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Presidential Meetings--Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89-10/2/89
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Presidential Meetings--Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89-10/2/89
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons Files
OA/ID Number:
91107
Folder ID Number:
91107-005
Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
1
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great
7/14/89
(b)(1)
TS
Britain (3 pp.)
02. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Sosuke Uno of Japan (2 pp.)
7/14/89
(b)(1)
C
03. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the
7/17/89
(b)(1
Netherlands (5 pp.)
04. Memcon
Re: Working Luncheon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister, of
7/17/89
(b)(I
Netherlands (2 pp.)
05. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Lee Sang Hoon, Minister of Defense of Korea
7/20/89
(b)(1)
(3 pp.)
06. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President France Albert Rene of Seychelles (2
7/20/89
(b)(1)
pp.)
07. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong of the
7/24/89
(b)(I
Republic of Korea (3 pp.)
08. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak (3
8/2/89
(b)(1
pp.)
09. Memcon
Re: Meeting with General Youssef Abu Talib, Defense Minister
8/8/89
(b)(
Egypt (2 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Pinksheet Number:
cap914
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
10a. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)
9/1/89
(b)(1)
C
10b. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (8 pp.)
9/1/89
(b)(1)
C
11. Memcon
Re: Meeting with John Major of the United Kingdom (4 pp.)
9/11/89
(b)(1
12. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti
9/15/89
(b)(1)
(6 pp.)
13a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Sandiford of Barbados (2 pp.)
9/19/89
(b)(1)
13b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister
n.d.
(b)(i)
$
Sandiford of Barbados (2 pp.)
14. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the
9/21/89
(b)(1)
Soviet Union (8 pp.)
15. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)
9/25/89
(b)(1
16. Memcon
Re: President's Lunch for Allied Representatives (3 pp.)
9/25/89
(b)(
17. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)
9/25/89
(b)(
18. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (4
9/25/89
(b)(1)
/
pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Pinksheet Number:
cap914
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
19a. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn of Hungary (1
9/25/89
(b)(1)
pp.)
19b. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Janez Drnovsek of Yugoslavia (2 pp.)
9/25/89
(b)(
20. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)
9/25/89
(b)(
21. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski of
9/25/89
(b)(1
Poland (2 pp.)
22. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Theo Waigel, Chairman of the Christian Social
9/26/89
(b)(1)
Union of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)
23. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (7 pp.)
9/27/89
(b)
1
24. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)
9/27/89
(b)(1
8
25. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Virgilio Barco of Colombia (8 pp.)
9/28/89
(b)(1)
8
26. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt (5 pp.)
10/2/89
(b)(1
S
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Pinksheet Number:
cap914
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great
7/14/89
(b)(1)
TS
Britain (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
By MM (NLGB) on 03/31/2011
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0429-F(89)
MR Case #:
2010-0187-MR(89)
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
11/29/2007
MR Disposition Date: 11/10/2010
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 500 LIBRARY
6824
DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
C&I
2/17/06
2009-0628-MR
2009-0275-
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister of Great Britain (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
DATE, TIME
July 14, 1989, 8:45 am - 9:30 am
AND PLACE:
Ambassador's Residence
The Prime Minister began the meeting by noting the importance of
an IMF agreement for Poland, without which the reforms and
assistance will be stalled.
The President agreed and mentioned that Chairman Jaruzelski had
said that it might be helpful to have the Head of the IMF on
television in Poland to explain what they are trying to do.
(
The Prime Minister said that flexibility is needed.
The President then turned the discussion to North-South issues.
(c)
The Prime Minister said that many of the developing countries
realize that privatization is the key. If there is a pot of gold
out there, it lies in private enterprise, which in turn depends
on reform. Reform is the responsibility of the countries, debt
is being worked on and aid should be carefully given.
()
The President asked about the Prime Minister's earlier point that
Third World countries are trying to sell the North commodities
that are not needed but which are in surplus.
The Prime Minister said that President Mitterand would surely
raise the issue. But the goal for these countries is to get
their economies functioning properly in order to attract private
capital. She pointed out that aid would not increase markedly
anytime soon. North-South dialogue should not be forced through
a Summit. In fact, some leaders, like Ghandi, realize this.
)
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0187-MR
11/10/2010 MM
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET
The Prime Minister then raised the issue of refugees. The most
immediate problem is Hong Kong where many of the residents want
the UK to issue an insurance policy.
()
The President asked whether the Prime Minister had contact with
the new people in China.
(
The Prime Minister
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The President said that he had reason to think that there was
hope for the Chinese leadership. Some have said that Li Peng is
pretty good. The key question is what the West should ask China
to do.
(e)
The Prime Minister
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The President turned to the question of Chinese students in the
United States and said that a number were choosing to have
children in the U.S. who would then be U.S. citizens.
(
The Prime Minister added that the students will want to stay and
that Britain intends to grant them working visas.
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The Prime Minister then turned to the problem of Cyprus,
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The President remarked that he saw no reason not to back the
Secretary General.
The Prime Minister then asked about the President's assessment of
the situation in Israel and the position of Prime Minister
Shamir.
The President said that the Israelis were upset but that they
would not dictate American policy. Some are after Secretary
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET
Baker whom the President said he backed fully. The goal is to
keep the election process on track. There are few answers to the
problems there, he said.
The Prime Minister
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
(e)
The President said that he had a lot of faith in people like
Rabin when he was there but hoped to work with this leadership.
Discussing the political situation further, the President noted
that Egyptian President Mubarak appeared relaxed about the
situation.
(b) (1)
The Prime Minister
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The President closed the discussion of the Middle East, saying
that some European states want to rehabilitate Qadhafi, a
position that the United States rejects.
The Prime Minister
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
(
The President remarked that he worried about another "aspirin
plant" in Libya and consequences like the Iraqi nuclear reactor
raid of several years ago.
The President turned the conversation to structural problems in
the Western economies asking Mrs. Thatcher's opinion.
()
The Prime Minister noted that the British have a budget surplus
and still a trade deficit even though the two are closely linked.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Sosuke Uno of Japan (2
7/14/89
(b)(1)
C
pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
1999-0471-F(29)
MR Case #:
2009-0628-MR (501)
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
2/7/2011
MR Disposition Date: 11/10/2010
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 99-0471-F 501 #29 LIBRARY 5975
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Sosuke Uno of
Japan
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor to the Department
of State
David Mulford, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Deane Hoffmann, NSC (notetaker)
Fumiko Gregg (interpreter)
Prime Minister Sosuke Uno
Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Foreign Minister
Nobuo Matsunaga, Ambassador to the U.S.
Takamori Makino, Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary
Michihiko Kunihiro, Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs
Tatsuo Arima, Director General for North
American Affairs Bureau
Yoshiyasu Sato, Director General for Economic
Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry
Seiroku Kajiyama, MITI Minister
Kouji Tsuruoka, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 14, 1989, 4:18-4:34 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Ambassador's Residence, Paris
The meeting began without the Prime Minister, who was late
arriving. (U)
(b) (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
C&I 4/14/03
99-0471-F
IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
(b) (1)
(The Prime Minister arrived at 4:27 p.m. -- two minute photo op.) .
(U)
[Japanese fumble for notes, pass out paper in kanji.] (U)
The President said it is time to go, that maybe a meeting can
take place in a corner later. Japanese-U.S. relations are very
important; the countries must work together.
(U)
(b) (1)
The Prime Minister departed at 4:34 p.m. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
confirmed Mtg w/
Beatnce ofNetherlands
on Jul 17th
No MEMCON
SECRET
SECRET
6824
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
of the Netherlands (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
C. Howard Wilkins, Ambassador
Governor John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President
for Economic and Domestic Policy
William K. Reilly, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency
Robert Zoellick, Counsellor to the
Department, Department of State
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, Department of State
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Rudolf de Korte, Vice Prime Minister
Hans van den Broek, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Onno Ruding, Minister of Finance
Ed Nijpels, Minister of Housing
Richard Fein, Netherlands Ambassador to U.S.
Henry Wijnaendts, Director General, Political
Affairs
M.J.D. van der Voet, Director, Information
Service
Robert Meys, Head of Western Hemisphere
Directorate
Jan Willem Holtslag, Advisor to the Prime
Minister
DATE, TIME
July 17, 1989, 11:40 am - 12:45 pm
AND PLACE:
Binnenhof 20, The Hague
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F
SECRET
SECRET
Prime Minister Lubbers said he was gratified and honored to host
the President in the Netherlands and expressed the hope that the
President could relax after his taxing European journey.
The Prime Minister said he particularly welcomed the President
back. It is not a cliche that our countries share fundamental
values. The Dutch are grateful to the President, especially for
the determination the President expressed in Brussels to overcome
the division of Europe. (U)
The President replied that it was hard to be formal with a man he
considers a friend of long standing. The President said he was
touched by Queen Beatrix's coming back from vacation to meet the
President at the airport. The President, offering to share his
impressions of the Economic Summit, said he would ask Secretary
Baker to sum up the actions taken, especially as they might
effect the Netherlands, and ask Mr. Reilly to discuss the
environment. The President added that he would also like to
discuss Eastern Europe and the amazing changes that have occurred
in Poland and Hungary in the last two years. (U)
Secretary Baker began by saying the Summit was a great success.
It was his ninth in one capacity or another and one of the most
successful he had attended. The Summit dealt with trade,
monetary policy, and debt, which is the most serious problem.
The Summit participants agreed to a certain amount of debt relief
for the Third World, especially for sub-Saharan Africa. The
Secretary noted they also talked about the Uruguay Round and
thanked the Prime Minister for his government's help in moving
the process along. On questions of development, the Summit
agreed on the importance of structural adjustment. There were
extensive discussions on the environment, about which Mr. Reilly
would be dealing with expertly, and on drugs. (C)
Secretary Baker, continuing, noted that the Summit also issued
political declarations on East-West relations, reflecting the
breathtaking changes in Eastern Europe, and on China, human
rights, and terrorism. The President had stressed the importance
of supporting change in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, the
economy is in desperate shape, but political changes are quite
dramatic. In Hungary, there are also political reforms and more
encouraging economic reforms. The Secretary said that in three
to four weeks there would be a follow-up meeting, to which he
hoped the Netherlands would come, chaired by the EC Commission.
There had been little debate on China. The President's policy of
avoiding isolating China was adopted in Paris. Finally, there
were strong declarations on human rights and the importance of
combatting terrorism, and especially aircraft safety. (2)
The President added that it is important to ask what we want
China to do now and what China can do now, mindful of the
constraints on this aging generation. The U.S. is trying to
preserve what it can of this relationship because of its
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
strategic importance. The President said the Administration is
thinking this through and wanted to discuss this with the Dutch.
(C)
Mr. Reilly observed that the Summit was wholly without precedent
with regard to the environment, which accounted for one third of
the communique. The Seven said action on an urgent basis is
required to address a full phase-out of fluorocarbons, support
for the Inter-Governmental Commission on Global Climate Change,
and to focus special attention on developing countries and on
Eastern Europe. Acid rain and pollution of rivers were of
special concern. The Summit also supported industrial scientific
research without delaying action. The Seven discussed the
problem of tropical rain forests and the idea of debt-for-nature
swaps. In short, he concluded, the Summit moved the environment
from the margin to the mainstream. (C)
Secretary Baker added that the Summit Declaration welcomed
changes in the Soviet Union but emphasized the need for a strong
NATO. (f)
General Scowcroft said it was not clear whether Chairman
Gorbachev had sent his letter to make news, but such was its
result. His broad suggestion for closer cooperation shows a
definite departure from past autarkic approaches. If the Soviet
leadership is serious, this initiative may be part of this
historic shift. It is not clear, however, whether they realize
how far they have to go. (2)
The President alluded to press speculation about whether
Gorbachev might attend a G-7 meeting. That would be impossible,
of course, but the Summit did not want to be begrudging. This
had been a major topic at the President's press conference. (2)
Mr. Fitzwater observed that this surprising element became
important because the rest of the Summit had gone so smoothly.
(2)
Prime Minister Lubbers found it reassuring that Gorbachev, with
all his problems, had time to write a letter. The Prime Minister
said that the Dutch are positive about the G-7 summit but
somewhat apprehensive about how the G-7 fits in with other
Western institutions, especially regarding financial and economic
matters. (2)
Foreign Minister Van Den Broek said the communique was helpful
and harmonious, but wondered how the discussions on monetary
coordination would be carried out. Would it be in the G-7, where
the Dutch do not participate, or in the IMF and other
multilateral financial institutions, as the Dutch would prefer?
The U.S. had created these institutions, and the Foreign Minister
said he hoped the U.S. would protect them. The Dutch are often
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SEGRET
asked to follow up on G-7 decisions, and would like to be
involved from the beginning. The Foreign Minister asked to what
extent the Russians have in mind obtaining credits through, for
example, the IMF. That would make the IMF a different sort of
institution. As to the international debt strategy worked out by
Secretaries Baker and Brady, the Dutch would have to examine the
question of whether more capital resources should be made
available for the IMF. ($)
The President replied that the Soviets will try to get economic
help from the West in any way they can. Gorbachev knows his
economy is in trouble. ()
Secretary Baker noted that all the discussions within the G-7
assumed that the international monetary institutions would remain
the center of this effort. As to the Dutch wanting to be present
at takeoff as well as landing, the U.S. would take note of this
very sensible point. The Soviet Union's joining international
financial institutions is premature and would fundamentally
change the charter of the IMF and World Bank. GATT would have to
come before the others. (f)
The President commented that General Jaruzelski said he would
welcome it if the heads of the World Bank and IMF came to Poland
to speak to the Polish people on the need for sacrifice and
reform. This would help Jaruzelski shift the onus for austerity
from himself to an external body. His was a cri de coeur. The
President said he could not imagine that happening in the Soviet
Union. Nor could the scene in Gdansk, with the enormous crowds,
happen yet in the Soviet Union. In Poland and Hungary, as well
as at the G-7, the President had stressed that the U.S. offers no
threat to Gorbachev. ()
Prime Minister Lubbers said he hoped for intensified global
efforts on the economy, but also expressed worry about new
tensions between North and South. Forests are a global problem,
which must be worked on together with the South. (2)
Mr. Mathis said it might be possible to establish a link between
the World Climate Convention and the G-7 to address the CFC
problem. (2)
Mr. Reilly noted that the question of international funding for
world environmental issues is a delicate one. Perhaps the World
Bank and the regional banks would be possible sources of funding.
(L)
Governor Sununu noted that the U.S. will spend a quarter of a
billion dollars this year on research modeling for environmental
efforts.
(2)
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Mr. Mathis added that at a conference in the Hague in November,
the Duthc hoped to improve our capacity to cooperate on the
environment. (2)
Mr. Reilly emphasized the need for concentrating efforts on
existing institutions. (C)
Prime Minister Lubbers agreed that this was an increasingly
important issue for politicians everywhere. He stressed the need
for a pragmatic approach and close cooperation between the U.S.
and the Netherlands. (C)
The President, concluding, mentioned that he had discussed the
environment with President Sarney at the Hirohito funeral and
agreed that this is a very sensitive issue that demands careful
handling. (2)
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6824
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Working Luncheon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime
Minister, of Netherlands (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
C. Howard Wilkins, Ambassador
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President
for Economic and Domestic Policy
William K. Reilly, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency
Robert Zoellick, Counsellor to the Department
Department of State
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, Department of State
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Rudolf de Korte, Vice Prime Minister
Hans Van den Broek, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Onno Ruding, Minister of Finance
Ed Nijpels, Minister of Housing
Richard Fein, Netherlands Ambassador to U.S.
Henry Wijnaendts, Director General, Political
Affairs
M.J.D. van der Voet, Director, Information
Service
Robert Meys, Head of Western Hemisphere
Directorate
Jan Willem Holtslag, Advisor to the Prime
Minister
DATE, TIME
July 17, 1989, 12:55 pm - 2:35 pm
AND PLACE:
Jacob Catshuis
Prime Minister Lubbers asked the President if the French
bicentennial had been successful. (U)
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The President answered that it had been marvelous and that the
French should take pride. The President asked Prime Minister
Lubbers to give his views of the role of the European
Parliament. (U)
The Prime Minister answered that the authority of the Parliament
is currently limited. Gradually the powers have increased but it
is a slow process but as the European Community's stature grows,
SO will the power of the Parliament. The Prime Minister added
that Austria has applied to join the EC but that its neutrality
poses a strategic decision. The issue was raised with Gorbachev
as well as whether the Council of Europe might be an appropriate
institution for forging relationships with East European
reformist regimes. (f)
Secretary Baker asked about the European Community's movement
toward monetary union. (f)
The Prime Minister replied that the French are now positive about
the prospect of monetary union but that the British are proving
to be very difficult. It may take many years to move from a
single market in 1992 to monetary union. (2)
The President asked how Turkey would be handled. (d)
Vice Deputy Minister Korte replied that Greece and Turkey are
problematic because of their low GNPs and violations of human
rights. ($)
The President asked why Austria wanted to join the EC but Finland
had made no such approach. (f)
Vice Deputy Minister Korte answered that trade patterns explained
the differences in the two approaches. (f)
The President continued, asking if these countries were not
worried about the single market. ()
Vice Deputy Minister Korte said that the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) is itself increasingly prosperous. (d)
The President then asked whether it was imaginable that a party
could come to power in Germany that would call these trends into
question. (2)
Prime Minister Lubbers answered that all Europeans are
increasingly worried about emigration and that this has fueled
the rise of the Republicaners who might question the single
market. (ø)
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5728
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Lee Sang Hoon, Minister of
Defense of Korea (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Henry Rowen, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
Karl Jackson, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)
Lee Sang Hoon, Minister of National Defense
Park Tong Jin, Korean Ambassador to the U.S.
Han Mun Sik (Translator)
DATE, TIME
July 20, 1989, 11:10 - 11:25am EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President welcomed the Minister of National Defense to the
White House and described the ceremonies going on with regard to
the twentieth anniversary of the American landing on the moon.
(U)
Minister Lee congratulated the President on his successful trip
to Eastern Europe and extended greetings from President Roh Tae
WOO. (U)
The President inquired about President Roh and said that he
wished his visit to Korea had been longer. The President asked
whether Minister Lee was optimistic about the general situation
in Korea, and especially the situation vis-a-vis the North. (L)
Minister Lee began by expressing his deep appreciation for the
excellent arrangements made for the SCM by Secretary Cheney and
Admiral Crowe. The Minister thanked the President for the strong
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statement that he had given in Korea regarding the U.S.-Korean
security relationship. (U)
The President interjected, reaffirming that commitment. (U)
Minister Lee said based on the President's strong commitment, the
SCM was successful and reaffirmed the importance of U.S. presence
in the Republic of Korea. The Minister described a previous
conversation with Ambassador Lilley. Ambassador Lilley said that
in spite of Soviet peace overtures, the Soviets are still
providing sophisticated weaponry such as MIG 23s, MIG 29s, and
SA-5s to the North. Lilley also felt that the current
disturbances in the South would continue for 2-3 years. The
Minister said that the North intended to exploit these and that
the North still seeks to spread communism to all of Korea. For
this reason the importance of the U.S. presence could not be
overestimated. (2)
The President said that the U.S. has no plan to change its
policy. On Capitol Hill the Administration needs help from Korea
to maintain support for the continued U.S. presence in Korea.
The President stated that the United States will continue to
resist the attempt to spread communism to South Korea. Except
for North Korea, everyone else in the world has embarked upon a
different political direction. (d)
Minister Lee raised the question of anti-Americanism in South
Korea. He assured the President that the majority of people in
South Korea like and respect the American people and understand
the need for U.S. forces to remain in Korea. (2)
The President said that we do not like to see anti-Americanism
but we nonetheless understand it and do not worry about it. (C)
Minister Lee said that a special committee had been formed
consisting of the Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and high level representatives from the Blue House to
develop countermeasures against anti-Americanism. The Minister
said that for the sake of peace he hoped to see the USA remain a
strong, influential, and dedicated Asian and Pacific power. (2)
The President replied that the U.S. will continue to be a Pacific
power with many friends in the region, including special friends
such as Korea. There will be no shift away from this position.
The President said that nothing will move us away from our
commitment to Asia and the Pacific. The President raised events
in China saying that the U.S. was upset by the tragic events like
everyone else in the world. (d)
Minister Lee delivered a letter to President Bush from President
Roh which the President opened. The President said he had great
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respect for President Roh and that Minister Lee could tell him
that the United States remains firmly committed to a U.S.
presence in Korea. He remarked to the National Security Advisor
that we should find an opportunity to publicly express the
firmness of the U.S. commitment. The President said that there
should be no doubt where we stand on this matter. (f)
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5743
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President France Albert Rene of
Seychelles (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James Moran, U.S. Ambassador to Seychelles
G. Philip Hughes, Executive Secretary
David Kaeuper, Director for Africa (notetaker)
President France Albert Rene
Danielle de St. Jorre, Foreign Minister
Marc Marengo, Charge d'Affaires
DATE, TIME
July 20, 1989, 3:10 - 3:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President opened the meeting by warmly welcoming President
Rene to the United States, noting that he had never been to
Seychelles but had visited Kenya and Somalia. President Rene
said he had just arrived in the United States. His last visit to
the United States was as a "visitor grantee" twenty years
previously. (U)
The President said that he had just signed a Presidential
Determination making Seychelles eligible for U.S. military
assistance. He had been glad to do this and a modest sum of
money was being made available to improve Seychelles' capability
for policing illegal fishing in its coastal waters. The
President said he understood that lease negotiations were about
to begin on the U.S. satellite tracking facility and that he
hoped these would go well, and congratulated President Rene on
Seychelles' purchase of a very fine aircraft, the Boeing 767. (U)
President Rene responded that bilateral relations had been very
good for the past several years and hoped they would remain SO.
The Seychelles was ready to begin negotiations on the satellite
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tracking facility agreement, and he appreciated U.S. assistance
for improving Seychelles coastal patrols. He also hoped that
"one day" the U.S. would take the initiative to make the Indian
Ocean "a zone of peace" whether or not an "Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace" conference were held anytime soon. ()
The President answered that he wanted to make the whole world a
zone of peace. He was very serious about working effectively
with the Soviet Union and wanted some of our friends who were
uncertain about it to understand this clearly. Improved U.S.-
Soviet relations would be beneficial to all, especially smaller
countries. Though the U.S. could not endorse the concept of
nuclear free zones, we are very very serious about making and
keeping peace. President Rene repeated that he hoped for an
American initiative (on the Indian Ocean) if it could be managed.
(U)
The President asked President Rene about the Seychelles' economy
and economic health. President Rene said that tourism and
fishing were the most important economic activities. Tourism was
"not doing badly, and Seychelles was developing a fish
processing industry based on tuna, much of it exported to the
United States and to Puerto Rico. Seychelles was planning to buy
its own fishing vessels. Seychelles policy on tourism was to
restrict the total numbers of visitors at any given time to 4000
as this not only pleased the tourists but also attracted "better
quality. Responding to several questions by the President,
President Rene described the distribution of tourists in
Seychelles, and noted that transportation to outlying islands was
a problem which was being resolved, in part, by the purchase of
two new Cessnas. (U)
Bringing the meeting to a close, the President asked President
Rene if anything could be done to make his visit more pleasant.
He thanked President Rene warmly for Seychelles' cooperation, and
wished him a good visit to Colorado Springs, to the Boeing
facilities in Seattle, and a successful, record-setting non-stop
return to Seychelles aboard his country's new Boeing 767.
President Rene thanked the President for receiving him and said
he was being treated very well with nothing more to be done or
to ask for. (U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong
of the Republic of Korea (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
William Clark Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asisan and Pacific
Affairs
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs
Choi Ho Joong, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Park Tong Jin, Ambassador
Shin Doo Byong, Director General for North
American Affairs
Chung Tae Ik, Political Counselor
DATE, TIME
July 24, 1989, 11:00 a.m.-11:15 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
Foreign Minister Choi began by conveying warmest regards from
President Roh Tae Woo. (U)
The President remarked on the fact that the ROK Defense Minister
had been in to see him the previous week and that it was a
pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Choi. The President opened
by discussing a new undercurrent of adverse opinion on U.S. troop
strength in Korea. The President mentioned that Senators Nunn
and Warner had raised the subject of drawing down U.S. troop
strength. (d)
Foreign Minister Choi thanked the President for his speech before
the Korean National Assembly in which he had reaffirmed his
strong commitment. (L)
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The President replied that this problem needed to be worked on
Capitol Hill. He suggested that the Foreign Minister should
discuss the matter when he met with particular Congressmen. In
addition, the President raised the issue of burden sharing by
saying that the more Korea could do to support U.S. troops the
better because much of the desire to withdraw U.S. troops is
driven by a budgetary rather than a strategic rationale. (1)
Foreign Minister Choi said that in his meetings with Congressmen
and Senators he would stress continuing the American troop
presence and the necessity of close consultation between the ROK
and U.S. He indicated that President Roh conveyed his warmest
wishes to President Bush and accepted the invitation to visit
Washington. He also passed the President a personal letter from
President Roh. (2)
The President thanked the Foreign Minister for the letter which
he said he would answer and discussed the October 17 visit and
the possibility of playing some tennis. (U)
Foreign Minister Choi inquired about the possibility of President
Roh addressing a joint session of Congress just as President Bush
had addressed the National Assembly in Korea. (2)
The President said that this would need to be decided by Congress
itself. The Executive can weigh in but the Korean side would
also need to contact the Speaker of the House and the Majority
Leader of the Senate. The President went on to say that the
bilateral relationship was a good one. There are some trade
problems and we now have the problem of troop strength. (2)
Secretary Baker intervened by raising the matter of the
relocation of U.S. Army Headquarters from Yongson. He said that
what we needed was prompt agreement between the two governments
which would diffuse some of the negative sentiments. The matter
is driven by the bilateral trade problem as well as by relocation
costs for the U.S. Army. ()
Foreign Minister Choi congratulated the President on his
successful trip to Eastern Europe and said that the ROK was also
trying hard to establish relations with socialist countries. (U)
The President replied that there were still big problems ahead
but that he was very pleased with the trip. The change toward
democracy is inescapable and it is in everyone's interest to
encourage the change. (U)
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Foreign Minister Choi then extended an invitation to the Vice
President to visit Korea in conjunction with his attendance at
the IDU Conference in Tokyo. (U)
The Vice President accepted the invitation, if it could be worked
out within his schedule.
(U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Foreign Minister Mohammed bin
Mubarak
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sam Zakhem, Former U.S. Ambassador
to Bahrain
Sandra Charles, NSC, Notetaker
Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak
Ghazi Muhammad al-Gusaybi, Ambassador to the
U.S.
Karim Ibrahim al-Shakar, Representative to
the UN
DATE, TIME
Wednesday, August 2, 1989, 1:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The meeting began with the President thanking Sheikh Mohammed for
his statement to the press on LTC Higgins that had preceded their
meeting. (U)
Sheikh Mohammed replied that LTC Higgins was their man as much as
ours and they shared our concerns. He then presented a message
from His Highness the Amir. (U)
The President inquired about the Amir's health, and recalled his
visit to Bahrain and the hospitality he had received from the
Amir and the Crown Prince. He noted that it had been a short but
wonderful visit. (U)
On the hostage situation, the President said he had received with
interest what the Foreign Minister had told Brent Scowcroft, and
that he would appreciate hearing any other thoughts the Foreign
Minister had. The President continued that LTC Higgins was an
international issue as the Foreign Minister had stated so
eloquently. He was an American officer, and as
Commander-in-Chief, the President said he was responsible for
U.S. forces. He noted there were no easy answers, yet there had
to be some action taken to stop hostage-taking. We were
considering doing something, but what was not clear. Since we
don't know enough, we were doing the prudent thing. Now there
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had been threats against Waite and Cicippio. The President
commented that if there was an execution every twenty-four hours
that would be bad. (d)
The President continued that he had called for the release of all
hostages held. He explained that from our independent
information we had reason to believe that Obeid had ties to the
Higgins' kidnapping. The President reiterated that our policy
remained that we would not negotiate with hostage holders
because, if we did, then there would be another American seized
there or somewhere else in the world. He welcomed the Foreign
Minister's comments. ($)
Sheikh Mohammed said that he believed we had been successful in
fighting terrorism. Ten years ago it was spreading, planes were
being hijacked everywhere. Now the circle was closing and one
area remained where these actions started -- Lebanon. We now
knew the area where terrorist actions originated. He stated we
should not blame the people but the countries behind them. He
believed that we should press those countries -- they were the
ones who had given the people guns, brainwashed and bribed them.
Working together we should be able to close off this area of
threat. Sheikh Mohammed suggested that it was not just this
issue, but we needed to react to the larger issue collectively.
This was not just a threat to Israeli, European, or U.S.
citizens, but to all. Therefore, we needed to cooperate; no
country could do it alone. He mentioned the courage the Kuwaitis
had shown previously in refusing to negotiate with hijackers.
(1)
The President told Sheikh Mohammed that he had called King
Hassan, Chadli Bendjedid and King Fahd earlier. He had saluted
their Tripartite Initiative on Lebanon and told them he was sorry
it was on the shoals. He revealed that King Hassan had told him
that he had just completed a long letter saying that the group
had received no cooperation from Syria. The President said he
told King Hassan that we supported the initiative and if the
United States could help to get it back on track, we would do
that. The President also agreed that we should look at the whole
situation as well as the hostage situation. (2)
Sheikh Mohammed stated that the first step had come from the
three Heads of State committee. He felt they needed to convene
another meeting and then another Summit. They had received
support from other Heads of State, and needed an incentive to
continue. He believed if the Committee succeeded and submitted
its report, then we could take some action. And if there was one
country that was not cooperating then we must say so. (2)
The President agreed, saying that King Hassan certainly intended
to do this with this letter which would be circulated to many
magazines and journals. The letter would summarize the actions
taken by the Committee, the three Heads of State would sign it,
and it would point a finger at Syria. The President had told
King Hassan that he felt that Syria was trying to help on the
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hostage matter; but King Hassan had cautioned that what Syria did
with one hand, they would take away with the other. The
President said we were not naive. Continuing, he noted that Iran
did not want anything to do with the hostage problem, but we had
seen some hopeful signs. He then asked the Foreign Minister if
he thoughtout of the Rafsanjani era there might be improved
chances for better relations. (f)
Sheikh Mohammed said that he believed the post-Khomeini era was a
step forward, noting there were better people to deal with there,
including Rafsanjani. He was not sure that Rafsanjani was in
control, and he felt we needed to know that. The Foreign
Minister believed that Khomeini may have some power over
Rafsanjani, but it was unclear. It also was unclear what role
Parliament under Ahmed Khomeini would have, or what kind of
government would be formed. He was hoping for a strong
government, one with which to have some "give and take" since
they had to deal with Iran. In the past, he said, the Iranians
had made too many promises and not delivered. (2)
The President then mentioned that the Interior Minister in Iran
had made some terrible statements about the hostage issue. That
showed that the situation in Iran was not under control. He
then expressed his gratitude for the Foreign Minister's
statements on Colonel Higgins. He asked that if he discussed
this matter at home and thought they could be helpful in getting
the body back, we would appreciate it. He recognized there
probably was not very much, but he was asking everyone to do what
they could on the return of the body. He agreed that on the
larger question of Lebanon we should stay in touch. (2)
In closing the President said he was grateful for the continued
close relations between our countries, noting that it was not
always easy standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States
as Bahrain had done with us in the Gulf. (U)
Sheikh Mohammed agreed that our relationship, particularly on the
military side, had been successful. We had tested freedom of
navigation in the Gulf, speeded the peace between Iran and Iraq
and stopped the war from expanding. (U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMCON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with General Youssef Abu Talib,
Defense Minister of Egypt (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The President
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East
and South Asian Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Egypt
General Youssef Abu Talib, Egyptian Defense
Minister
El Sayed Abdel El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador
General Mahmoud Fouad, Defense Attache
DATE, TIME
August 8, 1989, 10:05 a.m. - 10:20 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE
Oval Office
Following a photo opportunity and an exchange of pleasantries,
The President said that he viewed the U.S. -Egyptian relationship
as one of enormous importance and that strong, close relations
with Egypt both militarily and diplomatically were vital to us.
He added that he knew the Minister's predecessor well and that he
hoped to develop the same sort of friendship with the Minister.
(2)
Minister Abu Talib said that Egypt and the U.S. had been full
partners in the political and military realms for some 15 years
and would continue given their mutual interests. With modern
armed forces, Egypt could contribute to its own defense and to
the stability of the region. In so doing, Egypt had no intention
to participate in a regional arms race. (d)
The President said that Secretary Cheney was determined to work
with the Minister. He wanted to take this opportunity, however,
to make two points. Although there was no reason to think that
Egypt was in a position to help, he hoped that Egypt would do
what it could to bring about the return of Col Higgins' remains.
If Egypt could do this it would never be forgotten by Americans.
(d)
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Second, and as he had raised with President Mubarak in Paris,
there was the question of Qadhafi. The position of the U.S. had
not changed. We hoped Mubarak would be able to talk sense to
Qadhafi. Unfortunately, we had seen no evidence that Qadhafi had
changed and was prepared to live in the family of nations. (L)
Minister Abu Talib said he would respond to these two points by
communicating President Mubarak's message to the President. The
Egyptian President wanted to convey his personal grief over Col
Higgins. President Mubarak admired greatly President Bush's
efforts to resolve the hostage situation. President Mubarak was
trying to help without drawing publicity to himself and was
willing to do more if President Bush desired. (d)
The President said that he could not think of anything to ask
right now but at some point he might call President Mubarak.
(U)
Minister Abu Talib then raised the issue of dealing with Qadhafi,
pointing out that as the former director of artillery in Egypt's
army he had destroyed a Libyan brigade. Mubarak had agreed to
accept Qadhafi's expressions of good will. Thus far Qadhafi was
not interfering in the Sudan and was behaving better toward Chad.
(f)
The President said the Egyptians deserved credit for this. (d)
Minister Abu Talib said it was Egypt's goal to force others to
deal with Egypt on its terms. This was true for Qadhafi as it
was true for the Arab League. The Minister also wanted to convey
a personal message to the President and Mrs. Bush from President
and Mrs. Mubarak wishing the President success in the current
situation. In addition, President Mubarak recalled with
appreciation his conversation with President Bush in Paris and
along with that his hope that the U.S. would support Egypt in its
dealings with the IMF and the World Bank. Last, the Minister
noted that President Mubarak would be visiting New York on
September 29 in his capacity as President of the OAU and that he
looked forward to seeing President Bush at that time. (2)
The President said that he hoped to see President Mubarak then
and that we would try to work something out. (U)
Minister Abu Talib reminded the President that the two of them
had met when he had been Governor of Cairo and the President had
been Vice President. (He handed over a book of photographs).
(U)
The President thanked the Minister for the book of photographs.
The meeting ended. (U)
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confirmed Mtg. w/
Schluter of Denmark
on Aug 24th
No MERICON
Confirmed Mtg w/
Mulroney of Canada
on Aug 30th
No MENICON
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10a. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)
9/1/89
(b)(1)
C
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By ses (NLGB) on 7/19/11
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2009-0628-MR (509)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 2/7/2011
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
BUSH
509
LIBRARY
7378
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of
Japan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs
Fumiko Gregg (Interpreter)
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Tatsuo Arima (Interpreter)
DATE, TIME
September 1, 1989, 11:00 - 11:38am EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President welcomed the Prime Minister to Washington and
inquired about when Prime Minister Kaifu had last been in the
White House. (U)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that he had been a guest at the
White House under President Kennedy and under President Ford.
(U)
The President inquired whether Prime Minister Kaifu was the
youngest member ever elected to the Diet. (U)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that he had been elected at the age
of 29 but that in a later election someone even younger had been
elected to the Diet. (U)
The President congratulated the Prime Minister on the excellent
publicity in this country that has surrounded Kaifu's elevation
to the Office of Prime Minister. He went on to say that previous
Presidents and Prime Ministers have found it very useful and
appropriate to establish a personal relationship. If the Prime
Minister felt comfortable with this arrangement, he should call
the President George and he would call the Prime Minister
Toshiki. The Prime Minister accepted this idea as an honor and a
privilege. (U)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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The President said that he wanted this visit to be seen as
successful from the standpoint of the Prime Minister. The
President indicated that there was a good relationship between
Japan and the U.S. and that he wanted it to continue. In
particular, he wanted to be able to solve the problems that exist
on both sides of the relationship. If there is a politically
difficult problem for the Prime Minister or if he had a
politically difficult problem with Congress, the President said
that he hoped they would be able to talk to one another without
it getting into the newspapers. As an example of quiet
communication, the President raised burden sharing. He said he
knew this was very sensitive in Japan and that it was also a
tough problem with the U.S. Congress, which would be asking what
the President was doing to get the Japanese to do more. On this
our Foreign Ministers have agreed to keep working to solve it
without large scale publicity. The President said, "I would like
to hear your side of this issue and want to be able to discuss my
side frankly with you, but not in the newspapers, because I don't
want to place you in a difficult political position at home."
(e)
Prime Minister Kaifu thanked the President and said he was very
encouraged by what the President had just said. The Prime
Minister stated that the reason he had come to Washington almost
immediately after assuming office was to prove how important he
feels the U.S. -Japan relationship is. He described it as the
cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy and vowed to continue the
strong policies of his predecessors regarding the U.S.-Japan
alliance. (¢)
The President next discussed domestic politics. He said the last
thing he wanted to do was to interfere in any way in Japan's
domestic politics but that he was "extremely interested in your
being extraordinarily successful." He said that he would be
coming to the Prime Minister from time to time for help on
serious problems but that the main thing to do was to continue
the U.S. -Japan relationship at the same unprecedented level of
good will. (¢)
Prime Minister Kaifu described his difficult domestic political
situation with the Japanese Socialist Party and its real views
concerning neutrality and the military. He saw these issues as
very serious and expected to do battle on them in the upcoming
election. Regardless of the difficulties that Japan may be
facing, the President should feel free to approach him if there
are any strains because the U.S.-Japan relationship is basic to
Japan's entire foreign policy.
(c)
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3
The President alluded to materials he had read about the JSP's
views on foreign policy matters and said that he would be
concerned about the U.S. -Japan strategic position if the
Socialist leader's views came to dominate Japan. In addition,
the President described Mrs. Doi's views on trade as
protectionist, the same problem that he was fighting to contain
in the American political system. The President stated, "I want
to build on what we have and I see you as the leader of Japan and
want to work with you. I am enthusiastic about doing so." (c)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that Japanese politics differed from
the two party system of the United States in which the major
(b)(1)
parties are not so far apart.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(¢)
Prime Minister Kaifu stated that he would place more emphasis on
making Japan a consumer society as well as a more equitable
society. Before moving to the larger group he also wanted to
convey two messages from the Emperor. The Emperor expressed his
gratitude for President Bush's attendance at the funeral for the
Emperor Showa. In addition, the Emperor wished to extend an
invitation to the President to visit Japan as a state guest. (U)
The President asked the Prime Minister to convey his respects to
the Emperor and stated how honored he was to attend the funeral
of the Emperor Showa. Regarding the invitation to visit Japan,
the President said, "I accept in principle. I want to go. It's
a deal." (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10b. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (8 pp.)
9/1/89
(b)(1)
C
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/19/11
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/14/89 - 10/2/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2009-0628-MR (509.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 2/7/2011
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 509.01 LIBRARY
7378
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Plenary Meeting with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime
Minister of Japan
(e)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, The Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, The Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, The Secretary of Defense
Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Michael Armacost, Ambassador to Japan
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and the Pacific
(Designate)
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs
Fumiko Gregg (Interpreter)
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Taro Nakayama, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nobuo Matsunaga, Ambassador to the United
States
Nobuo Ishihara, Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary
Hisashi Owada, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Tatsuo Arima, Director General for North
America Affairs, MOFA
Sadayuki Hayashi, Director General for
Economic Affairs, MOFA
Yukio Okamoto, Notetaker
Koji Tsuruoka, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
September 1, 1989, 11:40am - 12:20pm EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President opened by welcoming the Prime Minister in the
warmest personal terms, saying that they had agreed to
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communicate on a first name basis, and offering to discuss
anything the Prime Minister had on his mind.
(¢)
Prime Minister Kaifu responded by thanking the President and
pledged, as his predecessors had, to preserve U.S.-Japan
relations as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. (C)
The President raised China policy as an example of the kind of
policy on which we must maintain close coordination. He opined
that China was having difficult times and that he hoped they
would eventually emerge from these.
(c)
(b)(1)
Prime Minister Kaifu
(b)(1)
The President interjected that Japan is lucky. China is knocking
the United States: "They are blaming us for everything that
happened in Tiananmen Square. To use an old Chinese proverb, 'It
hurts our feelings. (e)
Prime Minister Kaifu stated that in his past discussions with
high ranking officials in education he was told that the aim of
China is to allow people to read and think for themselves, to
become more free and affluent. The basic trend is there.
(c)
The President rejoined that change seemed to get out of hand.
Zhao had warned us when we visited China and events show just how
quickly things evolved. Now Zhao is in disgrace. However, if
the U.S. and Japan stay together on China policy with our friends
and allies we can manage this terribly important geo-political
relationship. (c)
The President next raised the trade issue by saying that in both
systems the executive faced pressures from the legislature. He
stated that on satellites, supercomputers, and forestry products
the negotiations must be successful. If the balance of trade
becomes more distorted, this will put even greater strain on the
U.S. -Japan relationship. He summed up by saying that the U.S.
places great importance on success in the Structural Impediments
Initiative (SII) and the trade talks that begin next week. The
President pronounced himself as "strongly encouraged by your
views" on improving this aspect of the relationship. He added
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3
that improvements in the structural relationship cannot be a one-
way street and that in the battle over the U.S. budget deficit we
hope to show a demonstrable improvement next year. (e)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that these problems, to the extent
possible, must be resolved quietly. Super 301 has been presented
unilaterally in terms of sanctions, a form to which the Japanese
people are not accustomed. He stated that he had instructed his
people to attend the talks and to work seriously on resolving the
outstanding problems.
(c)
The President volunteered that the U.S. and Japan work well
together internationally on economic matters such as GATT, the
environment and debt relief, and that we agree on the need for a
successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. (c)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that Japan was now struggling to become
an import superpower, making all sorts of efforts to become SO.
However, he stated that the figures would not change overnight,
but this should not be allowed to become a source of strain
between us. He agreed that we need a successful Uruguay Round.
He emphasized that the environment is important and that both
Japan and the U.S. have had experience in dealing with this and
that we should work together conducting studies and project
jointly. (C)
The President interjected that there was good agreement at the G-
7 on these matters and that he hoped this cooperation would
continue. (¢)
The President raised the question of U.S.-Soviet relations. He
said that Japan was correct about the Northern Islands and that
there will be no change in the constancy of U.S. support for
Japan's position on this issue. (¢)
The President changed the topic to East-West relations in Europe,
stating that all of us have a great opportunity at this time of
change. We are anxious to make progress on arms control,
conventional force reduction and chemical warfare. However, the
President emphasized that there would be no surprises for Japan:
"There will be no grand agreement that in any way diminishes
Japan's interests. There will be no trade-off of anything like
the deployment of forces." (C)
Prime Minister Kaifu stated that the Soviet Union should not be
confronted but should instead be more fully involved in global
affairs. He stated his full agreement with the President's
statement on relations with the Soviet Union. Regarding the
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4
Northern Territories, he expressed his gratitude for continuing
U.S. support. "We will keep in contact with you as we face the
USSR." (e)
(At this point the party broke for lunch and the President showed
Prime Minister Kaifu the inside of his private office and
escorted him to the horseshoe pit where both threw a few shoes,
with the Prime Minister proud to have put one in the pit while
the President's last shot was a ringer.)
LUNCHEON
The President raised the drug problem by inquiring whether drug
use was a problem in Japan? (&)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that stimulants rather than heroin
were the major problem in Japan. (¢)
The President described drugs as a modern plague that had led to
great consternation here. He said he was encouraged by the
courageous decision of the President of Colombia to confront the
drug cartel. (c)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that Asian heroin is coming through
Japan to the U.S. and that the two countries must cooperate to
cut the distribution network.
(e)
Secretary Baker raised the topic of Cambodia and stated that
Japan and the U.S. must remain close together on this topic. He
said it was especially important not to reward Phnom Penh with
access to financial institutions unless and until Phnom Penh
showed a real willingness to engage in power sharing. In
addition, he stated that it was important to do what we can for
Poland -- food, aid and the follow-up to the economic summit.
After all, "Now we are talking about trying to support -- not a
communist government trying to reform itself -- but a democratic
government trying to survive." (¢)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that his foreign minister had
briefed him on the less than completely successful Paris
Conference on Cambodia. He asserted that Japan wants a
comprehensive settlement rather than only an international
solution and was using the same approach as the United States.
(c)
Secretary Baker raised Panama and asked Japan to join the U.S. in
not recognizing the Noriega government. The Foreign Minister
said that he wanted to give this some thought. Secretary Baker
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5
(b)(1)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that they would consult on the Panama
issue
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(e)
The President spoke of the death of Colonel Higgins and the way
in which the photograph had shocked the American people: "The
picture of a U.S. Marine Colonel hanging from a rope while
serving the cause of peace for the UN." He remarked that the
perpetrators were so brutal that they remained unwilling to
return the remains. He said he appreciated Japan's attempt to
help. (U)
Secretary Cheney said that FSX was still working its way through
Congress. He characterized the overall state of U.S. -Japan
security relations as very good.
(e)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that in defense cooperation Japan
would continue to make extraordinary efforts because "this is the
most important aspect of our bilateral relationship.' ()
Secretary Brady praised the good cooperation with Japan,
particularly at the G-7 meetings and on the Mexican debt
situation. He said that the success of Mexican debt relief was
in large part caused by Japan's efforts." A very important
contribution has been made and we are grateful for it." He said
that Japan's policy on Mexican debt relief would be noted very
positively throughout Latin America. (c)
He stated that the Structural Impediment Initiative talks would
begin the next Monday. He described this as a major U.S.
initiative. It came at the same time as Super 301 and it remains
important to demonstrate to Congress that matters such as these
can be resolved without unilateral action. However, to conyince
Congress, he said, we would need some concrete results. (e)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that Japan was pleased to have Mexico
as the first step in Japan's new debt strategy and would like to
continue to cooperate in these matters with the U.S. as well as
with the international financial institutions. ()
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills underscored the Prime
Minister's earlier positive mention of the importance of the
Uruguay Round. She said it was important to make the vision of
worldwide growth a reality. Much more needs to be done to bring
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6
down trade barriers, to bring prosperity to all trading partners.
There are only 16 months to go to implement the declaration of
principles. She looked forward to progress and to her visit to
Japan.
(e)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that the two countries were in very
close touch on the Uruguay Round and would continue to be so.
(c)
The President mentioned the Vice President's upcoming visit to
Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. (U)
Prime Minister Kaifu said that Vice President Quayle's attendance
of the IDU would lend strength to the LDP and that he looked
forward to receiving him in his role as President of the LDP.
Turning to the Vice President he said that the government of
Japan also looks forward to the visit. (U)
The Vice President said it had been 10 years since he was last in
Japan and that he looked forward to his visit to the space
program and to the IDU conference. (U)
Prime Minister Kaifu said, "You are wholeheartedly welcome.
Please feel free to convey any requests to the LDP or the GOJ."
(U)
The President mentioned President Roh Tae Woo's October 17 visit
and indicated that he was curious about Kaifu's views regarding
North Korea.
(e)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied that any problem arising in the
Republic of Korea would immediately be reflected throughout Asia.
He said he hoped the DPRK-ROK will not engage in a military
confrontation but would engage instead in talks.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
The President
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
They are way behind on reform and there is
nothing on the horizon leading one to think that there would be a
rapid improvement in U.S. relations with the North. (C)
Prime Minister Kaifu returned to Secretary Brady's comments
regarding SII. He said, "I cannot promise that we will come up
with results by next Spring. These issues will require more time
to settle them in the long run. Short term problems should not
obstruct the overall picture." He said Japan wishes to promote a
global partnership on aid to developing countries and the global
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7
environment. He recollected that he helped found Japan's
volunteer corps. He said he was very sorry to hear about
Congressman Leland's fatal crash, and as an example of global
partnership with the U.S., he proposed a foundation to do
research and to train people to work on issues of hunger in the
developing areas. ()
The President said Leland came from his hometown in Texas and
that he has great respect for Congressman Leland's humanitarian
concerns. (U)
He strongly endorsed Secretary Brady's comments on SII. "I know
that we have differences but believe me it is terribly important
that we make progress. There is a tidal wave in Congress. I am
telling you, as a friend, we must find ways to agree on SII. We
cannot brush our differences under the rug but we must preserve
the relationship. There should be no arrogance on the U.S. side
but these are problems that we must solve.' (¢)
Prime Minister Kaifu replied, "We have heard you and I have
instructed my people to listen very carefully." (Φ)
Secretary Baker stated, "We won't be able to form a global
partnership unless we have a strong bilateral relationship. The
SII was a substitute for what Congress wanted to do immediately.'
He said that progress by late Spring is a necessity. In 1984-85
the trade imbalance created a similarly critical position but
actions were taken. Now the trade imbalance has stopped
declining and SII provides the way out. (Φ)
Prime Minister Kaifu said "I understand your concerns on SII and
your desire for meaningful results because I understand it is a
substitute for more unilateral 301 action. However, I remind you
that structural changes are very difficult and I cannot promise
progress by next Spring." He characterized next Spring as a very
short time but stated that he had instructed his representatives
to approach the talks in a very serious and sincere manner.
"But, I cannot make promises." (e)
The President said that both countries must try hard, "as a two-
way street. He said there were enormous and mounting pressures
and that he did not wish to imply by his silence anything less
than his complete agreement with what has just been said.
(c)
Mr. Arima then explained that the Leland Foundation was a
Japanese initiative with no obligations for the USG. Over the
next few years the GOJ would contribute $5 million as well as
seeking training and research. The program has been set up in
consultation with U.S. Aid for International Development.
(c)
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The President closed by saying that this was a very thoughtful
gesture.
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7018 add-on
WASHINGTON
MEMCON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with John Major of the United Kingdom (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director,
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
United Kingdom
John Major, Foreign Secretary
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Patrick Wright, Permanent Undersecretary
Stephen Wall, Private Secretary
Andrew Burns, Press Secretary
DATE, TIME
September 11, 1989, 10:00 a.m. - 10:35 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
The President welcomed the Foreign Secretary and hoped that he
would have a good discussion later in the day with Secretary
Baker. The President felt the U.S. and the U.K. were together on
most issues. He had talked to Prime Minister Thatcher and they
were in agreement on Poland, the anti-drug effort, and what the
G-7 might do regarding Columbia. The only difficulty was in the
Alliance's failure to meet its September 7 deadline for tabling
the remainder of its new proposal in the CFE negotiations. That
had caused the President some grief. The Allies need to move
this matter forward. NATO must keep momentum and not signal a
loss of interest. ()
The Foreign Secretary thought the obstacles within the Alliance
on CFE could be overcome and that he and Secretary Baker could
make progress later in the day. He hoped there would be no undue
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delay. The Foreign Secretary felt the President understood
London's concerns about non-circumvention; the new U.S. language
was very helpful.
(e)
The Foreign Secretary added that, as the President knew, the
Prime Minister hoped to come to the United States as soon after
the opening of Parliament on November 14 as could be arranged.
()
The President said he hoped for an informal session with the
Prime Minister on a wide array of issues.
()
The Prime Minister would like that, the Foreign Secretary replied.
She has Gorbachev on her mind, he said, in quite a big way. On
drugs, the President's initiative is going down very well in the
United Kingdom. The U.K. had its own team in Bogota last week and
London wanted to help. The British government would also be
pushing its European partners for more involvement.
()
The President asked if the British sensed that Barco was going to
last the course.
(S)
The Foreign Secretary said yes. Barco has made clear his
determination to stand up to a bunch of hoodlums.
(2)
On Poland, the Foreign Secretary said the U.S. and the U.K. shared
the same objectives. The Poles need a proper IMF agreement. The
West should not smother them with so much help that they do not
take the necessary steps. The British government was also
wondering what Gorbachev's real goals are in Eastern Europe. The
Foreign Secretary said he did not know.
§
The President said that Prime Thatcher would have a chance to look
into this question when she was in Moscow on September 23rd.
Congress had discovered Poland and pressure was building on the
Hill. The U.S. might be able to do more on food aid, but the West
should be sure it was not throwing money at the problem without the
needed structural reforms in Poland.
Secretary Baker asked if the British government was on board for
Paris Club rescheduling before an IMF agreement.
()
The Foreign Secretary said his Treasury Department would prefer an
IMF agreement first. ()
The President asked if Boris Yeltsin would be visiting the U.K.
(&)
Not yet, the Foreign Secretary said. Continuing, he noted that
there were a couple of problems of special concern to the Prime
Minister. First among these was Hong Kong and the Vietnamese boat
people. This issue had taken an immense amount of the Foreign
Secretary's time. On Hong Kong, London knew where it wanted to go,
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but was not sure about how to get there. There were no signs of
panic in Hong Kong, but much less confidence than before June. The
Chinese leadership was now being uncooperative about Hong Kong and
the modalities that still need to be negotiated.
The President asked about what had happened in the Hong Kong
market.
The Foreign Secretary said the market had survived remarkably well.
This was a mixed blessing, because the Chinese asked how the
British could cite a loss of confidence when the stock market was
doing so well. Still, it would be quite a job to restore the
confidence of the population of Hong Kong.
The President asked if the Foreign Secretary was under pressure to
be tougher on the Chinese.
The Foreign Secretary said the British government was happy to stay
where it was for the time being.
()
The President noted that there could be further surprises in China;
the West needed to be prudent. U.S. domestic pressure was
manageable now, but could increase from both the left and the
right, and the Chinese were increasingly blaming the U.S. for their
problems.
Secretary Baker asked what sort of contacts the British had through
their Embassy in Beijing.
Low level, the Foreign Secretary replied. The situation was pretty
much a standoff at the moment. Continuing, the Foreign Secretary
noted that when the President saw the Prime Minister he had touched
on the problem of intelligence, cooperation, and the need to
improve it. London had a package which would be given to Judge
Webster in October.
The President asked if the Foreign Secretary had any brilliant
ideas on how to solve the Lebanon problem.
The Foreign Secretary said that some people were concerned about
the U.S. taking its diplomats out because the Syrians might be
further emboldened and increase their military effort, and because
some might conclude the U.S. had given up. The U.K. was grateful
for the U.S. offer to take out British diplomats at the time of the
American evacuation, but the British officials were under no
unusual threat. The Western nations should try to reduce the
degree of shelling, even if they could not stop it entirely. (&)
The President said the U.S. took its people out because this crazy,
Aoun, was threatening them.
(8)
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The Foreign Secretary commented that moderates in Amal would want
the U.S. to return its Embassy as soon as possible.
(8)
The President said he hoped to do that. The situation was so
complicated, and SO sad. Did the U.K. have any representation in
Syria?
()
Permanent Undersecretary Wright said it was only an interest
section, a very small operation.
§
The Foreign Secretary wondered how much longer the Palestinian
problem could remain static.
()
The President remarked that the only game in town is elections in
the occupied territories, but he was pessimistic. (8)
The Foreign Secretary asked if Shamir was willing to make
concessions. ()
Secretary Baker said that would only be known when there are face
to face negotiations. Shamir's willingness could not be tested
before that point.
(s)
The President said the situation was discouraging.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Uruguayan President Julio Maria
Sanguinetti (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Everett Ellis Briggs, Senior Director, Latin
America and the Caribbean
Michael Skol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Julio Maria Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay
Luis Angel Barrios Tassano, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Ricardo Zerbino Cavajani, Minister of Economy
and Finance
Hector Luisi, Ambassador to the United States
DATE, TIME
September 15, 1989, 3:05 - 3:50 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President and President Sanguinetti met for 45 minutes in the
Oval Office on September 15, 1989. (U)
The President, after an exchange of pleasantries during which the
American and Uruguayan media representatives were allowed to be
present, referred to the visit President Sanguinetti had just
made to Japan. The President said he had noticed a significant
difference between the new Japanese government and the
Socialists, not only on defense policy but on trade issues. The
Socialists, he said, were pure protectionists. He said the U.S.
had a big stake in Japan's leadership choice, and thought the new
team was showing a lot of nerve. (8)
The President then noted that President Sanguinetti was a short
timer, and said he must be proud of the superb job he had done.
(2)
President Sanguinetti said, "fortunately!" He added, smiling,
that he wasn't sure what exactly he had accomplished, but he knew
he had avoided a lot of trouble. (2)
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The President said he appreciated Uruguay's leadership in showing
willingness to stand up for democracy in Panama. He regretted
all of us acting together had not been able to achieve the
changes sought by the Panamanian people. We seemed to be back at
square one. He asked what President Sanguinetti thought should
be done now. (1)
President Sanquinetti said we were back at the square one, but on
a different playing board. There was now a greater awareness
worldwide about the Panamanian situation, and this was important
in political terms. (2)
The President agreed that this was the case. He said that the
picture of Billy Ford spattered with blood and of the violence
committed by the dignity battalions were imprinted on everyone's
mind. (U)
The President assured President Sanguinetti that the U.S. had no
argument with the Panamanian Defense Force as such. Improved
relations with Panama would be instantaneous, he said, if Noriega
were to leave power. He said the problem was very frustrating.
(1)
President Sanguinetti felt what was needed was a combination of
patience and perseverance. As with other problem areas, time
might produce changes, as was occurring in Nicaragua. (C)
The President asked if President Sanguinetti thought there was a
possibility for genuinely free and fair elections in Nicaragua.
(d)
President Sanguinetti replied that he thought the elections would
be "relatively" fair. He asked rhetorically how a country
without democrats could hold a democratic election. Nicaragua,
he said, had no democratic tradition, so the elections could not
be expected to be "perfect." What was important, he felt, was
that there be a genuine "opening." Look at Paraguay, he said.
There was Stroessner, ruling a country that had never had
democracy, when all of a sudden he was overthrown in a palace
coup, whereupon an election had been held that although not
perfect had been free. One could not call the election "clean,"
exactly, but freedom now existed in Paraguay. (8)
The President said he was very pleased to hear this. And
speaking of Paraguay, he was grateful to President Sanguinetti
and several of his colleagues for being SO nice to his daughter
at President Rodriguez' inauguration. (U)
President Sanguinetti acknowledged that he had enjoyed meeting
the President's daughter in Asuncion. (U)
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The President said he had wanted to send a member of his family
to the inauguration, as a personal gesture. (U)
President Sanguinetti, returning to the earlier theme, said that
the Paraguayan example showed progress was possible, even without
perfection. ($)
The President asked if President Sanguinetti were going to the
San Jose Summit. (U)
President Sanguinetti replied, "yes." He congratulated the
President on his speech on drugs. He approved of the President's
approach, he said, of addressing both supply and demand. He said
Uruguay was working hard to keep from becoming a part of the
problem. He cited the case of an individual recently arrested in
Uruguay who was to be extradited on a charge of money laundering.
The case, he said, was proceeding nicely. The Uruguayan
government meanwhile was studying the possibility of a treaty
dealing with banking secrecy. Uruguay had to reconcile its
system of complete economic freedom with support for drug
control. Uruguay was examining the Swiss system, and soon the
Central Bank would offer a draft for an information exchange
treaty. (1)
The President asked what Uruguay's chief drug problem was -
whether drug abuse, corruption of society, health of youngsters.
Was Uruguay getting caught in the international trafficking web,
he asked. (f)
President Sanguinetti said Uruguay as a small country did not
offer a big enough market to interest international traffickers,
but since it had the most open financial system in South America
it was attractive to would-be money launderers. Therefore his
government was looking for ways to retain banking freedom without
falling prey to drug money. What it was seeking was some
preventive medicine. (2)
The President asked President Sanguinetti for his opinion as to
whether President Barco of Colombia would be able to stick with
his courageous stand against the drug cartels. ($)
President Sanguinetti said the big problem for Colombia was
"political." He said he was well acquainted with Colombia and
its brave people. Despite 16 out of 24 supreme court judges
having been assassinated, the institution was still working. The
police were holding on. So were journalists. He had been a
personal friend of the journalist Guillermo Cano, who had been
assassinated and whose newspapers headquarters had been blown up.
The newspaper was still being printed, and still attacking the
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drug traffickers. What was going on in Colombia was war.
Imagine, he said, if the world had tried to fight the Nazis with
judicial process and marshals. What he meant by "political" was
that the Conservative Party must give its full backing to Barco
to take exceptional measures to deal with the drug problem.
Barco must be able to declare a State of Emergency. ($)
The President observed that a recent poll in Colombia had showed
strong support for what Barco was doing, including extraditing
criminals. It also showed strong disapproval of the use of
foreign (not just American, any foreign) troops. This came as no
surprise to him, said the President. He was sensitive to
Colombian views. Because of widespread opposition to the use of
military force, he had tried in the case of Nicaragua and Panama
to use a multilateral approach, though he was terribly
disappointed that the OAS had failed to deal effectively with
Panama. The U.S., he said, had no plans to send troops to
Colombia, but the American press went crazy whenever we did
anything. For example, we sent equipment and some people to
Colombia to help set it up but if one believed the press, we had
sent a division of troops. Some of our European allies had
suggested putting together an international force, something we
would be prepared to do, but we had found no interest in Colombia
for that, either. He said he wanted President Sanguinetti to
know we had no plans. Only "if someone grabbed our Embassy or
took hostages, then " The U.S., he said, had no secret game
plan. He asked President Sanguinetti if he had any advice. ($)
President Sanguinetti said no, the important thing was to try
first to create a multilateral framework for dealing with the
problem. The Vienna Convention was a start. Perhaps, he said,
we needed a follow-up treaty to focus on the fact the drug fight
was universal in scope. Returning to his earlier point, he said
that the important thing was to ensure there was full political
support inside Colombia for Barco, to deal harshly with the
narcotraffickers. They were not SO invulnerable, he thought.
Everything they had was displayed openly: their homes, their
farms, their power. The problem must not be handled as if it
were a matter of simple crime. He did not think President Barco
lacked courage. He considered him a good executive, a good
president. The problem was: could he get support from Pastrana
and Belisario Betancourt? They must support him. ($)
The President said that what had made a profound impression on
him when he read biographic background information on some of the
Colombian drug lords was that someone like Rodriguez Gacha was
nothing but a common criminal; not a great brain, just a thug.
The mayor of Medellin had suggested negotiating with the drug
lords, as if they were a serious group, but they were crooks who
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did not deserve such consideration. He said he had one other
question: did President Sanguinetti think that when Castro had
Ochoa executed, it was because he was guilty of drug activity;
did Castro know himself what had been going on in Cuba? ($)
President Sanguinetti said that "basically" the reason for
Castro's action was "military." He had been expecting something
like that to happen. A few months ago, at President Borja's
inauguration, Mario Soares had made some interesting comments.
There was Fidel Castro, with his "show." Mario Soares said the
man was very smart, but he did not realize what was going to
happen when all his troops started to return from Angola.
Portugal had gone through such an experience. Castro did not
know what was going to hit him. ($)
President Sanguinetti continued: In Africa, the Cuban forces had
not been under Havana's direct control, and considerable
independence of action had developed among the military
leadership in the field. They dealt directly with the Soviets.
Furthermore, over half the troops were infected with AIDS. Their
return home was going to be terrible for Cuba. Within two months
of the return of the first units rumors of possible military
trouble began to circulate. Castro moved when he had to, to
retain control. It was probably true about Ochoa's drug
involvement, but what was at stake was Castro's power. He had
put Ochoa on television, and what came across was a man of
stature, a leader. So after one TV appearance, the cameras were
turned off, because Ochoa was the sort who could sway the people.
($)
The President asked if Ochoa could have been involved in drug
trafficking without Castro's knowing. (S)
President Sanguinetti said he did not know. The Cuban army had
become very autonomous. Individuals traveled to and from Angola
freely. ($)
The President said that Cuba had withdrawn most of its forces
from Ethiopia. If it were true that SO many had AIDS, Castro had
a problem. ($)
President Sanguinetti said he had a couple of "Uruguayan" issues
to raise. Smiling, he said he was always a bit frustrated
because people talk to him about Argentina or Colombia but rarely
ask about Uruguay. He wished to make two comments: First, he
appreciated the military assistance the U.S. had provided. It
was an example of how to help without sacrifice. The U.S. had
sent secondhand material to upgrade the Uruguayan forces, and
this was fine. The Armed Forces had been pleased to accept it.
They had remained absolutely loyal to the civilian government.
There had been no incidents, despite the fact they had been given
a small budget. Uruguay was now asking for additional help for
the Armed Forces. He did not foresee any problems with obtaining
it. ($)
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President Sanguinetti said the second comment was that Uruguay
was trying to use the Brady Plan to reduce its debt. Some in
Washington seemed to think that the Brady Plan should only apply
to those in really bad shape, those who had committed serious
errors. Uruguay has been meeting its debt payments, and would
continue to do so. Some of his advisers had suggested, in jest,
that the way to attract more favorable treatment would be for
Uruguay to declare a moratorium on its debt payments, as others
had done. The trouble, he said, smiling, was that no one would
believe it. So Uruguay would continue to pay up, but the problem
was that this stifled growth. During his first year in office
Uruguay had had a 14 percent growth rate, but this past year had
brought stagnation because of several factors over which they had
little control: the worst drought in the nation's history; the
spillover effect of their neighbor's economic problems; and the
need to make excessive use of their hydro power. Recovery would
take two years. Meanwhile, the situation was difficult. They
were trying to reduce their debt while retaining a rhythm of
growth. Uruguay wanted to proceed with a final negotiation on
resolving its debt. That would make Uruguay the first debtor to
overcome its problem, and he would appreciate any support the
President might give in this connection. Messrs. Brady and
Mulford, he said, were fully aware of the circumstances, and he
hoped the President would encourage them to be helpful. (d)
The President said he would. He asked if President Sanguinetti
would be seeing Secretary Brady. (U)
President Sanguinetti said he had an appointment next Monday.
(U)
The President said he would speak to Secretary Brady before then.
He said the U.S. would like to see countries besides the big ones
achieve success. He then asked about the IMF. (U)
President Sanguinetti said Uruguay had had one stand-by agreement
with the IMF, had met the conditionality, and was now discussing
a new stand-by. He was confident there would be agreement. A
meeting with the Uruguayan banks was scheduled for September 27.
He commented that Uruguay's case was a strong one; conditions
were easier than for Argentina or Brazil. Uruguay had already
achieved a good, peaceful transition to democracy, and now was
the time to show positive results on the economy. (d)
The President asked about the position of the contenders for the
presidency: were the presidential candidates committed to
following the same policies? (L)
President Sanguinetti said he saw no problems. The government
and opposition candidates agreed on lowering tariffs and working
with the IMF. There were some technical differences among them,
but not differences of substance. (2)
After a final exchange of pleasantries, the meeting ended at 3:50
p.m. (U)
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RESIDEM 7324
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
E
September 19, 1989
-
Rule
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SANDIFORD OF BARBADOS
DATE: September 20, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:15 p.m. - 2:25 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
I. PURPOSE
To underscore the friendly relations between the United
States and Barbados and our commitment to democracy and
economic development in the Caribbean region.
II. BACKGROUND
Prime Minister Sandiford is in Washington to attend the
annual World Bank meetings on September 25-29. He also will
meet with several members of Congress, including Speaker
Foley and Chairman Rostenkowski, Treasury, and USTR
officials.
Barbados has had close and cordial relations with the United
States since gaining independence in 1966. A multiparty
parliamentary democracy, its major political parties are
moderate with similar objectives of economic development,
political stability, and pro-Western outlook. The House of
Assembly is the third oldest elected body in the Western
Hemisphere and recently celebrated its 350th anniversary.
Sandiford, who took over upon his predecessor's death in
June 1987, is in firm control of his party and the
government and does not face re-election until 1991.
Despite our close relations, Barbados has been unhappy with
us recently over its decreasing sugar quota, the delay in
CBI II legislation, and a Congressionally mandated change to
the bilateral tax treaty when it expires at the end of the
year. U.S. sugar imports have fallen some 70 percent since
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quotas were established in 1982. In the tax treaty case,
Senator Dodd led the move to kill a tax exemption clause for
off-shore insurance firms--an amendment we opposed--which
will cost Barbados $4-6 million.
You should assure the Prime Minister of your strong support
for CBI II, although noting that the sugar provision of the
bill is a problem. Although acknowledging that our
financial constraints have caused a decline in assistance to
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the Eastern Caribbean, you should tell him that we are
continuing to look for ways to help and our interest in the
region remains high. Last week, we announced that sugar
quotas would be extended on a straightline basis through
September 1990.
Barbados has played a leading role in regional drug
cooperation and has cooperated with U.S. interdiction
efforts. Barbados hosted a Caribbean Ministerial Drug
Conference in March 1988 and its Attorney General will soon
introduce strict new anti-drug laws including longer
sentences, stiffer fines, and asset forfeiture provisions.
The Prime Minister supports a strong anti-narcotics role for
the Regional Security System, a cooperative security
mechanism of seven Eastern Caribbean states. It is
headquartered in Bridgetown and the Barbados Defense Force
plays the leading role in the organization. U.S. military
assistance to Barbados and the other Eastern Caribbean
states has dropped off sharply over the last two years,
which in 1984-87 was running about $5-6 million to the
region annually. We are sending a package forward for FY
1990 to restore spending to prior levels, largely focused on
anti-drug efforts.
You should commend Prime Minister Sandiford for his public
condemnation of Noriega's attempt to steal the May elections
in Panama and for his support for the OAS declaration of
July 20 demanding that he leave power by September 1.
Sandiford was one of the few heads of government to reply to
your circular letter asking for support for OAS efforts
(Tab B).
III. PARTICIPANTS
See Participants List
IV. PRESS PLAN
Pool Coverage
V.
SEQUENCE
Photo-op followed by brief discussion
Prepared by:
David Pacelli
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Sandiford Letter to the President, September 1, 1989
Tab C
Participants List
Tab D
Biography
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER SANDIFORD OF BARBADOS
It is a pleasure to welcome you. We value the close and
cordial ties we have had with Barbados for many years.
I congratulate you and the Barbadian people on your recent
celebration of 350 years of parliamentary democracy.
Although our budgetary constraints have caused a decline in
assistance to the Eastern Caribbean, we continue to look for
ways to help; our interest in the region remains high.
My administration is committed to obtaining new legislation
to extend and enhance the Caribbean Basin Initiative; I must
note, however, that we do have serious problems with the
provisions on sugar.
We value your leadership in regional cooperation in the
fight against drug trafficking; we are determined to address
the demand side of the problem here in the United States,
but we will not neglect interdiction.
--
I appreciate your strong public stance on behalf of
restoration of democracy in Panama, and I want to thank you
for replying to my recent letter on that subject.
--
I want to thank you for accepting the nomination of Joy
Silverman; she will make a terrific Ambassador.
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Letter from Prime Minister Sandiford
September 1, 1989
Dear Mr. President:
I thank you for your letter of August 22 concerning the
situation in Panama.
As you are aware from our previous correspondence on this
matter, I share with you an abhorrence of the brutal manner in
which the democratic process in Panama was aborted in May of this
year by the military authorities under the command of General
Noriega. I publicly condemned that act of repression at the
time.
Since then the government of Barbados has strongly supported
the efforts of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of
American States to resolve the crisis and restore the democratic
rights of the people of Panama.
In particular my government endorses the OAS declaration of
July 20 calling for a transfer of power in Panama by
September 1, 1989, and the holding of free elections as soon as
possible. I shall make a public statement on the matter.
I remain convinced, as I know you are, that if the democratic
community stays united and firm to its commitment to democracy, a
peaceful resolution in the crisis can be found in the best
interest of the people of Panama.
Sincerely,
L. Erskine Sandiford
Prime Minister
End of Text of Letter.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the Soviet
Union
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador to the United
States
A. Obukhov, MFA Chief of US and Canada
Directorate
T. Stepanov, Assistant to the Foreign
Minister
S. Tarasenko, MFA Chief of General
Secretariat
G. Mamedov, MFA First Deputy Chief of US and
Canada Directorate (notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
DATE, TIME
September 21, 1989, 2:00 p.m. - 3:05 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President: Let me welcome you to the United States. I am
delighted with the letter from President Gorbachev and was very
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pleased to receive it. There is a great deal of interest across
the country in your visit. I am pleased that you and Secretary
Baker can continue your dialogue. We are very pleased with the
preparations for this visit. (U)
I feel in a personal sense that I have a good relationship with
President Gorbachev. We feel nothing but affection and warmth
for him and I want him to understand this at a personal level. I
hope he knows I want to accelerate this relationship. I can
comment on your arms control proposals and Secretary Baker will
later faithfully represent my views. There are no serious
elements in the U.S. that want Soviet reforms to fail. Please
reaffirm that to President Gorbachev, although I hope it is not
necessary. We support perestroika and we do not want to
complicate your reform efforts. In New York, President Gorbachev
said some elements in the United States did not want perestroika
to succeed. That does not include either me or my
Administration. Please tell him that. We have confidence in
him, and please do not place great weight on the gloomy forecasts
sometimes heard in both our countries. The important thing is
that the reforms continue. Between us, President Gorbachev and I
can create a whole new fabric of U.S.-Soviet relations. ($)
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you, Mr. President. On
behalf of all my colleagues I would like to greet you here in the
White House. This is my first meeting with you as President.
You have made a personal contribution to U.S.-Soviet relations.
I would like to convey to you most warm greetings from President
Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Union. I recall the
meeting and good talk I had with you when were Vice President,
during the election campaign. The thoughts you expressed were
captured in the phrase, "the new closeness." This fully reflects
our concept of U.S. -Soviet relations at the current stage. (8)
During the last few years we have gone through an important
period of establishing a level of mutual understanding. Having
this positive experience in building our relationship, we can
move to partnership where possible, and we are ready for this
further stage. The INF treaty and the steps forward in bilateral
relations, such as over 40 bilateral agreements signed in the
last few years, demonstrate how far our relations, including
people to people contacts, have come. (8)
We can be bolder. There has been an erosion in both of our
countries in the image of the enemy. The atmosphere of U.S.-
Soviet relations is quite different than when I became Foreign
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Minister four years ago, when the tone was so confrontational.
Now, we are planning a joint statement on human rights. The
Soviet Union is moving toward the highest standards in this area
and we appreciate your support for holding the CSCE human rights
conference in Moscow. The Supreme Soviet will soon adopt new
legislation on entry into and exit out of the U.S.S.R. ()
You spoke warmly of President Gorbachev. I would like to stress
the important political asset represented in your personal
relationship with President Gorbachev. Nothing must spoil or
poison this trust. ($)
I would not wish to idealize our relationship, but one truth is
elementary. Relations between states can only develop if there
is domestic stability. Therefore, we appreciate the high degree
of U.S. interest in democratization and renewal in the U.S.S.R.
We have reassessed and condemned our previous policies quite a
bit recently, but we will not wipe out or negate the
accomplishments of the decades of our country. There are tragic
events in our past which are difficult to explain. But the
historical goal we have traversed is glorious and only on the
basis of these accomplishments can we move forward on reform. We
must not forget our two countries together saved world
civilization in the Great Patriotic War. There is no alternative
to perestroika. We have just completed a Central Committee
plenum on the nationalities problem, a painful problem. We are a
union of 15 states, as stated in our constitution, which poses
special problems. We believe we have now adopted policies that
ensure each state will be self-governing, and that will restore
stability. We are creating a new political culture and we have
made mistakes. But we do not see anything bad about this
expanding political awareness. People in the Soviet Union are in
favor of perestroika, although there are conservatives who oppose
it. But our people believe in perestroika, want perestroika, and
this process cannot be reversed. (C)
It is not easy to develop our new laws on the economy, including
those on cooperatives -- which produced 6 billion rubles of goods
last year. We are trying to reduce the incompatibility of our
economy with those in the West. Thus, we have emphasized joint
ventures, 1500 in all and 80 with the United States. I call your
attention to all this work on our economic legislation because
these developments should allow more economic interaction between
us. We are not asking for aid from you. We want only equal
cooperation. We have no doubt, to conclude, that perestroika
will succeed. I know some of my friends say we have 5 months, or
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1 year, or 18 months and then we will collapse. This is not a
serious view. I know my country, and predictions of catastrophe
for perestroika are not serious at all. We will succeed. ()
Let me say a few words about President Gorbachev's letter. In
the past several months, we have moved forward in arms control.
But the goal of 50% reductions in START remains to be achieved.
The main theme in President Gorbachev's letter is that we must
remove obstacles to agreement in Geneva on strategic arms. You
were right when you said in your letter of June 20 that there is
a conceptual gap on the ABM issue. We should stick to the
Washington formulation and return to the subject after a START
treaty is concluded. We will have to decide what is permissible
under the ABM Treaty. Research and testing could be permitted
except for ABM components. We would not insist on a fixed period
for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Our political decision
to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar site demonstrates our
commitment to the ABM Treaty. (f)
One important question remains and I would like to speak frankly.
A year ago, your scientists visited the Krasnoyarsk radar. It
would be good if our experts could visit your radars in Greenland
and the United Kingdom. ($)
On the issue of SLCMs, the question is different. Important
political decisions need to be taken. We should look at this
problem in a broader way, in the effort to rid the seas of
nuclear weapons. We hope you will join us in this effort. We
should concentrate on verification, without which no progress is
possible. A limit on SLCMs could be set by means of mutual
obligations which would be made in connection with the treaty,
but outside of it. ($)
On ALCMs and heavy bombers, we are ready not to count B-52s and
other aircraft that are conventionally armed within the 1600
limit. These aircraft would be counted outside the 1600, perhaps
with a limit of 100. The U.S. side should then accept a
realistic counting of ALCMs and reaffirm a 600 kilometer range
cut-off in defining such systems. There should be interim work
on verification measures, as you have proposed, but covering all
strategic offensive arms. We have the same approach to data
exchanges. We hope to sign an agreement with notifications for
strategic exercises. (f)
We do not see any insurmountable obstacles to agreement on
nuclear testing, based on work already done. Work should be
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completed at the end of this year and can be signed at the
Summit. (C)
We would like to ban fissionable material. I will discuss this
with Secretary Baker. (2)
On chemical weapons, we should speed up work on a convention
banning CW. Your personal interest and that of President
Gorbachev will assist that effort. It would be good for us to
set a target date to complete a treaty, in 1990 or 1991. (2)
On CFE, I will discuss this with Secretary Baker. We think we
can get results, as you have suggested, in 6-12 months. We are
ready to work together with you. We would like to have the 35
CSCE Foreign Ministers meet in 1990 to work on a treaty and, by
the end of the year, hold a Summit to sign the agreement. (C)
In order to accelerate work in Vienna, we need to start
negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. Conditions are ripe
for such discussions. We could start moving toward elimination
of these weapons. (d)
We are interested in your Open Skies plan. We shall participate
in an international conference on this subject. We have some
suggestions that we will put forward in Wyoming. (2)
Concerning regional problems, there is a great range of
possibilities for cooperation: Lebanon, the Middle East, Central
America, Asia, Cyprus, and other problems. I would like to
discuss with Secretary Baker the situation in and around
Afghanistan. This is very important to us. (L)
To conclude, Secretary Baker and I have already had useful
meetings this year. We have developed a frank, businesslike
relationship that makes it possible to discuss all complex
problems and move toward solutions. (g)
The President: Thank you. I was hoping to hear such a broad
treatment of the issues. On the regional issues, President
Carter was here this morning discussing the upcoming elections in
Nicaragua. The question of Nicaragua is a thorn in the side of
our bilateral relationship. I want Secretary Baker to discuss
this with you in detail in Wyoming. On the subject of
Afghanistan, we have no interest in seeing an anti-Soviet regime
installed in Kabul. Secretary Baker will elaborate on this. We
should be able to find a solution to the Afghan problem. We need
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to make progress. ($)
On conventional forces, I am pleased with the Soviet willingness
to see positive aspects in the NATO proposal. We want to move
forward, keep the momentum. An early CFE agreement would be
good. (f)
On START, we, despite what columnists here say, are interested in
an early agreement that enhances stability and will reduce the
risk of war. You are not going up against a stone wall in START.
We are ready to move. Secretary Baker will go into this more
later. (8)
Secretary Baker: I think the letter from President Gorbachev is
interesting, but it does raise questions we will want to go into
detail on in Wyoming. (f)
The President: On DST, a START treaty should not be held hostage
to an agreement on Defense and Space, negotiations which should
stand on their own. (2)
I appreciate what you said on chemical weapons and this is an
area on which we must find a solution. Secretary Baker will
discuss a new CW initiative on our part. If we can reach a CW
agreement, we will greatly reduce our stockpile. Secretary Baker
will give you the details. As we lead up to full ban, we can
make major reductions in our respective stockpiles. (8)
I also appreciate your position on Open Skies. Secretary Baker
will go into this in more detail. (Z)
On the issue of nuclear testing, we have made good progress on
verification, and I think decisions on our side will push forward
the negotiations and allow us to finalize the nuclear testing
treaties in the near future. (2)
Turning to the subject of perestroika, we are fascinated by the
process of reform in your country. We have great respect for the
principle of cultural autonomy. We are sensitive to the changes
going on in the U.S.S.R. I do not want our interest, however, to
be misunderstood, to complicate developments in the Soviet Union.
This is a delicate issue, and needs to be handled carefully. (f)
It is important that you and Secretary Baker have a good, frank
discussion about Eastern Europe. We think the Soviet leadership
has handled the Polish situation admirably. We hope you feel the
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same way about our policy. We want to support changes toward
democracy in Eastern Europe, but do not want to be reckless or
silly about it. We also admire your policy approach toward
Hungary. On Eastern Europe, I want us to be in such close touch
that we do not misunderstand each other's intentions. ($)
We need to work on mutual problems together. I would love to
hear your view on Cuba and Castro, who is so far behind the power
curve. (q)
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I cannot promise that, but I will
discuss Nicaragua, where I will stop after New York. This will
be my first visit to Nicaragua, the first by a Soviet Foreign
Minister. We want a free, fair election and the Nicaraguan
leaders want that too. I want to say we are not sending weapons
to Nicaragua. We gave our word and we have kept it. Before the
election, there will be no arms supplies to Nicaragua. (8)
The President: I hope you will have a good talk with Secretary
Baker on this problem. We are troubled by the flow of
substantial arms shipments into Nicaragua. The arms are coming
from somewhere. I do not question what you say, but we need to
talk in detail with you about this. (S)
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is one thing when a journalist
makes such a charge, another when a U.S. official makes such a
charge. We keep our word. ($)
Secretary Baker: You need to tell us who that official was and
when the charge was made. The level of East bloc shipments to
Nicaragua has increased and that is what we have said. If we
said it was Soviet arms, then please give us chapter and verse.
(8)
The President: We can iron this out, but we are concerned. The
total amount of Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua has increased.
($)
Secretary Baker: In a spirit of candor, we think arms are coming
through Cuba and are East Bloc, including Soviet, in origin. (8)
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I have no reason to suspect the
Cubans but, in any event, the Soviet Union cannot be held
responsible for all countries with whom we have good relations.
(8)
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The President: We appreciate your coming. You and Secretary
Baker have much to talk about. (U)
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Confirmed Mtg. w/
Sarney of Brazil
on Sep 25th
No MEMICON
Confirmed mtg. w/
Cerezo of Guatenlala
on Sep 25th
No Menicon
Confirmed Mtg w/
Paz Zamora of Bolivia
on Sep 25th
No MEMICON
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THE WHITE HOUSE
8042/
WASHINGTON
21222
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with United Nations Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar (2)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Thomas Pickering, US Ambassador to the
United Nations
John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State
(International Organizations)
Nancy Bearg Dyke, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of
the United Nations
Virendra Dayal, Chef de Cabinet,
United Nations
Marrack I. Goulding, Under Secretary General
for Special Political Affairs
Ronald Spiers, Under Secretary General for
Political and General Assembly Affairs and
Secretariat Services, United Nations
Luis Maria Gomez, Acting Under Secretary
General for Administration and Management
Alvaro de Soto, Executive Assistant to the
Secretary General
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 12:20 - 12:50 p.m.
AND PLACE:
The Indonesian Lounge, United Nations
The President expressed his pleasure at being back at the UN,
then referred to the tragedy of Colonel Higgins, expressing
appreciation for what the Secretary General has already tried to
do. (U)
The Secretary General introduced the subject of peacekeeping, and
the two exchanged comments about the increased budget
requirements to support new and continuing peacekeeping
requirements around the world. (U)
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The President: We want to try to help on peacekeeping. (U)
Secretary General: With new operations in Central America,
Cambodia, and the Western Sahara, we will have 12 peacekeeping
operations. (U)
Secretary General: Regarding Cambodia, they are now asking me to
send UN observers based solely on the withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops. The danger is that significant hostilities will resume.
(d)
The President: That would be bad. We were disappointed about
the conference in Paris. Sihanouk took a strange turn at the
end. (d)
Secretary Baker: Sihanouk did not carry the case very well. (2)
Secretary General: He may have been too shrewd for his own good.
()
Secretary Baker: The Soviets are very interested in pushing us
with respect to a moratorium on arms deliveries to the Cambodian
resistance. Shevardnadze raised it in Wyoming. (2)
Secretary General: I do not know if the Chinese are interested
in halting arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge. (2)
Secretary Baker: They may want to move in the direction of only
a partial settlement, but that may make it more difficult in
getting an overall internal political settlement. (C)
The President: Is there anything on the UNGA agenda that affects
the Chinese -- anything re Tiananmen Square? Are you hearing
anything in the halls? (d)
Secretary General: Anything on that would likely occur in the
Human Rights Commission in February. ()
The President: We are cautious on China and are trying not to
harm the "sensitive" interests of China in our public statements.
There are steps we need to take regarding the military
relationship. We are concerned about what happened but we do not
want to shove them into isolation. So, I wondered about any
initiatives that might come forth at the UNGA. (2)
Secretary General: A very difficult situation. (U)
The President: I did learn something from the Chinese: "standing
with hands in sleeve. " Sometimes it does not hurt to stand on
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3
the sidelines and not do anything for a time. We do not want to
isolate China. ()
Secretary General: I would like to thank you for the support we
are receiving from your country for UNTAG and UNAVEM. (U)
The President: It has to be there. (U)
Secretary General: There are continuing threats to free and fair
elections in Namibia. A demonstrably free and fair election is
necessary. We will try to sustain what we have begun in Namibia.
(U)
Secretary Baker: We are very supportive of your position. (U)
The President: Very. (U)
The President: What will happen about the PLO in this session?
What if the whole session is dominated by this? (U)
Secretary Baker: The problem has been more in the collateral
agencies, such as World Health Organization (WHO). It is less
likely to come up in the Security Council because of the veto.
(L)
The President: But it could come up in the General Assembly. (2)
Secretary General: They are observers now and they may push to
become state observers, if they can get it. (2)
Mr. Dayal: They have not shown their hand at all in this
session. (2)
Secretary General: The PLO will try to see what the reaction is.
They may ask for a visa. (2)
The President: We will get back to Ambassador Pickering with our
position. I know it would be an easier question if they applied
later if at all. (C)
Secretary Baker: The timing is important. If we can get Israel
to pick up on Egypt's proposal, we will be better off. Having
the PLO issue come up now would not help. (2)
Secretary General: Maybe in November. If I can, I will argue
with them not to press their case right now. (C)
The President: Afghanistan. (U)
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Secretary General: Things are improving and much depends on the
Soviets. We are trying to put a delegation together for
discussions to obtain a national consensus. (2)
Secretary Baker: It is hard to generate a national consensus
that way unless there is agreement in principle about the
transfer of power. I do not think the AIG will be willing to sit
down until then. (2)
Secretary General: Any solution requires a unified resistance.
Otherwise, you have the same scenario as Cambodia. (2)
Secretary Baker: We are more and more interested in looking at
avenues for a settlement. (2)
Secretary General: The time will come when the Soviets' friends
will be willing to make a deal. Right now, Najibullah is
mightier than before. (2)
The President: Yes, he has more stature now. (2)
Secretary Baker: We were closer last February to a solution than
we are now. (2)
Secretary Baker: On the PLO, I would like to reiterate a
critical point. We want the Israeli election proposal to move
along. If action were taken that gave the PLO increased status
at the UN, we flag for you the problems it raises for the US. (l)
UN Staff: Everybody knows this at the UN. (U)
Mr. Dayal: They have arrived at a strange status short of a
state. ($)
Secretary General: I will use my small influence. (2)
The President: Nicaragua. (U)
Secretary General: We are involved. 1) We are monitoring the
elections. 2) We are sending a group of observers to be sure
the territory cannot be used against another country. Spain,
Germany, Canada, and Venezuela will participate. 3) Disarming
and repatriation is more complicated. We have the Contras on one
side; the FMLN on the other. (U)
Secretary General: All in all, things are moving in many
countries. Are you very concerned about Panama? (U)
Secretary Baker: We took a multilateral approach for Panama and
we were very disappointed about the OAS. (U)
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Secretary General: Some former American administrations were
distrustful of the UN and went to the OAS. The OAS showed a real
lack of resolve on this. (
The President: We wish there were a quick solution but there is
not. We will keep making the effort. We do not have an argument
with the Panamanian Defense Force. We are not sure they believe
it, and we need to get the message to them better. All will sigh
a great sigh of relief when Noriega leaves. As Secretary Baker
said, we tried the OAS but the effort fell apart and we are
getting the flak for it. ()
Secretary General: What is needed is a target of democracy. At
the end of this year, all will be democracies in South America.
(U)
As both the President and the Secretary General rose, the meeting
was concluded with appreciation on both sides. (U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
President's Lunch for Allied Representatives
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to U.N.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)
Manfred Woerner, Secretary General, NATO
Peter Wilenski, UN Ambassador, Australia
Mark Eyskens, Foreign Minister, Belgium
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Canada
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Foreign Minister,
Denmark
Roland Dumas, Foreign Minister, France
Han-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister, FRG
George Papoulias, Alternate Foreign Minister,
Greece
Gianni De Michelis, Foreign Minister, Italy
Taro Nakayama, Foreign Minister, Japan
Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister, Luxembourg
Hans van den Broek, Foreign Minister,
Netherlands
Thorvald Stoltenberg, Foreign Minister, Norway
Joao de Deus Pinheiro, Foreign Minister,
Portugal
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Foreign Minister,
Spain
Mesut Yilmaz, Foreign Minister, Turkey
John Major, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom
Choi Ho Joong, Foreign Minister, South Korea
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DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 1:30 - 2:30 pm
AND PLACE:
Conrad Room, Waldorf Astoria, New York City
The President: Let me welcome everybody here. We are delighted
you are with us. I am new at this, but I understand this luncheon
has become a custom. As I said in my speech, we are living in
interesting times. I want to ask Secretary Baker to discuss his
talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. My meeting with
Shevardnadze went well, as did Secretary Baker's. We have
problems, but we have the possibility of real progress. Who would
have expected, a year ago at this luncheon, the changes we have
seen in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? I have been
criticized for my caution, but I think we have demonstrated that we
can take the offensive and we can be out in front. We will be
prepared to meet with Gorbachev half-way; we want to see him
succeed. We handled Yeltsin carefully during his visit to
Washington but if Gorbachev can see Teddy Kennedy, why can't I see
Yeltsin? I made this point to Shevardnadze. I am optimistic that
we can keep this process going in accord with Western interests.
(f)
Secretary Baker: I want to start by thanking everyone who helped
NATO table its CFE initiative in Vienna last Thursday. We believe
we are moving from competition to dialogue and even, in some
instances, cooperation. This is true across the full range of a
five part agenda: arms control; human rights; regional conflicts;
bilateral issues; and transnational problems like drugs, the
environment, and terrorism. We had a very productive ministerial
meeting and the Soviets feel the same way. ()
During the 4-1/2 hour flight to Wyoming, I had a good discussion
with Shevardnadze about what is going on in the Soviet Union. They
are quite preoccupied with their domestic problems, were candid
about them, and clear on what they intend to do about them.
Shevardnadze was confident and said the nationalities were the
biggest problem, then economic restructuring, and third, the
entrenched bureaucracy. They say Gorbachev's political position is
solid. On nationalities, they decided at the Plenum to give the
republics economic and political autonomy. But independence and
separation are not on the agenda. (&)
We spent a good deal of time on arms control and made good
progress. I hope we won't hear any more about dragging our feet.
We agreed to hold a Summit in the late spring or early summer next
year. The Soviets dropped their linkage between a START treaty and
a Defense and Space agreement. They agreed to dismantle the
Krasnoyarsk radar without preconditions. We broke a 15 year
deadlock on two nuclear testing treaties. We signed an MOU to
exchange data on chemical weapons and test verification methods.
We dropped our request for a ban on mobile missiles in START,
contingent on Congressional approval for our own mobile missile
program. We also moved forward on how to verify limits on mobile
missiles. We reached an umbrella agreement on the President's
proposal for interim verification and stability measures. The
Soviets responded positively to the President's Open Skies proposal
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changed their definition for coverage of aircraft in the CFE talks.
We also had a two hour discussion with them about their economy, at
their suggestion. (d)
Foreign Minister Van der Broek: Did the Soviets express worry
about Western activities in Eastern Europe? (2)
Secretary Baker: They say it is up to the countries in Eastern
Europe, but they do not want us aggressively fomenting change.
They will allow changes as long as the East European states remain
in the Warsaw Pact and the CEMA. (2)
Foreign Minister Genscher: Did you agree to give the Soviets data
about chemical weapons on German soil? (2)
Secretary Baker: We agreed to give aggregate numbers, but no
details about chemical weapons on German soil. (2)
Foreign Minister Stoltenberg: How was the SLCM issue addressed?
This is of interest to us. (C)
Secretary Baker: Treatment of SLCMs and ALCMs are the biggest
remaining issues in START. The good news is that they want to
handle SLCMs outside of START. The bad news is that they want to
do it within the context of naval arms control. (Z)
Foreign Minister Choi: Was there discussion of Asia and the
situation around the Korean peninsula? (2)
Secretary Baker: We talked about nuclear proliferation and North
Korea. The Soviets said they would push the North Koreans. (2)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Press Secretary
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State
(NEA)
Dennis Ross, Director for Policy Planning,
Department of State
Margaret Tutwiler, State Department
Spokesperson
Thomas Pickering, Ambassador to the UN
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC
Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister and
Finance Minister
Nimrod Novick, Political Advisor
Avraham Gil, Media Advisor
Moshe Arad, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 3:45 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.
AND PLACE:
The President's Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,
New York City, NY
The President: I am very pleased to see you again. I don't know
how you would like to spend this time, but we can talk about any
subject you like. Just let me say that we have taken a little
flak in the press here for not being activist in our foreign
policy. They have written especially about us not moving fast
enough in our relationship with the Soviets. But the Soviets
know, on the other hand, that we want to see perestroika proceed.
We hope this relationship will work to benefit our friends,
especially Israel.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: In a sense, Mr. President,
the Bush era that dates from 1988 will be seen in its first year
as the year of democracy. Communism is collapsing. Even the
Soviets have had elections. There have been student
demonstrations in China. The French celebrated their
revolution's anniversary more with regret than joy, and you will
recall Margaret Thatcher's remarks. The communist systems have
failed economically and socially. The gates to emigration have
been opened in the Soviet Union, and maybe this will be good for
us. After years of decline, the Arabs are asking themselves
"where did we go wrong?" You know, Mr. President, that there was
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a period in history when the Arabs were ascendant, at the top of
history. The Soviet Union is no longer an example to these
nations, so there are now voices in the Middle East saying "let's
try democracy." This could be the beginning of historic change
away from the rule of the gun that has characterized Arab
regimes.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: There have been some
initial successes in the peace process. You supported the
elections idea; now Egypt does as well. The Palestinians at
least do not reject it; maybe some even accept elections. The
Soviets are not prominent players and do not seem to seek a
spoiling role. Syria is weakened in Lebanon. Asad looks like a
man of yesterday, not a man of the future, of tomorrow.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: The Egyptian plan is not
so bad, although it raises some issues for us. The composition
of a Palestinian delegation is one issue, but we must recognize
that this is the first time we have a Palestinian side to talk
to. Differences remain in Israel over the question of including
"outsiders" in a delegation of about 10 persons. Egypt forged a
-- pardon my words -- Talmudic compromise by suggesting recent
deportees. On the 10 points themselves, Egypt has clarified that
this is the opening position. As a government, we must respond
to the issue of the composition of the delegation, because at a
minimum, the Egyptians and the Palestinians have accepted the
idea of elections. It is entirely proper, as well, that they
should demand the right for East Jerusalemites to vote. Of
course, the Israelis fight internally over these things -- we
are, after all, both democratic and Jewish. For example, when
Sadat came to Jerusalem, we went through a similar debate that
divided the two parties, forming strange parliamentary coalitions
that paired portions of each party rather than each party simply
opposing the other.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: We are as close as ever
before to starting negotiations, which of course would change
things dramatically in the Middle East. The Soviets are
diverted. Mubarak is strong and knows the heart of the matter
for us. There is no substitute for the role of the United
States. Furthermore, there is no opposition to the Egyptian role
per se. We should act now and decisively to tackle the heart of
the conflict -- the Palestinian issue. With the end of war in
the Middle East and the beginning of democratization, we could
turn to repair of our economies. Japan is a successful model --
it has a minimum of military power, but a maximum of economic
power. Compare it to the USSR, with a maximum of military power,
and a minimum of economic power.
The President: It is interesting what you say about the splits
in the political parties during Sadat's initiative. Is this the
situation now with Mubarak's 10 points? Or, is the split along
party lines?
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: For the time being, the
divisions are pretty much along party lines. Now, Likud is
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skeptical whereas Labor is supportive; the religious parties are
in the middle camp. Among the latter, there are interesting
developments: the chief rabbi of Israel's Sephardic Jews went to
Egypt, met Mubarak, and came back and issued a statement that
land is sacred, but human life is more sacred. Now, the dispute
is a classic one between the two major parties. A decision to go
ahead would keep the coalition intact, running away from a
decision would hurt the coalition.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: No one is asking Israel to
accept the 10 points. On the contrary, many in Israel are hoping
and asking the Palestinians to accept the 10 points because they
are so favorable from their point of view. Look at what is not
in the 10 points. There is no mention of the PLO, no mention of
the right of return, no mention of a return to the 1967 borders,
no call for a Palestinian state, and no call for
self-determination. Elections are the way to peace.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: A second point I would
like to mention is the economic situation in Israel. We are
turning the corner. The government's policy is gradually to
privatize government-owned industry. I always say that if we
want to give away dollars like socialists, then we must earn
dollars like capitalists. The entrenched bureaucracy is another
problem; we need to weaken their grip. Unemployment, though
high, is going down.
The President: What is the unemployment rate now?
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: It was 9.4 %, but the
number of employed has actually been increasing. One thing
keeping the unemployment ratio up is that the number of Bedouin
registering to collect benefits has been increasing. Now we are
looking at what we must do to prepare to receive more Soviet
Jews. Operation Moses, which the United States was such a big
part of, brought a forlorn tribe back to their land. Now we need
Operation Joshua for the Soviet Jews.
The President: How do we work with you on this? Our situation
is delicate. We face severe financial problems. There is a need
to control our immigration policy, yet we also want to preserve
the image of the Statue of Liberty welcoming people with open
arms. We don't want to turn people away.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: For years, Soviet
propaganda painted Israel as an inhospitable desert. Soviet Jews
were understandably reluctant to come to Israel because they
thought it would be a hardship. Soviet Jews must be brought to
see what Israel really is. We need $3 billion to absorb the
100,000 that possibly could be coming to Israel. Of this, we can
pay $2 billion from our own resources; we must raise the
remainder.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: Our relations with the
Soviets are strange. They permit great openness in some things,
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such as the ballet coming to Israel. They seek dairy technology
and we export COWS to the USSR. They are looking to barter for
fruit supplies to Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad. The Soviets
suggested that we take civilian cargo planes in return, but El Al
refused the planes. What is required is to improve the Soviet
aircraft by technical modifications. We want to know if this
would be all right with the United States. The idea is to expand
our relations with the Soviet Union so that Soviet Jews begin to
get a fuller picture of their nation.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: We want to encourage
Soviet Jews to come to Israel. If we can open their eyes, Israel
will be more attractive. 200,000 Jews came in the 1970's; none
have left. The 20,000 Soviet tourists who have visited us leave
surprised by what Israel looks like because of what they were
told by the Soviet authorities before.
The President: You want us to encourage those who want
to the United States to go to Israel?
Peres: Yes -- those with an Israeli visa should come to Israel
Secretary Baker: We are changing the process of reviewing
refugee applications to Moscow, away from Rome and Vienna. You
could help us in this effort by telling American Jewish groups
that the United States is not cutting back in the number of Jews
from the Soviet Union granted refugee status.
Deputy PM and Finance Minister Peres: We want a stronger
presence for Israel in the USSR so as to show our people what
Israel is about.
The President: The Soviets are sensitive to this issue as well.
The meeting then terminated; the President and Peres stayed on
for a ten minute private one-on-one.
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8476
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Venezuelan President Carlos
Andres Perez (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Director, Latin American
Affairs, NSC Staff
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter
Carlos Andres Perez, President
Reinaldo Figueredo, Foreign Minister
Simon Alberto Consalvi, Ambassador
Andreas Aguilar, Permanent Representative
to the United Nations
Danute Rosales, Interperter
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 5:30-6:00 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
Presidential Suite
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City
The President and Venezuelan President Perez met in The
President's Suite to discuss regional problems. (2)
The President: Welcome, Mr. President. It's so good to see you.
I always look forward to talking with you and getting good free
advice. (d)
President Perez: I don't give any free advice. (2)
The President: We have been involved in lots of work lately with
the domestic educational summit and people coming to Washington.
How about you? (L)
President Perez: Very busy also. I have been working on my U.N.
speech. (2)
The President: When do you give your speech? (L)
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President Perez: Today. Mr. President, I bring a present from
the people of Venezuela. (U)
The President: Should I open it now? (U)
President Perez: Yes, please do. (U)
The President: (Opens and admires present which is a round rug
or hanging which is brightly embroidered by hand.) (U)
The President: We have a million things to talk about in a short
period of time. I'd like to talk about Panama and Nicaragua.
What would you like to talk about? (C)
President Perez: I think that the most important problem we have
now in the Hemisphere is Panama. In spite of the problems in
Central America, things are going in the right direction there.
I think that we have to react to Panama. Unfortunately, we had a
bad experience with the OAS. The Commission didn't do a thing.
The meeting is still open. We have to clear it up if we go back.
I don't think there's much opportunity there. I have thought
about a number of things. One thing is that we have another
meeting of the Group of 8 coming up and that Panama should be on
the agenda. We should expel Panama from the group. We should
have the group that is going consult ahead of time, so that if we
can agree on what should happen, we can take action. It would be
absurd to have met and let another date go by without doing
anything about Panama. The whole constitution of Panama has been
destroyed. (2)
President Perez: We have to ignore the case of Haiti, but in the
rest of Latin America there is progress, but the countries have
been hard pressed. We have helped prevent coups in Argentina,
Ecuador and Peru, and allowing a military coup in Panama is very
dangerous. It could be the beginning of a new phase of coups.
(f)
The President: It could have a bad effect on Nicaragua. If the
elections are close, the Sandinistas will say, "What the hell.
If Panama can overturn elections, why can't we do the same?" (2)
President Perez: The events in Panama can act as a stimulant for
the Guatemalan army. At the group of 8 meeting we must move to
find a solution. I have been talking with a number of leaders.
One who is most firm is Menem. He sent a special delegate to me
to ask what position should we adopt regarding Panama. I
suggested the group of 8 where it would be agreed. (Z)
President Perez: I think it is essential that we agree on what
happens in Venezuela. On the third of November there will be a
big meeting for the defense of democracy that will specifically
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deal with the Panama problem. I hope to stimulate advocacy for
the Panamanian opposition. The independence day of Panama
(November 3) is an important date. We need to get more
international interest in Panama. We need action by the
Socialist International, the Christian Democratic International,
the Liberal International, and the Conservative International.
This would be important because we would cover the whole
political gamut. We are working on this idea. I'm thinking of
phoning important political leaders. I haven't decided whether
to invite the U.S. Democrats and Republicans. We have to think
about this. It may be better not to invite them in order to keep
the Latin flavor. (L)
The President: I'd like to ask a frank question. Has our
exercise of treaty rights been counter productive? We have not
tried to have confrontations. I wonder what you are getting on
feedback. Have we been too muscular? (2)
President Perez: There may have been some excesses when there
was a process of negotiations. This was exploited by Noriega.
Unfortunately the action of the commission had no weight. We
discuss the problem of treaties. January 1 is a crucial date in
the treaties. No matter what the circumstances, we will have the
problem of giving the administration of the canal to the
representative of an illegal government. Can we pressure them
enough to make a democratic government? In my speech, I talk
about his. Noriega has a problem of sustaining or not sustaining
the treaties. (d)
The President: Noriega is smart. He maintains the treaties.
(C)
Secretary Baker: A Panamanian Administrator nominated by Noriega
would never be ratified if nominated. We've got to get him out.
(2)
President Perez: That is the problem. I think the key error is
to make Noriega the problem. It is, but the problem of
democratization is crucial, from that - if you get a democratic
president, Noriega would have to leave. Noriega may be part of
the problem. (f)
The President: The question is, where do we go from here? What
can or should we do? (2)
President Perez: First, at the group of 8, have concrete action
taken on Panama. See the position of all the presidents. We
know the Mexican position. But perhaps we could get them not to
be an obstacle. We could have a program to: (1) expel Panama;
(2) recall all ambassadors and military attaches; (3) get others
to take similar action; (4) have a meeting of democratic forces
in Caracas. This could create a climate and solidify opposition.
(2)
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Secretary Baker: A question. Would Mexico not be amenable to
seeing Panama removed? (f)
President Perez: We haven't brought it up yet. I'm going to
talk to him. (2)
Secretary Baker: President Salinas has sent a message to Noriega
and sent a message to the government saying it is time you left
office. We think there is evolution in Mexican thinking. (2)
Foreign Minister Figueredo: I met the Foreign Minister of
Mexico. He said they shared the same view but would not say SO
publicly. They would not withdraw their Ambassador but would
continue to provide pressure. (2)
Secretary Baker: Does it take a unanimous vote to exclude? (2)
President Perez: No, we can try. I will say we can look to the
time of Samoza. There is a precedent. (C)
Mr. Aronson: If the group of 8 takes action, if the group
presents a strong position, you could go to Panama, you and other
Presidents could go to Panama and pressure for a democratic
government. (2)
The President: If Noriega does go, we don't want to have a
similar government take his place. (2)
Secretary Baker: You could ask for instant removal. (2)
The President: I wonder if there is not a widespread feeling
that all people in the Guard would suffer if Noriega went. That
is not so. I was troubled at a recent Coast Guard Academy
graduation where we could not play the Panamanian national anthem
for the Panamanian graduates who were fine young men. Our
problem is with Noriega not the PDF as an institution. (d)
The President: I understand that you want to talk with me
privately for a few minutes. (Z)
President Perez: Yes, for a few minutes if is not inconvenient.
(2)
The President: Let's go over here. (U)
NOTE: During this part of conversation, President Perez told the
President that the Foreign Ministers of Peru, Ecuador and
Colombia had been very unhelpful on the Panama question at the
recent non-aligned conference in Yugoslavia and had contravened
instructions from their Presidents after the Presidents left.
They had supported a very soft Cuban resolution on Panama,
instead of a resolution by the Yugoslavs, the hosts, which was
much stronger. Perez suggested that the President mention this
to the Presidents of Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. (2)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn of
Hungary
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Gyula Horn, Foreign Minister
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 8:15 - 8:20 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
Grand Foyer, Metropolitan Museum of Art,
New York
The President and Foreign Minister Horn met briefly during the
President's reception for Heads of Delegation, Permanent
Representatives and spouses, on the occasion of the 44th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly.
The President: I wanted to tell you how much I enjoyed my visit
to Hungary in July. Please pay my respects to your Government
for its courageous handling of the East German refugee situation.
Foreign Minister Horn: Congratulations on your speech today. It
was new in style and content, and very successful. I heard this
from many delegations, and not just out of courtesy. I am also
glad that what you said in Budapest has carried through.
The President: We are committed to the success of your reforms
and want to help in every way we can.
Foreign Minister Horn: We do need help, although we know we have
to rely on ourselves. We treasure your support and sympathy.
The President: We were impressed at the time of our visit and
have been enormously impressed with your diplomacy since then.
--End of Conversation--
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Janez Drnovsek of
Yugoslavia
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Janez Drnovsek, President
Budimir Loncar, Foreign Minister
Dragoslav Pejic, Permanent Representative
to the United Nations
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 8:30 - 8:35 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
Grand Foyer, Metropolitan Museum of Art,
New York
The President met briefly with President Drnovsek during the
President's reception for Heads of Delegation, Permanent
Representatives and spouses, on the occasion of the 44th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly.
The President: How long will you be in the U.S.?
President Drnovsek: We are leaving tomorrow. There are problems
in Yugoslavia to attend to.
The President: Are these on the financial side or the political?
President Drnovsek: We try to do our best on the economic side
but face real difficulties. We want a market-oriented economy,
but the problem is that inflation is running at 30% per month.
We are putting more emphasis on the private sector, introducing a
stock exchange, and completely reforming the financial
institutions. It is difficult to do everything, especially with
so many social problems.
The President: Is unemployment bad?
President Drnovsek: It is uneven around the country. The
average is 15%.
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The President: With Larry Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, there
is a special desire to have strong ties with your country. We
will try.
President Drnovsek: Can the Brady Plan be applied to Yugoslavia?
The President: In terms of concept, we are for that and are
trying to get the banks involved to help work these matters out.
I will check with Secretary Brady. The concept is much broader
than Latin America; it needs to be world-wide.
- End of Conversation-
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Moshe Arens of Israel ($)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Ambassador to
the UN
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC
Moshe Arens, Israeli Foreign Minister
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 8:30 p.m. - 8:36 p.m.
AND PLACE:
The Metropolitan Museum, New York City, NY
The President: I just wanted to take a few moments in private to
touch base with you on where we stand in the peace process.
Foreign Minister Arens: There is a lot of political turmoil in
Israel. It seems President Mubarak does not understand the
Israeli coalition and the nature of our politics. Had Mubarak
pursued his initiative differently by meeting with Shamir, things
would have turned out differently.
The President: What do you mean by political turmoil? Is there
the possibility of a breakup of the government?
Foreign Minister Arens: There has been talk of the coalition
breaking up. The best way to proceed now in the peace process is
for us to convince Mubarak to meet with Shamir. Mubarak has gone
about this completely wrong if his objective was to attract
Shamir into the process. By putting forward his initiative with
Rabin, inviting Rabin to Cairo, he was inviting the third best.
The President: I don't think Mubarak was being mischievous in
this. He honestly wants to make progress.
Foreign Minister Arens: He doesn't appreciate the intricacies of
Israeli politics. I will see Mubarak on Thursday. I understand
that he is reticent about a meeting with Shamir. I will talk to
him about this and I think you should do so also.
The President: We could discuss it with him, to see what his
thoughts are. However, he has been pretty clear that he's
willing to meet Shamir if there is something to show for it.
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Foreign Minister Arens: If Mubarak met Shamir, then the 10
points would likely be more acceptable.
Secretary Baker: His view is that a meeting could be worked out
if the outcome is positive. Getting a dialogue going between
Israelis and Palestinians might provide the right circumstances,
and Mubarak has said something public about this.
Foreign Minister Arens: It is difficult to say to a Prime
Minister that he must agree beforehand on something like the 10
points.
Secretary Baker: But that's not the issue, no one has said
anything about Israel or Shamir having to agree on the 10 points;
the 10 points are Egypt's and the Palestinians' position.
General Scowcroft: You don't have to agree on the 10 points.
The issue is the dialogue with Palestinians.
Foreign Minister Arens: Mubarak says that he will not meet with
Shamir unless Shamir agrees.
The President: The main thing is to avoid negative answers.
Foreign Minister Arens: This is an issue because of the way it
was handled, not because of the substance.
The President: What does the opposition say?
Foreign Minister Arens: The invitation to Rabin was a problem.
Secretary Baker: There was the image of Egypt dealing with
Labor, not with Likud, that was a problem.
The President: We kind of had that problem with Boris Yeltsin
during his visit, but I didn't let it bother me when he visited
with Ted Kennedy and others. I don't see any reason to get
offended about that.
Foreign Minister Arens: Your speech today was great. If
democracy ever comes to the Arab world then everything will
change for the better. I still think that what you must do is
convince Mubarak to meet with Shamir. This is the right way to
go.
The President: Well, we'll look into it, and see what he says
about the idea.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Foreign Minister Krzysztof
Skubiszewski of Poland
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Foreign Minister
DATE, TIME
September 25, 1989, 8:35 - 8:45 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
Grand Foyer, Metropolitan Museum of Art,
New York
The President met briefly with Foreign Minister Skubiszewski
during the President's reception for Heads of Delegation,
Permanent Representatives and spouses, on the occasion of the
44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
The President: The next time I see you, I hope we can put our
feet up and have a longer discussion.
Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: I would like to thank you for
your interest in our country. There are historic situations when
destiny is present. Now is such a time, in which we must shape
our future. Your moral support is crucial, as is what you do on
the material plane. We do not live in an era of Marshall Plans,
although some in Solidarity do not realize that. Help must come
from within to organize a market economy. I would like to
congratulate you on your speech, especially for helping Third
World countries through market mechanisms. This is also a
problem in Poland. In foreign affairs and our quest for external
sovereignty and internal independence, I can assure you that the
Polish Government has no intention of destabilizing Europe.
The President: I know that. I would like to bring you over to
have a fuller talk. We have respect for your leadership,
including General Jaruzelski.
Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: I agree.
2
The President: We want you to succeed. We want to help you, and
to do what is right. So when you are in Washington, please let
me know. You and Jim Baker can follow up on this, but I do not
want to complicate your efforts through U.S. zest.
Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: Your policy has transformed zest
into specific, helpful measures. Your influence was very, very
important in achieving a final compromise in Poland. Your name
was rendered in our debates, and you made a difference.
-End of Conversation--
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8904
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Theo Waigel, Chairman of the
Christian Social Union of the Federal
Republic of Germany
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Theo Waigel, Chairman of the Christian Social
Union
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador
DATE, TIME
September 26, 1989, 10:00 a.m. - 10:28 a.m.
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President and Chairman Waigel met in the Oval Office at
10:00 a.m. (U)
The President: Have you started your finance meetings? (U)
Chairman Waigel: We have begun our sessions. It has been a very
busy week. Congratulations on your UN speech. (U)
The President: I am anxious to know what you say when people ask
about "German reunification." I want to handle it right. (C)
Chairman Waigel: I would like to thank you for your personal
interest in and support for reunification; this is very
important for our people. No one ten years ago could have
imagined the changes we are seeing in the Soviet Union, Hungary
and Poland. They give us a chance to dismantle borders. We have
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an opportunity to end the division of Germany, within the context
of a Europe peace order and self determination for all people.
In the long term, no regime will survive against the will of its
people. Only two people in the world still believe in
Communism Castro and Honecker -- and they will be surmounted,
too. We are observing a struggle between two Germans: Karl Marx
and Ludwig Erhard. Erhard's ideas of free society are winning
out over Marxist ideas. ACT
I would like to thank you for your arms control proposals in
recent days. There has been a very positive reaction in the FRG.
We welcomed your leadership at the NATO Summit. Regarding
security, in spite of glasnost, we need a security policy. (c)
The President: On chemical weapons, verification is very
difficult. We need to stay on the offensive vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. The Alliance is in a good position now. Sometimes I get
criticism for going too slow with Mr. Gorbachev, but things are
moving in our direction. We do not feel under enormous pressure
to make unilateral concessions to Mr. Gorbachev. (CT
What is your view on Poland? I want to stay together with you on
Poland and Hungary. The Congress has discovered Poland,
especially some from Chicago who are running for reelection, and
want to throw money at the problem. We want to be responsive,
but we don't have bushels of money. SeT
Chairman Waigel: We discussed Poland and Hungary at the IMF and
G-7 meetings. We must support developments in Poland. I met the
Polish Finance Minister last night. We can help in three ways:
through IMF and World Bank expertise and knowhow on financial and
economic policy (Poland could also receive help under the Brady
Plan); food aid; and bilateral aid from the FRG to Poland --
which is already six billion DM. We are willing to terminate and
reschedule Poland's debt and extend credit guarantees that will
help Poland earn foreign currency. We have done more than any
other country SO far. (e)
The President: I met with the new Polish Foreign Minister and
was very impressed with him. Maybe we will have a good team to
work with, including President Jaruzelski. We want to stay
together with you on this, and we are thinking along the same
lines. (C)
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Chairman Waigel: The problem with Poland is that leaders of
government are full of good will and want to strengthen the
market, but they are under personal and political stress because
of the communist bureaucracy. I want to ask about your budget
process. Do you foresee a positive U.S. decision regarding
raising the IMF quota? Jes
The President: There is a possibility of it, but we have
distinct problems in the U.S. I would not rule it out. Are
there enough resources in the IMF now? set
Chairman Waigel: In the medium term, the IMF is afloat. But it
would be good to increase IMF resources. HCT
The President: We don't want to undermine the IMF. (C)
Chairman Waigel: Thank you for your willingness to spend time
with me. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Carlos Menem of
Argentina
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of
State
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of
Treasury for International Affairs
Terence Todman, Ambassador to Argentina
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Everett Ellis Briggs, Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for
Latin America and the Caribbean
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Domingo Cavallo, Foreign Minister of
Argentina
Guido Di Tella, Argentine Ambassador
to the United States
Nestor Rapanelli, Minister of Economy of
Argentina
Alberto Kohan, Chief of Staff to
President Menem
Humberto Toledo, Spokesman for President
Menem
DATE, TIME
September 27, 1989, 11:50 a.m.-12:40 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The President received President Menem at 11:40 a.m. in the Oval
Office, after which the two stopped briefly at the edge of the
Rose Garden for a friendly exchange with the media pool before
going to the Residence to meet Mrs. Bush. They returned to the
Cabinet Room at noon for the formal meeting.
The President: I wanted to show President Menem the White House
and introduce Mrs. Bush to him. And I wanted our press to see
for themselves the affection we feel for this president and
friend. I welcome you. Why don't you start? (U)
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President Menem: Thank you. I appreciate this departure from
protocol, having a chance to see your beautiful residence, and
most of all, to meet your wife. And it is especially nice to see
how the American people react to their president, to see how much
they love you. (U)
The President: I had a chance to introduce President Menem to
some tourists inside the White House. They were surprised to see
two presidents! (U)
President Menem They were especially pleased to see their
president. (U)
President Menem: I consider the relations with the U.S. now to
be excellent. This was not always so. I have wanted to turn
Argentina into a serious, reliable country, to build the best
relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world. I've put into
motion our economic program, with excellent results thus far.
Our respective teams are working very well together. (U)
President Menem: As you know, I am governing in a period that is
not mine. My predecessor, who is also a personal friend, left
office six months ahead of schedule. So I assumed responsibility
early, at Argentina's worst time, with the country perhaps near
to civil war and with a runaway inflation rate of over 200
percent. We have succeeded in drastically reducing the hyper-
inflation, and by the end of the year we hope to have brought it
under control, and keep it to a "civilized" rate next year of no
more than 15 percent. I hope my economists are not misleading
me! (U)
President Menem: We are especially eager to improve cooperation
with the U.S. in all areas and fields where we need to grow, and
towards which we wish to project Argentina in the future. We are
making great efforts to simplify what we are doing, including in
our foreign relations. (U)
President Menem: We look forward to a series of exchanges with
the British. We are meeting here with the British foreign
secretary, and will continue our talks in Madrid between October
16 and 17. We need your help as we work towards restoring
functioning relations, with embassies in each other's capitals,
by the end of this year or the first half of next, at the latest.
Restoration of relations with the UK will affect not only our two
countries, but will be good for all of Latin America whose
countries, in showing solidarity with Argentina, have found
themselves in varying degrees of confrontation with the British.
(2)
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President Menem: We are working as hard as we can to lighten our
foreign debt. It would help us financially if we could sell off
some of our excess armaments. We would like to see restrictions
on weapons sales lifted. They date from the Malvinas War, but no
longer are warranted. We would like to be able to sell some
frigates and submarines built in Argentina. We don't need such
armaments, and the restrictions block us from selling them. (1)
President Menem: We are holding talks here at the ministerial
level on reducing the debt, addressing interest payments and the
problem of arrears. We don't want material help from you, but we
do need help to make it possible for us to sell our primary
products. We'd like to see subsidies eliminated. (U)
President Menem: For its part, Argentina will unconditionally
fight terrorism, subversion and the drug traffic. In a few days
some rigorous new legislation will be enacted to deal with these
issues. I spoke with Bennett today. We agreed on many aspects
of the drug question. He asked for our help, and we will provide
it. I have organized my government in a way similar to yours. I
have a new secretariat to deal with the drug problem. Of course,
as Argentine President I lead the struggle. (U)
President Menem: We are doing all we can to help Colombia
despite our economic difficulties. I have donated three combat
aircraft to Barco for use against the narcoterrorists. I see a
great possibility of success in this war. And if Barco asked for
troops from Argentina, and our congress approved it, we would be
willing to help in that way, too. I should like to say this: we
are totally committed to fight this terrible evil that is
threatening society in the Americas, in Europe, and elsewhere as
well. (f)
President Menem: We have lifted restrictions on visits and
investment by foreigners in Argentina. American citizens can
travel to Argentina without a visa as tourists, or settlers. (U)
President Menem: I talked with Treasury Secretary Brady today
about a series of laws we have put in motion to consolidate what
we are doing. So far the results are excellent. I do not intend
to give in to any pressure to stop what we are doing. We shall
privatize the State-owned entities. We have opened the doors to
private capital, including from abroad, without limitations and
under the same conditions as with domestic capital. There will
be full repatriation of earnings. We are solving some of our
problems. This is not some kind of Argentine "perestroika."
What is going on here is a commitment to honesty, decision, and
courage. The people are reacting positively to this. Polls show
a 50 percent approval rating overall, with 80 percent supporting
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the economic program, and 89 percent endorsing the restoration of
relations with the UK. We shall continue. I should like to hear
any questions you may have about what we are doing, or any doubts
you may care to express. I suppose you have many. (U)
The President: I am glad you are here. I am sorry about your
previous engagement at the press club (which will prevent our
having lunch together). It is a marvelous forum and I am glad
you are speaking to them. I want to congratulate you on your
reforms. I am personally interested in hearing about them. You
inherited some tough economic problems, and have taken some
courageous steps. Have you gone into the question of our
supporting an IMF standby, Nick (Brady) ? We will support this,
and I urge you to stay in close touch with us. Secretary Brady
knows my keen interest in seeing Argentina succeed. (U)
The President: On drugs, your Vice President was here recently
and we were all very impressed with what Argentina is going.
This issue is of vital importance. I also agree that we need to
help (Colombian President) Barco. He will be here tomorrow
night; and he will be talking as well to our Congress. (U)
The President: You know our concerns on nuclear proliferation.
If you can implement the treaty that would be helpful. It would
enable us to resume mutually advantageous nuclear relations with
Argentina. (U)
The President: Has the Condor issue been touched? ()
Ambassador Todman: Yes, it was discussed this morning. (U)
Foreign Minister Cavallo: In the meeting with Secretary Baker.
(U)
The President: I understand you are interested in selling an
airplane. (U)
President Menem: It is an excellent aircraft. It flies. (U)
The President: Well, we shall see you get full consideration,
though I have to say there is intense competition. (U)
The President: It is very important that you resolve things with
the UK. If you can work it out, you can count on our full
support. I hope you can reach full normalization. We should
like to play a supportive role. You know about our historic,
special relationship with the UK, but that does not mean that we
would ever want to be unfair to Argentina. So, if you wish, feel
free to call me any time, by phone. (2)
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The President: I expect that the Commerce Department has
mentioned the problem of property rights, especially regarding
pharmaceuticals? (U)
President Menem: Yes, it is being discussed. (U)
The President: I want to raise another matter - Panama. We
especially do not want the aborting of the Panamanian election to
spill over into other countries, such as Nicaragua. With your
own recent experience in an election, you can have enormous
credibility on the Panama question. Any advice from you would be
welcome. We have an historic relationship with Panama; we have
the Treaty. We want to see Panama prosper as a democracy. (2)
The President: In Cuba, Fidel Castro is swimming against the
tide of history. There were some comments from Cuba about being
helpful on narcotics, but we have not seen much there, and I am
pessimistic that there will be any real change for the better
soon. (g)
The President: I guess we do not have time for a discussion of
the Middle East, but I know of your interest. With your recent
election and your background, I suspect you might have some good
ideas. (2)
The President: Those are the main points I wanted to raise.
There is a feeling here, in the Department of State, at Treasury,
at Defense, that we want your bold initiatives to succeed. We do
not want problems to interfere. (U)
The President: I want to say something else: our ambassador is
not only a respected diplomat, but also an old friend. When he
speaks he speaks on the basis of a relationship between us that
goes back a long way. I want you to know that. (U)
President Menem: I should like to make a brief comment, starting
with the last thing you said. You sent us someone who is more
than an ambassador. He is a gentleman and a professional of the
highest order. Our relations with him are excellent. I know
that when I speak to him, I am speaking to you. (U)
President Menem: On nuclear non-proliferation, I want you to
know that we are moving forward and anticipate signing (the
Tlatelolco Treaty). We are studying it. I hope to have word on
this, soon. (2)
President Menem: On the Condor, the objective has been realized.
The whole point was to gain new technology, not to produce a new
weapons system. Our purposes are technological, not warlike.
This took several years. Argentina exists for peace, not war.
(f)
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President Menem: On Panama, Argentina has not requested an
agrement for a new ambassador, and has no ambassador in Panama
now. At the Group of Eight meeting in Peru, October 11 and 12,
we will discuss what to do about Panama. We should like to have
the certainty that the U.S. will absolutely comply with the
Carter-Torrijos Treaty. We would then have sufficient authority
to demand a change in Panama. We also wish to avoid seeming to
be interfering in Panama's internal affairs, but we all want
democracy in Panama, as elsewhere. (1)
President Menem: On Cuba, this is difficult, too. The regime
has been in power some 34 years. I think the problem will
persist until Castro dies. This seems to be the case in several
parts of the world, where there are strongmen who have mutilated
freedom and imposed totalitarian systems. (2)
President Menem: As you said, I can talk with your ambassador in
Argentina, or with you on the phone. The same thing goes for me.
I think we can cooperate on everything. We have excellent
relations with the U.S. now. We want to put an end to the
problems of the past. We do not want to revive the old problems.
For our part of the continent we want the same kind of
arrangement the U.S. has with Canada. We have to get close to
our neighbors, in a union based on openness. (U)
President Menem: I have some advice for you, if you will permit
me. Put more emphasis on this continent. Not less on Europe,
just more on us. (U)
The President: I agree. There is a perception that the U.S.
neglects its friends. That is sound advice. We recognize the
importance of our relations with the Hemisphere, based both on
our friendship, and on our own self-interest. (U)
President Menem: There are 600,000,000 people in Latin America -
twice the population of Europe. Our economic potential is much
greater than Europe's. Everything is still ahead of us. If the
U.S., as the big brother, does not lead us, it could live to
regret it, as democracy fails and Latin America is unable to
continue as the world's breadbasket. (U)
The President: I only wish we had four more hours to talk. But
you have to get to your luncheon. By the way, are you going to
Costa Rica for that summit? (U)
President Menem: Yes. (U)
The President: What are we going to do there anyway? Do you
know? (U)
President Menem: Drink coffee, maybe. (U)
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The President: Or maybe cerveza. (U)
President Menem: (Laughs) (U)
The President: But we really ought to think about it. I am
worried about what is planned. How can you and I have some
useful conversation? How can we be properly respectful of Costa
Rica but still accomplish something? I am not sure Oscar Arias
really knows what he is getting into. We love the guy, but has
he thought about the invasion he is going to get from Argentina,
the U.S. and Brazil? (l)
The President: I wanted to ask you: Do you have any reason to
believe Barco would welcome foreign troops? (2)
President Menem: Our offer was based on a fear that Colombia is
impotent to deal with its problem effectively. I spoke to him by
phone. Actually, he called me to thank me for our support. I
said I would even be willing to send troops, if he wanted me to,
and if our congress approved. It was a gesture of cooperation so
he would not feel alone. (d)
Foreign Minister Cavallo: Yesterday I spoke with (Colombian
Foreign Minister) Londono. He said there was intense sensitivity
in his congress regarding foreign troops. So we are being
careful about what we say. (2)
President Menem: It was meant just to demonstrate our support -
that we are available to help. (U)
The President: The reason I mention this is that there has been
a lot of speculation here regarding U.S. troops. That sent us a
signal, so I let Barco know we had no intention of sending troops
unilaterally. But at the same time we sense a growing
willingness abroad, including among the Europeans, to send help,
if he needs it. The G-7 in Paris, for instance, would be
willing. But let me assure you we have no intention of moving on
our own. That would be totally counterproductive. (2)
President Menem: The last subject I wanted to mention: the
Middle East. I know you are trying hard to find a way to peace.
I have met the leaders of both sides. They seem positively
inclined to our helping in the quest for peace. So if there is
any way we could contribute to this, we are ready, and have told
the parties. (1)
The President: That is good. It is very constructive. Thank
you for coming. (U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMCON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Shimon Peres of Israel ($)
PARTICIPANTS:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC
Shimon Peres, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Finance
Nimrod Novick, Political Adviser
Avriham Gil, Media Adviser
Oded Eran, Deputy Chief of Mission
DATE, TIME
September 27, 1989, 3:40 p.m. - 4:05 p.m.
AND PLACE:
General Scowcroft's Office
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The most important thing that is
needed now is a clear U.S. position. (S)
General Scowcroft: A clear position regarding what? (S)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: A clear position should be
articulated on the (Egyptian) 10 points and the Government of
Israel's plan. It is today one package. The sooner things
happen, the more will happen. Egypt has now suggested guidelines
for a Palestinian delegation that offers the possibility, the
opportunity, of a Palestinian partner. The perception in certain
quarters in Israel is that this will emerge as a PLO delegation
because this effort has the approval of the PLO. Some others are
not as bothered by that. I will be meeting Mubarak this week and
I will tell him that the 10 points can be the basis of the
Palestinian position; we do not need to sign on to them. (S)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: I know that there is a worry here
regarding the possibility of a crisis in Israel and the fall of
the coalition government. My view is that action will save the
government; inaction will endanger it. This is a golden
opportunity before us. The Soviets are outside the process.
Jordan is distracted with its internal situation. Syria is
imbedded in Lebanon. Somehow, Egypt has managed to engage the
PLO. While the involvement of the PLO is not an ideal thing, it
is better that the PLO agree than that it shoots people. Each of
the two major Israeli parties would need to seek coalition
partners it does not like in order to form a coalition; for this
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reason, I do not think either party has the chance for a narrow
coalition. I had a trauma with the London Agreement, SO I don't
want to miss this opportunity. ($)
General Scowcroft: I agree that this is a moment of opportunity
and we want to be active. But we don't want to be in a position
to interfere in internal politics. We wholeheartedly back the
Israeli government's initiative. I do not think that we should
directly endorse the 10 points, since that is the platform for
the Palestinians. The critical point now is to get a Palestinian
delegation formed in a way acceptable to you and without a PLO
stamp of approval. Is there any possibility that 1-2 deportees
could be included as members of the delegation? ($)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: Some of us already agree to it.
Rabin and I do not reject this. There are different sorts of
deportees. Perhaps we should just agree on "agreed deportees."
For example, Muhammad Milhim's name has been mentioned. Though
he is not involved in violence personally, he is a member of the
PLO Executive Committee, and thus unacceptable. In fact, under
current Israeli policy some deportees are able to return in
accord with their behavior. The agreement on a Palestinian
delegation is something that should be done now. ($)
General Scowcroft: The important thing, you're right, is to get
the delegation in order to move to the next step. Is there value
in a Mubarak-Shamir meeting? I know Mubarak holds back. (8)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: How can I say anything but yes?
But Mubarak looks upon it as an incentive. This incentive is for
the delivery, not for a promise. If Mubarak asks me tomorrow,
then I would say yes. Let me remind you that we were
instrumental in arranging a meeting (for Shamir) with another
senior Arab. Did it help or not? I don't know. (8)
General Scowcroft: What can we do? (U)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The things you said and asked about
the Palestinian delegation should become a clear U.S. call for
action. We are talking about peace, not partisan politics.
There must be a timetable, also. (8)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The second point I wanted to raise
is regarding the Russians. They want trade with us. For our
part, we are interested, because trade can spread our people
throughout the USSR. With our large concentration of Russians,
Israel is ideal in terms of being able to understand the
Russians. They want three things from us: cooperation in
agriculture; medical scanners; and cargo planes (sic). In this
last one, there is a problem. We could use Soviet cargo planes
to take our goods to the USSR, and return with Soviet Jews.
However, these Soviet planes are only good for Russian pilots; we
want to Westernize them.
(S)
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General Scowcroft: Would you own the planes? ($)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: Yes -- they would be ours. With
your permission we would like to put on U.S. engines and other
equipment. If anything else is done with the aircraft, we would
ask your permission as required by law. The Soviets know this --
I told them that we would need your permission. They have
invited me to Moscow. On the Middle East, they show interest but
I do not feel that they have a coherent involvement. The small
Israeli Communist Party is old-fashioned -- it has not had a
glasnost. ($)
General Scowcroft: We would have no problem in looking at this
aircraft issue, if they are to be yours. (S)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The third point I wanted to raise
is Soviet emigration. We have reached an agreement with the
Jewish community that going to Israel will get a priority.
Israel needs these Jews more than they do, and they need Israel.
We are glad that the immigration decision will be in Moscow. We
estimate that 100,000 Jews will want to come out over the next
several years. To absorb them will cost $3 billion, and $2
billion of that will come from our budget over the next three
years. It is expensive, but the value is greater than the cost.
Jewish fund campaigns here can raise $500 million over the next
three years. We need to fill the shortfall, and one source is
guarantees for housing investment. We would like to get $400
million in U.S. AID housing investment guarantees. This would be
an off-budget item, since Israel always pays its debts. (8)
DCM Eran: Our preliminary check is that it would have zero
budget implications. (8)
General Scowcroft: We can look into this idea. Our resources
are very limited. (8)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: If Palestinians go for elections it
will be a great example for the area. The first consideration is
the time element; there must be an inner target. ($)
General Scowcroft: I agree, but there is a limit to what we can
do. (8)
Deputy Prime Minister Peres: We don't know how far Mubarak can
go. He is not terribly strong on the fine print and not great on
our internal politics, either. (8)
The meeting adjourned. Mr. Peres remained behind for a few
minutes to make some private points. (U)
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2 October 1989
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Virgilio Barco of Colombia
DATE, TIME
September 28, 1989, 5:45 - 8:00PM
AND PLACE:
Residence
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
William Bennett, Director of National Drug
Control Policy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)
Thomas E. McNamara, Ambassador to Colombia
Lillian Nigaglioni (Interpreter)
Virgilio Barco, President of Colombia
Julio Londono, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Fernando Alarcon, Minister of Finance
Maria Mercedes Martinez, Director of National
Planning Department
Rafael Munoz, Director of Anti-Narcotics,
Colombia National Police
Victor Mosquera, Ambassador of Colombia to the
United States
Leopoldo Villar Borda, Permanent Representative to
the Organization of American States
Gabriel Silva, Advisor to President Barco
Ximna Casalino, Minister of the Colombian Embassy
The President: I'm pleased to welcome you to this house. There
is great respect on the part of all Americans fcr what you are
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doing against the drug traffickers. I am eager to hear what you
have to say. Your success holds the answer to our success. You
should know that Ambassador McNamara is reporting daily both to
State and here. I know the coffee agreement has cost you
resources and I am prepared to talk about that. Again, welcome,
and please proceed.
Barco: I do want to talk about the coffee agreement and the need
to go to a new agreement. This is of great interest for us.
There is a willingness to change behavior and we know it will
have an impact on cooperation.
The President: Perhaps Larry Eagleburger can describe our
position on the coffee agreement.
Eagleburger: The disagreement is primarily with Brazil and their
reduction of coffee prices to countries outside the coffee
agreement. The US and Colombia are in basic agreement. This
dispute is not between us.
Alarcon: We have to solve the existence of two markets. In the
formal negotiations, it is clear that some mechanism is needed to
have the non-member countries observe the agreement. The US can
be useful in getting other countries into this mechanism and
establishing transitional rules. There are differences over the
time period of the transition, whether it should be one or two
years. But it is possible to work this out and I think Brazil
will support such an effort.
The President: So where is the ball now?
Eagleburger: The agreement has lapsed. The issue is whether to
bring the parties back together for negotiations. We have some
domestic problems with this. A problem posed by the
differentiation in price between those in the agreement and those
outside it.
Alarcon: The second point is the quality of coffee sold to the
US. The US has argued it does not get enough good coffee under
the quota arrangement. When prices are high the quotas are
adjusted according to some criteria. This problem can be worked
out. There is a promising possibility of agreement.
Eagleburger: We will regroup and see what can be done.
Alarcon: At the negotiations in London the attitude of the US
negotiator is quite positive and open. We expect something
fruitful.
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Bennett: Mr. President I would like for you to hear their report
on the war on drugs. I was encouraged by their briefing.
The President: We are very pleased to have your people here for
these briefings.
Barco: Let me return to the coffee agreement. The President of
the Coffee Federation is in London and things are going well.
Things are working there.
Alarcon: We must continue pushing. You must be flexible in the
negotiations. The key point is that we are sure an agreement can
be reached. We simply must find the formulas.
Londono: The Colombian people think that the actions of the US
on the coffee agreement led to this problem. It is important
that people think the US has not broken the agreement. They must
understand there is US support in this coffee fight. It is
important to support for the war on drugs.
President: I understand. I like what I'm hearing; we will keep
trying.
Londono: The price of Colombian coffee in the last three months
has dropped from a $1.46 per pound to $.80. It constitutes half
of our exports. Whereas there are very large farmers in Brazil,
most of the coffee farmers in Colombia are small farmers. There
are about 3 million of these farmers. If they do not work on
coffee, they will work on coca. We must avoid the coffee
planters going outside the coffee crop. It is important that the
Colombian people understand they are not alone in this fight. We
will lose $500 million in coffee revenues. The US has given $65
million for the drug fight and the contrast between these two is
unpopular. You must understand the psychological impact.
Barco: I am grateful for your letter on the coffee problem.
Colombia will maintain a flexible and constructive attitude to
find solutions to these problems. We hope a middle ground can be
found. The situation is serious. The International Coffee
Organization estimates that the price of coffee will remain at
the current level. Coffee producers worldwide will lose about
$3.7 billion in 1989-90. In Colombia this will be about $500
million, 10% of our total exports. The collapse of the coffee
prices means the loss of about 1% per year in economic growth and
about 500,000 jobs. We are aware of what has to be done for an
agreement. It is not easy. The US has taken an important step
in moving the negotiations forward. We look forward to a
positive dialogue. With good will and determination, we will
succeed.
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Alarcon: Let me give you a quick roundup on the Colombian
economic situation. The whole situation is one of uncertainty,
of people's feelings affecting the economic performance. There
is a slow down in tourism and trade with a negative impact. We
are committed to a healthy economy, not just on coffee but with
respect to Brady -- the flow of financial resources for Colombia
and enhancements in trade discussed with Ambassador Hills. It is
a pity to have a major economic slowdown. Now more than before,
we must maintain a good balance. That is why we are SO
insistent.
President: I understand, especially the situation with respect
to the small farmer.
Sununu: What is your marketing season?
Alarcon: Throughout the year. We have two coffee seasons, but
we manage our crops to maintain a stable level of exports.
Sununu: But is one time of year more important?
Alarcon: Right now. The crops come in in October.
Silva: You need to understand that in Colombia, as in other
countries, the loss of income will increase the pressure on the
US for aid and assistance.
Barco: Our coffee affects 35% of the population.
Alarcon: I attended the IMF meeting and heard your speech. You
addressed the important point of money laundering and that the
industrial countries are fighting against this. It is important
to us too. In the major financial centers, they smuggle cash to
Colombia, where they change it to pesos to finance their
operations. I was happy to hear you address this problem.
Scowcroft: The man in charge of tracking money laundering for
our government is the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. It is
receiving high level attention.
President: The G-7 agreed to do more on money laundering during
our meeting in Paris. I am very serious about cooperating in
every way. We can tighten our intelligence cooperation and the
Attorney General is looking at ways to tighten penalties. We
have a crime package on the Hill that should have a salutary
effect. We will follow up on any leads that you can provide us
and visa versa. If there is any area in which we're not doing
all we can, please contact our Ambassador. These people are very
clever.
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Thornburgh: The first of the criminal defendants has now been
returned to the US and it was a money laundering case. This is
evidence of our determination to interrupt this flow.
President: How is the drug war going? Are we making headway?
Are you optimistic?
Barco: We are beginning to show the terrorists and others that
we can create big problems for them. They are losing control of
areas. We are moving forward. The General here is in charge of
this fight with a special group of national police. I will ask
him briefly to explain the situation. The fight is a difficult
one because of difficult topography. Everyday we improve our
chances to get the heads of these groups.
Munoz: In the anti-drug struggle there are several new factors.
We are very optimistic about the situation in the future. First,
we have put all the resources at our disposal on attacking this
problem. Second, we have given the authorities the legal tools
to wage a more effective effort, for example the extradition
decree. We have enhanced the powers of the judicial police. In
some areas where the drug traffickers were operating freely, they
are no longer doing so. Their former supporters are giving
intelligence to the authorities. The problem is the long term
struggle of weakening their support and the economic well being
of these people. They had an infrastructure in place that
allowed them to move freely, which they are still using.
Although the problem is difficult, the struggle has the strong
support of all agencies, law enforcement and friendly nations.
We have had support from the US -- the Embassy and DEA have
really cooperated enthusiastically, especially with respect to
the exchange of information. They are enthusiastic and willing.
We hope in the near future to resolve the situation.
The President: Listening to President Barco, if we could bust a
major trafficker it would be a big step. Do you believe the
three major traffickers are hiding in Colombia?
Munoz: Intelligence information confirms they are in Colombia,
in the jungle moving around. They are limited in the areas they
can cover. We are gradually making progress.
Barco: It is important to make clear that the population is
losing its fear of providing information. The traffickers have
much less backing from the population.
Sununu: Do you know where they are?
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Barco: More or less. They are in the jungle in the Magdalena
River Valley. You know they had incredible houses, now they are
having to move around.
Bennett: We are showing that they can be moved out.
The President: Can you sustain the extradition decree?
Barco: Let me show you the pamphlets we have had prepared.
Londono: The next days will be important in Colombia. We are
waiting for the Court. It is listing about 15%. We don't know
what the Court will do, but the whole country is waiting. It is
difficult to go to our Congress to fix one law or provide one
solution. At the same time, in the preamble of the Presidential
campaign, the next days, will be important for Colombia as we
determine what are the options for the government.
The President: Is just the US extraditing people, or are other
countries?
McNamara: The Canadians have two possible indictments. The
French have sentenced one man to 20 years. Neither has submitted
requests for extradition yet. In essence, President Barco has
replaced the extradition treaties with a single decree, an
administrative mechanism for extradition which applies to all
countries.
The President: So the Court may say that the decrees are not
valid and then you have to go to the legislature?
Barco: Given the traffickers' power, it would be difficult for
the Congress to approve such legislation.
The President: The congress is afraid?
Alarcon: The traffickers focus their attention on all those who
would affect them and they can put pressure on individual
congressmen.
Sununu: Is the problem with the Supreme Court fear or bribery or
both?
Alarcon: They are always trying to bribe and if the bribes are
not accepted they kill them.
Bennett: There are a number of articles in the law and decrees
the court can cut and paste, pick and choose, which they which to
keep and which they discard.
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Barco: You have a list of 10 to 15 congressmen that is a
problem.
McNamara: President Barco is referring to the supposed existence
of a list of congressmen by the Embassy who have been refused
visas because of their involvement with the drug traffickers.
This is not true. There is no list of those cooperating with the
narco-traffickers.
The President: What do you mean cooperation?
McNamara: Knowingly accepting money from the traffickers. There
is an indictment in the US against one member of the congress.
The President: So this is causing a problem?
Barco: Well, they won't vote for help for the anti-drug fight.
They feel persecuted and unfairly accused.
The President: But if they are guilty, won't they vote for the
narco-traffickers on the legislation anyway? It is difficult to
say they are guilty. They protest their honor.
McNamara: This has a lot to do with the campaign atmosphere. It
is useful politically.
Londono: There are difficult debates in the senate about "black
lists". They will say that because of the blacklist they will
act tough on the traffickers.
Barco: They claim the government has permitted these attacks on
them. Well, we should discuss this.
Silva: It is important to maintain a consensus and it is
fragile. We must avoid a fracture.
McNamara: We will work closer to minimize the importance of
this.
Barco: They are playing for politics.
The President: Do you have time for refreshments?
(During refreshments, Munoz told Scowcroft and Gates that their
specific needs for the anti-drug struggle were 15 additional
helicopters so that they could open three more bases. He said
that Bell helicopters would be best given their maintenance
capability but these were obviously not the only ones they would
accept. He said they also need radar to cover the eastern and
southern part of country, the capability to intercept cellular
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telephone calls among the drug traffickers who are in hiding, and
secure communications for themselves. On a drug summit, Londono
told Scowcroft and Gates that they support a drug summit in
principle, but are concerned that if only the three Andean
countries and the US participate the rest of the world will feel
that these four have accepted worldwide responsibility for the
drug struggle and therefore not be as cooperative.)
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ADD ON 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt
(U)
PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State
(NEA)
Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning,
Department of State
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East
and South Asian Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Egypt
President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Osama al Baz, First Under Secretary of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of
the President's Cabinet for Political Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador
to the U.S.
DATE, TIME
October 2, 1989, 11:00 - 11:45am EDT
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President: It is a good day for us whenever you visit. I
see you are wearing two hats, the OAU and the bilateral. I'd
like to turn the floor over to you; feel free to talk about
multi-national issues or the Middle East, where your role is most
constructive. (U)
President Mubarak: Let's start with the Middle East. You are
familiar with events since we gave the ten points to
Representative Gray to deliver to Prime Minister Shamir. The
substance of our message was to tell Shamir that we don't say no
to elections, but that we need to clarify some issues to be able
to persuade the Palestinians to go along. This was in early
July; by September things began to work. I spoke to Shamir
recently, making clear that my efforts were not in any way
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AS AMENDED
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2000-0429-F 2000
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against his but were only an explanation for Israel's initiative.
I also told him that any negotiation would require the
involvement of Palestinians from outside the West Bank and that
we were ready to suggest good, moderate names. Shamir told me he
would not be ready to respond until after Arens and Peres
returned. He also asked if I can meet with them and I said of
course. Shamir told me that meeting with Rabin was not enough
given the split in the government. I said, "But he is in your
government. I told him I've met other members of his
government, and invited him to bring all the Likud ministers to
Cairo. Arens said that Shamir is sensitive and that it would be
an error to just use Rabin. I am afraid that to meet with Shamir
without a good result would create problems with the Egyptian
public. To help, I phoned Shamir to wish him a happy new year.
I told him I would like to meet but that we would need thorough
preparations to meet expectations. He told me he agreed. I do
not want to have to face my own people without results. Arens
told me that Shamir was pleased with the call. I have no
sensitivity about speaking with Shamir. But he cannot just say
no to everything. I am trying to help him. He raised the issue
of the Saudis and whether they would enter into diplomatic
relations with Israel. I told him that the Saudis are not in a
state of war with either the Soviets or China but they do not
even have diplomatic relations with them. Also, the Saudis are
helping with the peace process, so don't ask for diplomatic
relations. If we make progress, then all this would follow.
($)
The President: Was Shamir making diplomatic relations with the
Saudis a condition for moving ahead? (Z)
President Mubarak: No. But why even raise the Saudis? They are
not the key. Shamir then raised the issue of the Iraqis. I told
him they have no intention to create a problem with the Israelis
or start an offensive action. By the way, Saddam Hussein told me
that the Americans and the CIA are working to overthrow him. ($)
The President: He is crazy. Why would we want to do that? Tell
Saddam you raised this with me and I said so. We don't have a
history of close relations, but we are not out to get him. Why
does he think this? (8)
General Scowcroft: If anything, we are extending a hand to Iraq.
(8)
Secretary Baker: Maybe it is because we are discouraging Iraq
shipping arms to Lebanon. (2)
President Mubarak: We did the same. (2)
The President: We have no beef with Hussein and we are trying to
improve relations. (2)
President Mubarak: He is ready for improved relations. (2)
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The President: He is more reasonable than he used to be. (2)
President Mubarak: I have spoken to him a lot and told him not
to be a problem, and not to exert pressure on his Arab brothers.
He promised me he would not. Then one day we found some
Baathists in Egypt working against our government. I told him
and he was furious. Saddam then told his people never to do this
again against an Arab government -- except for Syria. ($)
The President: I want to raise a few points about the peace
process, that I want you to hear from me. We think your ten
points and efforts are very good. What you have done is strong
and creative. Your role in moderating Arafat is useful; there is
no disconnect between us here. We think we are on the threshold
of a key accomplishment if we can get a dialogue launched. I
like the idea of your issuing invitations to both sides. If we
can help screen names, fine. We need to keep the PLO's
fingerprints invisible. If there is a problem with Shamir we can
reassure him that the dialogue is on the basis of the Israeli
proposal. ($)
President Mubarak: I told him exactly this. (2)
The President: The ten points are not an alternative. (2)
President Mubarak: I said this too. (2)
The President: Palestinians should be able to bring the ten
points to the table. Israel should also be able to bring its own
points to the table. Israel will have to show flexibility on the
matter of the Palestinian delegation, including one or two
deportees. Shamir fears being excluded. We keep hearing this.
Your call helped here but getting him to Cairo could be key. I
met with both Peres and Arens -- this may have exacerbated
Shamir's feelings by the way we did the Peres meeting. I always
hear that I need to shore up Shamir. Again, your phone call
helped and if you could invite him to Cairo it would help. (8)
President Mubarak: We are ready to meet with him but a meeting
with no outcome would be very bad. (2)
The President: If there were a bad outcome, it would be bad, but
there is no need to solve the whole problem if he comes. (2)
President Mubarak: But we need to solve at least part of the
problem. Shamir needs to be flexible, to avoid saying no -- for
example, on land for peace. We are trying to work with the
Palestinians and we need something to work with. (2)
Secretary Baker: What if you could arrange a meeting in Cairo at
which the question of Palestinian representation would be
addressed by the US, Israel and Egypt. Would this be enough?
(2)
President Mubarak: We could work discreetly with them on this
question. (2)
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Secretary Baker: We should not go down the ten points one by one
to see which ones they accept. ()
President Mubarak: I agree. What is important is that they just
don't say no and don't increase our problems with the
Palestinians. The Israelis need to be practical. I reminded
Arens of what Dayan said, a "piece of land for a piece of peace."
Right now, "peace for peace" is not practical. (2)
On Libya, Qadhafi is better than ever before. I am still being
cautious, though. The big problem is Jallud, who gets Qadhafi
upset. The latest news is that Jallud brought Iranian, Syrian
and Palestinian representatives to Libya a month ago.
Fortunately, Qadhafi rejected this anti-Arab coalition after I
talked to him. Jallud is constantly working to upset my
relationship with Qadhafi but Qadhafi is running after me now.
(8)
The President: Why? Is he interested in you because of your OAU
hat? (d)
President Mubarak: No. When we met in Casablanca I was frank
with him. I told him you are alienating everyone with your
terrorism and insults. He said that it was the first time anyone
had ever spoken so frankly with him. (d)
The President: We have the greatest confidence in you and know
you will not be taken in by Qadhafi. We are still not convinced.
Don't let him get his hand in your pocket so he can steal your-
wallet. We always hear he wants better relations with us. (2)
President Mubarak: I told him he must change and stop supporting
terrorism. ()
The President: We have not seen this. (2)
Secretary Baker: Ask him why he still supports Abu Nidal. (8)
President Mubarak: I will. (d)
The President: Just meeting with you gives Qadhafi standing.
This is good for him, but if you lecture him and give him
direction, it is good. ()
President Mubarak: I will meet him again but not in Cairo. If
he behaves badly I will say so publicly. (C)
Mr. Al Baz: He has not moved against the PLO. (2)
The President: What about the Sudan? (d)
President Mubarak: He is acting better. (2)
The President: Chad? (2)
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Mr. Al Baz: We have no illusions that he has converted but he is
acting better. (C)
President Mubarak: In the Sudan he is doing nothing now. (2)
The President: If we see something, we will share it with you.
I don't want to miss some opportunity, but we are still
apprehensive (8) about whether this leopard has changed his spots.
President Mubarak: Let's give him some time; for now I am losing
nothing. (f)
The President: How's Chadli doing? (f)
President Mubarak: He is fed up with Qadhafi. He is asking for
my help. Sudat always spoke nicely to Qadhafi. I don't. When
Qadhafi made some false claims about Sadat in Casablanca I told
him to sit down and not to lecture us like students. After that
I (d) got him to shut up and just sit quietly for the meeting.
(At that point the President and President Mubarak met for a one-
on-one that lasted until about 12:15 p.m.)
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