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USSR Collapse: U.S.--Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April-May 1990) [1]
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USSR Collapse: U.S.--Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April-May 1990) [1]
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
USSR Collapse Files
Subseries:
U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91118
Folder ID Number:
91118-002
Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
2
5
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Baltic American Leaders (2 pp.)
4/10/90
(b)(1)
&
01b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Baltic American
n.d.
Leaders (3 pp.)
01c. Memo
Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft
4/9/90
d
Re: The President's Meeting with Baltic American Leaders, April
11, 1990 (1 pp.)
02. Memo
Michael Hayden/Coni Rice to Brent Scowcroft
4/19/90
(b)&i)
&
Re: Upcoming US-Soviet Military to Military Contacts (2 pp.)
03a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to Jim Cicconi
4/24/90
(b)(1)
Re: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting with the
Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)
03b. Talking Points Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Congressional Leaders (3
n.d.
(1)
/
pp.)
03c. Talking Points Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Congressional Leaders (3
n.d.
(b)(1)
/
pp.)
03d. Memo
Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
4/23/90
(b)(I)
Re: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting with the
Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
USSR Collapse Files
Subseries:
U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap997
OA/ID Number:
91118-002
Date Closed:
2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04. Memo
Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft
4/24/90
(b)
&
Re: Lithuania and the Internaitonal Court of Justice (2 pp.)
05. Talking Points
Re: Talking Points for President Landsbergis (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
06. Memo
Michael Hayden to Brent Scowcroft
4/26/90
(b)
/
Re: Soviet Defense Spending to "Double" (1 pp.)
07a. Memo
Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
4/26/90
(1)
Re: Letter to Landsbergis (1 pp.)
07b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
/
Re: Letter to Landsbergis (1 pp.)
07c. Draft Letter
To President Landsbergis (1 pp.)
n.d.
07d. Talking Points Re: Talking Points for a Phone Call to Vytautas Landsbergis (2
n.d.
(b)(1)
pp.)
07e. Letter
President Landsbergis to President Bush (2 pp.)
4/14/90
08a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene of
5/3/90
(b)
Lithuania (3 pp.)
08b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Lithuanian Prime
n.d.
(b)(1)
Minister Prunskiene (3 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
USSR Collapse Files
Subseries:
U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap997
OA/ID Number:
91118-002
Date Closed:
2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
08c. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Lithuanian Prime
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
Minister Prunskiene (3 pp.)
08d. Report
Biography Re: Kazimiera Danute Prunskiene
4/19/90
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
[redacted] (1 pp.)
08e. Memo
Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft
5/2/90
(b)(1)
$
Re: The President's Meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister
Prunskiene, May 3, 1990 (1 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
USSR Collapse Files
Subseries:
U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap997
OA/ID Number:
91118-002
Date Closed:
2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE PRESIDENT HAS 2749 SEEN
CHRON FILE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1990
MEETING WITH BALTIC AMERICAN LEADERS
DATE: April 11, 1990
/
DECLASSIFIED
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room
PER E.O. 12958,
TIME: 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.
AS AMENDED
2000.1197.F CAP
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT R8for
3/6/08
I. PURPOSE
To reaffirm your support for the aspirations of the Baltic
peoples for independence and to seek the understanding of
this group for your efforts to help the Lithuanian people
through quiet diplomacy.
II. BACKGROUND
The Baltic American leaders will urge you to recognize the
new Lithuanian Government and lend the moral and political
support of the American Presidency to the cause of Baltic
independence. After the meeting, they will want to report
to their constituents (and probably immediately to the
press) that they took a firm line and gained your support
for at least some of their arguments. Although members of
this group have been supporters of your Presidency and muted
in criticizing your handling of Lithuania, they will see
this meeting as their opportunity to deliver a strong
message and seek specific assurances from you.
We will issue a press release along the lines of the
attached (Tab C) immediately after the meeting to
ensure that our version of the meeting is on record
early. It includes the point you made last week to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, that the issue
could "adversely affect" U.S.-Soviet relations.
Moscow, meanwhile, continues to ratchet up the pressure on
Lithuania and the Baltic States generally. On April 9, the
Presidential Council, saying that Lithuania's response to
Gorbachev's March 30 telegram was insufficient, threatened
further economic, political "and other" measures against
Lithuania. (It is not clear whether Moscow really will
require a full revocation of the declaration of independence
or, as Yakovlev implied in his meeting with Lithuanian
leaders last week, if a partial backtracking would be
sufficient.) Similarly, Gorbachev declared Estonia's more
modest call for a negotiated transition to independence
"illegal" and demanded that it too be rescinded. No similar
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
confrontation with Latvia is likely until its newly
elected parliament convenes for the first time May 3,
but leaders of the Popular Front are already saying
publicly that they intend to press for independence.
In light of this hardening of Soviet attitudes, the Baltic
American leaders may argue that the time has come for a
tougher approach on our part. They may also try to pin you
down on press reports claiming that the Administration has
decided to side with Gorbachev over the Baltic States. Your
best response is to describe the steps we have taken,
including your letter to Gorbachev and meeting with
Shevardnadze.
While you are unlikely to gain the outright support of
these Baltic Americans, you should explain why you are
convinced that your approach is the one most likely to
help the Baltic peoples achieve their goals. You might
also note that bloody repression could set those goals
-- as well as U.S.-Soviet relations -- back for years
to come.
At least some in the group may be aware of Senator Lugar's
approach to President Landsbergis on the possibility that a
national referendum might defuse the situation. If the
issue is raised, you should simply say that the
Administration is using every available channel to get its
message across to both parties.
III. PARTICIPANTS
A list of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
Open photo, writing pool
V.
SEQUENCE
Photo opportunity and meeting in the Roosevelt Room
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
Tab C
Draft Press Release
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH BALTIC AMERICAN LEADERS
--
I appreciate your counsel. We are meeting at a good time,
after I have had a chance to raise this issue directly with
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
--
I hope you will stay in close touch with the Administration
as this process continues to unfold between the Baltic
states and Moscow.
--
I very much want to hear your comments. First, though, let
me explain what we have been doing with regard to Lithuania,
and why.
--
We support the Lithuanian people, who have, through their
freely elected Government, expressed their desire to
reestablish the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania.
--
We believe the best way to help Lithuania in this complex
and delicate situation is through a careful policy of quiet
diplomacy and public support.
Our approach has been to:
Reiterate our longstanding policy of refusing to
recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic
States into the USSR.
Urge the Soviet Government to enter into an immediate
dialogue with the Lithuanian Government, without
pressure and intimidation.
Convey to the Soviet leadership the high costs of
repression against the Lithuanians, and to keep all
peaceful options open.
2
The U.S. Government should do nothing that would
inadvertently make Lithuania's task more difficult by
inflaming the situation or making it harder to find a
solution through peaceful means.
It is premature to establish formal relations with
Lithuania right now. Rather than take any action that
might escalate the tensions between Moscow and the
Lithuanians, we want to keep pressing on peaceful
dialogue.
--
I raised the Lithuanian situation very directly with
Shevardnadze. I told him of my personal support and
sympathy for Lithuania, and I restated our policy of
nonrecognition of the annexation of the Baltic states and of
self-determination. I told him that much is at stake here,
that repression in Lithuania would have an adverse impact on
U.S. -Soviet relations across the board.
--
I made these same points in my letter to President
Gorbachev.
--
We may not have brought Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
around to our way of thinking, but they clearly
understand how important this matter is for us and to
U.S. -Soviet relations.
Our policy is based on helping the Lithuanian people --
and the Estonians and Latvians as well. We want to
avert a bloody repression, which could set back the
aspirations of the Baltic peoples for many years to
come.
--
We are convinced that our approach offers the best hope
3
of helping them, in the end, achieve their goals.
--
(SENATOR LUGAR'S MEDIATION -- IF ASKED) I can't go into
specifics, but we are using every available channel to get
our message across to both parties.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
This morning, the President met for approximately thirty minutes
with leaders of the Baltic American community. They raised with
him their concerns about the current situation in Lithuania and
the other Baltic States and expressed their strong support for
the rights of the Baltic peoples to self-determination and
independence.
The President shared their concerns and reiterated his support
for the right to self-determination for the Baltic States and the
long-standing U.S. policy of not recognizing the incorporation of
the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. He explained the
Administration's approach toward Lithuania, stressing that the
issue must be dealt with through peaceful means and through a
dialogue between the Soviet leadership and the freely elected
representatives of the Lithuanian people. He also reiterated
that this is an issue that could adversely affect the prospects
for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The President told the Baltic American leaders that the U.S. must
avoid taking actions that would inadvertently make Lithuania's
task more difficult by inflaming the situation. He stressed that
the course of quiet diplomacy and public support is the approach
most likely to lead to a peaceful outcome of self-determination
for the Lithuanian people.
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9002749
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 09 APR 90 17
TO: CICCONI, J
FROM: SITTMANN
DOC DATE: 10 APR 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: BALTIC STATES
USSR
AP
PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESS RELEASE RE PRES MTG W/ BALTIC AMER LEADERS 11 APR
ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO
DUE DATE: 12 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
SITTMANN
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSEF
DOC 3 OF 3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9002749
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SCOWCROFT
Z 90041012 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
001
X 90041210 GATES APPROVED RECOM
002 PRESIDENT
Z 90041019 FOR INFORMATION
002
X 90041210 NOTED BY PRES
003
X 90041210 SITTMANN SGD MEMO
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2749
ADD ON
April 10, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONI
FROM:
WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
W
SUBJECT:
Draft Press Release
Attached is a draft press release for use after the President's
meeting with the Baltic American Leaders on Wednesday,
April 11, 1990.
Attachment
Tab A Draft Press Release
CC: Marlin Fitzwater
Roman Popadiuk
TAB A
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
This morning, the President met for approximately thirty minutes
with leaders of the Baltic American community. They raised with
him their concerns about the current situation in Lithuania and
the other Baltic States and expressed their strong support for
the rights of the Baltic peoples to self-determination and
independence.
The President shared their concerns and reiterated his support
for the right to self-determination for the Baltic States and the
long-standing U.S. policy of not recognizing the incorporation of
the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. He explained the
Administration's approach toward Lithuania, stressing that the
issue must be dealt with through peaceful means and through a
dialogue between the Soviet leadership and the freely elected
representatives of the Lithuanian people. He also reiterated
that this is an issue that could adversely affect the prospects
for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The President told the Baltic American leaders that the U.S. must
avoid taking actions that would inadvertently make Lithuania's
task more difficult by inflaming the situation. He stressed that
the course of quiet diplomacy and public support is the approach
most likely to lead to a peaceful outcome of self-determination
for the Lithuanian people.
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2749
April 9, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
RB
FROM:
ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLtt
SUBJECT:
The President's Meeting with Baltic American
Leaders, April 11, 1990
At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with
leaders of the Baltic American community.
RECOMMENDATION
1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
2. That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the attached memo to
Jim Cicconi forwarding the draft press release.
Approve 8
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
Tab II
Memo to James Cicconi
Tab A
Draft Press Release
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/13/12
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHRON FILE
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
I
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 19, 1990
Natl Sec Advisor
INFORMATION
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT Are BLACKWILL
THROUGH:
FROM:
MICHAEL HAYDEN/CONDI RICE
SUBJECT:
Upcoming US-Soviet Military to Military Contacts
Although General Moiseyev has asked to postpone his May 13-19
trip to the United States until late September, there are several
other military-to-military programs scheduled to take place in
the next 45 days. Some of them have a potentially high profile.
The Soviets took great pains to emphasize that Moiseyev's request
to reschedule was based solely on the timing of the Washington
summit. "Preparation" demanded Moiseyev's presence in Moscow
and, in fact, his trip would have been coincident with the Moscow
ministerials. The Soviet spokesman specifically noted that
Moiseyev's decision had nothing to do with the postponement of
General Vuono's visit to the Soviet Union. He also expressed
concern that this trip and other exchanges would be affected by
U.S. reactions to events in Lithuania.
The Soviet initiated postponement is good news for us as the
Moiseyev visit would have been high profile: Gettysburg,
Ellsworth AFB, San Francisco (with a speech to the Commonwealth
Club), Fort Ord, San Diego, and Washington (including a session
with the President "if he is available). The Moiseyev visit
would also have been the occasion to announce the next two year
calendar of military contacts with the Soviets. Since it covers
such a long period, the calendar will look impressive even if it
is carefully drawn and appropriately limited. We have not yet
seen a Soviet proposal but our current draft (which will shortly
go through interagency review) is fairly ambitious. The delay in
the Moiseyev trip allows us to slow the pace in developing our
proposed program and pushes back the time when we must share it
with the Soviets.
A group of six officers from the Voroshilov Academy will visit
the U.S. from 29 May to 5 June. They will split their time
between NDU here in Washington and the Naval War College in
Newport.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2009-0945-MR
CONFIDENTIAL
SCS 4/22/13
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Although not strictly a military-to-military contact, the Coast
Guard will host a Soviet icebreaker in San Francisco from 10-13
May as part of the Coast Guard's bicentennial celebration. The
icebreaker will likely be joined by vessels from Canada, Japan
and Mexico. This visit is part of a rich exchange program the
Coast Guard has developed with their Soviet counterpart, a
program that has a higher proportion of substance over style when
compared to DoD's.
There is a potential problem with optics, however, as the Coast
Guard's Soviet equivalent is the Maritime Border Guards, a
component of the KGB. The problem will not be eased by the
presence of the commander of the Maritime Border Guards at the
San Francisco celebration. We have also learned that a Coast
Guard cutter is scheduled to call at Petropavlovsk in early June
although that visit has not yet gone through all the bureaucratic
wickets for final approval.
The postponement of the Moiseyev visit was a stroke of good
fortune; it pushes it to the background as we react to events in
the Baltic. The Voroshilov visit is low level, workmanlike and
will likely pass without notice. The San Francisco portcall,
however, points out the problem of trying to fine tune (or even
be fully aware of) what has become an exceptionally broad agenda
of bilateral contacts. In our view the visit, on its own merits
even with the "KGB connection", should proceed. Our cancelling
it now would almost certainly be viewed as a far stronger signal
than the one we sent in postponing the Vuono trip and would be
read by the Soviets as a sign that the entire military-to-
military relationship was in jeopardy. We should take that step
only as it is needed to support our broader reaction to events in
Lithuania.
Concurrence by: Don Pilling
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDE TAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 3071
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
DOCLOG EA. A/O
BYPASSED WW DESK:
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann
1
W
I
Bob Gates
2
Do
Brent Scowcroft
3
APNSA Has Seen
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
R
90 PI 28
4
MEN 4/30
N
NSC Secretariat
5
90 APR 20
N\R
A = Action
Is Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS FYT - Upcoming US Soviet
Military Contacts to na. tary
APNSA Has Seen
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9003181
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 23 APR 90 21
TO: CICCONI, J
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 24 APR 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
CONGRESSIONAL
EUROPE EAST
GATT
I
AP
PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
SUBJECT: PRES TALKING POINTS FOR MTG W/ CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO
DUE DATE: 26 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMDC
CLOSED BY: NSMDC
DOC 2 OF 2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9003181
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SCOWCROFT
Z 90042408 FOR SIGNATURE
002
X 90042411 SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap
NARA, Date 2/24/09
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3181
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 24, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
The President's Talking Points for the Meeting
with the Congressional Leadership
The President's talking points for his April 24 meeting with the
Congressional leadership are at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Talking Points
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/13/12
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 1 OF 6
TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
FIRST, LET ME SAY HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR
SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING ON LITHUANIA. THIS
IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE TO HANDLE, BUT IT HAS
BEEN ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL THAT LEADERS FROM BOTH
SIDES OF THE AISLE HAVE DELIVERED A STRONG
BIPARTISAN MESSAGE TO MOSCOW.
I WANT TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON MY THINKING
REGARDING LITHUANIA, AND TO SEEK YOUR COUNSEL.
AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DEAL WITH
THIS SITUATION THROUGH A CAREFUL POLICY OF
QUIET DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE
RIGHTS OF THE LITHUANIANS TO SELF-
DETERMINATION.
WE HAVE STRESSED ON EVERY OCCASION THAT THE
ISSUE MUST BE DEALT WITH THROUGH GENUINE
CONFIDENTIAL
CORPOLATINE
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 2 OF 6
DIALOGUE, WITHOUT FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.
WE HAVE COMMUNICATED THAT MESSAGE BOTH
PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY TO THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP, MOST RECENTLY IN SECRETARY BAKER'S
TELEPHONE CALLS TO FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE. SENATOR MITCHELL AND HIS
COLLEAGUES DELIVERED THE SAME MESSAGE, AS DID
SENATOR KENNEDY BEFORE HIM.
ALL OF US KNOW THAT GORBACHEV FACES GRAVE
PROBLEMS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS TRIED TO
CONDUCT ITSELF IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID
EXACERBATING AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SITUATION
IN LITHUANIA. WE HAVE ALSO TRIED TO KEEP ALL
GORBACHEV'S PEACEFUL OPTIONS OPEN.
AND WE RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH IS AT STAKE -- FOR
THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROIKA, THE CONSOLIDATION
OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0945-MR
SCS 4/22/13
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 3 OF 6
FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. WE DON'T
WANT TO RETURN TO A SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT IS
IMPOSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH.
WE FACE A REAL DILEMMA. WE ARE MORALLY BOUND
TO SUPPORT THE LITHUANIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION.
YET IT IS IMPORTANT TO WORK TO PRESERVE THE
CHANGED SOVIET POLICIES, FOR WHICH GORBACHEV
SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDIT, THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TO POSITIVE CHANGES IN SOME PARTS OF THE
WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY IN EASTERN EUROPE.
I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO REPRESS THE RIGHT OF THE
LITHUANIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH
THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THROUGH THEIR FREELY
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES.
--
THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY MOSCOW
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 4 OF 6
IS A STEP THAT HAS ONLY DEEPENED THE CONFLICT
AND INCREASED TENSIONS.
--
MOSCOW MUST ENTER INTO A GOOD-FAITH DIALOGUE
WITH LITHUANIA'S REPRESENTATIVES. THAT IS THE
ONLY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE.
--
THERE IS A LITHUANIAN DELEGATION IN MOSCOW
RIGHT NOW BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO
MEET WITH KEY SOVIET OFFICIALS.
--
THERE IS OBVIOUSLY SOME POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING GOING ON BUT IT IS NOT
CLEAR WHETHER IT GIVES THE TWO SIDES A BASIS
FROM WHICH TO BEGIN THEIR DIALOGUE.
:
WE ARE REVIEWING OUR OPTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN
THE ECONOMIC SPHERE.
AFTER ALL, THE SOVIETS ARE USING THEIR
ECONOMIC MIGHT AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE
LITHUANIANS.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 5 OF 6
WE ARE EXAMINING A NUMBER OF MEASURES,
INCLUDING WHAT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO U.S.-
SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON COMMERCIAL, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT AND TAX AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS ALL
EXCHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH OUR PROGRAM OF
TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
WE ARE ALSO CONSULTING WITH THE ALLIES TO SEE
IF THE MEMBERS OF THE GATT SHOULD DEFER
CONSIDERATION OF THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR
OBSERVER STATUS.
I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WANT TO AVOID TAKING
ANY STEPS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH ARE IN THE INTEREST OF US
AND OUR ALLIES. THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
THAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING WILL SERVE TO REDUCE
MILITARY TENSIONS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
LET ME SAY ONCE MORE THAT I APPRECIATE YOUR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CARD 6 OF 6
SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING. IT WILL BE
IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH
ONE VOICE.
I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
-- First, let me say how grateful I am for your support and
understanding on Lithuania. This is a difficult issue to
handle, but it has been enormously helpful that leaders from
both sides of the aisle have delivered a strong bipartisan
message to Moscow.
--
I want to bring you up to date on my thinking regarding
Lithuania, and to seek your counsel.
-- As you know, we have been trying to deal with this situation
through a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public
support for the rights of the Lithuanians to self-
determination.
--
We have stressed on every occasion that the issue must be
dealt with through genuine dialogue, without force or
intimidation.
-- We have communicated that message both privately and
publicly to the Soviet leadership, most recently in
Secretary Baker's telephone calls to Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze. Senator Mitchell and his colleagues delivered
the same message, as did Senator Kennedy before him.
-- All of us know that Gorbachev faces grave problems. The
Administration has tried to conduct itself in such a way as
to avoid exacerbating an already complicated situation in
Lithuania. We have also tried to keep all Gorbachev's
peaceful options open.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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CONF IDENTIAL
--
And we recognize how much is at stake -- for the success of
perestroika, the consolidation of democratic change in
Eastern Europe, and for East-West relations generally. We
don't want to return to a Soviet leadership that is
impossible to deal with.
--
We face a real dilemma. We are morally bound to support the
Lithuanians' right to self-determination.
-- Yet it is important to work to preserve the changed Soviet
policies, for which Gorbachev should be given credit, that
have contributed to positive changes in some parts of the
world, and especially in Eastern Europe.
--
I am increasingly concerned about Soviet attempts to repress
the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination,
which they have expressed through their freely elected
representatives.
--
The imposition of economic sanctions by Moscow is a step
that has only deepened the conflict and increased tensions.
--
Moscow must enter into a good-faith dialogue with
Lithuania's representatives. That is the only way out of
the current impasse.
--
There is a Lithuanian delegation in Moscow right now but
they have not yet been able to meet with key Soviet
officials.
--
There is obviously some political and diplomatic maneuvering
going on but it is not clear whether it gives the two sides
a basis from which to begin their dialogue.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
--
We are reviewing our options, particularly in the economic
sphere.
--
After all, the Soviets are using their economic might as a
weapon against the Lithuanians.
--
We are examining a number of measures, including what to do
with respect to U.S. -Soviet negotiations on commercial,
bilateral investment and tax agreements, as well as all
exchanges associated with our program of technical economic
cooperation.
--
We are also consulting with the Allies to see if the members
of the GATT should defer consideration of the Soviet request
for observer status.
--
I want you to know that I want to avoid taking any steps
concerning arms control negotiations, which are in the
interest of us and our Allies. The arms control agreements
that we are negotiating will serve to reduce military
tensions in East-West relations.
--
Let me say once more that I appreciate your support and
understanding. It will be important that the U.S. continue
to speak with one voice.
--
I look forward to hearing your views.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
3181
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 23, 1990
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL R3
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
SUBJECT:
The President's Talking Points for the Meeting
with the Congressional Leadership
Your memorandum to Jim Cicconi forwards talking points for the
President's meeting with the Congressional leadership tomorrow.
Ginny Lampley concurs.
corfor
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to Cicconi.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to Cicconi
Tab A
Talking Points
DECLASSIFIED
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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/16/12
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9003209
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 24 APR 90 15
Union
TO: SCOWCROFT
I
FROM: ROSTOW
DOC DATE: 24 APR 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
LEGAL ISSUES
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: LITHUANIA & INTL COURT OF JUSTICE
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT
DUE DATE: 27 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
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ROSTOW
DECLASSIFIED
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
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OPENED BY: NSJRP
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CONFIDENTIAL
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3209
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
4/24/90 1717
April 24, 1990
Good
avalysis Breat I Think Expecially Nick
INFORMATION
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
importent right. Symment meeting given at Bipand
FROM:
NICHOLAS ROSTOW
NR.
SUBJECT:
Lithuania and the International Court of Justice
Bb Bladill
Senator Moynihan, among others, has suggested that the United
States seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) "concerning the right of the Lithuanian people to
exercise self-determination" (Tab I). Article 96 of the U.N.
Charter specifies that the General Assembly and the Security
Council may request an advisory opinion on any legal question.
As a request for an advisory opinion appears to be a substantive
question, a resolution by the Security Council requesting an
opinion probably would be subject to the veto under Article 27.
Further, a resolution to treat a Security Council request for an
advisory opinion as a procedural question, not subject to the
veto, itself would be vetoable. Other U.N. organs and specified
agencies also may request advisory opinions when authorized by
the General Assembly. The United States acting alone does not
have the authority to request an advisory opinion.
The United States, moreover, may not sue the Soviet Union
directly because neither we nor the Soviets accept the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction or have a bilateral agreement providing
for ICJ dispute resolution with respect to Lithuania.
I strongly recommend against seeking an advisory opinion for the
following reasons. First, it is by no means certain that the ICJ
would reach a conclusion we would regard as right or acceptable.
The membership of the Court is not materially different from what
it was during the Nicaragua case.
Second, in the Nicaragua case, we strongly asserted that the
Court acted wrongly in terms of its own rules and precedents in
accepting jurisdiction. We have said the Court wrongly opined on
matters involving self-defense and national security, which, we
argue, exclusively fall within the competence of the Security
Council and reached a decision on the merits in defiance of the
facts and the law. Further, the ICJ will not overturn its prior
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2000.1197.F CAP
3/6/08
CONFIDE:
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Nicaragua decision on the ground that it was obtained by
fraudulent testimony by Nicaragua, although that is now obvious
to all detached observers. We therefore can hardly ask in good
faith that the Court opine on a question, which, from the Soviet
perspective, is as important to the Soviet Union as Nicaragua was
to the United States (whether or not we think the Soviets ought
to take Lithuania as seriously as we took Nicaragua).
Third, we are in the midst of negotiations with the five
permanent members of the United Nations aimed at securing their
agreement to submit disputes to the Court arising under specified
multilateral conventions, which provide for ICJ dispute
resolution. The proposed agreement specifically excludes any
dispute concerning any matter that one of the parties to the
proposed convention regards as concerning its national security,
broadly defined.
Finally, advisory opinions have been used by the General Assembly
to achieve a substantive ruling by the Court when the parties to
the dispute in question refuse to accept the Court's jurisdiction
for purposes of that dispute. This practice circumvents the
principle that the Court can issue substantive decisions only
when the parties to a dispute agree that the Court has
jurisdiction and easily could be used to the disadvantage of the
United States with regard to Latin America, the Middle East,
Southwest Asia, and other regions as well as with regard to
nonregional issues.
I believe the case against the advisory committee is strong and
compelling and that private conversations with Senatory Moynihan
and other congressional leaders on this issue ought to succeed in
dampening their ardor.
Concurrences by: Robert Blackwill, Virginia Blfor Lampley Condi Rice
CR
Attachment
Tab I
S. Con. Res. 112
CONF IDENTIAL
FILE for tracking or future reference? ('Y' or 'N')
LEGI-SLATE Report for the 101st Congress
Fri, April 20, 1990 12:51pm (EDT
BILL TEXT Report for S.C.R.112
As reported by Senate committee, April 5, 1990
III
Calendar No. 507
101st CONGRESS
2d Session
S. CON. RES. 112
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should seek to
obtain an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
concerning the right of self-determination of the people of Lithuania.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 30 (legislative day, January 23), 1990
Mr. Moynihan (for himself and Mr. Cranston) submitted the following
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
April 5 (legislative day, January 23), 1990
Reported by Mr. Pell, without amendment
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should seek to
obtain an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
concerning the right of self-determination of the people of Lithuania.
Whereas the State of Lithuania was historically an independent European
power and existed as a sovereign state from 1386 to 1795;
Whereas the State of Lithuania was annexed by the Russian Empire in
1795, but its people continued to resist the annexation;
Whereas Lithuania regained its independence following World War I and
functioned as an independent sovereign state until 1940;
Whereas Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union reached an illegal agreement
in 1939 which placed the independent State of Lithuania within the "sphere
of influence" of the Soviet Union;
Whereas the Soviet Union subsequently annexed Lithuania;
Whereas the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies has condemned the
Berman-Soviet pact as "legally untenable and invalid from the moment [it
was] signed":
the overwhelming majority of the persons living in Lithuania today;
Whereas the Lithuanian people have declared their sovereign independence
from the Soviet Union;
'Whereas the General Assembly has previously requested and received from
the International Court of Justice advisory opinions concerning the right of
self-determination for the peoples of Western Sahara and the legal status of
Namibia;
Whereas President Gorbachev has repeatedly expressed the Soviet Union's
strong desire to adhere to international legal norms and its belief that the
United States and the Soviet Union should make greater use of the
International Court of Justice; and
Whereas it is in the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union,
the people of Lithuania, and the world community that disputes be resolved
in accordance with principles of law rather than through the use of force:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That
the Congress--
(1) expresses its grave concern regarding the situation in Lithuania;
(2) calls upon the Soviet Union to adhere to its stated acceptance
of the norms of international law as they apply to Lithuania; and
(3) strongly urges the President and the Secretary of State to make
all appropriate efforts to ensure that either the Security Council or a
special session of the General Assembly requests from the International
Court of Justice an advisory opinion concerning the right of the
Lithuanian people to exercise self-determination.
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9003277
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 26 APR 90 08
TO: SCOWCROFT
SHRON FILE
I
FROM: ROY, J
DOC DATE: 25 APR 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUT
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES LANDSBERGIS RE SITUATION IN LITHUANIA
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES
DUE DATE: 30 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE
COMMENTS: ** NO COVER MEMO PROVIDED / SCOWCROFT DID NOT USE **
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT LANDSBERGIS
soo
Baker
NOT
I have been asked once again to call you on behalf of the
USED
U.S. Administration.
per
BS
As you know, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has just
concluded three days of talks with Secretary Baker and
4/25
President Bush.
I want to assure you that the situation in Lithuania was a
major topic of their discussions.
Secretary Baker and President Bush both made it very clear
to Mr. Shevardnadze that we stand firm on our policy of not
recognizing Soviet sovereignty in Lithuania or in the other
Baltic states.
And we will continue to stand firm: The United States
fully supports the right of the people of Lithuania to
self-determination.
--
I should add that Senators George Mitchell and Bob
Dole, the leaders of our Senate, told Mr. Shevardnadze
exactly the same thing when they met with him
separately.
Mr. Shevardnadze, I must tell you, was equally firm in his
response.
The Lithuanians will have the right to self-determination,
he said, including the possibility of leaving the Soviet
Union.
But they must exercise that right, he said, within the
limits of the U.S.S.R. constitution.
We understand that you cannot simply repudiate what you've
done and accept the legality of Moscow's authority. That
would be the same as admitting that what happened in 1940
-- your incorporation into the Soviet Union -- was somehow
legitimate.
We are increasingly worried, however, that the situation in
Lithuania is now reaching a dangerous stage and that one
incident could set things off -- leading perhaps to direct
intervention or even martial law.
-2-
The use of force would, of course, seriously affect
U.S. -Soviet relations, and it would badly damage Western
support for President Gorbachev and perestroika.
But I'm sure I don't need to tell you that such an outcome
would be a disaster for everyone.
We think both sides now need to focus on ways to defuse the
situation -- and, if possible, to find creative ways of
moving away from confrontation and toward a dialogue,
without requiring either side to lose face or to be forced
to give up their principles.
We said this to Mr. Shevardnadze.
If you'll permit me, I would like to discuss some ideas in
this connection.
We understand that Mr. Yakovlev, in his conversation with
Minister Ozolas on Tuesday, mentioned the possibility of
temporarily "suspending" -- not annuling (make certain
translation is right) -- your March 11 decree and other
laws not in conformity with the U.S.S.R. constitution.
Do you think this is a realistic possibility? It's our
sense the Soviets would in fact see a "suspension" as
providing them a way to deal with you. That's the first
point and we think it's important.
Secondly, you and others have mentioned that it might be
possible to hold a popular referendum which would show
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the people of Lithuania
truly want independence and not to be part of the Soviet
Union.
Is this a realistic possibility?
Might it not be possible for you to announce your
willingness to have a referendum and to go to Moscow to see
Gorbachev? We think your willingness to do both -- indeed
to go to Moscow -- would do much to begin a realistic
process.
If you were to go to Moscow, would you be willing to speak
to the Federation Council?
--
Not as head of the Lithuanian S.S.R. and not to take
part in the discussions.
-- But simply to explain to the leaders of the U.S.S.R.
why Lithuania wants its independence now and what
practical arrangements it is willing to work out with
the Soviet government, in order to guarantee that
everyone's interests will be protected.
-3-
We understand that these would be major concessions for you
and that you would expect some reciprocal moves by Moscow
in return.
(ONLY IF ASKED TO ELABORATE: If you were to do this, we
would expect Moscow to reopen your borders and to allow
journalists and diplomats back in. Gorbachev would also
have to agree ahead of time to respect the results of a
referendum and to negotiate in good faith on the basis of
those results.)
But if you were to take these steps -- perhaps as a single
package -- they might be enough to break the deadlock and
persuade Moscow to step back and begin a serious dialogue
and substantive negotiations.
I can tell you that such steps on your part would get a
very favorable reception in the West.
It's not our place, of course, to advise you on what to do,
and I apologize if I seem to be meddling.
We only want to be helpful, not to interfere.
I did, however, want to bring you up to date on our
discussions with Mr. Shevardnadze and -- let me repeat what
I said earlier -- to reemphasize America's support for your
people and your cause.
On behalf of the Administration and all the American
people, I wish you Godspeed.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9003294
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 26 APR 90 11
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: HAYDEN
DOC DATE: 26 APR 90
KANTER
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
1
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING TO DOUBLE
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 30 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
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FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
HAYDEN
KANTER
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
. BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 1 OF 1
CONFIDENTIAL
National Security Council
:
The White House
PROOFED BY: LMS
LOG # 3294
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
DOCLOG R A/O
BYPASSED WW DESK:
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
SSi
1
I
Bill Sittmann
Y
x
Bob Gates
Brent Scoweroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
APR 27 P7. 52
E.
4
prd 8/13
of
West WingDesk
NSC Secretariat
90
5
N/R
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Sruat Def
Spending 4 Double
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3294
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 26, 1990
INFORMATION
NOTED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ARNOLD KANTER Ale
FROM:
MICHAEL HAYDEN MTI
SUBJECT:
Soviet Defense Spending to "Double"
John Hines of RAND has informed us that, according to a staffer
from the Supreme Soviet's Military Affairs Committee, the'
official Soviet figure for defense spending will likely double by
the end of the summer.
The staffer was escorted by Hines during a tour of the United
States and indicated that his committee would soon report to the
full legislature an estimate of the military budget just about
twice the current announced total of $77 billion rubles. He
believed the legislature had enough leverage to make this stick
as the official figure, especially as the Supreme Soviet intended
to use it as the baseline for the 19% cut in production and 14%
cut overall promised by Gorbachev last year. The staffer was
especially concerned that the U.S. government recognize these new
numbers for what they were -- a more accurate calculation of
current spending -- not an increase.
The new figures, if indeed they are accepted, come close to our
overall estimate of Soviet defense spending but our methodologies
still differ. The Supreme Soviet's calculations try to use more
realistic prices for military goods but they are still based on
assigned -- not market -- costs. In addition, the Soviets
apparently still omit areas we consider very military (like some
space programs) and include items we routinely dismiss. The new
estimate, for example, will include a calculation of "rent" for
land used by the military in each of the Republics.
DoD is working on some contingency press guidance should this
Soviet debate really take place. Their comments will welcome the
greater openness, express the hope that market costs will one day
be used, and characterize the "increase" as new calculations, not
new directions in Soviet military spending.
Concurrence by:
Condoleezza Ca Rice and Bill Working
Robert Blackwill And
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
ses 4/22/13
CHRON FILE
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9003285
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 26 APR 90 10
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICE
DOC DATE: 26 APR 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
-
PERSONS: LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUTAS
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTR FM LANDSBERGIS RE LITHUANIA
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT
DUE DATE: 30 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
NSC CHRON
RICE
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSLMS
CLOSED BY: NSWEA
DOC 1 OF 1
CONFIDENTIAL
wines Lto α lo Landsbergi
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 3285
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOGO
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann
\
A
Bob Gates
26 P 46
3 SEE 8 GENERAL'S NOTE
2
Brent Scowcreft
Bill Sittmann
CEI
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
90 APR
4
Sprac
NSC Secretariat
Rice
5
FFA
Rice
Please return all
originals and routing slip
to west Wing Wesk,
Thank you
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
Sittmann concerned --
note to General says no phone
call to Landsbergis (send letter)
but in the memo to President
we seem to give the letter
and the phone call equal weight.
CONFIDENTIAL
3285
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 26, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
PB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
twing
SUBJECT:
Letter to Landsbergis
Your memorandum to the President at Tab I forwards a response to
the Landsbergis letter of several days ago (Tab A).
We have also provided talking points should the President decide
to call Landsbergis instead. We recommend, however, that the
President send the letter in lieu of a phone call. It is not
possible to judge Landsbergis' state of mind. He has already
accused the President of participating in a "second Munich." We
-
are concerned that Landsbergis could -- without time for
reflection -- make an ill-considered comment, distort for the
media the President's comments, or simply refuse to take the
President's call. The State Department advises that since
Landsbergis is President of Lithuania's Supreme Council, the
salutation "Mr. President" bestows no notion of recognition of
Lithuania. We want to avoid a signature block, however, to avoid
offending Landsbergis.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to President
Tab A
Letter to Landsbergis
Tab B
Talking Points for Telephone Call
Tab C
Incoming Letter from Landsbergis
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0945-MR
SCS 9/5/13
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONF IDENTIAL
HAL
3285
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Letter to Landsbergis
Purpose
To answer the letter that Landsbergis sent to you on April 14.
Background
You received a letter from Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania. A
proposed reply is at Tab A.
Alternatively, talking points for a phone call to Landsbergis --
should you decide to call him instead -- are at Tab B.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to Landsbergis at Tab A.
That you call Landsbergis.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to Landsbergis
Tab B
Talking Points for Telephone Call
Tab C
Incoming Letter from Landsbergis
DECLASSIFIED
CC: Vice President
White House Guidelines
Chief of Staff
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/17
CONF IDENT IAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear President Landsbergis:
Thank you for your recent letter. I support, as
American Presidents have for fifty years,
Lithuania's right to self-determination. The
United States is sympathetic to your
unassailable cause.
Through quiet diplomacy and firm public
statements, we have urged the Soviet government
to enter into a discussion with Lithuania's
representatives. We have also expressed our
deep concern about the Soviet decision to impose
economic sanctions on Lithuania -- a step that
undermines the possibility of a reasoned and
good-faith dialogue.
You may expect continued U.S. efforts to
convince the Soviet leadership to turn back from
the path of confrontation and to enter into
discussions with you because a solution that is
imposed upon the Lithuanian people will not
last. We have asked our friends and Allies
throughout the world to undertake similar
efforts with regard to the Soviet Union. It is
my fervent hope that a good-faith dialogue will
begin soon.
Finally, may I say to you that I have read your
recent comments about the policy of the United
States. I want you to know that every element
of our policy is designed to contribute to the
creation of an environment in which the goal of
Lithuanian independence can be attained. May
God bless you.
CONFIDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS FOR A PHONE CALL TO VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS
I wanted to have a chance to talk with you about the
situation in Lithuania.
--
First, let me thank you for your letter. It is important
that we communicate -- that I hear your views and you hear
mine.
--
I want you to know that I support the right of the
Lithuanian people to determine their own future.
--
I am sympathetic to your cause which is unassailable.
--
The United States is doing what it can to help.
--
Through quiet diplomacy and firm public statements, we have
urged the Soviet government to enter into a discussion with
the representatives of the Lithuanian people.
--
We have expressed our deep concern about the Soviet decision
to impose economic sanctions on Lithuania -- a step that
undermines the possibility of reasoned and good-faith
dialogue.
--
We are trying not to exacerbate the already difficult
situation in Lithuania.
--
In recent weeks, Secretary of State Baker has written to and
talked with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I have written
to President Gorbachev urging them to begin a dialogue with
Lithuania.
--
You may expect continued U.S. efforts to convince the Soviet
leadership to turn back from the path of confrontation and
to enter into discussions with you.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CONFIDENTIAL
2000.1197.
F
CAP
Declassify on: OADR
3/6/08
CONF IDENTIAL
2
-- A solution that is imposed upon the Lithuanian people will
not last.
--
We have asked our friends and Allies throughout the world to
undertake similar efforts with regard to the Soviet Union.
--
It is my fervent hope that a good-faith dialogue will begin
soon.
-- May I also say to you that I read your comments about U.S.
policy.
--
I want you to know that every element of our policy is
designed to help create an environment in which Lithuania
can achieve its goal of independence.
-- I will continue to look for ways to support Lithuania.
-- God bless you.
CONF IDENTIAL
APR 16 '90 17:26 LIC-WASH, DC
HER 18 30 11.01 CITHORNIAN INFO CENTER NEW YORK
P,2
LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS AUKSCIAUSIOJI TARYBA
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
EMBARGOED
Washington, DC 20500
United States of America
April 14, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
On February 24, 1990, after a fairly contested, multi-party
campaign, the people of Lithuania went to the polls to elect na-
tional representatives for the first time since the Lithuanian
nation came under foreign occupation in 1940, with the completion
of the final run-off elections on March 10, 1990, the demand of
the people of Lithuania was clear and overwhelming -- immediate
restoration of the Republic of Lithuania recognized de jure by
the United States of America in 1922, and the entry into force on
Lithuanian territory of the fundamental human, economic and
political rights proclaimed in the first Lithuanian Constitution
of May 15, 1920.
On March 11, 1990, the representatives of the Lithuanian
people met in the Assembly Hall of the Supreme Council in the
Lithuanian capital of Vilnius and expressing the will of the na-
tion' solemnly proclaimed the restoration of the Republic of
Lithuania on the basis of its de jure continuity since 1940. The
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet was re-established as the Supreme Coun-
oil of the Republic of Lithuania, and the 1977 U.S.S.R. Con-
stitution and other Soviet laws were annulled, insofar as they
applied to Lithuania. Only those Soviet laws which did not con-
fliot with the Provisional Basic Law of the Republic of Lithuania
were permitted to remain an vigour. These laws will be examined
and replaced with Lithuanian laws after future legislative review
and debate.
I have been asked by the Supreme Council of the Republic of
Lithuania to convey to you and the people of the United States
the most significant legislative documents enacted on and after
March 11, 1990. In particular, you will observe that the Lithua-
nian state emphasises its adherence to universally accepted prin-
ciples of international law, recognises the provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act with respect to international frontiers, and
guarantees the rights of all peoples and ethnic communities liv-
ins in Lithuania.
Mr. President, it has been nearly five decades since oppres-
sion and darkness descended upon the land and people of Lithuania
as a result of an illegal and morally reprehensible Non-Aggres-
sion Pact with secret protocols entered into by Adolf Hitler and
Josef Stalin on August 23, 1939. During this period, the
Lithuanian people were denied nearly every fundamental human
right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Commencing in 1940, hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians of all
ages, professions and backgrounds were deported to the U.S.S.R.;
our schools and churches closed; our farms and property laid
waste; our environment poisoned by industries over which we had
little control; and our sons laid to rest on battlefields far
beyond our frontiers.
In spite of these heavy burdens, and an unrelenting effort
by an alien political system to destroy the relisious and moral
values of the Lithuanian people, the Lithuanian nation endured.
In every Lithuanian heart burned a desire for freedom, justice
and peace.
Many of our people have taken great hope and courage from
the fact that the United States, like many other nations, has
repeatedly stressed its non-recognition of the 1940 annexation
and occupation of Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. Today, with increas-
ing freedoms and liberties & reality for most Lithuanians, the
people of Lithuania are hoping for your nation's support in the
process of political, economic and environmental renewal now
sweeping across our nation. We are very grateful for, and have
been very much encouraged by, the repeated statements on the part
of the United States over the last few weeks in support of
Lithuania's expression of its right to self-determination. What
we very much need today, however, is your strong political sup-
port -- your recognition of the new Lithuanian Government.
At this point, we need your concrete help; use of Soviet
military force, and political pressure on other countries to not
recognize Lithuania continue, and now there is the threat of an
economic blookade as a new Iron Curtain is drawn around Lithuania
on the Baltio Bea and the Polish border, This aggression must be
recognised for what it is, and labeled as such by the West.
Mr. President, the people of Lithuania and the Supreme Coun-
oil have asked me to convey to you and the people of the United
States their best wishes and warmest Easter greetings. To all the
peoples of the Soviet Union and the world, our nation extends
only the hand of friendship. I sincerely hope that the people of
United States will continue to reaffirm and support the right of
the people of Lithuania to freedom and dignity, and the right to
take their own path in building an independent democratic state.
Very truly yours,
Vyt.Lamarrezin
Vytautas Landsbergis
President of the Supreme
Council of the Republic of
Lithuania
EMBARGOED
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9003456
NSC/S PROFILE
CHRON FILE
90 18
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 02 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:
I
KEYWORDS: USSR
BALTIC STATES
AP
INTL TRADE
ECONOMICS
PERSONS: PRUNSKIENE, KAZIMIERA
MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
KOHL, HELMUT
SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PM PRUNSKIENE OF LITHUANIA
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 04 MAY 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
HUTCHINGS
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 3 OF 3
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3456
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 2, 1990
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KAZIMIERA THE PRUNSKIENE
OF LITHUANIA
DECLASSIFIED
PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
PER E.O. 12958,
DATE: May 3, 1990
LOCATION: The Oval Office
AS AMENDED
TIME: 2:30 - 2:50 p.m.
2000. 1197.F CAP
3/6/08
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
I. PURPOSE
To reaffirm your support for the aspirations of the
Lithuanian people for independence.
II. BACKGROUND
Both symbolically and substantively, this will be a tricky
visit to handle. As the first meeting between an American
President and a Lithuanian Prime Minister since the
annexation of the Baltic States, it will a precedent-
breaking event, which the press and Prunskiene will want to
portray as symbolic recognition of Lithuanian independence.
We will explain in a press release afterwards that you have
met with her not as Prime Minister of independent Lithuania
but as a recognized and freely elected representative of the
Lithuanian people, noting also that she has been received by
the Prime Ministers of Norway and Sweden and the Danish and
Canadian Foreign Ministers.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger -- or, if Larry is still ill,
Bob Kimmitt -- will be meeting Prunskiene earlier in the
day. This will enable us to get a better sense of what
specific requests she may want to deliver to you. Although
we believe she will try to avoid putting you on the spot,
her earlier meetings on the Hill and with the press will
give her ample opportunity for making her case in ways that
could be awkward for you.
The very fact of your meeting with Prunskiene will ease
somewhat the disappointment the Lithuanians, along with
Baltic Americans, have expressed about our policy. Your
reaffirmation of the U.S. position regarding the Baltic
States and your explanation of the approach you have taken
toward Lithuania may also help her understand what we have
done and why, though she is nonetheless likely to urge you
to exert stronger pressure on Moscow. In that regard, you
could indicate that we are actively considering steps the
U.S. might take in the economic sphere -- but without
mentioning your letter to Gorbachev, which we have not yet
announced to our friends and allies.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
Following the letter from Mitterrand and Kohl to President
Landsbergis, the Lithuanians have begun considering ways of
suspending implementation of their new laws in hopes that
Moscow will lift its sanctions and enter into a dialogue.
While you might welcome any steps toward breaking the
impasse between Moscow and Vilnius, you should not give the
impression that you are asking the Lithuanians to retreat in
the face of Soviet intimidation. Press stories along those
lines would undo any good this meeting might accomplish.
Although there have been indications that Moscow is
also considering a compromise to defuse the crisis,
there is no evidence that the Soviets have done
anything toward that end. Moscow's position may be
further complicated by possible moves by Latvia on May
3 and Estonia on May 14 to follow the Lithuanian
example in declaring independence. Landsbergis,
meanwhile, is under an increasingly open attack by
Deputy Prime Ministers Brazauckas and Ozolas, who would
prefer a leader more willing to compromise with Moscow.
In her meetings in Scandinavia and Canada, Prime Minister
Prunskiene did not call for recognition of Lithuanian
independence, nor did she make specific requests for Western
oil supplies. She did, however, push for stronger bilateral
trade relations. This, of course, is wrapped up in the
independence question, as we do not trade directly with any
of the Soviet Republics. On both oil and trade, we
recommend that you indicate firmly that any such steps on
our part would only complicate the situation. A
noncommittal reply might prompt her to tell the press that
the U.S. is considering such actions.
Prunskiene may also raise the matter of humanitarian
assistance. As it is still unclear to us why medical
supplies are not getting through, you might ask about
the severity and the causes of the shortages. We could
consider encouraging private American voluntary
organizations to help, but much would depend on whether
the Soviets are actively and intentionally blocking
medical supplies to Lithuania. The Soviets have denied
that they are doing so.
III. PARTICIPANTS
A list of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
Open photo, writing pool
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
V.
SEQUENCE
Photo opportunity and meeting in the Oval Office
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
Tab C
Biography
Tab D
Secretary Baker's Memorandum
SECRET
SECRET
TAB A
SECRET
SECRET
CARD 1 OF 6
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE
--
IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO WELCOME YOU TO THE
WHITE HOUSE. YOUR PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION HAS INSPIRED US ALL.
THIS IS A HOPEFUL, BUT ALSO A VERY DIFFICULT,
MOMENT IN LITHUANIA'S HISTORY. I WANT TO
EXPLAIN WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DOING
WITH REGARD TO LITHUANIA, AND WHY.
:
WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF THE LITHUANIAN
PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEIR
DESIRE TO REESTABLISH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
CARD 2 OF 6
:
WE BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO HELP LITHUANIA IN
THIS COMPLEX AND DELICATE SITUATION IS THROUGH
A CAREFUL POLICY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC
SUPPORT.
:
WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID STEPS THAT WOULD
INADVERTENTLY MAKE LITHUANIA'S TASK MORE
DIFFICULT BY INFLAMING THE SITUATION OR MAKING
IT HARDER TO FIND A SOLUTION THROUGH PEACEFUL
MEANS.
--
OUR APPROACH HAS BEEN TO:
O
REITERATE OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY OF
REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FORCIBLE
INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO
THE USSR.
O
URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO
AN IMMEDIATE, GOOD-FAITH DIALOGUE WITH
THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT. SUCH A
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000.1197.F CAP
3/6/08
SECRET
SECRET
CARD
3
OF
6
DIALOGUE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IN AN
ATMOSPHERE FREE FROM PRESSURE OR
INTIMIDATION.
O
CONVEY TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THE HIGH
COSTS QF REPRESSION AGAINST THE
LITHUANIANS.
O
ASK OUR ALLIES TO DO WHAT THEY
CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP TO ENTER INTO A
DIALOGUE.
WE DEEPLY REGRET THE SOVIET DECISION TO IMPOSE
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
WE HAVE CONVEYED OUR POSITION VERY CLEARLY TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE.
WE ARE CONSIDERING STEPS THE U.S. MAY
TAKE IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
CARD 4 OF 6
MOSCOW IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO
USE ITS ECONOMIC POWER TO STRANGLE
LITHUANIA.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE
PRESERVE THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE AND THE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN
EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR LITHUANIA AS WELL. A
RETURN TO A CONFRONTATIONAL SITUATION IN EAST-
WEST RELATIONS WOULD ONLY MAKE YOUR TASK
HARDER. IT COULD SET BACK THE ASPIRATIONS OF
THE BALTIC PEOPLES FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.
I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING THE
SUGGESTION PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND AND CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT A
POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE WOULD BE
FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SUSPEND
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
DEURET
CARD 5 OF 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF YOUR NEW LAWS.
OBVIOUSLY, THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO SEE THE
OPENING OF A DIALOGUE, AND WE WOULD WELCOME
ANY STEPS THAT YOU MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE TO
GET DISCUSSIONS STARTED.
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE IDEA OF MODIFYING OR
SUSPENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF YOUR NEW
LAWS? DO YOU BELIEVE MOSCOW WOULD RESPOND TO
SUCH STEPS ON YOUR PART BY LIFTING SANCTIONS
AND OPENING A DIALOGUE?
I HAVE READ WITH GREAT CONCERN THE
REPORTS THAT LITHUANIA IS RUNNING SHORT
OF CRITICAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES. HOW
SERIOUS IS THE SITUATION? WHAT GOODS ARE
IN SHORT SUPPLY? WHAT HAS BROUGHT ABOUT
THE PROBLEM?
WE WILL LOOK INTO THE SITUATION TO SEE
SECRET
SECRET
RECRET
CARD 6 OF
6
WHETHER THERE ARE WAYS THAT PRIVATE
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT HELP.
(STRENGTHENED TRADE RELATIONS -- IF
RAISED) WE BELIEVE THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIRECT TRADE TIES AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY
COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA'S
REPRESENTATIVES.
(ECONOMIC AID -- IF RAISED) WE BELIEVE
IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL -- AND IS
PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE -- FOR THE UNITED
STATES TO ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY OIL THROUGH
WATERS THAT ARE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.
SECRET
LUNET
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE
-- It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the White House.
Your peaceful democratic revolution has inspired us all.
--
This is a hopeful, but also a very difficult, moment in
Lithuania's history. I want to explain what the United
States has been doing with regard to Lithuania, and why.
-- We support the right of the Lithuanian people to self-
determination and their desire to reestablish the
sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania.
--
We believe the best way to help Lithuania in this complex
and delicate situation is through a careful policy of quiet
diplomacy and public support.
--
We have tried to avoid steps that would inadvertently make
Lithuania's task more difficult by inflaming the situation
or making it harder to find a solution through peaceful
means.
--
Our approach has been to:
O
Reiterate our longstanding policy of refusing to
recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic
States into the USSR.
O
Urge the Soviet Government to enter into an immediate,
good-faith dialogue with the Lithuanian Government.
Such a dialogue can only take place in an atmosphere
free from pressure or intimidation.
O
Convey to the Soviet leadership the high costs of
repression against the Lithuanians.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
AS AMENDED
Declassify on: OADR
2000.1197.F
CAP
SECRF™
3/6/08
SECRET
SECRET
2
O
Ask our Allies to do what they can to
encourage the Soviet leadership to enter into
a dialogue.
--
We deeply regret the Soviet decision to impose economic
sanctions.
--
We have conveyed our position very clearly to President
Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
--
We are considering steps the U.S. may take in our
economic relationship with Moscow if the Soviet Union
continues to use its economic power to strangle
Lithuania.
--
At the same time, it is important that we preserve the
positive atmosphere and the substantial progress that has
been made in East-West relations.
-- This is important for Lithuania as well. A return to a
confrontational situation in East-West relations would only
make your task harder. It could set back the aspirations of
the Baltic peoples for many years to come.
--
I understand that you are considering the suggestion put
forward by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl that a
possible way out of the impasse would be for your Government
to suspend implementation of some of your new laws.
--
Obviously, the United States wants to see the opening of a
dialogue, and we would welcome any steps that you might be
willing to take to get discussions started.
:
What is your view of the idea of modifying or suspending
implementation of some of your new laws? Do you believe
SECRET
SECRET
SECREI
SECRET
3
Moscow would respond to such steps on your part by lifting
sanctions and opening a dialogue?
--
I have read with great concern the reports that
Lithuania is running short of critical medical
supplies. How serious is the situation? What goods
are in short supply? What has brought about the
problem?
--
We will look into the situation to see whether there
are ways that private voluntary organizations might
help.
--
(STRENGTHENED TRADE RELATIONS -- IF RAISED) We believe
that establishment of direct trade ties at this time
would only complicate efforts to open a dialogue
between the Soviet Union and Lithuania's
representatives.
--
(ECONOMIC AID -- IF RAISED) We believe it would not be
helpful -- and is probably not feasible -- for the
United States to attempt to supply oil through waters
that are under Soviet control.
SECRET
SECRET
TAB B
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Arunas Pemkus, Interpreter
Lithuania
Kazimiera Prunskiene, Prime Minister
Joseph Kazickas, Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister
V. Bieliuskas, President, Lithuanian World Community
Viktor Nakas, Interpreter
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08d. Report
Biography Re: Kazimiera Danute Prunskiene
4/19/90
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
[redacted] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
USSR Collapse Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
By SS
on 7/7/22
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
USSR Collapse: U.S. Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]
Date Closed:
2/24/2009
OA/ID Number:
91118-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2009-0945-MR (507.03)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
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Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1453-MR
SECRET
dupucate.036
(b)(3)
Es 5/28/15
Kazimiera Danute PRUNSKIENE
USSR
(Phonetic: PROONskeen)
Chairman, Council of Ministers,
Lithuanian SSR (since March 1990);
Member, Sajudis Seimas Council
(since October 1988)
Addressed as: Madam Prime Minister
Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene is a
leader in her republic's efforts to secede from the
USSR. Her focus is creating a market economy
that would be outside Moscow's control.
1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)
©
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
Prunskiene appears to be taking a pragmatic approach to planning.
She has drafted a bill that would create an
independent currency, has set up an independent bank, and has agreed to form a Baltic
Common Market with Latvia and Estonia. Recently asked how an independent Lithuania
would raise revenues, Prunskiene responded, "We are not going to raise taxes." (b)(3)
Prunskiene is equally pragmatic about other aspects of the secession drive. She insists
that the Soviet Government meet Lithuania at the negotiating table as a partner state rather
than as a subordinate republic as dictated by President Mikhail Gorbachev; nonetheless, she
has often expressed admiration for the Soviet leader. She has repeatedly called for Western
recognition of Lithuanian independence as a bulwark against aggression by Moscow
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
Prunskiene has defended the right of Lithuanians to refuse to serve in
the Soviet armed forces but recently urged deserters to return to their units to take
advantage of Moscow's amnesty offer.
(b)(3)
A popular figure in Lithuania, Prunskiene has been called the "Iron Lady" and
Lithuania's Margaret Thatcher- 1.4(c); 1.4(d)
An
ethnic Lithuanian, she was born in 1943. She holds a doctorate degree in economics from
Vilnius University, where she has served as professor of industrial economics. She became
rector of the Lithuanian Institute of Higher Qualifications in 1986. Prunskiene was elected to
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989. In May 1989 she was elected to the
USSR Supreme Soviet and later became a member of its Economic Reform Committee; she
has declined to participate in the activities of the Supreme Soviet since Lithuania's March
1990 declaration of independence. In July 1989 she was appointed a deputy chairman of the
Lithuanian Council of Ministers, empowered to "ensure the economic independence of the
republic and widen foreign economic links." A former member of the Soviet Communist Party,
Prunskiene served on the ruling council of Sajudis, the popular front movement in Lithuania.
Divorced, she has at least one grandchild. Prunskiene may prefer to be addressed as Prunskis,
her name before her marriage. Her name is occasionally transliterated as Prunskene.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
LDA M 90-12681
SECRET
19 April 1990
TAB D
ATTACHMENT TO BE PROVIDED
SECRET
RECRET
3456
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 2, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS
RZH
SUBJECT:
The President's Meeting with Lithuanian Prime
Minister Prunskiene, May 3, 1990
At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with
Prime Minister Prunskiene. Although the meeting will be a
delicate one to handle, we do not anticipate any surprises from
Prunskiene, who was very careful in her visits to Scandinavia and
Canada. The Mitterrand/Kohl message is a potentially problematic
issue, and we recommend that the President avoid any appearance
of advising the Lithuanians to retreat in the face of Soviet
pressure. We also recommend that the President not mention his
letter to Gorbachev, which of course has not been made public or
announced to our allies.
The talking points we have provided track with those State has
prepared for Eagleburger, except that State's go farther in
pursuing the Mitterrand/Kohl proposal.
CR
NB
Condi Rice and Nick Burns concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
Tab C
Biography
Tab D
Secretary Baker's Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000.1197.MR CAP
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
3/8/08