOR
AGGRESSION
THE 'PEOPLE'S WAR'
Armed Forces Information and Education
Department of Defense
FOREWORD
Time has not dulled the message of Lin Piao's article, "Long Live the Victory
of People's War," which was published in Peking Review on 3 September 1965.
Lin Piao, Vice Premier and Minister of Defense of Communist China, wrote his
article ostensibly commemorating the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in
World War II. Actually, it sums up and reaffirms Red Chinese strategy for Com-
munist conquest of the free world.
This article is considered a significant statement of Red Chinese policy and is
based on the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.
Abhorrent as these ideas may be, we ignore them at our own peril. Members of the
U.S. Armed Forces especially need to know what Lin Piao said, to see how he has
distorted U.S. aims and policies, and to comprehend the long-range plan for Com-
munist domination of the world.
This pamphlet includes a digest of Lin Piao's article, followed by an analysis
of the article by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance. The full text of the
Lin Piao article is available at your Armed Forces library under the title, Red
Chinese Blueprint (DoD GEN-17).
We would not ignore the buzz of a rattlesnake!
We must not ignore the roar
of the dragon!
2
Long Live
the Victory of the
People's War
THIS IS THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST
BATTLE PLAN
This is a condensation of the 18,000-word manifesto
as expounded by Lin Piao, Vice Chairman of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and
Communist China's Vice Premier and Minister of
Defense, in September 1965.
All peoples suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression,
People's War Is the Road to Victory
unite! Hold aloft the banner of people's war and fight for
the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democ-
How did China, weak and semi-colonial, defeat Japan, a
racy, and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people
powerful imperialist country? By a people's war led by the
of the world!
Communist Party of China, Comrade Mao has explained.
Mao pointed out that the war, a long, protracted war,
would pass through three stages: the strategic defensive, the
War and Violence Are Essential
strategic stalemate, and the strategic offensive. The pro-
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Com-
tracted war was also to be a process of mobilizing, organizing,
rade Mao Tse-tung has declared. The seizure of state power
and arming the people. It was only by mobilizing the entire
by armed force, he clearly pointed out, is the central task
people to fight a people's war that the struggle could con-
and the highest form of proletarian revolution.
tinue and Japanese aggression be defeated.
We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffer-
ing to the people. But the sacrifice of a small number of
The Strategy and Tactics of People's War
people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole
During the war against Japan, Mao developed his strategy
nations and even for the whole of mankind. War can temper
of the encirclement of the cities from revolutionary bases in
people and push history forward. In this sense war is a great
the countryside. While the Russian October Revolution be-
school.
gan with armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the
The Soviet leaders have tried to revise these Marxist-
countryside, the Chinese revolution succeeded through the
Leninist principles. They peddle a line called "peaceful
surrounding of the cities from the rural areas.
co-existence." They claim that if people compete peacefully
Mao's strategy is tried and true. It can be applied today
the oppressed will be liberated and a world without weapons
by the oppressed peoples of the world. If North America
and wars will come into being. Rubbish! The oppressed
and Western Europe can be considered "the cities of the
peoples and countries which have won independence might
world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America make up "the
just as well lay down their arms and place themselves at the
rural areas." And the cause of world revolution today hinges
on the struggle of the "rural" Asian, African, and Latin
mercy of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys!
American people against the "imperialism" of the "cities."
3
Simultaneous struggles by different peoples against U.S.
U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to
imperialism can reinforce each other in a worldwide tide of
intimidate people. But nuclear weapons cannot be used
opposition. When the people in a country are awakened and
lightly. And if the U.S. were to use them again, it would
armed they can overthrow the reactionary rule. And we
Communists who have won a people's war are duty bound
become isolated in the extreme and would expose its own
to help others in their revolutions.
people to the same threat.
Using the tactics of guerrilla warfare, we mobilize and
Moreover, no matter how modern his weapons and equip-
expand the people's army, weakening the enemy. Whenever
ment may be, the imperialist cannot defeat an indomitable
we gain a clear superiority of forces we switch to a mobile
warfare. In either tactic, the goal of the people's army is
people fighting at close quarters with courage and the spirit
complete annihilation of the enemy. "Injuring all of a man's
of sacrifice.
fingers is not as effective as chopping off one," Mao has
pointed out, "and routing ten divisions is not as effective as
The Soviet revisionists worry that a single spark might
annihilating one of them."
touch off a world nuclear conflagration. But has a single
You rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly con-
one of the wars of national liberation in the years since World
scious revolutionary people an army based solidly on the
War II developed into a world war? No!
politics of the proletarian revolution. You fight your way
and we fight our way - land mine warfare, tunnel warfare,
Yet the Soviet leadership and the U.S. imperialists are
sabotage warfare. We fight when we can win and move
working together to extinguish the revolutionary flames of
away when we can't. When you want to fight us, we don't
people's war. They cannot do it. There are bound to be
let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to
people's wars and the revolutionaries of the world will
fight you, we wipe you out!
sweep aside everything that stands in their way!
The Politics of People's War
Vietnam Is a Test Case
In fighting imperialism, the Communist Party must lead
the masses in a United Front, rallying the patriotic-
The struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggres-
Communist and non-Communist alike — to the support of
sion is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the
national and anti-imperialist causes. Within the Front, and
world against U.S. aggression. No matter what U.S. imperial-
within the people's army, our Party maintains political
ism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people
independence. We of the Party lead the people in the
will support the Vietnamese people until every single one of
tortuous national-democratic struggle against imperialism
the U.S. aggressors is driven out of Vietnam. The U.S.
and its lackeys. Thus the way is paved for the socialist
leaders are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will
revolution of the proletariat which must logically follow.
lead to a chain reaction. But the more they expand the
war, the greater will be the chain reaction and the more
Imperialists and Revisionists
disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the
Cannot Prevent the People's War
world will see still more clearly that U.S. imperialism can be
"Imperialists and reactionaries are paper tigers," Comrade
defeated and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they
Mao has assured us. Though we must take full account of
can do too.
the enemy's capabilities if we are to wage people's war, we
need not hesitate.
Long live the victory of people's war!
So ends Communist China's blueprint for aggression
as expounded by Lin Piao, deputy to Red China's Mao
Tse-tung.
4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
on LIN PIAO
DOCTRINE
Lin Piao sees a major crisis in human
found bit of irony; that the Communists
intent is that his brand of communism
society in the second half of the 20th
in their ultimate view of history are al-
should eventually surround, encircle, and
century; he sees it taking place on the
most insufferably dogmatic and doctri-
finally cut off and defeat Western Europe
perimeter of the industrialized world -
naire. But in their efforts to manipulate
and the United States.
in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America.
that history, they are almost incredibly
But we disagree that that is going to
I think we can agree on that.
pragmatic and practical.
happen. Our defenses are strong, and we
Let us examine why.
What, then, is our answer to the Com-
remain alert and ready for whatever the
We can begin by reminding ourselves
munist manifesto of Mao Tse-tung, as
future may bring. But more important is
that the Communist mind is a curious
written by Lin Piao?
the fact that the free nations of the world
combination of ideological rigidity - and
First, our answer is that we agree that
offer a better future for the individual,
tactical suppleness.
the "focus" of the challenge lies, at the
and a peaceful path to that future.
The Communist mind is, at one and
moment, in Vietnam.
Finally, we agree with Mao that just as
the same time, philosophically closed
But the Government of Vietnam and
there are cities and countryside within
and pragmatically open.
the United States will not be defeated by
nations, so the world at large in its
In the past half century we have wit-
Communist aggression from the North.
current uneven rate of technological ad-
nessed an imaginative display of aggres-
We will continue our support of the
vance can be viewed as a series of
sive Communist tactics.
people of South Vietnam until a just and
industrialized centers, surrounded by a
The goal has always been the same:
reasonable settlement is reached-whether
less-developed countryside.
political domination. But the path to that
by agreement at a conference table or by
But we disagree that the historical proc-
goal has often switched direction.
a cessation of the aggression, as in
ess suggests that the global countryside
In our own lifetime, Communist tactics
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Greece.
will storm these centers, and put them to
have ranged through a broad and brutal
Secondly, we agree with Mao that the
the torch of Communist insurgency.
spectrum: everything from outright occu-
lands arching across the southern half of
On the contrary, we believe that the
pation by the Red Army in Eastern
the globe Asia, Africa, and Latin
historical process will be precisely the re-
Europe
through conventional aggres-
America are to play a decisive role in
verse; that the industrialized centers-
sion in Korea
to the guerrilla opera-
the future of humanity.
the fortunate nations of the world will
tions in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines,
But we disagree that their role is to be
and now in Vietnam.
increasingly seek to bring to the country-
hapless victims of Communist externally
side to the poorer nations of the world
Communist tactics have sometimes fo-
directed so-called "wars of national libera-
the very assistance and skill that will
mented revolutions, and at other times
tion." On the contrary, we believe that
have captured those initiated by others.
help these nations to close the poverty-
these nations desire to remain fully and
Communist tactics have learned to be
gap. And the rich nations will do this by
freely themselves- uncoerced by subver-
measures that will share talents and re-
as much at home with legal means, as
sion stage-managed and supplied from
sources by measures that will increase
with illegal means; with sophisticated
without. We believe that these nations
the self-confidence and self-reliance of the
societies, as with primitive ones; with right-
desire, with wisdom and dignity, to seek
poorer nations to achieve their own self-
ist dictators, as with leftist demagogues.
their own national progress in their own
sustaining political and economic growth.
Thus, if one surveys the total Com-
national way. And we stand ready to
In the United States we issue no global
munist movement of the past half-century,
assist them to do precisely that.
manifestos.
one cannot fail to be struck with a pro-
Thirdly, we agree that Mao's clear
But we do indulge in one dream. We
This text was taken from a speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance.
5
GANJANG
daRa
Young Indonesian foes of communism weakened the
grip of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) with
mass demonstrations.
do entertain one grand vision. We do look
pursuit of happiness.
We must meet that challenge.
to one great goal.
Those men in 1776 fused, primed, and
We must offer the more durable stuff
We are dedicated to continuing the
set off a political explosion that has had
of true, creative revolution.
dialogue with the rest of the world that
more ultimate effect on society than all
Lin Piao's statement of Communist
began in an obscure hall in Philadelphia
the dictators of history rolled into one.
China's goals for the world is 18,000
on July 4, 1776.
The fires of that revolution still burn
words long.
The men in that hall were revolu-
in this country; and the sparks of that
President Johnson has summed up our
tionaries.
revolution still fly, igniting the tinder of
goals for the world in three simple
The men in that hall did not believe
human aspiration all over the globe.
sentences:
that true political power can grow out of
One of the greatest challenges to this
Our own freedom and growth have
the barrel of a gun. The believed that
generation of Americans is to refine the
never been the final goal of the
true political power can grow only out of
formulas
American dream. We were never
the people themselves - for that is pre-
- for creating the driving sparks,
meant to be an oasis of liberty and
cisely where it is: within each individual
- for cultivating the leadership talent,
abundance in a world-wide desert of
human being.
- for unleashing and organizing the
disappointed dreams. Our nation was
Those men did not rant about class
earth's bountiful natural resources,
struggle. They said bluntly that all men
- for breaking down the out-of-date
created to help strike away the chains
are created equal.
barriers to progress, throughout the world.
of ignorance and misery and tyranny
Those men did not theorize about a
We have an enormous challenge to per-
wherever they keep man less than
dictatorship of the proletariat. They pro-
fect the formulas to do all of these things
God means him to be.
posed something far more explosive than
to permit what Lin Piao calls "the
It is for you and me - and all of us on
that. They declared that all men had an
countryside" to find their way up the
this small, whirling planet - to ensure
inalienable right to life, liberty, and the
rocky path.
that this forecast will prevail.
6
Ecuador
Hundreds of thousands of
people in Latin America have
demonstrated in the streets
against the threats of com-
munism to their peace and
freedom.
Brazil
SOCIAL
SIM.
HUMMIN
on
Bolivia
Students, favorite Communist
targets, are rejecting the Moscow
and Peking Pied Pipers. These
students in Ghana support their
army's coup against the Communist
influenced Nkrumah dictatorship.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington
31 May 1966
Blueprint For Aggression: The "People's War"
(DoD GEN-21) - This official Department of Defense
publication is for the use of personnel in the military
Services.
INITED STATE S OF OF DEFENSE
THE REALITIES
A Ripon Research Paper
The Ripon FORUM
September, 1967
OF VIETNAM
© Copyright 1967 by
The Ripon Society, Inc.
An Alternative for Republicans
Better is a poor and wise youth than an old and
ignoble commitment to covering over mistakes, an im-
foolish king who will no longer take advice
prudent commitment to the unlimited use of American
(Ecclesiastes 4:13)
resources and moral energy in a dubious cause.
With one eye fixed on remote posterity and the
The time has come for simple commitments to reality
other on the Gallup polls, President Johnson has had
and the national interest. Vietnam is the place to begin.
little vision to spare for the real constituency of his
The course of this war may well shape American think-
Vietnam policy: the generation of men who are ex-
ing on foreign policy for a generation to come, just
pected to fight the war and live with the results.
as the bitter neutrality controversy of the "Thirties dom-
As members of that generation, we have sought
inates the thinking of many officials responsible for our
the advice of experienced men; we are conscious of
present position. It is important, therefore, that the
the informed and responsible counsel that is available
proper lessons be drawn early. And it is appropriate
to the makers of American foreign policy. But even
that they be drawn by young men who will have to
seasoned observers agree that on the subject of Vietnam
build from the pieces that the Johnson administration
leaves behind.
rigor mortis has set in. A bureaucratic coalition within
the administration has reached a rigid consensus that
AGENDA FOR
The Ripon Society proposes a
repels knowledgeable advice. It has set its own terms
ACTION
thorough reorientation of Amer-
of discussion, enshrined its own version of the facts and
ican foreign policy in Vietnam
has for the most part succeeded in imposing its internal
and new departures in our conduct of foreign policy
as a whole. It calls for frank discussion of American
verities on public debate as a whole.
goals in Vietnam, the costs of fulfilling them, and their
FLURRY OF
Thus, the American people
place in a larger context of priorities for global foreign
DIPLOMACY
have been asking whether more
policy and domestic spending. It proposes the follow-
bombing, more troops, more dip-
ing agenda for debate and action.
lomacy, more refugee relief, better elections, or more
1. There must be an examination of present
economic aid hold the key to our difficulties in Vietnam.
policies in the light of the facts of Vietnamese political
And the administration has graciously suffered "dissent"
life. It is the conclusion of the Ripon Society that the
on these questions. Small wonder, when dissent on
present structure of policy is built on an expensive
tactical issues is easily preempted by bureaucrats who
fiction about what South Vietnam is and what it can
have the power to act: when "hawks" have the public
become. The American people should know how much
ear, the administration can intensify military activity;
it will cost to make this fiction into a reality.
when "doves" seem ascendant, it can treat them to a
2. New concepts are needed for Vietnam. In-
flurry of diplomacy. But the basic structure of adminis-
stead of our present military, centralized, "nation-
tration policy remains untouched by these fluctuations.
building" approach, the Ripon Society calls for a flex-
The larger questions of our involvement in Vietnam re-
ible, political approach to the problem that will reduce
main to be asked.
American troop commitments in the long run and take
Why has a conflict which has been repeatedly de-
cognizance of the strong ethnic and religious rivalries
fined as "political" and "essentially Vietnamese" become
that divide many non-Communist South Vietnamese
a largely military, largely American undertaking? Why,
from the Saigon government.
after six years of "limited" war, punctuated by glowing
3. The conflict in Vietnam has increased certain
predictions of success, has no upper limit yet been
imbalances in American political institutions: the im-
reached on American troops or expenditure? Why,
balance between our ability to wage war and our admin-
despite American talk about bringing peace and dem-
istrative capacity to seek peace; the imbalance between
ocracy to South Vietnam, has American policy led to
Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign
the further entrenchment of a regime of generals, who
policy. These imbalances as well as the present adminis-
are dependent for their power on the continuation of the
war?
tration's failures in foreign policy, provide both an op-
portunity and a duty for the Republican Party. The
PRIDEFUL
Answers exist to these ques-
COMMITMENT
tions, answers that demand an
Ripon Society calls on the Republican Party to bring the
unflinching reappraisal both of
issues of foreign policy to the people in the 1968
elections.
the structure of our Vietnam policy and of the conduct
of our foreign affairs as a whole. The Johnson admin-
istration is incapable of carrying out this reappraisal.
It is motivated, as the President and his advisors assure
us, by a sense of commitment. A commitment to a
I. The Costs of Implementing a Fiction
brave little nation? To the cause of freedom and
Visiting Congressmen and journalists who ask to
democracy? To the containment of aggressive Com-
see the success of pacification programs in South Viet-
munism? No, these broader goals have been obscured
nam are often taken to An Giang province. There they
behind commitments of a different sort: a prideful
are treated to the spectacle of orderly village life di-
commitment to continuing a misconceived policy, an
rected by respected local leaders who have a long history
of resistance to Communist control. These villages,
ern Coastal Strip, an area which is characterized by an
stable and secure from attack, have been electrified;
imperial tradition and deep-seated contempt for the
aerial land surveys have been carried out; American-
government of Saigon and where the militant Buddhists
sponsored improvements in sanitary, educational, and
are the most important non-Communist faction; second,
medical facilities have been made. To extend similar
the Central Highlands, populated by mountain tribes-
benefits to all the villages in all the provinces of South
men who are not ethnically Vietnamese and who are
Vietnam is the American goal, and it is a noble goal.
willing to ally themselves with any force that will
But there is another remarkable feature about the
protect them from Vietnamese cultural domination;
model villages of An Giang province. They are under
third, the southern part of the country (old Cochin
the sway of the Hoa Hao sect, which as recently as
China), which is divided among important religious
1963 was declared by the Saigon government to be part
groups (Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao), each
of the Viet Cong. American officials in nearby provinces
of which has strong political interests. The presence
and in Saigon fully accepted this interpretation, and
of ethnic Cambodians adds an element of racial di-
U.S. equipment and support enabled Premier Diem to
versity to the southern part of the country.
carry out a program aimed at the destruction of Hoa
Finally, in all these areas are the Viet Cong, whose
Hao power. Had Diem succeeded, there would be no
cadres control fully one-fourth of the rural population.
model villages in An Giang province today. There
They have developed an intricate network of front
would be refugee camps, large numbers of U.S. troops,
organizations that include youth groups, women's clubs,
and fragmented settlements that would be easy prey
and civic action groups in villages which, taken together,
for the Viet Cong.
contain three-fourths of the rural population. For many
LOCAL
Happily, the Hoa Hao were
villages the cadre's authority is inseparable from village
AUTONOMY
able to hold out against their
life, and indeed, the cadres have become a new social
enemies both in Saigon and in the
class in rural Vietnam.
Viet Cong until Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown. In
CENTRALIZED
To build a stable coalition from
1964 they negotiated an agreement with the new central
DEMOCRACY
the non-Communist fragments is
government: Hoa Hao areas, considerably reduced by
an ambitious undertaking that
Diem's attacks, were grouped within the newly drawn
might be accomplished by skillful bargaining. But the
boundaries of An Giang province; the autonomy of
American aim in Vietnam is more than ambitious. Under
local leaders was assured; and, in return for allegiance
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the United
to the Saigon government, the new province was guar-
States has been the partisan of a policy of centralized
anteed immunity from harassment by the Army of South
government in South Vietnam. Instead of seeking to
Vietnam. Almost overnight, An Giang became a "paci-
foster a political system built upon grass-roots support,
fied" area, and U.S. teams were able to enter to improve
American policy has been preoccupied with a dream
the lives of the villagers and to help them in their
of centralized democracy radiating out from Saigon,
long-standing effort to defend themselves against Viet
much as communism is thought to radiate from Hanoi.
Cong infiltration. Thus, the most successful example
(In actuality, the North allows some local autonomy to
of "pacification" is an area that has never had the
ethnic minorities, a fact which the Viet Cong use to
advantage of occupation by American or Army of the
good effect in their propaganda campaign among the
Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) troops. It is a region
mountain tribesmen of the Central Highlands.) The
in which a local group has been "redefined" from pro-
American mission in Saigon has accordingly been en-
Communist to anti-Communist status and which has been
gaged in a search for a "national leader" capable of
allowed a measure of autonomy in return for allegiance
carrying out a program of "nation building," a sort
to Saigon.
of man on a white horse who will be the South Viet-
Other local leaders have not been so lucky as the
namese counterpart of Ho Chi Minh.
Hoa Hao. They have been defeated by the combined
In the beginning this national leader was Premier
efforts of the Viet Cong, the Saigon government, and
Diem, and we acquiesced while he persecuted the Hoa
American policy. But since particularism runs deep in
Hao and made political prisoners of more than 40,000
Vietnam, local leadership may reemerge, just as the
of his non-Communist enemies. Later he was Premier
Hoa Hao resurfaced after American officials proclaimed
Ky, and we supported him in smashing the Budhhists
them to have been "for all purposes eliminated as a
in the northern provinces and in sending lowland Viet-
powerful political and military force."
namese with American troops to organize the mountain
The tenacity of local loyalties is a product of the
tribesmen of the Central Highlands. Now our candi-
ethnic and religious diversity of South Vietnam. South
date for national leadership is General Thieu, who has
Vietnam is a fragmented country; it is the product of
been chosen president in an election from which all
several waves of conquest and a long history of ethnic,
"neutralists" (including a former Cabinet minister)
religious and geographical rivalries that have left di-
were excluded.
visive hatreds. Even before the arrival of nearly a million
GOVERNMENT
But whoever the man, there
refugees from the North, it was rent by localism in
BY ARMY
must also be a white horse, and
the rural areas and factionalism in the cities. A realistic
unfortunately only one group in
approach to the country must build from this legacy.
South Vietnam has even a remote possibility of being
It must recognize that there are many non-Communists
ridden to power over the factions and fragments of po-
who, like the Hoa Hao, hate the mandarins and the
litical life. This is the army, most of whose top officers
army of Saigon just as much as they hate the Com-
were born in the North or fought for the French. The
munists.
American dream of making South Vietnam into a
THREE
As a first simplification, the
centralized, unified state thus inevitably means military
REGIONS
real South Vietnam may be di-
government. From the experience of other underde-
vided into three regions, each of
veloped countries, no reason exists to hope that a
which has a distinctive political culture: first, the north-
military regime will turn itself quickly into a consti-
2
tutional democracy or that it will be responsive to the
cities, the U.S. strategic reserve would be inadequate
interests of the rural population. "Nation-building"
to- respond. To ask whether this represents a prudent
as it is now conceived in U. S. policy means nothing if
investment of American resources, manpower, and moral
not military rule in South Vietnam, and indeed within
energy is now academic. The question is whether we
the State Department the military regime of South Korea
can hope for any substantial reduction of cost if present
is given as a model for South Vietnam. It would be
policies continue.
enough if we could hope for a military ruler who was
INSTALLMENT
The costs of Vietnam have been
capable simply of administering the countryside.
PLAN
built up on an installment plan.
But even here there are enormous difficulties. The
First a little more bombing, then
army does not have sufficient contact with the rural
a few more troops for conventional operations, then a
areas to understand peasant problems or to administer
few more for counter-insurgency warfare, then more
them effectively. The army of South Vietnam has had
investments in the "other war." With these four major
only one top-ranking general of peasant origin, General
elements - and with well-advertised elections and peace
Thi, and Premier Ky relieved him of his command of
offensives to legitimize its operations - the Adminis-
the I corps area soon after the Honolulu Conference.
tration has attempted to implement the fiction of unified
The social distance between officers and enlisted men
central government in Vietnam and to protect this
is great. Officers despise their troops with the tradi-
government against external aggression. The Adminis-
tional contempt of the high-born for the manual laborer.
tration clearly believes that more installment plan
Enlisted men are rarely promoted into the officer corps;
increases hold the best prospect for a long-run reduction
in the last three years only one field grade officer
in the costs of the war. But what are the likely results
in the army of South Vietnam has been wounded lead-
of intensification of the four major elements of present
ing his men into battle. The pruning out of ethnic
policy? What are the prospects for success of the two
Southerners and former members of the Viet Minh in
legitimizing devices?
favor of Northerners has further divorced the officer
1. BOMBING OF
Many impatient strategists who
corps from the country.
NORTH
apply a simple-minded interpreta-
The army of South Vietnam is
tion of the lessons of World War
BAD BET
thus not to be compared with the
VIETNAM
II to the Vietnam situation insist
popularly-based armies of some
that the quickest solution is to intensify the bombing of
other underdeveloped countries. It lacks their social
the enemy, assumed in this case to be North Vietnam.
base and political skills. What is more, the generals
A.
The first kind of bombing,
cannot even command the respect of the mandarin class,
the traditional rulers of the country, who have always
INTERDICTORY
mostly south of the 18.5° paral-
lel, aims at interdicting infiltra-
asserted the superiority of civilian to military authority.
tion. It has not, however, prevented the North Vietnam-
On its own merits, the Army of the Republic of
ese from installing missile launching sites and storage
South Vietnam is not, then, a good bet for unifying
depots, nor from surfacing a road within South Viet-
the country on a centralized model. But with the thrust
nam.
of American policy behind it, it is an even worse bet.
And the fact is that even if North Vietnam is
Just as U.S. military support relieves the ARVN from
bombed to rubble, the war in the South will continue.
going into the swamps, so U.S. political support relieves
For although North Vietnam unquestionably aids and
the Saigon generals from the need to bargain with
guides the Viet Cong, the conflict in the South is not a
civilian factions. Indeed, the one ruling general whom
result of simple aggression. Unlike World War II, and
the United States Mission publicly criticized, General
unlike the Korean engagement, the Vietnamese conflict
Khanh (now stripped of power), was also the only one
is largely a counter-insurgency war. Right now, the
to bring the militant Buddhists into a ruling coalition.
larger part of American troops is employed in securing
But American policy has become fixed around the idea
the South from guerilla activities, while the smaller part
that a nation-building war must be carried out on all
is employed in checking infiltration from the North.
political and military fronts at once, against Communist,
Many military and civilian leaders whose ideas' were
neutralist, and anti-Communist rivals alike.
formed by the two previous American engagements have
EXPENSIVE
Can such a war, carried on
been unable to come to terms with this fact. They have
PROJECT
without regard to the political
continually tried to define the war as a simple question
terrain, aimed at imposing central
of stopping aggression and have maintained that air
government in a country with decentralized bases of
power provides the most economical way of doing this.
power, dependent on the administrative capabilities of
Now, the insurgency in the South is supported by a kind
a narrowly based and politically unskilled military elite,
of aggression from Hanoi, but it is not one that can be
can such a war be successful? Probably it can. Imple-
stopped by bombing. The Northerners have trained
menting a fiction is not impossible, merely expensive.
guerilla cadres who operate in the South and bring iso-
It is now costing the United States, according to reput-
lated villages under the control of a centralized Com-
able estimates, upward of 24 billion dollars a year and
munist hierarchy. To try to eliminate these cadres with
casualties of 7000 a month. The budgetary figure repre-
airplanes is an admission of failure.
sents three times the total of American overseas in-
Diversingh
vestment for the current fiscal year and about seven
B. PUNITIVE
Bombing north of the 18.5°
parallel is usually punitive, de-
times the total foreign aid budget. The monthly cas-
signed to "raise the cost of aggression to Hanoi," without
uality figure equals the total number of Peace Corps
directly reducing infiltration. But Hanoi's "costs" are
volunteers who went abroad last year. The troop com-
calculated not by the monetary value of the installations
mitments to Vietnam represent an almost total invest-
destroyed but by the alternative uses for the labor and
ment of our available troops for flexible response to
capital needed to replace bombed facilities; i.e., by the
unanticipated crises in other parts of the world. If
"opportunity costs." The Hanoi regime presides over a
unexpected trouble should occur abroad or in American
largely peasant economy in one of the most densely
3
populated agricultural areas of the world. The regime
2. CONVEN-
Despite U. S. bombing, the
thus has a more comfortable supply of underemployed
TIONAL GROUND
North Vietnamese now have the
labor than most underdeveloped countries. If the Rus-
FORCES
initiative for escalating the con-
sians and Chinese supply heavy equipment and tech-
ventional ground war. They hold
nicians, the opportunity cost to the North Vietnamese
in reserve eighty per cent of their regular army (some
of diverting labor to repair damaged facilities is low.
400,000) men and during recent months have been
concentrating forces near the demilitarized zone. Con-
The only way to overtax the North Vietnamese
stant U. S. bombing by B-52's has not been able to
labor supply is by systematic bombing in civilian areas.
prevent them from building a surfaced road through the
The administration denies any intention of doing this.
A-Shau valley within South Vietnam, nor has it stopped
But according to reputable non-Communist sources,
them from storing in the caves near A-Shau supplies
American planes began punitive bombing against dikes
sufficient to support several divisions. They have also
in the Red River Delta of North Vietnam when the
received six-inch rockets from the Russians that have
BAD.'
waters were at a seasonal high this summer. Further
been installed and are being used inside South Vietnam.
bombing of the dikes will flood the best rice-producing
During the past six months Communist troops already
area of North Vietnam just before the October-Novem-
in South Vietnam have occupied for short periods four
ber harvest, creating conditions rivalling those of 1946,
of the five provincial capitals in the I Corps region
when a famine caused the death of one million North
without any protest from the local population. If the
Vietnamese.
Northerners are convinced that the United States means
to destroy their country from the air, they might very
CHINESE
Proponents of punitive bomb-
well try to make this occupation permanent by sending
INTERVENTION
ing may also want to humiliate
new troops to hold Quang Tri and Thua Thien prov-
Communist China by destroying
inces. Guerilla activities within both of these provinces
the Chinese railway line that cuts through North Viet-
have already been shifted from Viet Cong to North
nam. They claim that the Chinese railway brings sup-
Vietnamese Army command. Such action might easily
plies to Hanoi, and this is part of the truth. But no
tip the balance in Washington in favor of a plan previ-
Administration spokesman has ever mentioned that the
ously set aside for invading North Vietnam up to the
railway also has strategic importance within China: it
narrow neck of the country.
is a major means for transporting raw materials between
It should be noted that no increase in bombing is
Yunnan Province and the rest of China. A measure
likely to avert an invasion from the North. The more
of its value to the Chinese is that even before the
new targets that are bombed, the less deterrent effect
extension of U. S. bombing, 40,000 Chinese paramilitary
the threat of future bombing will have on Hanoi to
technicians were assigned to repairing the part of the
hold back its ground forces. In effect, the more hostages
link that passed through North Vietnam. The in-
we destroy, the fewer we have to bargain with. The
tensified bombing of the railway thus represents a cal-
American public was not made aware of these facts
culated risk of bringing China into the war. Will
earlier this year when General Westmoreland bargained
internal difficulties prevent the Chinese from intervening
for 45,000 more troops. They were not informed that
or will they postpone their quarrels in the face of ex-
any increase of conventional American forces up to
ternal humiliation?
300,000 men can probably be matched by North Viet-
nam. And any increase above that number is likely
Some within the administration may not care
to be the result of a full-scale, conventional, Korean-
whether we do provoke a Chinese response. They be-
style conflict that has hitherto been avoided.
lieve that a war with China is inevitable and that it is
3.
COUNTER-
Regardless of what happens in
better fought now than in the 1970's, when the Chinese
INSURGENCY
the conventional war against main
will be able to deliver nuclear weapons. When this
force units of the Viet Cong and
view is stated in explicit terms, it is easily countered
the army of North Vietnam, the counter-insurgency war
by those knowledgeable in the pattern of Chinese hos-
will continue, and the prospect is for stalemate unless
tility. But it is more often held implicitly. Many lead-
allied forces are vastly increased. The Pentagon's de-
ing policy-makers who publicly discount the possibility
clared ratio for success is ten counter-insurgency troops
of Chinese intervention are also those who believe in
to one guerilla.
the inevitability of a war with China.
The reason for a high ratio is that counter-insur-
Bombing also involves a calculated risk of escala-
gency warfare is essentially a local policing operation.
tion by the Russians, who are committed to preventing
The Viet Cong operate by calculated acts of assassina-
the collapse of the government of North Vietnam and
tion and terror that can be carried out by small bands
to protecting the integrity of shipping to Hanoi. The
of lightly armed men. To protect against such
costs to the Russians in prestige should not be under-
harassment requires a day and night policing function
estimated at a time when they are taunted by the Chinese
and an intimate knowledge of the political terrain.
Guerillas can harass villages on a rotating basis, but
for collaboration with the West. Finally, the North
counter-insurgency forces must stay put. The ten-to-one
Vietnamese themselves can escalate the war in response
ratio, moreover, is based on the experience of the
to bombing. North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet
British in Malaya and other long-term professional
Lao troops already hold sway over large parts of Laos.
counter-insurgency operations. To get a counter-insur-
Ho Chi Minh could reactivate the war there at will
gency operation in motion takes more than the standard
in the hope that an expansion of the ground war into
ratio. Only when once established can the ratio decrease
Laos might take some of the pressure off Vietnamese
as the perimeter of effective control spreads out. For
soil. Nor is this the only possible response by the
American troops in Vietnam who are rotated annually,
North Vietnamese.
the ratio may be much higher than the standard esti-
4
mates. Counter-insurgency cannot be carried out effec-
government a sure hold on areas that have been im-
tively on a short-term basis, and the yearly rotation of
pervious to its influence. It might be seen as part of
American troops makes almost impossible the establish-
the "other war," the war for the hearts and minds of
ment of necessary relations with translators, spies, and
the people of South Vietnam. It wins the minds of
local contacts. What is more, the northern coastal
Viet Cong sympathizers by disorienting them; it forces
strip of the country does not permit economies of scale.
simple villages off their lands, erodes their indepen-
The strip is broken into isolated valleys so narrow that
dence, and destroys the social order in which Viet Cong
a counter-insurgency operation has no room to spread
cadres thrive.
out. In any case, even the standard ratio would imply
A refugee camp solution to the problem of in-
a total allied force of more than two million men, as
surgency is, perhaps inadvertantly, well underway. As
the Viet Cong now have upwards of two hundred
a result of the war, South Vietnam must now import
thousand native Southerners in the field.
rice for the first time in its history. "Search and de-
As for the South Vietnamese army, the ARVN will
stroy" operations on the ground and bombing from
not be much more effective in counter-insurgency than
the air have drastically reduced local rice supplies.
it has been to date. Half of its total of 700,000 is
Meanwhile, under the U. S.-sponsored Chieu Hoy
composed of police, local, and regional forces who have
program Communists everywhere are encouraged to
been poorly paid and badly treated. They are not an
defect on an individual basis, villages are given the
efficient policing force, and in many_areas-they-have_a
chance to flee communist domination, but there is no
tacit agreement to coexist with the Viet Cong. The
way in which a Viet Cong cadre can agree to defect and
regular army, just over 300,000 men, has been an overly
bring his village with him. Thus, regardless of how many
centralized force, with too much authority concentrated
in too many generals, ever since it was reorganized under
defections are recorded, the rice must be destroyed and
American advisers in the mid-1950's. A return to a
the villagers removed to "deprive" those hard-core
decentralized force, giving more authority to lower-
elements that remain of both food and troops. The
ranking officers commanding smaller units, more ap-
effect is that sections of Vietnam are being devastated
and refugees generated at a high rate.
propriate to counter-insurgency operations, would
eliminate the work of half of the ARVN's present
Between late 1964 and mid-1967, 1.8 million
generals. Corrupt recruiting procedures and the lack
South Vietnamese peasants were made homeless by the
of Vietnamese interest in joining the army so long as
war. The present rate is probably greater than one
American troops are still available means that the ARVN
millon a year. If refugee generation continues at its
cannot provide forces for a larger counter-insurgency
present rates - and any intensification of the ground
operation.
war would make the rates higher - one-third of the
The fact remains that with more than a million
rural population of South Vietnam, some 4.5 million
allied troops now in the country, counter-insurgency
people, will be in refugee camps or relocation settle-
cannot be carried against all areas contested by the
ments within three years. Since no estimates put Viet
Viet Cong. The area south of the Mekong River has.
Cong control, total or partial, at higher than 4.5 million
not yet been entered by American troops. The ARVN
people, the gathering of that many peasants into refugee
troops stationed there engage in little fighting, as a
camps could go far to eradicate from the countryside
result of a tacit agreement to coexist with the Viet
the settlements that supply the Viet Cong with their
Cong. If under American pressure, this area should
food and troops. Peasants would then be domiciled in
be opened to active counter-insurgency operations, the
manageable units; a central government in Saigon would
level of U. S. involvement would rise. Thus, if present
distribute American aid to one-third of its population;
policies continue, the aim of pacifying all sections of the
and the dream of nation-building in South Vietnam
country by counter-insurgency methods would result
would become a reality, even if the reality were, as
in a serious and long-term drain on American man-
one anti-Communist editor (now deprived of his right
power. And if the Viet Cong recruit an additional one
to publish) has put it, "a nation of thieves and beggars."
hundred thousand men in the next year, the American
It should be emphasized that though the refugee
manpower requirement for counter-insurgency will sky-
camp solution is a likely one if present policies are
rocket, regardless of what happens south of the Mekong
extended south of the Mekong, there are obstacles to
River.
the success of even this inhuman course of action. So
4. THE "OTHER Because the counter-insurgency
far, the Saigon government has been incapable of se-
WAR"
and conventional efforts have
curing the allegiance of even its homeless population.
reached the point where only a
There are not less than 1.8 million refugees of South
massive infusion of troops can change the balance,
Vietnamese origin, yet not more than 500,000 of the
many spokesmen including Generals Thieu and West-
rural population are under total control of the Saigon
moreland have spoken of a long war of attrition, lasting
government. Indeed, after six years of war. Saigon can
perhaps ten to fifteen years. But there is no need to be
claim total or partial control of only 3.6 million of the
so pessimistic. Within the structure of present policy
total rural population of 13.4 million. This number is
a solution could be found within three to five years
less than the total of groups who should be rock-
that would make possible a modified form of central
bottom allies of the government, namely, the Southern
government. It is, we feel, an unconscionable solution,
refugees dependent upon it and traditional anti-Com-
but the only way in which centralized control can be
munist groups like the Hoa Hao, Catholics, farming
imposed upon South Vietnam.
refugees from the North, and ethnic Cambodians (See
Suppose for a moment that the rice supply of a
Tables I and II.) The Saigon government, then, has
Communist-held area were destroyed and the population
barely held its ground, despite massive American sup-
made dependent on imported food distributed in refu-
port. And because of American support it has felt free
gee camps administered by the Saigon government.
to alienate actively "neutral" groups like the militant
Such a refugee camp solution would give the central
Buddhists and mountain highlanders.
5
Even so, since it would be easier to convert the
the fort at Dien Bien Phu held for the French: they
ARVN into a refugee police force than into an effective
are yet another turning point in the war; they are a
counter-insurgency force, the refugee camp solution is
promise of lasting order; they are a glimpse of the new
the cheapest way to "win" the war. For refugee relief,
vision that the United States is bringing to the people
though prolonged, is much less costly than conventional
of South Vietnam. And they would not have been held
and counter-insurgency warfare, and in strictly military
had it not been for the insistence of the American
terms, it may also be much more effective. Bombing and
Mission in Saigon for a sign of national regeneration.
conventional warfare cannot solve the problem of in-
It should be recalled that it was not the military
surgency; counter-insurgency warfare requires close
consequence of the defeat of Dien Bien Phu that caused
knowledge of the political terrain and upwards of two
French withdrawal, but rather the public reaction within
million men. Refugee generation, on the other hand,
France to the collapse of a symbol that had been trum-
requires no more troops and no costly escalation, it
peted by the military as a new approach to the Indo-
can be accomplished without knowing the language and
chinese war. The Johnson administration has broadcast
without making difficult distinctions between friend
similar hopes about the September elections, which were
and enemy. It is accordingly the path of least resistance
its fortress against the realities of Vietnam. These
for American policy; it represents the lower limit of
elections were structured not to draw non-Communist
cost to the United States under present policies. The
factions into a new ruling coalition, but to lend an air
cost to South Vietnam in human terms is of course
of legitimacy to the nation-building war. South Viet-
intolerable, but it is fully consistent with the declared
namese political leaders who could challenge the mil-
aim of the Saigon government to eliminate Communist/)
itary junta or who favor negotiating with local Viet
influence from the countryside.
Cong groups were and have been systematically excluded
5. PEACE
To placate domestic critics the
from running. To speake of local negotiations was to
Johnson administration has peri-
admit that the problem of insurgency exists, and this
OFFENSIVES
odically made public appeals to
Saigon (and until late August the Johnson Administra-
Hanoi to negotiate. Energy expended on these peace
tion) has been unwill ng to do. Political processes
offensives is likely to be wasted. Hanoi remains com-
which are open only to those who reject reality are
mitted to the Mao-Giap theory of guerilla warfare:
not likely to work wonders. And now in the aftermath
captured documents provide ample evidence that the
of the Saigon elections, as it becomes increasingly
North Vietnamese leaders believe Viet Cong cadres
apparent that central democracy is spurious, it is time
can keep the United States from winning the country-
to reassess the costs of American support.
side and then can induce it to abandon the cities as
UPPER AND
The assessment should be made
well. Only an alteration in the balance of factions in
North Vietnam, including the demise of the "bitter
LOWER LIMITS
not by talking of "escalation" and
"withdrawal," but by comparing
ender" First Party Secretary, Le Duan, would mark a
the likely upper and lower limits of present policies
change in this attitude. During the coming election year,
with those of alternative approaches.
Hanoi will no doubt try to influence American public
opinion with diplomatic overtures. But the American
Within the structure of present policy, the best
effort at negotiations is much better directed at cadres
one can hope for is a refugee-camp solution to the
within South Vietnam who are independent of aid from
problem of insurgency in South Vietnam. It can be
the North. For though Hanoi and the Viet Cong hier-
reached, without mentioning the word "refugee," by
archy remain ideologically opposed to any sincere nego-
emphasizing current programs to relocate villagers in
tiation with the United States or the Saigon government,
secure areas, to promote individual defections, and to
the best American sources agree that a large proportion
deprive the Viet Cong of their rice supply. It would
of Viet Cong cadres are not indoctrinated in Com-
probably require a continuation of expenditures at their
munist ideology. What is more, local cadres, who see
present levels for three years, followed by a period in
the scale of American commitment, are much more
which American troops would be withdrawn and an
likely than their leaders to become convinced of the
expensive program of refugee relief and rural recon-
permanency of the American presence in South Vietnam,
struction would be expanded in accordance with the
humanitarian aims of the "other war." Such a solution
to admit the hopelessness of taking the cities, and to be
willing to make deals with the Americans. Only ne-
represents the lower limit of cost under present policies.
gotiations which seek local rather than national solu-
But to win the temporary allegiance of a people by
tions to the problem of insurgency have even a moderate
starving them into one's camp is short-sighted and self-
chance of success during the coming year. Only piece-
defeating.
meal negotiations which bid away their cadres will con-
As for the upper limit to the American commit-
vince Communist leaders to come to the bagaining table
ment, there is none. A different mix of elements -
for a total solution. Yet these are precisely the kinds
more emphasis on bombing or conventional warfare -
of negotiations that are actively discouraged by both the
could lead to an invasion of North Vietnam, an ex-
Saigon regime and the Johnson administration, both
tension of the war into Laos and China, a confrontation
of which prefer to polarize the alternatives between
with the Russians.
all (a capitulation by Hanoi) or nothing.
So long as it is conducted in accordance with the
6. ELECTIONS
There is, of course, a wide-
aims of the Johnson Administration, the war will, in
ly publicized political element
sum, get worse before it gets better. It is of course
amidst the overwhelmingly military devices by which
possible that both President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh
the United States is trying to build a nation in South
may flinch and open negotiations. But they are both
Vietnam: the September elections. They occupy in
stubborn men and their terms for bargaining are very
American policy much the same symbolic function that
far apart.
6
SKEWED
What should the upper and
The former have a typically French faith in centralized
PRIORITIES
lower limits to the American com-
government, to which the United States Mission has
mitment be? The Ripon Society
somehow been converted under the conviction that
believes that the proper upper limit of the American
it represents "nation-building." Non-Communist peas-
commitment has already been exceeded. A prudent policy
ants, on the other hand, have fought to resist central-
would demand that the level of present involvement be
ized control, whether from Hanoi or Saigon. If both
taken as a ceiling and that steps be taken to reduce the
urban and rural sources of support are to be drawn
drain on American resources. To do otherwise is to
into a stable non-Communist government, it will have
further distort our sense of priorities away from other,
to be on the basis of decentralized rule. Regardless of
strategically more important parts of the world and
the protests of the French-educated centralists, local
away from necessary expenditures of money and ideal-
leaders will have to have a greater degree of autonomy
ism at home.
than they have yet been granted. If they are not, if
But President Johnson's policy, however unrealistic
local leadership, however ignorant and unsavory it may
and costly, has also created obligations that put a lower
appear to city folk, is further undermined and destroyed,
limit on the American involvement. The United States
the result will not be a democratic government from
has a moral commitment to the one million refugees
Saigon. The result will be no government from Saigon,
from the North who have been resettled in South Viet-
save for refugee camps and American troops to carry
nam with our aid. It has an obligation to the 1.8
out the policing functions normally performed by local
million refugees generated in the South during the past
leadership. American troops would then be the objects
two years of heavy fighting. It cannot lightly abandon
not merely of Communist hostility but of opposition
these people and the others of South Vietnam who are
from all traditional groups seeking to protect their
not Communists to the vengeance of the Viet Cong and
social order from alien interference.
their Northern supporters. Nor can we accept a solution
THE VC
The second reality is the po-
that would pose a military threat to Thailand, which,
CADRE
litical and social innovation that
unlike South Vietnam, is a signatory member of SEATO.
is the basis of Viet Cong strength
REDUCED
The Ripon Society believes
throughout South Vietnam: the local cadre. Viet Cong
COMMITMENTS that an honorable approach to
cadres are the only effective link between many Viet-
Vietnam can be found that will
namese villages and centralized commands, and they
work within these new upper and lower limits. i.e.,
are the strongest such link in Vietnamese history. The
an approach that will reduce American troop commit-
cadre member is trained to live with the people of his
ments in the long run and minimize the destruction of
village, to seek out those with grievances against Saigon-
Vietnamese society. It is an approach that does not
appointed officials and local notables, and to provoke
demand precipitant withdrawal or imprudent escalation;
incidents which mobilize the peasantry against the
its effectiveness does not depend on the panacea of im-
government. He is instructed in the techniques of or-
mediate negotiation. It does demand something perhaps
ganizing front groups, engaging in the selective use
more difficult at this late date: a patient, realistic, flex-
of terror to intimidate his opponents, accumulating in-
ible, and humane vision of what can reasonably be
telligence from children and village spies, and co-
achieved in South Vietnam.
existing with potentially hostile groups until he is ready
to overthrow them. Very often "coexistence villages"
that are well-infiltrated by cadres admit U.S. medical
II. The Need for a Confederal Strategy
teams, vote in elections, and listen to Saigon-trained
propagandists by day, while the Viet Cong maintains
At selected moments in the unfolding of its Viet-
control by night. Cadres are an important new part of
nam policies, the Johnson Administration has chal-
the village social structure in three-fourths of the rural
lenged its critics to provide alternatives. After Hanoi
population of South Vietnam, although only one-fourth
failed to respond to the bombing pause, for instance,
of the rural population is under their total control.
the Administration asked whether there was any choice
Careful analyses of their training and internal mes-
but to resume bombing. When intelligence reports
sages indicates that they have taken on a new social role
showed increases in Viet Cong troop strength, the Ad-
that is more important to most of them than adherence
ministration paused to ask whether it could do anything
to Communist ideology. Hence, recent American usage
but increase American troop commitments. And so it
of the term "cadre" does not recognize the Communists'
has been. By posing stacked questions sequentially, the
claim to mechanical control. In our usage, "cadre" is
administration has proven to its own satisfaction that
not a collective noun denoting a well-disciplined group
its critics are naive and incapable of posing feasible
of men; it denotes an individual, professional agitator.
proposals for a change in policy.
If the cadres are to be dealt with realistically, both
Now the real basis for a responsible alternative in
the Saigon government and the American mission will
Vietnam is not to be found by manipulating elements
have to abandon the goal of extirpating them from
within the present structure of policy. The alternative
village life. And the United States will have to recog-
to policy based on a fiction is policy based on reality.
nize the futility of a Chieu Hoy program designed to
In reassessing the American undertaking in Vietnam,
encourage individual defections from cadres without
two central realities must be confronted.
guaranteeing a continuation of their social role. Viet
POLITICAL
The first reality is the fragmen-
Cong cadres are presently tying down nearly all the
FRAGMENTS
tation of the traditionally anti-
ARVN troops and more than half the American troops
Communist forces in South Viet-
in the country. To destroy them means either the de-
namese political life. In addition to the regional, re-
struction of a large part of rural South Vietnam or an
ligious, and ethnic rivalries traced in the Appendix to
enormous drain on American manpower. A means must
this paper, there is a wide gulf between the French-
be found to allow them to hold their social function,
educated urban middle classes and the rural population.
while neutralizing their military threat.
.7
A confederal strategy would deal with these two
fore any form of parliamentary coalition poltics can be
realities in a way that both Americans and Vietnamese
stable, prior confederal steps must be taken to give all
could understand.
important non-Communist groups a stake in the idea of
FIRST PHASE
In its first phase, a confederal
national government.
strategy would aim at develop-
A first, obvious step is to make formal and public
ing an effective and stable non-Communist coalition
the arrangements already in force with the Hoa Hao in
between the cities and the twenty-seven per cent of the
An Giang province and to ratify similar arrangements
rural population that is subject to government control.
for the enclaves of Cham peoples in Binh Thuan prov-
In cases of conflict among factions, American support
ince.
would go to those which have effective control of rural
Second, the government of South Vietnam should
areas, since their loyalty and local policing efforts are
fulfill promises already made to the mountain tribes-
alone able to free American troops for their proper
men to draft guarantees of cultural autonomy when
function of checking infiltration from the North.
the National Legislature meets this fall.
The concept of a coalition based on a confederal
Third, confederal decentralization and redrawing
approach requires the concession to local leaders of
of boundaries should be carried out to give other strong
formal guarantees of autonomy in the following ways:
local groups authority over their own regional affairs:
Control over local local police and militia.
the Buddhists in the northern coastal provinces; the
Election of provincial and district officials who are
Cao Dai and the settlements of Catholics and Northern
now centrally appointed. (Provincial and district
refugees in the lowlands; and, the ethnic Cambodians in
chiefs, most of them military men, now approve
Kieng Giang, Ba Xuyen, and Vinh Binh provinces.
candidates for hamlet and village elections and
Measures of this sort, which could be adopted almost
make the major civilian decisions affecting their
immediately, would give non-Communist groups a stake
areas.)
in the South Vietnamese government and constitution
Government officials of local origin. (This is
regardless of which faction happened to hold the reins
crucial in Vietnam where administrative rules are
in Saigon. There is no other way to deal with the
traditionally loose, allowing for wide discretion.)
problem of fragmentation of the non-Communist
Local rule in formulation of land tenure regulations
groups.
and reforms.
Redrawing of provincial boundaries to correspond
SECOND PHASE Once the rock-bottom non-
Communist groups are consoli-
to the realities of political control.
dated the same confederal framework can be offered
Cultural guarantees to ethnic minorities (e.g., pres-
to "co-existence" villages, which comprise much of the
ervation of customary law, use of ethnic languages
contested half of rural South Vietnam. Local Viet Cong
for primary school instruction).
Right to collect local taxes, supplemented where
,b
cadres and ARVN troops who have developed a rela-
necessary by direct access to U.S. aid. (A recent
fionship of tacit collaboration would be encouraged to
formalize their relationships in exchange for regional
amendment to Title IX of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967 permits the United States to find local
autonomy from Saigon. Provincial boundaries can be
redrawn for such areas, just as they were redrawn for
channels for the distribution of aid.)
In other countries similar measures for decentral-
An Giang province in October 1965.
ization might be accomplished by informal understand-
These agreements might require the marketing of
ings, without written guarantees. But the time for that
all surplus rice through Saigon, the payment of nominal
has passed in Vietnam. Too many promises have been
taxes, and other signs of allegiance in exchange for
made and broken for regional groups to trust any
separate access to U.S. aid to repair the devastation of
authority in Saigon. Nor can the United States serve
war. The second phase would provide an alternative to
as guarantor of informal bargains, for our Mission, too,
the ravages of war that does not now exist for these
has found it convenient to forget pledges made to
villages. There is at present no way in which a Viet
minority groups in South Vietnam. National elections
Cong cadre operating in contested villages can submit
may give the regional minorities temporary leverage
to popular war-weariness without losing his social func-
because of their ability to deliver bloc votes, but in a
tion. And villagers have no incentive to denounce
national legislature overwhelmingly dominated by urban
cadres so long as the alternative is not local control
Vietnamese the ethnic minorities have no continuing
but administration by a Saigon-appointed military gov-
means of enforcing their interests. They will be restive
ernor.
whenever they are not actively courted by the ruling
It is, of course, likely that the Viet Cong cadres
faction in Saigon.
would receive orders from above not to participate
In the September presidential elections, for ex-
in confederal bargains, in which case a clear conflict
ample, the Thieu-Ky ticket actively sought the support
of interest would be established within the Viet Cong
of the Hoa Hao in An Giang province, of the Cam-
ranks. Cadres who are not ideological Communists
bodian minority in Ba Xuyen province, and of the
or not dependent on the North for supplies would
Highland tribesmen. If Thieu is able to deliver on his
perceive differing interests from those trapped in the
promises of financial aid and autonomy, these ethnic
Communist hierarchy. This would put pressure on the
minorities will no doubt continue to hold anti-govern-
Viet Cong where it is economically most vulnerable,
ment feelings in abeyance. But their loyalty is not to
for those cadres who are independent of Northern
the constitution of South Vietnam, which provides no
supplies currently provide surplus rice for the Viet Cong
guarantee of their rights, but to the military faction.
efforts in weaker areas. Bidding away independent
Should it break its word or be replaced by a rival coali-
villages would begin the process of crippling the Com-
tion (e.g., one composed of Coastal Buddhists, Southern
munist movement by alienating cadres whose local
army officers, and Mekong Delta Vietnamese), the
social role is more important to them than the ultimate
ethnic minorities would again feel isolated. Thus, be-
Viet Cong aim of winning the cities.
8
THIRD PHASE
In its third phase, a confederal
cept is a strategy, not a rigid blueprint. It is designed
strategy would be offered to
to keep the costs of the war below the upper limit
villages under the full control of the Viet Cong, which
recommended in the previous section. It permits a re-
now hold approximately one-fourth of the total rural
thinking of Vietnam policy that provides not merely
population. Such hard-core villages would face increas-
an alternative vision to that of the Administration but
ing isolation as the earlier phases of the confederal
alternative emphases at every step of the way. This can
approach progressed. At this point the Viet Cong hier-
be best illustrated by showing how the major elements
archy would face three alternatives: 1) remaining in
of present policy will fit into a new pattern under a
the South while their villages are losing food and
confederal strategy, how such an orientation cuts across
manpower; 2) fleeing to the North; or, 3) retaining
some of the well-known "hawk-dove" distinctions.
much of their local power in Communist enclaves and
1.
BOMBING
Even if bombing some day
participating in the confederal framework. Once their
NORTH
leads Hanoi to nominal capitula-
prospects for taking over the entire country are cut
off by a consolidation of non-Communist groups, it is
VIETNAM
tion and negotiation, the Viet
Cong can still conduct intensive
likely that the Viet Cong high command would negotiate
guerilla activities, and they will do so unless they have
for the third alternative.
an alternative that permits popular southern Viet Cong
POSSIBLE
A confederal strategy provides
leaders to retain political power. A confederal strategy
OUTCOME
a vision of a feasible outcome
encourages the formulation of such alternatives. It can
that South Vietnamese and Am-
be adopted regardless of one's attitude to the effective-
ericans both lack. Urban Vietnamese can now envisage
ness of bombing in inhibiting infiltration.
only a French-style solution, with the urban classes
But we would claim as an advantage for confed-
playing the role of colonial administrators and the army
eralism the fact that it will allow for a de-emphasis on
securing the countryside. The American Mission, on the
bombing. The effect of bombing in fulfilling its two
other hand, seems infatuated with the model of South
major purposes has been very much overrated by the
Korea, where a military junta has taken steps toward
administration.
democratization. Both of these models fail to cope
Punitive bombing north of the 18.5° parallel
with the fragmentation of South Vietnamese political
simply does not save American lives. It risks conditions
life and the new social role of village cadres. A de-
under which more lives, American and civilian Vietnam-
centralized solution, by contrast, would permit both
ese, will be lost. And it is irrelevant to the insurgency in
local leaders and rural cadres to keep a stable base of
the South, which is the major drain on American fight-
power now denied to them under the slogan of nation-
ing forces. For these reasons, a confederal strategy
building.
would heavily de-emphasize bombing the North. Inter-
The minimal result of a confederal approach would
dictory bombing south of the 18.5° parallel would con-
be a consolidation of non-Communist groups, whose
tinue as long as it was necessary to cut infiltration and
territory the United States could then defend with con-
troop buildups.
ventional forces. The maximal application of the con-
2.
Invasion and insurgency are the
federal framework to the rest of the countryside would
make possible a political system that accommodates
CONVENTIONAL
two major military problems the
United States faces. A confed-
sharp political differences (as does Italy) and deep
GROUND
eral approach would employ con-
cultural diversity (as does Switzerland).
FORCES
ventional ground forces to defend
REASONABLE
A confederal strategy is de-
areas where the Saigon government had won the loyalty
COSTS
signed to reduce the American
of the people. It would also use them along the de-
commitment in installments much
militarized zone and at crucial mountain passes to
as the present policy seems destined to escalate it by
prevent an invasion of the northern I corps area.
installments. Barring massive invasion by North Viet-
While military leaders have been debating over
nam, a confederal strategy would operate well within
bombing, barriers, and infiltration, they have failed to
the present troop commitment.
remind the American public that the North Vietnamese
It would save manpower almost immediately by
seem to be preparing an invasion of the I corps area,
winning the cooperation of the local population in
where American troops are already stretched danger-
the northern provinces of the Coastal Strip and Central
ously thin. A confederal strategy would release troops
Highlands. It would prevent vast numbers of American
from policing and counter-insurgency operations to
troops from being sent for new counter-insurgency
counter a conventional thrust by the North Vietnamese.
operations south of the Mekong River. Saigon can no
South Vietnam is not worth the millions of troops
more surely lose its influence in this area than by per-
needed to counter both invasion and insurgency. Hence
mitting the entry of U.S. forces, which Communist
a confederal strategy provides a political framework
propaganda convincingly identifies with the French, to
in which present troops could be deployed against the
enter.
invasion of areas in which the local population ceases
Finally, by lowering the level of violence in se-
anti-government activity.
lected "coexistence villages," it would put steady po-
litical pressure on the Communists, who would be faced
A BARRIER
The approval of a limited bar-
rier by Secretary of Defense Mac-
with possible defections by their non-ideological cadres.
Namara is a half-way measure that has more meaning
The present policy of Saigon to root out all cadres
for the bureaucratic struggle over punitive bombing in
gives them no choice but to continue obeying orders
Washington than for the realities of the Vietnamese
from the Communist hierachy. A confederal strategy
situation.
would promote factionalism in the Viet Cong and unity
The original purpose of the barrier concept was to
among non-Communists; the present policy does the
threaten the North Vietnamese with interdiction of
reverse.
their supply lines to the South. In the years of its
It should be emphasized that the confederal con-
building the barrier would cost more lives than bombing
9
would but afterwards it would be a permanent structure
But a centralized program of land reform is un
that would reshape politics in Southeast Asia. Sup-
realistic. In many areas where land records have been
porters of the concept argued that if the Administration
destroyed, the attempt to resolve tenure disputes from
made known its firm intention to build a barrier clear
Saigon can only be capricious and corrupt. Local ad
across Laos, the only way to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail,
ministration of reforms is needed, not more centraliza
the North Vietnamese might have been led to negotiate
tion.
before the barrier was even completed.
A confederal approach would subordinate land
The Administration, however, has committed itself
reform to the political goal of developing local leader-
only to a very limited barrier, which does not include
ship. Saigon might limit the size of family plots; it
Laos. The major hindrance to going into Laos is not
might provide surveying teams and keep a central
the Geneva agreements, for the North Vietnamese army
record of land transactions. But the administration of
has been operating in Laos for years. Nor is it the
reforms and the settling of disputes - a powerful source
"giving away" of Northern Laos to the Communists,
of patronage - would be left to local leaders. The power
since most of it is in Communist hands already. The
to implement land reforms would provide an added
hard-core objection is that the North Vietnamese might
incentive for local leadership in coexistence villages to
support a conventional military operation in Laos and
participate in a confederal framework.
they would probably receive Soviet aid.
C.
ECONOMIC
To make a confederal strategy
The major function of the limited barrier is to
AID
credible the United States will
demonstrate publicly that there is an alternative to
have to demonstrate its willing-
bombing, even if that alternative is no more effective
ness to aid areas that are not under direct American
at attacking the main problems of insurgency and in-
military control. In principle, President Johnson has
vasion. Both punitive bombing and a limited barrier
committed himself to such a course, and indeed An
would receive low priority in a confederal strategy.
Giang province provides an isolated example of the
The United States can win the
purity of American intentions. The most dramatic
3. COUNTER-
INSURGENCY
counter-insurgency war, but the
symbol of American aims, however, was the proposed
standard ten-to-one ratio of con-
project for a Mekong Dam to aid people of Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam who are not under Am-
ventional to guerilla forces is not worth the price. Under
erican military occupation. After publicizing the project
a confederal strategy counter-insurgency operations
would not be extended to new areas of the country.
and engaging in preliminary studies, the Johnson Ad-
Plans for an offensive south of the Mekong River and
ministration dropped it without explanation. There is
based in the town of Can Tho would be permanently
perhaps no single act that would better symbolize the
American commitment to the long-term interests of
abandoned. In areas where counter-insurgency opera-
Southeast Asians than the revival of this project. Be-
tions are now underway, the promise of selective with-
cause it would take years to complete, it would make
drawal of American forces would be used to increase
Communists and non-Communists alike believe that the
the attractiveness of piecemeal negotiations under a
confederal framework. With counter-insurgency as with
United States has a permanent concern for the welfare
of Southeast Asia and that, unlike the French, Ameri-
bombing and conventional warfare, military action is
used in a confederal strategy to advance feasible
cans will not leave when they grow tired of the war.
A confederal strategy will also implement the For-
political goals.
eign Assistance Act of 1967, which stipulates that
4. THE
Under present policy the "other
"emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum par-
"OTHER WAR"
war" is too often the camp fol-
ticipation in the task of economic development on the
lower of military initiatives. After
part of people of the developing countries through the
bombing, search and destroy operations, and refugee
encouragement of democratic private and local govern-
generation have taken their toll, American teams offer
mental institutions." (Title IX, Sec. 281.) This would
food, medical aid, and refugee relief. The confederal
depart from present policies which emphasize chan-
strategy would use the economic, psychological, and
neling aid through the Saigon regime, which regularly
social programs of the "other war" independently to
tries to deny American funds to its non-Communist
fulfill political objectives.
opponents.
The Chieu Hoy program, which
A. CHIEU
5. PEACE
A confederal strategy will
encourages individual defections
HOY
OFFENSIVE
steadily improve the negotiating
of Viet Cong cadres, would oper-
position of the South Vietnamese
ate in a wider context. Defections would still be wel-
government by consolidating its support and enabling it
comed, but primary emphasis would be placed on
to bid away Communist cadres. It will create a basis
negotiation that permits cadres to retain their social
for national negotiations that cannot presently exist
role. Under present policies, defections among high-
so long as the Communists perceive that the government
level units are virtually impossible. The favorable sta-
of Saigon is inherently unstable. Should Hanoi and the
tistics on Chieu Hoy defections trumpeted by the Ad-
Viet Cong hierarchy become reconciled to the impos-
ministration make no careful distinction between politi-
sibility of a conventional military victory, they will still
cal defectors and simple refugees.
have the choice of reverting to guerilla warfare or of
B. LAND
Having ignored for some time
trying to bargain for partial control of their enclaves
REFORM
the pledges for land reform made
in the countyside in general negotiations. A confederal
in Honolulu in February of 1966,
approach will then make possible a stable solution. It
the Johnson Administration is considering putting new
should be emphasized that as long as all efforts for
pressures on Saigon. Now that it has declared the elec-
limiting American costs are directed at securing general
tion a success, the American Mission may demand a
negotiations, military escalation will go unchecked. A
centralized land reform program which is designed to
confederal approach, by coordinating military and po-
win peasant loyalty for the central government.
litical initiatives, will assure a lessening of the conflict
10
until such time as peace talks become feasible.
CLOSED
One cannot, of course, reduce
6. ELECTIONS
A confederal strategy would
OPTIONS
the costs of the Vietnamese under-
attack the endemic cause of in-
taking without eliminating certain
stability in an overly centralized system by conceding
options now open to American policy-makers; and it is
a measure of power to local leaders. Instead of placing
only fair to list two options that a confederal strategy
preponderant emphasis on village and national elections,
forecloses. The first is the possibility of ridding the
it would promise elections on the district and provincial
countryside of all Communist influence. This has been
level. Under present policies almost all provincial and
the expressed aim of a few Saigon army officers, but
district chiefs are military officers and all middle-level
no reputable American official has ever publicy favored
officials are appointed and promoted from Saigon; under
sending the millions of counter-insurgency troops re-
a confederal strategy many of these administrators will
quired.
be elected.
The second option is that of destroying North Viet-
Vietnam's local leaders need something to fight for.
nam and thereby provoking the Chinese into a war in
An increase in their own authority is a more plausible
which their nuclear capacity would be destroyed. This
incentive than the imposition of corrupt officials from
would presumedly be done by creating a situation in
Saigon. A confederal strategy would accordingly urge
Vietnam analogous to that in Korea. If the Chinese
that provincial and district elections be offered to all
were convinced that the United States had extended its
areas that are able to maintain internal security.
original war aims to include heavy punishment and
POSSIBLE
Elements of the French-edu-
possible invasion of the North, they might intervene and
OBJECTIONS
cated middle class of Saigon and
provide an excuse for pre-emptive war.
perhaps all the refugees from the
A confederal strategy assumes that the United States
North may greet a confederal strategy without en-
can contain the Chinese without destroying neighboring
thusiasm, and even with outright hostility. Thirteen
states, much as it contained the Russians in Europe.
years of American support have accustomed many
Those who disagree with this assumption will of course
Saigon residents to the illusion that they themselves have
find the cost of this strategy too high. They will find
ruled the provincial towns and the countryside. French
it intolerable that the United States adhere to its de-
intellectual habits have made them see Saigon as the
clared war aims, which include a preservation of the
Paris of South Vietnam, as an administrative capital of
South but not the destruction of the North.
a thoroughly centralized regime. Northern refugees, for
FOUR AIMS
A confederal strategy is de-
their part, are likely to oppose bitterly any scheme em-
signed to:
phasizing regional bases of power and implicity denying
I. Reduce American costs without sacrificing Am-
their right to return.
erica's moral obligations to its Southeast Asian allies.
But Vietnamese political and military leaders, how-
In contrast to present policies which increase the level
ever adamantly they may oppose a change in their com-
of United States military involvement in installments,
fortable assumptions, have also shown a remarkable
a confederal strategy aims at a decrease from the present
ability to adapt to political realities when they are not
troop levels. It accepts as a lower limit any troops
protected from them by American troops and economic
necessary to defend from conventional attack those
aid. The confederal strategy will remind recalcitrant
areas in which the local population is loyal to the gov-
Vietnamese leaders that the illusion of centralized rule
ernment and constitution of South Vietnam and able
was possible in the past only because of massive Am-
to maintain internal stability.
erican support and that such support will henceforth
II. To confront the significant a) political, b)
go to a vision of government that is more consistent
military, and c) diplomatic realities of the Vietnamese
with democratic ideals and more appropriate to Viet-
situation. These are: a) the fragmentation of non-
namese political realities. The United States can begin
Communist political groups and the social role of the
distributing its aid in a decentralized fashion even
cadre; b) the primacy of insurgency and the possibility
during the period of readjustment to the new idea.
of large-scale invasion; and, c) the unlikelihood of any
diplomatic resolution of the conflict until there is a
A second possible objection is that thanks to thir-
stable government in Saigon with a framework that will
teen years of suppression of local leadership, there may
permit the Viet Cong to retain power in the country-
be no popular regional and ethnic leaders with which
side.
to bargain on a confederal basis. The Appendix to this
III. Provide a direction for change and a vision of
paper should satisfy doubts on this matter. It demon-
a feasible outcome.
strates the tenacity of particularistic loyalties in South
Vietnam. American officials and Vietnamese politicians
IV. Coordinate military and political initiatives so
who deny these loyalties should spend more time outside
that they are mutually reinforcing.
Saigon.
A confederal strategy offers a coherent overview
of the Vietnamese conflict that specifies operational
Finally, must not areas be pacified militarily before
political goals for every province and district of South
they can participate in a confederal framework? An
Vietnam. The present goal of centralized government
Giang province suggests not, as do the repeated de-
is unprecedented in Vietnamese history and is accord-
mands by northern Buddhists and mountain tribesmen
ingly incapable of inspiring any real comprehension or
for a measure of self-rule. In a counter-insurgency war
loyalty in the countryside. A confederal strategy re-
the loyalty of the population is invaluable for reporting
asserts the primacy of the political element in limited
and resisting Viet Cong infiltrators. Wherever such
warfare and does so on a level where political guide-
loyalty can be won by the mere extension of local
lines can save American lives.
democracy, massive military pacification is neither neces-
For these reasons the Ripon Society endorses a
sary nor right.
confederal strategy. If great obstacles to its implemen-
11
tation exist, they are not to be found on the terrain
begun laying plans for such adaptation: plans for Con-
of South Vietnam. They are to be found in Washington.
gressional reorganization, for improved staffing, for
proper access to information and expert advice. But the
Vietnamese conflict came before any innovations could
be made and although it has forced many responsible
III. The Republican Responsibility
legislators to revise their own roles in the making of
foreign policy, it has caught Congress as a whole off
It is not necessary to blame the entire structure of
guard.
present policy on any one man or party, or any small
Congress has neither the staffing nor the machinery
group of officials. For although President Johnson and
to assert its prerogatives in the making of Vietnam
his advisers seem stubbornly committed to an imprudent
policy. Its right to be consulted has been compromised
and costly course of action, and although they will
into a right to ratify. Bureaucrats come before its
continue to use every available form of political leverage
inquiries in a contrived atmosphere of crisis with an-
to avoid being confronted with their mistakes, the fault
swers which are predetermined by carefully controlled
is not entirely theirs. Their misconceived policies could
information. Congress' right to know has been re-
not have developed unchecked were it not for deeper
duced to the right to be briefed. Legislators have been
malfunctions in our political institutions.
informed promptly of the results of policy in Vietnam,
BUREAUCRATIC
There has been, to begin with,
but no body of Congress has had continuing access to
an administrative imbalance be-
MOMENTUM
the political intelligence and strategic plans from which
tween our ability to take military
decisions are really made. Even Congress' right to set
risks and our ability to take political risks. The Depart-
broad aims has been undermined by executive decisions
ment of Defense, reformed under unified civilian con-
which, although apparently "tactical," have altered the
trol, has been able to offer flexible responses to world
character of the war. Congress, in sum, has been unable
problems. It has adopted a method of planning and
to check the bureaucracy from without. Since signifi-
budgeting that enables it to see clearly the costs, inter-
cant checks are also absent from within, the pattern
relations, and long-range military implications of its
of Vietnam can easily be repeated: American policy can
programs. And it engages in planning for contingencies
drift toward military solutions where political ones will
so that it will be prepared for crises.
suffice; American youth can die because its elders
No comparable comprehensive effort in cost an-
lack decisive civilian leadership.
alysis, coordination, and contingency planning has been
President Johnson did not
undertaken among the cluster of civilian agencies
PRESIDENTIAL
create the imbalances in our pol-
charged with economic and political elements of foreign
STYLE
itical institutions, but neither has
policy. As a result, the relations between military and
he tried to correct them. If anything, his personal style
non-military instruments of foreign policy have often
of administration has accentuated the difficulties. His is a
been determined by blind bureaucratic momentum,
which naturally favors the better-prepared agencies.
style of secrecy and silence. He has been willing to
consider only proposals that filter noislessly through
Because the Department of Defense is unified, massive
bureaucratic channels. He is famous for rejecting out
and engaged in stand-by operations, while civilian agen-
cies are fragmented and devoted to day-to-day details,
of hand programs that originate outside his administra-
tion and for cancelling plans that are leaked prematurely
American policy has a built-in tendency to drift toward
to the press. He has been criticized for this, and he has
military measures in times of stress.
South Vietnam provides a tragic example. Amer-
also been praised for relying more than any recent
ica's power to wage war in that country is enormous.
president on career civil servants.
But we have been unable to wage peace, to formu-
But the Johnson style has more important conse-
late a political strategy that would limit the loss
quences than its occasional outbursts of pique or its
of life and build a basis for a negotiated settlement.
encouragement of career service. Its charm for the
American forces destroy entire villages on less hard
President lies in its ability to stifle effective criticism.
intelligence than the Viet Cong use in assassinating a
By keeping programs secret until the moment of their
single village chief. Military contingency plans exist
release, the President gives opponents no time to pre-
for invasion of North Vietnam, for bombing of Hai-
pare alternatives. He subjects legislators to a blitz of
phong, for bombing of dikes, for counter-insurgency
proposals that overwhelms their meager staffs. The
operations south of the Mekong River and doubtless
President's practice of withdrawing nominations and
even for use of nuclear weapons. But do similar plans
programs that receive advance publicity also keeps dis-
exist for a confederal initiative or for any realistic
sidents within the administration from taking their case
settlement? Perhaps in a sub-basement of the State De-
to the public. Since a public row means the sure rejection
partment. But so long as there is no public indication
of a proposal, civil servants seldom dare to express their
of them American talk of negotiation lacks credibility.
preferences outside official channels. The president's
Political preparedness, like military preparedness, has to
style thus excludes the public (and Congress) from
be publicized to be believed. It is meaningless for
bureaucratic debate and in so doing leaves the natural
officials to talk of America's desire for peace and for a
momentum of the bureaucracy uncorrected by external
"political solution" so long as the administrative means
pressures. In foreign affairs this means that however
to implement these hopes are not known to exist.
many skirmishes may be won by proponents of political
CONGRESSIONAL A second imbalance, between
initiatives, the main thrust of American policy remains
WEAKNESS
Congress and the Executive
in the hands of the strongest agency, the Pentagon.
branch, has permitted bureau-
Even if the President should reorient his Vietnam policy,
cratic mistakes to go unchecked. The Legislative branch
his administration is unlikely to overcome its dependence
faces long-term problems in adapting its procedures to
on military plans and its habituation to military risks.
the growth of executive power. In recent years it has
It presents a classic example of self-entrenching bureau-
12
cracy that cannot be reformed from within.
tion) has been unwilling to do. Political processes
LESSONS FOR
If foreign policy is to change,
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
if the serious imbalances in our
NEW
The need for changes in
THE GOP
institutions are to be corrected,
DEPARTURES
foreign policy imposes a respon-
if the lessons of Vietnam are to teach anything, a new
sibility on the Republican Party.
administration must be elected. An alternative in foreign
On all fronts the Johnson Administration has failed to
policy will have to be Republican.
provide prudent, realistic leadership. Its political
Not any Republican alternative will do. A Re-
policies, which remain open-ended, will require many
publican administration must be committed to reducing
more American troops unless a hard decision is made
the costs of the American undertaking in Vietnam. We
between countering invasion and countering insurgency.
have described a general approach to Vietnam that
Its diplomatic policies, which ignore local negotiations,
eschews escalation, that can succeed without the good
have no prospect for success during the coming year.
will of the North Vietnamese, that keeps the cost below
Its failure to take steps for long-term administrative
an acceptable upper limit, and that can lead to an honor-
reform assures that these deficiencies will persist, that
able outcome. It remains for a new administration, un-
American policies will drift by installments toward an
deluded and free to act, to adopt a confederal strategy.
ever wider, ever more senseless war. The Republican
A Republican president must also commit himself
Party can provide a way out of this fiasco. It can
to long-range reforms in the administration of foreign
grasp the realities of local politics in Vietnam; it can
policy. Future involvements should be shaped by real-
reassert the limited nature of American aims; it can
ities abroad rather than bureaucratic inertia in Wash-
reduce the costs in human life; it can bring into Govern-
ington. Numerous analyses and proposals for adminis-
ment men from our universities, our professions, our
trative reform already exist. It is time to review these
business community who are better qualified to run this
materials and to lay plans for a change. Here is one
country's foreign policy than the self-deluded men who
try to make reality out of fiction from their desks in
area in which the appointment of a Presidential Com-
Washington. The best men, the best minds in this
mission could be more than a publicity stunt.
country are not making American foreign policy.
A Republican Congress (or at least a Republican
The Ripon Society calls on Republicans to under-
House) must adapt Congressional machinery to the de-
take new departures in foreign affairs. Though the
mands of global foreign policy. Congress should con-
issues are complex, their essentials can be brought to the
sider establishing a joint committee on intelligence and
people. In 1952 the Republican Party demonstrated
strategic planning which would require the Executive
that it could extricate America from a war on the Asian
Branch to report periodically on America's international
mainland. The issue now is whether the American
position, much as the Joint Economic Committee re-
people think our present course in Vietnam is worth
quires it to report on budgetary policies. Such a new
more deception, more resources, more lives.
Committee should have access to the on-going informa-
If they do not, there is an alternative.
This paper was written for the Ripon Society
the United States Government. The Society would
by Josiah Lee Auspitz and approved by the National
also like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of
Governing Board of the Ripon Society, Inc. The
several of its members and the number of non-
Appendix was written by Christopher W. Beal, who
members who are intimately acquainted with the
also prepared supporting research for the main
materials covered.
body of the paper. A fully footnoted version of the
paper and Appendix will be published separately by
Reprints may be ordered from the Ripon
the Ripon Society, along with a transcript of its
Society, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,
Vietnam symposium and several studies on specific
Massachusetts 02138 at $1.00 each. Please add 25c
aspects of the Vietnamese war.
for handling on all orders under $3.00. The bulk
rate is $60 per hundred. (Massachusetts residents
The map on page 17 is reprinted by courtesy of
please add 3% sales tax.)
13
SAIGON'S POOR CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION
The most important conclusions of the following
Saigon, one-fourth of the rural population in the
tables are:
Southern Lowlands traditionally has opposed the
Communists.
1. While the Viet Cong's control over its rural areas
is almost always "total," Saigon's is usually only
The numbers behind these discouraging compar-
"partial."
isons are very conservative. The "rural" population
2. Viet Cong cadres operate regularly among almost
under Saigon's control is greatly exaggerated, because
three-fourths of the rural population - the 25%
it includes district town (and probably also most pro-
controlled and the 47% contested.
vincial capitals) which are not really rural and which
can be protected by artillery and airpower without
3. The Saigon government has little positive attrac-
control over their inhabitants. The anti-Communist
tion for rural areas, for it controls no more people
groups are estimated by increasing past numbers with
(3.6 million) than the number who have been
a 2.8% annual population growth, U.S. AID's official
alienated by the Viet Cong (3.0 to 4.0 million).
figure; but since 1960, the year of Diem's most reliable
4. Over one-fifth of the rural population north of the
census, the population has grown even faster. The
Saigon area have become refugees since 1964.
number of refugees since 1964 is underestimated, because
many rural people who have fled to the cities and are
5. While the government probably relies on recent
now scratching out a living on their own have never
refugees for most of its controlled areas north of
been registered with the Saigon government.
TABLE I: Saigon's and the Viet Cong's Control over the Population of South Vietnam
Number
Percentage of
Percentage of
Total Population Rural Population
NON-URBAN POPULATION
Saigon's Control
3,618,400
21%
27%
"Total" Control
489,300
3%
4%
"Partial" Control
3,129,100
18%
23%
Contested Population
6,336,700
37%
47%
"Government-leaning"
4,360,600
25%
32%
"Viet Cong-leaning"
1,976,100
12%
Viet Cong's Control
3,325,400
19%
hiow
15%
13.5
25%
"Partial" Control
402,200
2%
is
3%
"Total" Control
2,923,200
17%
22%
Unclassified
152,300
1%
1%
URBAN POPULATION
3,732,500
22%
TOTALS:
Non-urban Population
13,432,800
78%
100%
Total Population
17,165,300
100%
N.B.: The number of voters
registered for the
Presidential election
5,853,251
69%
60%*
Total Eligible Population
over 18
8,500,000
The registered total corresponds almost exactly to one-half the sum of the urban population, plus
the rural areas under total and partial control and the "Government-leaning" portion of the con-
tested areas.
*Percentage for rural areas registered assumes one-half of the urban population to be eligible and
entirely registered.
14
TABLE II: Rural Groups that Should Support the Saigon Government
Compared to Population Actually Controlled
RURAL POPULATION GROUPS
CONTROL
STATISTICS
Northern Half of
Southern Half of
All of
(For comparison with
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Rural Group Totals for
All of South Vietnam)
(I and II Corps)
(III and IV Corps)
Most Secure Province (excluding
provincial capital)
AN GIANG PROVINCE
440,000
440,000
489,300
(Hoa Hao sect)
(Population under total
control of Saigon
Two Fairly Secure Provinces
Government)
(excluding provincial capital)
KIEN GIANG PROVINCE
339,000
339,000
(Assumed one-half Cam-
bodian)
22M farmer refugees, de-
scendants of 1954 farmer
refugees
NINH THUAN PROVINCE
128,000
128,000
2M descendants of 1954
farmer refugees
Traditional Anti-Communist
Groups
CAMBODIANS
374,000
374,000
(170M already counted in
to
to
Kien Giang Province)
624,000
624,000
DESCENDANTS OF 1954, I
76,000
80,000
156,000
Farmer refugees resettled
through Land Development
Program (24M already
counted)
DESCENDANTS OF 1954, II
765,000
765,000
Farmer refugees not
resettled through Land
Development Program
and hence still near Saigon
or now refugees in Saigon
SOUTHERN CATHOLICS
89,000
140,000
229,000
Descendants of Catholics
living south of the 17th
parallel in 1954 and out-
side of the main cities
(33% of total)
DOUBLE COUNTING
194,000
194,000
(Item to be subtracted
before totaling)
15
RURAL POPULATION GROUPS
CONTROL
STATISTICS
(For comparison with
Northern Half of Southern Half of
All of
Rural Group Totals for
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
All of South Vietnam)
(I and II Corps) (III and IV Corps)
on's Natural Support:
293,000
1,944,000
2,237,000
3,618,000
to
to
(Population under total
Three most secure provinces
2,194,000
2,487,000
or partial control of
dother traditional anti-
Saigon Government)
immunist groups)
BFUGEES SINCE 1964
1,080,000
720,000
1,800,000
(In refugee camps, returned
to home villages, resettled
delsewhere, registered and
receiving "limited assist-
fance")
INIMUM ADDITIONAL
787,000
787,000
BFUGEES
(Assumes recent refugees
include as many as possible
traditional anti-Communists)
AXIMUM ADDITIONAL
1,018,000
552,000
1,570,000
EFUGEES
to
to
(Assumes same proportion
531,000
1,549,000
of traditional anti-Com-
munists among refugees as
6
general population)
on's Minimum Potential
1,080,000
1,944,000
3,024,000
3,618,000
rol
to
to
to
ANGE: Group closest to
(Population under total
1,311,000
2,725,000
4,036,000
igon Government Control
or partial control of
raditional Anti-Communists,
Saigon Government)
free Secure Provinces, 1954
(Repeated for another
fugees)
comparison)
AL RURAL POPULATION
5,080,000
8,350,000
13,432,800
13,432,800
RCENTAGE: Saigon's
5.8%
23.3%-26.3%
itural Support as Share of
16.7%-18.5%
tral Population
RCENTAGE: Refugees as
21.3%
8.6%
are of Rural Population
13.4%
linimum Comparison, for
tal Base does not include
Reported and Unreported
fugees now in Cities)
NGE: Percentage of Group
21.3%25.8%
ntrol test to Saigon Government
23.3%-32.6%
22.4%29.8%
27%
(Total and partial
control of rural
population claimed by
Saigon Government)
16
NORTH
VIETNAM
Sakon Nakhon
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG
®
Quang Tri
Savannakhet
TRI
MUE 1
THUA
7
THIEN
by
MUI NANG
MANO
QUANG NAM
;
An
THAILAND
CORPS
Seravane
Tam Ky@
QUANG TIN
&
D
:,
Ubon
Ratchathani
S
Quang Ngaio
Pakie
QUANG
NGAI
KONTUM
@
BINH
Kontum
DINH
Pleiku
PLEIKU
Oui Nhon
.
Stung
PHU
2
Treng
Hau
PHU
Bon
C
A
M
B
o
D
I
A
BON
YEN
Tuy Hoa
II CORPS
DARLAC
© Ban Me
Purest_
Thuot
KHANH
HOA
QUANG
Rha Trang
R
DUC
TUYEN
Cia Nghia
PHUOC
©
DA LAY D
Kompong Cham
CAR KANN
Phooe
DUC
Binn
NINH
BINH
An
LONG
PHNOM PENH
TAY
LAM DONG
THUAN
#
NINH
LONG
Bao Loc
on
.
(Phan Rang
Tay
Ninh
CORPS
©
LONG
BINH
BINH
DUONG
KHANH
BINH
THUAN
Phu
Cyong OVEN
TUY
Khiema
HALLED 18ian
Kuan
Phan Thist
Cuong
NEHI
HOA
Loc
KIEN
© KIEN
Chau
Moc
001
a
Pou
PHONG
Hos
CHAU
TUONG
ONG AN
PHUOC
Ham
Cao Lanh
GIA
Phunc Le
Tan
DOC
0
etuy
Long &
DINH The
Xuyen
TUONG
O
Dc
YUNG TAU
SOUTH VIETNAM
GIANG DEC
GO CONG
040
Sa Dec
VINH
True Glarty
CAPITAL
KIEN
KEEN HOA
SPECIAL ZONE
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
Rach GIVE
The
LONG
CIANG
PHONG
AND MILITARY REGIONS
DINN
Phu Vinit
Vie
VINHA
JUNE 1967
Thank
BINH
CHUONG
THIEN
BA
©
Khannel
International boundary
XUYENHINE
Province boundary
BAC
NOR
Quan
©
Military corps boundery
PARIANG
Longe
LIEU Bar Liev
IV CORPS
®
National capital
AN
.
Province capital
XUYEN
PA (AT
Automomous municipality
and BAI BUNDR
CON SON
0
25
50
7
100 Miles
0
25
50
75
100 Kilometers
BOUNDARD 1861 a 15
401 a DISORITATIVE
17
SOURCES
Control Statistics
R. W. Apple, Jr., "Vietnam: Signs of Stalemate,"
New York Times, August 7, 1967, p. 14.
2.8% Yearly Population Increase
U.S.A.I.D., Vietnam, Joint Economic Division,
Annual Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, issued September
1966, P. 2.
Provincial Population Estimates (as of July 1964)
Ibid., p. 5.
Listing of An Giang as Most Secure Province; Kien
Giang and Ninh Thuan as Next Most Secure
Simon Head, "Pacifying Vietnam," Far Eastern
Economic Review, May 4, 1967, P. 260.
Number of Cambodians (assumed for mid-1960 to be
300,000 - 500,000)
Joseph Buttinger, "The Ethnic Minorities in the
Republic of Vietnam," PP- 99 - 121 of Problems of
Freedom, ed. by Wesley R. Fishel, M.S.U. Press,
1961, P. 120, n. 3.
Northern Refugees Resettled before July 1959
William Henderson, "Opening of New Lands and
Villages," Ibid., p. 136.
Farmer Refugees from North
Bui Van Long, former General Director of the
Refugee Commission of the Government of Viet-
nam, "The Role of Friendly Nations," pp. 48 - 53
of Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, An Interna-
tional Symposium, ed. by Richard W. Lindholm,
M.S.U. Press, 1959, P. 49.
Refugees in South Vietnam as of June 30, 1966
Government of Vietnam Special Commissariat for
Refugees, reproduced in William A. Nighswonger,
Rural Pacification in Vietnam, Praeger, 1966, PP.
181.
Refugees in South Vietnam as of February 6, 1967
Congressional Record, February 6, 1967, S 1609.
Descendants of Catholics in South Vietnam before 1954
Francis J. Corley, "Vietnam Since Geneva" in
Thought: Fordham University Quarterly, Vol.
XXXIII, No. 131, Winter 1958 - 1959; reprinted
by American Friends of Vietnam, p. 523. Higher
estimate is closer, for it includes the Hue vicariate,
"most" of whom were south of the 17th parallel.
18
APPENDIX: THE HISTORICAL BASIS
FOR A CONFEDERAL STRATEGY
The Three Regions of South Vietnam
The following appendix reviews the different political
ignoring the persistent regional differences of South
histories of the three basic regions of South Vietnam: the
Vietnam.
Coast, the Highlands, and the Southern Lowlands. The
historic roots and modern survival of crucial regional dif-
ferences are traced through five periods: pre-French and
The Highlands: Pre-French Tradition
French (up to 1945); Viet Minh activities (1945 - 54); the
Diem regime (1954 - 63); the Start of the Insurgency
(1957 - 63); and, Recent Events and U.S. Policy. Because
and French Rule
of their greater importance for one region, Diem and the
Viet Cong are discussed most fully in the appropriate sec-
The Highlands - comprising well over half of the
tions under the Southern Lowlands, and the Buddhists are
territory and within an hour's drive of most of the rest
treated in the last section on the Coast.
of South Vietnam - have always been unattractive to
lowland Vietnamese. Malaria, infertile soil, tigers, and
Any stable solution in South Vietnam other than com-
hostile tribesmen kept out Vietnamese settlements during
plete Communist control will have to respond much better
a thousand years of Vietnamese migration in adjacent
to local differences than is now possible. Even the Com-
areas.
munists in the North, with much smaller minority popu-
The tribesmen living in the Highlands are of at
lations, grant more cultural autonomy than the govern-
least two races, speak many languages, live in settle-
ment in Saigon. It is too late simply to make informal
ments of only a few thousand, and have no generally
concessions to local leaders within a centralized legal
recognized political institutions or tradition of common
structure, because such concessions have been made and
action. But the tribesmen have one thing in common -
betrayed by past Saigon governments, sometimes with
fear and hatred of the lowlanders, first of the Cham who
American assistance.
drove them from the fertile lowlands into the malarial
hills and then of the Vietnamese who kept them there
Our purpose is not to discredit the desire for cen-
and who sometimes tried to impose upon them the Viet-
tralized unity held by many urban Vietnamese nor to
namese way of life.
recriminate against American officials who often had to
Another thing most tribesmen have in common is a
make decisions within incorrect policy assumptions. It is
slash-and-burn technique of rice growing. Most land is
necessary, however, for anyone who wants to avoid the
left to weeds, small brush, and trees. Every few years an
refugee camp "solution" to appreciate the views of the
area is cleared, burned over, and cultivated until the
different rural areas, cut off from Saigon and from each
soil's temporary fertility is exhausted. The slash-and-
other. It is also necessary to realize that past mistakes
burn technique imposes a low population density and
in American policy cannot be dismissed by well-informed
small, scattered settlements on the tribes because most
Vietnamese as simply unfortunate decisions by a previous
of the land is left to grow wild.
rotation of Americans, because, unlike the French, the
The French did not rule the Highlands with con-
American government has great power to change reality
sistent policies. Sometimes they used tribesmen as local
to fit its myths.
administrators, sometimes Frenchmen, and sometimes the
The United States has great moral responsibilities for
hated Vietnamese. The French started schools, invented
South Vietnam's present difficulties, not only for millions
scripts for tribal languages, and established some modern
of refugees and for military officers and civilian officials
medical facilities. At the same time, the French brought
with poor prospects under a Communist regime. The
new products to the lowlands which replaced the cash
United States has steadily supported, in the name of
crops of the tribesmen, reducing their ability to support
"freedom" for South Vietnam, a great degree of central-
themselves. The French also impressed tribesmen to
work on roads and plantations.
ization and has ignored political repression. Americans
would never accept these actions at home. South Viet-
Although the French record in the Highlands was
nam's fragmented urban political groups and confused
certainly a dubious one - and provoked widespread
countryside are partly the result of thirteen years of in-
tribal revolts in the 1930's - the tribesmen south of
dependence without reform under Saigon governments
the 17th parallel can compare them favorably to the last
able to rely on American aid instead of taxes. Americans
Vietnamese dynasty and to the Diem regime, both of
should hesitate before being patronizing about South
which seized tribal lands, established Vietnamese settle-
Vietnam's lack of democracy.
ments in the Highlands, and tried to impose Vietnamese
customs on the tribesmen.
A Vietnamese businessman summed it up to an
American reporter last month: "You Americans think
we are stupid and backward people, but we are progres-
sive, and we will not be given a chance in this election."
The Highlands: Viet Minh Activities
He had half a chance, and 65% of the country took it to
show that they did not like the generals. But, because of
The Viet Minh success was based on an unprecedented
military pressure on the Constituent Assembly last sum-
adjustment by lowland Vietnamese to the Highland en-
mer the South Vietnamese did not have a chance to vote
vironment and to tribal customs. The anti-malarial pill,
in a run-off between the generals and their closest civilian
which the Viet Minh secretly purchased in large quantities
rivals. Now our government is touting the generals as
from French merchants, was generally regarded within
the first ticket in a "fair" election, but American officials
the Viet Minh as the greatest physical factor (aside
will not mention at home that the generals did not dare
from captured weapons and ammunition) behind their
enter a run-off. And neither will they mention that the
success. Viet Minh cadres who worked among the tribes
generals, with the encouragement of American policy, are
learned their languages, adopted their dress (even break-
19
ing their front teeth if local custom demanded), and
to ounter it he was refused. When the American Mission
married tribal women. Able tribesmen were given leader-
eventually opposed Diem's project for resettling ethnic
ship posts within the Viet Minh, and the most loyal tribe
Vietnamese in the Highlands, the reason given was the in-
(the Tho) was even represented by a Brigadier General.
fertility of the soil in the strategic places Diem chose,
Unlike earlier rebels against the French, the Viet
not the hostility such settlements were arousing among
Minh were able to use the Highlands for base camps
the tribes.
and rest areas and to recruit tribesmen for coolies and
Diem had taken office without a clear idea of the
soldiers. In the North, the Viet Minh had already ad-
Viet Minh path to victory, but by 1957, when the infiltra-
vanced into Laos when the French decided to fortify
tion began from the North, he was very sensitive to the
Dien Bien Phu in a vain effort to keep the loyalty of
unprecedented danger posed by enemy control of the
the Tai tribes and to defend Laos (whose French-sup-
Highlands. In addition to intensifying his unfortunate
ported government was the only one in Indochina satis-
cultural imperialism, Diem wanted to build access roads
fied with its limited degree of independence) against
through the Highlands and to turn his Civil Guard into
a paramilitary force to combat the infiltration by North
further invasions.
South of the 17th parallel, the Viet Minh effort
Vietnam. In Saigon, the American Embassy and the
came later but with as much success. By 1954, the Viet
U.S. Mission preferred more conspicuous roads, between
Minh had infiltrated the Highlands, opened the Ho Chi
the cities. U.S. officials in Saigon also opposed giving
Minh Trail, defeated the elite French Groupe Mobile
military training to the Civil Guard because it was
100, and gained a position to cut through to the sea
grouped in Diem's Interior Department instead of De-
coast if the French refused a cease-fire after Dien Bien
fense! When Diem made a special State Visit to Wash-
Phu. In the post-Geneva regroupment, some 25,000 tribes-
ington to ask for bulldozers for the roads and for financial
men left the area south of the 17th parallel - over
and training support for a paramilitary force, he was
twice as many proportionally as the number of lowland
again refused.
regroupees to the North.
The Highlands: Diem and Early
The Highlands: Start of the Insurgency
In 1957, just as Diem's repressive policies were taking
U.S. Policy
effect, tribesmen who had gone north in 1954 and who
had been trained as cadres in Hanoi began returning
Diem was the first lowland Vietnamese ever to rule
and starting cells in their home villages. Since the Viet
Minh had earlier taken over the area from the French
the Highlands directly, and his policies basically reflected
lowland contempt of the tribesmen. He regarded tribal
and since Diem had a much worse record among the
lands as the public domain and granted the choicest
tribes (around Kontum, Communist propaganda even
valleys to ethnic Vietnamese in order to facilitate direct
promised to bring back a popular French administrator
once the South Vietnamese were driven from the High-
Vietnamese physical control over the Highlands, to settle
refugees from the North, and to relieve population pres-
lands), the newly trained cadres moved easily through
sure along the crowded Coast. Diem abolished the cus-
the Highlands.
The Communist propaganda emphasized the autono-
tomary tribal courts established by the French and made
Vietnamese the language of instruction in the schools.
mous zones (on the Soviet and Communist Chinese
models) recently created for the tribes in North Vietnam.
Many of Diem's important American supporters ap-
proved of his approach to the tribesmen. An Associate
In the North, tribesmen were given administrative posts
Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations
within their areas, the Tho general cited earlier was
made chairman of his zone, tribal languages were kept
and one of the Council's Far Eastern specialists dismissed
other approaches (presumably the autonomous zones of
in the schools, tribesmen were given higher education
in Hanoi and elsewhere in the Communist bloc, and there
the French and of North Vietnam) as "reservations."
Under Diem, the tribes were to be "made more subject
was no land-grabbing by ethnic Vietnamese, although
to civil administration" and "ultimately assimilated"
population pressure was much greater in the North than
into "the surrounding civilization." Another early sup-
along Diem's Coast. Supporting the cadres were radio
porter, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
programs in tribal languages broadcast from Hanoi, while
Diem's government had discontinued such broadcasts
American Friends of Vietnam, wrote:
The tribesmen, unused to Vietnamese friend-
after the regroupment period, 1954
liness, grew more suspicious with every official
assurance of concern; the more they were told
that the government would at last do something
The Highlands: Recent Events
to remove the causes of their plight, the more
opposed they seemed to every new administrative
measure.*
and U.S. Policy
Not surprisingly, Diem's policies provoked a wide-
spread revolt in the Highlands. In the revolt were the
A crucial recent development has been the disil-
two tribes which the French had given important ad-
lusionment of the tribesmen with the Viet Cong. Harsh
ministrative posts and hence contacts beyond their
taxation and impressment of coolies for increased Viet
villages. The leader, Y Bham, a Rhade tribesman, is now
Cong operations over the past few years have destroyed
the leader of FULRO, the leading tribal organization.
the advantage the Viet Cong once had in the region.
Early American policy in the Highlands was different
While taxes and recruitment have always been great
from, but no better than Diem's. The French disbanded
burdens on Viet Minh and Viet Cong hard-core villages,
their commando force, the GMCA, and the American
the Communists have generally used political techniques
Military Mission did not pick up French contacts for
which prevent effective opposition. Short-sighted exac-
commando or intelligence operations. When two members
tions in the Highlands may have been undertaken con-
of the Michigan State Advisory Group in Vietnam re-
sciously, in the hope that victory over all of South
turned from field trips with reports of tribesmen cadres
Vietnam would come too swiftly for the tribesmen to
from North Vietnam organizing groups in the Highlands,
resist.
the U.S. Mission ignored them. When even Diem himself,
Unfortunately, the post-Diem Saigon governments
in a visit to Washington described below, warned of in-
have not moved strongly enough in the Highlands to
filtration in the Highlands and asked for American aid
make up for Diem's mistakes. The first steps have
been taken, and many good promises have been made. In
*The latter and probably also the former later changed
February 1964, Y Bham, the leader of the 1958 revolt,
their views on Diem. These passages are not cited to
was released from jail; in March a Bureau for Montag-
reflect discredit on these men, but to illustrate the
nard Affairs was established. In October 1964, the Saigon
general approval given by Americans to even Diem's
government held a conference for tribal leaders to pre-
cultural imperialism. (Pages 125 and 105 of Problems of
sent their grievances. The tribesmen now have national
Freedom, edited by Wesley R. Fishel, Michigan State
representation, access to universities through lower admis-
University Press, 1961.)
sions test scores than are required of the better-educated
20
Vietnamese, places in noncommissioned officers' schools,
only way to eliminate foreign domination. In South
a greater hand in local administration, and a promise of
Vietnam, the U.S. must show that this is not true.
a fair system of land titles.
Yet the confidence of the tribesmen has not yet
been gained. The conference of October 1964 was held
The Coast: Pre-French Tradition and
only after a revolt in September, and that revolt was
caused by the assumption of command over tribal military
units by ethnic Vietnamese ARVN officers. There have
French Rule
been two revolts since, in October and December 1965.
The latter revolt was well-organized, being staged simul-
Coastal Vietnam differs from the Southern Lowlands
taneously in five of the seven provincial capitals. Armed
in several important respects: it has a longer pre-French
tribesmen serving under Vietnamese officers have ex-
history; more extensive pre-French social cohesion, smal-
pressed the intent to throw out the South Vietnamese
ler change under French colonial rule; and, most impor-
by force when the Viet Cong are defeated.
tant, a far longer history of Communist influence. Because
A Tribal Revolt this Fall?
he is more traditional, is less Westernized, and probably
This fall there may be still yet another revolt in the
has Communist relatives, even the most anti-Communist
Highlands. When the Constituent Assembly was writing
Coastal Vietnamese is more difficult for Americans to
the present South Vietnamese Constitution, the tribes-
understand than a Vietnamese from Saigon or the Me-
men demanded explicit guarantees of autonomy. The
kong Delta.
Assembly, largely composed of urban Vietnamese, refused
The Coastal Region of South Vietnam extends down
to include such guarantees, though they wrote a long
through the present I Corps, the northernmost military
and detailed document with over one hundred articles.
region. But south of the next province, Binh Dinh, the
A tribal revolt was averted this spring only by promises
land narrows even further and is disrupted by sand dunes.
from Saigon and American officials that similar guaran-
Many villages (Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa) depend upon fish-
tees of autonomy will be passed by statute when the
ing instead of upon rice-farming. Still farther south,
new House and Senate convene this fall. If the newly
there is a half-settled area (Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan)
elected legislators refuse to honor promises made by the
which was once fully cultivated by the Cham people
military government and U.S. officials (quite possible for
but which the Vietnamese did not maintain or revive.
civilian politicans who hate the military government and
Vietnam's traditional civilization began in the Red
who fear permanent American domination), then another
River Delta in North Vietnam. Because the Coastal Low-
tribal revolt seems likely. It is important to note that
land are too narrow to attract quick settlement, the
the previous revolts have occurred in the fall, when the
Vietnamese moved down the coast only quite slowly, less
rainy season hampers the transport of Vietnamese and
than a thousand miles in about a thousand years. Their
American troops into the Highlands.
migration, spurred by internal political disputes and
Y Bham, now living in Cambodia, heads the only
population pressure, was necessarily southward; move-
tribal political group (FULRO) and claims to have or-
ment was blocked to the North by the stronger Chinese
ganized the three revolts of 1964 5. In their negotiations
and to the West by the even less hospitable mountains.
Poor communications made a centralized state im-
with FULRO representatives, the Saigon government and
the U.S. Mission have recognized FULRO leadership of
possible, but migration was slow enough that the same
structure of village life existed all the way down the
past revolts and taken seriously FULRO threats of re-
Coast when the French arrived in the mid-1800's. These
volts in the future. FULRO and the Cambodian govern-
villages were the basis of Vietnamese tradition. Much of
ment have agreed on a common propaganda line, that
all the Montagnards of South Vietnam are of the same
the land, averaging 25% and sometimes as much as
racial stock as the Cambodians in South Vietnam and
70%, was redistributed every few years among the house-
Cambodia. While based on false history (at least two
holds. Except for trade with neighboring villages special-
racial groups live in the Highlands), FULRO-Cambodian
izing in certain handicrafts, the rice-growing villages
were self-sufficient communities, independent of outside
cooperation corresponds to joint self-interest. FULRO
gains a safe headquarters on the Cambodian side of the
influence. Anyone from beyond the ring of immediately
border and access to the outside world. Cambodia gains
surrounding villages was regarded as a "foreigner." Ex-
contacts in the strategic Highlands of South Vietnam
cept for levying taxes and occasionally recruiting troops,
which may help less populous Cambodia to restrain any
the power of the Emperor stopped at the village gate.
future expansionist ethnic Vietnamese government in
In the traditional village the mandarin class provided
Saigon, whether Communist or not.
the best tie to the outside world. Most mandarins lived
The United States has always been in a difficult
in the villages, renting land, lending money, and serving
position in the Highlands. In 1961, the sending of the
on the village Councils of Notables. Some obtained,
Special Forces (similar to the previously disbanded
through examination or purchase, appointments from the
French commandos) was an implicit repudiation of Diem's
Emperor to provincial and district posts.
Fortunately, the Emperor was not a dictator in the
tribal policies and aroused Vietnamese suspicions. In
1964, after Diem's fall, the Special Forces were trans-
modern sense. Though the Confucian ethic supported
ferred from the CIA to the U.S. Army. Vietnamese
his powers over the mandarins in theory, the Emperor
ARVN officers replaced Americans commanding tribal
was restrained by the mandarins' partial independence
units and American officers became "advisers," as in the
of their salaries provided by their rents, interest, and
Lowlands. In the revolt and negotiations that have fol-
bribes and by the general expectation of all office-pur-
lowed this shift, Americans have played a crucial role
chasers that they would not be removed until they had
in mediating between the tribes and the ARVN. (The
gained a fair return on their investment. The power
only Vietnamese officer the tribes respected in 1964
of the mandarins over the villagers was restrained by
was jailed as a "neutralist.") But the unremitting hos-
several factors: the large proportion of communal land;
tility between most Vietnamese and the tribesmen (and
the lack of absentee landowners; a consciousness of ex-
Cambodians) and repeated decisions by the U.S. Mission
tended families, all of whose members, rich and poor,
worshipped the same ancestors; and a tradition of com-
in Saigon in favor of the Vietnamese will eventually
promise and adjustment in interpersonal relations.
undermine the prestige of Americans on the spot. The
Even before the arrival of French officials, this vil-
U.S. cannot expect to keep tribal loyalties by giving
lage tradition was challenged by Catholic missionaries in
out medical care and T-shirts emblazoned with the South
the North and along much of the Coast. The Buddhists
Vietnamese flag, because the Saigon government is not
had not established a centralized hierachy extending down
yet trusted. The only stable solution is a full recognition
into the villages that could compete with the influence
of tribal autonomy by urban Vietnamese. The U.S. can-
of the mandarin class. The Catholics not only set up such
not simultaneously mollify the tribes by implying a long
a hierarchy, they also developed a village daily routine
American presence and placate the Vietnamese by prom-
ising to leave as soon as Hanoi negotiates. Tribal min-
- mass every morning and regular prayers in the fields
at the ringing of the Angelus - which defied the tradi-
orities are a general post-colonial problem, for most
tion of compromise and forced villages to convert as
anti-colonial revolutions were led by well-educated low-
landers insisting that a highly centralized unity was the
whole units. Catholic villages were persecuted regularly
by their neighbors, often with the encouragement of the
21
Emperor, for their competing hierarchy and foreign way
to estimate probable tax returns and decide to travel
of life.
without military escorts was quite different from Na-
But despite the Catholic problem, when French of-
varre's. According to the civilians, France controlled
ficials arrived in the late 1800's, they found a relatively
only four isolated areas: the Hanoi-Haiphong area (where
stable social and political system, which they chose to
many French troops were stationed) and the Catholic
preserve along the Coast. Unlike the Southern Lowlands,
Bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu, where an anti-
the Highlands, and the Red River Delta, the Coast had
French Vietnamese clergy, not Frenchmen, enjoyed the
no minerals or lands appropriate for rice or rubber plan-
support of the populace.
tations whose exploitation would require and pay for
Along the Coast, in 1954 it was not even Frenchmen
direct French rule. The French therefore gave the
who were in charge of the non-Viet Minh enclaves. The
Vietnamese Emperor in Hue nominal authority, main-
decisive political figures under Emperor Bao Dai, the
tained a small French staff for the Coast, and controlled
French "alternative" to Ho Chi Minh, were Coastal
the Emperor through the Resident, ostensibly just an
mandarins and adventurers. By the end of the war, these
"adviser." The French even preserved the traditional
men had finally bargained from the French the financial
civil service examination based on the Confucian Classics
support for a "Vietnamese" army, predominantly led by
until 1917, twelve years after the Chinese themselves
French officers. During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu,
had abandoned them.
Bao Dai's followers were even able to obtain a major
While they had lost some power, Coastal mandarins,
separate operation along the Coast with troops that might
unlike those of the North and South, were not closely
have been better used in the undermanned French fortress
tied to French officials and businessmen. The French
to the North.
presence along the Coast did not bring great economic
After the settlement in Geneva just as the French
changes or disrupt traditional village life. Therefore,
were allowed to occupy Hanoi and Haiphong for 300 days
Coastal Vietnamese of all social classes, no matter how
to regroup their forces, the Viet Minh received full legal
well they spoke the French language, always regarded
authority over Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh, a longtime
the French presence as an insulting, alien intrusion which
Coastal stronghold between the 16th and 14th parallels.
would eventually be expelled.
In the two provinces, the Viet Minh established a long-
term political base by ordering several hundred of their
regular soldiers to marry local girls and leave them be-
The Coast: Viet Minh Activities
hind when they were withdrawn to the North in accord
with the Geneva agreements.
In most provinces, the Viet Minh ordered specific
From the outset of the anti-French revolt, the Viet
members to stay behind, and in many areas, they main-
Minh controlled most of the Coastal region. The situation
tained an intelligence network. The Hanoi government
was so severe for the French that they did not even
itself produced convincing evidence for such a network
attempt population estimates for most of the Coastal
when it described in detail to the International Control
provinces - indispensable for taxation and recruitment.
Commission reprisals by the Diem government in South
These estimates were made even for hostile provinces
Vietnam against former members of the Viet Minh be-
to the North and South.
tween July 1954 and July 1957. According to Bernard
Viet Minh influence along the Coast was assisted by
Fall's map of Communist Complaints, this intelligence
the fact that the only political groups active in the region
network was especially active in the Quang Tri-Hue-
were those the Viet Minh were already defeating in the
Danang area, which produced over one-third of the
Red River Delta through better organization, superior
descriptions of reprisals.
tactics and assassination of crucial leaders.
With the exception of the Catholic Bishoprics, and
the Emperor Bao Dai, political groups could be started
The Coast: Diem Family's Rule
only in exile in China, Hong Kong, and Japan. When
Northern and Coastal students conspired in exile for
Diem's family, the Ngo Dinh's, was a leading Catholic
unity, their rivalries were not so much regional as
manadarin clan centered on Hue. Diem and his older
personal or ideological, except to the extent of excluding
brother Khoi served as provincial governors under French
Southerners, whom the French were more confident of
indirect rule in Binh Dinh and Quang Tri Provinces,
controlling and who therefore were allowed some political
both along the Coast. When Diem took power in Saigon,
activity. When the Communists were able to limit the
his authority along the Coast was exercised by two men
power of rival exile groups in the North, the power of
whose names did not appear in official government docu-
anti-Communist groups was simultaneously limited along
ments: his brothers Thuc and Can. (Diem himself is
the Coast.
therefore discussed later, under the Southern Lowlands.)
By 1949, according to Lucien Boddard's insurgency
Thuc played a crucial role in the family and in the
map, the Viet Minh controlled all of the Coast north of
regime because he was the eldest surviving brother in the
Dong Hoi, a city just north of the 17th parallel. The
clan (Khoi was buried alive by the Viet Minh) and the
French then had a thin strip of four cities down to the
leading Vietnamese Catholic prelate. He frequently medi-
16th parallel: Dong Noi, Quang Tri, Hue, and Danang.
ated among the other brothers, especially at the clan's
Farther south, the Viet Minh controlled between the
annual meetings in Hue. Thuc also provided a discreet
16th and 14th parallels in 1949. During the next four
channel between the clan and important foreign Catho-
years, according to the May 1953 insurgency map of the
lics. (He was a former classmate of Francis Cardinal
French General Henri Navarre, the Viet Minh extended
Spellman in the Vatican.) Thuc also provided access to
their control down to the 11th parallel, around Phan
the regime for prominent Vietnamese, many of them
Thiet. Only two isolated French controlled cities in this
non-Catholic, who had complaints or suggestions but
area, Nha Trang and Phan Rang, were outside of Viet
who feared Diem and his brother Nhu too much to ap-
Minh control in this period. Bernard Fall's insurgency
proach them directly. This mediating role for non-
maps for 1954 (the first presumably for January or
Catholic Vietnamese was crucial for Thue, because it
February, published in March; the second for July) credit
protected him from criticism against his ideological role
the French with regaining control of the countryside
in the regime.
between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, but Fall still con-
The ideology of the regime was "Personalism." an
ceded the Viet Minh control of the Coast between the
intellectually respectable doctrine originally developed by
16th and 12th parallels when the war ended. Yet these
liberal Catholics in the 1930's. Many non-Catholic Viet-
estimates are clearly biased against the Viet Minh. They
namese, however, regarded it as simply a new political
include French urban enclaves, but omit at least one
terminology which the Ngo Dinh family could use to
prominent rural enclave controlled by the Viet Minh -
communicate with Vietnamese Catholics without encour-
the famous "Street Without Joy," a strip of villages be-
aging comparisons to the Catholic role under the French.
tween Quang Tri and Hue.
Thuc had started an institute to train people in Person-
Fall revealed the extent of Navarre's bias against
alism during the war against the French, when he was
acknowledging Viet Minh control in the Red River Delta.
Bishop of Vinh Long. About the time Diem took power,
The French military map conceded only five small, iso-
Thuc was elevated to the Archbishopric of Hue. He
lated areas to the Viet Minh in May 1953. On the other
moved his institute to Dalat and (with Cardinal Spell-
hand, the map of the French civilian officials who had
man's financial assistance) he simultaneously founded
22
the Catholic University of Dalat. Under Diem, Thuc's
is used here to describe the Viet Cong, it is not meant
institute for Personalism was the training school for mem-
to imply a spontaneous rebellion. The tragedy of South
bers of the Can Lao, a secret political group whose
Vietnam, especially along the Coast, is that the only form
members held administrative posts in the provinces and
of resistance available on the spot was a Communist
who reported directly to Diem's brother Nhu on the
movement already repudiated, at least implicitly, by the
behavior of non-Can Lao (hence mostly non-Catholic)
urban elite that had not already joined the Viet Minh.
officials.
This tragedy was the responsibility of Ngo Dinh Can
Diem's brother Can was a complete contrast to the
along the Coast. The role of North Vietnam was clear:
rest of the clan. He did not speak a foreign language
retaining an intelligence network after the partition of
and hence had almost no contact with foreigners. Nor
1954, supplementing that network with well-trained local
did he have much contact with Vietnamese, rarely
men who had been picked to go north in 1954; and, sup-
appearing in public and usually speaking only to his
plying the Viet Cong with limited arms and ammunition,
own followers. He ran a skeleton network of secret agents
in addition to those captured and secretly manufactured.
for Diem to watch Nhu and his supporters in the South,
Though not "aggression" in a conventional military sense,
predominantly refugee Catholics from the North. Other-
these acts were unequivocally aggressive.
wise, Can confined his activities to the Coast. He was
When Can realized the growing Viet Cong strength
a traditional, consistent warlord in the region, promoting
in his region, he responded, not by shelling and relocating
his supporters and punishing his opponents with political
villages as Diem and Nhu did to the south, but by train-
prisons and tortures that eventually shocked even old
ing cadres to live with the villagers as the Viet Cong do.
Asia hands; he controlled nominations to the National
Can's cadres minimized the level of violence by firing
Assembly and provincial and district appointments. After
only at individuals only when fired upon, and they kept
1956, when Diem abolished traditional Vietnamese village
the struggle on a political basis which did not force the
elections, Can replaced doubtful village and hamlet
villagers to choose sides. Can's cadres, some of whom
officials as well. Before the elections of March 1956,
were even being trained for the Mekong Delta when
Can had almost fifteen thousand people arrested, a far
Diem fell, were the direct antecedent of the present
larger number than any estimate of Viet Minh agents
"Revolutionary Development" cadres now gaining much
left south of the 17th parallel and an average of three
attention.
people per hamlet.
In Western terms, both Thuc and Can were "corrupt."
They exploited their public influence to assist their opera-
tions in Saigon real estate, forest concessions in the High-
lands, and the shipping business. But their system of rule
The Coast: Recent Events and U.S. Policy
was inherently more stable than that of Diem and Nhu in
the Southern Lowlands. Can was predictable in his repres-
Only an extraordinary group of men could have or-
sions, SO people who never spoke against him in private
did not feel threatened; Thuc provided access and an
ganized a new political group without succumbing to the
incentive for respected non-Personalists to remain dis-
secret agents of Can and the Viet Cong. Fortunately
for Vietnam, such men appeared, inspiring millions of
creet. Both brothers maintained loyal followings through
careful promotions.
Vietnamese along the Coast and in Saigon. They were the
militant Buddhists, based in the imperial city of Hue.
While their successes were wholly unexpected, they were
not without their weaknesses, the simple products of
their past.
The Coast: Start of the Insurgency
In addition to arousing Vietnamese and foreigners
to the hopelessness of the Diem regime and bringing down
The present Viet Cong strength along the Coast is
several post-Diem governments, the militant Buddhists
the natural result of the past twenty years. The Viet
negotiated two coalitions which promised them dominant
Minh controlled most of the rural areas against the French
influence around Hue and some national representation
and eliminated their nationalist rivals in the region.
in Saigon. The first coalition was suppressed by force,
When almost all of the Viet Minh had gone north in
the second was betrayed by Ky. Both the suppression and
1954 55, Ngo Dinh Can imposed a repressive rule mostly
the betrayal had U.S. support. The refusal of other non-
through Catholics which, like that of the earlier
Communist Vietnamese and of American policy-makers
French, prevented all political activity along the Coast
to develop a coalition with these men was a mistake
except for secret activity. As under the French, exile
which may have been irrevocable.
groups formed (in Paris instead of South China), but
The militant Buddhists' leader, Thich ("Reverend")
no new indigenous organizations could be started.
Tri Quang, is completely different from the urban Viet-
People hostile to Can had few alternatives. They
namese politicians and ARVN officers Americans prefer
could remain silent and do nothing, although this was
to deal with. He lacks both a manadarin education and
impossible under Vietnamese custom for anyone with a
foreign contacts, both of which are now in disrepute
friend or relative imprisoned or tortured. If they were
along the traditionalist Coast. Originally respected for
rich enough, they could go to Paris. Anyone who stayed
his knowledge of Buddhist scripture and self-denying
and wanted to resist had to join the Viet Cong, the
ascetism, Thich Tri Quang has been out of Vietnam only
successor to the Viet Minh and the only organization
once, for a short visit to Japan. His sudden populartity
with the clandestine techniques sufficient to survive Can's
was both a reflection of his intense, inflamatory speaking
secret police.
style and a repudiation of first the Diem regime and
The Viet Cong were therefore able to regain the
then successive Saigon governments as hopeless alterna-
position held by the Viet Minh along the Coast without
tives to the Viet Cong along the Coast.
nearly as many demonstrations and assassinations as in
The first political effort of the Buddhists was against
the Southern Lowlands. In the first period of Viet Cong
the Diem regime, beginning publicly in May 1963 with
violence tabulated by Bernard Fall, April 1957 to April
an incident at the Buddha's birthday celebration. Ac-
1958, there were only two assassination along the Coast,
cording to Ngo Dinh Nhu, Tri Quang had actually started
compared with more than fifty to the south. When Fall
the movement in Hue in 1961 by tricking Ngo Dinh Can
made his second analysis, April 1959 to April 1960, he
into paying subsidies for an inner group to prevent
did not even survey most of the Coast. Douglas Pike's
Communist infiltration of the Buddhist organization
list of "struggle movements" publicized by the Viet Cong
around Hue. Even if he did plan extensively in advance,
between December 1960 (founding of NLF) and Septem-
Tri Quang was by no means in a position to overthrow
ber 1964 credits (aside from eleven places whose region
Can when at the celebration his police prevented the
cannot be identified) only sixteen movements to specific
normal flying of the Buddhist flag without the simul-
places along the Coast and one hundred seven to places
taneous display of the South Vietnamese flag. After
in the Southern Lowlands.
several celebrators were killed, the Buddhist leadership
At the same time, in the years after 1956, surviving
tried to prolong the ensuing tension. When Diem met
Viet Minh agents along the Coast were supplemented by
their demands for assistance to the victims' survivors,
the return of Viet Minh members who had gone north
they insisted that the aid be described as "compensation,"
for further training in 1954. While the word "insurgency"
thus trying to force an implicit admission of police guilt.
23
Two great strokes of luck turned the Buddhist
Buddhists leaders tried to whip up an anti-Catholic sen-
leadership from a conspiracy seeking a cause into
timent as a means of strengthening their own position
a factor in world politics. On June 11, when the
with the vast non-Catholic majority.
Buddhist leadership was straining to keep resentment
At the same time, all Buddhist leaders were agreed
alive, an old monk burned himself to death in Saigon.
that only an ideology based on Buddhism could save
While the Buddhist tradition respects such suicides,
Vietnam from Communism, that an empty anti-Com-
nothing like it had ever been done before in Vietnam.
munism led by Catholics could not win in the villages. Im-
Instead of gaining simply a mild boost, the Buddhists
mediately after Diem's fall, the Buddhist leaders planned
found a transformed population. In Saigon the popular
a national Buddhist organization parallel to the South
response was extended by memorial services and the
Vietnamese government and reaching down into the
display of a heart, said to have survived the monk's
villages, as exists in Thailand and Cambodia. Thich
immolation and a final cremation. As a Saigon official
Tri Quang became the symbolic leader of the new or-
told a Time reporter, "We have been living under a
ganization, corresponding to the head of state. Thich Tam
regime of terrorism, but after Quang Duc [the immolated
Chau, a milder refugee from the North who had led
monk] I no longer feel fear."
Buddhists against the Viet Minh in the autonomous
The second event occurred in August, when Nhu sent
Catholic Bishopric of Phat Diem, was made premier and
the police into the pagoda used as the Buddhists' Saigon
placed over a cabinet of ministers. At the same time,
headquarters. The United States had already urged Diem
many Buddhist monks were made chaplains to ARVN
to mollify the Buddhists, and in other Buddhist countries
units.
Asians were blaming the Catholic President Kennedy for
Naturally, Vietnamese Catholic leaders were opposed
the supposed repressions of Buddhism by the Catho-
to the Buddhists riding to power on a wave of anti-
lic President Diem. After the pagoda raid, President
Catholic feeling and then assuming exactly the same
Kennedy hinted that Nhu's overthrow was necessary
political role the Catholics had enjoyed first under the
and made his famous remark "they [the Vietnamese] have
French and then under Diem. Since the native Southern
to win it." The coup that followed two months later was
Catholics were a disproportionately large portion of the
the result of complex military intrigues and complicity
urban middle class and since most of the Northern
by United States officials. Though the Buddhist leaders
Catholic refugees remained in the Saigon area, Catholic
did not play a direct role in the coup itself, they emerged
leaders were also able to produce favorable demonstra-
from Diem's fall with immense prestige throughout all
tions in Saigon.
of South Vietnam, far beyond the reach of their small
At the same time, most Can Lao members were
organization.
able to regain posts in the bureaucracy. Although they
Factionalism after Diem
were removed from their provincial and district posts
Unfortunately, in 1964 65 the Buddhists lost much of
in late 1963, not enough others had the training and
their general popularity and, after an initial effort at
experience to compete with them, and after several
months of confusion, most former Diem officials were
unity, the militant Buddhists from Hue split from the
Saigon groups, composed of refugees from the North and
simply assigned to different posts. Since the training of
Buddhist monks concentrates entirely on scripture and
unorganized Southerners. The Buddhist loss of popular-
omits both mandarin and foreign education, the Buddhist
ity and internal division occurred during the post-Diem
leaders could do no more than obtain a temporary pref-
"decompression" period of fierce factional infighting in
erence for non-Can Lao officials. Though temporarily
Saigon. With almost fifty thousand political prisoners
embarrassed and weakened, a Diemist recovery was in-
freed from the jails, a generation of exiles returning from
evitable after the fall of Diem himself.
abroad, and an internally divided army suddenly freed
from Diem's security agents, too many people wanted
Just as frightened of the Buadhists as the Catholics
to rule South Vietnam. Since the civilian politicians had
were the traditional urban politicians who had no organ-
ization, no mass following in the cities, and no tie to the
no organizations, their powers for good or ill, were con-
fined to teahouse intrigues, to deciding which group of
countryside (except sometimes the dubious one of ab-
civilians would provide external respectability and in-
sentee landownership). Since they could not quickly
ternal political skills for the rulers of the day in the
make up for lost time, their only hope for power was for
army. Shifts within the army caused most of the ten
the military to eliminate the Buddhists as a national
factor. Then civilian rule would mean rule by old men
changes of government in nineteen months, but most
who had been jailed by Diem instead of by monks and
of the troop movements were swift and bloodless.
Since the Buddhists were the only group able to
students who had demonstrated against him.
summon mass support, their factional efforts were the
Neutralization under Tri Quang?
most conspicuous and the bloodiest. Their mass support
A tragic element to the Buddhist defeat was their
frightened Vietnamese Catholics and urban politicians.
emphasis on being the only group who could gain a suf-
It seems probable from later events that U.S. officials
ficient mass following in the villages to deal with the
in Saigon and Washington gave up forever on the Hue
Viet Cong. Especially along the Coast, where people
Buddhists in this period. Since then, when they have acted
had never had an open alternative to the Communists
constructively within the implicit rules of the political
and the mandarins, the appeal of a negotiated settlement,
system, the United States has given Ky and the Saigon
a coalition government, and neutralization of South Viet-
politicians full approval to repress the Hue Buddhists
nam was very powerful. Although Thich Tam Chau
by military force and to change the rules against them.
was more cautious about the Viet Cong (as befitted a
When the Hue Buddhists have been powerful within
leader of Northern refugees, whatever the merits of the
their region, U.S. officials have publicly criticized them;
case), Thich Tri Quang cultivated an air of mystery.
when the Hue Buddhists have tried to resist being double-
encouraging Vietnamese to feel that given sufficient
crossed, U.S. officials have called for "unity" and for
power he could bring a stable settlement. Although this
letting "the Vietnamese" decide the matter "by them-
behavior is universal among politicians, the more Thich
selves."
Tri Quang pursued this line with non-Catholic Vietnam-
At first all Buddhist leaders, not just the ones from
ese, the more Americans mistrusted him.
Hue, frightened the Catholic groups. The Diem regime,
In Saigon, Vietnamese fearful of Tri Quang's dom-
it must be remembered, had not persecuted Buddhists
estic appeal quickly found that the best way to oppose
for their religion. Buddhism did not have a hierarchy
him at the U.S. Mission was to exploit his claim to be
or a doctrinal unity transferable to political affairs which
able to bargain with the Viet Cong. Refugee leaders
could have been persecuted even if Diem had so wished.
from the North used their Communist relatives and old
Diem went so far as to dedicate all of South Vietnam
friends as proof of a painful break, of an abiding feud
to the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1959, but neither
with the Communists. The Northern ties of the Hue
religious persecution nor forcible conversion were at-
Buddhists, however, provided innuendos of Communist
tempted.
influence. (Of course the Americans given these innu-
In politics, the Diem regime had simply favored
endos never were told that Tri Quang's mother and elder
Catholics and other Can Lao members and then im-
brother died in a Communist prison camp in the North
prisoned and tortured its opponents. These opponents
after partition.) Even Tri Quang's mass support from
differed in many respects, but by the process of elimin-
city people and from villagers who were trucked in for
ation they were almost all Buddhists. In 1964, many
demonstrations was used as evidence of Viet. Cong in-
24
fluence! It was permissible for the Viet Cong not to
13, and 17. By the end of the month, Father Quynh,
stop villagers from benefitting from U.S. medical teams,
leader of the Northern Catholics from Phat Diem and
but when the Viet Cong did not stop villagers who wanted
an impeccable anti-Communist, was also criticizing Ky.
to demonstrate for Vietnam's first non-Communist char-
In the first half of April, a compromise was devel-
ismatic leader, then Americans in Saigon and Washington
oped and General Thieu signed a decree promising elec-
became suspicious.
tions within five months, informally understood to be on
Not surprisingly, the Buddhists' most ambitious
August 15. The Buddhists asked for a definite agreement
plans for separate organizations failed. Tam Chau, the
that the Constituent Assembly would replace the military
Northerner who was supposed to head the hierarchy, lost
government as soon as the new Constitution was ratified,
interest. After he received no cabinet appointments and
and to everyone's surprise, a commission of politicians
Tri Quang got three, Tam Chau tried to regain his power
appointed by the generals to oppose the Buddhists agreed
by allying with Northern Catholic leaders instead of
with them. On April 17, Tri Quang flew back to Hue
working within the Buddhist coalition. Along the Coast,
and stopped demonstrations against Ky. This compromise
the Hue Buddhists tried to strengthen their organizaion
definitely was influenced by the U.S. On April 5, Am-
with "People's Councils for National Salvation," but
bassador Lodge had personally ordered American air-
when their student leaders led demonstrations in the
craft to help fly to Danang ARVN troops loyal to Ky
cities (which the Viet Cong had never been able to do),
in a show of force; the troops were kept on the airbase
more experienced Viet Cong cadres took the crowds away
and then later flown back to Saigon. On April 8, Assistant
from them and discredited the movement (a hostile
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William P.
action which was often regarded as roof of cooperation).
Bundy, publicly criticized the Buddhists for refusing to
The I Corps Coalition: Tri Quang and General Thi
compromise, ignoring the fact that the dispute began by
By early 1966, the Hue Buddhists had turned their
disrupting a Buddhist compromise, the I Corps coalition.
attention to another coalition, with ARVN officers and
Ky Doublecrosses Tri Quang
civilian officials in the I Corps, the military region com-
Once he had Tri Quang satisfied, Ky betrayed him.
prising the five Coastal provinces around Hue. The ARVN
On May 7 over a paper cup of Jim Beam bourbon he
commander was Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi.
suddenly revealed to a group of American reporters that
He was a native of Hue and the only important ARVN
he would continue in office and that the Constituent
general born of a peasant family. He led the first coup
Assembly would be disbanded when the Constitution was
attempt against Diem, in November 1960, with elite para-
ratified. This news was censored in the Vietnamese press,
trooper units who were disgusted with Diem's inability
and Ky surprised his enemies by sending ARVN troops
to contend with the Viet Cong's first massive wave of
and a third replacement for General Thi back to Dananag,
terror. After Diem's fall, General Thi took command of
just as the current I Corps commander was about to
the I Corps, his home area.
start a solidarity party of Catholics and Buddhists to
The I Corps coalition also included one of South
demonstrate to American officials and reporters their
Vietnam's two civilian province chiefs, an able, former
agreement. In Washington, Secretary Rusk and then a
exile civilian as Mayor of Danang, officials and professors
State Department spokesman disassociated themselves
at the University of Hue, and many civilian politicians
from Ky's alcoholic revelation and his second dispatch
who made up for the Buddhists' lack of administrative
of troops to Danang, but an American helicoptor was
training. None of these men was a Communist. Some
supplied to take the new I Corps commander from Danang
were suspicious of Americans conducting separate mili-
to the hostile city of Hue. This man, Ky's final replace-
tary operations and taking power more directly than the
ment for General Thi, was a notorius favorite of Diem
French had done in their area, and they became positively
(now head of an extremist Catholic ticket in the Senate).
hostile when American policy gave Ky full support in
His appointment was a clear indication that the coalition
trying to break up their coalition. The Honolulu Con-
which the Buddhists had developed with General Thi
ference of February 1966 probably finished the Hue
and which had survived his first two replacements was
Buddhists under the Johnson Administration. Although
shattered. The Diemist appointment was also a calcu-
its timing may have been planned to turn public attention
lated insult to the Hue Buddhists. As the American
away from the critical testimony of General Gavin and
helicoptor flew the new commander away after his speech,
Ambassador Kennan, the Administration had prepared a
a young ARVN officer tried to shoot him down. The
series of demands on Ky. One demand, agreed to then
American gunner in the helicoptor fired a burst of ma-
and now practically forgotten, was "social revolution,
chine gun bullets into the crowd, killing the officer and
including land reform," for which the Administration
wounding others.
promised its "full support" (the U.S. had refused to help
U.S. Ignores Double Cross
Diem pay for even his mild land reform). Also agreed
upon was "a democratic constitution," "its ratification
In the next ten days, Tri Quang tried to gain a
by secret ballot," and "elections rooted in that constitu-
reversal of American policy. He stopped a demonstration
tion." In his first announcement of the elections, Ky
after the helicoptor incident and withheld the news that
said that he would not himself be a candidate. President
an American (rather than an ARVN) soldier had fired
Johnson emerged from the Conference saying, "We talked
into the crowd. Three meetings with U.S. consular
of very specific things," and after the Conference Vice
officials and a cable to President Johnson produced a
President Humphrey and the Secretaries of Agriculture
"leave it to the Vietnamese themselves" style remark by
and Health, Education and Welfare visited Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk and a non-committal reply from the
President.
Ky and U.S. Oppose Coalition
Ky made many conciliatory statements, but he did
Ky's first "specific thing" after the Conference was
not explain how he expected to be trusted. On May 26,
to maneuver against General Thi in I Corps. In early
the point of no return was reached in Hue: the helicopter
March, the National Leadership Council unanimously
gunner was identified as an American at the funeral
deposed Thi, calling his a "war lord." The U.S. Mission
procession for the dead ARVN officer, and Tri Quang's
in Saigon agreed immediately, calling the deposition of
students led a crowd to burn the USIA library in Hue.
a popular general from his native area a "step toward
ARVN troops were sent into Hue; the Buddhist leaders
political stability" and "a defeat for warlordism." It
were cornered and then captured after a three-week
was perfectly clear that the U.S. would not continue to
seige.
assist Thi, whose command corresponded to that of the
American experts on the Viet Cong are rightly quick
U.S. Marines (also confined to I Corps), no matter how
to point out that the Viet Cong does not attract the
popular he was with his troops and the surrounding
South Vietnamese elite and that even Tri Quang in his
population.
most anti-Saigon and anti-American moments did not
Two days later the Hue Buddhists issued a demand
threaten to seek Viet Cong support. When defeated, he
for the return of Thi and the maintenance of all Corps
still did not flee to the Viet Cong; instead he risked
commanders until the elections. When demonstrations
house arrest under a hostile government in circumstances
began, General Thi appeared in person to ask them to
similar to those that killed Diem and Nhu. If American
stop, and they stopped. Fierce negotiations began in
experts emphasize this point, then they. should also em-
Saigon, with Ky, the Northerner Thich Tam Chau, and
phasize the desirability of reversing American policy and
the Hue representative in Saigon meeting on March 12,
giving Tri Quang and General Thi (now in Washington,
25
trying to learn English) a chance to reform their coali-
pended solely on his rents and interest to live a gay urban
life and conducted his business through a middleman.
tion.
Ky agreed to hold elections, and he has. The Hue
Even today, after a generation of warfare in the South,
Buddhists were excluded from the Constituent Assembly
Vietnamese families are strong enough that orphans are
and from the Senate for the sin of "neutralism." Tri
taken in by relatives of the fourth and fifth degrees,
Quang's group would have had a very good chance in the
rather than be left homeless. Pearl Buck's foundation
Senate contest, because the multiplicity of candidates
for orphans and abandoned children of American soldiers
disproportionately favored a well-educated block vote.
recently found that even compared with Japan and
This advantage was reaped by Catholic groups, who may
Korea Vietnam has few deserted children.
control over fifty percent of the Senate with less than
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
ten percent of the population and whose most popular
Instead of forming political parties and trade unions
Senate ticket received less than fifteen percent of the
along Western lines, Southerners found escape, unity,
Presidential vote.
and resistance to the French in two new Buddhist sects.
The first, Cao Daism, founded by a group of Vietnamese in
1926, was not exclusively Buddhist, but a combination of
the world's religions plus hero worship. (Winston Chur-
chill and Victor Hugo, for example, are Cao Dai saints.)
The Southern Lowlands: Pre-French
Its organization was consciously patterned on that of
the Catholic Church, and it spread SO rapidly among pea-
sants as well as government officials that the French
Tradition and French Rule
banned its advocacy from the Coast and in the North.
The Cao Dai "Pope" had close ties with reformist political
The Southern Lowlands were completely changed by
parties and with the Japanese. In fact, when the latter
the French. In the 1860's, a small Vietnamese population
took over Indochina, the French deported the Cao Dai
lived in villages less than one hundred years old and
Pope to Madagascar. After World War II, the Cao Dai
cultivated about 500,000 acres of land, mostly between
claimed a total of twelve sub-sects, totaling between one
Saigon and My Tho. As the Vietnamese Emperor had
and four million members, a large proportion of the
ordered all his mandarins to leave the southern area
population in the South.
first ceded to the French, the French had to rely upon
Hoa Haoism, the second sect, was started not by
themselves and the only inhabitants who knew any
a committee, but by a charismatic leader, the twenty-
Western languages, the Vietnamese Catholics. Saigon
year-old son of a minor notable. After developing a very
became the base of French activities in Indochina and the
attractive Protestant version of Buddhism (better to have
Southern Catholics (unlike Northern and Coastal Catho-
a pure heart than a rich altar - and debts to pay for the
lics, mostly living in their own villages) became the
altar), the Hoa Hao prophet predicted a Japanese attack
basis for an urban middle class, working under French
on Indochina as soon as France fell to Germany. With
more than one hundred thousand followers in less than a
officials, businessmen, and customers.
Great canals were dug to drain the vast areas flooded
year of preaching, Huynh Phu So was soon a potent force.
annually by the Mekong and bi-monthly by salt water
When the French exiled him to another part of the South,
from unusually high tides. By 1880 the cultivated area
So converted the surrounding population. When the
had more than doubled to almost 1.3 million acres; by
French committed him to a Saigon hospital, So converted
1937 it had quadrupled again, reaching 5.5 million. In
his psychiatrist. A second exile became a place of pilgrim-
those 57 years the population almost tripled, from 1.7
age; only Japanese intervention prevented a third exile,
this one to be outside Vietnam.
million to 4.5 million.
The area between the Mekong and the Bassac (the
The great expansion in rice fields produced two new
Vietnamese social classes: the absentee landlord, with
southernmost branch of the Mekong) rivers was more
vast holdings supervised by managers, and what a colo-
fully developed by the French than the land farther to
nial report of 1931 emphasized as a "very important
the southwest, the Transbassac. There drainage canals
rural proletariat" of tenants and migrant workers. Phy-
were still being dug when the Depression and World War
sically, there was plenty of land for all in the South, now
II disrupted the French pattern of colonial development.
almost four times as much per villager. But the expense
The Transbassac contained the largest landholdings, with
of opening new areas, even when they had already been
landlords whose word was law throughout their domains.
drained, and the competition for large plots completely
Fiercely militant Cambodian villages, survivors of the ori-
disqualified most of the rural population from potential
ginal Cambodian occupants of the Mekong Delta driven
ownership. Along the Coast 65% of the households owned
south by the invading Vietnamese, were (and are) also
at least a small plot, and everyone could rent communal
found in the Transbassac.
To the north of the Saigon-Tay Minh line the lands
land.
But in the South only 28% owned any land at all, and
were inhospitable all the way to the sandy and abandoned
the landless had no communal land to speak of (only 3%
areas on the Coast mentioned above. The major river in
of the total rice area, as contrasted with 25% along the
this barren area, the Dong Nai, was overgrown with man-
Coast). Coastal landholdings were generally worked by
groves and the high ground beyond the river was cursed
their owner or his sons and only 10% of the plots were
by malaria, a complete barrier to Vietnamese settlement.
worked entirely by tenants. In the South 35% of the plots
In the 1900's the French began developing the malarial
were owned by absentees, and, assuming their plots were
high ground; its red and grey soils were good for rubber,
the largest, these men owned 85% of the rice land.
whose rising price made cultivation very profiitable. The
The new villages in the South were connected to Can
rubber plantations soon became more valuable than the
Tho and Saigon by cheap, fast water transport. Most
French rice holdings (most large riceland owners were
of their inhabitants immigrated; everyone depended on
Vietnamese) and the rubber plantations have become
a good price for exporting rice all over Asia. Some fields
even more important to Americans today, because the un-
(80% in Bac Lieu Province, from which the present An
deveoped surrounding swamps and forest provide cover
Xuyen Province was separated) were worked entirely by
for guerillas and because rubber trees are vulnerable
migrant workers who would follow transplantings and
(they must grow seven years before producing) and easily
harvests up and down the Mekong. Some did not even live
taxed.
in villages-they simply lived on the bank of a canal with-
As far as most peasants were concerned, the South
out a government or community. In some areas, no effec-
was essentially a French creation. The Vietnamese and
tive government ruled at all; the landlord ruled without
Cambodians had dug some canals, and, if the French had
challenge from either established communities or from
never taken over, large indigenous landowners and a
the French administration.
rural proletariat might have arisen anyway. But every-
The result, of course, was a society in the South
where Frenchmen held critical positions: officials grant-
whose relations were monetary and impersonal and hence
ing land concessions and businessmen importing foreign
materialistic and individualistic by traditional Vietnamese
manufacturers in exchange for rice. While Coastal Viet-
standards, but the peasants were not Europeanized. The
namese could hate the French from a position of self-con-
traditional responsibility of the landlord and creditor to
fidence because of a memory of pre-French stability, Viet-
be easy on the tenant and debtor after a bad harvest could
namese in the South could hate the French only from
not hold if the landlord lived in Saigon or Can Tho, de-
a position of subjugation. For the United States today
26
this legacy has meant that while the suspicious Coastal
beyond Sa Dec, across the Mekong, to the south. In 1950
Vietnamese feel that "We don't need you - except to
Nguyen Binh directed a conventional military campaign,
supplement our army," the suspicious Southerners say,
similar to many of Giap's in the North, in an attempt to
"We don't want you running things on any terms, French
seize the large cities from the French, but apparently
or American." Therefore, no matter how terrible the Viet
without having consolidated his control over many rural
Cong may seem, it is very difficult for Americans to ap-
areas.
pear to offer a constructive alternative.
When this effort failed, Nguyen Binh was killed, not
by simple execution, for he was too popular in the South.
The Southern Lowlands: Viet Minh
He was sent, without any rest, with a small party of
troops loyal to Le Duan into the worst Cambodian jungle,
supposedly to find a new infiltration route. When sur-
Activities
prised by a unit of the Cambodian army, Binh's nominal
subordinates killed him before fleeing into the jungle.
Unlike the North and the Coast, the South had sev-
In 1951 after Nguyen Binh came Le Duan, the pres-
eral active indigenous organizations in addition to the
ent First Secretary of the North Vietnamese Communist
Viet Minh working against the French. The French had
Party, and Le Duc Tho, present head of the party's Org-
permitted some urban political parties and had not sup-
buro, as rival leaders in the South. While the origins and
pressed the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, so none of these groups
meaning of their rivalry are not clear, it certainly dates
were vulnerable to the Communists' mastery of exile
back to a dispute over the conduct of the war in the
politics. During World War II the Viet Minh controlled
South, which had to be resolved by Ho Chi Minh himself.
only a few villages and a forested enclave in the North;
In 1954 three short-term regroupment areas were
it started operations in the South too hastily at the end
established for the Viet Minh in the South: the tip of the
of the War to take over all anti-French activity.
Camau penninsula, an area somewhat larger than the
Even before the War Southern Marxists were divid-
present An Xuyen Province; the Plain of Reeds, some-
ed. A strong Trotskyite organization, led by the lower-
what larger than the present Kien Tuong Province; and,
class Ta Thu Thau, had badly defeated the predominately
the Xuyen Moc-Ham Tan area, which then straddled the
middle-class, orthodox Communists in the elections of
border between Cochin China and Annam and now over-
1938. In 1940 the orthodox Communists had tried to lead
laps Binh Tuy and Phoue Tuy Provinces. At that time
a peasant rebellion, but a security leak alerted the
the Viet Minh probably had two other base campe. First
French, the rebellion was crushed, and the Communist
was the present "Zone C," around Tay Minh and easily
organization was destroyed.
connected to the Plain of Reeds regroupment area.
The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao had improved their posi-
Second was the present "Zone D," until recently cor-
tions during the War as the result of a less hostile ad-
responding to the Phuoc Thanh Province and now the
ministration. A new group, improperly called a "sect,"
area where four provinces meet northeast of Saigon and
had also formed: the Binh Xuyen, a coalition of robber
are easily connected to the Xuyen Moc-Ham regroupment
bands around Saigon. Southwest of the Mekong Delta and
area.
in Vinh Binh Province the Cambodian minority, armed by
In the Southern Lowlands the Communist Party did
the French, fought all Vietnamese. In Kien Hoa Province
not hold the monopoly on effective, tested political or-
the Catholics organized a militia to defend themselves
ganization it enjoyed elsewhere in Vietnam. It could not
against the Viet Minh. At first the various factions in the
claim, simply as director of the Viet Minh, as much
South fought as much among themseves as they did
respect as it could command farther north. When Vietnam
against the French and the Viet Minh. Only the consistent
was divided at the 17th parallel in 1954 to give the anti-
hostility of the Viet Minh and the eventual French recog-
Communists a second chance, the best opportunities for
nition that these factions could be bargained with more
an indigenous anti-Communist coalition were in the
easily than they could be "pacified" permitted a loose
Southern Lowlands.
anti-Communist coalition. Among the factions two great
surprises came during the war against the Viet Minh. The
Hoa Hao, regarded as a loose, one-man organization, re-
The Southern Lowlands: Diem
covered after the assassination by the Viet Minh of their
charismatic founder. And the larger Cao Dai failed to
Since Diem had delegated most of his power along
establish a secure rural power base; not even a small one
the Coast to his brothers Can and Thuc, the Southern
could be set up around their Pope's residence in Tay
Lowlands tested his own abilities. His personality, like his
Ninh.
political support, had two complementary elements: the
The large number of indigenous factions make it even
traditional Vietnamese mandarin of Hue and the devout,
harder to estimate the extent of Viet Minh activities and
medieval Catholic of the North and the Coast. He worked
control in the South than along the Coast. Village land
long into the night in the tradition of the self-sacrificing
records, for example, were destroyed throughout most
mandarin or prelate, but he had neither administrative
of Vinh Binh Province. The French of course blamed the
skills nor charismatic powers. Though he was impressive
Viet Minh. The Viet Cong, claiming always to be their suc-
in small meetings with Western diplomats and journalists,
cessors (but also careful since then to have a Cambodian
he came to rely on his brother Nhu to decide which
representative on the National Liberation Front's Central
Vietnamese leaders and official papers were to be sent
Committee), have also given full credit to the Viet Minh.
to his office and to rely on the semi-secret Can Lao to
But it is impossible to verify today who destroyed which
control the population.
records, the Viet Minh rebels or the anti-Vietnamese
When Diem became premier in 1954, he was mani-
Cambodians armed by the French. It is clear, however,
festly the representative of the American policy of a
that unlike in the North and on the Coast the Viet Minh
second chance south of the 17th parallel for the anti-
were not the only organization fighting the French and
Communist nationalists of Vietnam. The initial French
terrorizing landlords.
policy after Dien Bien Phu was to preserve as many plan-
The Communists Fail in the South
tations and as much cultural influence as possible by
The Communist party, moreover, revealed more fac-
sending an old friend of Ho Chi Minh's (Jean Sainteny) to
tionalism in the South than in the North and along the
Hanoi and by not trying to develop an anti-Communist
Coast. The first Communist leader, Tran Van Giau,
coalition for the elections scheduled for 1956. The French
shortly after World War II tried to establish a tractable
still had close ties to the major opponents of the Viet
popular front in the South which would correspond to the
Minh in the South: Emperor Bao Dai, the recently created
Viet Minh. When, in 1946, it was clear that he had failed,
army, the Binh Xuyen, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao.
he was repudiated in the South and assigned overseas.
Diem's first cabinet was unimpressive; it was composed
Then Nguyen Binh, an ex-member of the VNQDD (the
almost entirely of blood relatives and in-laws. But the end
Communists' mortal rival in the North), was appointed
of 1954 saw a much broader cabinet, in which a majority
leader of the Viet Minh in the South. By 1949, according
(8 of 14) was held by the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. Both
to Lucien Bodard, Nguyen Binh controlled almost all of
of these groups had long feared the Communists and had
the South except for the vital roads connecting Saigon
interests which no longer corresponded to those of the
and Quan Long: most of the Transbassac; the seaward
French. Diem secured his position by gaining control over
tips of the Mekong Delta provinces; and, both sides of the
the army - with substantial American help. The crucial
"Duck's Bill" - from beyond Tay Ninh in the North to
subordinates of General Hinh, the army's commander,
27
were lured away on a visit to the much-admired Presi-
from a priest from Vinh Long, the seat of the area's
dent Magsaysay of the Phillippines and General Hinh was
Bishopric, the district "information" officer was reluc-
told bluntly that no military aid would be given until the
tantly starting an organization to propagate Catholicism
army was under complete civilian control (i.e., Diem's)
among the hostile local populace. Threatening letters to
Though he later claimed he could have started a coup
and assassinations of local officials were an increasing
against Diem with a telephone call, General Hinh yielded
problem. Diem's officials blamed the Hoa Hao, and the
and soon left for France, where he was given a military
latter blamed the Viet Cong, claiming that the local
appointment.
ARVN units were infiltrated and useless. Since Ameri-
Diem then began to fragment the sects represented
cans made only a few short visits outside of Saigon be-
within his cabinet, paying several Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
tween 1955 and 1962, it is impossible to say if My Thuan's
leaders over $10 million from American military aid for
plight was unusual. It should be emphasized, however,
"back pay." At the same time, in early 1954, Western
that the Americans reported no embarassment by Diem's
represenatives sympathetic to the sects (and hence their
officials at seeing their behavior observed and recorded.
only hope of getting the U.S. to moderate Diem's hostility
Even the Binh Xuyen - the gangland alliance which
toward them) were withdrawn from South Vietnam.
had controlled the roads into Saigon, the city's rackets,
When they realized Diem's intention to destroy their
and the French secret police - were not replaced by su-
groups, most Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders joined the
perior instiutions. Brother Nhu ran most of these activi-
Binh Xuyen leader on March 5, 1955 in demanding a
ties, not for personal profit, but to finance the Can Lao
greater role in the cabinet. Of course this was denied
and his family's political activities independently of U.S.
aid. Nhu controlled the opium trade and the lotteries,
them.
manipulated the foreign exchange market, and extorted
Although the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao held political con-
Saigon businessmen. The only Binh Xuyen activities Nhu
trol over the Tay Ninh area northwest of Saigon and over
did not take over where those that were banned by his
many areas south of the Mekong River, they had no con-
puritanical wife, the famous Mme. Nhu.
ventional force to match the 250,000-man army under
Mistakes by the U.S. Mission had a great influence
Diem, and their local exactions could not compete with
on South Vietnam's increasing difficulties. United States
the $250 milion annual American aid given Diem. Even
military "advisers" made no effort to anticipate a resump-
their claims to conventional military forces never reached
tion of Viet Minh guerrilla activities and converted the
50,000. The generally accepted total of 15,000 to 20,000
new Vietnamese army, originally created by the French
for the Cao Dai forces grossly exceeded the 4,916 regular
for decentralized, small-unit, counter-insurgency opera-
troops actually subsidized by the French at the end of
tions, into a highly centralized conventional force, con-
1953. While the details of Diem's negotiations with the
sciously imitating the South Korean army and prepar-
setcs are still obscure, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders
ing for a conventional invasion from the North. The re-
who had fought the French and the Viet Minh only when
fusal to finance Diem's plans for a paramilitary force
necessary could hardly have expected to defeat Diem's
has already been mentioned. In the Mekong Delta, the
army in conventional warfare. Their resistance must have
United States refused to continue the French-developed
been a desperate last resort, and they were defeated
naval units used to patrol the hundreds of miles of rivers
within a few months. The only surviving units were four
and canals (compared with only one major road south of
Hoa Hao battalions which fled up the Mekong beyond
Saigon). These military mistakes are being reversed to-
Long Xuyen and preserved themselves only by adopting
day, but without the slightest hint that present improve-
guerrilla tactics and hiding amidst the loyal Hoa Hao
ments are more a return to French methods than Ameri-
population.
can invention. United States Navy activities in the Me-
With the defeat of the Binh Xuyen and the sects,
kong, for instance, are being publicized as having been
Diem had a chance to offer a non-Communist, non-secta-
inspired by the Montitor and the Merrimac, two American
rian alternative to rural areas of the Southern Lowlands,
ships of a completely different war a century ago, rather
but he failed to make good on this opportunity. Large
than by methods successful in the same place against the
areas of land around Saigon (Binh Xuyen) and south of
Viet Minh within the past generation.
the Mekong River (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao), abandoned
U.S. Ignores Assassinations
during the war against the French, were taken for the
When evidence increased of a systematic insurgency,
settlement of refugees from the North (most of whom
as in reports of Hanoi-trained cadres in the Highlands and
were tightly-knit Catholic villagers) without the permis-
of assassinations and kidnappings concentrated in stra-
sion of local inhabitants. Improved security in rural areas,
tegic provinces south of the Mekong where the Viet Minh
especially those formerly terrorized by the aggressive and
had not been strong, the U.S. Mission maintained that the
intolerant Hoa Hao bands, led to some economic improve-
country was too prosperous for an insurgency to survive.
ment. But the new rural security also permitted Saigon
United States aid was mostly in the form of consumer
landlords who had not received rents for years to return
goods sold to merchants by the Saigon government, which
to the countryside on the heels of the army and to make
then spent the proceeds instead of relying on local taxes.
exactions in the form of "back rents," much as Diem had
The merchants sold the consumer goods in the provinces
paid bribes in the form of "back pay." Even refugee
and peasants bought them, without feeling the slightest
Catholic villagers, a basis of Diem's support and able to
gratitude to the United States for not being taxed harder.
publicize their complaints, were preyed upon by national
There was no way of knowing whether the peasantry had
and provincial officials until they were stopped by a
gained more from larger peacetime harvests and Diem's
national scandal and the dismissal by Diem of a coopera-
mild land reform and rent control laws than had to be
tive cabinet minister.
paid in rents to absentee landlords. Since no prolonged
Diem Misrules the Hoa Hao
American contact with rural areas existed until 1962, it
Hoa Hao areas associated with the surviving four
was surely cavalier to ignore totally signs of trouble and
battalions were repeatedly attacked by ARVN units, and
bury them under claims of South Vietnamese rural "pros-
the one peaceful Hoa Hao area for which information is
perity." The present Administration line, that the North
available was badly treated. As late as 1960, a Michigan
began the insurgency because it was afraid of Diem's po-
State University group found that Diem's government
pularity, similarly lacks supporting evidence and is
had taken over all Hoa Hao buildings without payment
grossly deceptive.
and had appointed all non-Hoa Hao officials in My Thuan,
The most grotesque American mistake was to con-
a former Hoa Hao headquarters in a part of Vinh Long
clude that there was "no alternative" to Diem and his
Province where 85 - 90% of the population belonged to the
family. The original reason for favoring Diem was a
Hoa Hao sect. The Americans then saw the suppression of
sound one: Diem was the best man to lead an anti-Com-
a Hoa Hao ceremony on the Buddha's birthday, initially
munist coalition. Bao Dai had been discredited by years
approved to honor Hoa Hao soldiers killed fighting the
of association with the French and of high living in Viet-
French and the Viet Minh. There were only 250 Catholics
namese and European resorts. Diem had stayed clear of
in the area, but they included crucial local officials, like
both the French and the Viet Minh, had good connections
the district chief, the district "information" officer, and
in the United States, and was a hard worker. In 1953, in
the canton chief. Catholics were allowed to build a church
a "neutralist" campaign that would be banned today in
instead of working on the local forced-labor construction
South Vietnam, brother Nhu organized a party that per-
projects (agroville) against the Viet Cong. Under prodding
formed well in the elections held by the French. Unfor-
28
tunately, Diem did not try to lead a coalition. He estab-
adjacent parts of Hau Ngia and Kien Tuong Provinces.
lished an inefficient dictatorship based on his family and
South of My Tho, Kien Hoa Province was a crucial
the Can Lao, preventing legal opposition but not providing
reforms and local competition against the Viet Cong
target, and captured documents indicated Viet Cong in-
tention to make Kien Hoa its model province for the
In 1960, eighteen leading civilian politicians, includ-
Delta. Kien Hoa is a cluster of three islands, and their
ing Suu and Huong, the best-known recent civilian Presi-
inlets offer many good places for concealed depots, hospi-
dential candidates, signed a long manifesto against Diem.
ARVN officers, disgusted by Diem's preoccupation with
tals, and rest camps at the opposite end of the Mekong
Delta from Chau Phu. At the same time, like the strip of
dividing the army rather than by fighting the Viet Cong,
rubber plantations circling Saigon to the north, Kien Hoa
attempted coups in 1960 and 1962. Diem's jails were full
offers an easily taxed cash crop, coconuts. The Catholic
of political prisoners, many of whom were brutally tor-
militia of the Vinh Long Bishopric had cleared out most
tured; 46,000 survivors were released in 1963 and 1964.
of the Viet Minh, but some agents survived and went
Yet U.S. policy decided to reinforce Diem and the
Can Lao instead of letting their domestic opponents re-
north in 1954. In early 1958, in areas where the Saigon
place them before Diem could fragment his opposition
government had not gained control, some of these agents
started returning to their native villages. There was as
even further. But after visits by Vice President Johnson
(May 1961) and General Taylor (October 1961) and a
much violence in Kien Hoa as in Long An in 1959 - 60,
about ten assassinations over twelve months. But when
major speech (June 1962) by Senator Mansfield, one of
an honest military officer was sent by Diem to clean up
Diem's original American supporters, calling for a reap-
Kien Hoa, he found far more (1,200) political prisoners
praisal, the United States started an approach similar to
in the provincial jail whom the former provincial gov-
the use of the Can Lao. Instead of trying to pressure
ernor had been trying to extort for their release. This
Diem or to allow his enemies to combine him, American
military officer, a former chief of counter-intelligence on
civilians and military officers were sent to crucial pro-
the Viet Minh in all of the Southern Lowlands, reopened
vinces to "advise" Vietnamese civil servants and ARVN
the road to Saigon. This man's successor also did well
officers, trying to persuade them to work against the
until he was transferred in May 1963, but thereafter the
system being buttressed by American aid in Saigon by
situation deteriorated and proved difficult to retrieve after
taking precisely those local initiatives which would yield
Diem's fall. Today much of Kien Hoa is controlled by the
local popularity and which Diem's family would not re-
Viet Cong, and parts of it are being bombed.
ward if the individual's full loyalty was doubted in secret
Can Lao reports. The hypocrisy and foolishness of such
provincial activities in support of a hopeless central gov-
ernment may be symbolized by the American AID official
The Southern Lowlands: Recent Events
in Quang Nam Province who unknowingly rented his
house from a notorious (to Vietnamese neighbors) par-
ticipant in local torture sessions.
and U.S. Policy
The Southern Lowlands have been divided since 1964
by the fact that major military operations have been con-
The Southern Lowlands: Start of the
centrated north of the Mekong River. Few American
ground troops, and even fewer North Vietnamese troops
or cadres, have been operating south of the Mekong. Most
Insurgency and the Viet Cong Cadre
North Vietnamese units have been fighting in the High-
lands and along the Coast. Until they drew away Ameri-
can troops from the Saigon area this spring, American
operations were concentrated on "search and destroy"
The survival of at least one Hoa Hao unit and of
missions in Viet Cong base areas in the sparsely populated
elements of the Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen forces, coupled
Plain of Reeds (Kien Tuong Province) and rubber planta-
tion area circling Saigon to the north (Tay Ninh to Phuoc
with the weak initial strength provided the Viet Cong by
Tuy Province).
the Viet Minh, make it impossible to be sure of the degree
of North Vietnamese control of the insurgency in its early
Yet the only large secure rural area is south of the
stages. The National Liberation Front (NLF) was not
Mekong, the Hoa Hao stronghold of An Giang Province.
started until December 1960, but even so, according to a
After Diem's fall, the survivors of the four Hoa Hao bat-
May 1966 memo issued by the U.S. Mission in Saigon, sur-
talions managed to negotiate with Saigon an agreement
vivors of the sects "made up the bulk of the early NLF
whose terms have not been publicized. It is clear, how-
support, although the alliance was at all times an un-
ever, that Hoa Hao leaders remain in charge of their pro-
easy one." Yet the December 1961 State Department
vince, that the population quickly turns in Viet Cong
booklet meant to "inform" Americans and foreigners of
agitators trying to establish a foothold, and that the
"A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to
province is receiving types of American aid which are
Conquer South Viet-Nam" referred to the NLF as "Ha-
possible only when full security is assured, such as elec-
noi's creation" (p. 15) and did not even hint at the parti-
trification and a land survey. Unfortunately, the present
cipation of non-Communists in their own groups, let
An Giang Province (redefined on October 1, 1964, around
alone at their ever having provided "the bulk of early
the time of the agreement) is much smaller than the
NLF support." The return of Communist cadres to the
areas controlled by the Hoa Hao before their conventional
Highlands in 1957 proves that North Vietnam was in-
defeat and steady harassment by Diem's forces.
volved in the insurgency from its beginnings, but the
In addition to the Hoa Hao, the Cambodian minority
original degree of Hanoi's control will remain in doubt
is a traditional enemy of the Viet Cong. Kien Giang Pro-
until a wider range of evidence is publicly available.
vince, south of An Giang, has a substantial Cambodian
The violent start of the insurgency was traced by
minority and the most successful resettlement of North-
Bernard Fall from contemporary newspaper reports of
ern refugees in all of South Vietnam. Not surprisingly,
assassinations, ambushes, raids, and cells of dissidents.
Kien Giang is often mentioned as being more secure than
The campaign of violence began in the Mekong Delta,
most areas. Two other provinces with large Cambodian
where the Communists were disproportionately weak. The
minorities are Ba Xuyen and Vinh Binh. Cao Dai and
first concentrations of violence (April 1957 to April 1958)
Catholic groups, who once maintained order around Quan
were in the areas around Chau Phu and My Tho, pre-
Long and in most of the Delta (Vinh Long, Kien Hoa, and
sumably establishing a position on the Mekong River
Vinh Binh), are no longer mentioned for their local con-
trol.
where the Cambodian border would provide a convenient
sanctuary and preparing to cut off the only roads bringing
Most of the populous area south of the Mekong River
rice from the Delta and Transbassac to Saigon.
appears to be involved in "live and let live" arrange-
The next pair of Viet Cong targets was immediately
ments. Local holders of power, Viet Cong cadres con-
to the north and to the south of My Tho, further isolating
trolling the villages (there being few local notables be-
Saigon from the Delta. In the period between April 1959
cause of the predominance of absentee ownership) and
and April 1960 Long An Province had about one assassin-
ARVN units stationed in the district town (there being
ation per month, and there were other deaths in the
few civilian district chiefs), do not challenge each other
openly or with violence. The Viet Cong cadres do not
29
expect to take over the district towns from the ARVN,
usually receives a threatening letter listing grievances
especially when these towns are protected by artillery and
against him and warning him to change his ways. At the
airpower. At the same time, the local ARVN officers,
time of an assassination or kidnapping, a list of the offen-
whether in civilian or military posts, do not expect to
ses for which he is being punished is pinned to his cloth-
challenge the Viet Cong seriously in the villages.
ing, or posted on a building, or read off to his frightened
family and neighbors.
Until the last few years, the Viet Cong had a "Robin
The Viet Cong: The Cadre, his Social
Hood" image, gained by killing and publicizing many ob-
viously corrupt officials. As a result, assassinations on
Role and his Misleading Tactics
false charges of honest and able officials, the insurgency's
worst enemies, were sometimes believed and did not pro-
voke the local hostility toward the Viet Cong that an air-
strike does against Saigon. Furthermore, not only are
Since most violence and struggle movements occurred
Viet Cong methods of violence inherently more selective
in the Southern Lowlands, eventually entirely under Viet
than those of ARVN and U.S. forces, but the political in-
Cong direction, it is vital to treat separately the basis of
telligence of a Viet Cong cadre is much better than that of
Viet Cong activity. This basis is a Communist political
the typical Vietnamese or American local official on rapid
and social innovation, the local cadre, and subtle political
tactics which make detection of his activity and a re-
rotation. Because of his better information, the Viet Cong
cadre gets more political leverage from his carrots and
sponse by the legal government very difficult. The Viet
sticks than our side does. Attacks on the most able
Cong cadres are the only effective link between many
men as well as on the most corrupt clearly indicates that
Vietnamese villages and centralized commands, and they
are the strongest such link in Vietnamese history.
Viet Cong cadres are seeking power in their villages and
not simply reforms.
The Viet Cong cadre is almost always an ambitious
local person who has been trained to live with the people
The second crucial tactic is that of the "coexistence"
of his village, to seek out those with grievances against
village, where the Viet Cong cadre, the village notables,
Saigon-appointed local officials and against local notables
the Saigon-appointed district chief, and local ARVN offi-
and to provoke incidents which mobilize the peasantry
cer "won't fight" and "live and let live," jockeying for
against the government. Land reform, for instance, is
political position without open resort to violence. Once a
not an abstract goal for the cadre and his followers - in-
village's front organizations have started up, a Viet Cong
stead it provides patronage for political power. Landless
cadre is not supposed to provoke attacks for fear of being
tenants who join the cause are given plots of absentee
shown as unable to defend his people. By day, such vil-
landlords and owners of medium-sized plots still living
lages are supposed to admit joint teams of American me-
in the village often join the Viet Cong to protect their
dical personnel and Saigon-trained propagandists. These
holdings.
villages all use Saigon government identity cards. In such
In each village, the Viet Cong cadre starts a series
villages, Viet Cong cadres would encourage participation
of front organizations which eventually should include
in Saigon's elections in order to keep all identity cards in
every villager. There are Liberation Fronts for farmers,
good standing, and the cadres would also oppose mutilat-
for their wives, for their children, and for old villagers.
ing ballots which could be traced to their districts.
At first, only a nominal membership fee is requested, but
While this balance of local power is stable, neither
enthusiastic members recruit their neighbors and even-
the Viet Cong cadres nor the ARVN officers can formalize
tually social pressure forces everyone to join and to parti-
their tacit arrangement. Viet Cong cadres can get am-
cipate actively. If a village is hesitant or hostile toward
nesty only as individuals through the Chieu Hoy program,
the Viet Cong, the cadre mobilizes greater hostility to-
and if a cadre were to bring over his small military force
ward the Saigon government by calling in a Viet Cong
with him, it would be imprisoned for treason or placed
military unit from another area and provoking air strikes
under the district ARVN officer, outside of the control of
or artillery fire from nearby ARVN or U.S. forces.
the amnestied cadre and his village. "Coexistence" ARVN
Even in contested villages, the Viet Cong cadre is the
officers have enough trouble avoiding taunts that they
most knowledgeable about local affairs. He deputizes chil-
"won't flight" without trying to suggest to Saigon that
dren to report on who enters and leaves the village and on
power be shared locally. In short, while the cadres and the
what newspapers are read and what radio stations are
officers can forestall disruption from their commands by
listened to. As the cadre's control increases, he announces
reporting back that all is quiet (but not yet quiet enough
more rules, "requests contributions" (taxes), and recruits
to become a Viet Cong base camp or for landlords to re-
troops, and villagers are increasingly careful to obey him.
turn for their rents) and by avoiding violence which would
Thorough investigation of their training and internal
attract attention to their area, they can do nothing
messages, together with lengthy interviews with cadres
constructive to promote their common interests and those
who have come over as individuals through the Chieu Hoy
of the populations they rule.
amnesty program, have shown that the Viet Cong cadres
Unfortunately, the introduction of foreign troops or
assigned below the provincial or district level are not
advisers disrupts the tacit peace and brings on violent
usually ideologically motivated. Just as many Vietnamese
incidents without being able to change the basic division
learned to speak French as a path to power, without
of authority. North Vietnamese units can not capture dis-
necessarily liking Frenchmen, so many low-level cadres
trict towns, and American forces, short of a full counter-
seem to have learned and applied new political methods to
insurgency operation, cannot capture the villages. Ameri-
take over their native villages without necessarly liking
cans usually cannot provide a direct alternative to the
the Communists who trained them. Cadres from middle
Viet Cong, even if a village's cadre has become unpopular,
class backgrounds, who are better educated and per-
because mistrust of a return to colonialism is stronger
form vital skilled functions, as in propaganda and medi-
than dislike of the Viet Cong. Under Diem, villagers south
cine, may even become inwardly hostile to the Viet Cong
of Saigon openly referred to the government as the "My-
command because it mechanically gives preferential pro-
Diem" regime, the "American-Diem" regime. In one
motions to their lower class rivals. The cadre's chief con-
Mekong Delta village where the peasants disliked the
cern is with his new social and political role, as the pro-
Viet Cong, a young ARVN officer began to make good
moter of non-family social ties and as a new bureaucratic
impression last year, and he was warned in time to leave
link between the village and the outside world, interpret-
each time the Viet Cong assassination squad visited the
ing commands from the center and communicating village
village. But when an American was assigned to advise
grievances back to it.
him, the villagers changed their minds, decided that the
Two tactics are crucial to a cadre-based insurgency.
Viet Cong were right in opposing even good officials from
The first is the use of terror, which is directed not simply
Saigon because they would bring American control, and
at eliminating enemies but more at manipulating the sur-
allowed the next assassination squad to kill the young
vivors. Before a man is assassinated or kidnapped, he
ARVN officer.
30
:
Background Notes
STATE
UNITED
U
LAOS
STATES
or
Population: 2.5 million (est.)
as others of Indonesian or proto-Malay background,
inhabit central and southern Laos. The lack of
Capital:
Vientiane (Administrative)
common origin, customs, language, traditions, and
Luang Prabang (Royal)
beliefs among the various minorities poses a serious
obstacle to the political unification of the Kingdom.
Strategically situated in the heart of the South-
There are influential minorities of Vietnamese and
east Asian peninsula, the landlocked Kingdom of
Chinese, and smaller groups of Cambodians, Indians,
Laos shares common borders with six other nations,
and Pakistani. In addition, there are more than a
two of which are under Communist regimes: on the
thousand French and other Europeans and Americans
north with Communist China (264 miles); on the
in the country, few of whom are permanent residents.
east a long frontier with North Viet-Nam (1,018 miles),
Lao is a tonal language like others of the Sino-
and with the Republic of Viet-Nam (301 miles); on
Thai family. The Vientiane dialect has six tones,
the south with Cambodia (366 miles); on the south
only three of which transfer directly to Bangkok
and east with Thailand (1,090 miles, of which more
Thai. Vientiane Lao and Bangkok Thai have areas
than 500 are formed by the Mekong River); and on
of mutual comprehension only to educated speakers.
the west with Burma (147 miles).
As with English and French, abstract words tend to
be cognate more frequently than everyday vocabulary.
Total area is approximately 91,000 square miles,
Written Lao and Thai both use scripts of Indian
or slightly more than Idaho or Great Britain. A large
origin, but Lao letters are rounded rather than
part of the terrain, particularly in the north, is
angular, and Lao uses fewer consonants. The Lao
covered by dense jungle and rugged mountains, the
spelling system is much more representative of the
latter sometimes rising over 9,000 feet.
spoken word than Thai, which tends to include un-
The climate of Laos is monsoonal, with three
pronounced letters, particularly at the endof a word,
seasons. There are 5 months of heavy rainfall, from
that display Sanskrit origin. Since textbooks have
May through September. When the rains start tapering
been developed only through sixth grade in Lao,
off in October, a cool season begins that lasts through
French remains the principal language of secondary
January. February through April is hot and humid. In
education. French thus serves as the second official
April, the warmest month, the temperature in Vien-
language, and is used commonly in government and
tiane normally ranges between 72" and 93"F., and in
commerce. Probably not more than 15 percent of
January, the coolest month, between 57* and 83" F.
the population is literate. Furthermore, the numerous
However, temperatures of 103" F. have been recorded
ethnic groups possess their own languages or dia-
in April, and 39" F. in January. Humidity is high most
lects, and the Vietnamese and Chinese retain their
of the year.
own school systems as well.
The flag of Laos consists of a three-headed white
elephant, standing on five steps under a white parasol,
HISTORY
against a red field. The elephant exemplifies the
historic kingdom-Land of a Million Elephants-and
the three heads represent the three principalities.
In the mid-14th century King Fa Ngoun united
The parasol symbolizes monarchy. The five steps
Laos, establishedhis capital at Luang Prabang, and
ruled an area that would today encompass not only
represent Buddhism's five commandments against
Laos but also much of northeast Thailand and the
murder, theft, falsehood, adultery, and alcholism.
southernmost part of the Yunnan Province of China.
In the following century the Vietnamese began their
periodic incursions, which persist to this day. By
THE PEOPLE
the 18th century Thailand and Viet-Nam had begun
their competition for Lao soil.
The population is about 2.5 million-an estimate,
In the early 19th century the Thai of Siam obtained
since no accurate census ever has been taken. This
ascendancy over much of what is now Laos and re-
sparse population is spread unevenly, with the
tained their hold for the most partuntil France made
greatest concentration in the Mekong Valley. The
Laos a protectorate in 1893. The Franco-Siamese
people lack homogeneity. About 49 percent are Lao,
Treaty of 1907 defined the boundaries of Laos as they
a people of Thai stock who are believed to have
exist today. Under the French, the three kingdoms of
migrated originally from southwestern China, prin-
Laos-Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak-
cipally in the 13th century. Mountain tribes of Sinitic,
were unified in 1946 under the dynasty of Luang
Tibeto-Burman, and Thai language families are found
Prabang. The country gained independence within
in northern. Laos. Many of these same tribes, as well
the French Union in 1949.
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
Mekong
Ssu-mao
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
CHINA
Ou
Neua
Red
CHINA
Ou Tay
Lai Chau
River
Phong Saly
Blood
NORTH
River
VIETNAM
Dien
BURMA
Muong
Bien
Son
Sing
Phu
Lar
Nam Tha
Hanoi
Muong
Ban
Sai
Houei
Sai
Nom
Sam Neua
Song
Muong Houn,
Mo
Pak Beng
Mekon
Luang
Plaine des
Ban
Prabang
Thanh
Jarres
Ban
Hoa
Muong
Nong Het
Phou
Khoun
Soul
Xieng Khouang
Gulf of -Tonkin
Vang Vieng
Tha
Thom
Vinh
Pak
Ban Hin
Sane
Kam
Ha-Tinh
Heup
13
won
Keut
Theun
8
Vientiane
Lak Sao
$
Nong Khai
13
Nhommarath
THAILAND
12
Dong-Hoi
Thakhek
Udon-Thani
Demercation
LAOS
Line
Seno
9
Quang-Tri-
Road
Houel Sane
Trail
Savannakhet
Muong
Hue
Phine
8
Route number
SOUTH
13
VIETNAM
0
25
50
75
100 Miles
Saravane
Kamane
Muang
Pakse
se
Ubon
Attopeu
Mekong
CAMBODIA
During World War II Japan did not fully take over
Geneva Conference 1961-62
control of Laos until March 1945, and just prior to
their defeat the Japanese persuaded the King of Luang
The United States was faced with three alterna-
Prabang to declare his kingdom independent. In
tives: the total loss of Laos to the Communists;
September 1945 the Prime Minister of the "inde-
military intervention, involving U.S. troops and other
pendent" Government proclaimed the creation of the
outside forces; or settlement of the crisis through
Kingdom of Laos, including the areas of Vientiane
peaceful international and internal negotiations to
and Champassak, under the King of Luang Prabang.
achieve a neutral status for the Kingdom that would
In October a provincial Government formed by the
permit it to survive as a nation. The decision was
"Lao Issara" (Free Lao) leaders "dethroned" the King
reached that a peaceful settlement transferring the
because of his alleged loyalty to the French. In May
struggle from the military to the political domain
1946 French troops occupied Laos and recognized
was the most desirable of the possible alternatives.
the sovereignty of the King of Luang Prabang over
The congressional leadership on a bipartisan basis
the entire country.
was consulted on this decision. It was thus that the
In a series of successive steps, France gradually
United States accepted participation in the 14-nation
accorded Laos its independence and, in October
conference convened at Geneva in May 1961 which,
1953, recognized the Kingdom as a fully sovereign
after long and difficult negotiations, resulted in the
state, although Laos reaffirmed its adherence to the
signing of new Geneva agreements on July 23, 1962,
French Union. This relationship was dissolved upon
providing certain international guarantees for the
the conclusion of the Geneva agreements of 1954,
independence and neutral status of Laos.
which terminated the Indochina War. Laos became a
On the internal level the three Lao factions-
member of the United Nations in 1955.
conservative, neutralist, and Pathet Lao-reached
From 1954 to 1960 pro-Western or conservative
agreement in June 1962 on the formation of a Govern-
Governments held power, except for the brief inter-
ment of National Union under the premiership of
val in 1957-58 of a coalition Government which in-
Prince Souvanna Phouma.
cluded Communist ministers.
Of immediate importance under the 1962 Geneva
A Communist movement, originally called the
agreements was the requirement that all foreign
Pathet Lao (Land of Lao) (PL) and later renamed
military personnel leave the country within 75 days
the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), was formed under Viet
of the signing. Under the supervision of the Inter-
Minh auspices in Communist territory in North Viet-
national Control Commission (ICC), consisting of
Nam in 1950 under the leadership of Prince Souphan-
political and military representatives of India (Chair-
ouvong. As a result of the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao
man), Canada, and Poland, all 666 U.S. military
invasions and occupation of parts of Laos in 1953
advisory personnel (no U.S. combat troops were in
and 1954, the PL was permitted by the terms of
Laos) departed from Laos before the October 7,
the 1954 Geneva agreements to retain control of two
1962, deadline. However, only 40 North Vietnamese
northern Provinces (Phong Saly and Sam Neua),
troops were withdrawn through ICC checkpoints. In
pending reintegration of the PL into the national
his letter of June 20, 1963, to the Co-chairmen (the
community. Prolonged attempts to integrate the PL
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) of the Geneva
into the Government and the armedforces failed and,
conference, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
supported by the North Vietnamese, the PL returned
charged that a substantial number of North Viet-
to insurgency in 1959. The presence of a United
namese cadres and combat troops remained in Laos,
Nations investigatory subcommittee in late 1959
and the Prime Minister has repeated this charge on
restored an uneasy peace with existed until mid-
a number of occasions since, including sessions of
1960.
the U.N. General Assembly.
In August 1960 a young paratroop commander in
Vientiane, Captain Kong Le, seized the capital in a
coup. In an attempt to avert civil war among the
After the Conference
non-Communist elements, Prince Souvanna Phouma,
a former Prime Minister, was again called upon to
Within a few months of the signing of the 1962
form a Government. General Phoumi Nosavan, a
Geneva agreements, the Pathet Lao, supported by
leader of the conservative, anti-Communist faction,
the North Vietnamese, began maneuvering to sub-
at first agreed to serve. in the Government, but soon
vert or eliminate Kong Le's neutralist military
reversed his decision and established a military
forces, which constituted Souvanna's principal mili-
headquarters in southern Laos from which he mounted
tary strength. Minor skirmishing broke into open
a campaign to retake Vientiane. He recaptured Vien-
hostilities by April 1963, when the PL attacked
tiane in December 1960, and Kong Le retreated with
Kong Le's troops in positions they had held jointly
his troops to the northeast and joined forces with
with the PL. These aggressive tactics by the PL
the PL.
not only failed to destroy the neutralist forces but
In early January 1961 Pathet Lao and Kong Le
resulted, rather, in much closer cooperation than
forces, supplied by the Soviet Union and advised and
before between the neutralists and the conservatives
encadred by the North Vietnamese, seized the stra-
in the political, as well as the military, field.
tegic Plain of Jars, where they established head-
With the outbreak of fighting in April 1963, the
quarters. By the spring of 1961 the Pathet Lao
two PL ministers withdrew from Vientiane, leaving
appeared to be in a position to take over the entire
PL representation in the Government in the hands of
country.
the two PL secretaries of state of cabinet rank.
3
7
By late 1964 the PL secretaries of state also had
neither of which the Communists have carried out.
withdrawn to Khang Khay on the Plain of Jars.
Up to now, failure to achieve peace has not been due
Negotiations to effect a ceasefire and to restore
to lack of conferences, but to failure on the part of
the governing coalition have taken place intermit-
Communist states to honor agreements already made.
tently ever since.
On April 19, 1964, following the failure of tri-
partite negotiations on the Plain of Jars between
Events 1965-67
the leaders of the three factions, disgruntled mili-
tary elements led by Generals Kouprasith Abhay
In 1965 the 5-year mandate of the National As-
and Siho Lanphouthacoul attempted to take over the
sembly elected in 1960 came to an end, and the
Government by force. The United States and other
Government concluded, somewhat reluctantly, that
foreign representatives, however, encouraged the
regular elections couldnot be held because of internal
Prime Minister to continue in office and resist the
warfare. Accordingly, a National Congress amended
efforts to displace him. By April 23, the coup
the Constitution, giving the King three options for
leaders had agreed to restore the Prime Minister
choosing deputies during times of crisis. A new
and his Government. Since that time, there has
Assembly was selected, and the Fifth Legislature
been no further attempt to overthrow the tripartite
entered into session August 18, 1965.
arrangement that is part of the 1962 Geneva settle-
ment.
The Pathet Lao was invited to participate in the
In mid-May 1964 the PL, supported by the North
selection process, but it predictably refused and
Vietnamese, took advantage of some dissidence within
denounced the process as a farce. The Pathet Lao
neutralist ranks and attacked in great strength Kong
also has continued to claim that its Cabinet mem-
Le's forces on the Plain of Jars. This deliberate
bers, along with a dissident neutralist minister and a
and open onslaught prompted the Prime Minister to
secretary of state, have been excluded from the
seek additional military assistance. The United States
Government. From its so-called "liberated" areas it
responded within the framework of the Geneva agree-
continues to affirm that these absent ministers
ments by supplying hardware in terms of military
remain the true representatives of the original coali-
equipment and supplies for the Lao Armed Forces.
tion Government, and it continues to denounce the
On May 26 the British, at the request of the Prime
"authorities of Vientiane" as American reaction-
Minister, invited the signatories of the Geneva ac-
aries. In the international sphere the Pathet Lao
cords to begin consultations in Vientiane on means
generally continues unqualified support of the Pei-
of restoring peace. The United States and several
ping and Hanoi line.
other signatories accepted the invitation, which the
On the military scene the North Vietnamese, with
Communist states spurned. At the close of consulta-
decreasing assistance from the Pathet Lao, have
tions in June, the representatives concluded that the
made strong attacks against Government positions
Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support, had
in Sam Neua Province during each dry season for
initiated the attacks against the neutralists, and that
the last 3 years. In Savannakhet Province, in March
the deteriorating military situation in Laos presented
1965, the Vietnamese launched a daring attack against
a grave threat to the peace of Southeast Asia. They
the Reserve Officers' training school at Dong Hene,
recommended that, in conformity with the Prime
along Route 9 some 50 kilometers east of Savanna-
Minister's views, all parties should abide by the
khet city. About 60 students and some officers suc-
ceasefire and withdraw, under ICC verification, to
cessfully withstood the Vietnamese assault, and,
positions held before the most recent fighting.
together with the Lao Air Force, accounted for a
Efforts on the part of the three Lao factions to
locally unprecedented 200 enemy dead.
resolve their difficulties, in meetings in Paris during
To conform with other Communist-instigated in-
August and September 1964, likewise produced no
surgency movements in Southeast Asia, the Pathet
basic concessions except a general agreement to
Lao was renamed the Lao People's Liberation Army
continue talking. Talks have continued sporadically
in October 1965.
in Vientiane since then. Their main topic has been
On the Government side, a significant area in
to discuss a place for the eventual meeting of the
northern Vientiane Province was regained from Com-
leaders of the three factions-Souvanna for the
munist control during Operation Triangle in the sum-
neutralists, Boun Oum for the conservatives, and
mer of 1964. Towns like Vang Vieng and Kassy,
Souphanouvong for the Communists.
and villages like Nong Peth, Ban Done, and Muong
With world awareness of the serious threat to
Met, were returned to Government control. In August
1966 the rich Nam Bac Valley in northern Luang
the peace posed by continued Communist aggression,
Prabang Province was recovered after more than 6
there have been various proposals for a new Geneva-
years under Communist control. In south Laos a
type meeting of the 14 nations that took part in the
1962 conference. The United States had indicated its
concerted social, economic, and security program
willingness to join some form of discussion to re-
had cleared much of the Sedone Valley by the spring
of 1967.
store peace, provided the Prime Minister's pre-
conditions-a ceasefire and Pathet Lao withdrawal to
In January and again in June 1966 the National
positions held before May 16, 1964-were met. The
Assembly mounted separate interpellations of the
United States also has pointed out that there already
Government, the second series continuing into Sep-
have been two high-level conferences on Southeast
tember. A motion of censure against the Government
Asia and two formal agreements in 1954 and 1962-
was introduced at the end of August, and the Assembly
4
rejected the Government's budget on September 16.
The Prime Minister has attempted without success
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma asked the King to
to persuade the Communist ministers to resume ac-
dissolve the Assembly, and, after consulting his
tive participation in the Government.
Council, the King SO ordered as of October 7.
Elections for the Sixth Legislature were held on
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
January 1, 1967, and 142 non-Communist candidates
competed for the Assembly's 59 seats. The new
After 14 years of independence, the Kingdom of
assembly, elected under normal constitutional pro-
Laos remains largely underdeveloped. The intrinsic
visions rather than the special ones that brought the
barriers to unity and a sense of nationhood described
Fifth Legislature into being, has a full 5-year man-
earlier have been increased by the internal and
external Communist threat. Efforts to bridge the gulf
date.
between the central Government and the people in
the countryside have been handicapped further by the
GOVERNMENT
lack of communications, particularly roads. Only a
few thousand individuals, most of them French-
Laos is a constitutional parliamentary monarchy.
educated, participate in government and politics; the
Under the December 1957 revision of the Consti-
bulk of the population is illiterate and politically
tution, originally promulgated by the King in May
passive. Popular identification with the country, the
1947, the hitherto exclusively male franchise was
Government, and the Crown-though stronger than in
extended to women. General elections normally are
the past-is very limited, and regional and family
held every 5 years. Constitutional amendments
loyalties continue to play a predominant role in
passed in 1965 give the King other options during
domestic politics.
times of crisis.
The Lao political situation is further complicated
The bicameral legislature is composed of a Na-
by two decades of international contention in the
tional Assembly of 59 members which wields the real
Indochina area. A formula was devised by the 14-
legislative power of the country, and a less active
nation Geneva conference in 1962 to bring peace to
King's Council of 12 elder statesmen, all of whom
Laos by making the country a neutral state with a
are appointed directly by the King, six upon the
coalition Government. But this design for national
recommendation of the Assembly. An absolute ma-
reconciliation and territorial unification has
jority of deputies present is required to uphold bills
been unworkable so far because of the intransigence
returned by the King's Council for Assembly re-
of the Pathet Lao. The internal struggles persist.
consideration. This Council privilege has been
Today the Communists occupy perhaps a third of
rarely, if ever, exercised.
the area and control about 20 percent of the population
The Prime Minister is designated by the King in
of Laos, generally tribal groups inhabiting the rugged
consultation with political leaders. The Prime Min-
and sparsely-populated uplands bordering Commu-
ister submits his proposed Cabinet to the National
nist China and the two Viet-Nams. The populous
Assembly for approval, a favorable two-thirds ma-
Mekong lowlands are under Government control and
jority of deputies present being required for investi-
there is considerable support for the central Lao
ture. Deputies who are candidates for ministerial
authority among many of the upland ethnic minority
posts may not participate in the vote of confidence
groups, notably the Meo and Yao.
for a new Government. Members of the Cabinetneed
The departure of the Pathet Lao from the tri-
not be Assemblymen. The Lao Patriotic Front
partite Government in 1963 reduced it to a neutralist-
(Neo Lao Hak Sat), the Communist faction, recog-
conservative coalition, with the latter faction nu-
nizes neither the present nor the previous two
merically predominant. The result has been the
legislatures and refused to participate in the national
achievement of a substantial degree of political
elections of July 1965 and January 1967.
stability. Nuetralist-conservative cooperation has
The Constitution provides that the judicial power
grown and in policy terms there is little distinction
shall be separate and independent of the executive
between the two. Political groupings in Laos gen-
and legislative powers. In practice, the judiciary is
erally consist of rather loose coalitions around
the least vigorous branch of the Government.
personalities, frequently along lines of clan loyalties.
Because of extreme factional strife and open
The sixth National Assembly, elected on January
fighting in Laos, the three principal Lao groupings-
1, 1967, has been more disciplined and orderly than
conservative, neutralist, and Communist-agreed in
its predecessor'. Although there are no sharply
June 1962 to form a tripartite Government of National
defined party alinements, a firm majority of the
Union under the premiership of Prince Souvanna
deputies have undertaken to support the policies and
Phouma, with carefully balanced participation by the
programs of the present Government.
three factions. The relationship of this Government
The Lao Communist political organization-the
to the Constitution remains undefined. Although in
Neo Lao Hak Sat or Pathet Lao-is neither strong
1963 Communist ministers withdrew from Vientiane
nor deeply rooted in Laos; it is almost completely
and from active participation in the Government of
a creature of the North Vietnamese on whose support
National Union, and other ministers have been desig-
and direction it has become increasingly dependent.
nated to carry on their work, the Communist minis-
Although the Pathet Lao abandoned its role in the
ters retain their portfolios in name, the door has
national Government in early 1963, it continues to
been left open for their return, and the tripartite
hold to the tripartite concept as a source of legiti-
Government remains undisturbed at least in form.
macy at home and overseas, a framework within
5
which to reenter the Government should the overall
Lao Governments have undertaken to increase Lao
situation in Indochina once again warrant the suspen-
rice production, first to self-sufficiency, and then
sion of hostilities and the adoption of political tactics.
to enter the relatively assured rice export market
Assisted by the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao has
as soon as possible.
retained firm control over the areas it occupies and
Forests cover about two-thirds of Laos. About
has allowed only a few outsiders to enter on conducted
50 percent of the forest land is considered of
visits.
commercial interest. Of the exploitable timber lands
The three-member International Control Com-
roughly one-third is now in secure or readily ac-
mission (ICC) plays an important role in the current
cessible areas. Although much finished lumber still
political situation. Originally created to supervise
is imported, forest products (timber, sticklac, and
the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements,
benzoin) form a substantial portion of Lao exports.
the ICC was given additional duties by the 1962
Mineral output is limited to tin and rock salt.
agreements to supervise the neutralization of Laos
Geological surveys, however, indicate deposits of
and preserve the peace. Despite obstructionism by
iron, magnesium, coal, tin, and petroleum. Reserves
the Polish member, who has always sided with the
of high-grade iron ore are sufficient for commercial
Pathet Lao, the ICC under its Indian chairman has
exploitation but located in an area that presently is
taken significant steps to preserve the 1962 agree-
insecure. The difficulties of internal transport
ments and to help stabilize the political-military
pose a serious obstacle to economic development.
situation. In 1965 and in 1966, the ICC conducted
There are no railroads in Laos; and the Mekong
investigations into and issued reports on the presence
River, while navigable by small craft and a potenti-
of regular North Vietnamese troops in Laos. Of the
ally important transport link, is interrupted by falls
more than 40 North Vietnamese soldiers captured in
and rapids which prevent effective commercial usage
Laos, the ICC has interrogated about 25. Although
of several sections of the river. With United States
the Polish Commissioner refused to participate in
assistance a substantial road construction and main-
these investigations, ICC reports were prepared,
tenance program has been undertaken.
sent to the Geneva Co-chairmen, and subsequently
As part of the Indochina complex, Laos had
made public.
economic ties to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and France
until 1954 when it assumed control of its own central
ECONOMY
banking, foreign exchange, and tariffs. Since that
An undeveloped country with most of its natural
time, its economic relations have been bilateral in
resources unexploited or unsurveyed, Laos is handi-
nature although the Foreign Exchange Operations
capped further by its geographic isolation. Almost
Fund (FEOF) has multilateral aspects. The Lao
85 percent of the people engage in subsistence
currency is pegged to the dollar at an official rate
agriculture, supplying the bulk of their own needs,
of 240 kip to one. Contributions from Australia,
including cloth. Per capita income is less than
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
$70, and fiscal year 1966 gross national product
States make foreign exchange freely available to the
was estimated slightly in excess of $173 million.
banks at a rate near 500 kip to the dollar. This
Local industry is quite limited. A few transport
system, recommended by the International Monetary
undertakings, a tin mining operation, about 50 saw
Fund, has stabilized the Lao currency and solved
mills, a soft-drink bottling plant, three cigarette
foreign exchange needs without creating an illegal
factories, and a few other small-scale local manu-
currency market or requiring unenforceable admin-
facturing plants constitute the present industrial
istrative controls.
enterprises in Laos. Consequently, a serious bal-
Because of the multinational program for the
ance-of-payments deficit exists as almost all manu-
development of the Mekong Valley, Laos, along with
factured products must be imported. Official im-
other Southeast Asian states, will experience in
ports were valued at slightly more than 27 times
coming years a massive influx of investment capital.
the $1 million worth of official exports. Being
The first major project of this multinational pro-
landlocked, Laos must depend on its neighbors,
gram, a $24 million hydroelectric dam on the Nam
principally Thailand, to facilitate transshipment of
Ngum River, is in fact located in Laos. The nine
goods.
contributing countries are Australia, Canada, Den-
Annual production of rice (about nine-tenths of
mark, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
which is the glutinous variety) has averagedbetween
Thailand, and the United States.
500 and 550 thousand metric tons. Formerly self-
sufficient in rice, Laos now must import 10 to 15
percent of its needs. Corn, tobacco, and tea have
The key to economic development for Laos is
long been grown in small quantities and cultivation
regional cooperation, of which from the standpoint
now is expanding steadily. Although curtailed sharply
of Laos the Nam Ngum dam is the best example.
by disease in the past few years, coffee production
As the least developed country in Southeast Asia,
in the south of Laos has been similarly reinvig-
Laos has much to gain from a quickened pace of
orated with the bulk of the small surplus exported
development in the region. Landlocked Laos has
to Singapore. A pre-World War II export trade
no access route to the sea and fully endorses a
in cattle hides and skins, drastically reduced by
policy of regional cooperation in order to help raise
war losses and more recently by rinderpest, is
its economy above the subsistence level. In those
being redeveloped with foreign assistance. As a
areas where Lao businessmen may be able to com-
primary development target the United States and the
pete effectively, they will need to market part of
6
their production in neighboring countries, particu-
Since 1955 the United States has substantially
larly Thailand. This is also true of the country's
assisted Laos in maintaining its independence in
agricultural and forest products.
the face of external and internal Communist pres-
For the immediate future, Lao efforts to
sure. From 1955 to the present the United States
develop rapidly will be limited severely as in past
has contributed over $460 million in economic as-
years by the country's task of coping with the dis-
sistance alone, the greater part of which has been
location caused by foreign invasion. About 500,000
for budgetary support and a lesser but still con-
persons have fled from areas occupied by Communist
siderable amount for development projects. The
forces. Presently, 250,000 people, or approximately
American program has three general objectives:
10 percent of the population, are still in refugee
stabilization of the Lao currency, humanitarian re-
status. Another 4 percent of the population serve
lief, and development of a viable economy.
in the army or civil administration. Because of
Stabilization assistance includes the Foreign Ex-
the large standing army, an estimated 20 percent
change Operations Fund (FEOF) and a commodities
of the active labor force is not available for produc-
import program. The commodities import program,
tive activity. There can be few countries in the
which provides petroleum products and a few other
world facing such problems; and the result is that
items deemed critical to Lao development plans at
both the Lao and friendly governments assisting
a favorable rate of exchange (i.e., 240 kip to $1),
it must direct their attention toward the pressing
further reduces the inflationary pressures on the
problems of survival and stability. A solid base
Lao economy while promoting essential development
for development, however, has been laid and, barring
activities. Australia and the United Kingdom also
dramatic reversals, significant progress to ward
furnish assistance of this type by means of separate
economic viability can be expected in the coming
but similar commodity import programs. For the
years.
present, Laos only earns part of the foreign ex-
change needed to support its vital expenditures
FOREIGN RELATIONS
overseas. The United States and France make up
in approximately equal parts this foreign exchange
deficit.
The foreign policy of the Lao Government de-
rives from the 1962 Geneva agreements. Laos
Communist violence in the past several years
has caused the Government of Laos to become res-
undertook to establish diplomatic relations with all
nations (its neighbors first) on the basis of equality
ponsible for about 250,000 refugees from Pathet
and respect for the independence and sovereignty
Lao-occupied areas. In addition to providing food
of Laos. Renouncing any intention of the use or
for these refugees, the United States is working
threat of force that might impair the peace of other
with the Government of Laos in the public health
countries, as well as any interference in their in-
field to provide medical care for these refugees
as well as for thousands of other Lao citizens.
ternal affairs, the Lao Government simultaneously
declared that it was the will of the Lao people to
The United States has assisted in building, equip-
protect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,
ping, and staffing an important hospital in the north
unity, and territorial integrity of Laos. It therefore
as well as over 100 dispensaries and infirmaries
appealed to all states to respect Lao sovereignty,
throughout the country. In cooperation with Opera-
independence, and neutrality and to refrain from
tion Brotherhood of the Philippines, the United
any actions inconsistent with these principles.
States helps support Filipino medical personnel in
In pursuit of its stated desire for friendly re-
hospitals and dispensaries throughout Laos.
lations with all states, the Lao Government estab-
United States developmental assistance is aimed
lished and maintains diplomatic relations with its
principally at improving the lives of the rural popu-
neighbors and all other signatories of the 1962
lation. A major United States-Laos objective is
Geneva agreements. Laos is a member of the
self-sufficiency in rice production. Early and effect-
United Nations and participates in several regional
ive accomplishment of this joint project and estab-
and international organizations of a non-military
lishment of a rice export market in place of the
nature.
current deficit require a combination of closely
In accordance with its continued policy of neu-
coordinated programs. Better seed, improved tech-
trality and independence the Lao Government has
niques, and widespread use of irrigation, fertilizer,
formally and publicly denounced the aggression from
and pesticides are the keys to increasing the amounts
North Viet-Nam and, consistent with the provisions
of rice grown by each farmer. A stable market,
of the 1962 agreements, has sought military sup-
credit facilities, and a distribution system for im-
plies for self-defense as well as economic assist-
proved seeds and implements will assure that the
ance for self-development.
farmer will benefit from his efforts. Improved
main routes and feeder roads also are required
to enable the rice to move to urban centers for
U.S. POLICY
consumption or export.
The United States is a major contributor to
The United States firmly endorses the efforts
regional projects benefiting Laos. The $24-million
of the Lao Government to preserve its independence
Nam Ngum dam on a tributary of the Mekong River
and neutrality and considers that the full imple-
will provide not only hydroelectric power for small-
mentation of the 1962 Geneva agreements offers the
scale local industries and the capital city of Vien-
the best method to obtain these objectives.
tiane but also supply water for irrigating 80,000
7
acres and by flood control bring another 25,000
Counselor for Economic Affairs and Director AID
acres back into productive use.
Mission-Joseph A. Mendenhall
Public Affairs Officer (U.S.I.S.)-David P. Sheppard
Army Attache-Col. Kurtz Miller
Air Force Attaché-Col. Paul A. Pettigrew
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The United States maintains an Embassy in
Chief of State-King Sri Savang Vatthana
Vientiane at Rue Bartholomie.
Inspector General of the Kingdom-Prince BOUN
OUM na Champassak
Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, De-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
fense, Veterans' Affairs, and Rural Affairs-
Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA
Cady, John "F., Roots of French Imperialism in
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Econ-
Eastern Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
omy, and Minister of Planning-Prince
1954.
SOUPHANOUVONG (in absentia)
Dommen, Arthur J., Conflict in Laos, New York,
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Edu-
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964.
cation, Fine Arts, Sports, and Youth-LEUAM
Dooley, Thomas A., Tom Dooley's Three Great
Insisiengmay
Books, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of National
Inc., 1960.
Economy-SISOUK na Champassak
Halpern, Joel M., Economy and Society of Laos,
Minister of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism-
New Haven, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Univer-
PHOUMI VONGVICHIT (in absentia)
sity Press, 1964.
Minister of Interior and Social Welfare-PHENG
Halpern, Joel M., Government, Politics and Social
Phongsavan
Structure in Laos, New Haven, Yale University
Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Planning-
Press, 1964.
INPENG Suryadhay
Hammer, Ellen J., The Struggle for Indochina,
Minister of Post and Telecommunications, Public
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.
Health, and Acting Minister of Information,
La Font, Pierre B., Apercus sur le Laos, Saigon,
Propaganda, and Tourism-Prince SISOUMANG
Imprimerie Nouvelle d' Extreme-Orient, 1959.
Sisaleumsak
Lancaster, Donald, The Emancipation of French Indo-
Minister of Public Works and Transport-NGON
china, New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.
Sananikone
Le Bar, Frank M. and Adrienne Suddard, ed.,
Commander-in-Chief, Lao Armed Forces-Maj. Gen.
Laos: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture,
OUAN Rathikoun
New Haven, Human Relations Area Files Press,
Ambassador to the United States, and to the United
1960.
Nations-Khamking SOUVANLASY
Meeker, Oden, The Little World of Laos, New York,
Charles Scribners' Sons, 1959.
Laos maintains an Embassy in the United States
Modelski, George, ed., International Conference on
at 2222 S Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.
the Settlement of the Laotian Questions, 1961-62,
Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press,
1962.
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Sisouk na Champassak, Storm Over Laos, New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.
Ambassador-William Healy Sullivan
Viravong, Maha S., History of Laos, Washington,
Deputy Chief of Mission-Robert Arnold Hurwitch
Joint Publications Research Service, 1964.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8301
Released October 1967
Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs
8