Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
366551677
label
Presidential Meetings--Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
366551677
contentType
document
title
Presidential Meetings--Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91
citationUrl
identifierLocal
91109-002
collections
Brent Scowcroft Papers
Presidential Correspondence Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
366551677
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
310625d5bdd3765d
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons Files
OA/ID Number:
91109
Folder ID Number:
91109-002
Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 - 9/24/91
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
1
3
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memcon
Re: Oval Office Meeting with President Robert G. Mugabe of
7/24/91
(b)(i)
$
Zimbabwe (4 pp.)
02. Memcon
Re: Plenary Meeting with President Robert G. Mugabe of
7/24/91
(b)(1)
&
Zimbabwe (5 pp.)
03. Memcon
Re: Luncheon Meeting with President Robert G. Mugabe of
7/24/91
(b)(1)
/
Zimbabwe (6 pp.)
04. Memcon
Re: Minutes of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister
7/26/91
(b)(1)
C
Charles of Dominica on July 26, 1991 (6 pp.)
05. Memcon
Re: Expanded Bilateral Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev of the
7/30/91
(b)(
USSR (4 pp.)
06. Memcon
Re: Luncheon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (4
7/30/91
(b)(1)
pp.)
07. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of
7/30/91
(b)(1)
&
Russia (3 pp.)
08. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid
8/1/91
(b)(1)
/
Kravchuk (3 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 - 9/24/91
Pinksheet Number:
cap927
OA/ID Number:
91109-002
Date Closed:
1/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
09. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation with President Abdou Diouf of
9/10/91
(b)
/
Senegal (2 pp.)
10. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal (5 pp.)
9/10/91
(b)(1)
S
11. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Bielecki of Poland (6 pp.)
9/11/91
(b)(I
/
12. Memcon
Re: Minutes of Meeting with Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister
9/13/91
(b)(1)
of
Boutros Ghali (4 pp.)
13. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President dos Santos of Angola (3 pp.)
9/16/91
(b)(1)
/
14a. Memcon
Re: Expanded Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
9/16/91
(b)(
$
Germany (4 pp.)
14b. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (4 pp.)
9/16/91
(b)
&
S
15. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Baltic Presidents (5 pp.)
9/17/91
(b)(I)
/
16a. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru (6 pp.)
9/17/91
(b)(I
16b. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru (6 pp.)
9/17/91
(b)(1)
8
17. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of the
9/23/91
(b)(1
S
United Nations (4 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 9/24/91
Pinksheet Number:
cap927
OA/ID Number:
91109-002
Date Closed:
1/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
18. Memcon
Re: Conversation with Prime Minister Bolger of New Zealand (4
9/23/91
(b)(1)
pp.)
19. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Fernando Collor de Mello, President of the
9/23/91
(b)(1)
Federative Republic of Brazil at UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel,
New York (5 pp.)
20. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin of the
9/24/91
(b)(1)
/
Soviet Union during UNGA (5 pp.)
21. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Oddsson of Iceland (3 pp.)
9/24/91
(b)(1)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 9/24/91
Pinksheet Number:
cap927
OA/ID Number:
91109-002
Date Closed:
1/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5578
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Oval Office Meeting with President Robert G.
Mugabe of Zimbabwe
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert C. Frasure (notetaker)
Robert G. Mugabe, President
Mary Muchada (notetaker)
DATE, TIME
July 24, 1991, 11:00 - 11:25 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President: I want to welcome you here. We have no set
agenda. But if you have a private point to make, please do so.
(U)
I think our bilateral relations are not bad. We have had our ups
and downs. That is inevitable. But it is always useful to clear
the air. I remember your kindness to me in 1982. If there is
any subject you want to raise, please do so. (U)
President Mugabe: I want to express my profound gratitude to
you for this visit and for this opportunity. There is a need for
closer relations in areas of mutual concern. A major area which
I want to discuss is our structural adjustment. This is being
done in an historical context. It is an adjustment from the
colonial situation in which there was an imbalance in society.
(U)
We have accepted that we have a multi-racial society. We want to
sustain that fact. White standards are up. Some Blacks have
been raised to that level. We need to get more up there. (U)
We need to develop an economy with an open market system. We
need your inputs. We have received U.S. aid in the past and hope
we can be treated in a slightly more special way. (U)
We are forging a society as a model for South Africa. If we
fail, I don't know what will happen there. (U)
We are glad our relations with the Whites are close. We don't
want to send out any Anglo Saxons. We are very close. They are
rooted in Zimbabwe.
(C)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/09 no
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
The President: Do most of your Whites live in the countryside?
(U)
President Mugabe: They are both urban and rural. Some are in
farming. Most are in urban areas. They run factories. We need
to have their help in expanding jobs. (U)
The President: Yes, there is a world recession. I was talking
to a Congressman the other day from Mississippi -- one of our
poorest states -- and he said to me that you don't understand the
people, that they are hurting. Your interests are abroad, he
said. (U)
I'm hoping our economy is coming out of it. But it is not as
strong as it should be. (U)
President Mugabe: That was the main subject I wanted to raise.
(U)
The President: Have your economic guys come along with you? (U)
President Mugabe: Not Chidzero. He had to stay to do our budget
presentation tomorrow. (U)
The President: It's lucky you are out of town! (U)
President Mugabe: He must defend it. (U)
The President: Should we talk about South Africa in the Cabinet
Room? (U)
President Mugabe: I am full of praise for how the U.S. has
handled it. You have relaxed sanctions. You had a commitment to
do so when certain conditions were met. We appreciate that you
still demand that human rights be observed and that some
sanctions remain in place. (U)
The President: We are not washing our hands of it. (U)
President Mugabe: There has been a wave of violence. (U)
The President: Terrible, terrible. Who is to blame for it? (U)
President Mugabe: Much of it is Black on Black. But the
government took advantage of it. (U)
Let me mention two sensitive points, first, Angola. te)
President dos Santos of Angola asked me to express his
appreciation to U.S. for its help in the Angola peace process.
Secondly, he would like to visit in September. Thirdly, he says
the American representative in Luanda is not playing a fair role.
(C)
The President: I don't know whether it is fair or not.
(C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Dos Santos has come a long way.
(C)
We are favorably disposed to him. We don't want to undermine
him. We don't want to send a signal that he is not appreciated.
SET
We would like to invest more there. Can we do that? (C)
Mr. Frasure: We will probably need to have a democratic
government in place first. There are certain prohibitions.
(C)
President Mugabe: My second point is that I have Mengistu now in
Zimbabwe. It is a real shocker for us. I talked to him, and he
gave me the whole history of Ethiopia, of the Arabs trying to
take over. (C)
He said he had appealed to the U.S. to mediate. It was decided
by his ministers that he should step down. He was told that, if
he left, there would be a peace process and no secession of
Eritrea. (c)
Mengistu said that, as soon as he left, the U.S. called on the
Tigrayans to go into Addis Ababa. There was no attempt to get
peace.
He asked if it is still the view of the U.S. that Ethiopia is one
country. He is grieved at the killing. (C)
Mengistu asked me to raise this with you. Is President Bush
interested in Ethiopia? Why do the Americans hate me?
The President: There is a long history there. Now the shoe is
on the other foot. Mengistu was very anti-American. He cast his
lot with the other great power.
(C)
There was a bad relationship and a lot of it was personal.
(C)
Mr. Frasure? Do you want to speak to this point? (U)
Mr. Frasure: With respect, President Mugabe, Mengistu is not
being straight with you. (c)
We did try to arrange a provisional government. We were trying
to do that in London after Mengistu fled the country. We were on
the verge of an agreement when things fell apart in Addis. Even
people from the successor regime felt the other side should come
into Addis to maintain order. We concurred with Democratic Front
forces to go into Addis. (C)
On Eritrea, it is a very tough problem. The fact is that the
other side won a thirty year war and controls the place. Ideally
we would like a united Ethiopia. But the situation on the ground
is something we don't control. It here is a referendum in two
years, we and others will have to respect the results. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
LUNF IUENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President: If Mengistu liked the United States, he had a
funny way of showing it. (C)
We didn't want to get in over our heads there. But we do want a
presence. LET
Where is Mengistu living now? In Harare? (U)
President Mugabe: We gave him a guest house. We took him in.
(U)
The President: We should try to calm that situation. (U)
President Mugabe: You have my letter on Chidzero. (U)
The President: A good man! Baker knows him well. He is well
regarded. But we are not behind any one candidate. (C)
It is Africa's turn. We are open minded. Will Chidzero get
African support? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes, I think so. (U)
The President: Shall we go next door? (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5579
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Plenary Meeting with President Robert G.
Mugabe of Zimbabwe
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
and National Security Advisor
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Jeffrey Davidow, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs
Robert C. Frasure, NSC Director for African
Affairs (Notetaker)
Robert G. Mugabe, President
Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Denis Norman, Minister of Transport and
National Supplies
Elleck Mashingaidze, Commissioner of Public
Services
Nicholas Goche, MFA Deputy Secretary
Stanislaus Chigwedere, Zimbabwean Ambassador
to the U.S.
Mary Muchada, President's Secretary
(Notetaker)
DATE, TIME
July 24, 1991, 11:25 a.m. - 12:05 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
The President: I want to welcome you all, and I would be pleased
to open the discussion. Secretary Baker is not with us. He is
travelling. We do have Larry Eagleburger. (U)
We can talk about Africa and any other subject. I would be happy
to talk about the Summit. But I hate the word "summit." It
sounds like you are excluding others. (U)
London went well. There was a common desire to do more for
Africa. We have to be sure that the voracious appetite of the
Soviet Union does not blank out others. (C)
There is the arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. (U)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
CONFIDENTIAL
2000-0429-F
8/21/09 no
LUNT IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
I don't want Africans to think that we are not going to deal with
their demands. (U)
I see an old friend Denis Norman over there. (U)
Mr. President? (U)
President Mugabe: I want to thank you for the visit. I
appreciate your kind invitation. It is an expression of
friendship and solidarity for us. (U)
You are people whom we have worked with in the past. We had your
support before independence. We had U.S. aid after independence.
Generally we have had good relations, but there have been ups and
downs. And they plummeted in 1986, turned sour. (C)
Our relations are now at a very high level. We want to maintain
them. (U)
We are embarked on a structural adjustment program. The Paris
Conference was a start. The U.S. has aided us on agriculture,
education and health. We hope that will be intensified. (U)
Ours is a peculiar society. We are multi-racial. The Whites
have high standards. The Blacks are aspiring to it. We have
educational opportunity for all. But the youths in the streets
are unemployed and demanding. Jobs are necessary. They are
needed. (U)
We want a transformation of our system. We appreciate the
inherited infrastructure. Mining is developed. Agriculture is
developed in some areas. We want investment by our people and by
others. (U)
We want $16 billion over five years; $3.5 billion of that would
come from outside the country. (c)
We must redress our shortcomings, the wrongs we imposed on the
economy. (U)
For example, we had limitation on labor. We didn't have full
flexibility. We want an open market system, competition, an
opening up. We appealed to the U.S. to help us. We want the
U.S. as a partner. (U)
One question, I want to raise is the region, South Africa, Angola
and Mozambique. (C)
The Angolans appreciate the U.S. role in helping a resolution of
the crisis. Dos Santos is happier now. The movement didn't come
until U.S. intervention. (e)
But Mozambique is a different situation. The other negotiating
partner unlike UNITA doesn't have a political culture. Renamo
doesn't appreciate things as UNITA did. They need pressure. (c)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNT
CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: What do you mean? (U)
President Mugabe: Renamo doesn't understand how to negotiate.
They don't understand that you cannot go back on points once you
agree on them. SCT
The President: Is Renamo solid enough that they can deal? Is it
one person or a lot of groups? J
President Mugabe: They were created by the Rhodesians to get
back at Samora Machel for helping us. (CT
At independence, Rhodesia handed it over to South Africa. It is
not the same category as UNITA. Djakalma doesn't seem to know
what to do. He doesn't have politically motivated people. It is
a cruel exercise. (c)
The President: I have a question on the economic program. What
should we be doing? Are U.S. firms investing? (U)
President Mugabe: We want U.S. aid. We want you to raise it, to
make it more sizeable. In the first place, it is the volume.
(U)
And there is a role for the private sector. There are about
fifty U.S. companies in Zimbabwe. Union Carbide is there in
chrome mining. They are working on expansion into other
minerals. (U)
The President: Is there a demand for chrome? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes. There is still a great demand. (U)
The President: Who produces it? You and the Soviet Union? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes. And South Africa. (U)
The U.S. needs to assure investors that the environment is safe.
We want that. That is why we signed the OPIC agreement. (U)
Previously we were suspicious of OPIC. Then we found out it was
only an assurance. (U)
The President: OPIC is very important. What were your concerns?
(U)
President Mugabe: From Latin America. Governments which
nationalized companies were dealt with ruthlessly. (U)
But we examined it. And discover that in the event of a takeover
it just meant compensation. So we decided to do it. (U)
The President: I'm sure that has helped. (U)
Acting Secretary of State Mr. Eagleburger: OPIC has done
remarkable things in Eastern Europe. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
UNIT IDEN
CONFIDENTIAL
4
President Mugabe: Yes. (U)
Heinz came in at a time when we were doubtful about OPIC. So we
did a bilateral agreement with Heinz. Now we are prepared for
OPIC too, which we think is better than a bilateral agreement.
(U)
The President: How is your agricultural sector. It is
important, isn't it? (U)
President Mugabe: It is expanding. It has been affected by
drought. We had good rainfall this year. But here have been
droughts in six or seven of the last eleven years. (U)
Our commercial agriculture is labor intensive; tobacco, cotton
and maize. (U)
The communal agriculture by the peasants produces mainly the same
crops. It is doing very well except for the rainfall. (U)
But there is more scope for development in agriculture. Lots of
capital is needed. It is the mainstay of our economy. (U)
The President: Are you self-sufficient in food? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes. But we only raise about two-thirds of
the wheat that we need. So we do swaps with USAID for wheat and
they provide our maize to Zambia. (U)
We have cattle ranching. We provide beef for the Common Market.
(U)
The President: Are there any questions? (U)
Assistant Secretary of State Cohen: At least three U.S.
corporations say they will now invest in Zimbabwe. The one-stop
investor center you have set up will strengthen things. As you
know, bureaucrats resist things. (U)
The President: The whole world over! (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: You should see OPIC as a
resource to find investors. (U)
Minister Norman: Let me mention one thing on investment. We get
inquires from American companies considering Zimbabwe as a hub
for the region. (U)
The President: That is interesting. As a hub for what
countries? (U)
President Mugabe: Mozambique, east and southern Africa. (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: You should let the
embassy know about them so that we can follow up. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
LUNF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5
The President: Shall we go on on over and have some lunch? And
continue the discussion. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5587
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Luncheon Meeting with President Robert G.
Mugabe of Zimbabwe
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
and National Security Advisor
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Jeffrey Davidow, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs
Robert C. Frasure, NSC Director for African
Affairs (Notetaker)
Robert G. Mugabe, President
Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Denis Norman, Minister of Transport and
National Supplies
Elleck Mashingaidze, Commissioner of Public
Services
Nicholas Goche, MFA Deputy Secretary
Stanislaus Chigwedere, Zimbabwean Ambassador
to the U.S.
Mary Muchada, President's Secretary
(Notetaker)
DATE, TIME
July 24, 1991, 12:05 - 1:15 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Old Family Dining Room
The President: Let's turn to South Africa. As you know, we
think the process is irreversible. How do you see the internal
scene? (U)
President Mugabe: I don't think Mandela is prepared to sit down
now and talk because of the violence. We want to see
negotiations for a new constitution. We want to see a unitary
system. We want to see democracy. So we want negotiations
sooner rather than later. SCT
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: I think the ANC should
enter negotiations now when the government is embarrassed. ()
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONF IDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAI
2000-0429-F
3r 8/21/09
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
President Mugabe: I agree. The ANC shouldn't refuse to
negotiate on a constitution. Political prisoners and other
issues can be addressed by democracy.
There will be a meeting in Abuja to monitor all of this. (C)
The President: How are your relations with Buthelezi? (Q)
President Mugabe: They don't exist. LET
We were in college together at Fort Hare. (U)
But because of the Bantustan system we haven't had relations. I
had been thinking of calling him but the incidents of the last
few weeks have prevented that.
The President: It's a setback. (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: It's essential that they
get together. (c)
President Mugabe: Yes. I agree. But I think that the National
Party needs an ally and sees that in Buthelezi. (C)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Angola is going quite
well, isn't it? (e)
President Mugabe: Yes, we are sending in some people to help.
(C)
The President: We were talking about dos Santos earlier. He is
coming here, I believe. Are there any special events coming up
in the implementation? (c)
Assistant Secretary of State Cohen: No. It is more of a
continuing process. (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Mozambique is not moving
well at all, is it? (C)
President Mugabe: No. We have been talking to the team in Rome.
The Church team is disillusioned by Renamo.
(C)
The President: Is there lots of violence there? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes. (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: We have no influence on
Renamo. (c)
Mr. Norman: Do they still have an office here? (U)
Assistant Secretary of State Cohen: No. They did. They still
have friends here. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: You know that some conservatives here once
thought Renamo was some kind of friend of democracy. Then the
torture reports came out. And some people at Heritage and
elsewhere woke up. SCT
What about the Secretary Generalship? How is support shaping up
in Africa? For Chidzero? (U)
President Mugabe: It's very supportive. We want to see more.
We will be discussing it at Abuja. SCT
The President: Are you confident that Africa will narrow its
list? (U)
President Mugabe: Yes. (U)
The President: Who is the Ghanaian? (U)
President Mugabe: Ken Dadzie. (U)
The President: Is Boutros Ghali in now? Is he active? (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Yes. (U)
The President: In September will the Africans at the UN get
behind your man?
(E)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: The Nigerians have put
forward Obasanjo? (U)
President Mugabe: Reluctantly. They really didn't want their
former President who is really a former General heading the UN.
()
The President: That is understandable. But there is the feeling
that Africa hasn't had its turn. Perez de Cuellar has done a
good job but he doesn't want to stay on. (ct
President Mugabe: Can we talk about the Middle East? 16t
We had a principle of friendship with Iraq. But we couldn't
countenance the violence, the aggression against Kuwait. We had
some sympathy with Iraq in the war with Iran. But we were
shocked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
SQT
The situation has been redressed, and we are happy about that.
SCT
We are glad that you have moved on to the Palestinian question.
We are especially concerned by the suffering of the Lebanese
people. iCT
We can appreciate the approach of the U.S. We can support it.
But I could use a little more information.
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President: On the first point -- Iraq -- we are terribly
concerned on this nuclear issue, but we don't wait to get
reengaged.
ACT
Saddam has violated the peace accord. I still feel very strongly
about this. Our problem is with Saddam Hussein. We will have no
normal relations with Iraq until he is gone. Saddam has diverted
his nuclear material and tried to hide it. He has diverted
relief food and medicine to his home area.
I don't trust him! (U)
I said during the war we would address the Palestinian question.
(U)
Our approach is take into consideration very carefully the views
of the region to use in conjunction with the relevant UN
resolutions.
(e)
The Arabs have said they will release the boycott if the Israelis
end the settlements. We agree with that. The settlements go
right to the heart of rightwing politics in Israel.
(C)
The Arabs are ready to go to a conference. (U)
The U.S. and the USSR are going to stay together on this. (U)
The Europeans are feeling a little whipped at the moment.
(C)
The question is which Palestinian representatives. Arafat
behaved so badly in the war. It would be difficult to include
him.
(C)
We want Jordan to come forward with the Palestinians. Hussein
said he would go. Then he said he wouldn't. (C)
We are a little bit optimistic. There is a lot of pressure on
Shamir. People here will get concerned with Israel. (C)
Have I left out anything significant, Larry? (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: No, Mr. President. You
never leave out anything significant. It's saying things like
that, keep getting invited back to lunch. (U)
There is a solid front against Israel on this issue without it
looking like that.
President Mugabe: But the Palestinians are the real question.
The PLO claims that Shamir will not accept people from areas that
matter. We have stressed the need to be flexible.
(C)
Arafat stressed the need for a flexible stance by the
Palestinians.
(C)
CONFIDENTIAL
COM
CONFIDENTIAL
5
General Scowcroft: But he has been getting hard on the issue
lately. (C)
President Mugabe: Is that so? (U)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: He fears he is being
marginalized. SET
President Mugabe: He probably wants some time to pass after the
Iraq war. Mubarak told me that people in the street don't want
Arafat anymore because of the war. (ET
The President: Arafat has a lot of fence mending to do in the
Gulf. Jordan is doing that. (c)
Can Arafat be cut out it? 70
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: No, not out of it. But
Shamir is badly positioned too. The rightwing may leave the
coalition. Shamir may have to rely on Labor votes to keep in
power. Labor would be prepared to do that for peace. (c)
Over time the Israelis may be prepared to come forward. (C)
General Scowcroft: I'm not quite so optimistic. The Palestinian
issue gives Israel room to play. (C)
There are four kinds of Palestinians; the PLO, the West Bank,
East Jerusalem, and others outside Israel. (c)
The issue is really East Jerusalem and others. (C)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: But you must admit,
Brent, it has gotten a lot further than you and I would have
thought. fe)
General Scowcroft: That's true. Assad saw the opportunity and
put Israel on the defensive. (C)
The President: How is it seen in your part of the world? (c)
President Mugabe: We are struck by the intransigence of Shamir.
We have supported the PLO in the past. But on Iraq, he was
wrong. LCT
The PLO, however, is still a force. But how do you get the
Palestinians to speak with one voice. (C)
The President: It's a problem. (C)
You know I think that Saddam convinced Arafat that we wouldn't
fight. He miscalculated. He remembered things like Vietnam.
(C)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Even if we get a
conference, it is only a beginning. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNI IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
President Mugabe: What is Shamir's solution?
(C)
The President: He doesn't have one. Shamir will have to yield
on territory.
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Shamir is a kind of
Scarlet O'Hara when it comes to decisions. He is a decision
maker who puts it off as long as possible. He is faced with it.
He realizes he must make a decision.
The President: The people in Israel want it. Labor wants it.
He can stand up against the right if he wants to. (C)
Governor Sununu: Have you talked to the PLO? (C)
President Mugabe: Yes, in Tunis recently. They told me they are
not moving away from the UN conference. A regional conference is
not enough. Secondly, the emphasis should not be on peace
between countries but it deals with the Palestinian question.
They are prepared to be flexible even on Palestinian
representatives in that case.
Why did Hussein get it wrong on the Gulf?
(C)
The President: There are two schools of thought -- the spoils of
war promised by Saddam or the pressure of fundamentalism.
Mubarak says spoils of war, oil. They promised them to him too.
(C)
President Mugabe: I thought he might have been afraid of Saddam.
(C)
Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: He misjudged the U.S.
(C)
The President: Hussein saw us flop around in other situations.
(C)
Shall we go on outside? (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04. Memcon
Re: Minutes of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister
7/26/91
(b)(1)
C
Charles of Dominica on July 26, 1991 (6 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
(Copy of Document Follows)
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By Col (NLGB) on 10/7/10
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 - 9/24/91
Date Closed:
1/28/2009
OA/ID Number:
91109-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0429-F(364)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
8/21/2009
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENTIAL
5672
THE WHITE HOUSE
BUSH
503
+ Dupot LIBRARY
WASHINGTON
00-0429 -F
#364
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the President's Meeting with Prime
Minister Charles of Dominica on July 26, 1991
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
G. Philip Hughes, U.S. Ambassador to
Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)
Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica
DATE, TIME
July 26, 1991, 10:30 - 10:50 A.M. EDT
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
The meeting opened with a friendly banter with the press where
the President reiterated a practice of not talking to the press
during photo opportunities. (U)
Prime Minister Charles: I remember you (to Helen Thomas, Dean of
Press Corps). (U)
Helen Thomas: We remember you well from Grenada. (U)
(Meeting officially starts)
The President: I had a talk with Prime Minister Manley not long
ago. I have great respect for him. I think that he is trying
very hard. (U)
Prime Minister Charles: I think he is doing well, if he can just
get the people to follow him. (f)
The President: He has taken a courageous leadership position and
we hope he will succeed. But how are things coming in Dominica?
How is the economy? (X)
PERECLASSIFIEDAS DECLASSIFIED IN MENDED DECLASSIFE,AS AS AMENDED
CONFIDENTIAL
or 8/21/2009
Declassify on: OADR
2000-0429-F
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Prime Minister Charles: Well not very well. We will only have a
4.1 percent growth rate this year instead of 7.5 percent. (C)
The President: Like to trade? (Laughter) (Z)
Prime Minister Charles: Well, this will cause us some trouble,
but it really is not that bad. (C)
The President: Seems to me that it is pretty good. (U)
Prime Minister Charles: We have strong opposition, which is
giving us some problems. (X)
The President: You had a confidence vote I think not long ago,
how did it go? ()
Prime Minister Charles: We won by one vote. They thought that
with all the internal discussions within our party that some of
ours would go over to them. But, no, that was not going to
happen. We have our own talks but I think the people felt that
you can't do anything for your country on the other side. I
think the person who they were thinking of will be with us. (C)
The President: When . was that confidence vote? (U)
In April? (U)
Prime Minister Charles: They are always making noises, but not
about the right things. We had a budget and I sent it up fifteen
days ahead and they walked out in protest. (X)
The President: Eugenia, what happened in Grenada? How is that
working out? (f)
Prime Minister Charles: They are all convicted. They will be
hanged. This is supposed to happen in August. Whether the
government will have the strength to hang them, I'm not sure,
but the people want them hanged. I think it's fourteen out of
the seventeen that were sentenced to be hanged. I said if you
want to send them over to me and we'll hang them. Mr. Bishop
says they must be hanged. (2)
The President: When do things happen? Is there a date? (X)
Ambassador Hughes: They appealed their sentence under the law
and the appeal has been upheld. (X)
The President: What is the next step? (d)
Prime Minister Charles: The order will be sent to the Governor-
General who will listen to the recommendation of the Prime
Minister. (C)
The President: What are the issues we should talk about? What
can we do to help? I know that there is a problem with an
airport. (φ)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Prime Minister Charles: Well that is one reason we are here.
(U)
The President: Isn't there some talk about how this could come
about? (C)
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We are having lunch with Prime
Minister Charles, Bernie and I and she will have a chance to beat
up on both of us. (U)
The President: Well, we would like to be helpful. (U)
Assistant Secretary Aronson: We have checked and we think the
figures would make it possible to do a little bit of assistance
in August. (C)
Prime Minister Charles: We've had considerable experience in
trying to move this project. It is difficult because of the
earth which was to be moved. I was hoping that we could have
some help from National Guards units in the United States. (f)
The President: Maybe it would be possible to do something on
moving ground with the National Guard. (f)
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Governor Sununu says that maybe
this would be possible. (2)
The President: The National Guards are under the control of the
Governors and they would want to control the activities to a
certain extent. Probably couldn't have them for a year, and they
would want to have some control. (X)
Governor Sununu: We wouldn't get them for a whole year, but
perhaps in groups at different periods of time. We could talk to
the Governors about this. (f)
Prime Minister Charles: I know that we could not do that.
Perhaps we could have three groups, one at a time. I would like
to say that there is a real problem. At the airport we are only
three minutes from 500 foot mountains. It is important for our
diversification to broaden our economy. But you can't for
example rely on sending cut flowers for shipment because it is
too undependable. (f)
The President: We worked out a difficult situation on cut
flowers with Colombian, didn't we? ()
Assistant Secretary Aronson and Mr. Pryce: Yes, we did.
(U)
The President: We are off to Moscow to try to ease tension. We
will sign a START agreement. I think this is important. I
mention this because I think people from various countries,
especially youth appreciate the signing of the agreement. This
will lessen the tension in the world in which they live. And it
should be helpful in the Soviet Union. I think they spend about
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
four times as much of their gross national products on armaments
as we do, don't they? (e)
Governor Sununu: Yes I think so, we spend about 5 percent, they
spend 20 percent. (φ)
The President: There is an economic impact for others in the
Soviet Union of this approach, and there are people in the Soviet
Union who are still suspicious of us, who want to continue
producing weapons and not reduce them. They have an interest in
maintaining the old ideas. Gorbachev has to deal with the people
on his right. There are people who still think that they should
emphasize armaments. There are people who still think the United
States has aggressive intentions. Brian Mulroney handled this
with Gorbachev very well. He looked down toward the United
States and said well, there is New York. And Gorbachev wondered
what he was talking about. Mulroney said do you know how much of
a border we have with the United States? Gorbachev said no.
Mulroney said well, it is about six thousand miles. And Mulroney
then asked do you know how many troops we have on the border?
Gorbachev said no. Mulroney said none. He said if the United
States was an aggressive power and had aggressive intentions, why
would they go to the Soviet Union, if they could go just right
north where there are 24 million people with a good economy. I
think that the more we can do to lessen tensions, the better off
all the world will be. (X)
Prime Minister Charles: Well, I think that the Communist groups
have made a mess of things wherever they are. (φ)
The President: It was interesting in Greece, I spoke to the
Parliament. There you can tell how the people feel, and who is
with and who is not with the government. People not with the
government literally sit on their hands and those in favor of the
government clap loudly and wildly. There was a Communist group
there; there was a woman who was rather plain but not
unattractive sitting there listening, but behind her were about
ten people who looked like Old Line Communists who had come out
of central casting. They were so stern and sinister looking and
they were the Stalinists. (e)
And look at Gorbachev, what's he saying now, "we don't want any
Communists in this party any more." (&)
Prime Minister Charles: That is why we are recognizing North
Korea. I told them that we don't like you as much as South Korea
but we' 11 have relations. They don't like me much. I told them
that I will come and visit you when you give us as much as south
Korea. They don't like me.
(b) (1)
(b) (1)
The President: Well, there may be some change in North Korea;
it's happening all over the world. Look at Mongolia, see how
things have changed there since you and I last talked. (Ø)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5
Prime Minister Charles: I told them, "I'm not going to see you.
You have been destroying young people and I hope that you will
give your people more freedom. (C)
The President: Do you think they will do something? (X)
Prime Minister Charles: I hope so. We won't go until they do.
(C)
The President: How is your friend Fidel doing? (U)
Prime Minister Charles: He will be the last Communist around.
My feeling is that the Cubans won't change. We refuse to talk to
them because they give scholarships which require indoctrination.
Now they go through Paris, which means that you can't require
Marxism-Leninism as part of the educational program; we are
getting somewhere on this. (d)
The President: Do you find the Cubans are more outgoing in
meetings? (Ø)
Prime Minister Charles: They talk to you one-on-one, but in
their groups there are always one or two people who are not what
they seem to be.
(b) (1)
You should ask
Gorbachev to do this. (2)
The President: Castro may not want to go. We may never get him
to open up the economy. He looks scared. (C)
Assistant Secretary Aronson: He wishes but. (e)
The President: But get C. and C. But they could help with the
Communists. (C)
You don't have a major drug problem. (Q)
Prime Minister Charles: We have just had a major bust. The
(U.S.) Coast Guard did a fine job. (e)
The President: Was this a transit? ()
Prime Minister Charles: Yes, but a little bit stayed behind. We
had a call and we didn't know where they hid it. We are very
keen on getting rid of cocaine. (e)
The President: Are you having to spend a lot on rehabilitation?
(2)
Prime Minister Charles: Not so much, but it's a real problem.
When we captured the twelve drug suspects, we had to put them in
the prison and four of our other prisoners escaped during the
process. We have a prison system where we are trying to get our
prisoners to work and we are paying them, but only at the end of
their term. Some people say they should be paid while they are
there but they will simply send their money to their families,
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
and they won't have anything when they get out, and their
families will be encouraging them to stay in jail. So I say pay
them when they leave. (2)
The President: Encouraging self reliance, I see. I hope they
become readjusted. ()
How are things shaping up for the future? (e)
Prime Minister Charles: I could run again in 1995, but I don't
intend to. We don't have a strong party. I'll retire and I'll
look after the party. (C)
The President: Will there be a successor to you? (2)
Prime Minister Charles: There is a person that I have in mind.
I think we need a younger person. I've talked about retiring
early so that I can press the buttons. I'll need to get the
right successor. (2)
There are a number of things that I want to get done before I
leave. I want the airport and a new sewage system and there are
three or four things I would like to do before I get finished.
(C)
The President: Well, it has certainly been wonderful to see you
and I know that you'l have a good lunch with Larry and Bernie
and talk about the airport and other things. (e)
(Meeting begins to break up)
The President: One of the things I hope you know and that I've
tried to make known is that as I'm off on other problems and I
think Eagleburger is the same, I don't want people to think that
I am forgetting Latin America, for I am not. I know that Carlos
Andres Perez used to worry about that. I have continuing
interests here in the Hemisphere and particularly in the
Caribbean, and I hope people know that. (X)
Prime Minister Charles: I think they do. Some people will
always criticize but I think most people know. (C)
--- End of Conversation ---
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
0096
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Expanded Bilateral Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev
of the USSR (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance
PER E.O. 13526
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
2005-1153-MR
Economic Affairs and Counselor
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
3 7/6/11
Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs,
NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Interpreter
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakh SSR
Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister of USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Foreign Minister
Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of Armed
Forces
Valeriy Boldin, Chief of Staff
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Advisor to the President
Aleksey Obukhov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Viktor Komplektov, USSR Ambassador to the US
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 30, 1991, 12:55 - 1:22pm
AND PLACE:
St. Catherine's Hall, Kremlin
President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you. I understand we will
be having lunch soon. (U)
I am satisfied with the visit. We've already talked about a wide
range of issues. (U)
First, I want to say that I am prepared to develop relations, and
to fill them with a new quality. This is our choice. This is
the Soviet leadership line.
(C)
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2
We will return to this question tomorrow in the fresh air of Novo
Ogarevo to ponder where we stand and act in this situation.
()
As I said on the eve of the meeting in the U.S., if the
relationship becomes weaker, we will defend it. It is important.
We have a joint interest in cooperation, in Europe, and
elsewhere.
You can act on the assumption that this is our choice. It meets
the long-term interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
()
Second, Mr. President, I explained the peculiarities of
developments in the USSR. I am grateful to you for your
interest. I consider it the wish of the President of the United
States to understand our reality. I see interest based on a
search for ways to cooperate today.
()
This is not an easy matter. The questions you raised enable me
to say our partnership is growing. We are trying to understand
each other better.
()
We also discussed economic cooperation. We want to depend much
more on the U.S. in economic terms -- not slavishly or out of
weakness. We want to develop and build our relationship. We
should be predictable for you. When countries are linked by
economic cooperation at a certain level, they become more
predictable.
()
It might seem a paradox that we want to depend more on you -- but
that's our line.
()
We discussed in the one-on-one the subject of "great" projects,
which can only be done with the participation of the U.S. These
are concrete proposals.
()
We are awaiting those delegations you discuss in your letter
[before the London G-7 meeting -- EH]. But I remind you, there
are [also] some issues of great importance for us: 1.) large
projects, and 2.) convertibility. I discussed this with the
President, and we agreed to work on it at the expert level.
()
Also, as I told you in London, it is important that we have
cooperation. But we are hampered by restrictions on your part.
I would like to return to that topic.
()
I advanced an idea. We need to earn money to pay back for
services we receive from you. We want, for example, machinery
for the food industry. We cannot, however, pay you with the
additional food we produce. You don't need more food. The money
must come from other sources.
()
We need to link cooperation in areas such as food production with
space research, defense conversion, etc. We could develop liquid
hydrogen engines. Your experts like our technology there. Or,
we could launch satellites, which is a $12 billion market.
SECRET
SECRET
3
There are probably other areas. The remnants of the Cold War
need to be eliminated.
Nazarbayev will discuss the Chevron project. We will find a
solution.
President Nazarbayev: This is the greatest project in U.S.-
soviet relations such as there has never been before. We should
develop it. We've just solved all the problems. One mistake --
we started the project during the Russian presidential campaign.
Everyone used it the wrong way.
Three days ago, we had talks with the Executive Director of
Chevron and the President. We started with fifteen outstanding
commercial questions, all identified by expert committees. We
have now narrowed that down to four.
(S)
President Gorbachev: Are you optimistic?
President Nazarbayev: Yes. I am confident we will succeed.
President Gorbachev: I ask once again in the presence of the
delegation that the President instruct them to consider
membership [for the USSR] in the IMF. I have big problems in the
next 1-2 years. Call us what you like -- "associate members,"
"half associate members.' It is important for us to use that
fund.
(S)
So, I express satisfaction with the beginning of our discussions,
as we are raising major issues of discussion.
()
The President: Thank you. I know we are short of time. I would
like to offer a few brief comments before lunch. (U)
First, U.S. -Soviet cooperation does not run counter to our
interests. What we are talking about with the Soviet Union is in
our interest.
Second, I agree that the partnership is growing. Your
willingness to welcome our administration people -- Agriculture
and Treasury -- is important. They can work out the details, for
example, on the IMF and the World Bank.
Third, I am grateful to the military for their hospitality to
Colin Powell. That kind of military exchange is useful. It
reduces the chance of surprises.
Fourth, on IFI's, just one word. Associate membership is not an
effort to put down the USSR. The Soviet economy is SO
potentially enormous, and facing enormous problems, that it
requires special handling. It could dominate other countries.
(C)
We' talking about exactly what you want, without the burden of
full membership. Everyone has the right to apply.
SECRET
SECRET
4
Fifth, in response to President Nazarbayev. I am not here to
carry water for Chevron. I do believe that, given the size of
the deal and of the potential dollar earnings, we should move it
forward. It would open doors for other investors. One billion
dollars. Take fifty of those, and you have a significant
investment.
()
I am delighted to hear that you have found a solution. This deal
is in the interest of the U.S.
Sixth, on projects. We'll look over the specific projects you
raised. We can talk later about what we are doing -- the trade
agreement, MFN, Stevensen and Byrd.
We will help. I approach this in terms of what is in the
interest of the U.S. But what is good for the U.S. is good for
you.
President Gorbachev: I am sure mutual interest will advance our
cooperation. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
-
SECRET
0096
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Luncheon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the
USSR (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for
DECLASSIFIED
Security Assistance
PER E.O. 13526
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs and Counselor
2005-1153-MR
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
3 7/6/11
Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs,
NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Interpreter
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakh SSR
Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister of USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Foreign Minister
Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of Armed
Forces
Valeriy Boldin, Chief of Staff
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Advisor to the President
Aleksey Obukhov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Viktor Komplektov, USSR Ambassador to the US
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 30, 1991, 1:28 - 2:07pm
AND PLACE:
Official Residence Dining Hall, Kremlin
Secrtary Baker: President Nazarbayev, what are the four
outstanding issues in the Chevron deal?
(S)
President Nazarbayev: The fifteen areas were reduced to four by
negotiation. Now there is criticism of this deal because it is
supposedly contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union, mainly
because profits are too high.
($)
First, the rate of return is 27.9 percent, while Chevron gets 22
percent world-wide.
(S)
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2
Second, there is the issue of royalties. President Bush and
Secretary Baker know the oil industry - 7.5 percent royalties are
too low.
Third, the Soviet Union has spent $850 million developing the
Tengize oil field. The U.S. side owes us 50 percent of that sum.
Chevron has agreed to that.
Fourth, this is a rich, complex oil field. In addition to oil,
there are by products, for example, one million tons of sulphur,
as well as polyethylene. We want Chevron to help us attract
other companies to develop those products, since Chevron is
clearly reluctant to develop them.
This is a huge deal: twenty-five years, renewable up to forty.
Over the first forty years the total revenues will be $169
billion, from an investment of $86 billion, with a new profit of
$65 billion.
President Gorbachev: In general, the negotiations are going
"normally." There is nothing insurmountable.
()
The President: This is very helpful, very interesting. It is
difficult to pin profits down to dollars and cents. To a degree,
a deal is a deal, and the contract should go forward. Holding to
that principle will attract business. They feel that they had a
deal, then a committee was formed. I am glad to hear it is on
the way to being resolved.
(
How do we attract capital? When we say there is a deal, then
there is a deal.
(C)
We' re not lecturing. I don't have all the answers. Even in our
country, businesses have problems with bureaucracy.
President Gorbachev: As the Secretary of State will appreciate:
no matter what, we will reach an agreement with the Japanese.
(8)
The President: Let me tell you a personal story from thirty
years ago. I was the president of a small offshore drilling
company. We pioneered the use of three-legged mobile drilling
platforms. We worked out a deal with the Japanese. The Japanese
wanted to work out a consulting contract. We'd build the rig,
called the "White Dragon." We would show them how to put it
together. They held out the hope of further business. We were
the first to drill offshore in the Sea of Japan. The Japanese
followed us around and took notes. They were very thorough. We
completed the first rig. They then said "Sayonara." No more
business. But they did fulfill the contract.
President Nazarbayev: When I met Secretary Baker on March 16, we
had no problems with Chevron. Probably by the time we meet again
there will be no problems with Chevron.
(8)
SECRET
SECRET
3
President Gorbachev: Right. By next meeting, probably there
will be no problems.
President Nazarbayev: I put the deal back on the table after
people were afraid it would collapse. The deal is in the
national interest. But there was lots of press about it. I
decided we needed 40-60 days to finish it up. We called on the
services of our experts to make sure all concerns are cleared up.
()
The President: It is very important to get it down. I am not
carrying water for Chevron. But this is a wonderful example of
partnership. It would stimulate other deals.
(8)
President Nazarbayev: Sure, I know. I met with Johnson and
Johnson.
()
President Gorbachev: Now, back to the Japanese, if I may. When
we met with Kaifu we spent 1-1/2 hours in the hall debating one
word in the final communique.
(S)
President Nazarbayev: One word with Yeltsin took three hours.
"Federal tax. " Finally Yeltsin agreed.
()
The President: Let's get rid of communiques. I'm talking about
the G-7 communiques. This is my proposal for better relations -
ban communiques.
(S)
President Gorbachev: We've lost communiques, which has improved
the dialogue. But the foreign ministers love communiques.
()
Secretary Baker: No, the foreign ministries love communiques.
()
The President: I hope you feel as good as we do about work on
the [START] treaty.
(S)
President Gorbachev: It took ten years. Such work! I knew we
had it done when neither our scientists or experts understood the
remaining details. So I said, " put them aside and sign it."
(S)
The President: I told the experts: "I'll impose my view on
shroud, telemetry, etc." I looked around and I knew more than
they did.
(S)
President Gorbachev: Exactly! I'm sure we'll all benefit from
the treaty. Imagine the amount of beer our negotiators consumed.
()
General Moiseyev: I should have bet Bartholomew during the last
meeting. I asked him, " will there be a summit or not? He had
his doubts.' " (8)
Under Secretary Bartholomew: I said there would be no summit
unless you went farther in your position.
(S)
SECRET
SECRET
4
President Gorbachev: I offer a toast to our negotiations. (U)
President Nazarbayev: Why not come by Alma-Alta? See Baikonor.
(U)
The President: There just isn't time. (U)
President Gorbachev: You have a choice of where to go. (U)
The President: We are very free. The problem is time. (U)
President Nazarbayev: I'm sure we'll see you. I hope we'll see
Secretary Baker. I'm good friends with Matlock. Matlock
promised to hunt. (U)
President Gorbachev: Can Scowcroft hunt with a rifle, or just
missiles? (U)
President Nazarbayev: We have all types of climatic zones in
Kazakhstan: deserts, mountains, steppe, arid areas. We grow
grain. (U)
President Gorbachev: It is a very tough climate. There are nice
areas. (U)
President Nazarbayev: We ship ten million tons of grain to other
republics. We produce 60-90 percent of non-ferrous metals in the
Soviet Union - 140 million tons of coal and 26 million tons of
oil. We could increase oil output to 100-150 million tons a
year, while our needs are only 12 million tons a year.
()
President Gorbachev: Of course, preservation of the environment
should be discussed. There has been lots of mismanagement in
agriculture for decades. We are at the very beginning [in
addressing environmental issues].
(X)
President Nazarbayev: We had considerable oil reserves around
the Caspian Sea. We' re not poor. U.S. business will find proper
conditions.
()
The President: What are you doing with the sulphur?
()
President Gorbachev: We buy it. We' re importing sulphur now.
()
Ambassador Komplektov: It belongs to the joint venture. We will
collect no taxes for the first five years, then 50 percent of the
normal tax for the next five years.
()
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
SECRET
0096
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of the
Republic of Russia (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs,
NSC Staff
Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet Affairs, NSC
Staff (Notetaker)
Peter Afanasenko, Interpreter
Boris Yeltsin, President
Aleksandr Rutskoy, Vice President
Ivan Silayev, Prime Minister
Andrey Kozyrev, Foreign Minister
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman, Supreme Soviet Committee
Yuri Skokov, State Councilor for Interrepublic
Affairs
Gennadiy Burbulis, State Secretary
Viktor Ilyushin, Chief, Presidential Secretariat
DATE, TIME
July 30, 1991, 3:55 - 4:30pm
AND PLACE:
The Kremlin
President Yeltsin: Mr. President, welcome to the Kremlin. I
would like to introduce you to my team (Yeltsin proceeded to say
a few words about each). We covered many issues in our private
meeting together. Now I would like to welcome President George
Bush and the U.S. delegation to the office of the President of
Russia. This is the first time ever in the 1000-year history of
Russia that there is a democratically-elected President in the
Kremlin. There are two flags in the Kremlin -- the Russian flag
and the Union flag. This is new and unique. (U)
The President: That is a long time. To those of you who were
not with President Yeltsin in Washington, I would like to say
that his visit to the U.S. was very good and very helpful. He
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED 10/20/03
99-0303-8/1 NO
SECRET
2
conducted himself in such a way that led to an improvement in
relations between Russia and the U.S. (U)
President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. I would like to say
that there have been twenty-eight days since Washington, since we
met, and a lot has happened since then. We agreed there to
upgrade relations in the following four areas: food storage and
processing; management training; defense conversion; and joint
transportation projects. I am happy to say that there has been
movement in all four of our working groups in these areas. I
would like to commend in particular the Department of Commerce
for this progress. I would also like you to know that there is
no allergy on Gorbachev's part for this program. (U)
In view of the fact that the Union treaty is no longer a draft --
we resolved the final problem yesterday and initialled an
agreement -- there is no longer any obstacle to going ahead.
Russia has no more tax problems. So, I would like to see now
movement toward formalizing our contacts. Perhaps at our next
meeting, since today's is too short, we could move to sign a MOU
on the four projects and on our contacts and cooperation. This
is based on the Union statement, the Union treaty which says that
the Union will coordinate foreign policy of the states of the
Union.
I would like to clear up the matter of the tax provision in the
Union treaty. This was not a personal issue or feeling on the
part of the President of Russia but a strong feeling on the part
of the Parliament. We want control of the budget. We want to
know where our taxes are going. We want to see the defense
budget reduced in very real terms. We want control of
expenditures. You have some budgetary control. We do not.
(S)
The President: Is this something that has been resolved by your
agreement with the center? (C)
President Yeltsin: No. The treaty reached with Gorbachev was a
compromise between the two of us. He removed one line and I
initialled that page. So there are no more problems on the tax
issue. The treaty calls for a fixed Union tax rate to be agreed
upon by the republics. (C)
Secretary Baker: Is this figure agreed upon or is it a figure to
be agreed upon?
(c)
President Yeltsin: For this year, it is agreed at 23.4 billion
rubles. For 1992, it will be a fixed percentage rate. (C)
President Yeltsin: No. We have only agreed to agree on a fixed
rate in the future. The rate of taxation will differ from one
republic to the next. The center will make an estimate of
spending for us.
(C)
Now, do I understand that you support my idea of formalizing the
basics of our relationship? (c)
SECRET
SECRET
3
The President: Which relationship? Do you mean the U.S. and
Russia or yours with the center? I am unclear about what you are
asking. We do want to look forward to cooperation with you. (C)
Secretary Baker: President Yeltsin, the answer will depend on
what the Union treaty says about the authority of the republics
to enter into agreements with other countries. We will have to
see this new Union treaty.
President Yeltsin: This matter is open for signature; all the
Union treaty problems have been resolved. The Union treaty will
be open for signature in August and states the following formula:
sovereign states can pursue their own independent foreign policy,
including foreign economic policy, but coordination of their
actions internationally will be vested in the Union which will
have responsibility for treaties and strategic relationships.
But the specifics of the relationship will be channeled through
the republics. This is the way it will be. (c)
The President: Please give us a copy of the Union agreement.
When it is finally worked out, we will study it and work within
it but not ahead of it. I don't want to plough new ground. (C)
President Yeltsin: I understand. I would not want to hand over
an initialled version but will give you a copy when it is final.
(C)
The President: In the meantime, please continue your contacts
with the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture.
These will be important contacts in the meantime. Well, the
Ambassador tells me we are being kicked out. (U)
President Yeltsin: We are not kicking you out, protocol is doing
that. (U)
The President: Well, you look very fit. You look good. (U)
President Yeltsin: I play tennis daily. (U)
The President: The Russians have some good tennis players. (U)
President Yeltsin: Yes, Chesnakov, Andrei Chesnakov is very
good. (U)
Prime Minister Silayev: I played tennis with your brother and
beat him! (U)
The President: Which brother? I have three brothers. (U)
Prime Minister Silayev: I can't remember his name, it was the
younger one, I think. (U)
- End of Conversation -
SECRET
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
0096
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman
Leonid Kravchuk (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs and Counselor
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs,
NSC Staff
Jon Gundersen, Consul General Kiev
Curtis Kamman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Director for European and Soviet
Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Interpreter
Leonid Kravchuk, Chairman
Evgeniy Fokin, Prime Minister
Anatoliy Zlenko, Foreign Minister
Gennadiy Yaneev, Vice President of the USSR
Viktor Komplektov, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
DATE, TIME
August 1, 1991, 1:45 - 2:15pm
AND PLACE:
Marinskiy Palace, Kiev
The President: I was very moved by the welcome of all those
people along the route as was every other American with me coming
into Kiev today. (U)
Chairman Kravchuk: Mr. President, welcome to Kiev, welcome to
Marinskiy Palace. First, I want to say to everyone here that I
am very satisfied by my talks with the President in the car and
in our meeting. I was also satisfied by your comments on many
issues. I hope you and your party have felt that the Ukrainian
people deeply respect the American people and your policies by
this welcome. I also hope, Mr. President, that you will
understand the aspirations of Ukraine for cooperation in
different fields. We believe friendship and cooperation are very
important for us. I would like the forthcoming UN General
Assembly to take into account the political forces in our country
and to treat them with respect. We are following resolutely
state sovereignty. We want to enrich the existing union and want
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
99-0303-F/1 10/20/0310
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
to become part of the union community, the European and the
international communities. As a UN member, Ukraine is willing to
participate in UN General Assembly meetings and discuss our wider
participation in this and other international organizations. (C)
We have great economic problems in Ukraine. I would also like to
say that the establishment of your Consulate here will contribute
to relations with our countries. I would be satisfied if the
U.S. would permit us to open a Consulate in the U.S. As I said
to the President in the car today, I also want to thank you for
your assistance for Chernobyl and hope it will continue. I think
the donors conference on Chernobyl will give a new emphasis to
Chernobyl problems. The nuclear agency in Vienna gave a report,
a rather modest assessment of the problem. The conference will
help with an objective view of this problem. (C)
The President: First, I want to say how pleased we are to be
here in Ukraine and are sorry that time is so short. I am moved
by the warmth of the reception you and your people gave us on the
streets. The dramatic results of perestroika and glasnost have
produced a new opening for the U.S. and Ukraine. I have had a
chance to explain to Chairman Kravchuk that we'll deal officially
with the center. I told him of my deep respect for President
Gorbachev. But as the Union treaty is worked out, I understand
it will allow more direct dealings with the republics. In the
meantime, we can go forward with economic issues, with nuclear
safety. There are a lot of areas where the U.S. can be helpful.
(C)
On our Consulate, I am delighted it is here. A reciprocal
opening would have to depend on the details of the Union treaty.
I hope you will agree with that. I know we are short of time but
there is a delicate balance here and I want to deal respectfully
with the center. And yet we have a couple of hundred years of
tradition with the U.S. and other countries dealing in many ways.
There may be some standard thing but Ukraine has a tremendous
following in the states where there are well over one million
Ukraine-Americans. This allows us to start off with a lot going
for us on both sides. So, I think I will leave it there for now,
but I would be glad to respond to questions you or your
associates may have. 16t
Prime Minister Fokin: It is a great privilege for me to consider
myself as your personal friend after this meeting. I will not
repeat what Chairman Kravchuk has said. I followed your airport
speech with great attention. I am satisfied by the fact that the
propositions I will make will respond to your ideas on
cooperation with the U.S. I would like to suggest: (C)
First, I think Ukraine should be given Most Favored Nation status
and, based on this, I suggest that relations between Ukraine and
the U.S. should be expanded.
Second, concerning U.S. investments, they will be guaranteed here
by the National Bank and the ministries. They can be made in new
projects or in reconstruction. What I would like to stress is
that these are not loans but investments of any possible scope up
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
to $5 billion. For this purpose, we should set up a joint
commercial bank based on shares.
Third, the American side should participate in the privatization
of industries here: in coal mining, mechanical engineering, and
light industry. After the reconstruction of industries, we could
use them to renew our economy. U.S. firms will be given the
possibility to trade freely here.
Fourth, we can guarantee investments of rubles in joint ventures,
primarily to produce consumer goods.
Fifth, we would like to establish a Ukrainian-U.S. association
which would open shops and stores here in Ukraine and in those
parts of the U.S. with heavy concentrations of Ukrainian-
Americans (Fokin handed a list of ideas to the President).
The President: Well, we will have to take a look at these ideas.
Of course, we are already doing MFN which covers all of the USSR,
so you will benefit from that. We will look at all five areas
but it doesn't sound like we can't do any of these. Trade is no
problem. And the new projects, we're for them. Small business
is a big part of U.S. employment and we could help you with that.
Let me get back to you with a more specific response. (C)
- End of Conversation -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6678
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation with President
Abdou Diouf of Senegal
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
President Abdou Diouf
DATE, TIME
September 10, 1991, 10:30 a.m. - 10:45 a.m. .
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President: I just have a few points. I want to thank you
for Desert Storm. I have a few observations on the Soviet
developments. Also I have good news on debt relief -- PL-480. I
am still concerned about Qadhafi. (C)
President Diouf: I appreciate the honor of this visit. I admire
the way you take on and fulfill respect as leader of the world.
I am proud of what we did in Desert Storm. (C)
The President: That was historic. I regret we still have Saddam
Hussein, but I believe we did the right thing. (C)
President Diouf: We had great success. I didn't think it would
wind up so quickly. It was remarkable. I am in the process of
organized the Islamic Conference, December 11-14. I will try to
forge some unity. This is a plenary meeting. Kuwait said Arafat
wanted to go there to improve relations with Kuwait. Kuwait
asked me to do nothing. We should not be duped, and we should
not reach out for reconciliation, especially with the PLO. (C)
The President: Saddam Hussein is trying to work his way back in
under the guise of Arab unity. He hasn't learned a thing. (C)
President Diouf: He is arrogant. We should keep the pressure
on. A new leadership would try to establish some ties. (c)
The President: If you could send word that if Saddam Hussein
left, the U.S. would give Iraq every fair chance to restore its
credibility. (C)
President Diouf: No one could be worse then Saddam Hussein. (C)
The President: Take Paraguay. He turned out not to be so bad.
(C)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
00-0429-F
8/21/09 w
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
President Diouf: What are your feelings on Iran? Given its
position on the Gulf War, do you think they are reliable over the
long run?
(C)
The President: You may be a better judge. Our big problems are
hostages. It looks like Rafsanjani is trying. I am pleased you
have better relations. They are a bit reluctant to have open
contacts with us. It is an internal problem for them. (C)
President Diouf: Congratulations on your energetic response to
the Soviet coup. You gave us all room to do what is right. We
are fearful about disintegration of the Soviet Union and control
of nuclear weapons especially. What you think? (C)
The President: I think the nuclear issue will be okay but, I
can't be sure the republics issue will remain peaceful. We don't
know enough to make confident predications. I don't even know
where all these republics are. I like Gorbachev and Yeltsin
cooperating. I will get pressures to eliminate my armed forces.
Gorbachev is a good man, and he has had a hell of a time. I give
him great credit.
(c)
Shall we go inside? (U)
President Diouf: The PL-480 relief is very good news. It is
very welcome. Just a word about Senegal politics. I have
brought the opposition leader into the government, Mr. Wade. He
and his party agreed to our sending troops to Desert Storm. His
cooperation helps stability. It is not a move to a one-party
state.
We have vigorous party system. And I want to make it clear that
I am not moving backward. (U)
The President: No. No one has made such an accusation.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal (5 pp.)
9/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
By (NLGB) on 10/7/10
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91 - 9/24/91
Date Closed:
1/28/2009
OA/ID Number:
91109-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0429-F(366)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
8/21/2009
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 509 LIBRARY
6957
Dup of 00-04-F
#366
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Abdou Diouf, President of
Senegal
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs
Katherine Shirley, U.S. Ambassador to Senegal
Thomas E. McNamara, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for African
Affairs (Notetaker)
Alec Toumahan, Interpreter
Adbou Diouf, President
Adboulaye Wade, Minister of State
Djibo Ka, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Famara Ibrahima Sagna, Minister of Economy,
Finance and Planning
Alassance Dialy N'Diaye, Minister of
Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts
Ibra Deguene Ka, Senegalese Ambassador to
the U.S.
Doudou Diop, Major General, Special Advisor
to the President and Inspector General
of the Armed Forces
Pascal Manga, Vice President of the National
Assembly
Babacar Carlos Mbaye, Presidential Diplomati
Advisor
Gabriel Sarr, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
September 10, 1991, 10:30 - 11:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The President: I apologize to those who have been waiting.
President Diouf and I have been caught-up in a host of issues
that we discussed in the Oval Office. We will go into them
further in this meeting. I welcome the entire Senegalese
delegation to Washington and to the White House, and
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
REGRET
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
51 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F
ULUNE
SECRET
2
hope they are enjoying their visit. I know Senegal is firmly
committed to democracy and congratulate Senegal as the first
African country to join in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. President
Diouf and I talked about democratic development in the Oval
Office. Bilateral relations appear in good shape; the few
differences can be talked out. Both of us are pleased with where
bilateral relations now stand. President Diouf do you have any
comments?
President Diouf: I would like to thank the President for the
very warm welcome that we have received. We were very
sympathetic to the President's and to U.S. feelings on Desert
Storm/Desert Shield in which we participated and lost 93
citizens. We were proud to have been a part, despite the loss of
our citizens -- a great cost to have paid. I thank President
Bush for his leadership and the U.S. for its sacrifices. The
respect for sovereignty was evident in that effort and in our
bilateral relations.
I was most impressed by the leadership, intelligence, and
diligence you showed in directing the coalition. I would like to
express thanks for the news I received in the Oval Office about
the cancellation of the $42 million debt. This is excellent
news, an extraordinary gesture, and an example of the very
excellent bilateral cooperation that exists between our two
countries. I know there are a number of competing and very
compelling requests, and therefore, I am all the more
appreciative since the competition is so heavy. To give this to
Senegal, is very good indeed.
I would like to thank you for helping to encourage Senegal and
other West Africans states to integrate economically towards a
United States of Africa which, although it is some distance away,
is the hope of all Africans. I thank the U.S. for its liberal
policies, the equality with which it treats other nations,
including Senegal, and the liberal economic example it has given
to the world. U.S. assistance to Senegal and other Africans has
helped us face our problems in the economic area.
Again, I thank everyone for a very gracious welcome and thank
President Bush for his leadership of what is no longer a bipolar
world, but a unipolar world with President Bush as the leader of
the pole.
President Bush: Thank you, President Diouf, for your very kind
words. I am interested in having your thoughts on Liberia. Some
are looking towards a UN force to take action in Liberia. But
the question is whether the UN could in fact do this without
interfering in the internal affairs of Liberia. The situation in
that country is heartbreaking; everyone longs for a peaceful
solution.
President Diouf: The difficulties in the Liberian situation
require a close look in order to tackle the problems in the
context of the West African economic organization. I would spare
no effort necessary to bring about a peaceful solution in
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3
The Ivory Coast and others in the ECOWAS, Houphouet in
particular, look to the UN to play a larger role.
The reaction on the part of the African states explains why they
look to the UN and not the ECOMOG itself; everyone recognizes
that the West Africans have united five nations behind the
effort, three of whom have troops in Liberia and the other two,
Guinea and Sierra Leone, are reluctant to put troops in because
of cost. If these nations cannot solve it, the situation is very
complex.
Even if Senegal and others want to have a different force, such
as the UN force, and if it were possible to have additional
troops, it would not necessarily permit a better situation to
develop and make Liberia's neighbors feel more secure. To do
this requires assistance from the U.S. and others. Only with
more assistance, can there be peace in Liberia. More of the West
Africans states could participate if there were more aid.
The conclusion is, therefore, that we need U.S. financing and
U.S. assistance to maintain sufficient troops in Liberia for a
successful and peaceful solution. There are other matters that
also need addressing such as the upcoming elections. There will
be elections five months from now. There is also a need to
convince Charles Taylor not to continue the war and to join the
peace process.
President Bush: We have just received news from Lagos from the
Vice President's party saying Nigeria would have no problem in
increasing the size of the force using Senegalese troops, even if
it means reducing Nigerian participation.
Assistant Secretary Cohen: Charles Taylor has no trust in the
Nigerians. Therefore, the presence of Senegalese troops would be
a test of his cooperation because we would be responding to one
of his complaints by reconstituting the force and bringing in
more neutral troops. We could assist, but to bring this about we
would need French help also.
President Bush: Changes in the USSR are affecting all of us,
including Africa. There are changes in resources available, and
the future is bright for bringing an end to the cold war. This,
therefore, increases the possibility for reducing defense
expenditures, such as for nuclear weapons. The problem is there
are so many parts of the Soviet Union that are looking for
independence. But there is a central government, and there is a
need for a central government.
In many cases these new republics, these new states, do not want
to completely separate from the center. They do not necessarily
want to push Gorbachev aside. Gorbachev has done much to assist
by helping out in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and
other places, and he deserves credit for what he has done. I
have no desire to put Gorbachev in the ash can of history.
Among other developments, the UN will look quite different in the
future than it has in the past. The Baltic states, for example,
SECRET
SECRET
4
want to push Gorbachev aside. Gorbachev has done much to assist
by helping out in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and
other places, and he deserves credit for what he has done. I
have no desire to put Gorbachev in the ash can of history.
Among other developments, the UN will look quite different in the
future than it has in the past. The Baltic states, for example,
will probably go into the UN as members. All things are not
clear but the future does look good as these problems sort
themselves out.
President Diouf: You have clearly explained the situation in the
USSR, and I concur with the evaluation. We are experiencing a
new world order since the Gulf crisis. It is clearer to us
everyday. And we in Senegal wish to see a new world order, but
one which is both political and economic in its scope. To bring
this about, we need solidarity between the north and south in the
dialogue. And what we need is dialogue, not confrontation --
dialogue based on the possibility for cooperation between north
and south. Senegal is in favor and committed to the new world
order which is taking place, and shape, right under our very
eyes.
President Bush: President Diouf, what are your views on the
situation in Libya? Is Qadhafi a disturbance to you, as he is in
some countries? Mubarak thinks we need to do more now to get
Qadhafi into the community of nations. I would appreciate your
advice and comments.
(b) (1)
President Bush: Thank you for your comments. We will continue
to watch the situation very carefully. In my opinion, the
leopard has not changed his spots.
Secretary Eagleburger: There will be an opportunity to
discussion Liberia at greater length during the lunch at the
State Department in just a few minutes.
President Bush: We will also have a chance this evening before
the dinner to discuss Liberia or any other issues that might need
further treatment. Let me close by saying I am delighted that
President Diouf was able to come for this visit.
President Diouf: I want to raise several issues since, if I omit
them, the Finance Minister will cut my throat. I want to talk
about the organizations set up by the valuable Bretton Woods
SECRET
SECRET
5
the financial programs that the IFIs insist on, but they must be
developed in a way which is socially doable. Such programs
should not be undertaken so they destroy the social harmony of
the countries where the programs are being carried out.
President Bush: Will you be meeting with any of these IFI's
while in Washington?
President Diouf: Yes
President Bush: I would like to say a word of praise for World
Bank President Preston whom President Diouf and I both know. I
wish you the best of luck in your conversation with the IFI's.
End of Conversation
SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6694
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Bielecki of
Poland
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Thomas Simons, Ambassador to Poland
David C. Gompert, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Richard Kauzlarich, Acting Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European
Affairs
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Prime Minister
Ewa Piwowar, General Director, Office of
Council of Ministers
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director, Prime
Minister's Office
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Polish Ambassador
Jacek Siwicki, Deputy Minister of
Privatization
Jerzy Makarczyk, Deputy Foreign Minister
DATE, TIME
September 11, 1991, 2:23 - 3:15 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
The President: Let me extend an official welcome to you and your
entourage. We started to talk in the Oval Office about the
situation in Poland, the Soviet Union and the Baltic states. I
told the Prime Minister that we are involved and will stay
involved in Poland. We have a sincere and genuine interest in
Poland's success. I also asked the Prime Minister to extend my
best regards to the President. So, welcome. (E)
Prime Minister Bielecki: Thank you for your kind words. Let me
start with the unexpected. I have a letter from my President, a
very warm letter, inviting you to come to Poland in the next yea:
-- without any precise date, because we know how difficult it is
for you to find even a few seconds. It is a very warm letter
because the Polish people, including the common people, like you
and have very warm regards for you. (C)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIRENTIAL
AS AMENDED
00-0429-F
8/21/09 10
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: I will accept the letter with pleasure and the
great hope that I will be able to accept. I don't know how I
could have a better visit than my last one. The hospitality was
wonderful. I don't know what my travel plans will be, but I
appreciate the invitation very much. (U)
Prime Minister Bielecki: Let me mention two levels of possible
assistance, cooperation and help of the U.S. First, and most
important, is the presence of the U.S. in Poland -- not only
investment and capital but also support for the process of Polish
reform and the challenge of building democracy and a modern
society. Your personal role in this is extremely great. Your
commitment and strong support in 1989 became a reality. We are
now able to build an independent democratic society. Now the
question is how to promote these values to the east. The process
started in Poland, then there was Czechoslovakia's Velvet
Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Then revolution came
to Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and so on. Now it has come to the
Soviet Union.
LCT
I must say, for me the Soviet Union doesn't exist. It must be
converted to a collection of sovereign states with their own
anthems, armies and maybe their own currencies. We may discuss
how to promote these values in the east and strengthen democracy
and a market philosophy, because this is becoming a significantly
great region of some 20 countries, maybe more. Your leadership
is very important. These countries also look to the Polish
example. I fear some other dangers of chaos and anarchy because
of the lack of knowledge of how to go forward and how to combine
freedom and responsibility. They are undertaking something new,
and the role of Poland could be helpful. (C)
This is level number one, where Polish security is also
important. When we are members of the family of the democratic
community, we will feel secure. We are also developing
cooperation with our neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as
well as with Germany and our eastern partners -- Lithuania,
Byelorussia and the Ukraine. When decisions are considered by
the G-7 or you, we would like to participate. We have plans
about how Poland could help by itself, but also we would like to
be included in general approaches provided by the leaders of the
world. (c)
The President: Are you speaking mainly of food aid, anticipatin
a bad winter? (U)
Prime Minister Bielecki: We were staggered by figures told us
:
the leaders of the Ukraine. They are potentially able to supp.
the whole Soviet Union, but today even the Ukraine suffers.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Distribution is also a problem.
Prime Minister Bielecki: Yes. Natural ties have broken down.
think this winter it will not be a question of great financial
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
assistance, because they have no program yet, but of humanitarian
aid.
(C)
Another issue which I have already discussed with the Secretary
of the Treasury and Secretary Mosbacher concerns our relations
with the international institutions, especially the international
financial institutions. We are very advanced in our transition
toward a market economy, but we have problems of understanding
from them. They, especially the IMF, adopted a set of measures
which was needed during our period of stabilization. But now
they have no vision of how to go forward. For example, we would
like to have certain support for the solving of our housing
problem because housing needs long-term help. My question is
whether it is possible to get some guarantees. This would be
more important than capital. (c)
I hope that after the elections, by the end of October, Poland
will be stronger and even more decisive. So these are my two
areas of problems or expectations.
The President: How long do you think it will be before the
republics could be viable? (C)
Prime Minister Bielecki: As of now they have no program, so we
cannot judge. They want to establish everything at once, but, of
course, that is impossible.
(C)
The President: Maybe, since you mentioned the international
financial institutions, I could ask Secretary Brady to say a word
about that.
Secretary Brady: I talked yesterday with the Prime Minister not
only about the IMF, but about other institutions. We believe he
has a legitimate point of view. The IMF especially has no real
experience with an economy dedicated to the transition from
command to market. This is a new set of problems for them. Mr.
President, the Prime Minister said yesterday that he sought to
find people for his central bank -- perhaps Poles in the U.S. who
could be put on the spot in the central bank. We are trying to
help in that regard. (C)
The President: Perhaps Larry Eagleburger could say a few words
about our assistance efforts. (U)
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: First, the Prime Minister knows
very well what we are doing in Poland. He was on the Enterprise
Fund Board until he left to take a bigger job. Our $200 million
dollar grant for the stabilization fund remains available to you
You might consider adding it to the Enterprise Fund. We are
going forward to Congress with a substantial assistance program
for central and eastern Europe. Poland will be the largest
recipient for very good reason. Poland does offer important
lessons for the Ukraine, for example. Our assistance program
runs the gamut. We hope to do more, although we now have three
new countries -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. But the
President made it very clear to us that whatever is done for the
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Soviet Union must not come out of the hide of central and east
European assistance.
(C)
The President: You mentioned a housing guarantee program. We
are working on that and I understand there will be $25 million
available for Poland in the first year. We have also been
working through OPIC on insurance programs. Have they been
making progress?
(C)
Prime Minister Bielecki: There is a dangerous gap between the
activities of these institutions and the commitments of private
businessmen. The problem is how to push private business to
Poland. That is why I raised the guarantee program. This is
very important in Germany, for example. When Hermes provides a
$2 billion DM guarantee, this helps push business in. This is
also what Exim Bank did for Boeing in Poland. Businesses look
for some guarantee, some protection, because they realize that
Poland is at the front line of an unexpected revolution. We
didn't close our border as did Havel, but we can't serve as a
special zone for millions of refugees. That is why I raised the
first issue and why it is SO important to us. Otherwise, perhaps
7 to 10 million visitors may come calling and decide to stay, or
those who are there already may decide not to go back.
The President: You might tell this group what you were telling
me about people selling bottles of vodka for the equivalent of
two to three months' salary in the Soviet Union. (C)
Prime Minister Bielecki: We have internal convertibility, thanks
to you, so they can buy hard currency at any corner and can sell
whatever products they have for hard currency.
(C)
The President: What do they have in their pockets when they
come? Rubles? (C)
Mr. Makarczyk: Goods, Mr. President. (U)
Prime Minister Bielecki: They have a strong black market
supported by the KGB and GRU. Our secret police also needs
cooperation with CIA because we suffer from the illegal injection
of communist capital via Poland to western Europe. Our secret
police are not well trained for that.
LeT
The President: We might be able to do more. Let me ask Bob
Gates about that. (U)
Mr. Gates: Yes. It is amazing how much cooperation is going on
already.
LCT
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Maybe you talked about this in the
Oval Office, Mr. President, but there is real concern in eastern
Europe about the refugee issue and the security issue. The Prime
Minister told me this is a major popular concern. The point I
made was that their surest security guarantee is the U.S.
presence in Europe and a reformed NATO.
CONEIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: Do you think that is generally agreed by the
people of Poland and other countries in the region? (ct
Prime Minister Bielecki: There is no doubt. Maybe not in
France, but in eastern Europe the support is very strong. (C)
The President: We sometimes worry about public pressures in
France or Germany. Our intention is to have a strong NATO and
not let some other security institution weaken it. We are having
a dispute now regarding our bases in the Philippines. We worked
out an agreement that was signed by the government. Now their
Senate is voting against it. I think they believe they will get
the price higher that way, but many people here, perhaps myself,
will say that if you don't want us, then we'll go. Europe is
different. But the pressures could come. I want you to know
that the Adminsitration is committed to staying and to keeping an
active NATO and a strong role in European security. We can
resist the pressure, but it is very important that we work
constructively together.
Mr. Makarczyk: It is the firm stand of Poland, shared by
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, that the main pillar of our security
is NATO and the U.S. presence. Relations with the Soviets are
better now. I have been involved in negotiating for troop
withdrawals and the new treaty with the Soviet Union.
(C)
The President: Who are you negotiating with?
(CT
Mr. Makarczyk: The new ones haven't appeared yet, but I am glad
about those who disappeared -- like Kvitsinsky.
The President: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Prime Minister,
about agriculture and your relations with the EC. Are they
getting more difficult?
(c)
Prime Minister Bielecki: I can answer in one sentence. During
the coup, relations were excellent; but after the coup, they
returned to normal. The EC has imposed protectionism, especially
on agriculture, textiles and steel. Unfortunately, the structure
of production in Poland is mainly in those areas. It is a
question of some small access to the EC market. We were very
close during the coup, but afterwards everyone went on vacation.
France, especially, refused better access on agricultural
products. Today we heard President Mitterrand changed his mind,
that he was always for Poland and will complete negotiations
before the end of the month.
(CT
The President: May I ask you another question? The EBRD ar-
any deals working? Is it doing anything?
Prime Minister Bielecki: A few times we exchanged views with
Secretary Brady about this. The answer is simple. It is an
important institution, but it cannot be chaired by a politician.
It needs a businessman. Attali is a politician. That is why h:
first initiative was to lift the ceiling on Soviet lending. of
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
The President: Our position, which we brought up at the G-7, is
that if you lift the cap for the Soviet Union, what about eastern
Europe, which the Bank was set up to help? Do you go to the bank
with projects? Do they help?
Prime Minister Bielecki: Getting a decision is an exhausting
job. We asked in March for an office in Poland but still there
is no office. The mistake of heavy institutions is that they
look for huge projects, which inevitably take time for study,
instead of small ones with good prospects. So the present result
is almost zero. That is why the Enterprise Fund is a much better
solution. $50 US dollars for venture investment is better than
$500 million of the other kind.
The President: What about the shipyard? Has Mrs. Johnson pulled
out?
Prime Minister Bielecki: I know the situation well. Mrs.
Johnson asked me to work on her behalf. That was before I became
Prime Minister. The problem is that Mrs. Johnson is not good in
business. Also, this is the first project in Poland and
Solidarity's expectations were too high. They thought the
shipyard was of the greatest value. It would have been a very
good project and a perfect example of the transformation of
Poland, but we couldn't come to agreement.
(C)
Governor Sununu: What's happening at the shipyard now? (U)
Prime Minister Bielecki: They have a good investment banker who
is looking for solutions. Let me add one more thing regarding
access to the U.S. market connected with our fishing agreement
and access to the Bering Sea. This must be undertaken by the
Congress and your office. (U)
Ambassador Simons: Poland allowed the agreement to expire. We
are now looking at it. (U)
The President: I am sorry that our time is up. I enjoyed our
meeting. I hope you have a good trip to the EDU. I went to its
first meeting in London. Good luck. We will try to follow up on
these ideas and I appreciate your President's invitation. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL
6830
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting with Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister
Boutros Ghali (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Near East
and South Asian Affairs
Boutros Ghali, Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt
The meeting began in General Scowcroft's office at 11:35 a.m.
Opening pleasantries.
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: I want to give you some background
on myself, my health, my role in the Mandela release, and on the
fund I have set up for Africa. We managed to lend $10 million a
year with a very small overhead, something that is not easy given
Egypt's bureaucracy. (U)
General Scowcroft: Nothing is easy in the Egyptian
bureaucracy. (U)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: I also have a letter for the
President from President Mubarak. (U)
(At this point the President enters the room - 11:40 a.m.)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: I saw Shamir in Paris. Shamir
wants to see Mubarak. I explained to him he needs to show
something before such a meeting, given Egypt's role in the Arab
world. Shamir objected. I told him progress in the peace
process would allow normalization and such a meeting. Getting to
the peace conference is key. (C)
September 13, 1991
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
00-0429-F
AS AMENDED
8/21/09
no
ICNFIDE
CONFIDENTIAL
2
The President: His response? (U)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: Shamir said that he agrees it is
important to have a conference. He said I could convey this to
Mubarak. All of this happened before your statement on loans.
There is good chemistry between us. I think he was frustrated by
the comparison with Begin. I reminded Shamir that there was
progress in our bilateral relationship at the time we used to
meet often. I told him that Egypt wants to help, that we have no
personal ambition now, and that we can work the Palestinian
problem. ICT
The President: What is Mubarak thinking on the Middle East? Is
he discouraged?
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: No. We will be able to start. The
momentum will allow us to continue the dialogue. It is important
to recall that the autonomy talks took two years, yet it was
still a mistake to have broken them off. I told Shamir that, and
he agreed, saying he's prepared to take the risk of the
conference. (C)
General Scowcroft: Shamir really wants to meet with Mubarak. of
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: Yes. He is humiliated by our press
attacks, by the comparison with Begin, by the fact that Shimon
Peres has met with Mubarak but he has not. Having the conference
will facilitate such meetings. (C)
The President: My relationship with Mubarak is "A-1". But why
this difference about Libya? What am I missing here? Why does
Hosni keep arguing he can bring him along? (C)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: We're trying to neutralize him for
our bilateral purposes. We have our border and tourism to think
about. Lots of Libyans come to drink beer in Egypt. The
problem is that he is helping the fundamentalists in Sudan, in
Egypt and in Tunisia. We're trying to get him to stop. (c)
The President: We'll try to keep an open mind, but his support
for the Soviet coup makes it impossible. Please tell Mubarak
that. Just look who else supported the coup. This is a tough
group.
yes
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: There are two schools of thought,
and the other is that we're wasting time with him.
CONFIDENTIAL
ONFIC
CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: We've got great confidence and respect for
Mubarak. It is one of the relationships I enjoy most. But in
our view the down side with Qaddafi dominate -- terrorism,
chemicals, etc. SET
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: We understand. His efforts to help
fundamentalists pose a real danger to Egypt. (C)
The President: Well, we are here to talk if you need to or want
to. On another subject, I hope our coalition partners stay tough
towards Saddam. This is in Egypt's interest too. I know you do
not want a new war, but Saddam cannot brutalize the Kurds or deny
helicopter flights -- and we can't think that by easing sanctions
it will help. The guy shows no signs of having learned anything.
It is important for Mubarak to stay with us on this. (C)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: Public opinion in Egypt is
increasingly anti-Saddam and it would be difficult for us to
change. Some two million Egyptians lost jobs and money. (C)
The President: I understand that you oppose any new use of
force. (C)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: Not so much. We would have to
explain it to public opinion. The only question for many
Egyptians is why we didn't finish him off. (C)
The President: That is a good question. We need to answer it.
On the UN, we've got great respect for you. We are flexible at
this juncture. We're just beginning to take a look at the
question of the next Secretary General. I don't know where we
will come out. (The President then read the letter from
Mubarak). I am glad to have this. You've got your President
strongly committed to you and this President has noted that. We
could not dictate to the UN even if we wanted to, and if we push
too hard, China or France could resist. But we will give it
serious thought.
(The President departed the meeting at 12:00)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: I have the support of France and
China.
General Scowcroft: That's interesting. China is worried about
the U.S. throwing its weight around. (c)
CONFIDENTIAL
FIDE
CONF IDENTIAL
4
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: China is not yet ready to declare
its position publicly. The Soviets too are supportive, in part
because I helped bring about Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement.
Primakov reiterated this to me after the coup. He said the key
would be US support. I met with [UK Foreign Secretary] Hurd. He
asked me about democracy in Africa and whether the UN should
intervene. I told him I thought that this was a problem best
handled by NGO's, by education and communication, and that I
favored an indirect approach not involving governments. If
governments get involved, there is the risk that the result would
be artificial multi-party systems. They need more education
first. Hurd told me the UK is not ready to take a stance on the
Secretary General matter. The non-permanent members of the
Security Council are in favor. This includes India, even though
it is not yet ready to go public. The Latin Americans would
support me if deCuellar does not present himself. I've avoided
getting Arab League support so as not to provoke Israel. I am
representing myself as the candidate of Africa, not the Arabs. I
reminded the Israelis that I was the only minister to accompany
Sadat to Jerusalem. I am told by my Israeli friends that they
will not oppose me. The Europeans also favor me. (ct
General Scowcroft: Is there any chance the Africans will come
together behind one candidate?
(C)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: No. They have a short list of six
candidates and only ask that one of the six be chosen.
General Scowcroft: We are trying to act quietly. It would be
dangerous for us to assume a high profile. Obviously, we are
very sympathetic but we will have to see.
(c)
Deputy Prime Minister Ghali: It is important to have a Third
World candidate. Many in the Third World fear that East-West
reconciliation will come at the expense of the North-South
dialogue and marginalize the third world. This would help. (C)
General Scowcroft: I hope you know the esteem in which we hold
you and your boss. We will take this seriously. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6799
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President dos Santos of Angola
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John Sununu, Chief of Stuff
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Thomas E. McNamara, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and
Senior Director for African Affairs
Walter Kansteiner, NSC Director for African
Affairs, (notetaker)
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President
Colonel Jose Maria, Secretary for Defense and
'Security Affairs
DATE, TIME
September 16, 1991, 11:00 - 11:25 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President: I want to welcome you and tell you of our
interest in seeing a successful conclusion to the peace accords.
(U)
The Vice President is just back from visiting with Dr. Savimbi,
and he's committed to the peace arrangements. We hope both sides
will move the peace process forward. (U)
President dos Santos: Thank you for your welcome. I also want
to thank you for the important role you have played in the peace
process. The various letters you sent were helpful in getting us
to an agreement. We are determined to bring the process to
completion. ACT
The President: Is the assembling of troops on schedule? (C)
President dos Santos: Things are now going well. There were a
few delays initially; they were infrastructure problems like
providing housing and water and food to the camps. This was not
in our budget, but now we are making a real effort. We are now
providing temporary structures for troops. (c)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
00-0429-F
8/21/09 no
CUN IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
I would like to give you a copy of the schedule leading to
elections. This is a proposal we have given UNITA at the JPMC,
but unfortunately it was given to them the same day they withdrew
from the JPMC.
(C)
The President: Will this answer their questions about elections?
Closer to September is the best. (U)
President dos Santos: This is just a proposal -- the details
could be worked out later. The proposal includes consultations
with the other political forces; we need to discuss with all the
parties the election's schedule.
(C)
We would like to have the election process finalized in December.
And then start a census in January. The census will be six
months or so.
(C)
The President: The election date is to fall between September
and November, right? (U)
President dos Santos: The date is September-November. The
actual date must be determined by consultations with all the
parties. (U)
I want to assure you we are intent on seeing the process through.
Our three primary goals include: 1) implementing the peace
accord., 2) democratization and formulate a multi-party structure
and 3) economic reform -- move toward a free-market system. (C)
The President: Okay. We are delighted with free elections. We
just want it to go forward on schedule, with no snags. Such
elections are the basis of the U.S. system, and we want them to
succeed. We can consult on how to help them be a success. (U)
Is the housing situation worked out for UNITA troops?
President dos Santos: Yes, government forces are now in assembly
points, despite the earlier difficulties that both UNITA and
government faced -- logistical problems. These are areas that
the U.S. and others could be very helpful.
(C)
Another task is free distribution and circulation of goods
throughout the country. When UNITA comes back to JPMC it will be
easier to iron out these problems.
SCT
Assistant Secretary Cohen: We now have the UN helping to move
food in the country. Our Defense Department has given the O.K.
to ship rations -- they will be arriving early October. (C)
The President: Is the man in the street in Luanda excited about
democracy? (U)
President dos Santos: People are for it, and peace is bliss. We
now have 30 political parties. (U)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
There's another subject I would like to raise: U.S. -Angolan
relations. As you know, we have great deal of trade between our
countries. Oil companies have offices there, and you have a
"liaison office." We would like better means of contact with
you in Washington.
(ct
The President: Well we should discuss that. We will look into
possibilities. What is important is to stay on the path to
elections and after elections we'll have full diplomatic
relations.
Do you go straight back or are you going up to New York. (U)
President dos Santos: We will go straight back. (U)
The President: And thank you for bringing your lovely daughter.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
SECRET
6970
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 23, 1991
SIGNED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
FROM:
DAVID C. GOMPERT
all
SUBJECT:
Memoranda of Conversations of the President with
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on September 16,
1991
Attached at Tab A and B are Memoranda of Conversations between
the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on
September 16, 1991.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the
record.
Approve the
Disapprove
That you sign memorandum to State at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to State
Tab A
Expanded Memorandum of Conversation
Tab B
One on One Memorandum of Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Coup NARA, Date 01/28/09
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6970
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Expanded Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
of Germany
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Kimmitt, Ambassador to Germany
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)
Richard Kauzlarich, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State of European and Canadian
Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Peter Hartmann, Security Adviser to the
Chancellor
Walter Neuer, Head of the Chancellor's Office
Angela Merkel, Minister for Women and Youth
Affairs
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary and Government
Spokesman
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
DATE, TIME
September 16, 1991, 1:30 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Residence/Cabinet Room
The President: German-American contacts are particularly
important at this time. German-American relations are going very
well and I always benefit from the Chancellor's views. I would
like to give you the floor, Helmut. You can take it from there.
(S)
Chancellor Kohl: First, with regard to the situation in Germany,
the California trip we took was important. I've never seen this
face of America. We are setting up a German-American academy of
sciences. This will be a platform for our two societies to work
together in science and cultural exchanges which are important.
California was a pleasant surprise. There is a strong interest
there in Germany. I got the impression in California that people
were happy to see a European face because of the preoccupation
DECLASSIFIED 00-0429-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958, 8/21/09
AS AMENDED no
SECRET
SECRET
with Japan there. Next year we might do something about this,
George. My second point is that I completely support you on the
Middle East peace process. No American president in U.S. history
has done more for the Jewish community than George Bush. The
peace process requires you to stick with your course. If the
process breaks down fundamentalism and war will follow. Israel
is asking for German financial support. We have said no if it
will be used for settlements in the occupied territories. We
need to coordinate our responses. The EC agrees that the U.S.
peace initiative should be supported. (S)
The President: We also discussed the Uruguay Round during our
private conversation. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Of course we are in agreement on the
objective. We want success for three reasons. First, the Common
Agricultural Policy has to be changed in any case. We can't keep
funding these export subsidies. Second, Germany depends on
exports. Third, the LDCs are badly in need of an improved
trading system. So, I will do my utmost to help produce a
success in the GATT. I would like to point out that I will have
to talk to one of my friends. I am not pessimistic. Of course,
textiles and other issues have to be addressed as well. In the
EC, people are becoming more aware of the need for progress. But
there is a suspicion that the Japanese are forthcoming in their
public statements but really torpedoing the talks. (8)
On Germany, we had serious problems with the five new laender at
first. Now not even one year since their accession, the economic
situation has improved. But for many individuals, its still a
hard time. In some villages over 50% are unemployed. The old
structure of enterprises cannot survive. In three to five years,
we will have made it. It just so happens that that will be an
election year in Germany. We are finding that the East Germans
state security system had its tenacles in everything and poisoned
everything it touched. We will soon see the same thing in the
Soviet Union, but the KGB had 70 years to work on it.
Economically, I'm happy about this situation in Germany. GNP has
increased by 3%. But we have had to undertake radical budget
cuts. We cannot continue to borrow the way we have. I will
repeat what I said before. Deutschemark stability is crucial.
It is also crucial for European union. We have to move toward
greater austerity. (S)
With regard to the Soviet Union, we should be careful not to leap
to conclusions.: There is something very strange about the
current situation. One week everyone is chanting "Gorby, Gorby"
and the next everyone is chanting "Boris, Boris. I am telling
people that we need both of them. When the winter comes people
will ask Yeltsin what he has been doing. If Gorbachev lasts the
next 4-8 weeks his position will become stabilized. I was very
happy to see that the White House and Secretary Baker are saying
that we favor federation, not fragmentation. Some in Congress
want to support individual republics. We can only support and do
business with individual republics in the context of supporting
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
the center. Also, successful arms control requires an effective
center.
As for Western aid, I think it is significant that this week the
State Council will be debating the structure. This has to be
done otherwise there can be no aid. Economic Union is a
prerequisite for aid. Food aid is a priority. But the Soviet
debt also has to be addressed. The IMF is coming up with the
figures. Germany will keep paying because of the Soviet troop
withdrawals. The next installment is due soon. We need to have
some burden-sharing. Germany has paid 60 billion deutsche marks
to USSR and Central and Eastern Europe. We are now at the limit;
we can't continue on that scale. Japan will have to help. For
years, we have all done more than Japan. I believe that the
Kurile issue could be solved if the Japanese were more
forthcoming.
(S)
With regard to food aid, we should not fight between the U.S. and
the EC leadership. And we should not forget Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia. Polish elections are important. The
situation there could become unstable. Prime Minister Bielicki
is good, and we should want him to be re-elected. Of all the
leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, he is the best on
economics. If the Soviet Union deteriorates further, we could
have massive exodus of people to the West.
1ST
The President: We are putting together a humanitarian food and
medicine package for the winter. I don't think it will be
politically controversial. With regard to Baker's visit, we
sense strong cooperation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. We share
your view that fragmentation is not the answer. The Baltics were
a special case. Baker was satisfied that Gorbachev and Yeltsin
agreed on the need for singular nuclear control and also a single
currency. Baker says that they are willing to work through the
IMF and World Bank. They have moved on Cuba and they have moved
on Afghanistan. The Northern Islands could be tougher but as
these political conditions and center republic relations are
clarified, we are ready to help. There will be a divided view in
the United States on this. There will be some resistance to
providing aid to the Soviet Union. But we will do our part, and
we will work with the Japanese. I agree with you completely on
Central and Eastern Europe and about the Polish Prime Minister in
particular. He wants to be involved in helping the Soviet Union.
The best thing we can do for Central and Eastern Europe is to
open our markets.
(s)
Chancellor Kohl: There is a tough discussion in the EC on the
association agreements for the East Europeans. The German
position is absolutely clear. We must help these countries now
or it will cost us far more in the future. (S)
Yakovlev visited me. He's one of the smartest of the Soviet
leaders. He played a very important role along with Yeltsin
during the coup. Yakovlev said that we need both Gorbachev and
Yeltsin and worried that people in the West may be misjudging
this. He says food aid needs to be rapid and well-coordinated.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
4
I understand how the American people feel about the Soviet Union.
But if we don't help now, it will cost us more later. I agree
that we need to focus on concrete projects.
(S)
The President: Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Gorbachev agreed with
my Kiev speech which emphasized that we can support in self-
determination but not anarchy.
(S)
I would like to hear your views on Yugoslavia.
(S)
Chancellor Kohl: The problem we are faced with is different to
us than it is to you. We have 700,000 Croats in Germany. We
have excellent relations with Yugoslavia. The situation is
horrible but at least there is one positive aspect. If they were
occurring in 1975 we could have World War III on our hands. Now
it is a localized conflict. But neither you or I can offer a
solution. The problem is not just Slovenia, that's really no
problem. The Serbs will let them go. But Croats and the small
enclaves, Kosovo. Albania wants the Kosovo. Where do we start.
We start European differences are significant due to domestic
politics. Felipe Gonzales, who is a true democratic, is very
worried about the Basques. European history of a thousand years
is about to resurface. If there is a major battle, public
opinion in Europe will be unambiguous. Mitterrand hesitated but
now he is clear. (S)
The President: We are worried about triggering a civil war
through recognition. (s)
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Milosevic doesn't care about
Yugoslavia. He will let Slovenia and part of Croatia go because
what he wants is greater Serbia. I don't see how a civil war can
be avoided in Bosnia-Dercegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. There
are no heroes. Everyone is at least partly guilty. The Slovenes
for leaving in the first place; Tudjman for not doing more about
the Serbs in Croatia; and Milosevic most of all. I don't see a
solution. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: We have put pressure on Tudjman to look after
the Serbs in Croatia. He took too long to realize this. But now
the mood in Germany is shifting because of daily television
scenes of violence against the Croats and of course there is a
strong religious angle. (S)
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: We need to get the message out
that Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, and the Greeks need to show
restraint.
(S)
Chancellor Kohl: If there is no dialogue and a war begins to
rage, recognition of sovereignty will become a necessary
consequence.
(S)
End of Conversation
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6970
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
Germany
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Mrs. Kohl
Peter Hartmann, Security Advisor to the
Chancellor
DATE, TIME
September 16, 1991, 12:00-1:30pm
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
Chancellor Kohl: We need to make good use of our time. We've
had good talks here with academic people between the MIT group
and California. I think the idea of a U.S. -Germany Academy of
Sciences is excellent. Maybe we could inaugurate this next year.
It is good to see this level of interest. I went to Berkeley
because there are three centers of excellence in the United
States: Harvard, Georgetown and Berkeley. We found both graduate
and post-graduate students making good progress. Unification has
led to an increase in the importance of German language in U.S.
universities. I will note all of this in a letter to you. For
now I just want to underscore how good it would be for both of us
to pursue this kind of cooperation and exchange. It would be
particularly good if we could do it in 1992. About 25% of the
American people have German ties. (U)
The President: Please send me the material. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: Even when there is an EC political community,
we will be Germans and there will be 80 million of us. I was
surprised that SO many people in California were interested in
Europe. There is a bit of anti-Japanese sentiment there as well.
($)
The President: Is there anti-Japanese sentiment in Germany? (ST
Chancellor Kohl: Not SO much, but in Europe generally there is.
The Japanese are more difficult for Europeans to understand than
for Americans to understand.
(S)
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
AS AMENDED
00-0429-F
8/21/09 no
SECRET
SECRET
The President: We have the Pearl Harbor anniversary coming up.
I have to manage that so as not to make the problem worse.
Anyway, I will come back to you on this. On another matter which
General Scowcroft and Hartmann can discuss, I have been working
on Mitterrand for months explaining how within European political
union we can retain NATO. The calendar for that will start in
the coming year. We agreed in 1986 that Europe would have a
genuine common market. This will happen at the end of 1992.
There is also the security aspect. It is complicated right now
without the French. German unity was a blow to France. Now that
nuclear weapons are no longer SO important, and economic power is
more important. Recently at a Franco-German meeting, we talked
to Cresson and Mitterrand. They feel that Germany will have
problems for two or three years but that we will be much stronger
after that. But the people-to-people relations are fine between
Germany and France.
The President: Is Cresson pro German?
(S)
Chancellor Kohl: She is not friendly. Mitterrand has a good
attitude toward me. We are friends. Currently, the French are
trying to get closer to NATO through the WEU. We should try to
inch them along. I told Francois we should think hard about
this. When we have gone a bit further we should have a
trilateral meeting.
(8)
The President: Could we do this without raising problems with
others?
The Chancellor Kohl: We would have to be careful, but I am
hoping to give Mitterrand the credit.
(S)
The President: What would be the outcome of such a meeting?
(ST
Chancellor Kohl: The permanent representatives would be
simultaneously WEU and NATO, thus, allowing France de facto to
come back into the alliance. The General and Peter Hartmann can
perhaps discuss it. We can tell Baker but it should not go
further than that until we have it worked out. (S)
The President: Let's have Brent and Peter work on it. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: There is a good chance here to have European
political integration help NATO. Many in Washington worry about
political union. That is wrong. If it is worked out right, it
can benefit the United States. It will happen in your term of
office. I want it to be helpful to you. There is nothing in it
for me personally. If we have this close link with you, it will
be easier for us and also for the British. Thatcher is making
things very tough for John Major. She was on holiday in Austria
and told Vranitzky that Austria shouldn't join the EC. (S)
Mitterrand is looking for a way out of his situation. We spoke
for a few hours just like this. Afterwards, Mitterrand said to
his staff that it was the best meeting we had ever had. He has a
difficult internal problem. I must work on him on the GATT. (S)
SECRET
SECRE
SECRET
SECKET
Chancellor Kohl: If you can make headway on that -- we just must
not fail. Even without the GATT we have to change the CAP. The
situation is absurd and I have problems with our partners. We
seem to have money only for the farmers. We have made genetic
progress also. Tremendous progress yields one-third more now.
This is not good for nature. The third reason to change is the
Third World. They can't buy our machines if they can't sell us
products. (s)
The President: Does Mitterrand think that the U.S. will leave
Europe? (S)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. 1st
The President: What do I have to do on GATT? (st
Chancellor Kohl: I will call you in two to three weeks. I want
to go through the agenda with DeLors, then I will call. (S)
Let me raise Israel. You must not give way. I think you have
most Americans and all Europeans with you. The next war is on
the horizon. It will be a long one. Fundamentalism is on the
rise. In Turkey, they are worried too. There will be no
compromise on my part. If we gave into Sharon, he would end up
driving their policies and the peace process would come to an
end. I have alot of stake with the domestic policy as well. 1st
Chancellor Kohl: I am totally un-antiSemitic. As a German I
must restrain myself but there is no way to repair the pain from
the past with money. We have tried insofar as money is
concerned. Adenauer paid 100 billion deutsche marks. In the
second half of 1989 Jewish organizations urged the GDR not to
unify with the FRG. In December of 1989 representatives of the
Jewish World Congress, including Mr. Bronfman, were in East
Berlin and told the East Germans that the Jewish World Congress
was against unification. (8)
The President: They've asked you for 10 billion - 5 in grants
and 5 in loans?
(S)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. We will wait to see how you do. I fear
restraint won't prevail on the Jewish side. The Israelis will
emigrate, and they will vote for Sharon or Shamir. In 2-3 years
things will be tougher in Israel. I will support you anyway I
can; also in the EC. (S)
The President: Maybe we can get the sides talking. But not if
we give in now. We won't do it. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: If there is no peace, Mubarak and Hussein will
be in big trouble. Whoever comes after them will be much more
difficult for Israel to deal with.
(S)
The President: Hussein has behaved badly but he has big
problems.
(S)
SECRET
CLORE!
SECRET
4
Is Mitterrand well? (S)
Chancellor Kohl: It changes. His problems are more
psychological right now. He has a strong position
constitutionally, but the world is changing around him. All of
us want to join the EC but France is very restrained about that.
He also wants to be able to pick his successor but this won't
happen. He can't prevent Rocard from succeeding him. (S)
The President: Who does Mitterrand want? (ST
Chancellor Kohl: Fabius.
The President: Let me ask about SPD politics now: the attitude
in that party about NATO, about the U.S. and security, etc. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: Right now, there is no SPD view, but rather a
multiplicity. Some day they will have a majority. In the 1970s
the socialists everywhere drifted sharply to the left and Schmidt
did nothing to stop it. (ST
The President: Baker just called to say that he had a three hour
meeting in Israel half of which was one on one with Shamir. They
have proposed a compromise but there is no deal. They argued
that they were blindsided. Baker set them straight. He said
that they still can get full benefits from sitting down with
their adversaries. (ST
Chancellor Kohl: History doesn't repeat itself. But the Weimar
experience is instructive. Jews didn't understand that they
should support a moderate.
(8)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDE
CONFIDENTIAL
6882
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Baltic Presidents (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Mary Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet Affairs, NSC
Staff (Notetaker)
Arnold Ruutel, President of Estonia
Anatoliy Gorbunovs, President of Latvia
Vytautas Landsbergis, President of Lithuania
Lennart Meri, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estonia
Janis Jurkans, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Latvia
Algirdas Saudargas, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lithuania
Rein Kivi, Assistant to the President of Estonia,
Interpreter
Stasys Lozoraitis, Charge d'Affaires of Lithuania
in Washington (Interpreter)
Karina Petersson, Interpreter for President of
Latvia
DATE, TIME
September 17, 1991, 10:00 - 10:45am
AND PLACE:
Oval Office, Rose Garden and Cabinet Room
The President: Let me open this meeting by simply saying welcome
in the spirit of joy that events are moving SO fast and that you
will be members of the United Nations. We are very pleased. I
apologize in advance for our crowded schedule today. We have the
President of Peru here on an official visit and I must see the
Secretary of Defense. The schedule is cluttered. (U)
But the main point is we welcome three democratic leaders of the
Baltic countries to the White House. This is an important
meeting for us as I hope it is for you. I just spoke to
Secretary Baker. He has just left Israel for Egypt. He asked
that I thank you for him for the hospitality he received during
his trip to the Baltics. We viewed this as a significant visit.
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
00-0429-F
8/21/09 no
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
I want now to turn the program over to you with my
congratulations. On behalf of the American people, let me say
that we want to work closely with you. All of you have a big job
ahead and problems with the Soviets. It will be one of our
priorities to try to be of assistance. We are glad you are here.
(U)
President Ruutel: I am sitting here in the middle of the table
and SO will speak first. Mr. President, for myself and the
Estonian people, we are gratified by U.S. support for our
independence which we believe is irreversible. I was in the U.S.
not long ago and met with many political leaders. I felt here a
strong sympathy from everyone. As your time is limited and the
joyful event at the United Nations awaits, let me just give you a
few ideas. (U)
I hope the U.S. can support us in solving our many problems. The
deployment of the Soviet army in Estonia and the other Baltic
states is important and should be part of your agenda with the
Soviets. We understand that everyone must demonstrate
responsibility on this problem which affects security in Europe
and the whole world. But it seems to us that the time for
solving this problem has come. We have no doubt that the
resolution of this problem will help to build a Common European
Home. We, of course, are also very much interested and involved
in the acute problem of economic development. We need to fill
the gap between us and other European countries produced by the
last fifty years. I won't go into details since we have
discussed this before, but perhaps we could present some thoughts
to you later.
(C)
The President: Excuse me, but I have one question. In helping
you to solve the problem of the Soviet army, do you mean we
should do so in our regular meetings with the Soviets or in
another forum? (CT
President Ruutel: Yes, I meant in your normal dealings in the
course of arms reductions talks. But the Balts should be an
entirely separate question in the arms negotiations. As the USSR
plans to reduce overall troop levels, it would be logical to do
it with the Baltics first. I am quite sure that it would not
pose a danger to the USSR if we were neutral. (C)
The President: Thank you for that clarification. (U)
President Landsbergis: Allow me to express my joy and gratitude
for the political protection you gave us in establishing
diplomatic relations and in sponsoring us for the UN. I also
want to note that our security will not be complete until the
Soviet army leaves. We want their troop removal to begin this
year. They came as an army of occupation in 1940 and should go
out this year, or at least begin to leave. It is very important
that the army leave from our occupied countries. We are not
formerly communist allies of the USSR like Poland and
Czechoslovakia. We are occupied and are in much worse condition
than them. The situation is very clear. We do not want any
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
agreements that would provide a legal basis for the Soviet troops
to stay. They are there illegally and we do not want to legalize
their continued stay. I am asking for the political and legal
support of the U.S. The U.S. should raise this with the Soviets
and perhaps tie it to aid and credits.
The President: This is very clear and I understand the request.
We want to help. That is why I asked how we could do so -- in
the UN or bilaterally. Their major argument in staying is
housing. Did they raise this with you since you achieved your
independence?
President Ruutel: Yes, the Soviets have asked us to pay for
housing and want us to provide it for officers.
(c)
The President: Dick Cheney has just come in and will be
interested in this. His job has changed, given the tremendous
changes in the USSR. We in the U.S. have a disproportionate
responsibility in the world to safeguard peace and freedom. We
are fighting to keep a strong defense for the U.S. which we think
is in the best interest of world peace. Dick and I have talked a
good deal about this.
President Gorbunovs: Mr. President, I have nothing substantial
to add to what my colleagues from Lithuania and Estonia have
said. It is with great gratitude that the Latvians remember how
the U.S. supported us for fifty years during the illegal Soviet
occupation. This sense of gratitude was elevated when we learned
that the U.S. would recognize the Baltic states and re-establish
diplomatic relations. Mr. President, I was personally gratified
that you called me and the others leaders to announce this. We
are also gratified by Secretary Baker's visit and for your
support for our economic development and our participation in
international organizations. We were very satisfied to learn
that the gold you kept in safe vaults for us would be available
to us. We face many problems. We intend to build a free market
but it will be very difficult to accomplish. We hope the U.S.
will support us in this. But our main concern is the presence of
the USSR armed forces. They are a major destabilizing factor.
There should not be a legal status for these troops. They must
be removed.
(C)
The President: Well, let me make some comments. I hope you all
understand that since we have come to office we have made it
clear to Gorbachev that the best thing he could do would be to
free the Baltics. Gorbachev felt he was unable to do this at the
beginning. We put that to him as the number one thing at Camp
David and Helsinki and other meetings. As Ambassador Lozoraitis
knows, there is a strong domestic feeling and our sense of fair
play was also a factor. We wanted the Soviets to leave. We
rejoice in the fact that circumstances have led them to do so. I
hear what you are saying on the military and we will try to find
ways to help. You have a very strong legal case as free
countries and should not have troops on your soil. The moral
case is also clear. Let us see how we can be helpful. The Vice
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
LUNF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
4
President, Acting Secretary Eagleburger and Dick Cheney will all
be dealing with this issue. We will be alert to ways to be
helpful. Of course, there will need to be negotiations between
the parties concerned.
(C)
We outlined six measures that we will take to support you. We
have supported you for UN and CSCE membership and will also
support you for other international organizations. You know
about our intention to return the gold and other assets. We want
to normalize our bilateral economic relations with MFN, GSP, OPIC
-- that is very important, OPIC, in insuring investments abroad.
Larry Eagleburger can fill you in on the details. It is a very
active program abroad. We also want to help you integrate into
the world economy, to help you prepare for membership in the IMF
and World Bank. We support your immediate membership in the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We have also
decided to start a small assistance program and will do what we
can to help you. Finally, we would like to send Peace Corps
volunteers to your countries and I understand some of you have
responded favorably to that. We would urge your rapid movement
to free markets while recognizing the difficulty that your
economies are interlocked with the Soviet economy in energy and
production. To the degree that we have expertise, we want to
help.
I applaud your determination to have a peaceful transition. I
would only caution you or just say that adherence to CSCE
principles -- the rule of law and respect for minority rights are
important. I don't want to lecture here because we have our own
stormy history on this. But we are committed and think you
should be to human rights. We are excited by all this. It is a
hopeful time and I wish we weren't laboring under a trillion
dollar debt. People ask why we don't launch a Marshall Plan.
Well, our hands are tied to some degree. But our economy is
getting better after our long recession. Everyone's trade is
somewhat dependent on our economy.
I want to leave you with a hopeful message. We have great
enthusiasm for Baltic independence. There is a movement in our
country that I need to fight a little that says we are doing
enough overseas. But we will not withdraw from our
responsibilities to our friends, friends like you, to firm up
these changes that are occurring. We won't give up on the Middle
East peace process or on Latin American debt. But I do want you
to know that we are not as flush or as able to do as much as we
would like. But we will work with you. I think it is good you
are here to tell the American people about the work that needs to
be done, that you need help. If the Baltic leaders can make this
case, you will have our support and gratitude. It will help with
this quasi-isolationist attitude that springs up in the U.S. from
time to time. We haven't done enough and we want to do more.
Again, a thousand apologies for the time problem. I am delight
you are free. Larry, do you have anything to add? (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I would only add with regard to
the assistance program that we have learned from Eastern Europe
that it is much easier to deal with your needs if there is one
place in your government we can go with contacts. I would urge
you to name one person. (U)
The President: When will you formally be admitted into the UN?
(U)
President Landsbergis: Today. (U)
Foreign Minister Meri: At 3:00 p.m. (U)
The President: What will you have to do? Make speeches? (U)
President Ruutel: We will have to make brief remarks. (U)
The President: I say this with some degree of facetiousness,
having served at the UN. There is no such thing at the UN as a
short speech. I recommend you leave at some point because it
goes on and on. But seriously, the UN is in an interesting time.
It is much more helpful on peacekeeping. We still fall short on
some issues like Cyprus and Middle East peace. But it is an
exciting time and this Secretary General has been superb. (U)
President Landsbergis: Mr. President, I would like you to know
that we would like Mr. Lozoraitis to be our Ambassador to the
U.S. (U)
The President: I am delighted. We know Mr. Lozoraitis well and
have respect for him. I mean that. Congratulations. (U)
President Landsbergis: Does this mean we have agrement? (U)
The President: Yes. Of course. It does mean there is agrement.
And now we won't have to shuffle all those papers. I think it is
great and congratulate you, Ambassador Lozoraitis. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
SECRET
6850
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Alberto Fujimori, President of
Peru (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John E. Robson, Acting Secretary of the
Treasury
William P. Barr, Acting Attorney General
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert Martinez, Director of National Drug
Control Policy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
Anthony C. E. Quainton, U.S. Ambassador to
Peru
Thomas E. McNamara, Senior Director for
International Programs, NSC Staff
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC
Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie van Reigersberg, Interpreter
Alberto Kenyo Fujimori, President of Peru
Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, President of the
Council of Ministers and Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Augusto Antonioli Vasquez, Minister of
Justice
Cesar Fernandez Arce, President of the
Supreme Court
Pedro Mendez Jurado, Attorney General
Arnaldo Velarde, Commanding Officer, Peruvian
Air Force
Roberto MacLean, Ambassador to the United
States
Hernando de Soto, Advisor to the President of
Peru
DATE, TIME
September 17, 1991, 11:40am - 12:10pm DST
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
The President: I want to express my apologies to the Peruvian
members of the delegation and to my own delegation for having
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
00-0429-F
8/21/09 w
SECRET
SECRET
2
taken so long to get here. First, we had the family in the Oval
Office and then we got into a very interesting discussion of an
anti-narcotic idea put forth by the President and I kept asking
questions and getting very good answers.
1st
What I would like to do here is to turn the meeting over to you,
Mr. President. You can ask any questions that you like or make
any statements that you would like to make on any subject you
like. Then we will be going to lunch (perhaps a bit late) and
then we have departure statements. (U)
The last thing that I want to say is how much I looked forward to
your visit and to welcoming you to the White House and how much
the American people admire you and what you are doing. You have
captured their imagination. I hope you feel you are among
friends, because you are. (U)
President Fujimori: I would like to let you know that we are
involved in an economic reform program which is a very difficult
one. Needless to say that we are very happy that we have the
valuable help of the United States. We appreciate your co-
leadership of the group to free our debt. In that connection,
the debt that we inherited is a very heavy burden on our economy.
We would like to discuss perhaps the refinancing or the forgiving
of the concessional part of our debt (to the U.S.)
The President: Well, we can discuss that question. Perhaps
Acting Secretary Robson could begin that discussion. (U)
Acting Secretary Robson: The IFI's, with our help, have been
making progress in straightening out international arrears of
$2.2 billion. We have now put together a group to get rid of the
arrears. This has been a very innovative program made possible
by the economic progress made by Peru and by the actions of our
government and the Japanese. Today, Peru's official debt is
being discussed by the Paris Club. We are discussing very
generous terms to give them the best opportunity to get on their
feet. I got a report this morning -- things seem to be going
well. I think that we need to get this in place before going to
the next stage which will include commercial debt. Progress mac.
has been very, very good. We hope this will encourage the
private banks. President Fujimori's program has been excellent
and we are astonished he has gone as far as he has in one year.
We could not have imagined this progress one year ago. (S)
President Fujimori: We want to tell you of a figure. We have
arrears of $4.8 billion. When you consider the problem we
inherited -- poverty, terrorism, corruption -- this is a very
heavy burden which, although the Paris Club can help us, we hc:
you will consider the $4.8 billion of arrearage a year is too :
a burden. So I would urge you to forgive some part of our
official debt. (8)
The President: Let us visit more on that question. We want t :
work on the whole program. You have a good case. We will see
what we can do. (s)
SECRET
SECRE
SECRET
SECRET
3
President Fujimori: In regard to narco-trafficking, let me say
here in the presence of all what our approach is. We want to do
it in an integrated way, at the highest political level where
problems can be dealt with more effectively. We do not think the
problem is only a criminal one. If the program has the support
of farmers as well as people, it will succeed, and 80% of the
people have approved of the program. We are trying to get them
to eradicate production of the coca leaf once and for all. This
policy is reflected in our common agreement. I think we should
concentrate on areas where you can have a market economy. I
would ask in this connection that we have your cooperation. We
have support in the Congress. As I told you earlier, I have
talked to Congressmen -- Mr. Obey, for example. He said I was a
good salesman, perhaps because of my Japanese origin. We need to
have cooperation in the military field. Part of the aid to the
military will be aid for civic action, not a war for territory,
but to win over the common people -- that is the way in which we
are working and your assistance would be used in this way.
(S)
The President: Let me add that the approach which President
Fujimori has outlined, is based on farmers having the opportunity
to export goods to us, and get credit with firm titles to their
land. I have the feeling that we need to combine this with total
cooperation on law enforcement and interdiction. Governor
Martinez is very interested in law enforcement. I would like to
suggest that the President and Mr. de Soto talk a little more on
this concept. You sell the program to the farmer. We need to
know from your able Ambassador or Mr. de Soto what is needed to
have people want to free themselves from coca production. This
idea has enormous appeal to us.
(s)
President Fujimori: Yes, I would like to have Mr. de Soto
elaborate. (U)
Mr. de Soto: President Fujimori stated his policy on October 26.
It is to solve the narcotics problem in Peru, based on a social
analysis which involves working to disengage the traffickers from
the growers. It is the farmers who grow the coca. The farmers
only get about $100 million for the coca and there are 250,000 of
them. That means that they are getting about $400 per capita per
year in narcotics money. They are exploited by the big
traffickers just like the farmers are in Peru; the entrepreneurs
are not. And when I talked to the farmers, I found that they
would rather grow coffee or rice or cocoa, rather than coca.
(s)
When they try to grow another crop, they have to get on four
registers, one of which is always closed. When they want to grow
coffee, they have to get on six registers, two of which are
closed. They also have to show that they have grown coffee for
the last three years, and they also have to show bank statements.
It is like saying you have to be a Yale graduate to get into
Yale.
(S)
We have compiled an accordion list of all the regulations and it
is sixteen and a half yards long. We are trying to apply the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative by removing the obstacles.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
So, the important part of the analysis is that before shooting
the farmer, what President Fujimori has said is why not try both
innovation and market economics.
(S)
Property rights are a problem. The coca farmer is limited to
about two hectares because he doesn't have title to the land. So
you can only make money with a high value crop. If you don't
have property rights, you don't get production. Two pillars are
property rights and free markets. As we discussed, we signed an
agreement with the U.S. on May 14, 1991. President Fujimori then
decided to have a campaign. He sent out advertisements to coca
growers, saying we want you to switch, and here's what we have
agreed with the United States, please fill in the form if you
want to talk with us. President Fujimori also distributed forms
for the people who may not have read the newspaper, the idea
behind them is to demonstrate success.
(s)
We know where the coca growers are. In the Upper Huallaga
Valley, 60% of the coca is growing and in the Valley of Apurimac
much is growing. It is easy to determine where this coca is
being grown by your satellites and by your planes. This is an
easier approach than in the United States where you have 5,000
different ports of entry. We have signed up 57 production
committees in the UHV and 117 in the other areas. We have
listened to them, and. we have a map of information where they
are. They say we would rather switch than fight. There are 174
organizations which market in the areas where they would like to
switch. If you spend $20 billion you spend one-half of one
percent of what they earned. These people are the weak link in
the narco chain. People want out. It's a bad neighborhood.
There is death, anarchy, and pervasive police and military come
in and bother people. (S)
That is where the Shining Path is being successful. Where the
people feel they need it to protect property, like the Vietcong
in Vietnam. To give them security we need to distinguish between
growers and traffickers. If the growers have title, we can
supervise and we can hold them accountable. At present, with the
coca land, one-third is already cultivated. The idea of
President Fujimori is to homestead the part which is not growing.
Homestead, give out property titles, start switching, even where
coca is now being grown, 60% of coca growers make $70 billion.
(S)
President Fujimori ends up with a proposal that is important that
police and military are only part of the program, the way they
are in Burma, Lebanon, Laos and other points. The last part, he
has contacted European emissaries. There are six countries which
have $120 billion in needs. They know how to do a crop
substitution program. We tell them if you are worried about the
environment, if you want to improve it, the only way is to get to
the farmers. They have agreed to do this if the U.S. and Peru
agree that there is a program which could be followed. (S)
The President: Why don't I make a suggestion. Since this has
various policy implications, why doesn't Larry Eagleburger get a
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
5
group to come together with you to see how this program works. I
thought that many people were involved in the production of
narcotics. You can talk together about it and we will also see
if we can get together on it.
President Fujimori: I want to say when we have Capitalism
working to shut down narcotics production, the other part of the
program which I want to mention is development financing and we
need to control the agenda for violation of human rights.
Perhaps you would like to have clarification of the program. We
have the President of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and
the Minister of Defense. All are committed to see that human
rights violations disappear. (S)
I think that we have made progress. We have cut human rights
violations drastically. Unfortunately, our orders have not
always reached lower levels where unfortunately we have high
levels of corruption. There are very powerful organizations
financing the Sendero Luminoso. Some of our people have been
incarcerated for human rights violations. Some have been
sentenced. Many cases are not solved but we feel that this
problem is being dealt with and will be eliminated eventually.
We cannot change the entire situation overnight. I inherited a
very dirty war at every level. (ST
That is why we have invited the International Red Cross to come
in at every level. They will have free access at the detention
centers and will be able to monitor human rights violations. Our
agreement has a clause regarding human rights violations. Not
long ago I authorized prosecutors to have access to detention
centers. This is supported by the armed forces. The President
of the Central Command has offered every facility in carrying out
human rights protection. My government has offered a criminal
code, the first in Latin America, which defines and punishes
human rights crimes. We used to have about 30 human rights
violations a month, but the number is way down. We had three in
July and six in August. These are acts committed by law
enforcement wrongly. In this, we fully agree with you, I assure
you.
(8)
What I want to say is that my government is fully committed to
defending human rights. Mr. President, I appreciate the help.
(S)
The President: The President and I had an opportunity to talk
about this in the Oval Office and the importance of having
Congress know what has taken place, including access by the
International Red Cross Committee. All of this helps much in
dealing with Congress. (st
I think that foreigners sometimes think that we hide behind
Congress on difficult decisions. That is not the case, certainly
not here. We want funds to be freed up. We agree with the
Congress on human rights, but we want the funds freed up. The
more this message can get to Congress, the better we are. Bill
(Barr) would you like to add something? (8)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6
Acting Attorney General Barr: Peru's new programs are very
encouraging. No, my people are very interested in having the
funds freed up. It is very important to us. We want funds
released in part because part of the funds are to be used for
administration of justice programs. We are in full agreement
that the war on narcotics traffickers cannot be won by
interdiction alone. But economic development and social programs
can't make progress without a police and military effort. We
think that interdiction of aircraft and having radar detection
systems are important. There is a need to stop traffickers'
control of airports. We need to move against traffickers because
this will drive down the price for the coca growers. (S)
The President: This may be a good time to break here, and move
over to the other side for lunch. We will have plenty of time to
continue our discussions because this will be a working lunch.
(U)
--- End of Conversation ---
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6850
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Luncheon with Alberto Fujimori, President of
Peru (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
John E. Robson, Acting Secretary of the
Treasury
William P. Barr, Acting Attorney General
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert Martinez, Director of National Drug
Control Policy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
Anthony C. E. Quainton, U.S. Ambassador to
Peru
Thomas E. McNamara, Senior Director for
International Programs, NSC Staff
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC
Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie van Reigersberg, Interpreter
Alberto Kenyo Fujimori, President of Peru
Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, President of the
Council of Ministers and Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Augusto Antonioli Vasquez, Minister of
Justice
Cesar Fernandez Arce, President of the
Supreme Court
Pedro Mendez Jurado, Attorney General
Arnaldo Velarde, Commanding Officer, Peruvi
Air Force
Roberto MacLean, Ambassador to the United
States
Hernando de Soto, Advisor to the President
Peru
DATE, TIME
September 17, 1991, 12:15 - 1:15pm DST
AND PLACE:
Old Family Dining Room
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
SECRET
SECRET
00-0429-F
Declassify on: OADR
8/21/09 10
SECRET
SECRET
2
The President: Well, we need to talk about other agenda items,
but let's continue with narcotics. Governor Martinez, would you
like to say something? (U)
Governor Martinez: I agree that property rights and title to
property are useful and the ability to bring across the market
place is a good approach. I think there is no doubt that
Mr. de Soto outlined a very interesting plan, so long as there is
also interdiction. Law enforcement goes along with economic
assistance. (8)
General Scowcroft: It seems that there is a question of
economics. Have you seen that the alternative crops will be
economically viable? Can you get something to grow that will
bring in $200 million? (8)
President Fujimori: The Upper Huallaga Valley is very, very
fertile. It could become the breadbasket of Peru. Now it is
more profitable to produce coca. The coca traffickers come right
to the coca farmer for his product. When coca prices are low,
the farmers could produce other products profitably. But other
crops need a system of transportation to get them to market,
otherwise the farmer has no outlet. He can sell the coca on his
own farm, but can't get other products to market. Under an
effective crop substitution plan, we would need to give
preferential treatment for the farmers which would allow us to
give him an incentive. Let's suppose you give us preferential
treatment such as zero customs for a five-year period and as the
Europeans have already given us. You should do this. 1st
Mr. de Soto: I think an important fact is markets. We have 1800
different surveys of alternative crops which talk about what
would be marketable. I had a meeting with Secretary Kemp
regarding his project HOPE (Housing Opportunity for People
Everywhere). I said what are you giving people? He said we are
now taking a different approach. We are not trying to direct
people; we are giving them the opportunity to do (regarding
housing) what they want to do. We need to trust people, we need
to have people know what they want to do and help them do it. We
need to find out what the farmers want to market. (8)
The President: I have a question. Suppose the farmer marketing
today doesn't want to grow coca, he wants to grow something else,
like rice, why can't he do that right today? (S)
Mr. de Soto: Because there is no profit in small hectares
(acreage). He is now limited to two hectares because of the lack
of title. If you gave him title to a greater amount of land then
the market would open up. And you have to give him the capacity
to get the product to market.
(S)
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: If they shift, what will happen?
What kind of reaction will there be from the Cartel, terrorism?
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3
Mr. de Soto: We really don't know. The traffickers have trouble
in working with the farmers. Fifty percent of them say they
don't really want to grow coca. A year ago only three percent
were against drugs, but with President Fujimori's program we have
explained the problem with drugs, and now 81% of the people would
prefer not to be involved with narcotics. (S)
The President: Why would the drug cartels, since they are only
paying $100 million for all the coca there, if the farmers decide
to grow rice, not simply say hey, we will raise the price? (S)
Mr. de Soto: Anything could happen. We don't know too much, but
they can't do that because there are thousands of buyers. In a
case where the price in the U.S. goes up we find that it goes
down in Peru. What the government has to offer the farmer is
much better. Property rights -- when you get title to land this
doubles the price of the land, value of land rises. You can also
pass it on to your son. The government can bring electricity,
roads and respectability -- this is something the traffickers
cannot do.
(S)
Mr. Pryce: Yes, but is there a market for other products? (S)
The President: If the value of the coca goes up, can you shift?
(S)
Mr. de Soto: These are areas where we need to talk. These are
things we must ask ourselves. We need to deal with the coca
growers, not only in terms of maximum money. President Fujimori
has identified 57 and 117 different agriculture committees in two
areas. We need to deal with them as representatives of the
farmers and see how we meet their needs. (S)
The President: How do you feel about your neighbors? Does your
success depend upon the success in Colombia and Bolivia? Are you
optimistic? As I heard in Cartagena, we are all in this
together. I'm glad you mentioned consumption. We want people to
know that we are trying to reduce demand. Is there a problem
with non-cooperation from neighbors, or is this going well? (S)
President Fujimori: Progress at Cartagena was good, but there
has been an increase in coca cultivation. We are re-analyzing.
We need to control production of coca leaves if we control
demand. We are attacking the problem in a radical approach. We
are going to the very root of the problem, not just the symptoms.
If we work in an effective way, we will defeat the narco-
traffickers. I think our neighbors are making a great effort,
but their problems are different. They are in trafficking, we
are mainly in growing.
1st
The President: President Fujimori's doctrine of making farming
commercially viable will be different perhaps in other countries;
it would not apply in Colombia.
(ST
Assistant Secretary Aronson: It would apply more SO in Bolivia.
(8)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
4
The President: Do you think that President Gaviria's policy of
amnesty will work? I hope so. (ST
President Fujimori: The problem for them is that the traffickers
are SO strong. We don't have strong traffickers, but we are not
prepared to bargain, and we do mention the possibility of
extradition.
The President: What do you think, Bernie? (U)
Assistant Secretary Aronson: Both economics and security are
necessary. The aid money would allow people to build roads which
will allow better infrastructure. The President has proposed a
special trade preference for the Andean countries. If this
passes it will mean that there will be special preference for the
Andes for up to ten years. If President Fujimori can talk to
Congressional people, this will help very much with this aspect
of the Enterprise for the Americas. 1st
President Fujimori: I will continue to talk to Congress. I
talked with Congressman Obey and he said I was a good salesman,
perhaps that is because I am of Japanese ancestry.
($)
The President: Anything you can do with the Congress will be a
very big help. (S)
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We are leaning heavily on the
Hill. (s)
The President: We need to think about Senator Dodd. (S)
Acting Secretary Robson: We will be signing an anti-money
laundering agreement, which will help. (s)
President Fujimori: General Velarde, who is here with us, has
done very important things in the fight against narcotic
traffickers. I think that you might be able to support what he
is trying to do with assistance. 1st
Assistant Secretary Aronson: I believe part of the aid we have
in mind includes spare parts to refurbish and improve aircraft.
There may be a possibility of new aircraft. (S)
General Velarde: The week before last, I came up here and talked
with Chief of the Air Force General McPeake. We talked about the
problems we have and the idea of an intense campaign against air
trafficking. This is the most effective military operation
against narcotics trafficking. In the Upper Huallaga Valley we
were able to keep planes and aircraft on the ground and to
interdict Colombian flights with very little training. We have
active anti-drug strategy. We have a request in to Mr. McPeake
to supply us with the Bronco OV-10 plane, which will allow us to
intercept. We want only little planes. You are a pilot, so you
know how UV-10s can fight narcotic traffickers. We need more ov-
10 Broncos. 1st
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
5
The President: What are you up against. Cessnas, Beechcraft?
(S)
General Velarde: Basically two engine Cessnas. When we began we
were working with Brazilian Tucans, but we find that we need a
faster plane with greater range. Our fight against anti-narcotic
traffickers is not an easy one. The Air Force is most effective.
We stopped seven Colombian planes without a single person being
injured. They were forced down, not shot down. The Air Force
has been very helpful in contributing its P-3s to our operation.
We would like to get Broncos and also four radar. We try to
concentrate in six areas. Our capacity to control is very
limited. I don't want to bore you but I do want to say that the
first operations we had with AWACS on the first day without any
previous training with you, we forced down a Colombian plane.
Our A-37s did it and they are not really equipped to do it. (S)
The President: Was the plane carrying drugs, using U.S. pilots
or Colombian pilots, were they Soldiers of Fortune? (S)
General Velarde: This gave us an opportunity to cooperate with
Ecuador. We cooperated with Ecuador because the plane we forced
down landed in Ecuador and was captured there. The pilots were
Colombians. (s)
The President: How did you feel your talks with General McPeake
went?
(8)
General Velarde: It seems that the few Broncos which are
available have already been spoken for by other countries. (S)
The President: Let us see what we can do. (S)
Mr. McNamara: The OV-10 has gone to Colombia under a program
that was designed to be a cooperative program. The AWACS has
been successful in cooperation with the OV-10. We are optimistic
that programs will develop over the next year. It is designed to
expand regionally in Peru and involve Ecuador.
(ST
The President: Where do the AWACS come from? (s)
Mr. McNamara: From SOUTHCOM in Panama, mostly, some from the
U.S. (8)
General Velarde: In two months we will use the AWACS and two
radar and see if we can make a dent in the traffic by air. We
will do a full deployment with your cooperation. (ST
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: General Joulwan has been very
supportive of this. (ST
General Velarde: Oh yes, Joulwan has been very enthusiastic on
this. One of the problems we have is night operations. (S)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6
The President: What we are learning is that we need both
interdiction and economic progress.
President Fujimori: We know that we will not have success with
economic programs alone.
(S)
The President: Who would have thought when you came in that
there would be this much change in the world. We see nothing but
good in the development of the Soviet Union following the
policies of Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Although things are
uncomfortable I think the changes benefit everybody. I am afraid
that it may appear to South America that we will somehow get all
involved with Eastern Europe or Afghanistan and other places to
the point that we lose sight of our neighbors in the Hemisphere.
We are enthusiastic about that change in Eastern Europe, but that
does not mean that there is any dimension of our interest in our
own Hemisphere. The changes in the Hemisphere are just as
exciting, we are working for democracy in the Hemisphere, and
improved relations in Eastern Europe help but our interest there
is not to neglect the countries of the Hemisphere. I wanted you
to hear from me that we have a keen and enormous interest in the
Hemisphere. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is no
slogan. We don't need more slogans. We will be as actively
engaged as possible, but we don't want to be overbearing. You
may see us shaking hands with Gorbachev or Yeltsin, but we don't
want South America to convey any sense of neglect. (S)
President Fujimori: We are very happy to hear first hand you
mention friends in South America and pleased that you have taken
so much time to discuss Peru and its problems. The Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative is bearing fruit -- it is very
important for the development of Latin America. (S)
The President: I hope we can enhance Peru's situation. The
Enterprise for the Americas is very important to us and we will
be working hard to make it effective. One important thing before
we leave, how do you spell your son's name? (S)
President Fujimori: Kenji. (U)
The President: I understand he is a souvenir collector, and I
have something to give him. (U)
President Fujimori: He will be very proud. (U)
The President: I think it is very important to have strong
family values. When I think of South America, I think of the
strength that family brings. I think that your family values ::
Latin America are a strong help. I worry about why our familie
these days are sometimes less strong. Family values are still
strong but need to be encouraged.
(C)
End of Conversation ---
SECRET
SECRET
SECKEI
SECRET
7225
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Secretary General
Javier Perez de Cuellar of the
United Nations (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and
Deputy Chief of Staff
Thomas R. Pickering, Representative of the
United States to the United Nations
John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs
Nancy Bearg Dyke, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary
General
Virendra Dayal, Chef de Cabinet
Ron Spiers, Under Secretary General
Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General
Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary General
Gustav Feissel, Special Representative for
Cyprus
Lisa Buttenheim, Senior Officer (notetaker)
DATE, TIME
September 23, 1991, 1:15 - 1:30pm EST
AND PLACE:
The Indonesian Lounge at the United Nations,
New York City
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: On Afghanistan, I recently
met with the Presidents of Iran and Pakistan and the King of
Saudi Arabia. I stressed the five points for an Afghan
settlement. Recent US-USSR statements have been extremely good.
I am having a further meeting today. The Soviets are now saying
that Najibullah is prepared to step down during a transition
process. Moreover, Najibullah himself confirmed this to Benon
Sevan recently. I am preparing to call a meeting in Geneva of
all Afghan factions. Included in the topics for discussion would
be Najibullah's movement to a transition process. Benon Sevan is
in consultation with everyone to get an acceptable list of
Afghans who could be invited to the Geneva conference. I expect
that the conference could be convened toward the end of October
or early November. (S)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
SECRET
00-0429-F
8/21/09 10
SEC
SECRET
2
Secretary Baker: We want to assure you that your efforts have
the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union. (C)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I am concerned that the
Foreign Minister of Pakistan is still not persuaded that the UN's
efforts should be supported. (C)
Secretary Baker: We are trying to persuade the Pakistanis as
well. (C)
The President: Who will address the UN General Assembly for
Pakistan? (U)
Secretary General de Cuellar: The Secretary General of the
Foreign Ministry. The Saudis are also supportive of my
efforts.
(C)
Secretary Baker: I agree. (U)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The Iranians have agreed to
work with the Afghan factions represented in the refugee
population inside Iran. (U)
The President: What about El Salvador? (U)
Secretary General de Cuellar: I was up until 2:00 a.m. this
morning in discussions with the Government of El Salvador and the
FMLN. I believe that there have been important mutual
concessions, and President Cristiani seems optimistic. The three
problems of the elections, purification, and the social and
economic issues remain. I believe that both President Cristiani
and the FMLN really want a settlement. I am hopeful on the
situation. ICT
The President: What about Cyprus? We thought it was on track
fairly well, until the Yilmaz-Mitsotakis meeting. (c)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The Cyprus problem is like a
yo-yo; it goes up and it goes down all the time. Turkey has been
very helpful with Denktash, and I am planning to meet with the
Foreign Minister of Turkey soon. Denktash is a spoiler. (C)
The President: We thought the process was on track fairly well
until the Yilmaz-Mitsotakis meeting, but that meeting derailed
things.
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes. Mitsotakis called me
subsequent to the meeting to say that the Greeks would
nonetheless continue to negotiate. The problem is that Yilmaz is
an ambitious politician and he is very concerned about the
Turkish elections. LET
The President: I really am disappointed because I thought things
were going in the right direction. We tried to bring it closer
to an understanding. (C)
SECRET
SEURCH
SECRET
3
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: On the Western Sahara,
things are moving. But King Hassan has made problems for MINURSO
by the extensive supplemental list of voters submitted by the
Moroccan authorities and by the threat to move as many as 150, 000
so-called Sawharis from Morocco into the Western Sahara. (C)
The President: The King is coming to Washington later in the
week. (U)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I will see him too and I
will tell him that it is impossible to move that many people back
into the Western Sahara. SCT
The President: We will try to help on that because we are going
to have some private meetings with King Hassan. (e)
Secretary Baker: I spoke with the King in late July when I was
in Morocco and urged him to cooperate with the UN. He gave me
verbal assurances that he would cooperate, but we will mention
this again in Washington. ()
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar : I want to tell you that the
UN is facing immediate cash flow problems. (U)
The President: What is the status of our appropriations
request? (U)
Assistant Secretary Bolton: Appropriations are moving well in
Congress and we should get full funding for the assessment and
slice of arrears later this fall. The authorization conference
is next week, so it is a matter of time. (U)
The President: If there is a continuing resolution, can we get
the Secretary General some money? (U)
Assistant Secretary Bolton: We want a larger chunk than
that. (U)
Secretary Baker: There are large peacekeeping operations coming
up for funding. (U)
The President: Hungarian Prime Minister Antall told me that
Czechoslovakia may split up as soon as next week. The Hungarians
are also worried about refugees coming from Yugoslavia. (C)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: We have no reserves
(funds) (U)
Under Secretary Spiers: There is a tough structural problem
because the fiscal year of the US differs from the UN year. So
the assessment payment comes late in our year. (U)
SECRET
SECURITY
SEURCH
SECRET
4
Assistant Secretary Bolton: That is the result of a one-time
budget maneuver in the previous administration. The only way to
change it is to move it back a year, thus entailing a double
payment in one year. (U)
The President: We should look for opportunities to return to the
prior appropriations schedule. The way to do it may be to get a
big win out of Iraq and have Congressional emotions high. (U)
Ambassador Pickering: It would be a big slice of money. (U)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I want to pay tribute to
Secretary Baker for his efforts in the Arab-Israeli peace
process. (U)
Secretary Baker: I don't have anything concrete yet, but I am
hopeful. (C)
The President: We want to thank you for what you and your people
have done on the hostages. It is important to the American
people. What you told me about Picco is very important. The UN
guy (Higgins) who died was an American and his wife is an
American Marine. She is very courageous. (C)
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: We are doing it step by
step. (C)
The President: You told us you would try and you have. (C)
End of Conversation
SECRET
COMPIDENTIAL
CONE IDENTIAL
7676
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Conversation with Prime Minister Bolger of
New Zealand
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Douglas Paal, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, Notetaker
Prime Minister Bolger
Terence O'Brien, Permanent Representative to
the UN
DATE, TIME
September 23, 1991 Time 6:35 - 6:45 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE:
Reception at the Waldorf Astoria, New York
The President: I am glad to have this quick chat with you. I
have heard from our able Ambassador all about of what you have
done. That's just fine. I would like to ask Brent Scowcroft
here to plant a ray of hope in our relations. 16)
Gen Scowcroft: We will soon be announcing something big with
respect to nuclear weapons. (c)
The President: Really, pretty big. (C)
Gen Scowcroft: What we will announce will have an effect on your
policies, we believe. (C)
The President: What you have done with your law makes it
complicated with us and with the Australians. And now, here we
are, we are cooperating in the Gulf and there have been things
that you have been willing to stick your neck out on. If this
problem were not on paper, we could make progress. (C)
PM Bolger: We inherited this policy. The last person I spoke to
before I left New Zealand was Della Newman and, of course, you
know we have another channel as well, one familiar to you. (C)
The President: We have a good man in there, he is Brent
Scowcroft's right hand man and he is my right hand man. He is
going to do well. (c)
PM Bolger: Ambassador O'Brien put his hand through the hole in
the wall (sic). When my people approached me about the Gulf I
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
OH 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F
CONFIDENTIAL
2
said we could not send the battalion that you sent, but we could
do a little and we did it quietly. (CT
The President: What is the political situation like down there?
(U)
PM Bolger: They are out to cut my throat. (C)
The President: Is it your guys or their guys trying to do that?
()
PM Bolger: I have to get some wealth for New Zealand. We are
really down in the polls, but I am totally optimistic. All the
polls are against us, but I am confident that we will be
reelected in two years. It is also important that we be
credible, and that is why we have to stick to our policy on ship
visits. (C)
Obviously you and I did not share our speech notes, but your
remarks at the United Nations helped us sell our policy back
home. ()
The President: How are you doing with the Australians? (C)
PM Bolger: Ninety-nine percent of our relations are very good.
And I respect Bob Hawke.
The President: Bob Hawke is actually a very agreeable guy. (C)
PM Bolger: He is a good guy, only he is losing. (C)
The President: I met the other side a couple of months ago. (c)
PM Bolger: That would be John Hewson. He is a good guy. He has
been over to visit and he will work with us. Yet you have to
remember that Bob Hawke is very sensitive on the nuclear issue.
I am not being critical of him, but he is just very sensitive on
this issue.
The President: I do not want to be under false colors here. I
do not want to make trouble for him. I am not implying that is
against Hawke's position. I would put it in a broad historical
perspective. I am a World War II sort of guy. You and I, we
agree on many things, let us get this one hurdle out of the way.
set
PM Bolger: We do on SO many things, we should get this out of
the way. (C)
The President: And you have got great trout fishing, really
great trout fishing, I heard from a friend of mine. (U)
PM Bolger: It is almost worth changing your policy to get to the
trout. (U)
The President: Why don't you change your policy?
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
PM Bolger: I will take you to a small lake with brown trout.
They have got a lot to do and you can get out and walk around
without a helicopter. (C)
The President: I would love to go to cook out. Where were we?
(c)
PM Bolger: You have got to change your policy. (C)
The President: No, you have got to change your policy. (C)
PM Bolger: We have got a lot of capital out on the economic
reforms.
SET
The President: We sent Dick Solomon down there. (€)
PM Bolger: That went well.
The President: Dick's a good man. SCT
PM Bolger: I said to Richard that we have spend all our
political capital on the economy. At the moment we are 20 points
behind in the polls. There is no particular concern about this
on my part, we will be elected. But you are in a better position
right now to push this forward. You are more a shoo-in than me.
(c)
The President: Don't believe that crap. The polls can change in
an instant. SCT
PM Bolger: You did a tremendous job in the Gulf. What you did
in the UNGA I said was an exciting display of international
diplomacy. You had to go out, pick up nations one at a time. In
terms of the future, I want to revoke the legislation. But we
cannot just change overnight. We cannot turn the legislation
over. I want an amendment that allows you -- and the Chief of
Defense Forces of the United States -- so that you can come back.
I want the Chief of New Zealand Forces to be able to participate
in exercises of your forces. If I said right now that I want to
change, after I am gone, the opposition instantly will repeal any
changes. ICT
The President: It is precisely the same if I went out. Each has
to stay where we are and know in our hearts we will get out of
this. LCT
PM Bolger: I am tremendously pleased you agreed to this meeting.
We cannot go out and say everything is changed. But we can say
we talked about ways to work out the problem. (C)
The President: Say we had an informal chat in connection with a
social occasion. Each side repeated its position and found
common ground on economics and trade. We talked about how to
work out the problem, but rather
...
(e)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
4
PM Bolger: We talked at a reception and had an informal chat.
There were issues where we had agreement, such as our views on
trade and the like. (c)
The President: Say that the President is an old guy who
remembers the loyal stand of the New Zealand people. I am going
to remember New Zealand during the war as long as I live. We all
stood together on something pretty big. (C)
PM Bolger: I remember being sent, as a nine year old, out to
milk COWS. It is certainly difficult to believe U.S. -New Zealand
relations have this bitter disagreement. I have a nine year old
today. (c)
The President: Well, I have been married 46 years and if I am
any later for dinner I am going to risk the whole thing. Thanks
a lot. (c)
End of Conversation
CONF IDENTIAL
-CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
5975
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Fernando Collor de Mello,
President of the Federative Republic of
Brazil at UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New
York (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the
President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
America and Caribbean Affairs, NSC
(Notetaker)
Marcel Bouquet, Interpreter
Fernando Collor de Mello, President,
Federative Republic of Brazil
Jose Francisco Rezek, Minister of External
Relations
Jose Goldemberg, Minister of Education
Marcos Antonio de Salvo Coimbra, Ambassador,
Secretary General of the Presidency
of the Republic
Jose Lutzenberger, Secretary for the
Environment
Rubens Ricupero, Ambassador to the United
States
Gelson Fonseca, Jr., Ambassador, Assistant to
the President (Notetaker)
Gisela Claper, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
September 23, 1991, 3:15 - 3:45pm, D.S.T.
AND PLACE:
UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York
The President: Welcome to you and your colleagues. I'm glad we
are having this meeting. We can proceed in any way you would
like. Perhaps you would like to lead off and then I have a
couple of points to make. (U)
President Collor: If you would like me to speak, I will mention
a number of subjects of general interest. Let me start off by
thanking you for the words you spoke when Ambassador Ricupero
presented his credentials. They were important and positive
words and we are very happy with them. I would like to say a few
DECLASSIFIED
GONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
KO
AS AMENDED
00- 0429-F 8/21/09
CONFIDENTIAL
CONE IDENTIAL
words and give a few thoughts about the situation in the world
today; and then mention a few problems and possible approaches to
economic and social questions. (C)
Mr. President, you gave an example of political resolve when you
talked for the democracies of all the world when you led the
world at the United Nations.
You also achieved economic victory with your proposal for the
Enterprise for the Americas. I would like to propose that you
carry another banner, and that is the social question. Without
any commitment, of course, I would like to see you lead in a way
which would have the countries of the world focus on the social
development problems of the world. I worry that three-quarters
of the people of the world live in need, poverty and deprivation.
We need to change that. It is a very dangerous situation. The
Enterprise for the Americas could also be extended to social
formations. These are intricately involved with factors of
capital formation and debt. I worry that 77% of the population
lives on only 15% of total production. This is the reason for
migration. Unless we can somehow solve this question, the world
will be in serious trouble. We are trying to solve our problems
in Brazil. We have three basic tasks in seeking to achieve
stabilization. First, is to solve the negative flow of foreign
debt. Second, is to advance. Third, is the need to pose
amendments to the Constitution. There are some 25 amendments in
all which need to be made. We hope that all this will be
possible before the end of the year. (e)
On the debt question, we are negotiating with the banks. On
Friday, we made what we thought was a very positive proposal --
very forthcoming. But the private banks have offered a counter-
proposal in what looks positive at first but then asks for
commitments we cannot honor. We would like your help in
overcoming this.
(C)
The President: First, in talking about the third world -- North,
South problems of social development -- they are upsetting in
many respects. Many countries face a very difficult situation.
I am convinced that the satisfactory negotiation of a trade
agreement is the most important step which will bring economic
progress to developing countries. I also believe that a
successful GATT round will help very much. If you would like
further discussions about what you think we might do we could
arrange that.
(c)
We are coming out of a recession. I have thought that because of
the size of the United States, this will help all the world. I
would like to get a better idea of your thinking. We appreciate
your trying to batten down inflation. I don't know what the
counter influences are or what the U.S. can do to help? Reaching
an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, which would pave
the way for help under the Brady Plan, I think would be a good
development.
(C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
I have a note to congratulate you on the Brazilian statement on
disarmament. Anything we can do to be helpful. We want to help.
If our experts can help in any way, we will. 16t
What do you have in mind on debt? What could the U.S. do? (c)
President Collor: First, I mentioned the social problems of the
world. There is no way that a proposal of the U.S. would be
negative. Given your position in the world, maybe your
Government could lead and say "let's talk about the problem." No
country will ask that the U.S. help directly. Also, we know what
your priorities are. ()
On the environment, there is no need to mention specifics, just
say that we should have public talks about it. That would be
encouraging. (C)
Regarding debt, talks are going well, but private banks made a
counter-proposal which we cannot meet. If Mulford could sit with
the banks and tell them they are asking too much? (c)
Ambassador Ricupero: Our main goal is to reach a monetary
agreement which will be satisfactory to everyone. We have
offered a guarantee of $2.2 billion on principal. The banks are
demanding equal guarantee on interest. This would mean another
$2 billion. This would require longer term negotiations. We are
not acting like a Persian bazaar, where they ask 55, and we offer
15. We made a firm offer of 32.5 percent. Their counter-
proposal would require a complicated negotiation. It would
require a different kind of agreement. It would jeopardize our
program. We need to move soon. 185
The President: We would like to help. We will talk to Brady and
ask him to look into it. (e)
Ambassador Ricupero: The problem is enhancement. We offered
only for the principal, and they are asking for the interest
also.
199
Secretary Baker: What is the effect with the IMF? An agreement
would not yet be enough. A stand-by facility would take months.
You mentioned the discussion with Treasury. They will want to
discuss it, talk with the Federal Reserve, and see what they can
do. What banks are in the program? Is City Bank the lead bank?
182
(6)
President Collor: There is a committee. fe)
Secretary Baker: Is the problem with City Bank, or is it that
they cannot get other banks to go along? (e)
President Collor: To lighten up on the banks would let
investment into Brazil. (C)
As of June this year, we had more invested this year than in all
of last year. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIREN
CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President: They have facilities and are doing banking? (C)
President Collor: Yes. Mr. President, you mentioned in your
speech several points I want to bring up. First, GATT and
Zionism. On GATT, this is a very positive position. We are in
agreement. This will help development. (c)
Regarding Zionism, we are in agreement -- what do you want us to
do? (C)
The President: We would like to co-sponsor a simple resolution
of repeal. Given the developments, we might just succeed. It
would resolve a point of concern of Israel. As you know, we are
having a little flap regarding loans. Jim Baker has worked very
hard and is continuing to work on this. Israel is afraid they
will get a bad deal in the UN, and they have had bad deals in the
past. If countries were willing to help, especially on this
resolution, it would create a better environment. We didn't say
anything about deadlines. But this is a blot that we would like
to remove. If Brazil would help, would sponsor or co-sponsor a
resolution. We will have our U.S. Ambassador consult. If somehow
the U.S. is out in front and then has to step back, we think this
would be wrong. If we can work together in diplomatic channels,
then it is possible that we can resolve this problem. (C)
President Collor: For the first time. (U)
Secretary Baker: The problem is that there will be a number of
amendments.
(C)
We hope that Brazil will be able to sign an agreement with the
IAEA.
SCT
Foreign Minister Rezek: We had something almost ready to go --
it was impossible to do in Vienna; we hope to have it done before
the end of November.
(C)
Minister Goldemberg: The negotiators in Vienna are working on a
series of regulations. We have a feeling that the IAEA are being
more restrictive. If you could ask them to be flexible. (c)
President Collor: Mr. President, I want to bring up the question
of the G-7 and help with the environment regarding a tropical
forest. This is the only area where we have a debt program of a
swap of debt for nature. At Houston, the G-7 talked about the
need to help. As a result, there was a proposal for a $1.2
billion fund. In London, they mentioned contributing $50 million
to start. This is not up to our expectations; if we could do
more to help it would help, but the problem I want to emphasize
is foreign debt. The needs are urgent for a resolution of the
debt. We want to be able to agree quickly. (c)
The President: We want to go forward with the G-7 and we want to
help. We know that Brazil wants to get this settled, and we will
want to help. I hate to leave it vague -- but it is important,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
and we think that Brazil wants to get this solved. We will work
to help. (C)
Secretary Baker: Re Suriname, we worry that the military does
not understand sufficiently the need to arrest civilian
directors. You can help. SET
--- End of Conversation ---
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7072
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Boris
Pankin of the Soviet Union during UNGA (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the
President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ralph R. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European and Canadian Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
America and Caribbean Affairs, NSC
(Notetaker)
Peter Afanasenko, Interpreter
Boris Pankin, Foreign Minister, Soviet Union
Viktor Komplektov, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgiy Mamedov, Head of U.S./Canada Section,
Foreign Ministry
Vitaliy Churkin, Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Igor Gelukh, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
September 24, 1991, 9:00 - 9:30 a.m., D.S.T.
AND PLACE:
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York
The President: Welcome. Thank you for coming over here. We are
interested in trying to emphasize the positive way we view
developments in the Soviet Union and I want to tell you that we
want to continue our close bilateral relationships on a basis of
mutual respect. We recognize the historic changes that have been
made. Changes are happening so fast. We want to help but at the
same time, we do not want in any way to imply that we wish to
shape those changes. I would like to know what you think the
United States can do to help. We will be giving assistance for
humanitarian support. Secretary Brady has been over there and
Jim (Baker) is practically a native. (C)
Foreign Minister Pankin: Mr. President, I thank you for this
opportunity. I think it is appropriate to discuss a broad list
of issues. But first of all, I want to convey heart felt
greetings from President Gorbachev. He expressed great
satisfaction with the talks he had with Secretary Baker. He
gives those talks his highest assessment. The talks also gave
Secretary Baker a chance to assess things and see where we are
going. Now, as we join with you DECLASSIFIED in seeking to solve our
PER E.O. 12958,
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED no
00-0429-F8/21/09
CONFIDENTIAL
2
problems, he wanted me to say that the meeting he had with
Secretary Brady was also very helpful.
(C)
He was struck by the similarity of the situation of the Republics
and the G-7. In both cases it is difficult to find a consensus.
Actually a stronger and more expressive wording was used. And
the same thing was said by Prime Minister Major and Lushkov in
London. He said that one should look to President Bush, even if
he is the coordinator. So that is why my President considers the
meeting with you to be the closing of the first series and to
make it possible to bring the meetings to an even higher level of
cooperation. (C)
I would like to start with a general assessment. In 1945 there
were hardships and Europe faced a calamity. The Marshall Plan
was the result. Later there were military challenges which came
about and military blocks were formed. At the present time, we
are facing an economic catastrophe and the possible collapse of
the Soviet Union. So an immediate solution must be found. We
are talking about emergency measures, but we are optimistic after
the attempted coup, especially with the situation of the
Congress. Between the 22nd of August and the 8th of September,
eight Republics decided on independence and this was reflected in
their actions. But then in meetings with Congress, we began to
see where proud peoples could see that all their sovereignty
needs could be met and we began to see centripetal forces taking
effect. And the activities of the State Counsel led by President
Gorbachev began to demonstrate this. In addition to other steps,
I would like to dwell on the Nagorno-Karadakn Accords signed by
Yeltsin and getting the military accommodations -- what they did
was done in the State Committees. (C)
I'm dwelling on this to say that many of the questions which the
world community is asking, have their answers and now we hope for
a reaction from the world community. And we hope that reaction
will not be asking that more progress is being made. (C)
The President: Let me be clear on the outset. Is the question,
"what do we do to assist, or what do I think of the changes"?
(C)
Foreign Minister Pankin: These are truly interrelated. (C)
The President: I hope our people have made clear that in
assessing the economy there needs to be further clarification
regarding the relationship between the Soviet Union and the
Republics. People have to know who they are dealing with.
Agreements need to be formalized in terms of the most urgent
questions. I want to say, first that we want to help. Second,
our Agriculture Secretary is going there on the heels of a visit
by Mr. Crowder. We are meeting this week on the question of
agricultural support. We will be dealing with questions of how
do we help with food, how do we get it to the people who need it?
We are moving forward. We need to see how to do it better. We
have certain internal laws that have to be complied with. For
example, to go forward on the last agriculture loan guarantee
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
package, the Secretary of Agriculture had to certify the credit-
worthiness of the Soviet Union. We recognize that given the
extraordinary changes in the Soviet Union and the difficulties
encountered, that credit-worthiness may be difficult to certify
right now. (C)
It is my view that Congress wants to help. Therefore these legal
technicalities we face may be more easily dealt with than was
possible in the past. We are also meeting with our Treasury
experts, bank experts and others to see what we can do. But I
would like to ask Secretary Baker to elaborate. (C)
Secretary Baker: Mr. President, you said that it would be easier
now with Congress. I agree. But, we are not over the hump
entirely, as regards assistance to the Soviet Union. But it is a
different world than it was 60 days ago. (C)
We have three political problems in addition to the technical
problems. First, the Baltics. That is handled. Second, Cuba.
That is being handled. Third is the percentage of the gross
national product being spent on defense. It's very much in
excess of what we spend. This will of necessity be addressed
when you come up with a free-market reform plan, because there is
no way that a plan will be creditable if you spend 25 percent of
the gross national product on defense. We believe we will see
repeal of some of the laws restricting Soviet assistance. (C)
The President: We will try to help. (C)
Secretary Baker: You take humanitarian assistance. We think
that areas where we can be helpful are on food distribution,
defense conversion, and energy. Whatever we can do will be more
effective if we do it in consultation with the G-7 and others.
This will depend upon two things, maybe three. The most
important of which is our own budget restraints. The other two
are what I talked about in Moscow. (C)
First, you need to determine the relationship between the Center
and the Republics and between the Republics themselves. So, an
economic treaty is of great importance. After that is done, then
we need to make a credible economic plan which can be worked on
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But a
viable plan cannot be developed until you have defined a
relationship between the Center and the Republics. (e)
Foreign Minister Pankin: May I comment further? First, I want
to emphasize that we are in the process of resolving problems on
the basis of making policy separate from ideology. As for the
third issue regarding the reduction of military spending, we are
taking steps and Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov has been tasked
to come up with a plan. Also, the new head of the KGB, Mr.
Bakatin has been asked to come up with a plan. We are also
having talks on the subject of restructuring of the KGB. That is
why progress is proceeding at a good pace. That is why we have
movement, not because the world has become aware of our problems,
but because the road block has been removed. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: We know that defense reductions are not easy. We
have problems ourselves with base closings. Our Deputy Secretary
of Defense has been intimately involved in this and I'm sure he
will be as cooperative as possible on the subject of defense
conversions. He is a person with great experience in business.
LCT
Secretary Baker: Mr. Atwood will be in Moscow and will be
talking on this subject. (c)
The President: He is a very good man. One who will come up with
positive suggestions. (C)
On the question of assistance, we want to help with food and
medicine right away. We have to clear out our own underbrush to
see how we can move right away. We will be talking with those
who still have worries about Soviet intentions, understandably
because of the past. The more you can do in defense, the better.
The more statements you can make in the defense area the better.
You can understand our apprehensions. As long as you have
missiles pointed at us, there will be apprehension. The more you
can say that we are not a threat to the Soviet Union anymore, the
more we will be able to help. SCT
Foreign Minister Pankin: Almost half of my speech is along these
lines. (e)
The President: I want you to tell President Gorbachev and
President Yeltsin that we are committed. This is not a climate
where we think we would be without difficulties. It is important
that you know that we want to help, but Jim can talk more on this
-- we have to have tangible reforms if we are to be able to give
you the kind of help we want to give. (C)
Foreign Minister Pankin: We have made our decision and we are
following the course we have chosen. Already there is a balance
between the centripetal forces. The main thing we now need is
for the International Community not to wait because the decision
has been taken and we need to see aid now. (C)
Secretary Baker: The International Community wants to help. But
for this process to succeed in a meaningful way, I can't over
emphasize the issue of the Northern Territories. Because the
Japanese are the number one surplus country in the world. We
have not had a single major joint international economic effort
which has not involved the Japanese. (E)
The President: They do want to help. (C)
Secretary Baker: Yes, they do want to help. They contributed
billions to the liberation of Kuwait. (C)
Foreign Minister Pankin: President Yeltsin and I met with
Foreign Minister Nakayama. He will be meeting with President
Gorbachev also. I think there will be forward movement. We
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5
understand that this will have to be resolved -- even though it
is delicate. SCT
The President: Well, unfortunately I have to go, but I want to
say again that you need to get with the International Monetary
Fund and the world financial organizations. The more you can get
them involved, the better the prospects for your success will be.
I know that you are working on this and I encourage you to
continue. LET
It has been a great pleasure to have the chance to talk with you.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUNFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7460
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Oddsson of
Iceland
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and
Deputy Chief of Staff
Charles Cobb, United States Ambassador to
Iceland
Ralph Johnson, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director for International
Programs and Public Diplomacy, NSC
(Notetaker)
David Oddsson, Prime Minister
Gudmundur Benediktsson, Secretary General,
Prime Minister's Office
Greinn Loftsson, Assistant to the Prime
Minister
Tomas Tomasson, Icelandic Ambassador to the
United States
DATE, TIME
September 24, 1991, 9:45 - 10:15am EST
AND PLACE:
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City
Opening pleasantries about Prime Minister Oddsson being in
Florida with Ambassador Cobb and having dinner with Jeb Bush. (U)
The President: How is your President? (U)
Prime Minister Oddsson: She is well and is coming to the US. (U)
The President: Pay my respects to her please. I remember
especially a dinner she gave at her residence when I was
there. (U)
Prime Minister Oddsson: We have a new government in Iceland.
The cornerstone is good relations with the US. (U)
The President: I am trying to think if you and I met in Iceland
when you were mayor. (U)
Prime Minister Oddsson: No, unfortunately I was away when you
visited. (U)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
Declassify on: OADR
00-0429-F
CONFIDENTIAL
8/21/09 no
CONFIDENTIAL
2
The President: Ambassador Cobb has invited me to come back and
fish more. What would you like to discuss today? (U)
Prime Minister Oddsson: Our relationship is very good. I would
like to discuss about Europe and to know about changes in NATO
and changes in Iceland's role. Iceland is very important. We
know things are changing in Eastern Europe. We know defenses
will be reduced. We would like to think the situation in Iceland
is different. It is important to keep the way open between the
two continents. I can hear from some Americans that the
importance of NATO is decreasing. But I still believe in NATO
and think it is not very wise to take it away.
KCT
The President: Our relationship is good. I don't see anything
changing in Europe that would weaken the close relationship
between the US and Iceland. Our commitment to Iceland's security
is important, and Iceland's position as a member of NATO is
important. Yes, there will be some reduction of US forces around
the world. Keflavik is very important. We think the cards
should still be with NATO and it should remain the principle
guarantor of security. We are committed to remaining there. One
scenario I suppose is that the French and others could push for
us to leave. But we get high- level assurances from France that
they want us there. You may see isolationist talk in the US, but
neither I nor our administration will be part of that. Our
commitment to Iceland is important. Brent, would you like to
comment further? (C)
General Scowcroft: The role of Iceland in NATO may become even
more important. As the role of NATO decreases, we would depend
on Iceland more for getting forces over. 16t
The President: The Soviets are desperate for humanitarian
assistance and we should help, but when it comes to massive
economic aid, that is more problematical. Soviet missiles are
still aimed at us and Soviet ships are patrolling. (We have
missiles aimed at them, too, I have admitted to them.) It is not
now that all swords should be beat into plowshares. (C)
Prime Minister Oddsson: It is important to help them to help
themselves. They have to build free markets. (U)
The President: Exactly right, but they do not know how to do it.
They have to hammer out legal arrangements because otherwise it
so difficult to provide technical assistance. Where do
corporations pay taxes, and many other questions must be sorted
out. We do not want to build a perpetual customer for aid
grants. I will give you an example. We were flying with
Gorbachev to Camp Davis. It was a 30-minute flight over the
suburbs of Washington. Gorbachev said who would own a house like
that, referring to the houses below. I said workers, maybe those
who work in some of the buildings below. Gorbachev asked if the
worker could sell it, how he would sell it. I said he would use
a real estage agent. Gorbachev said a real estage agent would be
shot in the Soviet Union. It is mind boggling that the Soviet
Union is so far back on this idea of free enterprise. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIA
L'UNFIUENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
Prime Minister Oddsson: We have changed our position on naval
reductions. We don't think that is a priority of NATO. It is
not healthy.
SCT
The President: I am delighted to know of the change. We had
differences with the previous government on naval arms control.
The US is unilaterally reducing from 600 to 450 ships without any
arms control. I am delighted to know of this. (c)
We are not in the business of encircling the Soviets. Gorbachev
gave us a map, including highlighting the Panama Canal, and said
we are encircling them. The world is changing and we will change
but we won't get rid of our Navy because it is a force for peace.
This change you are talking about will be welcome by us and
should be by others in NATO. LCT
Prime Minister Oddsson: There is tension about whaling. We are
living off of fish products -- 70% of our income. We have been
in the International Whaling Commission and we think it does not
live up to its international responsibilities now, and we are
thinking of moving out of it. I am not saying this day or year;
there is no decision yet. But we are thinking this organization
does not play by the rules and does not act scientifically. We
know states like the US can withdraw from international
organizations, like the US did from UNESCO. YCT
The President: We hope you will reflect carefully on the need to
get out. There are problems but my persistent view is that
sometimes extremes drive these groups. We do not want to see an
extreme dominate. We can stay in and work on it. But there will
be outside groups and we have no control over them. I am
sympathetic. Yes, countries feel free to come and go from
international organizations. It would compel us to take action
if you leave. I feel uncomfortable to tell you because we are so
delighted with your other policies. (C)
General Scowcroft: It is best to reform the organization. (c)
Ambassador Cobb: I have said let's work within it. (C)
The President: Yes, let's do that. We cannot let extremes
dictate to the International Whaling Commission. I appreciate
your bringing it up. We will have the Ambassador and State stay
in touch with you so you do not get blindsided. We owe it to
you. We would be under pressure to do sanctions or something if
you withdraw.
Prime Minister Oddsson: Ambassador Cobb is doing a good job. (U)
The President: We wish you luck and will keep in touch
especially on the IWC. (U)
I am very worried about detaining of the United Nations
inspectors in Iraq. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL