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Presidential Meetings--Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92-7/9/92
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons Files
OA/ID Number:
91110
Folder ID Number:
91110-001
Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
1
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan (7
7/1/92
(b)(1)
/
C
pp.)
02. Memcon
Re: Meeting between POTUS and President Mitterrand (9 pp.)
7/5/92
(b)
03. Memcon
Re: Vice President Quayle's Meeting with Prime Minister
7/9/92
(b)(
8
Vagnorius of Lithuania (3 pp.)
04. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Giuliano Amato of Italy (3 pp.)
7/6/92
(b)(1)
05. Memcon
Re: Opening Session 1992 Munich Economic Summit (14 pp.)
7/6/92
(b)(I
06. Memcon
Re: Plenary Session 1992 Munich Economic Summit (3 pp.)
7/7/92
(b)(1)
07. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)
7/7/92
(b)(1)
08. Memcon
Re: Private Plenary Session 1992 Munich Economic Summit (9
7/7/92
(b)(1)
pp.)
09. Memcon
Re: Afternoon Plenary Session 1992 Munich Economic Summit
7/7/92
(b)(1)
of
(3 pp.)
10. Memcon
Re: Joint Plenary Session 1992 Munich Economic Summit (3
7/8/92
(b)(
pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Pinksheet Number:
cap934
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
11. Memcon
Re: Heads of Delegation Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin at
7/8/92
(b)(1)
$
the 1992 Munich Economic Summit (11 pp.)
12. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis of
7/9/92
(b)(1)
&
Greece (4 pp.)
13. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman of the State
7/9/92
(b)(1)
/
Council of Georgia (4 pp.)
14. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary General (3
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
pp.)
15. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus (3
7/9/92
(b)(i)
&
pp.)
16. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (5 pp.)
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
17. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Havel of Czech and Slovak Federal
7/9/92
(b)(1
/
Republic (3 pp.)
18. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Presidents Ruutel of Estonia, Gorbunovs of
7/10/92
(b)(1
&
8
Latvia, and Landsbergis of Lithuania (5 pp.)
19. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis of
7/9/92
(b)(1)
/
Greece (4 pp.)
20. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary General (3
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Pinksheet Number:
cap934
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
21. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel of Turkey
7/9/92
(b)(I)
$
(2 pp.)
22. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Aliza Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia-
7/9/92
(b)(1
/
Herzegovina (4 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Pinksheet Number:
cap934
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
JULY
CONFIDENTIAL
CORRECTED PAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
5453
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
of Japan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Michael Armacost, Ambassador to Japan
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs and
Counselor, Department of State
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian Affairs
Karl Jackson, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Douglas H. Paal, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, NSC
Torkel Patterson, Director for Asian Affairs,
NSC, Notetaker
Francis Seeds, Interpreter
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister
Nobuo Matsunaga, The Envoy of the Government
of Japan
Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador to the United
States
Motoji Kondo, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister
(Political Affairs)
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Foreign Minister
DECLASSIFIED
(Economic Affairs)
PER E.O. 13526
Yukio Sato, Director General, North American
2009-0649-MR
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kazuo Takeuchi, Executive Assistant to the
SCS 1/6/2011
Prime Minister
Hajime Hayashi, Interpreter for Mr. Kondo
Daisuke Matsunaga, Interpreter for the Prime
Minster
Nobuaki Tanaka, Director of the First North
American Affairs Division
DATE, TIME
July 1, 1992, 3:40 - 4:30pm EDT
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
LUNI IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5453
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
of Japan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Michael Armacost, Ambassador to Japan
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs and
Counselor, Department of State
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian Affairs
Karl Jackson, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Douglas H. Paal, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, NSC
Torkel Patterson, Director for Asian Affairs,
NSC, Notetaker
Francis Seeds, Interpreter
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister
Nobuo Matsunaga, The Envoy of the Government
of Japan
Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador to the United
States
Motoji Kondo, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister
(Political Affairs)
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Foreign Minister
(Economic Affairs)
Yukio Sato, Director General, North American
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kazuo Takeuchi, Executive Assistant to the
Prime Minister
Hajime Hayashi, Interpreter for Mr. Kondo
Daisuke Matsunaga, Interpreter for the Prime
Minster
Nobuaki Tanaka, Director of the First North
American Affairs Division
DATE, TIME
July 4, 1992, 3:40 - 4:30pm EDT
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: I am very pleased that on the eve of such a busy
schedule preparing for the G-7 meeting, you would come here to
see me. This is a tiny opportunity for me to repay the fine
hospitality I received in Japan. I still remember it as a good
visit even though the press tried to savage it. We made very
good progress and I hope that we will be able to review that
while we're together. I want to give you all a full welcome. (U)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Thank you very much, we appreciate your
hospitality. (U)
The President: Let's talk about G-7 issues. This is very
important for our side. One of the key issues for us in Munich
will be supporting economic growth. It's important for us all.
I'm pleased with the statement your party made on economic growth
and I hope you' be able to announce details of domestic growth
package soon. That would be very good. The Prime Minister has
explained to me some of the complications, but we would hope that
you are serious about promoting growth. Our econometric model,
however, seems to differ somewhat from yours. We show that six
to seven trillion yen will produce about 2.9% growth, rather than
3.5%. I recognize that these models are sometimes not
particularly accurate. As you are aware, a Japanese supplemental
budget that promotes substantial growth, through strengthening
domestic demand rather than exports, presents a positive message
to the G-7 partners. I feel funny discussing financial issues
with Prime Minister Miyazawa because he's such an expert. He and
Jim Baker worked out something similar under the Plaza Accords.
(c)
I talked to Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand about our
negotiations over the Uruguay Round; they' been working hard to
try to resolve our differences on agriculture before Munich.
Kohl does not want discussion of the Uruguay Round to dominate
Munich, but we are probing to see how far we can go. The
President of France has invited the Secretary of State to come in
before Munich to a ministerial to discuss GATT, but we're not
sure we want to do that unless we know that we're going to make
some progress. We'd like to get it moving. The Europeans
weren't too flexible, but we think they have some more room.
Frankly, I think that they have to move a little bit further.
The Germans say the U.S. is closed, and that we are not
supporting the Dunkel text. It may or may not be a good starting
point but we need to give it a serious look. We will see whether
or not the Europeans can move more; we are waiting to see if a
"last gasp" effort will be effective. I strongly solicit the
support of Japan. I want to be side-by-side with Japan to
support us actively to bring remaining issues, including services
and market access, to closure.
It is critical that we provide support and reform to the growing
market economies, and that was something I talked about at length
with Boris Yeltsin. We believe in that well know adage that
"trade is better than aid."
(L)
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CONFIDENTIAL
I told you that I'd raise the Northern Territories with Boris
Yeltsin and I did. I told him that we are strongly on the side
of Japan on this issue. It is so much in the Russian interest.
Brent, do you have anything more to add on this? (c)
Brent Scowcroft: Well, he described some of the problems he had
at home and he talked about interim measures that he would be
taking and the fact that he would have to bring something with
him when he goes to Japan. The man is faced with enormous
problems. His ability to move is somewhat limited. (c)
The President: We have some more things to talk about today,
including nuclear safety, LDC debt, a little bit more about
Yeltsin in Munich or, if you'd like, we can talk about North
Korea and other regional issues. Let me give you a chance to
speak, Mr. Prime Minister. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Thank you for this briefing on some of
the problems we face together. First let me congratulate you on
your leadership. Your economy is doing better, the trade balance
is turning to the better. You've been good at resisting
protectionist moves. You had a very successful meeting with
Yeltsin, and your agreement on reduction of nuclear weapons is
really great. Your leadership is important and we do appreciate
America taking the leadership role in the post-cold war world.
Our relations have never been better. I had a good meeting with
the Vice President. We agreed to aid to Eastern Europe,
including some to Poland. I also want to thank you for your help
with Mr. Kanemaru. (C)
The President: He's a fine man. We had a good visit. (U)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Concerning Yeltsin, we've been briefed
by General Scowcroft on his meetings here. I have met with most
of the G-7 leaders on the Northern Territories issue; some are
sympathetic, others are not. I do appreciate you making the
Northern Territories issue a priority. Before the Yeltsin visit
I expect that we'll have a meeting of our foreign ministers in
August or September. (f)
The President: Do you share the feeling that Yeltsin's visit to
Japan in September can take place without any progress, or does
he need to make progress? (c)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Yeltsin initiated this meeting some
time ago in New York, so he is coming with his own ideas.
Subsequently, his situation has gotten difficult, but hopefully
there will be some breakthrough. Up to now, and historically,
the Russians have been stonewalling, so let's see. ()
The President: We offer our offices, if we can be of help. ()
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Thank you. Mentioning this does make a
difference. (f)
On the economy, we took special measures to front-load our budget
this year, and it's made no impact. If that should not prove
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENT IAL
enough, which looks likely, it seems inevitable that we will have
to take additional measures of substantial magnitude that will
make the Japanese economy pick up later in the fall or hopefully
at least by the end of the year. Hopefully this will put us on
the path of sustainable growth. Secretary Baker and I did this
in '87 with some success. We are trying to mobilize all of our
resources.
The President: Do you have any resistance to this? I can't
image that anyone would be opposed to it. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Well, not in the political and economic
circles, but in the bureaucracy, yes (laughter). My intention
with this package is to use government bonds to develop sewage,
parks, garbage disposal and improve the quality of life. In view
of the fact that we export too much, while living in rabbit
hutches, we are going to emphasize reducing working hours and
increasing spending in science and technology and other areas for
domestic growth. On the Uruguay Round, I'm hoping that the
Secretary of State will be able to make a breakthrough, but we
don't believe the outlook is rosy. But it would be wonderful if
we could. Japan has one area that's a difficult issue, however.
(C)
The President: Let me guess (laughter). Any flexibility in that
area? (c)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Well, no, but on market access Japan
has been most forthcoming. On the other problem, we have the
upper house elections. On the Russian problem, we heard from the
Secretary General of the IMF that the Russian economy is worse
than expected and that we need to wait until the IMF letter of
intent with Yeltsin can be agreed. It's not likely that they can
agree, but that's what we need to do. (f)
The President: May I make a comment? We had a briefing from the
IMF and the Russian economy is doing worse. Having said that, we
have to be flexible enough to help Yeltsin. He is up against
very powerful reactionary forces. The IMF feels constrained by
its own guidelines. We would like to find something as soon as
possible, something tangible to put in the hands of Yeltsin.
He's made some tough decisions, but of course he needs to do
more. Yeltsin has taken some difficult steps, we know that he's
trying, but it would be a terrible setback to see him thrown out
and the hardliners be put back in. Secretary Baker do you have
anything to say to this? (c)
Secretary Baker: Since my conversation with you earlier, we need
to try to stretch to see if we can go along with IMF Managing
Director Camdessus' suggestion that we provide $1 billion for the
first traunche, without tying him up in conditions. ()
Secretary Brady: It would be one thing if we started from
scratch but Camdessus got out in front and put this package out
publicly. If he hadn't, maybe we could get this completed
without embarrassing Yeltsin; but since the IMF has gone ahead,
its going to be very difficult, so we need to be in such a
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM IDENTIFIC
position that we can do something. We are stuck. The only
solution we're going to have is to provide him the $1 billion
that he needs to carry through. (L)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: We are not opposed to the $1 billion
for the first traunche.
The President: Well symbolically it's important. I can't agree
with the IMF to throw this out and two months later just cut him
off. Yeltsin has a good message, he's trying to produce, he
talks a good game and he's sincere, but his problems are
enormous. We were very impressed when he came here. He's got an
attractive young team around him. The Defense Minister backed
him up big in the intercontinental ballistic missile discussions.
His people are young, good people. They are serious. (c)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: You mentioned North Korea. The
problems remain the same and we wonder to what extent we can
expect much progress. An inspection by IAEA only is not
adequate. There needs to be bilateral inspections also. We are
suspicious of some of North Korea's preparations and we don't
know very much about what they're doing. We need mutual
inspections between the North and the South where the South can
have more intrusive inspections. Our information is that the
North is rather recalcitrant. We are still in the dark,
especially about what's going on at Yongbyon; it's not clear.
Japan has been negotiating with North Korea for normalization,
but we will not finalize until we are certain that the nuclear
issue has been resolved. I think your Under Secretary Kanter has
been in touch with them and maybe he has more information. (c)
The President: We appreciate your efforts to hold the line.
Dick Solomon, do you have anything to add on North Korea? ()
Assistant Secretary Solomon: The strategy of the North is to
split the South from the U.S., but we can't let them do that, and
we won't let them do that. We agree that we need both
inspections. The South has some incentives to keep the dialog
going, but we are certain that they are going to hold firm.
We're firm on the need for both inspections. In our own
bilateral relations with the North, we have other issues besides
the nuclear one, including proliferation, war remains and others,
that we're going to have to take care of. But the fundamental
issue that we have to keep in mind is that the North-South
relationship has to be kept out in front. We are hoping too,
that once the bilateral inspection is established it may lead to
an arms control process. It's important to all of our security.
(c)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Well there seems to be some doves and
hawks in Korea. (d)
The President: Where is Kim Il Sung's son? What do you think
about him?
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Well, the son is taking over from the
father, but to what extent he will succeed is not clear.
(e)
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The President: Our profiles indicate that he is not dependable,
he's rather erratic and obsessed with perpetuating the myth of
being better than everyone. I don't see any reason to think that
his succession should be reassuring. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: We really don't have much knowledge of
him. (f)
The President: Dick, you're our expert, do you have anything to
add? (U)
Assistant Secretary Solomon: Well, he's a bizarre fellow. He
has some rather strange tastes; he's only met with Chinese
foreign leaders and we really don't know much about him. (£)
The President: Mr. Prime Minister, will you comment on Cambodia?
(c)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: All factions agreed to the Paris Accord
and the establishment of the Supreme National Council, but at the
second stage of UN peacekeeping the Khmer Rouge refused to
demobilize. We've since then had this conference in Tokyo. We
had an all night session to work out some problems and to push
hard for reconciliation, but it failed. It seemed to me that the
Khmer Rouge representative didn't have enough instructions or
authority to make decisions. Now they are supposed to meet with
the Khmer Rouge, in Phnom Penh, but Prince Sihanouk is having a
diplomatic illness. People are rather pessimistic about what's
going on there which makes the activities of UNTAC difficult.
Unless the Khmer Rouge does agree the whole operation of
peacekeeping may come into doubt.
(c)
Secretary Baker: This is an extremely big and enormous
operation. Japan has been very generous, Mr. President. We need
to press China and Taiwan to be firm with the Khmer Rouge. (e)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Well, we found China to be rather
cooperative but the Thai we're not sure of. They had a leader
for a while who seemed to be rather helpful but he didn't win the
election. ()
The President: Well, it looks like we're running out of time
here, I wonder if we shouldn't adjourn. Would you like to come
into my office with me and then we'll go out and make our
statements to the press. Thank you all very much. (U)
-- End of conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
SECRET
6046
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting between POTUS and President Mitterrand
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Baker
DECLASSIFIED
Secretary Brady
General Scowcroft
PER E.O. 13526
Robert Zoellick (notetaker)
2009-0649-MR
President Mitterrand
SCS 1/6/11
Minister Dumas
Hubert Vedrine, Presidential Assistant
Anne Lauvergeon, Presidential Assistant
DATE, TIME
July 5, 1992, 8:30 - 10:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Munich, Germany
President Bush: Thanks for coming over. Hope we can work out
dates for a meeting at Camp David or some place else. Sorry
for being less flexible than I would like about the exact
date. (U)
President Mitterrand: No problem, we will work something out.
(U)
President Bush: It's important that we meet. I don't want to
see a disconnect between the United States and France. We may
have differences. But it's better to talk about them, get them
on the table. This is an interesting period in the United
States. We're in a presidential year; some are saying the U.S.
has done its part, and that it's time to come home. It's a mood
right below the surface. We also are facing a sluggish recovery.
This adds to feelings of people asking why we should spend money
abroad. My view is that it's in our own interest to have our
troops here in Europe. I also believe most Europeans want us
here. But I'm not sure I fully understand the heartbeat of the
French on this question. I think I understand it when you and I
discuss this subject, but then problems arise. There is a broad
feeling in our government that the French are ambivalent about
the U.S. presence. (d)
Perhaps you have concluded we'll leave. For us to remain, we
need to put our emphasis on NATO. We know of your historic
differences with NATO. But that's one reason I was anxious to
meet, so I hope you'll be frank about our existing problems on
questions of security for Europe. We get different answers on
the Franco-German Corps from the French and from the Germans.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
We also have had differences in the NACC. I need to know where
you're coming from. France is important to the security of
Europe and elsewhere. I don't want us to be ships passing in the
night.
(d)
President Mitterrand: Our position is simple. We are members
of the Atlantic Alliance. There have been no serious
circumstances where we have failed to meet our obligations.
We're present at political meetings. The status was designed
by de Gaulle because of our nuclear armament. We couldn't deal
with your nuclear doctrine in the way you wish, to put our very
physical existence at stake. But then again this is speaking as
if the Soviet Union is still as it was. I don't see how you
believe that we make things difficult. My impression is we
have good relations with the U.S., although they seem to
complain. We pay for the Atlantic Alliance. We don't want to
dismantle it. Of course, we won't move into the integrated
command. But we have good relations between military staffs.
So where are the difficulties coming from? I understand that
you regret that France is outside the integrated command. But
this has no serious impacts. We've been living with this since
1966. In all serious circumstances, the French and the U.K.
have been very close to the U.S. So, I don't understand why the
question is asked. ($)
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, I haven't understood the
reasons why you're trying to give NATO a new content. At the
time that the threat of war is receding, it seems you want NATO's
mission to expand. Why is this? You never discussed it with us.
What does the U.S. want more than it had before? Do you want a
political role? That's difficult to give a military
organization. If I have any qualifications, it's that. But I'm
not seeking to be stubborn. If you're keen on some ideas, let's
discuss them. I remember at Williamsburg, when Ronald Reagan
submitted a text talking about Japan and the Atlantic Alliance as
if they were the same thing. Not to me. So I disagreed. In the
Middle East, you saw our position and support on Iraq. In North
Africa, you see our position. But I feel alien to Tokyo
Taiwan. If there's a problem, we should discuss it. What
responsibilities do you want to give to a renovated NATO? It
seems you're striving to make NATO the only place to discuss
defense problems. But there are other places. I know of the
U.S.'s anxiety. In Rome, you showed great understanding on the
WEU. But then we thought your position became firmer, that you
hardened. ($)
It seems that any military unit alongside NATO gives you worry,
even if it's in harmony with NATO. You had the same reaction to
the Franco-German Corps. I don't see how I could differ with
Kohl. The Corps represents the most we can do. Its value is
primarily political. For more than a century, France and Germany
were enemies. Now we meet together in Munich. What incredible
memories. There were mistakes before the war. We abandoned the
Czechs. I have neither illusions, nor ambitions to make the
Corps into a new army. What is done is done. It's difficult to
take it further. Others will join, but not many, perhaps the
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Belgians, the Luxembourgers, the Italians. But if they don't, it
is of no matter. The Corps illustrates the reconciliation
between France and Germany. It is a duet that demonstrates
strength and power. We're not asking for more. It is not to
conquer foreign lands. We intend no offensive actions anywhere.
($)
I don't see U.S. troops leaving for a long time; I'll be long
dead, so that's not my aim. There are, of course, elements that
could undercut you: public opinion, the press, budget. For the
next four years the President will be you, I won't hide my
feelings, but your successor may not have the same policies. So
we need an organization to ensure our own security. Not against
NATO, but with NATO. Look for a single example to the contrary
of what I'm saying. ($)
President Bush: If you felt because of pressures that we'd
pull out I would understand. But I have to ask myself what does
the Franco-German Corps do? I understand that it would shore up
your friendship. But our problem is that more differences seem
to be appearing. We thought we'd agreed on the definition of
CSCE security. We thought that France believed the U.S. should
remain. But the more differences we encounter, the more
questions raised in our minds of whether the U.S. is wanted. I
would understand it if you think that we are pulling out,
returning to 1938. And that's the Catch 22 that's created: that
theme plays on sentiments in the U.S. As long as I'm President,
we will stay. How much of our differences -- in NACC, CSCE, with
the Franco-German Corps -- are because you think we're going to
pull out? ($)
President Mitterrand: We don't feel a need to say yes without
consultations. When you define your broad strategy, you're the
most powerful, (cites various recent examples) and we don't want
to learn what you're doing by reading it in the press. Of course
you've been kind to write about the things you're doing, but
others may not be. (d)
President Bush: Take the case of Yugoslavia, we didn't push.
We said let others proceed. (&)
President Mitterrand: I'm trying to explain my reasoning. On
each problem, it seems possible for us to reconcile our
differences. If the Franco-German Corps is of no particular
use, how can it hurt? (d)
President Bush: We get different definitions of the
Franco-German Corps. Let Secretary Baker say a word. (c)
President Mitterrand: Let's be precise. All armed forces of
the Western allies will inevitably exist within NATO. France
is not within the military integrated command, but our own
strategy operates within NATO. We want distance between the
integrated military. But this Corps is a small part of the
German army, perhaps 35,000 men. You're giving very
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formalistic answers. I can't imagine the Franco-German Corps
will engage in any action outside of NATO. It would have to be
complementary. ($)
President Bush: We're not seeking to encourage antagonism. (U)
Secretary Baker: The key is in your words. If the Corps is
indeed complementary, fine. We've supported the European
security and defense identity. But what we' worried about is
duplication. We respect the French view on the integrated
military command. But German forces would normally have priority
assignment to NATO. The Germans tell us that their forces in the
Corps will, but the French tell us something different. ($)
President Mitterrand: I don't understand. The Franco-German
Corp has no direct instrument without NATO agreement. How
would it do so? For example, if there's a conflict with
Russia. The Franco-German Corps is an embryo, it would take
25 years or longer for Europeans to develop their own security.
The Corps is as far as I can expect to go. ($)
Secretary Baker: Our concern is that the embryo will grow into a
rooster and be duplicative of NATO. If its role is not
clear, it will undermine the United States' consensus for NATO.
You mentioned a possible political role for NATO. Yes, that is
what we want. NATO is not just a military alliance, but it's a
political alliance and that has been demonstrated in the past.
So the new roles and missions for NATO means the enhancement of
its political role as well as strengthening its military role.
We have no problem with the European defense identity if it
complements NATO, but doesn't duplicate it. But when we ask
Germans if their forces have first priority to NATO, the Germans
say yes, but you say something different. ($)
President Mitterrand: But this is devoid of content. Even the
question is odd. How can we be different from NATO? To do what,
to go where? (f)
Secretary Baker: Go wherever the head of it goes. (U)
Minister Dumas: We saw an example in Yugoslavia. The U.S.
didn't want to get involved. But Europe may be concerned. So
we need flexible relations with NATO and a European view.
Europeans need something to help deal with such situations
without being incompatible with NATO. Look at the Gulf. The
WEU forces complemented the U.S. But for the moment we're only
discussing German and French forces. On doublehatting, some
nations will say they would like to participate but all troops
will be in the integrated command. That's no problem. They' 11
be allocated twice.
President Mitterrand: I have seen that the Franco-German Corps
seems to be worrying the U.S., why is this? ($)
President Bush: It sends signals to the U.S. that you believe
we won't remain. ($)
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President Mitterrand: It's not as clear as that. (U)
President Bush: It's clear to us. Congress says why should
U.S. troops be in Europe? France has a new answer. We say NATO
is a stabilizing force. Either you think we're leaving or
that NATO is not important. It's fine to go march into
Sarajevo. But the problem is if you think that the U.S. can't
be counted on. ($)
President Mitterrand: It's impossible to compare this to the
tremendous power of NATO, and I repeat we're part of NATO,
we're one of two European countries with nuclear forces, small
but enough to make a difference. This is not the same as all the
forces with NATO. ($)
President Bush: I'm not being articulate on this. The signal
is that we're not going to stay or that we're not wanted. (x)
President Mitterrand: Then what should we do? Leave the
United States' military in charge of all decisions? ($)
Secretary Baker: No, establish true complementarity. Answer
the questions about the Corps the same way as the Germans are
answering them. You will develop it as a European defense
identity to deal with problems that NATO won't. Where there's a
conflict, it can be complementary, but not duplicative. ($)
President Mitterrand: Secretary Baker is the best spokesman of
France's policy. (d)
President Bush: We have some CSCE problems. ($)
Secretary Baker: This is referring to the problem of NATO as a
component of CSCE peacekeeping. We encountered great trench
warfare in Oslo. Now we're repeating it in Helsinki. ($)
President Mitterrand: I'm not interested in that war. We're not
going to return to trench warfare. Maybe it's possible for all
of Europe to be in the same alliance, but I don't see how Bosnia
and others would be a part of it. CSCE enabled us to join the
former Soviet Union with Western Europe. I even had difficulty
convening CSCE in 1989. But there was instability in that
period. I held the conference in Paris. We were behind making
CSCE a success. You were more concerned. I was all in favor of
CSCE. If you can say they're all ready to join the alliance
(C)
Secretary Baker: No, but all agree with the idea of a NATO
peacekeeping force except France. ($)
President Mitterrand: Well, then we have the pleasure of an
original position. Look at the heads in the former Soviet
Union, they are all apparatchiks. They save their skin by
becoming super nationalists. They're not the ones to give us
lessons on loyalty to the alliance. (c)
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Minister Dumas: We would like to agree to call on NATO or the
WEU as needed.
(C)
President Mitterrand: This is not a problem for us.
(d)
Minister Dumas: But in some situations it may not be a good
idea for NATO to intervene.
President Mitterrand: This is not a big problem. We don't
care much. What other forces are there than through NATO?
()
President Bush: Put on your historian's hat. Do you believe
the United States will be in Europe in ten years?
President Mitterrand: Yes. I'm not sure about 50 years -- not
because of the Europeans but because of the Americans. I
understand the Franco-German business concerns you because of
our different status in the alliance. But we all have
constitutional differences. We can find a solution if we work on
it. And we have no problems with the CSCE issue, I just find it
amusing.
President Bush: Our objective is to achieve stability.
()
President Mitterrand: I have two worries: First, Russia has
been rolled back from its achievements over three centuries. In
some barracks or elsewhere, people will argue that Russia
has been betrayed. They will feed on the discontent. This is
not a probability, but I fear a coup even if through civilian
leaders pandering to nationalism and for people seeking revenge.
Second, I worry about Europe splitting up. We're going too far
in splitting. This is counter to the historical trend. There
are new states that never existed. Take for example, Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ossetia. There'll be wars. Specters are
coming back. I'm not joking; I'm talking to the President of the
United States, the most powerful country in the world. Watch
Russia and Ukraine. That relationship will be of primary
importance to Germany. Poland has always been a friend of
France, but it's never been capable of governing itself. Do you
think I have the illusion we could solve all this without you?
($)
President Bush: The best signal to all of them is a strong
united Western alliance. It avoids a signal to the United
States that throws doubt on us.
($)
President Mitterrand: Does it add suspicions on your part,
with the press? (U)
President Bush: Don't feed the feeling in the U.S. I can
contain it. Avoid a signal that sends the clock back to the
'30s.
($)
President Mitterrand: We can't give up on our personal thoughts.
The things we propose aren't all stupid. We know Europe well.
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For example the Court of Arbitration. We set up one in the EC.
It's a good system. Let me give you an example, through
Yugoslavia. Once Yugoslavia started to break up the Germans
wanted to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. I felt it was wrong to
move quickly. We needed to define principles in law on the
frontiers and minorities. But they rushed into unconditional
recognition. A Court of Arbitration would have been useful in
this circumstance. The minorities fear that they will be
massacred. But we didn't succeed. We had a map. We were trying
to determine which villages belonged to which groups. What I'm
saying is not all French initiatives are bad. ($)
President Bush: I saluted you for your acts in Sarajevo. (U)
President Mitterrand: The idea was not to get negotiations
started. We just wanted to open the airport. (U)
President Bush: It was very important symbolically. (U)
President Mitterrand: The plane had to land in Croatia.
Tudjman wanted to have dinner with me. I said no. I'm not
here to negotiate. Milosevic said don't land in Sarajevo it's
too dangerous. I said I didn't want to ask the Serbian President
for permission to land. ($)
President Bush: You stayed out of the political side, you
stressed the humanitarian. (U)
Secretary Baker: It also sent a clear signal to the warring
tribe that there's a price to be paid. (U)
President Bush: How was it received in France? (U)
President Mitterrand: Well, when I landed, a Serbian general
there said that the international press was slandering the Serbs,
but it's really the Moslems. I said how can they kill your men?
Only because you're here. Why are you here? ()
Coming back to CSCE, I don't see how there can be differences
between the United States and France on where we want it to go.
I think you' re wrong on the Court of arbitration. (c)
Minister Dumas: The other problem is CSCE calling on NATO for
peacekeeping. (C)
President Bush: Our difference isn't just one about the role of
arbitration. It's the role of NATO. Everyone else agrees
on this, but I know what's it like to be alone. Like me in
Rio.
(c)
President Mitterrand: Dumas says you want CSCE to call on
NATO. We want the WEU to be available too.
(X)
Secretary Baker: That's OK with us. The exact difference is
that you want to make it difficult procedurally. (c)
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President Mitterrand: I'm not legalistic to that degree.
Let's talk about things that exist. NATO does, luckily. The
WEU barely exists. CSCE will do what it wants. That's no
problem. Can you accept the Badinter proposal? (e)
[Then there follows a discussion in which we tried to explain
that we hoped to figure out a way to let Badinter proceed even if
we could not agree with it. We also explained our directed
mediation proposal and how it would be complementary. ($)
President Bush: I stopped in Poland on the way here. Walesa
is trying but things are very difficult. I said we'd convert
$200 million from the stabilization fund to other uses. I hope
you'll look at it. (d)
Anne Lauvergeon: The French shared 600 million on francs, we'd
always planned to use it for Polish development projects. You
have no problem with us. (f)
President Mitterrand: I'm very happy to do this. (U)
President Bush: I worry about Poland.
(f)
President Mitterrand: Yes, there's disorder, there's chaos,
there's not much political weight. They have a key role to
play as a buffer between the Germans and the Slavs. Silesia
and Pomerania are part of Poland now, but they were German.
The Russians occupy part of Poland. (d)
President Bush: You're nice to say you'd see Baker on the
Uruguay Round. We thought the European Community might come
forward with some flexibility. But they were silent. So we
didn't feel that the meeting was worth your time. We made two
proposals. I just wanted to apologize for the lack of the
meeting. ()
President Mitterrand: It was better not to meet if there were
going to be no change in position. (c)
President Bush: I know it's tough for you and us, but I think
we're not far apart.
(d)
President Mitterrand: I want GATT to be a success. It would
stimulate the world economy. But we have big differences on
agriculture. We've moved forward. The new agriculture policy is
almost causing a peasant revolt. It goes in your direction on
export subsidies. Exports will be cut at least 18 percent. It
comes part of the way. We're ready to discuss the rest. We've
fought on agricultural terms since 1985, but it's no longer the
main issue. We have to focus on services and industry. ()
President Bush: We understand. But too much of a departure
from the Dunkel text will lead to a revolt in the United States
and the Cairns group. ()
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Secretary Baker: I think we're a lot closer than the parties and
the public realize. We also need an agreement on market access
in services. Your actions on CAP reform make a solution
possible. I know it's painful. But we need to incorporate your
CAP reform proposals in a text. If we can guarantee the sanctity
of income support payments to farmers, what could you do for us
on export subsidies in volume terms? I think that there is an
agreement to be made. (d)
Anne Lauvergeon: There's a big difference between 18 and 24
percent. (d)
Secretary Baker: We think we can satisfy you on internal
supports and then you can meet us on export subsidies. Some of
our people say that there should be no agreement without the
other areas that we are still lacking, but we don't agree. An
agriculture deal would be a big step. We're not sure where to
deal. Delors and Andriessen need to consider and consult with
each member. But if you, Kohl, and Major instruct them to look
at the income supports, to make payments inviolate, and then
look at what you can do for us in exports subsidies. It would
codify your past reform policies. If you gave them that general
instruction, I think we can reach an agreement. (d)
President Mitterrand: I think we can move in this direction.
We can't agree here, but we can move in that direction. (f)
Let me summarize. On NATO, WEU and the Franco-German Corps, you
discussed the different explanations between German and France.
The Franco-German Corps should be able to fulfill its own
missions, NATO need not intervene, but they should decide
jointly. I'm not closed to discussing further along these lines.
On CSCE, we are prepared for conciliatory formula on using NATO
and the WEU. We're quite prepared to give the maximum
flexibility to reach agreement. Finally, I would be grateful if
you would examine the Court of Arbitration. ($)
President Bush: We will have a look. (U)
President Mitterrand: As for GATT, the new CAP reforms can
bring views on farm products closer. But 18-24 percent is a
We also need a comprehensive agreement for GATT.
big difference. What could you do that would be comparable? (c)
Secretary Baker: I wonder if it's useful to try and get a
clearer understanding on complementarity in a working text.
()
President Mitterrand: I agree. (U)
President Bush: I think the EC has offered 20 percent on export
subsidies. (f)
Meeting closed with various pleasantries. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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July 9, 1992
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Vice President Quayle's Meeting with Prime
Minister Vagnorius of Lithuania
PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The Vice President
Karl D. Jackson
Nick Burns, NSC
Jeff McKitrick
Lithuania
Prime Minister Vagnorius
Gabija Petrauskas, Advisor to the Prime Minister
Stasys Lozoraitis, Lithuanian Ambassador to U.S.
DATE:
July 6, 1992
TIME:
1:15 p.m.
PLACE:
OEOB Office
The Vice President: Good to see you again. We have met in
Indianapolis, Vilnius, and now here in Washington!
Prime Minister Vagnorius: And I have signed three agreements
with you.
The Vice President: Right. Well, what's happened in Vilnius
since I left there in February. I know the snow must have all
melted!
Prime Minister Vagnorius: We are determined to move forward on
reform without hesitation. The major focus in our country is on
reform. We intend to continue the privatization of major
industries. But there are several impediments. We have
difficulties with some of our neighbors and the economic reform
program is causing some problems.
The major issue for the entire region is democratization. Will
is continue to completion? Or will certain forces stop it?
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There are some forces in the East that are hampering our efforts
as well. This fall is crucial. It is the turning point in
Russia and in Lithuania. Nobody can guarantee that we won't face
some surprises in Russia this fall. We see some worrisome
tendencies there and we're the first to feel the impact of any
shifts.
So the time for the West to help us is now. First, to stabilize
our trade relations. Second, to establish economic reform
programs. And third, to regulate the removal of Soviet troops.
Turning to other issues facing Lithuania, we face an unexpected
crisis because of the drought. We just had a meeting with the
World Bank and we will raise this problem at the G-24 meeting as
well. We need assistance with feed grain, primarily for our
livestock herd, which we export as meat to our eastern neighbors.
But the priority item is the removal of foreign troops. The
Russian government agrees with us, but the timing is still
unresolved. It is critical to resolve it right now. If we could
establish a time frame with Russia, the situation would
stabilize. I hope the U.S. sympathizes and understands and will
help us further on this. It is a priority item for us to remove
the troops as soon as possible.
For our part, we are addressing the issue of housing for those
troops. We have established a fund for housing them. Our funds
are limited, however, and it is difficult to explain to our
people why they should contribute money for housing an occupying
force. That is why the housing fund must be joint; so our people
can accept it.
The Vice President: You mentioned the problem Russia may face
this fall. What is your impression of Yeltsin? He was just
here, you know. He seemed to be in charge. He seems committed
to democracy. He has a plan for the withdrawal of troops. In
your view is Yeltsin strong enough? Or has he been weakened?
Prime Minister Vagnorius: Yeltsin is popular with the Russian
people. But there are forces in Russia opposed to political and
economic reform. They have become more vocal in recent weeks and
indications are that they are increasing their efforts.
The major issue for Yeltsin is can he see the political and
economic reform effort through to completion. This depends on
aid from other governments and the establishment of conditions in
Russia to help reform.
The major issue is the economic and social conditions in Russia.
The people have to see that reforms will succeed.
The Vice President: What do you pick up on what's going on in
the Russian military? Do the troops in Lithuania talk about
what's going on back home?
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Prime Minister Vagnorius: The Russian forces in Lithuania are
not interested in leaving. If we set up this fund, 70 to 80
million dollars worth, we will use it to provide monetary
incentives for them to leave.
The Vice President: By building housing for them in Russia?
Prime Minister Vagnorius: The fund would not be only for
housing, but also for dislocation compensation for the families
of troops in Lithuania. There are other political motifs
complicating the withdrawal issue. But in our talks with the
Russians, we have offered the compensation package.
We are interested in providing monetary incentives to the
families so they would want to leave. Or we would provide
compensation to those troops who would want to remain, but not as
troops.
This issue will be more difficult to resolve next year.
The Vice President: But the issue is not only housing. Don't
they like Lithuania and see no future back home? There must be
more at work than just monetary compensation can solve.
Prime Minister Vagnorius: For regular soldiers, there is a
better opportunity if they return to Russia. But the socio-
economic situation of officers is different. This is a unique
situation that calls for innovative solutions.
Another unique situation is economic reform in Lithuania. There
are no more collective farms in Lithuania, but there are still
collective farms in Russia and that has a major influence on the
way things are ordered.
It took a great effort for us to eliminate collectives. And we
had a difficult time setting up a production program. And if we
succeed in completing this process, we will have a major impact
on Russia. That's why the West should pay more attention to our
situation.
The Vice President: We want Lithuania to make it. Trade and
investment, like the framework agreement we are about to sign,
are key elements. We also want democracy to succeed in Russia.
You have our commitment to help.
Please give my very best to President Landsbergis. Tell him to
keep up the good work.
KaulD.
Prepared by: Jeff McKitrick
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Giuliano Amato of
Italy
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Prime Minister Giuliano Amato
Foreign Minister Scotti
Ambassador Vallani
AND PLACE:
July 6, 1992
DATE, TIME
Munich, Germany
The President: Welcome. I wish you the best of luck. Economic
growth is one of the things we want to talk about. We should
also, discus Russia and Bosnia.
(c)
Prime Minister Amato: I bring you greetings from
President Scalfaro. We have new people. We share you sense of
need for our economies to grow. After consumer expectations are
higher, we must show that our systems work. Our public (budget)
deficit is difficult. We went for months without a government.
Then we had the Danish referendum. The first victim was the
lira. We had two difficult days on Thursday and Friday. We won
a confidence vote on Saturday by a 50 vote margin. We decided to
hold prices and salaries. We have to reduce the public deficit
significantly in the next six months. So we have to raise taxes
for two-thirds of this and cut expenditures for one-third. If we
succeed the deficit would go under 10 percent for the first time
in years. We need solidarity by our friends at this moment. ($)
The President: What kind? (U)
Prime Minister Amato: The Central Bank has raised the rate by
two points. (U)
The President: What does solidarity mean? (U)
Prime Minister Amato: If you could express appreciation for our
program as soon as possible. (C)
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The President: We will certainly look at it. You have always
been most understanding of us. And we will stay with you every
way possible. (d)
Prime Minister Amato: The public sector won't come under the
same pressure as private sector, which faces competition.
(L)
The President: Is this unpopular? (U)
Prime Minister Amato: I'm sure it will be. (U)
The President: We respect your position on Bosnia and feel you
were helpful in bringing the French along. We feel we need to move
on GATT. We are fairly close.
(d)
Prime Minister Amato: Do you hope to close before elections? (U)
The President: We would like to. We don't want it to dominate the
summit, but we will push GATT around the fringes. (Description of
Mitterrand meeting.) ($)
We are concerned about the debate about NATO, the Franco-German
Corps, etc. There is a danger this will push the U.S. out of
Europe. I did have a good talk with Mitterrand, however. ($)
Prime Minister Amato: We strongly share this view in strategic
terms. We don't see how your European integration can work without
strong U.S. relations. Without a strong U.S. presence, the
Community would weaken. We feel strongly on this issue.
(f)
The President: Italy has been great on this. I bring the subject
up only to make our position clear with you. (U)
I would appreciate getting your views on Yugoslavia. (U)
Prime Minister Amato: It is difficult to have a view on this. It
is a new problem and hard to assess. The realities are so
intertwined. They can't agree on the status for minorities which
will work. We can only hope to lower the temperature. The only
solution is to have separate states with minority guarantees.
(d)
The President: There is so much ethnic hatred coming out now.
These same sorts of issues pervade the CIS.
(c)
Prime Minister Amato: The key is growth to help assimilation. (U)
The President: Look at Czechoslovakia. Havel will be forced out.
(f)
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Prime Minister Amato: Are you ready to bet on Yeltsin over the
next months?
($)
The President: We have to. We don't want to pour money down a
rat hole, but Yeltsin is trying hard and we have to bet on him.
($)
Prime Minister Amato: We hope the Japanese will give us a hand.
These islands are important to them.
(C)
The President: Can you help on the Polish stabilization fund?
(d)
Prime Minister Amato: I received your message, and we are thinking
about it. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Opening Session
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Ministry of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic
Ms. Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary
General, Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Mr. Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary,
Treasury
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
DATE, TIME
Monday, July 6, 1992, 2:15 p.m.-5:50 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Vierschimmelsaal
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
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Chancellor Kohl: (Official opening.) Welcome. This is a
particular honor for me, since this is the first Summit since
unification and it's in Germany. Thank you for your help with
unification. (U)
We have problems here in Germany. People want to right in a year
or two wrongs that took forty years to develop. There are
dramatic changes in Europe. Many problems here and elsewhere
create uncertainty, but also opportunity. We need a message of
realistic optimism, of positive expectations. There are
difficulties in the world, although the overall situation is
positive. We need to tackle challenges jointly. This Summit
will give an indication of whether we can do this. (C)
Economic considerations are in the forefront for all of us:
jobs, economic uncertainties. There are regressive trends in a
number of nations. There are signs of recovery, but it's not
assured. We especially need to address unemployment, especially
among young people. We need to strengthen our forces while still
keeping stability. We need new dynamism. This will help Central
& Eastern Europe. (d)
With regard to the Uruguay Round, all eyes are on us. Last
year's formula won't do. We can't just say we desire success.
We can't negotiate here, but I urge you to consider a formula
that will lend to readiness after Munich to bring this to a
conclusion. I know this will be hard on some nations. LDCs have
vested hopes in the economy and on the environment, post-Rio.
(C)
Yeltsin is coming, too. We need a predictable basis for helping.
We need data from Yeltsin. We can't pour money down a pit. We
need reasonable conditions. (c)
We'll discuss Central and Eastern Europe, too. We can't say
we're only concerned with the FSU. All of these countries
suffered under the USSR. (C)
We had working groups focused on drugs. Good work has been done.
I will send letters of thanks to them. (U)
We need to be open in our conversation and not just read from
prepared texts. (U)
We need to come to results in an amicable spirit. Expectations
are high. So welcome. I'd like to ask for a first round of
brief statements. (U)
President Mitterrand: We will explore these problems. Let me
raise questions to get the conversation going. Let's not forget
that the G-7 is an economic summit; that's what it's called. We
have looked at other issues, like drugs. This is fine, but let's
start with the economy. (d)
We see half of our economies in recovery after recession, e.g.,
the U.S., and slow growth in Japan and Germany. France may be
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the most healthy, but we've only got 3 percent growth, so we
won't flatter ourselves. The OECD says recovery is on the
horizon, but they say it won't reduce unemployment. Unemployment
is social/economic gangrene. It affects everything else. So we
need to support recovery, and make inroads on unemployment. What
instruments are available? Not many. First, we need signs of
confidence in ourselves. We need to give the right impression.
So we need a vigorous text. We need a drop in interest rates. I
know Germany has difficulties, and is working hard on this.
We're trying not to brag on the issue of interest rates, but I
will mention it. (d)
Then there is the failure of GATT. We could discuss this, but
this isn't really the right time. Once we get agreement, the
markets will respond. (d)
So our first priority is to support recovery. (f)
Our second priority is aid the former Soviet Union (FSU),
especially Russia. There have been a lot of announcements made,
but the results don't always follow. We need to know more about
the IMF's talks. All of the FSU needs aid. (d)
Third, there is the problem of nuclear power stations. When he
visited Lithuania, our minister was discouraged. The risk of
explosion is 100 percent in the next 15 years. We won't escape
this. It's a lethal danger. It could permeate entire
generations. And it would hurt the nuclear industry. France
relies a lot on nuclear power, though there have been no
accidents in France. We had problems with discharge and siting,
but no longer. Chernobyl creates a psychosis. Twenty percent of
France's electricity comes from nuclear power. What will happen?
Experts need to submit reports. (C)
Finally, there is the issue of development: This is an issue in
Africa, Oceana, and some Latin American countries. Now we add
Central and Eastern Europe. The more prosperous nations must
make sacrifices. We need agreement or a way to do this. (α)
Prime Minister Mulroney: The question is whether we'll influence
the world or not. If the G-7 doesn't lead, who will? I know
there are concerns about institutionalizing, and about media
attention. But Canada favors a stronger G-7 role if we make our
meetings less formal with less emphasis on communiques. I would
like to focus especially on political problems: (1) lasting,
stronger economic growth, (2) the FSU, (3) Yugoslavia. There is
tragedy and disgrace in Yugoslavia. In the FSU, future
generations will judge. Change won't be done overnight. But
there is fundamental reform going on. (C)
I'd like to underline the nuclear safety initiative. We strongly
support it. I got a letter from EBRD President Jacques Attali on
the Bulgarian plant. If something happened, it wouldn't just be
headlines; we'd be rushing for our planes. (d)
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On recovery, unemployment is the issue. It's probably highest in
Canada. We'd be pleased with the U.S. level of 7.8 percent. We
need more hopeful remedies. We can help each other with lower
inflation, lower interest rates, and lower deficits. (d)
Another issue is collective security. Peacekeeping is the new
challenge. I appreciated President Mitterrand's visit to
Yugoslavia and the U.S support for our troops if they're under
fire. The world is looking for leadership, whether the issue is
Uruguay Round or Rio follow-up. (d)
Finally, the LDCs think we don't care. They think we're
preoccupied with the FSU and Central and Eastern Europe. It
would be unfortunate if we let that impression prevail. We
should support Trinidad Terms for the poorest of the poor. (X)
Prime Minister Major: You suggested we move from scripts and be
franker. I strongly agree. We have political leaders here with
great authority. We can't solve all problems, but failure will
hurt all of us. The G-7 is on trial. (d)
I see the economy not doing well. A cold look at the situation
is as follows. The world economy is sluggish, unemployment is
too high, interest rates are generally too high. Growth rates
are lower than our capacity and lower than we need in order to
sustain improvements in living standards (or people's
expectations) and to match LDC expectations. The world also sees
what we said last year -- that we expected recovery. I thought
so, too -- that there would be recovery in the second half of
1991. But we were wrong, badly so. All our publics expected
more. People are concerned. We did have signs of recovery last
year, but it wasn't sustained. We've fought against inflation,
but it's a hard won battle. (d)
A short-term boost will be of no use; it needs to be sustainable.
I'm very concerned about flat growth or even a dip. We joined
the Exchange Rate Mechanism to help in the medium term. Italy is
doing the same. We need to keep wage demands restrained. It's
not happening everywhere. We still have large, unsustainable
fiscal deficits, especially in the UK. Interest costs are high
and this eats savings from the private sector. For the UK,
three-quarters of the deficit is cyclical; one-quarter isn't. We
need to bring this back into line. The key point is the evil of
unemployment. It's too high -- around 10 percent for many of us;
this is an immense loss. So we need a message to sustain
recovery and create jobs, without throwing away the gains made
against inflation. The U.S. discount rate cut is helpful. I
hope Japan will tell us of fiscal efforts. (d)
We need the right macro/micro and structural mix. One issue is
worker training/retraining. Wages need to reflect local markets
and skills. The EC has particular responsibility to make
conditions flexible. All this sounds like an ideal solution.
These goals are hard to reconcile. (d)
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One point that would help is a successful Uruguay Rouna. I don't
have a shred of doubt that it holds back confidence. We had
language on this at Houston and London. A Uruguay Round
agreement would produce big income gains, especially for the LDCs
and former communist countries. Lack of a Uruguay Round
agreement makes our aid discussion ludicrous. If we don't
negotiate on this, we need at least to reinforce progress in the
Round. (&)
There are other topics: Aid to the FSU. They face the risk of
inflation and risks posed by their deficits. There doesn't seem
to be an understanding that this could produce disaster, with
fallout for everything. It raises the migration issue. We need
to talk about their nuclear power plants. We live in the shadow
of catastrophe. They don't have the money to deal with this
problem or to provide for alternative power sources. (C)
There is also the issue of the poor nations. A GATT success
would help them. We can't forget Somalia and the problem of
drought in Southern Africa. There is no prospect of rain. There
is probably going to be great loss of life, though this won't
make the headlines. And we need to follow through on Rio. (d)
Finally, we'll meet in Japan in a year. We'll look back. We're
at a pivotal time with a sluggish world economy, the problems of
the FSU. One wish is that we'll look back not just at the
wording of the Communique, but at the right strategic decisions.
We need a clear look at these problems. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: Let's start in general terms, then look at
specific issues in each nation. (U)
President Delors: I'd like to wait for the general economic
discussion. (U)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: We need to sustain a policy of
cooperation. For us to help Russia, they need to overcome their
past legacy and act on the basis of law and justice. We want to
reflect on the concerns of the Asia-Pacific. We also need to
discuss political security. (d)
Prime Minister Amato: We attach great priority to recovery and
growth. I would add a political reason for doing so. Opposition
is growing in many nations that is different from in the past (in
Italy, France, and, to some extent, Germany). This is not an
issue of opposition parties, but of hostility to governing.
Instability threatens democracy. It affects the U.S., too: this
strange Texan. This new opposition is rising. (C)
We shouldn't just dwell on interest rates. The real problem is
savings. We are generating savings, but need to get these
savings put to work. We agree we need different words on the
Uruguay Round. This is partly because we can't increase aid to
the LDCs. We should be frank about it, and open our markets. We
need to follow up on Rio. The G-7 needs a common position on
follow-up. Nuclear safety is an important issue. It's also
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important for its affect on our future use of nuclear energy. It
affects public opinion. On aid to the FSU, I don't have much to
add.
(C)
We should spend time on Yugoslavia. We should also mention drugs
and the related issue of crime. This is a sensitive issue in
Italy. It's an international phenomenon. The murder of Judge
Falcone was not decided in Italy. We need strong coordination on
this issue. (d)
The President: I think most of the key issues were covered.
(1) We need to address ourselves to growth. I've listened
to Prime Minister Amato on the subject of this strange political
year. I've never seen anything like it. I hope the "strange
Texan" he referred to was Perot! People are only saying, "throw
the bums out." I'm determined to have us contribute to world
growth. The U.S. deficit is outrageous; we've got to get it
down. We had 2.7 percent growth in the first quarter. We were
optimistic last year. Now most of us think we're moving, but too
slowly. I salute the Italian government. I'm pleased with the
cut in our discount rate. I'd be pleased to explain our plans on
the deficit. (d)
(2) We need to discuss how to help Yeltsin. The IMF deal
was good news. Yeltsin will say he only gets talk from us, not
action. Yeltsin will say he's trying to make changes, and that
the alternative is worse. (d)
(3) We'll talk about IFI help for Russia. We shouldn't be
under fire for helping Russia vs. others; they've gone faster.
But there are anxieties in the Ukraine. (d)
(4) The conclusion of the Uruguay Round is not only in our
interest, but would be the best single thing for the LDCs. We're
under fire on the spending front at home. We need to control the
deficit. This puts us in conflict on aiding the LDCs. We have
forgiven debt. We could have conflict here, but our position is
based on our deficit. (C)
(5) Unemployment: Ours is up. I was surprised. The figure
will be revised -- up or down. A lot of this is summer kids
seeking jobs. I'm not excusing this, because it's a real blow.
(C)
(6) We want to reuse the Stabilization Fund to help the
Poles. I think there is a lot of agreement around the table. I
may have differences with you, Helmut, but would like this
mentioned (in the Communique). (¢)
(7) Yugoslavia. I salute Francois. I'm interested in
whatever else we can do, in suggestions. (C)
(8) I agree with Prime Minister Amato on improving savings.
We need to get the deficit under control. The key is control of
the growth of mandatory spending. (C)
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(9) Uruguay Round: Let's get this finished. (&)
Chancellor Kohl: Let's focus purely on the economy now, then
have coffee, and then look at LDCs. We'll have political
questions at dinner. (U)
President Delors: Three elements justify our focus on the
economy. First, disappointment. We all expected stronger
recovery. We had weak investment. We need to discuss why.
Second, all businessmen say they no longer expect anything from
government. This is a cause of concern. Third, unemployment.
(C)
I'm worried our Finance Ministers' cooperation is no longer as
effective at it used to be. The Plaza and Louvre accords coped
with financial challenges. Now we only see press references to
different positions. (d)
Does a soft recovery reflect the lack of innovation, the end of a
cycle? I don't think so. There is a lot going on, e.g.,
biotechnology. There is a low level of demand. Comecon trade is
lacking so those countries look to us. A Uruguay Round success
would help. Can we see more from Japan? It has a recovery
program. For others, perhaps they rely too much on monetary
policy and not enough on income/revenue controls. There is much
to do in the budgetary field. Anti-inflationary policies are
important, but inflation is very low compared to other periods of
recovery. (d)
I see five areas: (1) Rebalancing: ask less of monetary policy;
this could lead to lower interest rates. (2) Savings are
insufficient. I see a trend toward higher long-term interest
rates. The decline in public savings is a cause here. (3)
Strengthen G-7 cooperation. Get the benefits of technological
cooperation. (4) How to increase our association? Given limits,
the best way is to open our markets in a Uruguay Round agreement,
in the context of accords between the EC and Central & Eastern
Europe and the FSU, and via debt relief for the LDCs. (5) Within
the EC, we need to increase projects to increase competitiveness.
The EC could help generate sustainable growth, both in the medium
and longer term. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: The Japanese economy is in bad shape
now. We're in a bust period. The burn started at Plaza, in the
days when Baker, Lawson, etc., struggled with the question of the
yen's value. I stimulated Japan's economy in 1987. This had
good effects on the economy, but two side effects: (1) Excessive
yen in the market (due to public works spending, tax cuts, and
government intervention) gave rise to a bubble. (2) Land prices
skyrocketed, and so did shares. Speculators gained. The decline
of land prices was healthy, but not the decline of stock prices.
We had high private investment in this period. We're in a rut
now, due to inadequate demand. We had excess revenue in the
boom, but not now. How long will the bust last? We front-
loaded 70 percent of our 1992 public works spending in April, but
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this may not be enough. And we will have to make up (for this
front loading) in early fall. We'll probably have extra stimulus
like in 1987. I hope this will help with recovery. I hope we
have a normal economy by the end of the year. (X)
We don't have large unemployment. We're almost fully employed.
So we need higher investment. Both help me. I'll have to wait
several months before I can say we're back to normal. An
unfortunate trend is toward a higher trade surplus. It was over
$100 billion in 1991; I would expect a higher level in 1992,
though it won't be as high as a percent of GNP: 2 percent vs. 4
percent (?). It embarrasses me. Germany needs to be our
comrade. There is also the issue of capital increase for the
World Bank. Any increase of exports to Japan is welcome. The UK
and France are trying to encourage this. (d)
We've got a new five-year plan: for a better quality of life.
It's true we export a lot and live in rabbit hutches. We'll
shorten working hours, open more sewage plants, and make Japan
into a country worth living in. We built a military 100 years
ago at the expense of the people. We beat Russia. We lost WWII.
But we're single-minded; after WWII, we shifted into exports.
The habits of our bureaucracy haven't changed. We don't look to
consumers or family life. We require a revolution in the state
of mind of government officials. You can expect that in five
years, we'll be a different country, though I hope we will still
be competitive. We may not be able to have our cake and eat it,
too.
(f)
Prime Minister Amato: There is a difficulty with coordination at
Summits. At first, we were effective because the subject was
monetary policy. When we turned to structural [notetaker: did
he mean fiscal?] policy, it was harder. The question is the
medium point between monetary and structural policy: to increase
savings and channel those savings into productive activity. We
might work more together on this. Our greatest contribution
would be to put our own economies in order. Public spending
creates instability in Europe, higher interest rates, less help
for LDCs. My government inherited a long period of pure monetary
policy; only the Central Bank was acting. Industry was very
dynamic and potentially competitive, but was quashed by the high
lire rate to hold down inflation and high interest costs. We
need to cut the cost of money through better incomes policy. We
could start by cutting inflation and the deficit. Inflation was
only just over 5 percent, but was 2 percent above the European
average, and the economy pays for those costs. We need an
incomes policy; this will be novel for Italy, because the private
sector has low inflation, but public sector inflation is high.
(&)
We need structural reforms. We need more savings, and to reach
activities without intermediation that increase costs. This is
true for social services and for industry. We're looking at our
integrated pension system, trying to introduce elements of
competition into our health system, and improving financial
markets. Debt is more useful than venture capital now. We want
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private capital in public investment. For example, the
Eurotunnel -- which has had high costs and low return. (X)
Finally, will our political system manage to get through reforms
of this type? When I left the Finance Ministry, I said we needed
constitutional reform, less proportional voting, and to reduce
the deficit. My successor came to the same conclusion. There is
concern in Italy about the Parliament's ability to do this.
Parliament is now looking to reorganize the constitution. This
is unusual for the U.S. You examine the constitution all the
time, but don't need to change it. We do. We need to move
toward a majority system. There are two schools of thought: (1)
The German model: a strong executive. (2) The French President.
The question is whether we can carry out economic reforms at the
same time. (C)
The President: On the U.S. economy, we were wrong last year. So
the public thinks I'm disconnected. This makes me more cautious
on predictions. Economists are second guessing again and believe
our economy is less robust. I think we will grow in the second
quarter, but less than in the first quarter, which was anemic.
To give you an idea, 92 percent of T.V. news on the economy is
negative; 80 percent on me is negative. Sixty percent of the
American people thinks the economy is getting worse. (d)
Psychology affects the recovery; there are negative psychological
effects (of this news coverage). Plus we're in a four year dance
where the opponent has to say how bad it is. A recent survey
shows that confidence is back a bit. We need to send a message
that it's not business as usual. We need short, medium and long
term actions. I salute Prime Minister Miyazawa's actions. I
hope the trade deficit is cut soon; this would seen a good
signal. (d)
The U.S. is trying to encourage growth through education, e.g.,
competitiveness in elementary and secondary education; R&D, where
the government is spending $90 billion/year, including for
defense. This strategy has related elements. Basically, it's
designed to open up society to competitiveness and free choice,
while focusing government on helping people adapt -- for example
through worker training. ($)
In education, we have six national goals: to implement America
2000; job training, youth apprenticeship
On crime, we need
to marry up our efforts to fight crime with our work in education
and jobs. We're spending $28.5 billion a year countering the
drug problem. We're making some progress. We're working on
deregulation, and getting some hell from the environmentalists.
For example, we had the issue of the spotted owl vs. 30,000 jobs.
This was not a pleasant fight. We have a good environmental
record. Regulations are tough on small business. (C)
I'd like to return to make an appeal on the Uruguay Round. I
think we're close. A Uruguay Round agreement would do more than
any aid or spending. Maybe we could hammer this out here or
later. It's worth a push. I'd be glad to answer questions. (L)
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Chancellor Kohl: At dinner, we need to consider GATT again. (U)
We've highlighted unemployment in our Communique. Psychology is
a problem in Germany, too. The situation is not typical. With
unification, we added 17 million people. Their jobs were all
tied to the old Warsaw Pact. We have great sympathy for Central
and Eastern Europe and the FSU; we see a microcosm of their
problems here in Germany. Unification helped stimulate activity
in Europe. Now we have the collapse of the labor market in
eastern Germany; trade with the East has collapsed. We have seen
1.8 percent growth in the first quarter for the western part of
Germany; we may hit 2.0 percent this year. (d)
Our big domestic discussion is on spending and tax increases.
Last week, our solidarity tax ran out. We need to push
investment in the eastern laender and infrastructure spending.
The problem now is putting money to good use; you need lead time.
The privatization of public enterprises is two-thirds complete
(8,000 of 12,000 firms). We're giving this a fresh boost, but it
takes a year or more to change. We're happy to see foreign
investors; France is in the lead. We can't mobilize more funds
for Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU. Eighty-six billion
dollars has been provided; Germany has provided 55 percent of
this. We've submitted a new budget in 1993 and for the next
three years which increases spending only 2.5 percent; we're
giving this drastic treatment. There is no alternative; we need
more savings. We will cope with the problems of the eastern
laender. But we must not live beyond our means. The work week
is too short. We need to cut government spending. We have
explosive increases in health care costs. We can't just keep
absorbing this. (d)
In sum, unification has led to big psychological problems. There
have been no real sacrifices made in the western laender. We
resolve to have a sound fiscal policy. We'll still be in an
uproar, but the next important election is at the end of 1994.
We expect to see results by then. In eastern Berlin, people want
the same standard of living as in western Berlin. This is
understandable, but not realistic. Those in the West say it took
40 years. So the people need patience. We need smaller steps
than in the past, but we must be clear. ($)
President Mitterrand: By the way, I'd like to make a comment to
Prime Minister Amato on the Channel Tunnel project. I think this
is a great project. It's not working well, but involves no
public funding at all. The clash is between the enterprises and
the banks. It's not our fault. In France, public projects work
well. Everyone assumes they don't. (I'm from a Socialist
government.) (d)
France doesn't have a great deal to complain about. Our growth
rate is the highest among the major partners. But public opinion
doesn't show any progress. I inherited 140 percent inflation.
Delors cut it to 10 percent. Now it's 3 percent. Our budget
deficit is down. But if you ask people whether inflation has
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come down since 1981, 63 percent will say no! I'm reassured that
President Bush says he's a victim of the same phenomenon. This
is important: skepticism must have been the reason behind it.
Propaganda alone won't explain it. Maybe it's because these
problems are everywhere. How does the G-7 convince the public,
restore faith in ourselves, and end self-doubt? ($)
Our budget deficit is down to 1.7 percent. Turning to industry,
we had a great deficit in the past, but our firms are in the
black now for the first time since 1974. Annual production is
up; market share is up. We have a healthy balance of payments.
But unemployment is increasing. (C)
I'm not blowing my trumpet, but am pointing to psychological
causes: failure is a disaster and success never gets recognized.
We're doubting ourselves. We need to treat this psychological
disease. The G-7 must be useful, whether through GATT or
whatever. (d)
On the Uruguay Round, CAP allows some rapprochement. The U.S.
and the EC should make some sacrifices. What can the U.S. do?
You ask for 24 percent (cuts in export subsidies). What do we
get in return? It's not that I'm not willing. I just can't
accept the EC suffering from the economic power of our best
friend. Is the U.S. a little deaf? What concessions are being
made by U.S. producers? The farm problem is not the only one;
there is also services. (C)
We're waiting for ideas to demonstrate to world opinion that
we're on the winning side. (d)
Prime Minister Mulroney: A Canadian of German extraction named
Krauthammer lives in Washington. He says the problems of modern
society are so complex that if a leader leaves office popular, he
has no greatness. This means absolute failures.
We all
live with accumulated problems. Presidents Bush and Mitterrand
pointed to the problem of the message. I saw a New York Times
survey which reported that leading Presidential candidates were
given 7.3 seconds to talk, while reporters get two and one-half
minutes to criticize. This shows the serious challenges we face.
(C)
I'll use my personal experience, since I'm the most unpopular
leader here. We're coming out of two years of recession. We've
had a proliferation of parties. We're full of one-trick ponies.
Like Perot: When asked about the Rio UNCED Conference, he said
he'd never heard of it. France has this, too: Le Pen. In
Canada, some of our problems are self-inflicted. We've increased
spending 14 percent a year for 10 years (?). Our deficit has
risen to $40 billion/year. This is equivalent to a $400 billion
U.S. deficit. 35 cents of every revenue dollar goes for debt
servicing. Every Canadian gets $1.33 in services for $1 paid in
taxes. Our national debt has doubled twice. (2)
What are the lessons? You can't spend irresponsibly for 15 years
and say it didn't happen. You can't ignore the issue of
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productivity. We cut spending. We cut the deficit in half as a
percent of GNP. We reduced services -- to 98 cents per person.
We negotiated a free trade agreement. Despite the recession,
trade was up $30 billion a year, creating 30, jobs in both our
countries. We introduced the GST (goods and services tax).
We've privatized. We've worked on wage settlements for the
public sector. We've worked on NAFTA and GATT. Inflation is now
1.3 percent. Growth next year will be 5-6 percent. Interest
rates are down. But I'm still unpopular because they want to
live in a dream world. Prime Minister Major showed how to
succeed. Have a serious plan, stick to it, and take it to the
people. ($)
President Bush noted problems. Can things turn around because
the people believe in third party endorsement? They' believe
Mitterrand about Mulroney. The G-7 should say good things about
the U.S.; it will help. (&)
It will be good to work on GATT tonight. This group can say the
economy is robust and the recovery will be sustained. The
American public will believe us. The countries represented
around this table have 22 million unemployed. We need to do
better. The G-7 as a third party endorses growth. We need to
exude optimism, confidence. We can overcome this. President
Bush is the one who needs to fight off the crazies now; others
will need to do this later. We need the G-7 to endorse sound
policies and beat the press. (C)
President Mitterrand: I'd like to add a word. We have to pay
attention to this: In most social crises, the poor rise up
against the privileged. But this is a disease of affluent
nations. The wealthy complain more. This is a psychological
issue and a moral one, too. We need men and women to believe
that society gives them something to believe in. Our societies
are sick because of affluence. France has one of the best
standards of living, but the most protests. Perhaps it's
something in human nature. Is affluence destructive? If we just
juggle the statistics, we won't answer the questions put by Prime
Minister Mulroney. Productiveness doesn't give happiness. (f)
Prime Minister Major: This is a debate on the philosophy of
unpopularity. It relates to the adversarial nature of debate.
In the House of Commons, I get questions; I'm responsible for all
the problems. We have the other side of the 1980s boom in the
UK. Core inflation is falling and interest rates are down. But
this hasn't inspired confidence and boosted spending. Now people
are saving too much to get us out of recession. (d)
Recession is harsh. Unemployment is high. Our fiscal deficit is
up. Long-term unemployment is down. We had a recession of 2
percent last year. The consistent factor that hurts confidence
is the value of property and equity. Houses are worth less. I
think that until housing prices go up, people won't spend. Also
the nature of unemployment is different. Now it's white collar
people with large houses and mortgages who are unemployed.
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Usually, these people spend us out of recessions. The problem is
no confidence; this is the biggest factor. (C)
There's been a lot of discussion of the Uruguay Round. I find
that encouraging. I think the problems are political now. We
should give the lead here. I hope we can make progress over
dinner. The EC's CAP settlement should help us reach a solution.
I see only four points of principal concern: (1) The level of
internal supports for farmers. It shouldn't be a problem to cut
this 20 percent in the aggregate. (2) Peace: I know we can do
this. (3) Rebalancing: It's clear to me there can be a bargain.
(4) Export volume: There are different options -- 6-8 years,
aggregation, different base years. I know that 24 percent (cut
in exports) is crucial. A Uruguay Round resolution could do as
much as anything to regenerate growth. Also, with regard to
Delors' point on opening markets to East-Central Europe, let's
have the (association agreements?) come into effect before all 12
ratify. (f)
BREAK
Chancellor Kohl: Development aid and debt strategies: A lot of
positive work is going on here. On Rio, we need to implement
agreed actions as soon as possible through national policies. We
need to consider the issue of development carefully given the
lack of resources. On debt, some have mentioned the poorer
LMICs
($)
Prime Minister Amato: We need to distinguish between types of
aid. We need to provide resources to the poorest, not pure gifts
or grants to the lower middle income countries (LMICs). (d)
Chancellor Kohl: Do you think the Sherpas can agree? (C)
Prime Minister Amato: I think so. (d)
Prime Minister Major: The poorest have no chance. We ought to
help the LMICs, too. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: Agreed? ($)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: I'm concerned about the moral hazard.
What are our criteria? There are different problems in the
Eastern Hemisphere. ()
The President: This raises a good question. We've tried to do a
lot on the bilateral front. We've provided $11 billion in debt
relief, including $3 billion for Latin America, Africa, and
Bangladesh. But we can't do this in the Paris Club unless there
are rescheduling options, as France has done. We have a budget
deficit problem. We can't do more bilaterally. I can't answer
questions like China. (c)
Prime Minister Major: We can try to answer on India. Sub-
Saharan Africa can't pay. India can and does. India also gets a
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lot of attention. It's in their interest to pay. Sub-Saharan
Africa cannot pay their stock of debt. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: There is a big difference between the PRC,
India and Sub-Saharan Africa. Can we ask Sherpas to agree on a
text to endorse? (C)
Prime Minister Amato: Sub-Saharan Africa? (C)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: (Expresses reservations.) (C)
President Mitterrand: Let's not be too logical. We should work
on case-by-case measures. (He mentions Poland and Egypt.) We've
written off debt to 30 nations; they wouldn't pay anyway. I hope
the text will come to a good result. We need to have a result.
(f)
Prime Minister Mulroney: President Mitterrand said we started
with the French speaking and then the Commonwealth countries, and
then wrote off the debt of 40 countries in 1987 to give them a
breathing space. We were embarrassed by Brundtland when she said
Norway had reached the ODA 0.7 percent target. We're still far
from it. Prime Minister Major got through Trinidad terms. (2)
Chancellor Kohl: We have a clear mandate to the Sherpas. We
should say what we can on aid. For LMICs, sub-Saharan Africa, we
agree on that. (Not clear what Kohl was referring to.) On Rio,
we listened (to the LDCs for two and a half days). We also
talked to the Baltics. Their need is very great. (d)
-- End of Meeting --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Plenary Session
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Klaus Kinkel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Minister of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the French
Republic
Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary General,
Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State
for External Affairs
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic
Gianni De Michelis, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary, Treasury
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Nobuo Matsunaga, Adviser to the Foreign
Ministry
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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2011-0831-MR
Declassify on: OADR
SCS 4/15/13
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Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
DATE, TIME
Tuesday, July 7, 1992, 9:40 a.m.-10:10 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Room 111
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Kohl: Welcome. We will receive the report of our
foreign ministers and adopt the Political Declaration and a
statement on Yugoslavia. We want to make this public today, and
will release the texts after we adopt them. Then we'll go to the
next room for a discussion among Heads on the former Soviet
Union, especially the issue of nuclear safety. (U)
Foreign Minister Kinkel: We have 3 papers: (1) the Political
Declaration; (2) a special statement on Yugoslavia; and (3) the
Chairman's statement. (U)
We've agreed on a political statement. It's more concise than in
the past. It covers 3 main topics: (1) Central & Eastern Europe
and the FSU; (2) weapons of mass destruction; and (3) the UN.
We'll also comment on other topics, e.g., regional issues. (U)
(1) We see the Chairman's statement as a complement to the
Political Declaration. It also fits with the Economic
Declaration. Our motto is: Shaping the New Partnership. This
is a partnership with Central and Eastern Europe and the new
nations of the FSU, as well as the LDCs. It's a partnership of
equality. We need to realize this partnership. (U)
(2) Next we have the Chairman's statement. (POTUS asked
for copies. The Germans handed out the Chairman's paper and the
Political Declaration.) (U)
(3) Next we have the statement on Yugoslavia. It begins
with concern about the ongoing crisis and violence. We stress
Lord Carrington's efforts and call on all parties to resume
negotiations. We call for the parties not to endanger relief
operations. We don't exclude the use of military means. The
issue of Kosovo autonomy is discussed. (U)
President Mitterrand: I have two points. (Interruption)
Second, the reference to Lord Carrington's conference is OK as
far as it goes. But I think if we could decide on a means to
protect minorities through arbitration, it would be useful to do
so. Our means are too limited. The EC conference is not enough.
We need a broader international conference under the UN -- like
the U.S. conference on the Middle East or Cambodia. The EC
conference is too slender and has exhausted its possibilities.
We're not trying to launch broad-based discussions; the G-7 is
not for that purpose. I won't press this, but would like some
modification in the text. (c)
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Prime Minister Mulroney: I endorse President Mitterrand's
suggestion. We should expand a conference to include minorities.
(X)
Chancellor Kohl: We had a discussion last night. I got an
instructive report. We discussed the international conference.
I'm sympathetic. Let's accept the text in principle, but ask our
foreign ministers to draft a few sentences. They would come
after the second section. Let's not draft this here, but just
agree in principle. (C)
Prime Minister Major: Let me flesh this out. There may be scope
for an international conference and arbitration. But what if
arbitration isn't accepted. Should it be imposed? If so, how?
Sanctions? But we're doing this now. Or is it through military
intervention, about which we all have reservations. So I'm
cautious on arbitration. On an international conference, this
may be the right way. But you need the will of those concerned
for this to succeed, and we don't have this. I'm worried that we
haven't had any discussions on this yet with Carrington, the UN,
and the Russians. We're not yet clear on these points. The
draft declaration has a concept of cooperation between the EC and
the UN in the second paragraph. Perhaps we can build on this
without saying what we'll do in advance. (&)
Chancellor Kohl: It's possible to find a common line. President
Mitterrand proposes that arbitration might result from an
international conference. So let's ask our foreign ministers to
add a couple of sentences on an international conference. If
they can agree, they need not come back to us. Agreed. (C)
-- End of Meeting --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
President Bush's July 7 Meeting with
EC Commission President Delors (c)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
W. Henson Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President
David Mulford, Under Secretary of Treasury
for International Affairs
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Jacques Delors, President, EC Commission
Frans Andriessen, Vice President, EC Commission
DECLASSIFIED
Henning Christopherson, Vice President,
PER E.O. 13526
EC Commission
Horst G. Krentzler, Director-General for
2009-0649-MR
External Relation, EC
SCS 1/6/11
Pascal Lamy, Chef de Cabinet, Office of the
President of the EC
Johannes P. Wijnmaalen, Chef de Cabinet,
Office of the Vice-President of the EC
for External Relations and Trade Policy
Bernhard Zepter, Adviser, Office of the
President of the European Commission
DATE, TIME
July 7, 1992, 7:45 a.m. - 8:15 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Munich, Germany
The President: Our discussions yesterday on the Round were very
general. Do you think the French were in a position to cut a
deal? The impact of domestic politics is understandable, and we
really have to be practical. (d)
President Delors: Secretary Baker and I were asked, yesterday,
to seek to make a breakthrough; however, French Foreign Minister
Dumas said that nothing would be possible until after the
September 20 French referendum on Maastricht. The Commission had
been prepared to make an effort to narrow the gap. We are
embarrassed by the current state of affairs. (c)
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The President: The media is trying to raise expectations. The
U.S. was ready to try, but there is no use trying if this is
doomed to failure. ()
Secretary Baker: Are there any new developments? (U)
President Delors: Dumas reported to Mitterrand on the discussion
at the foreign ministers dinner and then I spoke to Mitterrand.
Mitterrand said that he was prepared to give the U.S. volume
reductions in subsidized grain exports, but would require, in
return, limits on U.S. exports of cereal substitutes. Mitterrand
explained that he had to be able to demonstrate to French farmers
that the agreement is a good deal. ($)
Secretary Baker: This goes to the substance of the discussion.
All participants should be interested in reaching an agreement in
Munich. We should discuss the politics of the issue. The
Community can argue that a deal that protected direct payments to
farmers and cut significantly the U.S. EAP program was a good one
from the EC point of view. However, I see doubt on the EC side
that a deal is possible at this time. (f)
President Delors: It should be possible to reach agreement on a
press statement which said, honestly, that progress had been made
and that a good working procedure to resolve the remainder of the
issues had been established. (d)
The President: Let me repeat, we are ready to seek a deal.
(C)
(Delors and Andriessen offered suggestions for positive public
statements.) (U)
President Delors: In conclusion, I just do not think it is
useful to waste time on the Round. (d)
The President: I regret that conclusion. Let me mention any
concern about your approach to a quota for bananas and its
negative effects for GATT tariffication. (d)
President Delors: Others are also seeking exemptions, especially
the Japanese on rice and Canadians on dairy. (c)
The President: We all have problems. In the U.S. case, it
involves dairy, peanuts and sugar. Mulroney has told us that his
political life depends upon securing an exemption for Canada's
dairy program. (f)
President Delors: The EC is only asking for a temporary
derogation on bananas. (U)
The President: The U.S. sugar interests could do the same. (U)
Secretary Baker: Care must be taken to avoid an action that
causes the entire tariffication package to unravel. (U)
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Secretary Brady: Failure to close the remaining gaps on the
Round will feed the pessimistic mood in the economy. (U)
President Delors: I agree. (U)
The President: Yesterday's summit discussion on the world
economy demonstrated that problems thought to be uniquely
American are, in fact, present in all the summit countries. (U)
President Delors: I am sorry that at yesterday's session no one
picked up my point that too much weight was being placed on
monetary policy to control inflation and that fiscal instruments
were largely immobilized due to high interest rates, which has a
chilling impact on economic activity. (d)
Secretary Brady: In the United States, fiscal and monetary
policy are headed in the same direction. (U)
The President: I am worried that Yeltsin would come to the
Summit and complain afterward that all the G-7 does is talk while
he is under fierce attack at home. Moreover, the $1 billion due
from the IMF doesn't go into his pocket, although he might not
know that yet. (f)
Secretary Baker: What conditions has the Fund imposed for the $1
billion? (U)
Mr. Christopherson: I understand that the key ones are a
reduction in the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP. During
my last visit to Moscow I found conditions the same as under
Gorbachev -- little movement and no implementation. (d)
The President: Yeltsin has done some big things. (U)
Mr. Christopherson: The first tranche from the IMF will, in any
case, have to go to the Fund for the first tranche of Russia's
quota. (U)
Vice President Andriessen: What is the U.S. position on
conditionality? Should the same conditions be established for
Russia as for other fund borrowers? Some, such as UK Prime
Minister Major, take the line that a more flexible approach was
needed. ($)
Secretary Brady: The Fund is being more flexible, although some
conditions, such as the reduction in the budget deficit, are
being imposed. (f)
Secretary Baker: The Fund should concentrate on three key
factors: the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, the growth
in the money supply and the establishment of a realistic exchange
rate. (&
Mr. Zoellick: A substantial part of the aid package is
bilateral. The United States is moving ahead with some of its
programs such as CCC credit guarantees. Secondly, the IBRD is
working on a $500 million general import program. A larger
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project loan package will be the next step. Finally, debt relief
through a Paris Club agreement would be worth about $2.5 billion
annually. (U)
The President: What would the total U.S. contributions through
Freedom Support be? (C)
Mr. Zoellick: That would amount to a total of $7.5 billion,
including $1.5 billion in direct grants (including technical
assistance). (U)
President Delors: Yesterday's discussion of nuclear safety did
not reach conclusion. I would like Frans to explain the
Community's position. (U)
Vice President Andriessen: On procedure, the EC prefers a
multilateral program. On the program itself, the EC's
contributions amounted to $70 million in 1991 and $130 million in
1992, with a further increase foreseen for 1993 to $250-$300
million. (U)
President Delors: The Community has undertaken a large program
in Bulgaria, with the IAEA, on the Kozloduy station. (U)
The President: Bob, could you explain our program? (U)
Mr. Zoellick: We have agreed to the G-7 action plan and our
bilateral support will probably amount to more than $100 million
over the next 2-3 years. For the next five years, the total
program has been calculated at $680 million, of which $200
million would be contributed by the host countries. Thus, with
the existing programs, it appeared that sufficient resources
would be made available. What would a multilateral program be
expected to do? I worry that it could serve as the launching pad
for long-term projects for the overhaul/replacement of power
plants with price tags in the $20/40 billion range. (U)
President Delors: It is necessary to clarify what was being done
bilaterally and what the function of a multilateral approach
would be. (U)
Mr. Christopherson: We must not forget about the needs of the
other 11 new states. Several EC members have taken individual
states into their IMF "constituencies", and it would be helpful
if the G-7 could say something about meeting the needs of those
states. (U)
The President: Ukrainian President Kravchuk had been upset not
to have been invited to Munich. ($)
Mr. Christopherson: Many of the new states are in substantially
worse shape than Russia and have essentially no potential for
export earnings. (U)
The President: We should also keep the needs of the
Central/Eastern Europeans and the Baltic States in mind. (U)
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Mr. Christopherson: The EC will have separate programs for the
Baltic States and that the IMF calculates their 1992 needs at
about $1 billion. (U)
President Delors: Each of them wants its own currency. (U)
Vice President Andriessen: Albania is in a deep economic crisis.
(U)
The President: We were very impressed with President Berisha.
(U)
Mr. Christopherson: Albania's uncovered needs in 1992 were
relatively modest, about $100 million. (U)
The President: I wonder how Albania made it before the
democratic revolution. (U)
Mr. Christopherson: Is the United States prepared to aid Poland?
(U)
The President: We are ready to convert our $200 million share of
the Polish stabilization fund to some other use and are
encouraging the other contributors to do the same. The Germans
might have problems with this idea. (X)
Mr. Christopherson: Are you imposing any conditions on this
action? ($)
Mr. Zoellick: It is tied to the conclusion of a new IMF program.
(C)
Mr. Christopherson: The Poles still seek additional budgetary
support for 1992. (U)
Mr. Zoellick: The latest IMF analysis indicates that better than
expected growth and inflation performance may obviate that need.
(U)
- End of Conversation -
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Private Plenary Session
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Ministry of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic
Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary
General, Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther
Ireland
DECLASSIFIED
Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary, Treasury
PER E.O. 13526
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
2011- 0831- MR
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Ses 4/15/13
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
DATE, TIME
Tuesday, July 7, 1992, 10:20 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Vierschimmelsaal
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Kohl: We need to talk about our preparations for
President Yeltsin, including the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Our experience in eastern Germany shows that the damage is
considerable. Problems grow day-by-day. All my information is
that if the winter is harsh, the food situation will be more
difficult. Less than 50 percent of the land is being used for
grain. We need to structure our talks with President Yeltsin.
We want to be helpful. This not a tribunal. But we need to be
straightforward. (d)
President Yeltsin does face increasing difficulties. Let's
recall that Gorbachev faced a putsch shortly after London. Our
program is Help for Self-Help. We can't pour money down a
bottomless pit. The invitation alone represents cooperation.
The Sherpas have prepared a program of help for self-help. It
includes concrete measures. We want specific pledges to come out
of this. (C)
I'll start by briefing Yeltsin on what we're doing. We need to
discuss the link between help for self-help and actions in the
FSU. We can't just do this year after year. I hope Prime
Minister Mulroney will start with political questions. Then
we'll go to economic subjects. We'll reflect this in our press
conference afterwards. We also have to note problems among
republics. There is the issue of returning troops. It could be
explosive because there is nothing to return to. They lived well
in Germany. Now they have no prospects. This is dynamite. (C)
The President: Let me start with President Yeltsin's visit. I
think it was successful. He's trying to distinguish himself from
President Gorbachev. Given the rising nationalism at home, he
needs balance, help and respect. We're pleased to see the
structure of political topics after the statement. It will
accord President Yeltsin respect. Let's get his views on
Yugoslavia. I spoke to him; he said he'd stand with the West.
(C)
Russia has the opportunity to open doors in the Asia-Pacific. I
took up the Northern Territories issue. It's important to Kiichi
Miyazawa. Yeltsin said he had problems. Yeltsin plans to visit
Japan. We all need to stand by Japan. (d)
On the economy, Yeltsin and Gorbachev before him have taken
courageous steps. But they have a long way to go. They are set
up for failure if they expect a normal market economy overnight.
The goal is to keep the democratic and market reform process
moving forward. He'll talk with confidence about his actions.
But he still faces roadblocks. The energy sector. He will
stress areas of immediate interest. (C)
This is a challenge of political economy, not just technology.
He needs to establish the fundamentals. He needs a political
base through a middle class of property holders; to get retail
shops into private hands, as Central and Eastern Europe did; to
allow farmers to buy, sell, and mortgage land; and to give trucks
to soldiers, which will earn them a living and provide
competition. Yeltsin talks as if he understands, but I'm not
sure he does. He needs to break up monopolies. Energy could be
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a real model. He could get hard currency right away. I think he
recognizes this, and may announce some moves. He has problems
with his parliament. Our points could help him use these points
at home. ($)
The IMF's phased approach will help us move forward. There is a
danger of hyperinflation. I agree with the idea of a
Consultative Group for Russia in the context of budgetary,
monetary and structural reform. The World Bank has coordinated
consultative groups in the past. (f)
Our Congress is moving on the Freedom Support Act. It passed the
Senate. I hope to get it through Congress this month. We've
pledged over $7 billion in aid to the FSU and disbursed about 60
percent of this. This includes $1.6 billion in grants. He will
press for debt relief. We should give Paris Club rescheduling of
principal and interest. He will ask us to open our markets. He
will press for this to become a G-8. The present formula doesn't
make sense. He's not a full-fledged participant. I'm open tp
discussing this. We could give him standing without putting him
in the middle of the rest of our work. We could make him
welcome, but not as a full member. (C)
This is an important meeting. He's worried about his right wing
forces. And sometimes he makes optimistic statements he can't
back up (e.g., the Minsk "agreement"). We need to take this into
account. (f)
Chancellor Kohl: I talked to Yeltsin about the possibility of a
putsch. He said the same as Gorbachev had said a year ago. I
agree with President Bush on Yeltsin's euphoria. He can't carry
his burdens without a positive spirit. But we have to look at
this in the cold light of day. Yeltsin needs to know we have
confidence in him. There are ups and downs in political life,
particularly for him. He's got to find hope somewhere. On the
G-8, I wouldn't discuss this. He's invited, he's welcome. The
future is in the hands of history. We'll assess the situation
regarding Japan. I urge that we not discuss this tomorrow. He's
stuck to the status quo. (f)
Prime Minister Amato: President Bush and Chancellor Kohl made
full statements. I don't have much to add. We need to help
strengthen Yeltsin politically and psychologically. A post-
Yeltsin period would be worse. So we need to help him overcome a
difficult phase. I wouldn't discuss a G-8 or a G-7+1. The aim
of the G-7 is to coordinate the economies of the most
industrialized states. As President Bush said, you can't do that
with an economy that's not a market economy. The relationship is
political. I agree with Chancellor Kohl. Yeltsin will ask for
things. We know what we can give him. We should ask him for
things that would be useful for him. First, a readiness to solve
the Northern Territories with Japan is important. Yeltsin is in
a corner domestically, so there is no instant solution. But our
aid could be used to advance a future solution. Second, is the
issue of safeguarding common areas with other republics. If
links are eroded -- trade, monetary, military -- there will be
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big problems. The USSR survived through centralization of power.
People will concentrate on the local market if they don't have
(this power). An interstate commerce clause could be important
as in the U.S. It's essential, though this may be beyond them.
They need a single command of the armed forces, a monetary
system, and prices. ($)
On the economy, I agree with President Bush. We need to shift
the attention to aspects where we can have a partnership --
capital input with managers. Gorbachev's plans never reached
reality. So if Yeltsin worked with us on energy, infrastructure
(roads, telecom) in a profitable way, it would change the
economy. We have things to offer apart from financing: (1) the
IMF $1 billion; (2) debt -- a 5 or 2-year moratorium; we need to
decide; (3) technical assistance. I think we should comment on
Russian troops in the Baltics. We also need to talk to the Balts
about the rights of Russians there. It's hard to pull out troops
if the Russians there receive discriminatory treatment. The
constitutions should guarantee the rights of minorities there. A
second issue is the legacy of Soviet scientists. President
Mitterrand has a proposal to create a foundation. This is a
great pool of experience. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: We're discussing Russia, but should talk about
other republics, too. We'll meet Kravchuk in Helsinki. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: We've pledged $2.6 billion plus $20
million to the nuclear scientists' centers. This is on top of
the $24 billion. We agreed to provide $25 million for nuclear
plant safety. We have a concrete proposition on simulator
centers. They will need to replace less stable power stations.
This could involve billions, not to mention jobs. ($)
Tomorrow, we'll be meeting as the G-7+1. We'll extend a clear
message on aid to the market democracies. They need to implement
the IMF's measures. They need macro reforms with
micro/structural reforms. I expect Russia to take appropriate
measures for the domestic legal structure. (d)
I appreciate the reference to territorial problems. It's
important to integrate Russia into the Asia-Pacific as a
constructive partner. This isn't just a bilateral issue, but is
important for the whole international community. I hope this is
a common message. (C)
Our nightmare is Russian sales of conventional arms -- to Libya,
North Korea. They haven't sold to China yet, but the Chinese
could afford a lot, including for the navy. The IMF
recommendations can't include the disposal of weapons. This
could make the PRC very strong militarily. As to inviting
Yeltsin to the next summit, I need to examine the question before
making any decision. So I'd appreciate not mentioning this to
Yeltsin. ($)
President Delors: I last met Yeltsin on May 30. He expects a
great deal, perhaps too much. He said he hasn't received a
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kopeck; I explained that he was wrong. He didn't conceal his
difficulties with the Ukraine. I see he had a meeting yesterday
with the other 11 republics on military topics. He said there
are problems running a country with 130 nationality groups. He
welcomed the EC decision on providing $250 million grant aid and
counterpart funds. He wanted an agreement with the EC, like we
have with the U.S. and Japan. We're working on this. On the
economy, he admitted it's not working. We can't get an
interlocutor on technical assistance; we can't implement $2
billion worth of programs. (C)
There is a growing conflict between Gaidar and Volskiy's defense
industrialists. Yeltsin plays one off against the other. There
is no uniform monetary system; it's archaic. The economy is
still deteriorating. Inflation was at 650 percent in the first
quarter. Interest rates are negative. Oil exports are down,
bottlenecks exist, facilities are obsolete. The European Energy
Charter has been held up because of the lack of reliable
spokesmen. (&)
On the other side: The IMF can't use the same approach (it's
used elsewhere in the world). They can't move rapidly to
budgetary reform. They need debt rescheduling. We need to
structure our emergency relief; there are severe shortages. For
the science foundation, the EC is pledging 4 million ECU. Re
nuclear safety, we're at work in Bulgaria. We committed $120
million. We know this is not sufficient for closedown.
Chernobyl's radioactivity is eating away at
(f)
Prime Minister Major: I agree with much of what President Delors
said. We do Yeltsin no favors if we're not frank. Our obligation
is to help him face his problems. A lot has happened in the last
year. Twelve countries are no longer one. Those twelve have
ties, hostilities, and historical burdens. There are barriers to
trade. There is no control of the money supply. The economy is
deteriorating greatly. A fall in output of 15 percent for the
FSU is forecast. Some of this is fewer tanks. People are being
paid for not producing. Unemployment is low in theory. But this
is a fool's paradise. They can't survive. They're moving to a
black market and a barter economy. Some other republics followed
Russia in freeing prices. In Ukraine, there is no tangible sign
of reform. They are focused on Russia. (&)
The key is Russia itself. If they succeed, others will follow.
It is the most reform-minded and purposeful. I think Gaidar
understands; Yeltsin knows less well, but he backs Gaidar.
Parliament shows no sign of understanding. Yeltsin does deserve
our support. He would like to go down in history as the one who
implemented market reform. Gaidar is the best prime minister
they'll get. But put it in the context of what's really been
done (it's less impressive) There has been no real
privatization. The gaps between words, especially in parliament,
and actions is great. Laws and decrees are not carried out. On
land reform, little ownership is established. Where it occurs, a
farmer can take over vacant land, but has no legal title or right
to sell. They have big factories. These can't be closed without
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some social unrest. The reformers have setbacks: the budget,
inflation. I think the deficit is up from 33 percent to 50
percent of GDP in the first six months of 1992 (?). The end
product is hyperinflation. That's the alarming part. (C)
There are some positives: Enterprises are dealing with one
another. Flats are being privatized. New businesses are
springing up. Plots are being distributed for private farm
production. (d)
I think the message should be:
(1) The IMF agreement is good. The deficit should move to
5 percent of GDP, and inflation to 10 percent/month.
(2) Be clear why we welcome this agreement: The Russian
government must take actions to avoid hyperinflation. No
government would survive this. I don't think he understands what
hyperinflation would do. There is a sheer lack of control over
money. You can't destroy confidence in money as you start with a
money economy.
(3) ?
(4) This is politics, as well as economics. Presentation
is as important as the contents. We need to stress his position.
We can't extract reform commitments. We should build on our
historic partnership.
(5) I hope we can hear what it's like in Russia; at the
micro level, too. What are they actually doing to set up market
structures? Are there plans for property rights, anti-monopoly
policies, etc. We're committed to try to help. But success will
come only from Russia itself. Self-help -- cooperation.
This won't be a comfortable meeting, but a valuable one. I share
your views on Northern Territories. I also agree on the troop
withdrawal point. (&)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: The first IMF tranche is good news, but
it's a drop in the bucket versus the $24 billion program. Is it
anti-climactic? What is your assessment? (C)
Prime Minister Major: They won't solve their problems with the
first credit tranche. But it shows we're ready to respond if he
moves. Russia gave commitments on interest rates, to build up
its foreign exchange reserves, to cut expenditures 20 percent, to
increase import tariffs, to cut credit supply increases. I see
this as an indicator of good intent. (&)
Prime Minister Mulroney: President Yeltsin just visited. It was
successful. He is traumatized by Gorbachev. He says Russia is 7
years behind because of Gorbachev and his half-reforms. He is
testing the political limits of reform. He faces military
opposition. We should probe about his immediate plans. What
will he do next week and next month? We should speak plainly
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about what we can and can't do; he thinks we can do anything. He
needs to be treated with honor, e.g., on the IMF and debt
rescheduling. (C)
Canada has already disbursed $2.5 billion. Only Germany is ahead
of us on a per capita basis. Yeltsin could get $60 billion if
everyone did the same per capita as we. We should highlight
people-to-people contacts; we need to help reform take root. We
should ask him to look into minority rights; he brushes this
away. We also need to encourage him on the Baltics. He says he
can't afford to bring the troops home. (&)
We should set the Tokyo Summit as the target to settle the
Northern Territories. The nuclear arms agreement with the U.S.
was the most important. We've failed to recognize the enormity
of this. (C)
We need to say tomorrow that Yeltsin has done 3 times more than
Gorbachev. To put this in perspective, we looked at the Marshall
Plan. It involved $12.4 billion over 4 years; 16 nations; 255
(?) million people. This translates to $72 billion in today's
dollars -- or 1.2 percent of U.S. GNP. We now are at 0.2 percent
of our GNP. There was a kick in clause for Europe to help
itself. The Marshall Plan was a most generous act. We think
we're doing a lot, but just compare. (&)
Yeltsin has great pride and sensitivity. He's concerned with his
image and how we treat him. We have to tell him the truth; what
we can and cannot do. (d)
President Mitterrand: I don't have much to add. I'd stress 3
points. (2)
(1) Baltics: The Russian argument is not fully sincere.
Hundreds of thousands of soldiers are there. They're in the
heart of the capitals, such as Riga. The Balts fear incidents.
They've got national pride. There is rotation among the troops;
troops are sent in and the governments aren't told. This is tied
to self-esteem; access to the sea; Peter the Great. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: These are elite troops. (d)
President Mitterrand:
(2) Scientific Potential: This is true in. the nuclear
field. Their scientists and top engineers shouldn't be available
to anyone. We could benefit, too. (c)
(3) Nuclear power plants: There is a 100 percent certainty
of an explosion in the next 15 years that will be as serious as
Chernobyl. We would be gravely negligent if we don't grasp this
issue. It would hurt all our nuclear plants. We meet 70 percent
of our power needs (through nuclear), and all of our electricity.
It's more economical than coal. (C)
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The revolution is just starting. These leaders will pass from
the scene. They're in the last stages of the Marxist era.
(L)
Chancellor Kohl: Prime Minister Mulroney mentioned the Marshall
Plan. It was an important part of my life. We were half-
starved. Americans brought rations to our school. Unlike in
1919, the Americans remained and brought practical aid, not just
soldiers. Recall Stalin at Yalta: Impoverishment would lead to
world revolution. The Marshall Plan stopped that. We can point
to this with gratitude, but this is also a model for us now.
History doesn't repeat itself, but could. (L)
This is a vast country -- from Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) to
Vladivostok. It needs investment in the future. If it reverts,
it will return to arms expenditures. Future generations will ask
what we did. We can't leave them to their own devices. We need
to talk about what we can and cannot do; their expectations are
absurd. We need to be frank with Yeltsin, but this isn't a
tribunal. ($)
I hope we can devote our last half-hour to the issue of nuclear
power plants. I have to warn against saying it's just our
neighbors' problem. There is no real alternative to nuclear
power now. I hope we can agree on what the Sherpas have drafted.
(d)
We don't want to confine ourselves to bilateral aid. Germany has
already put up $58 billion. It will be wretched if we don't do
this jointly. If we do, we'll get. into figures amounting to $700
million over five years. Needs more. ($)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: (Disagreeing.) What do you mean by
jointly? (&)
Chancellor Kohl: Two aspects: (1) Bilateral aid coordination.
This is a good idea. (2) Agree to do this in a collective way.
(d)
Prime Minister Amato: I support the Chairman's proposal. We
should pool our efforts, and affirm a modest amount over five
years. We should have a Common Fund, perhaps. Let's just agree
to the principle here. (X)
The President: I oppose another fund and bureaucracy.
Considerable amounts have been pledged; we'll do our part.
That's why we have brackets (in the text). Let's get bilateral
commitments to cover nuclear safety. I hate to object to a new
international organization, but I fear bureaucracy. We're
reserved on a fund. We have money available, so let's do the
assistance on the basis of coordination. (C)
President Delors: I'm looking at the text. Different objective.
Fund within the context of the G-24. (C)
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Chancellor Kohl: There is no danger of a bureaucracy. The idea
is to have a practical effect. Please reconsider this; we can
come back to it. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Is this money for the EBRD? ()
Chancellor Kohl: No. (C)
Prime Minister Mulroney: I understand it's within the purview of
the EBRD. (C)
(Exchange of views.)
The President: There is an international organization already
working. What's then to be done? (f)
President Delors: It's an existing organization with new tasks.
The Fund is to stimulate bilateral action. (d)
Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm also concerned with bureaucracy.
These funds should be only for near-term actions. I understand:
(1) no new bureaucracy; (2) donors manage; (3) EBRD to
administer; and (4) coordination through the G-24. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: If you look at EBRD management practices
When contracts are being granted, there is no fear of getting cut
out. Can we agree to break off this discussion for now and come
back to it later today? ($)
Prime Minister Major: There is a misunderstanding. The fund is
a backup for gaps in the bilateral efforts, filler for cracks.
(C)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Bilaterally you focus on points of
interest. (C)
BREAK FOR LUNCH
-- End of Meeting --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Afternoon Plenary Session
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the
Treasury
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Theodor Waigel, Minister of Finance
Jurgen Moellemann, Minister of Economics
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Ministry of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic
Michel Sapin, Minister of Economy and
Finance
Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary
General, Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Don Mazankowski, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Finance
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic
Piero Barucci, Minister of the Treasury
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Norman Lamont, Chancellor of the
Exchequer
Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary, Treasury
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Tsutomu Hata, Minister of Finance
Kozo Watanabe, Minister for International
Trade and Industry
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
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Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
DATE, TIME
Tuesday, July 7, 1992, 2:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Vierschimmelsaal
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Kohl: Welcome. We'll have a brief summary of the
Heads' discussion and then hear from Ministers Waigel and
Moellemann. I want to finish before 5:00 pm. I'd like to thank
our guests for their frank, friendly tone. (U)
We want a message of optimism from Munich. We want to
concentrate on economics. We all need recovery. It's beginning,
but is slow. We need to cultivate the recovery and boost it. We
need higher and sustainable growth, low inflation, and to make
inroads into unemployment. We need to show confidence. We've
had intensive talks about unemployment. We see this as a human
problem, not just a statistic. We all want low interest rates,
but recognize the specific problems of each of us. We discussed
GATT. We cannot negotiate here, but we don't want the same
generalities. We want success. I hope the wording will lead to
clear perspectives. We discussed drugs, poverty, migration, the
environment, debt relief for certain poorer countries, support
for Central and Eastern Europe. We discussed the FSU and "help
for self-help." We talked about nuclear safety; I hope we can
find wording. We have an historic opportunity. (C)
Finance Minister Waigel: We're conscious that the recovery has
begun, but there are great differences -- and weaknesses. A
Uruguay Round agreement would help. We need to bundle different
national measures, and keep inflation and deficits down.
Unemployment is of a structural nature, and growth alone has
limited effects. We talked about the IMF report on Russia. (d)
The IMF program foresees a three-phase plan. There will be a
first tranche loan. This will be the basis for further debt
relief. The cutoff date on existing Soviet debt will be
maintaining. There still needs to be all-encompassing
adjustment. We agreed on nuclear safety and on G-24
coordination. We discussed LDCs and aid, and the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) issue. All these issues
are interrelated. There was discussion of the issue of debt
forgiveness. (Notetaker was interrupted.) (&)
Finance Minister Moellemann: Need to stress (for FSU and Central
and Eastern Europe) structural change and modernization. Munich
is the beginning of a new structural policy coordination. They
need: (1) to reduce subsidies; this helps budget and better use
of investment; (2) strengthen competition and
deregulation/privatization; (3) strengthen international trade;
(4) work on environmental policy. We need to connect the macro
and the structural aspects. They need a legal framework for
private investors; this demands a positive investment climate and
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non-discrimination against foreign investors. There needs to be
protection on intellectual property. And improvement of the
environment. All this is true for both the FSU and CE/EE; we
discussed the latter, too. There should be follow-up through
economics and finance ministers with CE/EE in Japan. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: Comments? (U)
Prime Minister Amato: In paragraph 8, we could stress employment
more; stress training and the use of savings. There is a link
here to lower interest rates. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: This can be touched upon, but don't lengthen
the text. (U)
Secretary Brady: Finance ministers agreed to strengthen the
language on growth as an overall objective -- though leaving to
each nation to do this in its own way. We should leave no doubt
growth is the answer. (L)
Chancellor Kohl: Growth and stability go hand in hand. (U)
Finance Minister Mazankowski: We want more language in paragraph
10 on unemployment. Refer to labor market reform. Address
chronic structural unemployment. (C)
Prime Minister Major: Caution. We want more growth, less
unemployment and training. But I have a reservation: What are
the two energizers? (1) Lower interest rates and (2) the Uruguay
Round. But we have nothing to say on either. We can say what we
want, but there's no progress on ways to deliver. The opposition
will point to fine words; we should be able to point to something
tangible. Can't lower interest rates for reasons we all
understand. Nor can we expect a breakthrough in the UR. So we
can't say no to business at home to be confident. The
disjunction between what we say and what we can achieve is stark.
(C)
-- End of Meeting --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Joint Plenary Session
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the
Treasury
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Klaus Kinkel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Theodor Waigel, Minister of Finance
Jurgen Moellemann, Minister of Economics
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Ministry of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic
Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Michel Sapin, Minister of Economy and Finance
Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary General,
Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for
External Affairs
Don Mazankowski, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Finance
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
DECLASSIFIED
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister
The Italian Republic
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Vincenzo Scotti, Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Piero Barucci, Minister of the Treasury
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Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Norman Lamont, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary, Treasury
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Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Nobuo Matsunaga, Adviser to the Foreign
Ministry
Tsutomu Hata, Minister of Finance
Kozo Watanabe, Minister for International
Trade and Industry
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Jacques Delors, President
Commission of the European Communities
Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
DATE, TIME
Wednesday, July 8, 1992, 9:20 a.m.-10:15 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Room 111
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Kohl: Let's turn to the Economic Declaration. You
have the draft. On two paragraphs, there are comments: 8 and
46. (U)
President Delors: I suggest including the European Energy
Charter in paragraph 35. We'll give you a text. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: Let's return to it after seeing the text. (U)
URUGUAY ROUND
Prime Minister Amato: On paragraph 8, I think it's right to send
a clear signal on progress and on achieving a solution by the end
of 1992. But what is the purpose of the two paragraphs in
brackets? They raise individual questions where agreement is
lacking. These subjects are more suitable for the GATT
negotiators. Also, there could be more specifics on services.
(C)
Chancellor Kohl: I have to contradict you. These are accurate
reflections. If we pass over
(c)
President Delors: The second paragraph shows differences from
last year; it shows that there are smaller difficulties. It's
useful. ($)
Prime Minister Major: We have to justify a statement of
progress. These two paragraphs do so. This is the minimum. We
can't hide our disappointment. Last year, we expected agreement
by 1991. Now we say 1992 without saying what we'll do. We all
pledged our personal involvement. Not sure why we should now be
unambitious. (1) I believe (less) would be disappointing. (2)
The text will be weaker than London if we cut the two paragraphs.
(L)
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Chancellor Kohl: (Urges the Italians to accept.) (C)
The President: We associate ourselves with Prime Minister Major.
I see in the papers that people think our elections make it
harder to get an agreement. This is not true. We came prepared
to negotiate. It would be good to get an agreement. We've all
said that world growth is critical. We'd say nothing without
these two paragraphs. This is the bare minimum. Good things are
said on CAP reform. If we cut this, the signal could be that the
Uruguay Round is dead. We're ready. If people have practical
suggestions, we're ready. Politics should be to get a successful
conclusion. We're ready now or at any time up to November. (2)
Chancellor Kohl: Can Italy remove the brackets? (d)
Prime Minister Amato: Our agreement is total; we won't veto (the
bracketed text). (C)
Chancellor Kohl: Thanks, I appreciate it. (U)
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Foreign Minister Dumas: Paragraph 46 is not efficient. Don't
like "consensus." Coordination at some levels. No mention of a
figure. We want to delete "consensus." We want one body to
coordinate in the EBRD. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: This is a difficult paragraph. Some fear
enormous capital needs, some reference to $25 billion. Could we
substitute for "consensus"? (d)
(Exchange of views. Paragraph 46 agreed.) (e)
ENERGY CHARTER
The President: The first sentence is OK, but not the second.
(&)
President Delors: We need the second sentence to achieve
results. (C)
(Discussion. Accept as the second sentence: "We urge rapid
conclusion of the preparatory work." Economic Declaration
adopted.) (C)
Chancellor Kohl: I talked to President Yeltsin. We'll hear from
him and then have a general discussion. At 10:40, we'll meet in
the Hall for the reading of the Declaration. (U)
-- End of Meeting --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Heads of Delegation Meeting with
President Boris Yeltsin at the
1992 Munich Economic Summit (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
George Bush, President of the
United States of America
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Ministry of
Finance
Francois Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic
Anne Lauvergeon, Deputy Secretary
General, Office of the President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Guiliano Amato, Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Counsellor
John Major, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Andrew Turnbull, Deputy Secretary, Treasury
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Koichiro Matsuura, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission of the European Communities
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff to the President
of the EC Commission
Boris Yeltsin, President of the
Russian Federation
Yegor Gaidar, Acting Prime Minister
Peter Aven, Minister for Foreign Economic
Relations
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DATE, TIME
Wednesday, July 8, 1992, 3:05 p.m.-5:40 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Residenz - Kaisersaal
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Kohl: Warm welcome, particularly to President Yeltsin
and PM Gaidar. I hope we'll have a frank and open conversation.
We will end at 6 p.m. sharp. President Yeltsin and I will have a
press conference at 6:55 p.m. (C)
We've been discussing the dramatic changes in Russia. Your
presence here is living proof of that. We all see the major
challenges, but also opportunities. We discussed reforms in
Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU, particularly in Russia.
We all know what energy, power, courage, and determination are
required, and we pay tribute to you. We're excited to hear what
you'll say. We don't want to interfere in your domestic
concerns; we want to encourage you. What is going on is of
interest to all of us. Backsliding would hurt us, cost us
dearly. We know the difficulties you face. Macro stabilization
is a prerequisite for political stability. Privatization is
important. Your job will be easier if you mobilize foreign
investment. We'll support you in developing a legal structure.
The safety of nuclear power plants is important. The shock of
Chernobyl is still with us. (C)
We've drawn up 10 points we want to discuss. Our idea is
comprehensive partnership. Our offer of assistance goes beyond
Russia. Help for self-help. (C)
(1) Support of financial institutions. The IMF has agreed
with you on a three-phase program; the first credit tranche is
important.
(2) Period of grace for debt.
(3) Export credits. Would like a counterpart from you (?).
(4) Technical help. Tangible assistance to build markets.
(5) Support for private investment, especially in oil and
gas. This will be a success for you.
(6) Trade concessions.
(7) Management training for privatization, consultancies.
(8) Cooperation in arms conversion, space technology,
science.
(9) Nuclear plant safety.
(10) Consultative Groups to encourage structural reforms,
coordinate with you, if you agree. (d)
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We're partners here. It's not a question of rich and poor.
Russia has a great history and culture. We need a friendly and
frank exchange, to say what's true. Perhaps Prime Minister
Mulroney would like to speak. (C)
Prime Minister Mulroney: I have been asked to speak on political
matters; this is a synthesis of our opinion. Your presence is a
vote of confidence in you and the Russian people. We want to
help you succeed. We know you have a proud history. You are
coming as a partner looking to get his country off the ground.
(C)
You need a free and open society for reforms. There are 7
nations here, who represent a large share of the world's GNP.
Economic well being is tied to openness. There are great
differences among us: cultural, geographic, language, etc. What
keeps us together and explains our success? It's freedom. The
key is liberty and democracy. It doesn't emerge overnight. It's
fragile, ungainly, but pure and impressive. Genuine political
freedom is linked to the market and prosperity. You can't have
bits and pieces. We know you're building a reform constituency.
You face daunting problems. As if we didn't have any. Canadians
are waiting to bury me. Your courage on the tank is a symbol of
your political courage. Tolerance and respect for minorities are
at the heart of democracy. You face problems of ethnic
nationalism. Your commitment to reform is a powerful example for
others. (d)
I know you're preoccupied with your neighbors. Relations with
Ukraine are essential to stability; we hope you'll work out the
Crimea. We'd like to know how you see these relations evolving.
On the Baltics, we urge you to reach settlements on the timing of
withdrawal. Even a gradual withdrawal would be positive. I know
you're worried about where to put the troops. But we understand
you're also rotating troops in. It's important to show movement
on this soon. We will speak to the Balts on Russian minorities.
(f)
Congratulations on an historic arms control agreement. We all
agree that your work in this area reduced pressures for
proliferation. It will help redirect resources. There is the
problem of the flight of experts. The Moscow Science Center will
help. (C)
International law and justice provide the basis for resolving the
Northern Territories with Japan. I know you feel the importance
of this bilaterally; but the consequences affect all of us. (X)
We welcome your peacekeeping support at the UN. We'd like to
hear your assessment of Yugoslavia. We want to work with you as
a partner. The peacekeeping agreement on Moldova is important.
(C)
Prime Minister Major: I'd like to add my welcome. We will be
frank to help you overcome difficulties. We all have practical
interests in Russia. We all have sympathy and admiration. Big
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changes took place in the last year. The USSR was a different
country: it had a command economy, wasn't democratic, and didn't
have a freely-elected leader. This meeting is different. (C)
The task in front of you is huge. You've joined the family of
democratic nations, but not yet the world economy. Change will
take time and will be painful. It is the right way, the only
way, to secure economic well-being. We all have problems, but
there's more on your table. We do have experience. The changes
that have occurred over the past year add to the difficulty.
There was a single monetary and economic area. Now there are
barriers to trade, effective control of the money supply has been
lost. This is not a technical matter. There is risk of
hyperinflation. It would destroy the market economy before it's
born. There is a sharp fall in output. Much of the decline
comes in appropriate areas -- e.g., tanks -- but jobs in these
factories did give people wages. But they're getting wages
without production now. New firms are being established, some of
them private. There will be a showdown over the infrastructure
of the market economy -- privatization, land reform, operation of
the bankruptcy law. Laws and decrees need to be implemented and
enforced across Russia, e.g., privatization must go widely. Land
reform is not just allowing farmers to own their land, but legal
title, ability to sell, etc. You face unemployment. People are
being paid for jobs that don't exist. There are still subsidies
for your social services. You need to move the subsidies from
enterprises. You'll face unemployment on a new scale. You need
a social safety net. Money will need to be taken from subsidies.
(&)
There is risk of hyperinflation. You've got budget deficit and
credit problems. Countries don't survive these problems without
great damage; it lasts. It may be hard to explain
hyperinflation. The market economy needs money people can trust.
If money loses value, so will everything else in society. Wages
lose value. A painful economic reform can be a recipe for
disorder; but hyperinflation can be the seed of revolution.
So the IMF discussions are critical. Tough targets were agreed
to, but they are crucial, essential. I hope the IMF agreement
will be a bargain between Russia, the IMF, and the G-7; it's a
partnership. It will be difficult. It will work; we believe
this. Investment will follow from abroad; yours can be the first
government to privatize. With the right legal framework,
billions could flow. A revolution in living standards will
occur. (e)
So we have the release of the $1 billion; there is more to come.
There is generous debt rescheduling. We'll continue technical
assistance (banking experts to clean up and interest others in
our banks). Bilaterally, we will release $500 million in export
credits. A GATT agreement could help. The safety of nuclear
power plants worries all of us. (C)
There's a crucial wider point: If you complete what you've
begun, this will contribute to political stability and faster
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growth, etc. We have an interest in your success. We want to
work as partners. We have two hours here to hear what will be
done and how, your timetable, what practical steps you plan to
take, and your problems. The more we know in detail, the more we
can help. At the end of the day, your policies will determine
your success. The price of success will be very great. The
converse is true, too. (C)
President Yeltsin: Let me begin by expressing gratitude for
being able to attend this leading Western forum. This direct
contact should be friendly, not formal. This includes problems
in Russia. We'll reply to your questions in the spirit that
you're not expressing doubt, but have a genuine desire to have
our problems elucidated first hand. (Refers to Gaidar, too.)
(C)
The world has changed greatly following the collapse of communism
and totalitarianism. The Cold War has ended. We're in
transition toward partnership. But we've delayed. There are
still differences between East and West. We're proceeding
confidently on the road to freedom, civil rights, rule of law.
We need radically new approaches in our relations. (d)
Bilaterally, we've discussed this. But it's not yet accomplished
in Japan. In the course of an official visit in September, I'm
convinced that we'll find a way to solve problems. The Northern
Territories issue is bilateral, but it's important to understand
that you wish to bring mutual understanding and open economic
cooperation. It's in your declaration. We'll seek that road.
The Russian people have had a hard time. The psychological
burden will make it difficult. The economy will help solve some
of your other problems. We've studied your economic and
political declarations and will support them and move in those
directions. ($)
Now I'll discuss problems. I regret that economic reform was not
initiated 6 years ago. We can't turn the clock back. We've had
a firm march for 6 months. We can't agree on a march back; we're
following this month to month. These 6 months for Russia have
been bitter. Seventy years wiped out the notion of private
property. It used to evoke an allergy; now we need to change our
thinking. The second stage of our reform started July 1 in the
Deeping Program which runs through 1993 and 1994. We're
reaffirming the strategies of the first part and will be
deepening it, especially as concerns property. There's not been
much progress on privatization. This is true. But for 74 years
we lived by levelling. Now there are 150,000 private farms.
They're small, but there. This will rise four and five times,
and soon will be millions. We have a clear program for
privatization. It's not just shops. We have the legislative
basis for joint stock companies, which will be for all large
enterprises in the first stage. If we stick to it, they'll be
about 70% by 1993. (d)
Next is the issue of inflation. I understand your and the IMF's
concerns. It's not just a concern to me, but a painful subject.
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It's declining. In June, it was 11%, versus 300% in January; by
1993, it will return to 3%. Inflation will blow up all our
reforms. This is a confidential gathering. We have to take care
of all states of the CIS. The USSR budget consisted of subsidies
to them. Now we don't have formal subsidies, but half a year's
difference is owed us -- 300 billion rubles, or $10 billion. We
can't ask them to pay. It would repulse them, including the
three nuclear powers. We want to carry though, at least until it
is irreversible. We've got a bold government. I personally
support it. We will follow through. There is no way back. (C)
We have about $70.7 billion in external debt. Frankly, we can't
pay. We are paying interest: for deliveries of food, grain from
the U.S. and others. We won't follow the Bolsheviks of 1917 and
renounce our debt. We will pay. No CIS republic has paid a cent
to us; we pay for them, too. I look to you for your support in
the London and Paris Clubs, to support a realistic rescheduling
time frame. (C)
As for nuclear plant safety, with assistance from the U.S.,
Canada, Germany, and France, we'll have a program. The first
stage is for the next 2-3 years. We want to close down all first
generation plants. The second stage is to retrofit the second
generation plants under IAEA safeguards. The cost is $10-15
billion. Most of this falls on us. But Chernobyl shows the
danger. We hope that one-third of this comes from others, for
equipment and operational training, etc. The third stage is to
get new stations installed. We have pretty clear ideas on where
to build them. We understand concerns and are taking practical
steps. (¢)
Next, we want to liberalize our external economic relations.
We've reached the first stage with the IMF. Thank you for your
help. It should get easier. We've eliminated differences of
principle. It's unrealistic to completely liberalize energy and
fuel prices. There are limits to peoples' patience. This is our
biggest difference. We've adopted laws, removed barriers,
established MFN status. We look to you to remove obstacles.
You're closed to us. This costs us more than the assistance we
get. This is a paradox. What to say about GATT? This is good
news, but other barriers exist. We need more export
possibilities. We could swell our hard currency earnings. (C)
We have a decline in production. It's one of our most difficult
issues. It's down 15% in six months. You're right that the
largest part is in the military-industrial complex. You know how
militarized our economy is. It's a sclerosis. We impoverished
our people for military uses. Now we're working on conversion of
defense industries. I've talked about this with you and
businessmen. We need a common program. You have technical and
engineering experience. This is vital. We're discussing how to
stabilize in the fall; its not getting much worse in the second
quarter -- the big decline was in the first quarter. (C)
The mass media is carrying reports of a possible putsch. I can't
understand the actions of national communists. No objective
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prerequisites for a putsch exist. All military-defense leaders
are committed to the President, the Prime Minister, and to the
Supreme Soviet. (C)
CIS: It's only 6 months old, too. You have more experience in
commonwealth. There are differences, but views are converging.
Especially with Ukraine. Agreements have removed the main bones
of contention. We still have the problem of the ruble zone. The
first IMF credits will be used for this. We've discussed
mechanisms to counter difficulties if one republic moves to its
own currency. (C)
Regarding trouble spots, you're well informed. Shevardnadze and
I signed an agreement on South Ossetia. We're implementing it
now. Forces are being pulled back. We have agreement with
Moldova for disengagement. (Romanian and Bulgarian troops can
help.) Nagorno-Karabakh requires a CSCE mechanism. This will be
discussed in Helsinki. The conflict goes way back; everyone is
well armed. It's a dangerous situation. (c)
Political decisions have been taken on the Baltics. There are
100, 000 troops, and they are to be withdrawn. There is no other
possible decision. These are left over FSU forces. Russia
didn't send them. We finance them and are obligated to withdraw
them. We agreed for a timetable for the second half of 1992 and
1993. We'll stick to it. There are financial difficulties, and
housing problems, etc. But the most important thing is that we
don't intend to beef up these forces. Our tour there is for 2
years. We're not bringing single divisions up to strength as
troops leave. It's easier to withdraw some officers and
equipment. (d)
We signed an agreement with President Bush. We will strictly
carry out nuclear weapons destructions. We signed with Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and
the NPT. We will carry out these obligations. Some missiles
have already been withdrawn (SS-18s). (&)
We welcome a Consultative Group with persons from your nations to
prepare for the next meeting (Tokyo Coordinating Conference?).
(C)
I discussed with Secretary Baker moving on the sale of land and
bankruptcy. We now have private land ownership, including by
foreigners. (C)
Some 50% of our population lives below the poverty line. This
causes real pain. I hope you can help us ease social tensions.
Greater hope for the success of reform will help. (d)
I hope I have answered your questions. I don't want to abuse my
time. There are no East-West divisions now. The rules of the
game should be equal for us all. (d)
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Prime Minister Amato: Russia is now part of Europe. It had
drifted away. I want to thank you and President Bush for your
arms agreement. I'd like to ask for a few clarifications. (C)
(1) Inflation: How is it diminishing? We know there are
products in the shops. My son is in Russia, as Boris Yeltsin
knows, but prices are high. Is demand declining, SO prices come
down?
(2) The relationship between the decline of production and
the military apparat does exist. Our companies could help you.
(3) You're reassuring on relations with the republics,
regarding non-proliferation and the use of forces. Is there a
problem with the monetary system, e.g., with Ukraine? Are your
companies using international prices with other republics? What
are the consequences of this?
(4) Nuclear plant safety: $10-15 billion has been
mentioned for second generation plants. You said that one-third
of this would come from outside, for equipment, etc. Assistance
could be more helpful if Russia eliminated duties on these
materials. Are you prepared to lift them?
(5) I agree on the need for debt rescheduling. (f)
President Yeltsin: It would be interesting to hear from Prime
Minister Gaidar, too. ($)
Prime Minister Gaidar: Regarding inflation, of course, the fall
in prices for the mass of goods is something we can only dream
of. We're trying to prevent hyperinflation. It would end
democracy. This is a real and serious risk. We started reforms
at a time of easy money. Prices took off at first, but tight
money policy has been turning this back, slowing the rate of
growth. We used financial instruments to bring them down. In
January, inflation was 345%; February - 308%; March - 208%;
May - 17%; June - 19%. It's still high; there's inertia behind
it. (C)
And this is not against a background of increased production.
Linkages are breaking down, and military production is declining
-- whole sectors of the economy. Also, we have forced cuts in
imports because of the lack of hard currency. It hurts
production. We hope you can help. ($)
Re world prices, decontrol has moved prices up to world levels
for many products, except fuel -- which we'll bring up over the
course of two years. There are vast and concealed subsidies.
(C)
Re tariffs on nuclear equipment imports, we will certainly reduce
these. (&)
President Mitterrand: Others raised questions. I don't need to
repeat them except one: Russia is part of Europe. It's
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illuminating to say this because we'd forgotten. It's not part
of our working circuit. Gorbachev and Yeltsin are Europeans.
Even we have our faults; I know President Bush, Prime Minister
Mulroney, and Prime Minister Miyazawa feel that. Many of our
criteria should apply to you. It's a different order of
magnitude. You're in a period of transition which will be quite
long. Forty years ago many of us struggled to get on our feet.
Russia is one of the great states. Russians are no less gifted
than others; they only lack experience and habit. For 74 years
you were absent. You had your own system; it failed --
astonishingly quickly. (Notes link between market economics and
democracy.) Great scientific developments. We want a foundation
for young people. This is an elite like ours. Misguided for
military. You will become a true competitor -- this will be all
the better. (C)
There are two duties for Russia to fulfill. It's not just a
matter of granting political and economic freedom. First, to
address the social consequences of brusque change. Hundreds of
thousands of people will be destabilized. They have a right to
live. Inequalities could lead to discord, disavowal of their
leader. You need to ensure they can earn their livelihood. I
wonder how Russians manage. They're very patient. This can't go
on forever. Second, your strategic arms agreements are worthy of
the gratitude of the world. They gave a new impulse; I hope
there is follow-up. Need time to digest. I hope someday to stop
nuclear testing. I know George Bush and John Major don't agree.
Since you continue them, I will, too. But I regret it. It's
absurd. We have no enemies.
(C)
You should set up a plan for withdrawal from the Baltics; they're
worried. You need to recognize their sovereign rights. I think
nuclear plants are the main danger. We need a rapid response to
$10-15 billion -- one-third from us. We need to face this by
summer. Ethnic disputes worry us. Seeking tribal divisions.
(f)
Re Yugoslavia, we need an international force to protect
minorities. All are afraid. Rule of law guaranteed.
International Arbitration Court. Need to stop Yugoslav
contagion. Need to force states to accept international
arbitration. If they see the U.S. and Russia associated with
this idea, it will give it strength. Could add military
sanctions. Prime Minister Mulroney realizes this. Most
countries breaking up had a dictatorship or empire. Higher power
protected (minorities?). Who does now? You' have these
problems in your own area. This is not to accuse; the new
fashion affects us all. Need rule of law. (X)
The President: I can't add anything. Two questions, perhaps for
Prime Minister Gaidar. First, you asked about access to our
markets. Is there one category, or are you referring to
everything? Second, knowing of the historical friendship of
Russia with Yugoslavia, do you have difficulty with our
communique? We should act in concert if we can. Perhaps you
have a unique role. (&)
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President Yeltsin: We fully support your declaration on
Yugoslavia. I reaffirm our phone agreement re UNSC. Also
applies to Croatia. Need to broaden our view; it's not just
Serbia and Croatia. May involve the UN and Russia re Croatia and
Serbia. (C)
Prime Minister Gaidar: We face a whole series of obstacles
because we were isolated for many years. First, metals. Uranium
sales are shut out -- this is particularly important for the
conversion of industries from nuclear weapons production.
Mineral fertilizer. Aluminum. Mercury. Cast iron. Wood
materials. Second, high technology. Especially the COCOM
limits. There has been progress, but this is still a major
restraint. Space, etc. (d)
Prime Minister Miyazawa: Your success is important to all of us.
So is the principle of law and justice: we announced package on
this basis. $1.4 billion in trade insurance re oil and natural
gas. ($200 million for natural gas can be agreed on soon.)
Multilaterally, we support the IMF, the World Bank, the Science
Centers, $25 million for nuclear power safety. Camdessus said
the release of the first billion dollars will come soon. We
welcome this. For Prime Minister Gaidar, do you expect agreement
with the IMF? A debt agreement? (&)
Prime Minister Gaidar: This is the approach. The first credit
tranche opens the way for broad cooperation. In August, we'll
negotiate a standby, and agree by October 1. We' negotiate
a
Stabilization Fund so we can activate it when the prerequisites
are created, perhaps by the end of the year. The way is opened
for Paris and London Club debt reschedulings. (C)
President Yeltsin: I would like to add on debt: We could go
boldly for debt-for-equity swaps. Give property, buildings,
facilities, plants, land, minerals. There is vast oil in
Sakhalin. (C)
Prime Minister Amato: Regarding barriers to trade and COCOM, it
could be useful to check on the criteria applied. Perhaps
they're less favorable than for nations without the partnership
we have. (C)
Prime Minister Major: President Yeltsin's point on debt-for-
equity swaps is very important. This has immense possibilities.
It's the most encouraging thing in a long time; it's worth all
else here. (C)
President Delors: I have 3 questions regarding Russian-EC
cooperation. (C)
(1) Regarding trade restrictions, the EC applies MFN to
Russia. We've eliminated quantitative restrictions on state
enterprises; 85% of all goods enter duty free. On aluminum,
despite your low (electricity prices and therefore low prices?),
we've taken no anti-dumping actions. Uranium is a problem.
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(2) To develop our technical assistance, including training,
we've committed 1.3 billion ECU. But we lack a single
interlocutor. I think you said you'd set up one central point of
contact. Will you?
(3) Is energy aid going to be needed next autumn? (e)
And other questions: (1) What about the ruble zone? (2) How to
attract private investment? Is there a way to guarantee a return
on capital and dividends? Like a debt-for-equity arrangement?
(3) Many difficulties are linked to your distribution system.
How can we help here, especially in the spirit of a market
economy? (&)
Prime Minister Gaidar: We have no interest in dumping. As a
former finance minister, I can assure you that all our exports
suffer from our weak exchange rate. We're grateful to the EC for
technical assistance. We need a market infrastructure, massive
training, lawyers, accountants; and to upgrade our agriculture,
especially our livestock and modernization of distribution.
Technical assistance coordination would be a natural for the
Consultative Group. Regarding guarantees, we're pleased that the
U.S. moved on the bilateral investment agreement; we're working
also on this with Japan. Our most important medium-term task is
political risk insurance and insurance for other risks. (d)
President Yeltsin: I'm very satisfied with our conversation and
grateful for the understanding you've shown. I appreciate the
style of openness and mutual confidence here. We've been equally
candid. I want to thank you for the actions you've taken and for
support of Russia's reforms. This concerns all of us. It's
inspiring and encourages us. (&)
Chancellor Kohl: This was an unusual discussion. There was real
frankness. President Mitterrand went beyond just economic issues
-- to think about where we're coming from and where we're going
to. As a German, I'm sensitive to Russia's role. We were on the
way to Russia, as it were (?).
(C)
Now we'll go to our press conference. I'll make clear the hard
work that has been done here. The most important things to say:
Your success will be our success. Any falling back to old
structures will be disappointing. Now we're in Munich. In 1938,
we were on the verge of WWII. Now we have great opportunities.
This is the most favored generation of the century. The most
important thing is to signal optimism, confidence, and hope. ()
Prime Minister Miyazawa: As the next chair
Thanks for this
successful summit. (U)
-- End of Meeting --
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Constantine
Mitsotakis of Greece
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of
Greece
Lucas Tsilas, Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister
Virginia Tsouderou, Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 7:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Guest House, Helsinki, Finland
The President: I want to hear from you especially on Cyprus and
Macedonia. (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you for receiving me. I have
the same two topics to discuss with you. On Macedonia, I
believe we are close to a resolution. The EC decision
facilitates a solution but Gligorov has yet to accept this
decision. I think Gligorov's domestic decision is strong. He
can implement this if he wants to. I think he wanted the
government to fall. It should not be an insurmountable problem
for him to accept the EC decision. The U.S. position will be
decisive with him. This is how I feel. I think the U.S. should
adopt a clear stand. (¢)
The President: We have tried to hold back on recognition. Your
proposal seems okay with us. What makes you think Gligorov is
prepared to accept it? (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If Gligorov is convinced that there
is no alternative, he will go along. This is a terrible problem
for him domestically. But if it is not solved, it will continue
to be a crisis. All Greeks oppose any other solutions. If
Greeks are hostile to Macedonia, there cannot be co-existence.
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But we are ready to recognize them if they accept our proposal on
the name. There is no hostility toward them. (d)
The President: Is there some way you can reach out directly to
Gligorov? Do you believe he knows your heart beat on this? ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have used public statements and
private contacts to connect with him. (c)
The President: Reach out if you can. (d)
Prime Minster Mitsotakis: I will make a speech and reach out in
that way. Also we are prepared to provide aid. (f)
The President: Does Gligorov really understand your sincerity on
this? (c)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: What I can't do is meet with him. We
have used intermediaries. I'll do what I can to convince him
that we want his country to exist. It is in our interest.
(f)
The President: We think the Macedonians have done a good job on
how they have gone about trying to achieve their international
status. Why is it that you can't meet with him? ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: As soon as he accepts a name that
does not include "Macedonia" I will be ready to meet with him.
In the meantime, Douglas Hurd will go to Skopje on July 18. ($)
Secretary Baker: We have sent the message to Gligorov saying
that we would support your proposal. We have made it clear to
them that this is the EC decision and we support it. (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have to try harder to convince
Gligorov. ($)
Secretary Baker: But he came to see us and we told him the
facts. (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have to insist. (f)
Secretary Baker: We are worried about the situation in
Macedonia. (C)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I told the Europeans that they have
to chose and then persuade Gligorov. We want stability in the
south of what once used to be Yugoslavia. This could be our
first success from this crisis. But the U.S. must insist. He
will be prepared to decide this. He has people who want to
settle it. Such a solution will also increase the U.S. prestige
in Greece and in Europe. ($)
Secretary Baker: Even if Gligorov agrees, will this political
situation permit him to survive? (c)
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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Gligorov has control. He can accept
this. But it is hard for him to shift especially from the hard
core people who surround him. (d)
The President: Maybe we can escalate our presentation to
Gligorov. I understand what you want. Maybe we could do
something in connection with Hurd's visit. I still wonder if
Gligorov can survive. But I can see what I can do. ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The dual name compromise eliminates
no one. It is a fair compromise. ($)
Secretary Baker: Have you suggested what the formal name would
be? (C)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It can be anything they want as long
as doesn't include "Macedonia." (c)
The President: We will see what can be done. We are terribly
worried about instability in this region. ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If we solve the Skopje problem and
are careful about the Kosovo, perhaps we can keep the war out of
the South. (d)
The President: We were impressed with the new Albanian
President. Berisha is a good man. (L)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree. (U)
On Cyprus I know about the efforts you are making. We have a
great opportunity right now. I went to Istanbul twice. (f)
The President: I know that Demirel likes you. (U)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have met with Ozal, Inonu, Demirel,
and Cetin. Cetin in particular is a great man. I try to create
a good atmosphere with Turkish public opinion during my visits
but I will be frank. I am still not sure that the Turks want a
settlement of the Cyprus problem. Demirel, Cetin, and Yilmaz all
said that they are ready but I am not sure that they have reached
a final decision. We may be in the last days, please keep up the
pressure on them. I've tried to be helpful. (C)
The President: Don't you need to lean on our friend Vassiliou?
If there is a problem on either side, we will weigh in. I know
the territories and refugees are key for you. The Secretary
General's proposal seems reasonable, that is his so-call "set of
ideas.' (C)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Territory is key. ()
The President: You are asking us to keep after Ankara. ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Yes, in order to keep the pressure on
Denktash. (C)
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The President: We have little influence on Denktash.
(d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Denktash doesn't really exist. I
will be seeing Demirel while I am here. (d)
The President: So will I. Let's see what we can all do to bring
this to a conclusion. ($)
-- End of Conversation --
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2009-0649-MR
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman of
the State Council of Georgia (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Russian Affairs, NSC Staff,
Notetaker
Interpreter
Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman of the State
Council of Georgia
Aleksandr Chikvaidze, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Sergei Tarasenko, Assistant to the Chairman
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 8:05 - 8:25am
AND PLACE:
Guest House, Helsinki
The President: I am very pleased to see you. I know you are
confronting great difficulties. We've been through a lot
together including the 55 speeches we are hearing together here
in Helsinki but at least everybody is keeping it short. Castro
came to Rio and everyone expected a two hour speech but give the
man credit he finished in the allotted seven minutes. (U)
Chairman Shevardnadze: But we know he can talk for six hours.
(U)
The President: Well I am just delighted to see you. Obviously
we want you to succeed. We respect you for taking on this
challenge. I would like to hear from you about how it is going.
(c)
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Chairman Shevardnadze: Thank you. Everyone comes to the U.S.
President with requests. We have decided not to ask for
anything. You have been generous with your support and
assistance, you played a decisive role for our country. If it
had not been for your recognition policy, there would be no
democracy today in Georgia. Jim's visit has historic
significance and we welcomed him with a big crowd. (&)
Secretary Baker: I have to tell you a story about that. You
know we have great confidence in Eduard. He said let's go greet
the crowd so we plunged in. At that point, my friend the Foreign
Minister said, this is extraordinarily dangerous. Our confidence
in Eduard was put to a test. (U)
Chairman Shevardnadze: Of great importance to my country was
membership in the IMF. Your word on that was decisive. We also
got help on medicines -- insulin and hospital equipment without
which our situation would have been impossible. (C)
The President: Are things under control now? (c)
Chairman Shevardnadze: Yes. Your Embassy is staffed and working
well. We have cooperation working in specific areas. I hope
that we can be of use to you as well. Let me give you a run-down
on our situation. Slowly, we are making democracy and
stabilization irreversible. Consolidation is taking place. In
October we will have elections. They should go well. So we are
finding solutions. There is one conflict (Ossetia) but it is not
too great. We are building good relations with Russia and
Ukraine. Our relations with Turkey are not bad. Our relations
with Iran are within allowable limits so I am more optimistic now
about our future. But we still have some problems. Georgia is
small but in an interesting geo-political location. It is on the
border between Islam and Christianity, between North and South.
Maybe we can play an interesting role in avoiding this large
conflict. I am also now engaged in Black Sea cooperation, where
Turkey is playing a constructive role. (f)
The President: We, of course, have good relations with Turkey
and Prime Minister Demirel. (d)
Chairman Shevardnadze: The most dangerous and explosive area is
the Caucasus. We have to think about security structures. We
will support regional organizations. I can foresee the
involvement of Turkey, the Caucasus states, and Russia. Turkey
is taking the lead and should be supported. Some forces in
Turkey want to take a different (less cooperative) tact. I would
like to talk to the U.S. about our region, either with Jim or
perhaps in a working group. (c)
The President: This type of cooperation is in our own interest.
We are worried about these conflicts that are breaking out. We
have a high regard for the Turks and know we can work with
Demirel. He is reasonable. Tell me more about Iran. (C)
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Chairman Shevardnadze: Our Prime Minister had a promising first
meeting with the Iranians. Rafsanjani hinted that they want to
regularize political and economic relations with the European
countries. Iran is interested in moving its goods through
Georgia and the Black Sea to Europe. Its' options are the Black
Sea, the Caspian, and the Gulf. We should work with Iran. They
have promised Georgia oil and gas. I am concerned that the
Caucasus will be fought over among Turkey, Iran and Russia.
(x)
The President: I am pleased to hear that you are getting along
with Russia. We have told Yeltsin of our high regard for you.
And they say they are positive toward Georgia.
(c)
We know about your problems with regard to grain. I admire you
for not making a request and I am embarrassed to say that I don't
have an immediate answer but I wanted you to know that we are
sensitive to your problem. Jim will ask the Saudis if they can
do something. I am not sure what we can do because of our law
on dispensing food aid under PL. 480. We will try as hard as we
can. I cannot promise anything but we feel your need in our
hearts. ()
Secretary Baker: Have you heard from the Saudis? (f)
Chairman Shevardnadze: We will need the credits or we will die.
The Georgian economy was part and parcel of the Soviet economy
which has fragmented and collapsed. I know about your problems.
I know you can not make large moves at this time. Maybe the
Saudis or the Kuwaitis can help. Maybe the IMF can help. It
depends on whether we can be given the status of a developing
country. (f)
The President: What is of the utmost urgency? (f)
Chairman Shevardnadze: We are experiencing hunger. The Turks
have helped us. We have ten days of food supplies left. (L)
The President: We will try our best. This has nothing to do
with our election. The problem is that we evidentially have
nothing left under the normal program. (d)
Chairman Shevardnadze: Mr. President, what you' ve said about
this is better than receiving the grain itself.
(f)
Secretary Baker: What is your view on South Ossetia? (c)
Chairman Shevardnadze: Things are better. I met with Yeltsin
and am trying to settle the problem with him. Russian extremists
were causing a problem. Yeltsin made a basic decision so there
is less fighting now. There is still some shooting but
negotiations have begun.
(f)
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The President: We had a good meeting in Munich with Yeltsin.
He was very serious about what needs to be done. Given your key
and constructive role, I wanted you to know that. (c)
Chairman Shevardnadze: You have to support Yeltsin. The
reactionaries in Russia -- the so-called "Red-Browns" -- are the
biggest threat to all of us.
(d)
-- End of Conversation --
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
General (3 pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0233-F3 (159)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 3/14/2011
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 159 LIBRARY
SECRET
5611
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 13526
2000- 0233-F13
SCS 3/14/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary
General
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas M. T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
Gephardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary
General
Roland Wegener, Director of the Private
Office
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Finland
The President: Tell me about yesterday's NATO meeting. We are
not trying to push the WEU off the scene. I take it there may be
a serious problem with the French. We are running into this a
lot. (C)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
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The President: What is this talk about the WEU opening up a land
corridor?
(C)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner
(b)(1)
The President: What is the attitude of the French?
(e)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: I have been talking to the other foreign
ministers and they have been talking to Dumas. I have to wonder
about whether we want a NATO ministerial here in Helsinki. It
could appear as if we are seeking to displace the WEU. Could we
not just have a quiet conversation? We are prepared to see the
WEU involved as much as NATO is.
($)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: What the President has said is this. The U.S.
cannot sit back on a humanitarian role. We support use of all
necessary means the not too settle the political problem. We
haven't ruled anything out, but we are unlikely to provide ground
combat forces. We would consider making air and naval forces
available. NATO might play a useful role. I offered that to
Butros Ghali. Amato definitely would support NATO-WEU
coordination. ($)
The President: What if Boutros Ghali says that NATO should go
into Bosnia? Would we have some obligation? (S)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(S)
The President: If NATO were not involved what would the WEU do?
(C)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
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Secretary Baker: Yes, maybe. But propose we do it
cooperatively between NATO and the WEU. We would cooperate for
this discrete problem. The question of intervention is a
separate bridge to cross. (8)
The President: But we have to consider how we define this at the
beginning. We can't be contradictory. We will cooperate with
the WEU and provide sea and air forces. But I want to be careful
about NATO being in the lead. (S)
General Scowcroft: This could be a precedent setting. If NATO
stays in the background, France will say that such conflicts are
to be managed by Europeans. Also let's not forget that these are
NATO ships. (S)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: We can confront that question later. The key
is not to prejudge it. (U)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(C)
Secretary Baker: The WEU will not be able to handle it if the
situation gets bloody. (S)
Secretary General Woerner: Let's stay in touch. I will be
talking to everybody today. (U)
Secretary Baker: The real issue is this. Why not go to the
French, sit down with them and say we don't want a confrontation?
This is the time to put that behind us. Let's fess the
agriculture question by doing it cooperatively. (s)
Secretary General Woerner: Okay, I would expect you to prepare
the ground with the French.
(C)
Secretary Baker: In the meantime, Gompert, Zoellick or Niles
will stay in touch with you.
()
The President: I am trying to look over the horizon. I don't
see how we can say that the NATO is in and the U.S. is out.
()
- End of Conversation -
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CONFIDENTIAL
5654
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009- 0649-MR
ses 1/6/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich of
Belarus (U)
PARTICIPANT
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Henson Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European and
Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Stanislav Shushkevich, Chairman of Supreme
Soviet, Belarus
Pavel Kozlovskiy, Minister of Defense
Petr Kravchanka, Minister of Foreign Affairs
A. Sychev, Director of External Economic
Relations, Minstry of Foreign Affairs
N. Buzo, Counselor, Department of Information,
International Humanitarian Corp. & Human Rights
O. Ryabkov, Interpreter
DATE AND TIME July 9, 1992, 3:30 - 4:00pm
PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Finland
The President: So far this is an interesting conference. (U)
President Shushkevich: I am also pleased with it. I was glad to
get your letter about the CSCE. I share your approach. It
corresponds to ours. I am happy with the activities of your
ambassador and your embassy. They enable us to solve issues very
quickly. (U)
The President: You have gotten off to a quick start. I view
this as very important to our own interests. I thought we ought
to get together and would like to hear anything that is on your
mind. Be as frank as you wish. (U)
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I want to mention our interests in the rapid ratification of CFE
and your assurance to the NPT as fast as you can. We are off to
a good start and we want to go forward. You gained respect for
your position on START and NPT. The other point I want to
mention is the importance of working with the IMF to get a
comprehensive economic reform going The floor is yours sir,
Welcome. (d)
President Shushkevich: Mr President, first thank you for the
opportunity to meet you. We have had many opportunities to meet
with Secretary Baker. Our views have not changed. We shall
fulfill every share of our obligations to the FSU. They want
Belarus to be nuclear free and we support the establishment of a
nuclear free belt in Europe. Unfortunately, there are some
technical difficulties with our CFE ratification. I stress
technical difficulties. Due to the excess of democracy in our
country our deputies now have a chance for two months vacation
and I have not used my constitutional right to reconvene our
parliament.
(f)
The President: That way you can bring them back in a good mood.
(U)
President Shushkevich: You understand our difficulties with the
economic situation. But, in contrast to the former Soviet Union,
we would like to develop sophisticated modern technology. We
supply ourselves with food stuffs. We do not have enough raw
material unfortunately to have well trained, disciplined
engineers and work force. We appreciated very much your
humanitarian aid from volunteers and non governmental
organizations after the Chernobyl disaster. We need assistance
in education and training. In scientific assistance, we have
received from Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago. This has
allowed us to avoid an emotional approach regarding Chernobyl.
We would appreciate your government's support.
The President: What is the status of nuclear power in Belarus?
Are there nuclear plants there? Is that what you are referring
to?
(c)
President Shushkevich: Mr President, the terrible irony is - we
never had a single power plant on the territory of Belarus.
Chernobyl was 9km from our border but in a different territory -
in the Ukraine. Yet, our territory received 70% of the fallout.
(f)
The President: Did you receive power from Chernobyl? (d)
President Shushkevich: It is difficult to determine where
precisely we were supplied with energy. We were buying it from
others including Chernobyl - also from plants in Lithuania,
Ukraine and Russia. We have never had a single power plant on
Belarus soil. ($)
The President: What about power today? (U)
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President Shushkevich: Mr President, we are now in a perverse
situation. It is difficult to imagine even for the President of
the United States that our per capita consumption of raw oil is
about the same as the U.S.A. We buy it all from Russia.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
16. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (5
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By of 2 (NLGB) on 10/12/10
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-1198-F(5)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 2/5/2003
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
SECRET
5662
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2000-1198-F
3r 2/5/03
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of
Ukraine (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Henson Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European and
Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Interpreter
Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
Anatoliy Zlenko, Foreign Minister
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 4:05 - 4:23pm
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Finland
The President: It is good to see you again. (U)
President Kravchuk: I see you every day on television. The G-7
meeting was covered widely. (U)
The President: I think it went well. There is a spirit of unity.
When did you arrive? (U)
President Kravchuk: Two days ago. We were in Brussels and I
visited NATO headquarters. I had good discussions with the NACC.
I also addressed the World Jewish Congress. (U)
The President: How did that go? (U)
President Kravchuk: The Congress is organized very well. The
main topic was the fight against anti-semitism. (U)
The President: Yes, the head of the U.S. is Edgar Bronfman. We
like him. ($)
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President Kravchuk: I had a long talk with him. He is of
Ukrainian origin. He supported the idea of starting businesses
in the Ukraine. (c)
The President: They've got plenty of money. You might get him
to invest some of that Bronfman money. Well, how are things
going? The science and technology center is a high priority for
us. We want to get that going. (C)
President Kravchuk; Yes, our parliament has already ratified the
trade agreement. Peace Corps training is starting. American
businessmen were attracted to the Ukraine after my visit to the
U.S. I think that had a good effect. (¢)
The President: So many Americans wish you well. You have a good
base of people who are interested in your success. I did want to
ask when you can accede to NPT. This is a priority for us. I
would encourage you to move as soon as possible. (f)
President Kravchuk: It is mainly a matter of timing. The
documents are ready. The parliament is starting to consider it.
We have already ratified CFE. We have a program now for the
ratification of START. As soon as the parliamentary vacation is
over in September I have no doubts that we will ratify. (C)
The President: I had a fairly optimistic assessment from
President Yeltsin of his visit with you. Do you share that
impression? ($)
President Kravchuk: Yes, it went very well.
($)
The President: I had a talk with you about that. We talked
about the Crimea. (d)
(b) (1)
The President: What flag flies on those ships. I asked
President Yeltsin that but I can't remember. (S)
(b) (1)
The President: Good. How about the Moldovan problem? We want
to see it peacefully resolved without border changes.
(b) (1)
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(b) (1)
The President: Is it a nuclear plant? (U)
(b) (1)
The President: The Moldovans called for a multi-national
peacekeeping force of neighboring countries? ($)
(b) (1)
Secretary Baker: Do you want CSCE approval of that?
(S)
(b) (1)
Secretary Baker: Would this peacekeeping force go into
Transdneistr or just on the river? ($)
(b) (1)
The President: What are your thoughts about that? The Bosnian
president came in to see me with a heartrending story of the
suffering in Bosnia. ($)
(b) (1)
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(b) (1)
The President: How much do you think Milosevic is the problem?
Will things get better if he were out of the picture? (S)
(b) (1)
The President: The army would have to be forcefully put back or
in the face of force, go back.
(8)
(b) (1)
The President: Are threats enough or are they crazy enough to
fight? I ask because the Bosnian president said that if they see
muscle they will go away. ($)
(b) (1)
The President: There is no simple solution. (S)
President Kravchuk: That is right. We tried to discuss it in
Moscow. ($)
The President: Have the Turks been helpful? (8)
(b) (1)
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The President: I'm afraid we are running out of time. I have to
give a speech later on this afternoon but I promise mine will be
short. (U)
President Kravchuk: I am very glad to have had this opportunity
for a meeting. (U)
The President: I am so pleased. There was great satisfaction
with your visit to Washington. We have a keen interest in your
success. (U)
- End of Conversation -
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5696
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Havel of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Counsellor to the President
and Press Secretary
W. Henson Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs,
NSC, Notetaker
DECLASSIFIED
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech and
PER E.O. 13526
Slovak Federal Republic
2009-0649-MR
Jozef Moravcik, Foreign Minister
Alexander Vondra, Foreign Policy Advisor to
SCS 1/6/11
the President
Michael Zantovsky, Press Spokesman for the
President
Jan Kubis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Alexandra Brabcova, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 4:30 - 4:50 pm
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland
President Havel: Thank you very much for your recent letter.
(U)
The President: I want to express, as President of the United
States, my full confidence in President Havel and my great
respect for him. The American people identify with him as a man
of freedom. (The press corps leaves). I wanted to get that
statement out while the press was still here. I confess I don't
understand what your legislature is doing with you and your great
stature around the world. (c)
President Havel: Mr. President, let me again thank you for
finding the time for this meeting. I will offer a brief
explanation of our situation. After the recent parliamentary
elections, developments accelerated in a way that makes it
increasing likely that our State will divide. For my part, I
exerted a great deal of effort to keep a common state of equal
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federal units. But this seems to have been superseded by the
dramatic flow of history. It looks like the division will take
place. Links will remain, though, the two republics will develop
contractual links. Let me make two other remarks. First, if the
division takes place, both republics will have as their
objective, moving in the same direction in foreign policy, market
economy, democracy and joining Europe, so the basic orientation
will remain the same. Second, this will take place in a
constitutional, civilized way, we will not become a hot bed of
instability. Our two peoples have never been enemies, so we see
no reason for conflict, although the technical process will be
difficult. ($)
The President: What is the process? What has to take place,
technically. (d)
President Havel: The first act will be a declaration of
sovereignty by the Slovak parliament. Followed by a Slovak
constitution in August. By the end of September a decision will
be taken as to how the constitutional structure of the state or
states is to be determined. The constitution of the Czech
republic is also being developed. My days are numbered, maybe
I'm the last federal President of my country. Nevertheless,
maybe the offices of Czech and Slovak Presidents will be created,
and I offer my services to my fellow citizens.
(L)
The President: The vote on your reelection, with your great
standing in the world, what prompted this outcome? (c)
President Havel: The situation in our parliament is we have two
chambers, a House of the Peoples and a House of the Nations. It
is not possible for the larger people, the Czechs, to out-vote
the smaller. I got enough votes in the Czech lands, but not
enough in the Slovak part of the House of Nations.
(c)
The President: Were they simply doing that to assert the first
step to separation? (d)
President Havel: It has been interpreted that way, although MPs
who voted against me deny it. I don't see it as opposition to
myself as a person, although some may feel that way, but rather I
have been linked to the concept of the Czech-Slovak Federal
State. But perhaps our foreign minister, who was elected in
these recent elections, would offer a different opinion. (X)
Foreign Minister Moravcik: No, I agree fully. (c)
The President: Let me ask you something, I'm sure the answer is
no, but is there anything we can do to help? First, we respect
the internal affairs of peoples and don't want to interfere. But
if there's anything we can do to facilitate what you want --
clearly, if there are two separate countries, we want to work
with both. But I would hate not to ask whether there's anything
we can do to help preserve a federal state within the bounds of
proper international behavior.
(d)
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President Havel: I think this is an historical movement. It
does not make sense to try to stop it. We have not succeeded
from inside, it would not make sense to try from outside. But
what would make sense would be if the U.S. stressed the
importance of adherence to correct constitutional procedures,
and, given the geo-political importance, that the process be
accomplished in a civil way. (c)
The President: We can certainly do that. And we will look for
an opportunity to do so. (f)
Secretary Baker: I understood there would be another round of
elections on July 16. Is it a foregone conclusion that your
candidacy was voted down finally and conclusively? (c)
President Havel: The situation is as follows: on July 16th the
next round of elections for the Presidency will be held, two
votes will be taken. Those in the previous round are banned.
But if no new President is elected in the third round, the
unsuccessful candidates from the first round can run. This
process can go on indefinitely. My impression is that I should
not take part in this strange comedy. (d)
The President: Perhaps you can write a comedy about this. I'm
afraid I have to go and give my speech. (U)
President Havel: May I call attention to the fact that Mr.
Zantovsky, my press spokesman, will be the next Ambassador to the
U.S. and I would be happy if the new U.S. Ambassador could come
soon.
(f)
The President: It is up to our Senate right now, but it should
move quickly. Let's talk to Senator Biden and Senator Pell and
say that President Havel has requested this. He has great
influence with them and others in Congress. (f)
- End of Conversation -
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SECRET
SECRET
5783
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0649-MR
ses 1/6/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Presidents Ruutel of Estonia,
Gorbunovs of Latvia, and Landsbergis of
Lithuania
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs,
NSC, Notetaker
Arnold Ruutel, President of. Estonia
Anatolijs Gorbunovs, President of Latvia
Vytautas Landsbergis, President of Lithuania
DATE, TIME
July 10, 1992, 10:25 - 10:55 am
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland
(Continuing conversation begun during photo op.)
President Landsbergis: Some high persons in Russia are speaking
even aggressively. ($)
The President: Against all three countries? In what sense? Are
they making aggressive statements like wanting to take over? ($)
President Landsbergis: They are using tactics. Military
officials also imply things. For example, the Minister of
Defense issued a decree that soldiers could defend themselves by
force of arms. This is creating a psychological atmosphere that
is quite dangerous. ($)
The President: Is this with regard to defending the Russian
minority or overall? ($)
President Landsbergis: It is an additional gimmick I would say.
($)
President Gorbunovs: It is evident that Russia admits to a
strategic interest in the Baltics. If the statements by
President Yeltsin would be matched to their commitments we would
see over the next year a withdrawal of all troops at least from
capitals. This would stabilize the situation and create an
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atmosphere of trust that would be the basis for further
negotiations. ($)
President Landsbergis: There is no danger of a denial of human
rights for Russians in the Baltic countries.
($)
The President: That is very important so that there will be no
excuse for those forces being there.
($)
President Ruutel: The Estonian proposal was for there to be a
withdrawal this year of offensive troops. I have proposed this
also in a letter to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. But we
have information that recently Russian units in Estonia were
supplied with combat munitions. We know there are social
difficulties with the accommodations of soldiers in Russian but
we could help them in building housing, we could offer the
capacities of our construction organizations. The Russians say
they can finance additional construction work but maybe they
should also get credits from the West so that they could pay us
for this. But if housing is built or not built this should not
be a pre-condition for the withdrawal of these forces.
The President: No, I understand that entirely. (U)
President Ruutel: But we could do our utmost to help build
houses there so as to reduce social difficulties in Russia. If
this problem could be solved in this positive way it could do a
great help for Russia in the reconstruction process. (
The President: I worry about the red/brown problem, the
reactionary right and the military right, will that complicate
your lives or can you manage? ($)
President Ruutel: If Russia should be helped in building houses
and in addressing the problems with their military it would also
be a great help for Yeltsin.
Estonia Foreign Minister: The only way to help Yeltsin is to be
tough with him and not repeat the error we made with Gorbachev.
($)
Lithuanian Foreign Minister: We pushed Gorbachev into the arms
of the military, Gorbachev lacked a hard message from the West
when he returned from his trips abroad. If Yeltsin receives such
a message it could help him in dealing with his hard liners. (S)
Estonia Foreign Minister: We must help him with his arguments.
($)
The President: That message is pretty clear but I'm interested
that you think it may not be that clear.
(s)
President Landsbergis: The troops can go home, it is not a
problem of hundreds of thousands of houses but a relatively
smaller number. ($)
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The President: It is true that they are not putting new people
in as attrition takes place? ($)
President Landsbergis: We demanded that many times but it is not
true. They are trying to introduce new truths, it is a strange
game they are playing with us. ($)
Lithuanian Foreign Minister: They promised us that also just
last week but still they are coming.
($)
The President: President Yeltsin said to me that they are not
replacing enlisted men. ($)
President Landsbergis: Yeltsin promised the same thing to me but
they have been continuing to replace their troops. ($)
The President: We have made the point very clearly there is no
doubt in Yeltsin's mind, we may be able to be helpful. These
points are helpful because we want them to honor their public
line, we want this to be followed through.
($)
President Ruutel: In my opinion western aide should be made
dependent upon Russian behavior in the Baltic States and the
withdrawal of Russian troops as well as dependent further
democratization in Russia.
($)
Estonia Foreign Minister: You were told in Munich by Yeltsin
that the task of redeploying these forces would be formidable.
They used numbers like a 100 or 120 or 130 thousand housing
units, but we know that many of these soldiers have homes in
Russia or other means of getting houses, so the question is not
one of 120,000 but maybe 18-20,000 housing units. So Yeltsin's
not given you an honest number, they are just playing for time.
($)
The President: What possible good is it for Yeltsin to have
these troops there? ($)
Latvian Foreign Minister: If you read Russian military doctrine
you will see four points. First, free access to the Baltic Sea;
second, that no third states stationed forces in this area;
third, that there be no military alliance against Russia; and
fourth, that the rights of the Russian minority be protected.
($)
President Landsbergis: They say that they will defend mother
Russia. ($)
The President: That's a good reason to get them the hell out.
($)
Lithuanian Foreign Minister: Housing is an excuse, many officers
have apartments in Russia, many others in our capitals have
apartments in our towns. So this social issue is no excuse.
($)
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The President: Why are they keeping their forces in Germany?
($)
Latvian Foreign Minister: That is a different kettle of fish
because of their doctrine regarding the Baltic states. ($)
President Landsbergis: They want to keep troops in our countries
as long as possible. ($)
Ambassador Meri: It is the new Brezhnev Doctrine. The Russian
Deputy Defense Minister said that Russians have a duty to protect
all Russians with military means if necessary. This is the new
Brezhnev Doctrine developed by the Russian military. There was
an interview that Kozyrev gave in Izvestia that was very
important and frank. If there is another coup I would not like
to be in Kozyrev's position, this document has been
underestimated in the west.
($)
The President: What did he say? (U)
Ambassador Meri: That Russian policy is made by the generals and
the mechanisms to implement these policies are military. ($)
The President: I would like to see this article. ($)
Mr. Zoellick: This is the red/brown article that you referred to
Mr. President. ($)
Ambassador Meri: It is a game of pretext to show that Russian
officers are loyal to him. ($)
The President: Perhaps it is a document to make the military
feel better, we'll take a look at it. ($)
Ambassador Meri: Russia has no European policy just as the West
and the U.S. don't have a Russian policy. ($)
The President: You don't think we have a policy toward Russia??!
($)
President Ruutel: Mr. President,
(U)
The President: Wait, I want to finish this. We think we have a
pretty sound policy. You don't think so? ($)
Ambassador Meri: It is SO dynamic a period that we have to
adjust every month, there cannot be a tactical approach. But as
you said recently, we need to deal with principle. ($)
The President: That is what I believe, that is our doctrine.
($)
President Landsbergis: There is also the problem of defense
conversion. ($)
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The President: We have sent teams there but you know we are
facing the same situation in the U.S. Out in California where we
are closing many bases they ask what I'm going to do. It's not
easy but we have sent teams there. It's very important that
defense conversion be successful so as to break up the military
industrial complex there. This is in the interest of the Baltic
states, it is also in the interest of the U.S. We've spent
trillions of dollars over the years to defend against Russia but
it won't be easy to address this defense conversion issue, there
is so much they must do in the area of market reform for this to
work. ($)
(Side discussion between Estonian President and President Bush
regarding Estonia's desire to bring two Americans of Estonia
background now working at the Pentagon into Estonia as military
advisors. The Estonia President referred to a letter recently
sent to Secretary Cheney. President promised to look into it.)
- End of Conversation
-
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CONFIDENTIAL
5558
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009- 0649- MR
SCS 1/6/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Constantine
Mitsotakis of Greece
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of
Greece
Lucas Tsilas, Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister
Virginia Tsouderou, Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 7:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Guest House, Helsinki, Finland
The President: I want to hear from you especially on Cyprus and
Macedonia. (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you for receiving me. I have
the same two topics to discuss with you. On Macedonia, I
believe we are close to a resolution. The EC decision
facilitates a solution but Gligorov has yet to accept this
decision. I think Gligorov's domestic decision is strong. He
can implement this if he wants to. I think he wanted the
government to fall. It should not be an insurmountable problem
for him to accept the EC decision. The U.S. position will be
decisive with him. This is how I feel. I think the U.S. should
adopt a clear stand. (d)
The President: We have tried to hold back on recognition. Your
proposal seems okay with us. What makes you think Gligorov is
prepared to accept it? (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If Gligorov is convinced that there
is no alternative, he will go along. This is a terrible problem
for him domestically. But if it is not solved, it will continue
to be a crisis. All Greeks oppose any other solutions. If
Greeks are hostile to Macedonia, there cannot be co-existence.
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But we are ready to recognize them if they accept our proposal on
the name. There is no hostility toward them. (c)
The President: Is there some way you can reach out directly to
Gligorov? Do you believe he knows your heart beat on this? ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have used public statements and
private contacts to connect with him. (f)
The President: Reach out if you can. ($)
Prime Minster Mitsotakis: I will make a speech and reach out in
that way. Also we are prepared to provide aid. (d)
The President: Does Gligorov really understand your sincerity on
this? (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: What I can't do is meet with him. We
have used intermediaries. I'll do what I can to convince him
that we want his country to exist. It is in our interest. ()
The President: We think the Macedonians have done a good job on
how they have gone about trying to achieve their international
status. Why is it that you can't meet with him? (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: As soon as he accepts a name that
does not include "Macedonia" I will be ready to meet with him.
In the meantime, Douglas Hurd will go to Skopje on July 18. ()
Secretary Baker: We have sent the message to Gligorov saying
that we would support your proposal. We have made it clear to
them that this is the EC decision and we support it. (X)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have to try harder to convince
Gligorov. ($)
Secretary Baker: But he came to see us and we told him the
facts. (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have to insist. (c)
Secretary Baker: We are worried about the situation in
Macedonia. (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I told the Europeans that they have
to chose and then persuade Gligorov. We want stability in the
south of what once used to be Yugoslavia. This could be our
first success from this crisis. But the U.S. must insist. He
will be prepared to decide this. He has people who want to
settle it. Such a solution will also increase the U.S. prestige
in Greece and in Europe. (d)
Secretary Baker: Even if Gligorov agrees, will this political
situation permit him to survive? (C)
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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Gligorov has control. He can accept
this. But it is hard for him to shift especially from the hard
core people who surround him. (f)
The President: Maybe we can escalate our presentation to
Gligorov. I understand what you want. Maybe we could do
something in connection with Hurd's visit. I still wonder if
Gligorov can survive. But I can see what I can do. (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The dual name compromise eliminates
no one. It is a fair compromise. ($)
Secretary Baker: Have you suggested what the formal name would
be? (f)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It can be anything they want as long
as doesn't include "Macedonia." (f)
The President: We will see what can be done. We are terribly
worried about instability in this region. (d)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If we solve the Skopje problem and
are careful about the Kosovo, perhaps we can keep the war out of
the South. (&)
The President: We were impressed with the new Albanian
President. Berisha is a good man. (&)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree. (U)
On Cyprus I know about the efforts you are making. We have a
great opportunity right now. I went to Istanbul twice. (C)
The President: I know that Demirel likes you. (U)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have met with Ozal, Inonu, Demirel,
and Cetin. Cetin in particular is a great man. I try to create
a good atmosphere with Turkish public opinion during my visits
but I will be frank. I am still not sure that the Turks want a
settlement of the Cyprus problem. Demirel, Cetin, and Yilmaz all
said that they are ready but I am not sure that they have reached
a final decision. We may be in the last days, please keep up the
pressure on them. I've tried to be helpful. (c)
The President: Don't you need to lean on our friend Vassiliou?
If there is a problem on either side, we will weigh in. I know
the territories and refugees are key for you. The Secretary
General's proposal seems reasonable, that is his so-call "set of
ideas." ($)
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Territory is key. ($)
The President: You are asking us to keep after Ankara. ()
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Yes, in order to keep the pressure on
Denktash. (C)
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The President: We have little influence on Denktash.
()
Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Denktash doesn't really exist. I
will be seeing Demirel while I am here. (d)
The President: So will I. Let's see what we can all do to bring
this to a conclusion. (d)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
20. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary
7/9/92
(b)(1)
S
General (3 pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/1/92 - 7/9/92
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
OA/ID Number:
91110-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0233-F3 (159)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
3/14/2011
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 159 UBRARY
SECRET
5611
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 13526
2000- 0233-F13
SCS 3/14/11
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Manfred Woerner NATO Secretary
General
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas M. T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
Gephardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary
General
Roland Wegener, Director of the Private
Office
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Finland
The President: Tell me about yesterday's NATO meeting. We are
not trying to push the WEU off the scene. I take it there may be
a serious problem with the French. We are running into this a
lot. (C)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
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The President: What is this talk about the WEU opening up a land
corridor? (C)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner
(b)(1)
The President: What is the attitude of the French?
(e)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: I have been talking to the other foreign
ministers and they have been talking to Dumas. I have to wonder
about whether we want a NATO ministerial here in Helsinki. It
could appear as if we are seeking to displace the WEU. Could we
not just have a quiet conversation? We are prepared to see the
WEU involved as much as NATO is.
($)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: What the President has said is this. The U.S.
cannot sit back on a humanitarian role. We support use of all
necessary means the not too settle the political problem. We
haven't ruled anything out, but we are unlikely to provide ground
combat forces. We would consider making air and naval forces
available. NATO might play a useful role. I offered that to
Butros Ghali. Amato definitely would support NATO-WEU
coordination. ($)
The President: What if Boutros Ghali says that NATO should go
into Bosnia? Would we have some obligation? (8)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(S)
The President: If NATO were not involved what would the WEU do?
(C)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
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Secretary Baker: Yes, maybe. But propose we do it
cooperatively between NATO and the WEU. We would cooperate for
this discrete problem. The question of intervention is a
separate bridge to cross. (8)
The President: But we have to consider how we define this at the
beginning. We can't be contradictory. We will cooperate with
the WEU and provide sea and air forces. But I want to be careful
about NATO being in the lead. (8)
General Scowcroft: This could be a precedent setting. If NATO
stays in the background, France will say that such conflicts are
to be managed by Europeans. Also let's not forget that these are
NATO ships. (8)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
Secretary Baker: We can confront that question later. The key
is not to prejudge it. (U)
(b)(1)
Secretary General Woerner:
(b)(1)
(C)
Secretary Baker: The WEU will not be able to handle it if the
situation gets bloody. (&)
Secretary General Woerner: Let's stay in touch. I will be
talking to everybody today. (U)
Secretary Baker: The real issue is this. Why not go to the
French, sit down with them and say we don't want a confrontation?
This is the time to put that behind us. Let's fess the
agriculture question by doing it cooperatively. ()
Secretary General Woerner: Okay, I would expect you to prepare
the ground with the French.
(C)
Secretary Baker: In the meantime, Gompert, Zoellick or Niles
will stay in touch with you.
()
The President: I am trying to look over the horizon. I don't
see how we can say that the NATO is in and the U.S. is out.
()
- End of Conversation -
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THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0649-MR
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SCS 1/6/11
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel
of Turkey
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas M. T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey
Hikmet Cetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ozdem Sandberk, Deputy Secretary for Foreign
Affairs
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 12:15 - 12:45 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Helsinki Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland
The President: Turkey is playing a useful role in the whole
region. Thank you for your leadership on the extension of
Provide Comfort. We have great confidence in your leadership and
I want you to know that you are important to the United States.
I admire the way you handled Provide Comfort. You were right to
get Parliament on board. Now what's on your mind? (d)
Prime Minister Demirel: I think this was better done by
Parliament. It gives Provide Comfort more legitimacy.
I
believe we have done the right thing to ensure humanitarian
protection for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. But we still have
some worries. Now that these people are safe from Saddam Hussein
we do not know how far they will want to go. We want things to
go no further. A Kurdish state in northern Iraq will create
serious problems for Turkey. I was pleased with the resolution
of the U.S. Congress respecting the unity of Iraq. The USG has
also said this and it is useful for you to repeat it. We don't
want to give birth to a new Kurdish nation.
(d)
The President: I understand. What happened with regard to the
bombing incident with Mrs. Mitterrand?
(C)
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Prime Minister Demirel: The Kurds have various groups and can't
control them all.
(&)
The President: I would like your view on Bosnia. Will Milosevic
back down if we demonstrate the use of force?
($)
Prime Minister Demirel: This problem is not limited to Sarajevo.
Milosevic will continue if he is not stopped. It is important to
show determination.
($)
The President: Do you mean that we should go beyond the
humanitarian effort?
($)
Prime Minister Demirel: Perhaps the humanitarian effort should
go beyond Sarajevo?
(&)
The President: Izetbegovic made an emotional case to me just
now. He said that heavy arms continue to pour in. What is your
judgment about this? (f)
Prime Minister Demirel: I'll tell you what has to be done. All
CSCE members must decide that something must be done to stop the
massacre otherwise CSCE will have no credibility. We should do
whatever is necessary. Everyone is saying that the UN should use
military force. How and where to use force is another matter.
($)
The President: We are thinking about the structure of NATO/WEU
cooperation. (c)
Prime Minister Demirel: Everything should come from the UN.
()
The President: No question about that. (U)
Prime Minister Demirel: Maybe the UN Security Council can make a
new decision. (f)
The President: We have to decide whether to pursue NATO/WEU
cooperation or risk eroding the role of NATO.
(c)
(After this conversation the President walked with PM Demirel
back to the Plenary, during which he raised the subject of
Cyprus.) (c)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Aliza Izetbegovic, President of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for
European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC
Notetaker
Aliza Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Haris Siladjic, Prime Minister of Bosnia-
Herzegovina
DATE, TIME
July 9, 1992, 11:45am - 12:30pm
AND PLACE:
Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland
President Izetbegovic: Thanks for seeing me. European
intervention in the Bosnia crisis will not work without the U.S.,
so we would appreciate U.S. interest. Sarajevo is now open but
it is still under attack. It is a miracle that any aircraft can
land. The UN Resolution said that the airlift should be just the
first step. It called for the creation of a security zone around
the city. Aggression is continuing all around Bosnia. The Serbs
are sending new reinforcements. As for the humanitarian aspect,
the situation is horrible and we don't even know what is
happening throughout the country. They have destroyed the
telephone and TV system. We do know that genocide is being
committed, but we don't know the scale. That is why we want the
world to take an interest. That why we need the Red Cross. We
need to be able to get access to the closed regions. I would
appreciate it if the U.S. could send agencies along with the ICRC
into the closed areas. (C)
I also want to raise with you the problem of the weapons. We
asked the U.S. to do what it can to get the JNA out of Bosnia.
The UN Security Council Resolutions are not being respected. The
Serbs say that their soldiers are only local Bosnians. Our
position is that Bosnians-Serbs can stay in Bosnia but their arms
must be returned to Serbia or be concentrated and put under UN
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control. If they are not prepared to do this then these arms
should be destroyed. This means that your air force must go in
under the UN. I am grateful for humanitarian relief, but this is
the problem we have to confront. (c)
The President: Are you saying that you have no faith in the
sanctions? (C)
President Izetbegovic: They are just ignoring the sanctions.
yes
Secretary Baker: Do you agree that Romania is the biggest
problem?
President Izetbegovic: The Serbs have large war reserves. They
could fight for a long time and they are crazy enough to keep
fighting. Time is working against us. The centers of Bosnian
resistance cannot hold on for long. The Serbs can wage war
longer than we can resist. We have to prevent them from
reinforcing. The question is how. We would like to see the UN
deploy observers along the Serb-Bosnian borders. This will
require a limited number of UN peacekeeping troops. I know that
there are still some tanks coming in from Serbia as well as
aircrafts. The JNA jets are still active. They say that they
are assigned to "Bosnian-Serb Army". tes
The President: What do you make of the Croatians' intentions and
their role in Bosnia? (C)
President Izetbegovic: I talked to Tudjman, he reconfirmed
Croatian recognition about the territorial integrity of Bosnia.
He has twice offered diplomatic relations. There are some
Croatian units fighting Bosnia but these are local Bosnia Croats.
They are getting some arms and some soldiers from Croatia. But
these Croatian forces are exposed to Serbian aggression also.
Therefore, it helps Bosnia since it engages those who otherwise
devote their full efforts against us. The Croatians may have had
plans for the future. But it is clear that we can not possibly
match both Croatian and Serbian action. (C)
The President: We think that Croatia has some responsibility and
we recommend that you talk to the Germans about this. (C)
Let me state our position on Bosnia. We are committed to
alleviate humanitarian suffering. We are also discussing this
with the WEU and what NATO might do to enforce sanctions. We
will not give up on the sanctions and we will not give up in
support diplomacy. But may stop short of inserting forces on the
ground. We think outside force could bring on more conflict. I
don't want there to be any false expectations about this, we
don't believe that the problem can be solved militarily. We will
support the UN fully on sanctions. (C)
If there were one other thing you could ask of us, what would it
be? Are we using our diplomatic leverage? (C)
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President Izetbegovic: It seems to me you are doing all you can
on the diplomatic front. And you can see what it has achieved
and failed to achieved. What remains will require limited
military action. We are sensitive to the dangers to the loss of
life. We are definitely not requesting ground troops, but we are
requesting the help of your air force to hit large concentrations
of Serbian weapons and air fields. We have to find a way to
eliminate the disproportion means available to the two sides or
else you can give us arms. But this is not our preference. It
is better to remove or destroy the JNA weapons in Bosnia. Even
the removal of Milosevic will not suffice. We must remove the
heavy weapons. ICT
The President: In our assessments these weapons are widely
dispersed. (C)
President Izetbegovic: Well then at least around Sarajevo. (C)
The President: Whenever we ask our military for their assessment
of Sarajevo, they say one thing: Dien Bien Phu. The Europeans
say the same thing. This city sitting in a basin of mountains
around it makes it vulnerable. (C)
Prime Minister Siladjic: There are other names that comes to
mind when you mention Bosnia. Names like Auchweitz and
Treblinka. Mr. President forgive me for being so blunt. People
are being loaded into sealed wagons and taken to Hungary. There
are 27 concentration camps in Bosnia. Seven children were shot
while they were playing. We are dealing with monsters. I am
sure that we will lose another 40,000 citizens in Banjak Luka.
50,000 people want to escape to Hungary. The Serbs say that this
is their city. One, of course is not. The world and the U.S.
must help us. We don't want parades on our airports while our
people are dying. The sanctions were applied thanks to the
intuition of Secretary Baker, but we will lose another 40-50, 000
people. So far we have not seen gas chambers but we know that
there were 14 trucks of civilian bodies removed and if this is
not stopped, it will lead to a much larger Balkan war. There is
another aspect of this. I just came from Saudi Arabia and that
situation in Bosnia will galvanize the extremist in Muslim
countries. This is a very important political consideration.
Again Mr. President, I apologize if I have been rude. (C)
The President: Not at all. This brings home the picture very
clearly. This helps me understand what we are up against. We
want the bloodshed to end. We are prepared to maintain
humanitarian relief. We are determined to see a peaceful
settlement. I think the only real difference is the question of
introducing U.S. air power. SCT
Prime Minister Siladjic: They will turn chicken under your
pressure. (C)
The President: Are you talking about delivering an ultimatum?
(C)
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I hope you understand reluctance of any U.S. President to commit
troops to battle. But I promise you we will stay engaged and I
know the Europeans want to help. (C)
President Izetbegovic: This is a European problem but it is also
a world problem. (C)
The President: We are not detached from this problem, we are a
part of Europe. We feel very strongly about this. (c)
Prime Minister Siladjic: The Europeans will not act, they need
your leadership.
(C)
-- End of Conversation --
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