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Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
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Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
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Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
OA/ID Number:
91128
Folder ID Number:
91128-007
Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
4
7
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
11/6/90
(b)(1)
[Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)
02. Cable
To White House, Re: Message for Brent Scowcroft from
11/13/90
(b)(1)
S
Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS
REDACTED] (2 pp.)
03a. Cable
From White House , Re: Message from President to President
11/12/90
(b)(1)
S
Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)
03b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock
11/90
(b)(1)
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
03c. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
04a. Memo
Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft
11/7/90
(b)(1)
8
Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (1
pp.)
04b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (2
pp.)
04c. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
11/6/90
(b)(1)
[Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1081
OA/ID Number:
91128-007
Date Closed:
4/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
05a. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)
11/11/90
(b)(1)
05b. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)
11/11/90
(b)(1)
06. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush (5 pp.)
11/6/90
(b)(1)
07. Message
Re: Gulf: Message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev (2
n.d.
(b)(1)
pp.)
08a. Cable
Moscow to White House, Re: Letter from President Bush to
10/20/90
(b)(1)
S
Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)
08b. Cable
White House to Moscow
10/20/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
08c. Cable
White House to Moscow
10/20/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
09a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock
10/19/90
(b)(1)
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
09b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
09c. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
10a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock
10/19/90
(b)(1)
8
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1081
OA/ID Number:
91128-007
Date Closed:
4/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
10b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
11. Memo
Re: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign
8/7/90
(b)(1)
Minister Shevardnadze (2 pp.)
12a. Memo
J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft
10/12/90
(b)(1)
Re: Correspondence from President Gorbachev (1 pp.)
12b. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
10/90
(b)(1)
[English] (2 pp.)
12c. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
10/90
(b)(1)
[Russian] (2 pp.)
13. Letter
E.A. Shevardnadze to James A. Baker, III
n.d.
(b) (1)
[Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)
14a. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
9/17/90
(b)(1)
14b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
9/15/90
(b)(1)
Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (2 pp.)
14c. Memo
Arnold Kanter/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
9/14/90
(b)(1)
8
Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (3 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap 1081
OA/ID Number:
91128-007
Date Closed:
4/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
HAND. DELIVERED
noo 6. 1990 - 4:00 pm
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your
frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter
alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined
in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this
context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality
with which you related your impressions from your discussions
with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly
that it was precisely this kind of reaction consistent with
the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the
state level that I was counting on.
This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to
fully understand one's partner that has developed between
ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing
with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually,
the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain
and France.
It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this
question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time
for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems
inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika?
Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps
no other leader in the world, understand the special
responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the
world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently
balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really
postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly
on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.
His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
2.
First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting
the official results - you no doubt know them.
Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders
expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation.
But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found
the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted
dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break
into the open field of free democratic development and take
a worthy place in the international community, was very
important.
All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal
couple who played such an important role in the critical period
of Spain's transition to democracy.
As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated
by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of
the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon
- our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured
prospect.
Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see
each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something
new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this
is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries
and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique
treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in
contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability
of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki
multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the
other, which is the development of the bilateral relations.
And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace
back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world
politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to
consider each other as enemies.
A major place in the talks in both capitals was given
to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential
to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with
the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to
help.
3.
In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time,
we were able to touch upon all the main European and world
problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted
to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the
Persian Gulf crisis.
The mission of my special representative, E.M. Primakov,
continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during
the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of
even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked
you and other Security Council members to postpone a little
bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.
Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad,
as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the
positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have
maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly.
Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region.
I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression
must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a
reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand
I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in
our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently
and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by
the UN Security Council".
At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow,
we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's
regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between
us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single
crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had
complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to
a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would
have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful
settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all
areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor.
I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki,
that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the
4.
US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective
of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".
Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions
about E.M. Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal
view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein
appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has
gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments
and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq
has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull
out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become
inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time,
but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results.
In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with
Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken
off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After
all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives
this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new
world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward",
albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind
that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path
is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context
in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible",
"unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at
the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is
"undesirable". )
In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the
Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the
"let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort
of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and
you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to
the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and
offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement
in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam
Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without
any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem
mantle.
5.
There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic
efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our
citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound
to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among
them. You understand that given our present situation at home,
this is of particular importance. After the meetings with
my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach
to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi
leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet
specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect
to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that
some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The
rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed
by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure
should be intensified in this area as well.
In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein
in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe,
put off the more general problem of the future of that region,
including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building
measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian
problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.
I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly
link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian)
with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression.
But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world
that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within
their field of vision and shall promptly address it after
Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.
Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share
with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will
have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.
Sincerely,
M. .GORBACHEV
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02. Cable
To White House, Re: Message for Brent Scowcroft from
11/13/90
(b)(1)
S
Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA
RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By MM
on 5/27/2016
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Date Closed:
4/13/2009
OA/ID Number:
91128-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0847-MR(501)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 501 JBRARY
2011-0847-MR
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY~IN SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
DTG 131339Z NOV 90
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0845-MR
TO WHITE HOUSE
2/25/2014 MM
SECRET
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.
DEAR BRENT:
1 DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANATOL' IY CHERNYAEV, WHO PROMISED TO GET
IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY.
I REVIEWED FOR CHERNYAEV THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE RESOLUTION. IN
RESPONSE, CHERNYAEV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO
THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING, BUT NOTED THAT:
- - GORBACHEV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY
BAKER, AND WITH THE CONVERSATIONS THAT BAKER HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE
ON THE PERSIAN GULF;
- - GORBACHEV REALIZES HOW IMPORTANT OUR COOPERATION IS IN THIS AREA,
AND AGREES THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.
CHERNAYEV TOOK NOTE OF THE P.S., AND SAID GORBACHEV WILL BE HAPPY TO
SEE IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOONER WE HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE KIND
OF HELP THAT IS NEEDED, THE BETTER WE CAN CONSIDER HOW TO ADDRESS IT.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY REQUEST COULD BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED: (1) THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO DELIVER FOOD TO WHERE IT IS
NEEDED AND (2) A MECHANISM TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO THE BLACK MARKET.
CHERNAYEV AGREED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO
DO. HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SATISFACTOR
SECRET
I
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
ILY
RESOLVED THE AID WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD. MOREOVER,
DISCREDIT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON
THE PROBLEM. AND WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DECL: OADR.
s E C R E
# 0963
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03a. Cable
From White House, Re: Message from President to President
11/12/90
(b)(1)
S
Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By MM
on 2/13/2015
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]
Date Closed:
4/13/2009
OA/ID Number:
91128-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0844-MR(506)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 11/25/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Phg # 8851
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 122212Z NOV 90
<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
(b)(1)
PRESIDENTIAL
502
<TEXT>ZEM
(b)(1)
SECRET VIA
LIERARY
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
2011-0847-MR
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE,
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM BRENT
SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.
-
-
JACK:
-
PLEASE DELIVER TO CHERNYAYEV THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED AT THE
EARLIEST CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY.
-
WARM REGARDS, BRENT.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
-
PER E.O. 13526
-
2011-0844-MR
BEGIN TEXT:
11/25/2013 MM
-
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
-
JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME IN DEPTH ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. ONCE AGAIN I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY HOW MUCH
OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CHANGED FOR THE GOOD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
UNTHINKABLE EVEN IN THE VERY RECENT PAST TO ENVISION THE KIND OF
DISCUSSIONS YOU AND YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE JUST HAD WITH AN
AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE.
-
WE NOW CAN TRULY HAVE HONEST DIALOGUE WHERE EACH OF US LEARNS
FROM THE OTHER -- WHERE EACH OF US GENUINELY SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND
THE OTHER'S VIEWPOINT AND CONCERNS -- AND RESPOND TO THE OTHER'S
SUGGESTIONS AND NEEDS. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE. ARE
DEVELOPING A REAL PARTNERSHIP, AND THAT PARTNERSHIP IS SERVING
NOT ONLY OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF THE
ENTIRE WORLD.
-
NOWHERE HAS THAT PARTNERSHIP BEEN DEMONSTRATED MORE CLEARLY THAN
IN THE GULF. THAT PARTNERSHIP HAS BOTH LED AND CEMENTED THE
INTERNATIONAL COALITION CONFRONTING SADDAM HUSSEIN. I CAN'T TELL
YOU HOW GRATIFYING IT WAS FOR ME TO RECEIVE YOUR RECENT LETTER
AND HAVE YOU EMPHASIZE YOUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING ABSOLUTE
UNITY BETWEEN US ON THE GULF. I KNOW YOU MADE THAT POINT WITH
GREAT CONVICTION TO JIM, AND MADE IT CLEAR AS WELL THAT THE
FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP SHAPES YOUR APPROACH
ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.
-
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THAT. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I SHARE
YOUR VIEWS. IN THAT SPIRIT, I HAVE THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT YOUR
SUGGESTION FOR TWO UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- THE FIRST TO ISSUE A
WARNING THAT IF SADDAM FAILS TO WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN TIME THERE
WOULD BE A SECOND RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF ALL
NECESSARY MEANS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.
-
I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WANT TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, BUT FEEL THE
NEED TO HIGHLIGHT THAT WE HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL OPTIONS BEFORE
LAYING DOWN WHAT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS AN VLTIMATUM.
-
I AGREE THAT WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE EXPLORED FULLY OUR
NON-MILITARY OPTIONS AND THAT WE HAVE GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR
CHANCE TO WORK. I THINK THE TYPE OF RESOLUTION WE ARE
CONSIDERING -- ONE WHICH WOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH BUT ONLY
BECOME OPERATIVE AT SOME POINT AROUND THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR --
DOES JUST THAT. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN
SANCTIONS FIVE TO SIX MONTHS TO WORK. WE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO
POINT TO TEN PREVIOUS UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- ALL REJECTED. WE ONLY
WEAKEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A MECHANISM FOR PREEMPTING,
MANAGING AND SETTLING CONFLICTS IF RESOLUTIONS SUCH AS THESE CAN
BE REJECTED. WE RISK MUCH WITH ANOTHER RESOLUTION THAT, IN
EFFECT, ASSUMES A FAILURE WITHOUT GUARANTEEING A SPECIFIC
CONCRETE ACTION.
-
IN MY OPINION WE SHOULD FOCUS ON A RESOLUTION THAT OFFERS SOME
PROSPECT OF MOVING SADDAM. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY
WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR ENDS PEACEFULLY IS, IRONICALLY, TO CONVINCE
SADDAM THAT MILITARY ACTION IS IMMINENT. A RESOLUTION OF THE
SORT WE ARE SUGGESTING, WITH A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME FOR WHEN IT
BECOMES OPERATIVE, WOULD HAVE THIS EFFECT. IT WOULD ALSO SIGNAL
SADDAM THAT WE ARE UNIFIED, DETERMINED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE
NEEDED TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION, AND THAT WE WILL NOT BE
DIVIDED. IN EFFECT, IT DOES THE SAME THING AS YOUR PROPOSED TWO
RESOLUTIONS, BUT COMBINING THEM INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION MAKES
THE EFFECT MUCH MORE COMPELLING.
-
I FEAR THAT A PROPOSAL FOR TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD
CONSTITUTE A RETREAT FROM OUR INITIAL RESOLUTION (UNSC 660)
CALLING FOR (BEGIN UNDERLINE) IMMEDIATE (END UNDERLINE)
WITHDRAWAL. WE CAN'T STEP BACK FROM THAT. IN ADDITION, WHILE
WE CAN TALK OF TWO RESOLUTIONS, WE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF ONLY
GETTING THE FIRST AND NOT THE SECOND, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE BY
THE TIME WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GO FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION
WE WILL NO LONGER BE IN THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC. WE COULD BE TIED
IN PROCEDURAL KNOTS BY OUR SUCCESSORS IN THE CHAIR -- YEMEN, ZAIRE,
AND ZIMBABWE.
-
ASIDE FROM THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM, WE WOULD ALSO RUN THE RISK
THAT SADDAM MIGHT OFFER A REAL, BUT UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL
SOLUTION OR ALTERNATIVELY PULL BACK PARTIALLY AS A WAY OF
UNDERCUTTING THE CONSENSUS FOR USING FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS,
SADDAM MIGHT WELL BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE ENVIRONMENT TO ENSURE
WE COULDN'T GET A SECOND RESOLUTION. AND THE IMAGERY OF A LONG
DRAWN OUT PUBLIC EFFORT TRYING TO GET A SECOND RESOLUTION WILL
MISLEAD SADDAM INTO THINKING THE COALITION AGAINST HIM COULD
BREAK.
-
I HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO WRITE YOU IN THIS DETAIL BECAUSE YOUR
IDEA WAS PRESENTED IN A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND DESERVED A
#0014
ZEM
00 U CD E THE [n]
(b)(1)
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
SERIOUS, CONSIDERED RESPONSE. I BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO COMBINE
BOTH THOUGHTS INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION TO BE MOVED WHILE WE ARE
CHAIRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
-
MIKHAIL, I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE
PEACEFULLY, IF WE STAY TOGETHER AND IF WE LEAD THE WAY ONCE AGAIN
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP MAKES THAT
POSSIBLE, AND OFFERS US GREAT HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.
-
I KNOW YOU KNOW HOW VERY IMPORTANT I THINK THIS MATTER IS AND HOW
VERY MUCH I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN WITH US, WITH FRANCE AND WITH THE
UNITED KINGDOM IN SUPPORTING THIS APPROACH IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER. AS JIM BAKER TOLD YOU IN MOSCOW AFTER HIS
MEETING WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, WE ARE ALSO HOPEFUL
THE CHINESE WILL GO ALONG -- A POSSIBILITY THAT WILL BE EVEN MORE
LIKELY, AS OUR EXPERIENCE ON UNSC RESOLUTION 665 SUGGESTS, IF YOU
JOIN WITH US.
-
LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU
SOON AND SEEING YOU IN PARIS.
-
I
SINCERELY,
-
-
GEORGE BUSH
I
I
PS: JIM BAKER HAS TOLD ME THAT YOU MAY HAVE SOME EMERGENCY FOOD
NEEDS THIS WINTER. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WISH TO BE AS
HELPFUL AS I CAN BE IN THIS REGARD.
-
-
I
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
END TEXT
-
DECL: OADR
#0015
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0014 <TOR> 901112171511 MSG000279738911
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0015 <TOR> 901112171636 MSG000279738996
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
November
, 1990
TO:
AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE
DELIVER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.
Jack:
Please deliver to Chernyayev the following message from President
Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered at the
earliest convenient opportunity.
Warm regards, Brent.
BEGIN TEXT:
(copy attached)
END TEXT.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0844-MR
ES 5/23/13
Dear Mr. President:
Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and
Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much
our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been
unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of
discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an
American Secretary of State.
We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns
from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand
the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's
suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are
developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving
not only our respective interests, but the interests of the
entire world.
Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than
in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the
international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell
you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter
and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute
unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with
great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the
fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach
on this and other issues.
2
I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share
your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your
suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a
warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there
would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all
necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.
I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the
need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before
laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.
I agree that we must demonstrate that we have explored fully our
non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair
chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are
considering -- one which would be passed this month but only
become operative at some point around the beginning of the year --
does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given
sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to
point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only
weaken the Security Council as a mechanism for preempting,
managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can
be rejected. We risk much with another resolution that, in
effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific
concrete action.
3
In my opinion we should focus on a resolution that offers some
prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only
way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince
Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the
sort we are suggesting, with a specific timeframe for when it
becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal
Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are
needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be
divided. In effect, it does the same thing as your proposed two
resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes
the effect much more compelling.
I fear that a proposal for two Security Council resolutions would
constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660)
calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that.
In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run
the risk of only getting the first and not the second,
particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go
for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at
the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors
in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk
that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial
solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of
undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words,
4
Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure
we couldn't get a second resolution. And the imagery of a long
drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will
mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could
break.
I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your
idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a
serious, considered response. I believe it is crucial to combine
both thoughts into a single resolution to be moved while we are
chairing the Security Council.
Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective
peacefully, if we stay together and if we lead the way once again
in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that
possible, and offers us great hope for the future.
I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how
very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the
United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security
Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his
meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful
the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more
likely, as our experience on UNSC Resolution 665 suggests, if you
join with us.
5
Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you
soon and seeing you in Paris.
Sincerely,
George Bush
PS: Jim Baker has told me that you may have some emergency food
needs this winter. I want you to know that I wish to be as
helpful as I can be in this regard.
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
8851
November 7, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
FROM:
NICHOLAS BURNS NB
SUBJECT:
Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the
President
Attached, per your request, is a summary of Gorbachev's
November 6, 1990, letter to the President. We have also
highlighted the most important passages on a copy of the letter.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Summary of Gorbachev letter
Tab A
Gorbachev letter to the President
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
2011-0845-MR
ES 5/23/13
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
8851
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0847-MR
INFORMATION
SCS 5/31/12
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the
President
Gorbachev's November 6 letter responds to your October 20 letter
on the Primakov trip to the U.S. and the situation in the Gulf.
Gorbachev begins by describing his recent visits to Spain and
France. He was impressed in Spain by that country's transition
from dictatorship to democracy, implying that it held lessons for
the USSR. In France, he had a productive meeting with
Mitterrand, highlighted by signing of a treaty on concord and
cooperation. Gorbachev says he was particularly satisfied by his
talks on economic relations with both countries.
Gorbachev's thinking on the Gulf crisis dominates the remainder
of the letter. He reviews the basis for Primakov's recent trip
by stating the Soviets "wanted to take advantage of even the
smallest chance in Baghdad.' He specifies that he remains
committed to the agreements reached at Helsinki, and that the
USSR will continue to hold firmly to the position that Iraq's
aggression must be reversed, and that we should abide by the UNSC
decisions. Gorbachev claims that his statement on the
"unacceptability" of military force was mistranslated. The
Russian word, he says, is "undesirable."
Reviewing the Primakov trip, Gorbachev states that Saddam appears
to be more aware of the gravity of his situation, although it is
too early to tell if he will act accordingly. He says that
Primakov told Saddam that if he didn't leave Kuwait, a military
strike might be inevitable. Gorbachev suggests the utility of
involving the Arab countries more closely to make it easier for
Saddam to agree to a potential solution.
Gorbachev closes with two suggestions. The first is that we
maintain pressure on Iraq to free the hostages. The second is
for the U.S. and USSR to let the Arab world know that while we
could not directly link the Gulf crisis to the wider Arab-Israeli
conflict, we could address those issues after the conflict has
been resolved.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
In sum, it appears that the purpose of this letter is to reassure
you of Gorbachev's commitment to full compliance with the UN
resolutions. He clearly wishes to dispel your discomfort with
his recent statements concerning the "unacceptability" of the
military option and the need for an Arab solution.
Attachment
Tab A
Gorbachev letter
HAND. DELIVERED
nov 6, 1990 - 4:00 pox
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your
frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter
alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined
in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this
context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality
with which you related your impressions from your discussions
with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly
that it was precisely this kind of reaction consistent with
the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the
state level - that I was counting on.
This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to
fully understand one's partner that has developed between
ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing
with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually,
the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain
and France.
It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this
question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time
for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems
inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika?
Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps
no other leader in the world, understand the special
responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the
world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently
balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really
postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly
on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.
His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
2.
First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting
the official results - you no doubt know them.
Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders
expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation.
But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found
the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted
dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break
into the open field of free democratic development and take
a worthy place in the international community, was very
important.
All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal
couple who played such an important role in the critical period
of Spain's transition to democracy.
As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated
by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of
the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon
- our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured
prospect.
Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see
each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something
new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this
is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries
and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique
treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in
contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability
of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki
multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the
other, which is the development of the bilateral relations.
And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace
back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world
politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to
consider each other as enemies.
A major place in the talks in both capitals was given
to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential
to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with
the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to
help.
3.
In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time,
we were able to touch upon all the main European and world
problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted
to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the
Persian Gulf crisis.
The mission of my special representative, E.M. Primakov,
continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during
the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of
even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked
you and other Security Council members to postpone a little
bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.
Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad,
as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the
positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have
maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly.
Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region.
I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression
must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a
reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand
I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in
our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently
and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by
the UN Security Council".
At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow,
we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's
regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between
us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single
crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had
complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to
a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would
have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful
settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all
areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor.
I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki,
that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the
4.
US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective
of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".
Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions
about E.M. Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal
view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein
appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has
gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments
and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq
has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull
out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become
inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time,
but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results.
In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with
Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken
off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After
all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives
this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new
world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward",
albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind
that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path
is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context
in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible",
"unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at
the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is
"undesirable". )
In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the
Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the
"let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort
of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and
you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to
the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and
offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement
in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam
Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without
any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem
mantle.
5.
There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic
efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our
citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound
to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among
them. You understand that given our present situation at home,
this is of particular importance. After the meetings with
my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach
to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi
leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet
specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect
to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that
some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The
rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed
by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure
should be intensified in this area as well.
In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein
in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe,
put off the more general problem of the future of that region,
including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building
measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian
problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.
I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly
link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian)
with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression.
But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world
that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within
their field of vision and shall promptly address it after
Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.
Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share
with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will
have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.
Sincerely,
M. . GORBACHEV
CHGS
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you
and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how
much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have
been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the
kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had
with an American Secretary of State.
We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us
learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to
understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to
the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt
that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership
is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests
of the entire world.
Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly
than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented
the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't
tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent
letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining
absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that
point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well
that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your
approach on this and other issues.
- 2 -
I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I
share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully
about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to
issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain
time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of
all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.
I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel
the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before
laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.
explored fully
I agree that we must demonstrate that we have exhausted our
non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair
chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are
considering -- one which would be passed this month but only
at some point around
become operative after the beginning of the year -- does just
that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five
to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten
previous UNSC resolutions : -- all rejected. We only weaken the
Security council
UNSC as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling
conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We risk
with
don't need another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure
without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.
- 3 -
Inmy opinion we shouldfornson
Rather, we need a resolution that offers some prospect of
moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to
achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam
that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we
specific
are suggesting, with a timeframe for when it becomes operative,
would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are
unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse
his aggression, and that we will not be divided. In effect, it
resolutions, but cornbering them FENTH single
does the same thing as your proposed two
resolution I know that's mahes important The to you'as effect mich well as/me. I know word also compelling
that we both share the conviction that we must not suggest any
weakening of our position to Saddam. To the contrary, we want
Breag
to signal unmistakeably that our position is becoming stronger
and tougher.
Security Council
I fear that a proposal for two UNSC resolutions will send
world
the opposite message. It will constitute a retreat from our
initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal.
We can't step back from that.
In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would
run the risk of only getting the first and not the second,
particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go
for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at
the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our
successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
- 4 -
And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get
a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the
coalition against him could break.
Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the
risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial
solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of
undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words,
Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to
ensure we couldn't get a second resolution.
Further, if we fail to produce a second resolution after
issuing the warning in the first resolution, we will have ended
any possibility of using the UNSC to resolve the crisis. And if
the UNSC is seen as having failed in this crisis -- the first
test of the post Cold War era -- it will have very little
future. That will frustrate our mutual hopes and aspirations
for a very different international order.
Finally, let me make one last point. I believe the concept
we have for the resolution -- namely, that it is adopted now but
litter my on
isn't operative until after the beginning of the year -- really
should get at your concerns. It permits us to demonstrate that
aged
Saddam Hussein has been given every opportunity to withdraw
peacefully. If, after this additional period of time, he still
- 5 -
won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful
way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully.
And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented
fully.
I have taken the time to write you in this detail because
your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and
I belipure it is crind
deserved a serious, considered response. I don't see any good
To combine both thoughts intoa single resolution
alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker
described to you while we 're in the chair of the Security
Tole moved while we are chairing the Security
Council
Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective
if we
peacefully, but only if we stay together and lead the way once
again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that
possible, and offers us great hope for the future.
I know you know how very important I think this matter is
and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and
with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the
Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow
after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also
hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be
even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665
suggests, if you join with us.
Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing
from you soon and seeing you in Paris.
10:30 11-11-90
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you
and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how
much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have
been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the
kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had
with an American Secretary of State.
We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us
learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to
understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to
the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt
that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership
is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests
of the entire world.
Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly
than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented
the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't
tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent
letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining
absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that
point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well
that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your
approach on this and other issues.
- 2 -
I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I
share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully
about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions - -- the first to
issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain
time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of
all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.
I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel
the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before
laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.
I agree that we must demonstrate that we have exhausted our
non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair
chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are
considering one which would be passed this month but only
become operative around after the beginning of the year -- does just
that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five
to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten
previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the
UNSC as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling
conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We risk
much with
don't need another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure
without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.
- 3 -
Inmy opinion we shouldfornson
Rather, we need a resolution that offers some prospect of
moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to
achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam
that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we
are suggesting, with a timeframe for when it becomes operative,
would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are
unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse
his aggression, and that we will not be divided. In effect, it
resolution but combining them single
does the same thing as your proposed two
resplution mahes The much word
I know that's important to you'as well as/me. I know also compelling
that we both share the conviction that we must not suggest any
weakening of our position to Saddam. To the contrary, we want
to signal unmistakeably that our position is becoming stronger
and tougher.
I fear that a proposal for two UNSC resolutions will send
the opposite message. It will constitute a retreat from our
initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal.
We can't step back from that.
In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would
run the risk of only getting the first and not the second,
particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go
for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at
the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our
successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
- 4 -
And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get
a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the
coalition against him could break.
Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the
risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial
solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of
undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words,
Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to
ensure we couldn't get a second resolution.
Further, if we fail to produce a second resolution after
issuing the warning in the first resolution, we will have ended
any possibility of using the UNSC to resolve the crisis. And if
the UNSC is seen as having failed in this crisis -- the first
test of the post Cold War era -- it will have very little
future. That will frustrate our mutual hopes and aspirations
for a very different international order.
Finally, let me make one last point. I believe the concept
we have for the resolution -- namely, that it is adopted now but
this letter. my on Poul
isn't operative until after the beginning of the year -- really
should get at your concerns. It permits us to demonstrate that
Saddam Hussein has been given every opportunity to withdraw
peacefully. If, after this additional period of time, he still
- 5 -
won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful
way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully.
And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented
fully.
I have taken the time to write you in this detail because
your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and
I belifire it is crina
deserved a serious, considered response. I don't see any good
alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker
To combine both troughts intoa single resolution
described Toll moved to you while while we're in we the chair are of chaning the Security the Security
Council
Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective
peacefully, but only if we stay together and lead the way once
again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that
possible, and offers us great hope for the future.
I know you know how very important I think this matter is
and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and
with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the
Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow
after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also
hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be
even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665
suggests, if you join with us.
Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing
from you soon and seeing you in Paris.
5
11/11/90 1
11/6 ⑈
3
BS save Larry Easlebuyu
Flourne-
a copy (directly to him)
Attached is "ocisinal"
Condi Rice has copy
General Acoumost had
cy. No other eys.
we
Document Originally
Attached to
HAND DELIVERED
noo
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your
frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter
alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined
in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this
context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality
with which you related your impressions from your discussions
with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly
that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with
the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the
state level - that I was counting on.
This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to
fully understand one's partner that has developed between
ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing
with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually,
the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain
and France.
It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this
question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time
for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems
inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika?
Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps
no other leader in the world, understand the special
responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the
world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently
balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really
postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly
on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.
His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
2.
First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting
the official results - you no doubt know them.
Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders
expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation.
But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found
the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted
dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break
into the open field of free democratic development and take
a worthy place in the international community, was very
important.
All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal
couple who played such an important role in the critical period
of Spain's transition to democracy.
As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated
by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of
the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon
- our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured
prospect.
Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see
each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something
new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this
is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries
and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique
treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in
contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability
of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki
multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the
other, which is the development of the bilateral relations.
And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace
back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world
politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to
consider each other as enemies.
A major place in the talks in both capitals was given
to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential
to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with
the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to
help.
3.
In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time,
we were able to touch upon all the main European and world
problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted
to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the
Persian Gulf crisis.
The mission of my special representative, E.M. Primakov,
continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during
the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of
even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked
you and other Security Council members to postpone a little
bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.
Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad,
as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the
positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have
maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly.
Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region.
I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression
must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a
reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand
I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in
our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently
and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by
the UN Security Council".
At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow,
we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's
regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between
us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single
crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had
complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to
a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would
have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful
settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all
areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor.
I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki,
that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the
4.
US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective
of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".
Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions
about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal
view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein
appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has
gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments
and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq
has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull
out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become
inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time,
but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results.
In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with
Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken
off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After
all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives
this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new
world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward",
albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind
that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path
is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context
in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible",
"unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at
the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is
"undesirable". )
In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the
Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the
"let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort
of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and
you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to
the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and
offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement
in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam
Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without
any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem
mantle.
5.
There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic
efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our
citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound
to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among
them. You understand that given our present situation at home,
this is of particular importance. After the meetings with
my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach
to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi
leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet
specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect
to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that
some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The
rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed
by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure
should be intensified in this area as well.
In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein
in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe,
put off the more general problem of the future of that region,
including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building
measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian
problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.
I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly
link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian)
with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression.
But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world
that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within
their field of vision and shall promptly address it after
Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.
Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share
with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will
have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.
Sincerely,
M.GORBACHEV
"Eyes Only"
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British Linbassy
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The Embussy has been asked by Mr Powell ( 10
Downing Street) to give to General Scowcroft a copy
of the attached message from the Prime Minister to
Mr Gorbachev.
Edmund Hosker
Embassy DUM officer
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n.d.
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S
Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)
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PAGE 01
20 Oct (1030
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2011-0847-MR
per BS
SIT. FILE PRIVACY~IN SIT SUM
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 201220Z OCT 90
(b)(1)
3)
file
TO WHITE HOUSE
(b)(1)
SECRET
0000
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: CHARGE HULINGS, EMBASSY MOSCOW
TEXT:
I DELIVERED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO GORBACHEV TO
CHERNIAEV AT 12:30 P.M. (LOCAL) OCTOBER 20. CHERNIAEV SAID
GORBACHEV WAS IN THE BUILDING AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE HIM THE
LETTER IMMEDIATELY. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE QUICK
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN REACTION TO THE PRIMAKOV
VISIT, SAYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS KIND OF FREQUENT, PERSONAL
COMMUNICATION WAS ONE OF THE BEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN OUR IMPROVED
RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO SAID SADDAM SHOULD NOT GET ANYTHING OUT
OF HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT.
END TEXT.
DECL OADR.
#0387
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0 8 44-MR
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VIA BACK CHANNEL
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October 19, 1990
D
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
MOSCOW
DELIVER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY
Dear Jack:
Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from
President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered
before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20.
BEGIN TEXT (Copy attached)
END TEXT
Warm regards,
Brent
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0844MR
ES 5/23/13
Dear Mr. President:
I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on
his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how
much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and
the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just
how much the relationship between our two countries has
developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long
acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful.
I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our
discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to
underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our
conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal
detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would
violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki.
Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this
approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would
inevitably present as a "reward."
In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in
doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic
proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who
can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become
the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we
have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That
is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In
addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that
in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era,
we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from
aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the
1930's.
Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of
weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an
approach of this kind would probably convince him that the
coalition against him is beginning to unravel.
I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of
his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke --
result from the real pressure of the whole world being against
him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led
the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international
consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it
also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new
international order where aggression has no place.
Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to
increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to
settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is
no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his
brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance
whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent
men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am
now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter
because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in
Kuwait and because, the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of
Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.
I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why
he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common
front or the messages we send, Mikhail.
Sincerely,
George Bush
(more in
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Dear Mr. President:
I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on
his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how
much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and
the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just
how much the relationship between our two countries has
developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long
acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful.
I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our
discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to
underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our
conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal
detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would
violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki.
Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this
approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would
inevitably present as a "reward."
In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in
doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic
proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who
can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become
the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we
have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That
is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In
addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that
in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era,
we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from
aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the
1930's.
Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of
weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an
approach of this kind would probably convince him that the
coalition against him is beginning to unravel.
I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of
his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke --
result from the real pressure of the whole world being against
him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led
the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international
consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it
also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new
international order where aggression has no place.
Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to
increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to
settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is
no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his
brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance
whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent
men, women and children.
I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why
he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common
front or the messages we send, Mikhail.
brutalizing and
Sincerely,
to nn Primation,
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X
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VIA BACK CHANNEL
SECRET
October 19, 1990
D
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
MOSCOW
DELIVER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY
Dear Jack:
Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from
President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered
before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20.
BEGIN TEXT (Copy attached)
END TEXT
Warm regards,
Brent
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0844-MR
ES 5/23/13
Dear Mr. President:
I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on
his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how
much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and
the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just
how much the relationship between our two countries has
developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long
acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful.
I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our
discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to
underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our
conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal
detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would
violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki.
Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this
approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would
inevitably present as a "reward."
In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in
doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic
proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who
can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become
the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we
have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That
is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In
addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that
in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era,
we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from
aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the
1930's.
Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of
weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an
approach of this kind would probably convince him that the
coalition against him is beginning to unravel.
I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of
his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke --
result from the real pressure of the whole world being against
him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led
the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international
consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it
also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new
international order where aggression has no place.
Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to
increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to
settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is
no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his
brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance
whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent
men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am
now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter
because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in
Kuwait and because the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of
Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.
I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why
he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common
front or the messages we send, Mikhail.
Sincerely,
George Bush
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
October 18
Florence:
I spoke with Susan Porter Rose today
about the attached and told her NSC
approved.
She had, as you suspected, already sent
the cable to Moscow.
She said she had also run into the
President and General Scowcroft and
briefed them.
Case closed. Sculpture will probably
be dedicated by the First Ladies at
the next Summit in the USSR.
B.NB
B.
IMMEDIATE
FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY,
FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. JACK MATLOCK
FROM: SUSAN PORTER ROSE, Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush
SUBJECT:
Make Way for Ducklings" Statue
During the spring Bush-Gorbachev Summit, on Friday, June 1,
1990, Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev made a visit to Boston after
Wellesley College. They made a stop in the Boston Public Garden
and visited the "Make Way for Ducklings Statue" with a group of
elementary school children from the Mather School in the Boston
area (which happens to be the oldest elementary school in the
United States). The Make Way for Ducklings Statue was designed
by Nancy Schon and is based on the famous American children's
book by Robert McCloskey, Make Way for Ducklings. The statue
truly is lovely, and although universal in its appeal, it is
first and foremost designed to be loved and climbed upon by
children.
Following the visit of Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev to the
duckling statue, we received a wonderful letter from Nancy Schon,
the sculptress, offering to replicate the same statue at a park
in Moscow. She proposed this as a gift to the Soviet people and
the Soviet children from the United States. Mrs. Bush very much
liked the idea and raised the question with Mrs. Gorbachev at
their Sunday, September 9, 1990 meeting in Helsinki. Mrs.
Gorbachev said she would look for a park. Mrs. Bush also
apprised Mrs. Matlock of this.
I have had several phone conversations with Nancy Schon, the
sculptress, and she has said that the placement of the statue
will be very important. It will need to be in a location easily
accessible to children; preferably, there would be a pond toward
which the ducklings could be headed; and if possible, it should
be located near some trees. Ideally the statue should be
created, prepared, and installed before a meeting/summit in
Moscow (whenever such a meeting might take place) with the hope
that on such a trip Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by
Soviet shcool children, could visit and perhaps dedicate the
completed statue.
We also believe it may be possible to have the children's
story on which the statue is based, Make Way for Ducklings,
translated into Russian for Mrs. Bush to bring copies with her to
Moscow. In my conversations with Nancy Schon, she has indicated
that she has been in touch with the author, Robert McCloskey, and
that he is very enthusiastic about this possibility.
Mrs. Gorbachev is looking for a park where the statue would
fit and be appropriate. In the event there should be a U.S.-
Soviet summit in Moscow in the next few months, we need to move
along rapidly as it will take time to lay the groundwork and put
the statue in place once a site has been determined. I have been
working closely with the Soviet Embassy here in Washington.
Would you please telephone me upon receipt of this cable.
The phone number is: (202) 456-2957 or (202) 456-1414. I can be
reached at home through the 456-1414 number.
Thank you so much.
bcc: General Scowcroft
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
8/7/90
NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
The attached memos are FYI
for you and the President.
JABIII
APNSA Has Seen
Date:
August 7, 1990
Time:
1329 EDT
SECRET
From:
A. Mann, S/S-O
SR
8/7
To:
S; S/S
Subject: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze
The Secretary wanted to make sure Shevardnadze had received the
message Ambassador Matlock had delivered earlier in the day. He
stressed that the actions described in the message were taken purely
for Saudi Arabia's defensive needs. The Secretary said he was leaving
on Wednesday (8/8) for Ankara at the President's request to consult
with the Government of Turkey. On Friday, the Secretary will be in
Brussels for a NATO meeting. He said he would welcome the opportunity
to meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels to brief him. The
Secretary also raised the possibility of a multinational naval force
to prevent the export of Iraq and Kuwait oil if the UN resolution on
sanctions is not effective. He asked if the Soviets would have an
interest in participating in such an effort.
Shevardnadze asked if a decision on the matters raised in the
message had already been taken. The Secretary said the President had
reached the decision yesterday evening (8/6). Shevardnadze then
wondered what he was being consulted about. He reminded the Secretary
of their airport conversation in which he had asked the Secretary not
to rely on military force. He stressed that the Soviet approach had
not changed. He said that after the second UN resolution on sanctions
Iraq should have been given the opportunity to tell the world its
attitude on the document.
Shevardnadze said it is very difficult to say what the
consequences of the American action will be. The Soviet Union would
consider this action exceptional, extraordinary and temporary and any
military forces should leave as quickly as possible. He added that
the Soviets are prepared to discuss any future plans and ideas, and
suggested the military staff committee of the UN Security Council as a
possible forum. He also noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels
would be prepared to meet with the Secretary in Brussels.
The Secretary replied that only one thing had been decided and
there are still many other multilateral efforts to contain Saddam
Hussein's aggression which have not been decided. He said no
offensive actions were planned - it was strictly to deter; the
decision was taken at the request of the Saudis; the U.S. considered
this an extraordinary matter; and the assistance would remain only as
long as the Saudis wanted it. In keeping with their airport
conversation, the Secretary assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. does
not intend to strike at Iraq, but the U.S. reserves the right to
protect its citizens, and to defend Saudi Arabia and the free flow of
oil.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2011-0843-MR
6/6/13
SECRET
Date: August 7, 1990
Time: 1453 EDT
From: S.D. Mull, S/S-0
SR/8/7
To: S; S/S
Subject: The Secretary's Follow-up Conversation with Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
The Secretary said the President asked him to call Shevardnadze
to underscore that the action the US is about to take in Saudi
Arabia is temporary, extraordinary, and in response to a Saudi
request. It is also only defensive -- the US has no intention
to take any offensive action against Iraq.
He said the President also wants to convey to President
Gorbachev that the US would be pleased if the Soviet Union
would participate with the US as part of a multinational force
in Saudi Arabia. He said the US is willing to explore that
with the Soviet Union bilaterally or multilaterally through the
UN. The Secretary said the Saudis would have to agree to such
an arrangement, but that he expects they would have no problem.
Time is of the essence, said the Secretary. As long as the
current situation exists, there is no impediment to further
Iraqi aggression moving all the way down the Arabian peninsula.
Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for this information and
said he would discuss it with Gorbachev and get back to him.
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
October 15, 1990
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union has been a
courageous force for peaceful change in the world. I want to
offer my congratulations on behalf of the American people for his
selection to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He has brought
historically significant change, both political and economic, to
the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe. East-West relations hold
greater promise for peace and world stability today than at any
time in the last 45 years. The United States continues to work
with the Soviet Union to promote regional and international
peace. Barbara and I send our warmest regards to President and
Mrs. Gorbachev in receiving this international honor.
# # #
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6
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
OCT 12 1990
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Correspondence from President Gorbachev
The attached letter from President Gorbachev to President
Bush was delivered to Secretary Baker by Ambassador Bessmertnykh on
October 12.
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET/NODIS
AS AMENDED
DECL: OADR
1998-0099-F/3
07/28/2003 MM
1
Dear Mr. President,
A few days ago, Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the
Presidential Council, returned from Baghdad, where he had been
as my personal envoy. We discussed such a possibility in
Helsinki. You supported the idea, saying that you do not have
direct access to Hussein. Ye. M. Primakov was the right man to go
also because he has personally known Saddam Hussein for a long
time.
The talks were difficult but candid. Primakov tried to show
the Iraqi leader an extremely objective picture of the
consequences for his own country and for the entire region,
should things come to war.
Naturally, he set forth the Soviet position strictly in
accordance with the obligations which we had assumed by
endorsing the UN Security Council Resolutions, ruling out any
doubts whatsoever regarding that in the mind of his
interlocutor.
As had been expected, .Hussein began by taking a hard
line, trying to justify the occupation and annexation of Kuwait
by considerations of Iraq's national security. Nevertheless,
along with militant rhetoric his remarks also contained
references to a political settlement of the Gulf crisis
involving the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. And, our
envoy feels, the most important thing for S. Hussein now is to
save face.
2
Eduard Shevardnadze has sent Secretary Baker a detailed
account of Ye. M. Primakov's talks with the Iraqis. Let me just
once again reafirm my approach, which you and I discussed in
Helsinki. We should not retreat from the positions agreed upon
at the United Nations, we should toughen sanctions where
appropriate, strictly monitor their implementation, continue by
political and diplomatic means the course of isolating
S. Hussein, particularly in the Arab world, and activate the Arab
factor. At the same time we should not miss any opportunity or
ignore any possible signal from Baghdad in order to look for a
non-military solution to the crisis. The situation is not
hopeless so far as a political solution is concerned.
In this sense, I regard Yevgeny Primakov's mission as
useful. He also had the task of raising in sharp terms the issue
of all "hostages", whatever their nationality. He was able to
make some progress as regards Soviet specialists.
Taking into account our many recent contacts we are
exploring possible options for a solution leading subsequently
to an overall Middle East settlement. If we are able to come up
with anything commensurate with the realities and the risks
involved in this problem we shall of course first consult with
you.
Thank you for the note you sent to me with Vitaliy
Ignatenko.
Sincerely,
M.GORBACHEV
October
, 1990
Уважаемый господин Президент,
Ha днях из Багдада вернулся E.M. Примаков, который находился TaM
B качестве MoeΓo личного представителя, OH член Президентского CoBeTa.
O такой возможности мы C Вами говорили B Хельсинки. Вы поддержали эту
идею, сославшись Ha To, что y Bac прямого выхода Ha Хусейна HeT.
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лично.
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Ho объективно обрисовать иракскому лидеру последствия для eΓo страны, для
BceΓo региона, если дело дойдет до войны.
и, ecTecTBeHHo, позицию CCCP излагал B cTpoΓoM соответствии c
обязательствами, которые мы взяли Ha себя, подписав резолюции CoBeTa
Безопасности ooH, исключая какие бы TO ни было сомнения Ha этот счет
y cBoeΓo собеседника.
KaK и предполагалось, поначалу C. Хусейн держался жестко, пытался
оправдывать 3axBaT и аннексию Кувейта соображениями национальной без-
опасности Ирака. TeM He MeHee, наряду c воинственной риторикой B eΓo
высказываниях появились и слова o политической развязке кризиса B Заливе
C уходом иракских войск из Кувейта. При этом, по наблюдению нашего
представителя, главное для C. Хусейна сейчас - "спасти лицо".
Подробно o содержании бесед E.M. Примакова C иракцами Э.А. Шевард-
надзе информировал Госсекретаря Дж. Бейкера. Хотел бы только еще pa3
подтвердить свой подход, o KoTopoM мы-с Вами говорили B Хельсинки. He
отступать oT согласованных B OOH позиций, ужесточать, где нужно, caHK-
ции, cTpoΓo контролировать их исполнение, политически, пипломатически
продолжать линию Ha изоляцию С.Хусейна, особенно - B арабском мире,
активизировать арабский фактор. И BMecTe C TeM He упускать ни одного
шанса, ни одного возможного сигнала из Багдада, для ToΓo чтобы искать
невоенной развязки кризиса. Ситуация ДЛЯ политического решения He без-
надежна.
2.
B этом смысле считаю миссию Е.М.Примакова полезной. B eΓo задачу
входило также ocTpo поставить вопрос o Bcex "заложниках", любой нацио-
нальности. Определенного сдвига удалось добиться B отношении советских
специалистов.
C учетом многочисленных KoHTaKToB 3a последнее время мы прораба-
тываем возможные варианты развязок c выходом 3aTeM Ha общее урегулиро-
вание Ha Ближнем BocToKe. Если получится что-то адекватное реальностям
и опасности проблемы, мы, разумеется, прежде BceΓo проконсультируемся
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C уважением
М.ГОРБАЧЕВ
октября 1990 года
Unofficial translation
James,
As a follow-up on our telephone conversation of October
7, I wish to inform you in more detail on the substance of the
discussions of Presidential Council member E.M. Primakov with
Iraqi leaders and with the PLO Executive Committee Chairman
Y. Arafat.
As I told you before, E.Primakov was sent to Bagdad as
a special representative of the USSR President in order to
resolve the matter of bringing back to the Soviet Union those
our specialists who thus far have not been able to leave Iraq
because of the virtually open opposition on the part of that
country's authorities. This is causing a lot of problems to
us, since of the five thousand people who remain in Iraq about
two thousand insist that their return to the home country be
arranged as soon as possible. The issue disturbs our country's
public opinion as well.
The discussion of this matter with President Hussein and
other members of the Iraqi leadership proved rather difficult,
because the Iraqi side, using formal pretexts, kept saying that
a departure of such a large number of Soviet specialists would
only be possible if they could be replaced by those from among
local residents, which would, allegedly, take some time. As
a result of an intense argument, we succeeded in reaching
agreement with Saddam Hussein that 1,500 of our people would
leave within one month.
We were also quite emphatic in insisting before the Iraqi
leaders on the inadmissibility of keeping citizens from other,
first of all, Western countries, as a "human shield". It was
emphasized that such actions by Bagdad are being extremely
strongly condemned all over the world, that they discredit Iraqi
leaders in the eyes of the world public opinion and will not
prevent a large-scale military action against Iraq, if things
come to that. From the remarks by Foreign Minister T. Aziz one
2.
could form the impression that on this matter there are
certain differences of opinion in Bagdad.
Another objective of E.M.Primakov's trip to Iraq, no less
important, was to explore, and even to strongly press for, the
possibility of S.Hussein fundamentally changing his position,
above all on the issue of Iraqis' withdrawal from Kuwait.
During his meeting with the Iraqi President, E.M. Primakov,
pursuing an energetic and convincing line of reasoning, strongly
urged him to display a sense of realism, emphasizing that the
Soviet Union and the international community as a whole would
never accept the annexation of Kuwait.
Although to justify his Kuwaiti adventure Hussein advanced
the largely well-known set of arguments, our representative
still had the impression that there emerged some new nuances
in the Iraqi position. .Hussein was no longer saying that the
annexation of Kuwait's was "final and irrevocable", and in the
course of the conversation several times stated his readiness
to look for a political solution to the crisis, and did not
reject, in principle, the possibility of pulling out the Iraqi
troops from Kuwait.
In a one-on-one meeting .Hussein finally conceded that
withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait would be possible - but
not in conditions of the ultimatum: either a withdrawal, or
a military strike on Iraq. In this case, said the Iraqi
President, Bagdad refuses to change anything in its current
position, and a military action against it would entail large-
scale actions by Iraq that would be devastating for many
countries. M.Primakov understood the Iraqi President to
primarily imply a simultaneous destruction of all oil fields
on the Arabian peninsula.
At the same time, .Hussein was quite clear and unambiguous
in saying that a political solution of the Kuwaiti crisis must
be a "package" one, that is, must include not only Iraqi
"concessions", but such "meet-you-half-way" elements that would
3.
enable the Iraqi leader to save face before his own people and
in the Arab world at large. From S.Hussein's remarks one could
conclude that, in specific terms, he was referring to real
progress in achieving the settlement of the Palestinian problem
and giving Iraq secure access to the Persian Gulf.
As the discussions suggested, Hussein fears that even
after getting out of Kuwait Iraq will remain blockaded in some
way, while the Iraqi President himself will never again be an
acceptable figure in Western eyes. This definitely makes the
choice in favor of a political solution more difficult for him.
The subject of terrorism was raised before the Iraqis,
and particularly before Y. Arafat, with utmost frankness. The
Soviet representative stressed that carrying out terrorist
actions against the United States and other countries would
spell disaster for Iraq and the Palestinian cause. The PLO
Executive Committee Chairman showed full understanding of our
arguments and gave relevant assurances.
By and large, from a preliminary analysis of E.M. Primakov's
discussions in Bagdad the impression is that the clear and
unequivocal refusal of the international community to accept
the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, the adoption of energetic
Security Council resolutions to this effect are resulting in
an appreciable, if slow, sobering of Hussein. Our
representative even had the impression that people in the
immediate entourage of the Iraqi President are afraid to report
to him the true situation obtaining around Iraq. Observations
suggest that the economic sanctions imposed by the Security
Council's decisions against Iraq are beginning to have their
effect as well.
Those are our general impressions from E.M. Primakov's
discussions in Bagdad. We intend to discuss the results of his
trip in detail, and if we have some additional considerations
with respect to the future course of action about the situation
in the Persian Gulf, I shall be ready to share them with you.
Sincerely,
E.A. .SHEVARDNADZE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 17, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
When you and I met in Helsinki, we reaffirmed
our goal of completing the CFE and START
treaties this year. I have now received a
report of the just completed Bartholomew-Karpov
meetings in Moscow that were intended to
accelerate progress toward that goal.
I must tell you frankly that the results were
very disappointing. No major issues were
resolved and few differences were narrowed.
Indeed, on some questions, the sides moved
further apart. Put simply, we are not now on a
track that will lead to the completion of either
treaty this year.
As we have discussed, these agreements are keys
to putting the relationship between our two
countries on a new footing and building the new
world order we both seek.
The START agreement will codify and regulate a
more stable US-Soviet strategic nuclear balance
and will provide a solid basis on which to
pursue -- as we also agreed at Washington --
further stabilizing measures. The CFE agreement
will provide the framework for the new security
structure in Europe. Circumstances in Europe
are, of course, changing rapidly, but I am
convinced that the CFE framework can be adapted
to these and other changes in follow-on
negotiations. Conversely, it will be extremely
difficult to manage the military aspects of
those changes without the CFE framework in
place. Convocation of the CSCE Summit and talks
about shorter-range nuclear forces both depend
on completion of CFE.
2
You and I must take a direct role if we are to
ensure that the START and CFE agreements are
completed this year. Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze will be in the United States for
several days within the next two weeks. I am
now persuaded that unless all the remaining
substantive issues are resolved during the
Shevardnadze visit, it will literally be
impossible to complete START or CFE this year.
Accordingly, we must commit ourselves to use
this time intensively and wisely.
Here is what I propose. I will ensure that the
U.S. side will be ready. As I told you in
Helsinki, I will give Secretary Baker the
flexibility he needs to reach mutually
satisfactory solutions and the authority to take
necessary decisions. I ask that you give
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze the same
flexibility and authority so that they can make
best use of this last opportunity to achieve the
goal we set for ourselves.
Sincerely,
GBml
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
21049 9-17-90
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CHRON FILE
90 SEP 17 P4: 08
September 15, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Arms Control Talks in Moscow
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0843-MR
Purpose
8/20/2013 MM
This memorandum recommends that you send the letter at Tab A to
President Gorbachev urging his personal involvement to conclude
START and CFE by the end of the year.
Background
As Jim Baker agreed with Shevardnadze in Irkutsk, Reg Bartholomew
led an interagency team for September 9-13 talks in Moscow to
resolve remaining differences in START and CFE. These talks were
a bust. No progress was made on any of the major issues. If
anything, we lost ground on CFE. Absent dramatic changes in the
way both sides do business and interact, I am convinced we will
not be able to sign either treaty this year.
Despite the fact that we are well into the end game, the Soviets
were not ready to do business during the Moscow meetings. Some
of their hard line may have been tactical, and there are also
indications that the Soviets are having real second thoughts
about CFE as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates around them. But it
was clear both from the low-level composition of the Soviet team
(which was heavily populated by General Staff colonels and
Foreign Ministry notetakers), and from their unwillingness to
engage in a substantive give-and-take, that the top Soviet
leadership was not engaged. This must change if we are going to
wrap up these treaties.
The week of September 23 will be critical to the resolution of
the remaining issues. Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about
ten days, beginning with the U.N. and ending with the CSCE
Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. Jim is scheduled
to meet with him on September 26 and will be seeing him again
during the CSCE conference. If necessary, Jim probably could
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engage Shevardnadze by phone, if not in person, at other times
during the week. You also will be seeing Shevardnadze some time
that week.
We must also find a way to engage Gorbachev personally, if only
because Shevardnadze probably cannot overcome the bureaucratic
inertia and General Staff footdragging by himself. To that end,
the proposed letter at Tab A to Gorbachev tells him that
completion of START and CFE this year is in serious jeopardy and
urges him to become directly involved.
We also need to make final decisions ourselves on the major
remaining START and CFE issues so that Jim has the authority he
needs to close the deal if and when the Soviets get ready to
engage us seriously. I will be asking you to address these
during the coming week.
RECOMMENDATION
That you send the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to President Gorbachev
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 14, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
All
FROM:
CR
ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLEEZZA RICE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SUBJECT:
Arms Control Talks in Moscow
2011-0843-MR
8/20/2013 MM
The four days of talks were a waste of time or worse. We made no
progress on START and literally lost ground on CFE. If the U.S.
side was not prepared to do end-game hard bargaining, the Soviets
were barely ready to meet. Karpov was not well prepared. The
General Staff was represented by colonels. Aside from a last-
minute (if fascinating) appearance by Akhromeyev on CFE, there
were no signs that anyone among the senior Soviet leadership was
engaged or that the Soviet positions being articulated were
serious.
In brief, neither side -- but particularly the Soviets -- behaved
as though there was any intention of signing CFE on November 19
or START by the end of the year. Unless both sides change the
way they do business rapidly and radically, there is no
possibility that we will be able to achieve the goal that the
President and Gorbachev reaffirmed in Helsinki: completion of
both treaties this year. Even then, making the end-of-the-year
target will be a long shot.
We thus have two problems: engaging the top Soviet leadership --
including Gorbachev -- and getting our own house in order.
To address the first, we have drafted a memo to the President
(attached at Tab I) recommending that he send a letter to
Gorbachev (which we believe would have greater impact than a
phone call). To address the second, achieving rapid U.S.
consensus on the major remaining issues, we propose that they be
addressed next week at your level and decided by the President.
In that way, the President could give Baker the authority to
close the deal (if and when the Soviets are ready), while
accepting the responsibility himself for the bottom-line U.S.
positions.
The Talks in Moscow
START. Except for closing on two secondary matters, the Soviets
simply went through the motions on START, confining themselves to
reiterating familiar positions and reciting well known arguments.
They did not respond to a new U.S. proposal on Backfire which,
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while modest on its face, was unmistakably an invitation to deal.
They also did not engage us on heavy ICBMs, not even to repeat
their insistence that the issue was closed for the remainder of
the current START talks. Overall, the Soviets did little more
than propose that issues be deferred to Geneva or offer to return
to them when we meet in Washington next week.
CFE. The problems in CFE are more serious and raise the real
possibility that the Soviets may be re-evaluating their stake in
a CFE treaty. The Soviets introduced two new positions -- one on
zones and one on the "sufficiency rule" -- that dramatically
widen the gap between the sides. They indicated that both
changes were required by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact
and the resulting need for the Soviets to single-handedly balance
the collective military forces of all the NATO allies.
Akhromeyev also said that there was no way the Soviets could
include limits on land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) in CFE.
Drawing an explicit analogy between LBNA in CFE and ALCMs in
START, he said that refusing LBNA limits was a matter of
"national dignity, and that any Soviet government that accepted
such limits would be forced to resign.
If the Soviets are serious about these new positions -- and their
candid assessment of their new strategic situation gives every
indication that they are -- the prospects for wrapping up CFE
soon have become extraordinarily bleak. It might be possible to
work out a compromise on zones, and we might decide in the end to
side-step the LBNA issue by dropping aircraft limits from CFE.
But the Soviet effort to increase their share of equipment
permitted under CFE limits -- a reflection of their go-it-alone
approach to the European military balance -- will rightly be
strongly resisted by the Eastern Europeans as well as by most of
the NATO allies.
Next Steps
If we do not complete the treaties by the end of the year, there
is a real chance that both will slip away as the political
consensus grows that they no longer are worth the trouble. From
one perspective, that would not be a calamity: both treaties
were conceived in (and for) another era and arms control has gone
from being the centerpiece to just one more element in superpower
relationship. But the political costs to the President of what
would undoubtedly be viewed by arms control afficionados --
particularly on the Hill -- could be significant. Our European
allies would also be alarmed, particularly by the failure to
complete CFE, which they (and we) have promoted as a cornerstone
of the new Europe. If we want the benefits of these treaties and
(at least as important) avoid these costs, we may be in a "now or
never" situation.
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Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about ten days beginning
around September 23. He will be preceded by Karpov to resume the
"working group" discussions with Reg Bartholomew. That ten-day
period will be critical in determining whether we get one or both
treaties this year. The proposed letter to Gorbachev is intended
to increase the chances that Shevardnadze comes prepared and
empowered to do business.
Baker will meet with Shevardnadze around September 26. They
agreed in Moscow that arms control will be the major subject.
Baker will be seeing Shevardnadze again in New York at the CSCE
Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. (A Shevardnadze
meeting with the President also is likely during that week, but
that should not become a negotiating session.) A meeting of NATO
foreign ministers and/or a meeting at the 23 immediately prior to
the October 1-2 conference to address CFE also is a distinct
possibility.
We need to use the coming week to ensure that we too are ready.
Because the remaining START issues are largely political, the
bureaucracy cannot solve them and should stop trying. The new
Soviet positions in CFE post fundamental questions about that
negotiation that likewise should be addressed at your level.
Accordingly, you should be prepared to have one or perhaps two
meetings with your counterparts on the major remaining issues and
then take them to the President for decision. You also will need
to address whether we can agree at the October 1-2 CSCE Foreign
Ministers' Conference to set a November 19 date for the CSCE
summit and signing the CFE treaty. (Substantively, it is very
hard to imagine how we could agree. Politically, it will be
enormously difficult, but probably necessary, not to.)
Recognizing the risks of leaks, you also may want to have an NSC
meeting both to put a formal stamp on the process and to signal
clearly -- including to the Soviets -- that we are fully ready
for the end game.
RECOMMENDATION
That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A
Letter to President Gorbachev
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