Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
366551726
label
German Unification Files (December 1989)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
366551726
contentType
document
title
German Unification Files (December 1989)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
91116-002
collections
Brent Scowcroft Papers
German Reunification Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
366551726
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
c3d259bac2d88cd6
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
German Unification Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91116
Folder ID Number:
91116-002
Folder Title:
German Unification (December 1989)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
2
3
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
Re: Mitterrand, the Germans and U.S. -EC Cooperation (1 pp.)
02. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
12/15/89
(b)(1)
/
Re: Scope Paper Your Meeting with President Mitterrand on
December 16, 1989, at St. Martin (3 pp.)
03a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
12/22/89
(b)(1)
$
Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe (4 pp.)
03b. Memo
Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft
12/19/89
(b)(1)
&
Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
[Released with WHG on 3/23/10] (1 pp.)
03c. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
12/22/89
(b)(1)
&
Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe (1 pp.)
03d. Memo
Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft
12/19
(b)(1)
$
Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
[Released with WHG on 3/23/10] (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 1
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
German Unification Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
German Unification (December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap975
OA/ID Number:
91116-002
Date Closed:
2/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
SECRET
RECORD ID: 8910482
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 13
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 14 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: EC
FRANCE
GERMANY FR
2
PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND / GERMANS & US - EC COOPERATION
ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
DUE DATE: 08 JAN 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/17/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSBTM
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 8910482
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001
X 90010417 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
001
X 90010417 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/17/09
SECRET
CHRON FILE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10482
12/14/89
1655
Brent
Baker will probably
be sending in same Thoughts
on This subject I wanted
therefore to get The attached
to you.
BD Blackill
10482
SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CHRON FILE
Has Seen
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Mitterrand, the Germans and U.S.-EC Cooperation
In addition to the briefing book you are receiving separately, I
wanted to give you some final thoughts on handling Mitterrand's
increasing concerns about German reunification. It is likely
that Mitterrand has concluded that the reemergence in spades of
the German Question has made U.S. -French cooperation more
important than at any time in the post-war period. He has made
clear in a variety of public statements and at two NATO Summit
meetings that the United States has an indispensable role in
managing the future of Europe.
Thus, we are in a good position to seek Mitterrand's agreement to
what we now want out of the U.S.-French relationship. This
brings me to Jim Baker's Tuesday speech in Berlin. In that
speech, Jim proposed "that the United States and the European
Community work together to achieve, whether it's in treaty or
some other form, a significantly strengthened set of
institutional and consultative links." This, of course, followed
up on similar comments you made at your Boston University
commencement speech and subsequently in Europe.
The issue of U.S. ties to the European Community has a long and
bitter history in U.S.-French relations. De Gaulle wanted no
American role in European integration and Henry Kissinger's
attempt in 1973 to strengthen U.S. ties with the Community
triggered a poisonous year of recrimination with France.
The question before us now is whether Mitterrand is sufficiently
worried about the future of Germany that he will support enhanced
U.S. EC cooperation, both as a counterweight to Bonn and as a
further means to try to ensure continued U.S. involvement in
Europe.
I recommend that you raise Jim's suggestion in your private
meeting with Mitterrand and ask him for his reaction. It would
be a mistake in my judgement to press Mitterrand on the matter
since he is probably not had time to digest the implications of
our proposal.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0669-MR
31 8/26/10
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
9938
DECLASSIFIED
December 15, 1989
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0669-MR
32 8/26/10
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BRENT SCOWCROFT B
2
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Scope Paper - Your Meeting with President
Mitterrand on December 16, 1989, at St. Martin
Setting: Mitterrand will be coming to this meeting with you from
perhaps his most intense period ever of European diplomacy. With
4
his domestic political standing at a high level, Mitterrand's
Presidency of the EC has coincided with the extraordinary
acceleration of changes in Eastern Europe since last spring. He
has provided the steadiest policy by a European leader during
these six months of turbulence on the Continent. His long
Presidential and political experience, his acute sense of
history, and his solid domestic base equip Mitterrand with unique
assets for leadership within Europe -- and for partnership with
you in managing the historic transition now under way.
Mitterrand saw Gorbachev in Kiev on December 6, a meeting at
which he seemed to agree with Gorbachev on the need, for now, of
two German states (text of Mitterrand/Gorbachev press conference
is at Tab A). He then presided over the generally successful EC
summit in Strasbourg December 8 and 9. (Text of his press
conference following the Strasbourg meeting is at Tab B). He is
scheduled to visit East Berlin on December 20. The future of
Germany, of Eastern Europe, and of the Soviet Union will be
foremost on his mind, although he will also be very concerned
about Lebanon.
When you agreed to meet in the Caribbean, you suggested a broad-
ranging discussion about the future of Europe. Nothing could be
more timely, and no French President since the war would have
been a more useful interlocutor. His gesture of coming to the
Caribbean to make it easier for you to see him on French soil
would have been unthinkable for most of his predecessors.
Tenor and Objectives: Mitterrand shares your vision of a new
European order on Western terms, and his views on how to achieve
this new order are in most respects similar to yours. As you
know, he favors continued deepening of EC integration as the
primary means of reinforcing Germany's anchor to the West and of
solidifying France's leadership role in the new Europe; but he
has also spoken in favor of an important continuing role for
NATO.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2
Mitterrand was shocked that Kohl put forward his ten point plan
for German reunification, which downplayed both NATO and the EC,
with no consultation with Paris. (The same was, of course, true
of us; Horst Teltschick told Vernon Walters and the French
Ambassador in Bonn that Kohl had, however, discussed his ten
points in advance and in detail with Gorbachev.) Many in the
French Government worry that the close postwar Franco-German
relationship will suffer as Bonn becomes ever more preoccupied
with the GDR and reunification.
Mitterrand's statements about the possibility of German
reunification have become more cautious as events in the GDR
threaten to spin out of control and deep post-war French concerns
about Germany are now near the surface among France's political
elite. This is not a new concern for Mitterrand. In 1979 he
said in public that German reunification was neither possible nor
desirable. Nevertheless, he regards Mrs. Thatcher's crude public
opposition to German reunification as a mistake which could push
the Germans in a dangerous direction. Finally, although
Mitterrand has profound doubts about the advisability of early
German reunification, if it appears that it will occur
nonetheless rapidly, he will ensure that France is not a
begrudging participant in the process.
Despite Mitterrand's close personal bond with you and his
similarity of strategic view, not all that we hear from the
French government is helpful. The French bureaucracy has moved
less rapidly than we would like in reaching common ground on CFE
negotiating positions. On Open Skies, the French desire for
linkage with CFE, and for inclusion (from the start) of the
neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe, is impeding
progress. In our efforts at closer partnership with the EC, we
occasionally get hints of French distrust or desire to keep some
distance. For example, the French have moved slowly on their
contribution to the $1 billion stabilization fund for Poland,
reportedly partly out of fear that the Europeans might not have
sufficient say on management of the fund. While Mitterrand is
unlikely to raise specific issues like this one, the St. Martin
visit may be an ideal opportunity for a general discussion of
your interest in close US-EC partnership.
As indicated, Mitterrand saw Gorbachev on December 6 and will
undoubtedly wish to compare notes with you on your Malta meeting.
He is likely to express concern that the speed of events in
Eastern Europe, and particularly in East Germany, could pose a
threat to Gorbachev's position and to perestroika. Mitterrand
will of course also be interested in hearing your reasons for
deciding to send Larry Eagleburger and me to Peking, and about
the results.
On the issue of strategic trade, Mitterrand may stress the need
to accelerate the "streamlining" process in COCOM. The French
have supported our efforts throughout the 80's to tighten the
embargo and stop illegal diversions. But they join the Germans,
British and others in believing that the U.S. is moving too
SECRET
SECRET
3
slowly in reducing the list of controlled items. He
may warn of the possible collapse of the existing consensus on
strategic trade -- and the risk of more illegal diversions --
unless the U.S. commits itself to genuine liberalization in
COCOM. You may wish to take this opportunity to indicate your
readiness to review our policy in COCOM to meet these concerns.
Other issues which may arise in your St. Martin meeting are
Lebanon; the Middle East peace process; Cambodia; anti-narcotics
cooperation; the French proposal for a North-South summit; the
Nicaraguan elections; and a Helsinki II CSCE Summit in 1990, an
idea he endorsed in Kiev with Gorbachev.
Attachments
Tab A
Mitterrand/Gorbachev Press Interview
Tab B
Mitterrand Press Conference
SECRET
RECORD ID: 8910215
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 89 15
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 22 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:
2
KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST
EUROPE WEST
PERSONS:
1,3,4,
5
SUBJECT: US DIPLOMACY FOR NEW EUROPE
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 22 DEC 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
ZELIKOW
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/17/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRLG
CLOSED BY: NSJRP
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECREI
CHRON FILE
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
10215
DECLASSIFIED
1989 DEC 22 Fil 8 32
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0669-MR
December 22, 1989
3r 8/26/10
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
Historians are likely to view 1989 as a year, like 1848, which
transformed a continent. The past is irretrievably gone, but the
future remains cloudy. The eroding Soviet political and military
presence and influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
prospect of a reunited Germany eighty million strong, are rapidly
changing European politics. Our diplomatic approach will need to
change too, acquiring new intensity and suppleness. No other
nation can undertake the singular American role in this dangerous
period.
You have laid the groundwork by forcefully articulating our goals
for the future of Europe and of Germany. The components of our
approach -- active support for democratic change in Eastern
Europe, the search for a new security environment through the CFE
process, the continuation of nuclear deterrence, and an American
partnership with a more united continent -- are welcome in
Europe. U.S. objectives have become, by and large, the
Alliance's objectives. Now, having set the agenda, we need to
use our policy instruments to help make these things happen, to
remain, as you have said, a "European Power.
As the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact fades, there is a
natural tendency to understate the new political and economic
forces that are being unleashed. When the democratic
revolutionaries of 1848 were at the peak of their success, cowing
kings and toppling princes, they thought the remaking of society
would overshadow the old diplomatic rivalries. Victor Hugo
speaking for the firebrands in Paris, put it best when he said
that: "We are a predestined generation. We have bigger and more
frightening tasks than our ancestors. We have not time to hate
each other." Just as this hope was romantic and wrong then, it
is romantic and wrong now. The outlines of ancient European
antagonisms are already beginning to emerge.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
2
The most important element of the current period is the Soviet
Union's retreat from Eastern Europe, a reversal unrivaled in
the history of the U.S.S.R. since the Soviets made peace with the
Germans in 1918. Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe is in a
shambles and Gorbachev finds himself unable to shape the sweeping
political events there. The Soviets have attempted to make a
virtue of necessity -- encouraging reform in hopes of maintaining
influence in Eastern Europe by diplomatic means rather than by
coercion.
But this tactic cannot mask the fact that the Soviet leadership
faces a deadly set of circumstances in the coming years
political and economic chaos at home; diminishing influence in
Eastern Europe; and the looming prospect of German reunification.
The Politburo is now -- and will continue to be -- insecure and
nervous about the course of events in Europe. No one can predict
how Moscow will adapt to this tumultuous environment. Given the
significant Soviet military presence in Europe -- a presence that
will be maintained in any event by virtue of geography --
Moscow's unpredictability carries significant dangers for the
West. Not surprisingly, Gorbachev now SO worries about the
Germans that he wants the United States to play an active and
moderating role in Europe well into the next century.
The revival of the German question will be no less a critical
factor in the 1990's than the Soviet Union's decline, including
for Gorbachev's grip on power and for perestroika. West Germany
enters this decade wielding economic power unrivaled on the
Continent and with the potential to dominate the monetary and
macroeconomic policies of a more united EC. The Germans can use
that economic clout to renew their historic political influence
on a fragmented Eastern Europe. The spectre of German power,
particularly if the two Germanys reunify, will lead Britain and
France to seek new political arrangements to protect their
interests. Italy will push hard for recognition as a major
actor, aligning and realigning itself to serve that goal. The
smaller Allies will be inclined to revert to the 19th century
diplomatic pattern of cutting the best deals they can.
Increasingly because of the German problem, the Soviets are
pushing -- successfully -- for the widest possible diplomatic
engagement in Europe and the West Europeans are reciprocating.
In the last two weeks, as well as meeting with you, Gorbachev
also hosted Mitterrand in Kiev and Genscher in Moscow. Moscow
requested, and achieved, the reactivation of Four-Power
mechanisms at a level and intensity unknown in two decades.
Shevardnadze just held an unprecedented meeting with NATO
Secretary General Woerner. Mitterrand, at his joint press
conference in Kiev, referred to a return to more active Franco-
Soviets bilateral relations. The FRG Ambassador at the CFE talks
now consults as intensively with the Eastern Europeans as with
his NATO counterparts. Kohl had more consultation with Gorbachev
than with you before presenting his ten-point plan for
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3
reunification, and Mitterrand and Kohl are both visiting East
Germany this week.
The EC's political role is growing rapidly as well. Discussions
among West European leaders are continuous and largely
independent of us. There have been two EC summits since mid-
November. EC Foreign Ministers and their staffs meet twenty to
thirty times a year. A generation of West European diplomats has
emerged, habituated to constant interaction with their
colleagues, whom they have known well and worked with for years.
A good illustration of this new kind of diplomatic relationship
is COMEU, an electronic communications network linking the EC
capitals for daily faxing and exchanges of cables, position
papers, and other information on foreign policy problems of
common interest, totaling thousands of messages each year. In
your pre-Malta telephone calls to NATO leaders, you witnessed
just how much of their own thinking had been influenced by the
November 18 EC Summit in Paris. And as we move toward 1992, the
Community's economic decisions will have decisive consequences
for the United States.
You have already devoted much time and effort this year to
cultivating our European relationships. We will need to maintain
this degree of commitment at all levels, and expand it. NATO is
still irreplaceable , but the EC -- with which our enhanced
dialogue is promising but still embryonic -- will become ever
more important to us as time passes.
The United States is at a strategic crossroads in Europe. We
will either find a way to keep up with the intensifying pace of
diplomatic interaction on the Continent or we will drift away
from the inner workings and direction of European politics. This
may cause us, in turn, to fall prey at home to a new form of
isolationism -- detachment by default rather than by choice.
That could be tragic for European stability and for America's
world leadership role, which would diminish greatly if our
partnership with Europe waned.
No issue will test our real influence and diplomatic skills more
than the potential reunification of Germany. A French diplomat
expressed to an American colleague recently a oft repeated
refrain in the past century. "The Germans are the only people
who are never satisfied with what they have on the Continent.
They always need more. It will never end." The U.S. must not be
seen as opposing the aspirations of the German people for
national unity. We want to tie the Germans to the West, not
create new sources of resentment like those of the 1920s. Yet we
can accept the eventual goal of reunification while at the same
time using our diplomacy skillfully to try to keep the process
gradual and carefully managed.
We must also play an active role in an entirely new situation in
Eastern Europe. With the virtual collapse of Communist rule in
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
4
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, a power vacuum is
developing. This presents both risks -- of a Federal Republic
willingly drawn in to fill the void, and in the process slipping
from its western moorings -- and opportunities for a much more
robust and a constructive U.S. role in the center of Europe.
The opportunities can only be exploited if we follow through
systematically on your policy goals. NATO and nuclear deterrence
must be kept vital in these new circumstances. Your four points
on German reunification must be reinforced and translated into a
program for consultations associated with the "step by step"
process we envision. We should strengthen our resources, human
and financial, to engage Eastern Europe more actively and update
our policies to reflect the rapidly evolving situation there.
Our objective of partnership with a stronger EC also needs to be
manifested in concrete actions. And we must stay in closest
possible touch with Gorbachev and his colleagues as events in
Europe plunge on.
The key in the period ahead will be our ability to: 1) manage
those elements of our European policies that are still inherently
bloc to bloc (especially the military competition and arms
control negotiations with the Soviet Union); while 2) we engage
fully in a complex European diplomatic environment which reflects
the return, after half a century, of a shifting search for a
classical balance of power on the Continent. Twentieth century
history gives no encouragement to those who believe the Europeans
can achieve and sustain this balance of power and keep the peace
without the United States.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
10215
12/19/89
1750
ACTION
Brent
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
I hope you like
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB
this memo. We over
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW 2
here believe its'
important.
SUBJECT:
U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
Bb Blackwill
I attach for your review a memorandum to the President on the
challenges to U.S. diplomacy of present events in Europe.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By zr NARA, Date 3/23/10
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
rec'd 12/22 8:32pm
THE WHITE HOUSE
to
WASHINGTON
10215
CO 12/23
December 22, 1989
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
2009-0669-MR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
3r 8/26/10
SUBJECT:
U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
Historians are likely to view 1989 as a year, like 1848, which
transformed a continent. The past is irretrievably gone, but the
future remains cloudy. The eroding Soviet political and military
presence and influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
prospect of a reunited Germany eighty million strong, are rapidly
changing European politics. Our diplomatic approach will need to
change too, acquiring new intensity and suppleness. No other
nation can undertake the singular American role in this dangerous
period.
You have laid the groundwork by forcefully articulating our goals
for the future of Europe and of Germany. The components of our
approach -- active support for democratic change in Eastern
Europe, the search for a new security environment through the CFE
process, the continuation of nuclear deterrence, and an American
partnership with a more united continent -- are welcome in
Europe. U.S. objectives have become, by and large, the
Alliance's objectives. Now, having set the agenda, we need to
use our policy instruments to help make these things happen, to
remain, as you have said, a "European Power."
As the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact fades, there is a
natural tendency to understate the new political and economic
forces that are being unleashed. When the democratic
revolutionaries of 1848 were at the peak of their success, cowing
kings and toppling princes, they thought the remaking of society
would overshadow the old diplomatic rivalries. Victor Hugo
speaking for the firebrands in Paris, put it best when he said
that: "We are a predestined generation. We have bigger and more
frightening tasks than our ancestors. We have not time to hate
each other." Just as this hope was romantic and wrong then, it
is romantic and wrong now. The outlines of ancient European
antagonisms are already beginning to emerge.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
SECRET
Basbara B' SECRET save NATIONAL Scow ASHINGTO this SECURITY D.C. 2050 COUNCIL Rec-19
10215
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW 2
SUBJECT:
U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe
I attach for your review a memorandum to the President on the
challenges to U.S. diplomacy of present events in Europe.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By 3r NARA, Date 3/23/10
SECRET