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Gorbachev -Sensitive January-June 1991 [3]
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Gorbachev -Sensitive January-June 1991 [3]
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
OA/ID Number:
91129
Folder ID Number:
91129-003
Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
4
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Re: [No Subject] (3 pp.)
02. Cable
From White House
5/3/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)
03a. Letter
Re: The Soviet side
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
[Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)
03b. Letter
Re: The Soviet side
n.d.
(b)(1)
8
[Russian] (1 pp.)
04. Cable
Re: Gorbachev Letter to President Bush (6 pp.)
4/26/91
(b)(1)
/
05. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
4/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
06. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
4/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)
07. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
3/25/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock
[redacted] (4 pp.)
Page 1 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1086
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
08. Cable
From White House, Re: [No Subject] [081806Z Apr 91] [FOIA
4/8/91
(b)(1)
S
RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)
09a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
4/6/91
(b)(1)
Re: Response to Gorbachev on CFE (2 pp.)
09b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)
4/5/91
(b)(1)
09c. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
3/27/91
(b)(1)
[Translation] (7 pp.)
09d. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
3/21/91
(b)(1)
10. Report
Re: Biography (1 pp.)
3/18/91
(b)(1)
S
11. Cable
To White House
3/23/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (1 pp.)
12. Cable
From White House
3/22/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)
13. Cable
To White House
3/11/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock (2
pp.)
Page 2 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1086
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
14a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock
for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
14b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
3/10/91
(b)
15. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
16. Memo
Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft
3/7/91
(b)(1)
8
Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
17a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock
for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
17b. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock
for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
17c. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
17d. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
17e. Draft Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 3 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1086
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
18a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock
for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
18b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
3/10/91
(b)(1)
18c. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
18d. Memo
Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft
3/7/91
(b)(1)
8
Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
19. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to
3/11/91
(b)(1)
S
General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [111025Z Mar 91]
[FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)
20. Message
Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime
3/5/91
(b)(1)
S
Minister to the President (5 pp.)
21. Cable
To White House
3/1/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2 pp.)
22a. Letter
President Bush to Eduard Shevardnadze (2 pp.)
2/20/91
(b)(1)
22b. Letter
Eduard Shevardnadze to President Bush (2 pp.)
1/20/91
(b)(1)
Page 4 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1086
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
23. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/21/91
(b)(1)
$
[EUR/SOV Translation] (4 pp.)
24. Telcon
Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 5 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1086
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Re: [No Subject] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By SCS
on 2/6/15
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(500)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>
PRESIDENTIAL
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE SIT
BUSH
500
<DIST>
LIBRARY
SIT: PRIVACY IN
(b)(1)
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
<DTG>
(b)(1)
<ORIG>
<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
<TEXT>ZEM
SECRET 071515Z MAY 91 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS ONLY
2011-0853-MR
0000
SECTION 01 OF 03
3r 9/17/13
BEGIN TEXT
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
1. FOLLOWING OUR EXCHANGE ON CFE, WHICH I HAVE REPORTED
SEPARATELY THROUGH STATE CHANNELS, GORBACHEV ASKED ME TO
CONVEY PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH SOME CURRENT CONCERNS
REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIP. BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSITIVITY,
I HAVE CHOSEN TO UTILIZE THIS CHANNEL. I ASSUME THAT YOU
WILL SHARE THIS REPORT WITH SECRETARY BAKER. (BESIDES
GORBACHEV AND MYSELF, ONLY CHERNYAYEV WAS PRESENT AT THE
MEETING.)
2. WHEN WE HAD FINISHED THE DISCUSSIONS OF CFE, GORBACHEV
SAID THAT HE HAD SOME CONCERNS WHICH HE WOULD APPRECIATE MY
CONVEYING PRIVATELY TO PRESIDENT BUSH. I AGREED TO DO so,
AND HE LAUNCHED A 15-MINUTE MONOLOGUE, WHICH IN A RAMBLING
FASHION EXPRESSED HIS DISMAY OVER WHAT HE SEES AS A PATTERN
OF DRAWING BACK FROM SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC REFORM HERE.
3. TAKING A PAD, HE MADE DOTS AS HE LISTED SEVERAL
RECENT NEGATIVE DECISIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA:
PRESIDENT BUSH'S REFUSAL TO EXTEND FURTHER CCC CREDITS;
THE REFUSAL OF EXPORT LICENSE FOR SOME COMPUTERS (NOT OTHER-
WISE SPECIFIED), EXPORT CONTROL PROBLEMS WITH THE PROJECTED
JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. HE JOINED THESE
DOTS, EACH AN INCH OR SO APART, WITH LINES, AND SAID "THIS IS
ONE PATTERN."
4. THEN, DRAWING A SMALLER PATTERN TO THE SIDE OF THE
FIRST, HE SAID "ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE PRESIDENT BUSH'S
PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR PERISTROIKA, AND OUR PATTERN OF UNDER-
STANDINGS, UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH I HAD THOUGHT WERE STRENG-
THENED BY OUR COOPERATION DURING THE GULF WAR." HE ADDED
THAT SOVIET VOTES IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BROUGHT DOWN
UPON HIS HEAD IMPRECATIONS FROM THE "LOUD MOUTHS" OF "OUR
CHAUVINISTS", BUT HE HAD BEAT THEM BACK TO PRESERVE HIS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.
5. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD TROUBLE "FINDING A CONNECTION"
BETWEEN THE FIRST PATTERN HE HAD DRAWN (ALLEGED REFUSALS ON
OUR PART) AND THE SECOND (PRESIDENT BUSH'S ASSURANCES OF
SUPPORT). "AND NOW I HEAR YOU ARE LEAVING SOON AND I DON'T
UNDERSTAND THAT. HAVEN'T WE WORKED TOGETHER CONSTRUCTIVELY
OVER THE YEARS?" HE ASKED RHETORICALLY "OR DO YOU THINK THIS
SHIP IS SINKING?" AND WITHOUT GIVING ME A CHANCE AT A
REJOINDER, OBSERVED THAT HE HAD TO WONDER IF HE WAS NOT
WITNESSING THE BEGINNINGS OF A U.S. CHANGE OF COURSE. WHILE
WE WERE PRESSING HIM TO GET THE EMIGRATION LAW APPROVED, HE
WONDERED IF SOME OTHER PRETEXT FOR DENYING THE SOVIET UNION
NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE FOUND EVEN IF IT WERE
PASSED.
6. "WHAT I WANT YOU TO TELL THE PRESIDENT," HE CONTINUED,
IS THAT MY POLICY REMAINS THE SAME AS BEFORE. I WILL DEFEND
IT TO THE VERY END." OF COURSE, HE ADDED, TACTICS HAVE TO BE
ADJUSTED TO REALITIES AND HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT TEMPORARY
TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT, FROM TIME TO TIME, BE REQUIRED.
HOWEVER, THE UNDERLYING POLICY TO SEEK DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF
SOCIETY AND AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE MARKET WILL REMAIN.
7. AT THIS POINT I BROKE INTO HIS MONOLOGUE TO SAY THAT
HE WAS SEEING A PATTERN WHERE NONE EXISTED. I COULD NOT
CONFIRM THAT A FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON THE REQUEST
FOR CCC CREDITS, BUT I KNEW THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFICUL-
TIES WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO
HELP. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE ONLY $1.1 BILLION IN CCC
CREDIT AUTHORITY LEFT FOR WORLDWIDE USE THIS FISCAL YEAR AND
THAT OUR LEGISLATION PROHIBITS ALLOWING POLITICAL FACTORS TO
#1234
ZEM
S E C R E T 071515Z MAY 91 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS ONLY
0000
SECTION 02 OF 03
BE CONSIDERED IN GRANTING THESE CREDITS. THE OTHER MATTERS
HE MENTIONED - IF THEY WERE AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEM - WERE
CERTAINLY NOT CONNECTED. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT
BUSH REALLY WANTS TO HELP BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR TO US
HOW THIS CAN BEST BE DONE, AND SOME THINGS MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE
BECAUSE OF OUR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION.
8. GORBACHEV REJOINED THAT HE HOPED THAT HE WAS NOT SEEING
A PATTERN, BUT IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT "THESE NEGATIVE
VOICES ARE VERY HARMFUL TO US." I SAID THAT THERE HAVE BEEN
CRITICS OF HIS RECENT POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IN
OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD NOT JOINED THAT
PARTICULAR CHORUS.
9. GORBACHEV ANSWERED, "BUT HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT WE ARE
NOT CREDIT-WORTHY. THIS WAS QUOTED IN OUR PRESS AND EVERBODY
HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DOESN'T BELIEVE WE ARE GOING TO
MAKE IT. THIS HURTS US A LOT," HE ADDED.
10. I TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS
OUT OF CONTEXT; PRESIDENT BUSH HAD MERELY STATED THE OBVIOUS,
THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD,
AND HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT REFORMS AND WANT
THEM TO SUCCEED.
OUR PROBLEM IS, I SAID, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO
FIND A WAY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE UNLESS THE COUNTRY IS MOVING
TOWARD A MARKET SYSTEM. SOME OF THE RECENT MOVES BY HIS
PRIME MINISTER DO NOT INSPIRE A LOT OF CONFIDENCE. FOR
EXAMPLE, WE SEE THE PRESERVATION OF THE VERTICAL STRUCTURES
OF THE COMMAND ECONOMY, AND WE KNOW VERY WELL THAT WE HAVE
NO FORMULA TO MAKE THEM WORK EFFICIENTLY. OUR EXPERIENCE
IS JUST NOT RELEVANT TO A COMMAND ECONOMY. FURTHERMORE,
SOME BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL LARGE CREDITS NOW, WHEN THERE IS
NO CLEAR PLAN TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE REFORMS, CAN DO MORE
HARM THAN GOOD. ADDITIONAL CREDITS MEAN HIGHER DEBT, AND
IF THEY ARE NOT USED TO MAKE THE SYSTEM MORE PRODUCTIVE,
THEY CAN BE A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN FUTURE REFORM EFFORTS.
11. "DO YOU WANT US TO HAND YOU THE TILLER?" HE ASKED.
I SAID "HEAVEN FORBID! WE DON'T CLAIM TO HAVE A RECIPE FOR
YOUR SUCCESS. BUT WE ALSO KNOW WHAT WE CANNOT DO, AND THAT
IS TO MAKE YOUR COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM WORK. IF YOU
HANG ONTO IT, THAT'S YOUR BUSINESS, BUT WE WILL BE IRRELEVANT."
12. I THEN UNDERTOOK TO FIND OUT THE PARTICULARS OF SOME
OF THE "CASES" HE HAD MENTIONED, AND TO CONVEY THEM TO HIM
VIA CHERNYAYEV. I TOLD HIM I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY HIS
REMARKS TO PRESIDENT BUSH, BUT COULD ASSURE HIM IN ADVANCE
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT CHANGED HIS POLICIES.
13. GORBACHEV SAID WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT PAVLOV
IS UNDER HELLISH PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES AND IS PRESERVING THE
CENTRAL ECONOMIC MINISTRIES ONLY TEMPORARILY, TO AVERT CHAOS.
THE NEW MINISTER OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS
ALREADY WORKING OUT A PLAN TO LIQUIDATE HIS MINISTRY. HE
CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE COULD ASSURE PRESIDENT BUSH ONCE
AGAIN THAT HIS GOALS HAD NOT CHANGED AND THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE
TO DEFEND U.S. - SOVIET COOPERATION IN PUBLIC AS WELL AS IN
PRIVATE.
14. COMMENT: SOME OF THESE COMMENTS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE
HE MADE TO RUPERT MURDOCH YESTERDAY. I WILL FOLLOW UP TO
CLARIFY SOME OF THE PARTICULAR CASES HE MENTIONED AND WILL,
OF COURSE, RELAY ANY REACTION THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO
SEND.
#1234
ZEM
SECRE T 071515Z MAY 91 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS ONLY
FINAL SECTION OF 03
0000
REGARDING THE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL CCC CREDITS, I AM UNAWARE
THAT A FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE. GORBACHEV, IT SEEMS, IS
UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS BEEN. WHATEVER THAT DECISION
MAY BE, IT WOULD PERHAPS BE USEFUL FOR PRESIDENT BUSH TO
EXPLAIN THE SITUATION IN A DIRECT MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.
END OF TEXT
DECL OADR
#1234
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507144010 MSG000294936010
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507141513 MSG000294934513
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507141917 MSG000294934757
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02. Cable
From White House
5/3/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By 5CS
on 2/6/15
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(501)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
-SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 501 LIBRARY
PRT: GANTT
SIT: GOMPERT
PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 030319Z MAY 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
(b)(1)
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR MR
SECRET
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
3r 9/17/13
0000
(b)(1)
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE
TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-
1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV THAT BEGINS IN PARA. 2 BELOW. BEFORE
DOING SO, YOU SHOULD PREVIEW IT WITH BESSMERTNYKH, MAKING
CLEAR YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER IT TO GORBACHEV.
YOU SHOULD TELL BESSMERTNYKH THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO A
MEETING OF TEAMS IN GENEVA, BUT THAT WE WANT TO BE
RESPONSIVE TO HIS IDEA OF ENGAGING MOISEYEV DIRECTLY. IF
BESSMERTNYKH INSISTS THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH WASHINGTON BEFORE
SCHEDULING AN APPOINTMENT WITH GORBACHEV.
-
2. WE HAVE RECEIVED FM BESSMERTNYKH'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY ON
CFE.
-
3. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO SEE YOU ON THIS MATTER. HE
BELIEVES THAT IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE TWO OF YOU WORK TOWARD
A PROMPT RESOLUTION. UNTIL THIS PROBLEM IS RESOLVED, THE
CFE TREATY IS NOT RATIFIABLE, AND IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR
US TO SIGN A START TREATY. WE NEED TO GET THIS PROBLEM
BEHIND US WITHOUT DELAY.
-
4. WE CANNOT REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY THAT ALREADY HAS
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BEEN SIGNED BY TWENTY-TWO NATIONS. ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS
NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON EACH OF THE
SIGNATORIES BY THE TREATY. WE LIKEWISE CANNOT CONTEMPLATE
ANY OUTCOME THAT RELIEVES THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER
SIGNATORY OF THE OBLIGATIONS IT ACCEPTED WHEN IT SIGNED THE
TREATY. THE NUMERICAL CEILINGS AND DESTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 LETTER ARE DESIGNED TO
BRING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL CONFORMITY WITH THE
TREATY. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS UNWILLING TO FULFILL ITS
TREATY OBLIGATIONS, IT WILL KILL THE TREATY, WITH DAMAGE TO
U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS, TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, AND TO
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.
-
5. IN HIS APRIL 8 LETTER TO YOU, THE PRESIDENT HAS GONE TO
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL LIMIT IN HIS SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL
SOLUTION TO THE CFE PROBLEM. THIS INCLUDES THE QUESTION OF
NAVAL INFANTRY. UNLESS THAT ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED IN THE
PRACTICAL WAY PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT. THE DAMAGE TO THE
CFE TREATY WILL BE FATAL. WHILE HE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO
YOUR INTERNAL POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND DOES NOT WISH TO
COMPOUND YOUR PROBLEMS IN ANY WAY, HE ASKS THAT YOU ADDRESS
ANY REMAINING CFE QUESTIONS PERSONALLY. THEY CANNOT BE LEFT
TO EXPERTS TO SOLVE.
-
6. IF IT WOULD HELP YOU RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, WE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO WELCOME GENERAL MOISEYEV IN WASHINGTON AS SOON
AS HE CAN COME. WE WOULD MAKE OUR TOP OFFICIALS AVAILABLE
TO HIM.
-
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
*0010
SECRET
L7 bd7 CE
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
B
S/S #
MESSAGE NO. 066155 CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
No. Pages TWO
FROM: BOB PEARSON
S/S
75302
7224
(Officer name)
(Office symbol)
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF OF SOVIET VIEWS REGARDING
-
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
NSC
EYES ONLY -- MR. SCROWCROFT
NSC
EYES ONLY -- MR. SITTMANN
FOR:
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS: URGENT - ASAP
BP
S3
S/S Officer:
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
FORM
DS-1760
7-77
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
SECRET
NODIS S/S 9107647
File Copy
DIST:
Unofficial translation
4/30
S
D
The Soviet side has carefully analysed the views set forth
P
T
in the letter by the President of the United States dated April 9
C
S/P
regarding the subject of conventional weapons.
EUR
INR
By and large, we find the approach by United States to be
S/S
constructive. A. number of proposals contained in the letter by
President Bush can be accepted. The principal remaining difference
in the two sides' positions concerns the armaments of the Soviet
naval infantry (120 tanks, 753 armored fighting vehicles, and
234 artillery systems).
Given the progress in narrowing the differences, which
has been possible on the basis of the exchange of messages
between President Gorbachev and President Bush, and taking into
account the brief discussion of this question in Kislovodsk, we
propose to hold a high-level expert meeting in Geneva beginning
on May 15 for the purpose of working out a definitive comprehen-
sive solution of this problem. On the Soviet side the group of
experts could be led by the Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed
Forces, General of the Army, Mikhail ..Moiseyev.
The results of the work of the group of experts would be
reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Secretary
of State, who would submit possible agreements to the Presidents
of the USSR and of the United States for their approval. Then,
the results of the bilateral discussions would be turned over
for consideration to other states participating in the Vienna
talks.
We hope for a prompt reply of the US. side.
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PER E.O. 13526
2011- - 0853 MR
ES 4/11/13
Советская cTopoHa тщательно проанализировала соображения,
изложенные B письме президента США OT 9 апреля c.Γ. по обычным
вооружениям.
Мы находим американский подход B целом конструктивным. Ряд
предложений, содержащихся B письме Дж.Буша, может быть принят.
Главное остающееся расхождение B позициях cTopoH касается Boopy-
жений советской морской пехоты (I20 TaHKoB, 753 ББМ, 234 артсисте-
мы).
C учетом продвижения B сближении позиций, KoTopoΓo удалось
добиться Ha ocHoBe обмена посланиями по обычным вооружениям
между М.С.Горбачевым И Дж.Бушем, a также принимая BO внимание
KpaTKoe обсуждение этого вопроса Ha встрече министров B Кисло-
водске, предлагаем американской cTopoHe провести B Женеве, начи-
ная C I5 мая, встречу экспертов Ha высоком ypoBHe для выработки
окончательного комплексного решения этой проблемы. C советской
стороны группу экспертов MOT бы возглавить начальник I'll BC CCCP
генерал армии М.А.Моисеев.
Результаты работы группы экспертов были бы доложены министрам,
которые представили бы возможные договоренности Ha одобрение
президентам CCCP И США. 3aTeM итоги двусторонних обсуждений были
Óы переданы Ha рассмотрение других государств-участников перегово-
poB B BeHe.
Надеемся Ha Оыстрый oTBeT американской стороны.
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PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT FILE GOMPERT HAASS BURNS HEWETT PAAL PRES_MSGS SIT SUM VAX
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
<DTG> 260115Z APR 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNCD/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000
N
INFO RUEHMO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
0
D
SECRET STATE 135498 TOSEC 050491
I
NODIS
S
E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH
1. THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 25, SOVIET DCM CHETVERIKOV
MET WITH EUR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOBBINS TO
DELIVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT
N
BUSH DEALING WITH THREE ISSUES (TEXT\ PARA 5) :
0
- -
KURDISH SITUATION: GORBACHEV EXPRESSES CONCERN THAT
D
INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN IRAQ WITHOUT BAGHDAD
I
S
CONSENT. WHILE JUSTIFIED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, SHOULD
NOT BE SEEN AS PRECEDENT. NOT SHOULD IT REVIVE HOPES FOR
CREATION OF A KURDISH STATE.
- - JAPAN VISIT: GORBACHEV EXPRESSES SATISFACTION WITH
HIS VISIT TO JAPAN AND THE AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA FOR
FUTURE DISCUSSION OF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE.
N
- - KOREA VISIT: GORBACHEV NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THT
0
ROH TAE W00 DID NOT WAIT TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF
D
PERESTROYKA, BUT BEGAN TO ACT (I.E. ON ECONOMIC
I
ASSISTANCE), AND REVEALS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT OBJECT
S
TO SOUTH KOREAN SOLE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN IF THE NORTH
KOREANS REJECT SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION.
3. IN PRESENTING THE LETTER. CHETVERIKOV UNDERSCORED THE
POINT THAT THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ IS HIGHLY
DECLASSIFIED
UNUSUAL: THEREFORE THE U.S. AND ALLIED RESPONSE SHOULD
PER E.O. 13526
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NOT BE SEEN AS A PRECEDENT FOR SIMILAR ACTIONS ELSEWHERE.
HE NOTED THAT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS MAY REVIVE
HOPES FOR A SEPARATE KURDISH STATE AND STRESSED THAT A
CLEAR DISTINCTION MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN OUR
HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS AND PROSPECTIVE KURDISH POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. DOBBINS SAID OUR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE
COINCIDED AND WE WANTED TO FIND A WAY TO WITHDRAW OUR
FORCES FROM IRAQ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WITH RESPECT TO
N
THE ISSUE OF KURDISH AMBITIONS, WE HAD NO INTENTION OF
0
CALLING INTO QUESTION THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ANY OF
D
THE STATES IN THE AREA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE
I
SOVIETS WEIGHED IN WITH THE IRAQIS TO ENCOURAGE THE
S
ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURE CONDITIONS FOR THE KURDISH
REFUGEES THAT WOULD MAKE AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL POSSIBLE.
SIMILARLY, DOBBINS URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR
INFLUENCE WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND SPECIALIZED
AGENCIES TO EXPEDITE THE UN'S EARLY ASSUMPTION OF THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE U.S. AND COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.
N
0
4. ON THE ASIA VISITS, CHETVERIKOV STRESSED THAT, IN
D
SPITE OF PRESS REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, GORBACHEV WAS
FULLY SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF HIS TRIP TO JAPAN.
S
WITH RESPECT TO GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH ROH, CHETVERIKOV
STRESSED THAT THE DPRK HAS NOT/NOT BEEN APPRISED OF THE
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING UN MEMBERSHIP. CHETVERIKOV SAID
THAT WHEN BRIEFING THE DPRK AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW,
BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE TALKS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE ROK
WERE AIMED AT ADVANCING RELATIONS WITH THE ROK IN ORDER
N
TO FACILITATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. DOBBINS
0
REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS' ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV'S TOKYO
D
VISIT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. WE WERE PLEASED THAT A PROCESS HAD
S
BEEN ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.
DOBBINS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GORBACHEV'S
POSITION ON SOUTH KOREAN UN MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF KEEPING THIS CONFIDENTIAL.
5. BEGIN TEXT (SOVIET EMBASSY UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)
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DEAR GEORGE
-
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 17 CONCERNING
MEASURES TO HELP THE IRAQI REFUGEES. THESE ARE
EXTRAORDINARILY BUSY DAYS FOR ME. THIS WEEK WILL BE
MARKED. I THINK, BY EXTREMELY IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT
WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO GET ON THE PATH OF STABILIZATION
AND A STEADIER MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEW ECONOMY. FOR ALL
THAT. AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
N
PROBLEM THAT YOU RAISED, I DECIDED TO REPLY IN WRITING.
0
-
WE IN THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, ARE ALARMED BY THE
D
TERRIBLE SITUATION IN WHICH THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ
I
HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES, FEEL SYMPATHY FOR THEM, AND ANGER
S
TOWARD THE REGIME WHICH IS BEHAVING WITH SUCH CRUELTY.
ELEMENTARY HUMANESS REQUIRES THAT ONE HELP PEOPLE IN
SUCH PLIGHT, STOP THE DYING, AND LLEVIATE THEIR
SUFFERING.
-
I UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS THE EXTREME SEVERITY OF THE
SITUATION THAT NECESSITATED SUCH AN UNUSUAL STEP AS
N
DISPATCHING US AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES' TROOPS TO THE
0
BORDER AREAS OF IRAQ TO SET UP TEMPORARY RELIEF AND
D
PROTECTION CAMPS.
I
-
S
AT THE SAME TIME IT CANNOT BE DENIED THAT THE FACT
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOP CONTINGENTS INTO THE
TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT THAT STATE'S REQUEST
OR CONSENT, EVEN WITH SUCH A HUMANE GOAL, CAN BE
PERCEIVED AS A THREAT TO ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IN
THAT SENSE RESOLUTION 688 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DOES
N
NOT CHANGE THE MEANING OF THE PRECEDENT. SOME OF THE
0
ACTIONS. LIKE THE DEMAND THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS BE PULLED
D
OUT OF THE TOWNS IN THE BORDER AREAS, POINT TO A BROAD
I
INTERPRETATION OF THAT RESOLUTION ITSELF.
S
-
I DO TRUST THE CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE
CHARACTER OF THE OPERATION THAT WAS UNDERTAKEN, ITS
OBJECTIVES AND THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE GOALS PURSUED,
AS WELL AS THE COMMITMENT TO MOVE THE OPERATION UNDER THE
UN CONTROL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT WITHIN SOME QUARTERS
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OF OUR PUBLIC AND THE PARLIAMENT THERE ARE DOUBTS AND
SUSPICIONS I CANNOT BUT RECKON WITH THIS. AND,
GENERALLY, FROM EVERY STANDPOINT INCLUDING FROM THE
STANDPOINT OF THE PROSPECTS AND TERMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
SETTLEMENT, IT IS DESIRABLE TO WITHDRAW FOREIGN TROOPS
FROM IRAQ'S NORTHERN AREAS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND TO
ENTRUST THE WHOLE MATTER TO UN REPRESENTATIVES
-
THERE IS ALSO SUCH A DELICATE ASPECT AS THE REVIVAL
N
OF HOPES FOR CREATING A KURDISH STATE. WHICH I THINK HAS
0
NOT ESCAPED YOUR ATTENTION. YET THIS CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE
D
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF IRAQ, IRAN. TURKEY,
I
AND SYRIA. IT IS NOT HARD TO IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF A NEW
S
CRISIS CAN BE GENERATED BY THIS DEMAND, IF IT WERE TO BE
PURSUED. THEREFORE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL
TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY THAT THE US
AND ITS ALLIES DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES AND WHATEVER
POLITICAL GOALS.
N
-
IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WE ARE
0
TRYING TO CONVINCE IT THAT THE OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE
D
I
US, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE HAS A PURELY HUMANITARIAN AND
S
TIME-LIMITED NATURE. WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT IRAQ WILL
NOT OPPOSE THIS OPERATION. THE IRAQI TROOPS HAVE BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TO ENGAGE IN
PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE
FOREIGN TROOPS DISPATCHED TO HELP THE REFUGEES, BE ISSUED
RELEVANT STRICT INSTRUCTIONS AS WELL.
-
N
DEAR GEORGE, I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
0
SHARE WITH YOU MY IMPRESSIONS FROM THE RECENT VISIT TO
D
JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA.
I
-
THE VISIT WAS NECESSARY. IN A SITUATION OF PROFOUND
S
CHANGES IN THE WORLD THE FROZENNESS OF SOVIET-JAPANESE
RELATIONS STOOD OUT AS A CLEAR ANACHRONISM. I UNDERSTOOD
THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SATISFY THE HOPES OF THE
JAPANESE, BUT IT WAS MY EXPECTATION THAT AN OPEN AND
FRANK DIALOGUE WITH MR. KAIFU, A "MEETING WITH JAPAN"
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WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND
GET THE TALKS ON THE MOST PAINFUL ISSUE CLOSER TO THE
PRESENT- DAY REALITIES. OUR CONVERSATION WAS NOT EASY
BUT. ON THE WHOLE, A SUBSTANTIVE. FRANK, AND FRIENDLY ONE.
-
AS A RESULT WE ADOPTED A FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT
DOCUMENT, A JOINT STATEMENT AND CONCLUDED FIFTEEN
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER MATTERS.
-
THE PEACE TREATY PROBLEM. INCLUDING TERRITORIAL
N
DELINEATION. TOOK PARTICULARLY MUCH TIME AND EFFORT. AS
0
A RESULT, THE ALMOST TWELVE HOUR-LONG INTENSE WORK AND
D
EIGHT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS PRODUCED A FORMULA WHICH NOW
I
MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO SEARCH MORE CONFIDENTLY FOR A
S
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE BALANCE OF
INTERESTS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING REALITIES
BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY, CREATING A TOTALLY NEW NATURE OF
RELATIONS AMONG STATES AND PEOPLES THROUGH A MANY-SIDED
AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS.
-
I AM SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS. I BELIEVE THEY
N
MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN
0
D
WITHOUT PREJUDICING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES,
I
AND HAVE LAID A SOLID GROUNDWORK FOR MOVING SOVIET-
S
JAPANESE RELATIONS ONTO THE TRACK OF COMPLETE
NORMALIZATION.
-
THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ROH TAE W00 WAS SHORT,
BUT VERY SUBSTANTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. AS YOU RECALL, WE
HAD FIRST MET IN SAN FRANCISCO NOT WITHOUT YOUR GOOD
OFFICES. THIS FOLLOW-ON SAW FAST PROGRESS. I GREATLY
N
APPRECIATE PRESIDENT ROH' S COURAGE AND FORESIGHT. HE DID
0
NOT WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE OUTCOME OF PERESTROIKA WAS GOING
D
TO BE, BUT, RATHER. AWARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
I
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS SUCCESS OR FAILURE FOR HIS COUNTRY AS
S
WELL, BEGAN TO ACT.
-
THE TALKS ON THE ISLAND MADE IT POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE KOREAN PROBLEM
INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
WE ARE FOR A SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION OF BOTH THE DPRK AND
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THE ROK. BUT IF T DOESN'T WORK OUT. WE SHALL NOT OPPOSE
SOUTH KOREA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN I ASKED PRESIDENT
ROH NOT TO PUBLICIZE THIS POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING.
YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHY
-
WE ALSO REITERATED OUR POSITION REGARDING THE DPRK'S
NUCLEAR FACILITIES OUR INSISTENCE BEFORE ITS LEADERSHIP
THAT THEY BE PLACED UNDER THE IAEA CONTROL. ROH TAE W00
CAME OUT IN FAVOR OF DEEPENING THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE
N
DPRK AND SEARCHING FOR WAYS OF PEACEFUL UNIFICATION, BUT
0
WITHOUT HASTE AND BEARING IN MIND, BY ANALOGY, SOME
D
EXPERIENCE. WE, FOR OUR PART, ADVOCATED REDUCING
I
TENSIONS PREVENTING NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION ON THE
S
PENINSULA, AND ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF
KOREA. THIS IS IN OUR INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF
ALL. ROH TAE W00 WAS UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RELATIONS WITH
THE DPRK.
-
I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST,
-
SINCERELY,
N
-
M. GORBACHEV
0
END TEXT.
D
EAGLEBURGER
I
BT
S
#5498
N
0
D
I
S
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
4/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By ses
on 2/6/15
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(504)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
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PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 0917302 APR 91
(b)(1)
TO WHITE HOUSE
SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
FROM JACK MATLOCK
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR NAME IN THE SECURE TELCON FROM THE WHITE
HOUSE WITH JIM TIMBIE ON APRIL 9, I MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OBUKHOV AT 7PM TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON
CFE. I COVERED THE TALKING POINTS, EMPHASIZING THAT THE
PRESIDENT WANTED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT PERMITTED
RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO OCCUR. I SAID THE PRESIDENT
BELIEVED HIS PROPOSAL OFFERED A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE
CFE PROBLEMS AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO URGE THE OTHER
CFE SIGNATORIES AND THE SENATE TO ACCEPT IT. OBUKHOV READ
THE LETTER CAREFULLY, CALLED IT AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT THAT WOULD
REQUEST THOROUGH STUDY AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT PROMPTLY
TO HIS PRINCIPAL. SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT
SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE LETTER BEFORE IT HAD BEEN STUDIED, OBUKHOV
DID NONETHELESS NOTE THAT THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE WAS AN
IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE.
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
*0301
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
31 9/17/13
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
4/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By SCS
on 2/6/15
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(505)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 505 LIBRARY
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY SIT
< PREC > IMMEDIATE CLASS SECRET
<DTG> 091145Z APR 91
(b)(1)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
TO WHITE HOUSE
2011-0853-MR
3r 9/17/13
SECRET
091145Z APR 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
WHITE HOUSE PASS TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
0000
TO: WHITE HOUSE
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK.
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE.
BEGIN TEXT:
BRENT:
I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE
ME TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE. CHERNYAYEV IS
ALSO NOT AVAILABLE: HE IS ILL, AND HIS OFFICE TELLS US HE WILL BE
OUT AT LEAST TWO DAYS. WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV UNAVAILABLE
TODAY AND NO ASSURANCE I CAN GET TO SEE GORBACHEV EVEN TOMORROW. I
NEED GUIDANCE ON HOW TO PROCEED.
DELIVERY TO BESSMERTNYKH IS NOT AN OPTION UNTIL LATER THIS
WEEK. HE IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE NOT
RETURNING UNTIL THE EVENING OF APRIL 10. OTHER OPTIONS ARE VERY
LIMITED. AMONG KEY PLAYERS IN THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY, THE ONLY
FIGURE WE ARE CERTAIN HAS BEEN PRIVY TO THE EXCHANGE ON CFE IS
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV. IF URGENT DELIVERY IS REQUIRED,
HE IS THE ONE OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE LETTER COULD BE DELIVERED TODAY
AND TO WHOM I COULD TURN FOR HELP IN GETTING IT TO GORBACHEV
PROMPTLY.
DURING A MEETING WITH OBUKHOV THIS MORNING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT,
OBUKHOV VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICE HAD CALLED
HIM ABOUT MY REQUEST TO SEE THE PRESIDENT OR CHERNYAYEV TO DELIVER
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. HE TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
SECRET
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
HAD SAID SCHEDULING AN APPOINTMENT FOR ME WAS A PROBLEM AND
SUGGESTED THAT OBUKHOV MIGHT RECEIVE IT. I TOLD OBUKHOV ONLY
THAT WE WERE AWARE A LETTER WOULD BE COMING AND THAT I WOULD
PROBABLY RECEIVE. AS USUAL SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT ITS
DELIVERY. IF THERE IS TIME. I CAN CONTINUE TO PURSUE APPOINTMENTS
WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV, OR WITH BESSMERTNYKH ON HIS RETURN
IF DELIVERY OF THE LETTER TO HIM IS ACCEPTABLE. IF TIME IS
URGENT I RECOMMEND CONVEYING THE LETTER TO OBUKHOV.
END OF TEXT:
DECL OADR
#0300
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft
3/25/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock
[redacted] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
By ses
on 11/6/13
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0853-MR (506)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 7/16/2012
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
PRESIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH
506
dup
LIBRARY
of
PAGE 01 01 04
5
PRT GANTT
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
DTG 251349Z MAR 91
(b)(1)
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRE
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV THIS AFTERNOON,
JUST AFTER HE MET WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION LED BY OZAWA. ONLY
CHERNYAYEV WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING BESIDES THE TWO OF US.
2. I DESCRIBED TO GORBACHEV THE MAIN POINTS IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER
AND STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPENING THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL
SOLUTION OF THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS, AND WE SINCERELY HOPED HE WOULD
FIND THIS APPROACH ACCEPTABLE. SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLEAR THE WAY
FOR OTHER POSITIVE STEPS.
3. GORBACHEV SAID HE WOULD GIVE PROMPT ATTENTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S
IDEAS, AND INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THES
E
ISSUES. HE ASKED ME TO ASSURE "GEORGE" THAT HE UNDERSTANDS VERY WELL
THAT CONTINUED U.S.- SOVIET COOPERATION IS THE CORNERSTONE OF SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT HE, GORBACHEV, WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IT THAT WAY
4. I GAVE HIM THE MESSAGE REGARDING THE BW INFORMATION, AND HE REPLIED
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2000-1389-F
SECRET
ses 7/16/12
IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04
THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO RECEIVE THIS INFORMATION SO THAT HE CAN BETT
ER
UNDERSTAND HOW TO REASSURE US. "WE ARE ACTING WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE,"
HE SAID, "BUT IF YOU DON T LET OUR PEOPLE VISIT YOUR FACILITIES THAT WIL
L
RAISE QUESTIONS. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP THE EXCHANGES ON
TRACK AND THOUGHT THAT THE PAPERS WE WOULD GIVE BESSMERTNYKH WOULD MAKE
CLEAR THE SORT OF ACTIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.
5. FINALLY. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT THE REPORT HE
MENTIONED TO SECRETARY BAKER REGARDING AN ALLEGED CONVERSATION WITH YELT
SIN
WAS FALSE. (THE REPORT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT YELTSIN HAD ASKED ME WHAT
THE USG WOULD DO IF "HIS GROUP" CAME TO POWER BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS.
)
I TOLD GORBACHEV THAT YELTSIN HAD NEVER SAID THIS OR ANYTHING LIKE IT TO
ME. IN FACT, IF HE HAD, I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY SEVERED ALL CONTACT WI
TH
HIM. HE SAID THAT THE REPORT CAME "FROM YELTSIN'S ENTOURAGE,' AND I
REPLIED THAT, WHATEVER THE SOURCE, THE REPORT WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
6. GORBACHEV THANKED ME FOR THE EXPLANATION, THEN LAUNCHED A RATHER
LENGTHY COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT I AND MY WIFE ARE VERY RESPECTED AND
VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT WE
UNDERSTAND THE COUNTRY AND ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ITS CULTURE. THIS MEANS T
HAT
OUR CONTACTS AND ASSOCIATIONS HAVE A POLITICAL SIDE TO THEM. HE HOPED T
HAT
I WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE "FIERCE STRUGGLE" GOING ON. "WE HAVE GONE THRO
UGH
A REAL WAR THESE LAST FEW WEEKS," HE ASSERTED, AND SAID THAT EVEN THE MO
ST
INNOCENT CONTACTS COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AND THAT CHARGES COULD BE MADE 0
F
COLLUSION.
7. HE QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S
ATTITUDE AND MY OWN ACTIVITIES. " OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME CLANDESTINE
ACTIVITIES; WE ARE NOT NAIVE," HE SAID, "BUT ALL COUNTRIES DO THAT."
SECRET
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04
I INTERJECTED THAT THERE WERE NO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO
SUBVERT THE SOVIET UNION. AND HE HALF-CONCEDED THE POINT. BUT SAID THAT
DESPITE THE UNDOUBTED GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND
SECRETARY BAKER. THERE ARE "ELEMENTS" IN THE U.S. WHICH WOULD WELCOME
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION.
8. IN ANY EVENT, HE CONCLUDED, HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BEAR THE DELICACY
OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN MIND. AND DO MY BEST TO COUNSEL MY
STAFF TO STAY CLEAR OF TICKLISH SITUATIONS LEST THEIR ACTIVITIES BE
MISCONSTRUED. (HE DID NOT DIRECTLY MENTION CONTACTS WITH THE STRIKING
MINERS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.)
9. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE WAS SAYING, BUT WE COULD NOT ENTIREL
Y
PROTECT OURSELVES FROM MALICIOUS FABRICATIONS. THERE WERE GOOD REASONS
FOR US TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEGITIMATE POLITICAL FORCES, AND WE
CANNOT DRAW BACK FROM SUCH CONTACT WITHOUT GIVING A NEGATIVE POLITICAL
SIGNAL TO OUR AND THEIR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, I WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE
SE
CONTACTS DO NOT CROSS THE LINE INTO INTERFERENCE.
10. HE THEN CLOSED THE TOPIC BY THANKING ME FOR MY EXPLANATION REPEATING
THAT HE WAS NOT IN ANY WAY CASTING ASPERSIONS ON MY CONDUCT WHICH IN
FACT HE ADMIRED - BUT WANTED TO SENSITIZE ME TO THE FACT THAT THERE ARE
THOSE WHO WOULD TRY TO USE THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL BENEFIT.
11. COMMENT: WHEN WE LEFT THE OFFICE, CHERNYAYEV OBSERVED THAT IT WAS
"VERY IMPORTANT" THAT I HAD CLARIFIED THE REPORT REGARDING YELTSIN'S
ALLEGED QUESTION TO ME. I TAKE IT FROM THIS THAT GORBACHEV MUST HAVE TA
KEN
IT SERIOUSLY, INDEED.
12. GORBACHEV SEEMED IN GOOD SPIRITS, BUT LOOKED PUFFY AND TIRED. HIS
REFERENCE TO HAVING GONE THROUGH A "WAR" RECENTLY OBVIOUSLY REFERRED TO
THE REFERENDUM, AND HIS CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WON.
13. HE RECEIVED ME IN HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, RATHER THAN IN ONE
OF THE GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE KREMLIN, AS IS USUALLY THE CASE. HIS
ASSISTANT EXPLAINED THIS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OZAWA THERE
SINCE HE MET OZAWA AS PARTY LEADER RATHER THAN PRESIDENT.
14. WARM REGARDS, JACK MATLOCK.
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUA ON ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 04
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0195
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08. Cable
From White House, Re: [No Subject] [081806Z Apr 91]
4/8/91
(b)(1)
S
[FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 10/23/2015
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0853-MR(507)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: PRIVACY_OUT
<PREC> FLASH
<CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 081806Z APR 91
<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENTIAL
3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)
507
<TO>
BUSH
LIBRARY
<TEXT>ZEM
SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:
3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)
PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-
-
1. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE REPLY IN PARAGRAPH 3
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER ON CFE. IT HAS
BEEN REVIEWED BY SECRETARY BAKER. IF GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE,
LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV. ANY REPORTING SHOULD BE
MADE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.
-
2. IN DELIVERING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND DRAWING ON THE
FOLLOWING POINTS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF
THAT HIS PROPOSAL IS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE ALL THE REMAINING CFE
ISSUES QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY SO THAT RATIFICATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY CAN GO FORWARD.
-
-- BUILDING ON THE IDEAS IN GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER, THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING CFE PROBLEMS.
-
- THE NUMERICAL REPEAT NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT'S APPROACH AND GORBACHEV'S APPROACH IS VERY SMALL:
THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH MORE
WITHDRAWAL OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE CFE ZONE NOR DESTRUCTION OF
EQUIPMENT THAN DOES GORBACHEV'S OWN PROPOSAL. THE DIFFERENCE,
HOWEVER, IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVING THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS.
AS SUCH, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BE A PRACTICAL
SOLUTION THAT CAN OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE III.
-
-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS AS FAR AS WE CAN GO IN HELPING THE
SOVIETS FIND A SOLUTION TO THEIR CFE PROBLEMS, AND IS THE LEAST
WE CAN ACCEPT.
-
-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL REFLECTS HIS OWN IDEAS. HE CANNOT
SPEAK FOR HIS NATO ALLIES OR THE OTHER CFE SIGNATORIES. IF,
HOWEVER, GOBACHEV CAN ACCEPT IT, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE
OTHER SIGNATORIES--AND THE U.S. SENATE--TO ACCEPT IT AS WELL.
-
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
-
PER E.O. 13526
3. BEGIN TEXT:
2011-0853-MR
-
4/21/2014 MM
-
MIKHAIL:
-
I APPRECIATE YOUR MARCH 27 LETTER AND YOUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN WITH
ME IN THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING CFE
PROBLEMS. IN THE SAME POSITIVE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND FRANKNESS,
LET ME PROPOSE A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH THAT ELABORATES YOUR IDEAS
IN A WAY THAT ALSO WOULD ACHIEVE A PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF THE
DIFFICULT NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE, AND WOULD REMOVE ALL OF THE
REMAINING ROADBLOCKS TO THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CFE TREATY.
-
UNDER THIS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD, AS YOU
PROPOSE, MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT OUTSIDE THE TREATY NOT TO
INCREASE THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY UNITS IN THE COASTAL DEFENSE, NAVAL
INFANTRY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC
ROCKET FORCES.
-
THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO WOULD MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT TO HAVE 933
FEWER TANKS, 1,725 FEWER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 1,080 FEWER
ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE CFE ZONE AND IN ACTIVE UNITS THAN THE
QUANTITIES TO WHICH IT BELIEVES IT IS ENTITLED UNDER THE CFE
CEILINGS. SOVIET EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS IN THE CFE SUBZONES AND ON THE
FLANKS WOULD BE REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. THE SOVIET SIDE COULD WITHDRAW
EQUAL NUMBERS OF TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY
PIECES OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE. IT WOULD DESTROY OR CONVERT EQUAL
NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY
PIECES CURRENTLY LOCATED INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE USING
CFE TIMETABLES AND CFE PROCEDURES (OR SOME OTHER AGREED
PROCEDURES FOR EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE THE ZONE THAT PROVIDED VISIBLE
EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD BEEN DESTROYED OR RENDERED MILITARILY
UNUSABLE)
-
AS YOU PROPOSE, THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY AND COASTAL
DEFENSE UNITS WITHIN THE CFE ZONE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS INSTEAD OF THE DECLARED SITE VERIFICATION REGIME THAT
APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE UNITS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE WILL ALLOW THESE INSPECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A
MANNER THAT FACILITATES EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.
-
AS AN ADDITIONAL EFFORT TO PUT US IN A POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD ON
THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY, I AM
PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THAT WERE
ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED
WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE TREATY'S NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, ON THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT NO OTHER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES OR OTHER
EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE SRF.
-
MIKHAIL, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THE EFFORT YOU HAVE MADE TO BRING
US TO THIS POINT, AND I HOPE THAT YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE
DIFFICULTY OF THE STEPS I WOULD ASK THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE
SIGNATORIES TO TAKE IN RESPONSE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN OUR VIEW,
EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITH COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN
THE SAME VERIFICATION REGIME THAT APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE
UNITS. BECAUSE OF MY COMMITMENT TO WORK WITH YOU TO FIND
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO YOUR
VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.
-
I LIKEWISE MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT
TO ACCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO OUTSIDE THE CFE
ZONE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT ADDS TO OUR ALREADY SERIOUS CONCERNS
#0087
ZEM
SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
REGARDING THE VERY LARGE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET
SIDE WITHDREW FROM THE CFE ZONE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TREATY WAS
SIGNED. ALTHOUGH THESE EARLIER WITHDRAWALS WERE TECHNICALLY
LEGAL, THEY RAISE QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT COULD UNDERMINE
THE VERY OBJECTIVES OF THE CFE TREATY THAT YOU AND I SO STRONGLY
SUPPORT.
-
NEVERTHELESS, I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS
AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED IF YOU CAN
FORMALLY CONFIRM WHAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ALREADY HAVE TOLD US
IN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR SIDES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL
MONTHS. YOUR ASSURANCE IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT THE
EQUIPMENT ALREADY WITHDRAWN OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE COULD NOT BE
QUICKLY MOVED BACK AND INTEGRATED INTO MILITARY UNITS THAT REMAIN
IN THE CFE ZONE, OR BE USED TO BUILD UP SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN
WAYS THAT COULD DESTABILIZE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE,
ASIA, OR ELSEWHERE. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD ASK THAT THE SOVIET
SIDE FORMALLY:
-
-- REAFFIRM THAT YOU WILL DESTROY OR CONVERT BETWEEN NOW AND 1995 AT
LEAST 6,000 TANKS, 1,500 ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 7,000
ARTILLERY PIECES NOW LOCATED EAST-OF-THE-URALS, IN ADDITION TO THE
DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. (AS YOU
CAN UNDERSTAND, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR YOU TO COMMIT TO CARRY
OUT THESE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO ENSURE THAT YOUR
COMMITMENT TO DESTROY OR CONVERT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AS PART OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WAS MEANINGFUL.
-
-- PROVIDE NOTIFICATION OF THE CONVERSION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS
EQUIPMENT, AS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, AND PERFORM THE PLANNED DESTRUCTION
OR CONVERSION USING AGREED CFE PROCEDURES OR IN SOME OTHER VISIBLE
WAY THAT BUILDS CONFIDENCE THAT THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DESTROYED
OR PERMANENTLY RENDERED MILITARILY UNUSABLE.
-
-- PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT THE WITHDRAWN EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE USED
TO CREATE NEW MILITARY UNITS OR A STRATEGIC RESERVE, AND WILL NOT BE
STORED IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE EQUIPMENT TO BE RETURNED QUICKLY TO
THE CFE ZONE, AND THAT THE MILITARY UNITS REMAINING IN THE CFE ZONE
WILL NOT BE ORGANIZED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE ABLE TO ABSORB QUICKLY
LARGE QUANTITIES OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT.
-
-- FINALLY, IF YOUR SIDE COULD IDENTIFY THE CURRENT LOCATIONS OF THE
TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TOLD US HAVE BEEN
MOVED TO DEPOTS AND UNITS EAST-OF-THE-URALS SINCE JANUARY, 1989, IT
WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE DATA THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE TREATY.
-
MIKHAIL, THIS ELABORATION OF YOUR PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT A
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES IN A MANNER
THAT SATISFACTORILY ADDRESSES OUR RESPECTIVE CONCERNS AND CAN BE
SUCCESSFULLY PRESENTED TO OUR LEGISLATURES. IT DIFFERS ONLY
SLIGHTLY FROM THE NUMBERS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, BUT IT HAS ONE
CRUCIAL ADVANTAGE: IT WILL ALLOW US TO MOVE FORWARD WITH
RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY BECAUSE IT WILL
BRING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL CONFORMITY WITH TREATY
OBLIGATIONS AS THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD BY THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE
SIGNATORIES.
-
I RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROPOSED APPROACH REQUIRES FURTHER MOVEMENT
BY BOTH OF US, BUT WITHOUT SUCH RECIPROCAL EFFORTS THE CFE TREATY
AND ALL THE BENEFITS THAT FLOW FROM IT ARE IN JEOPARDY. I
THEREFORE KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO PUT THE ENTIRE MATTER BEHIND US, QUICKLY AND
COMPLETELY, BEFORE IT UNDERMINES ALL THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED.
-
WE HAVE COME so FAR AND ACCOMPLISHED SO MUCH THROUGH THE
RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION AND TRUST THAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED.
WE MUST NOT LET THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AND FORWARD ELUDE US.
IF YOU CAN JOIN WITH ME IN ACCEPTING THIS COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION,
I WILL URGE MY NATO ALLIES AND THE U.S. SENATE TO ACCEPT IT AS
WELL, AND WILL DIRECT MY EXPERTS TO FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY WITH
YOURS TO FORMALIZE OUR AGREEMENT.
-
WITH CFE RESOLVED BY OUR PERSONAL EFFORTS, I WILL BE READY TO WORK
WITH YOU--IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF OPENNESS, FRANKNESS, AND
COOPERATION--TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING START
ISSUES SO THAT WE CAN SIGN THAT TREATY AT AN EARLY DATE. I ALSO
WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR BROADER AGENDA. WE
HAVE SO MUCH YET TO ACHIEVE. RESOLVING THE CURRENT PROBLEMS NOW
WILL SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS.
-
-
SINCERELY,
-
I
GEORGE BUSH
-
-
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
-
END OF TEXT.
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WASHINGTON
APRIL 6, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
B
FROM:
BRENT 3COWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Response to Gorbachev on CFE
Purpose
To respond to President Gorbachev's March 27 letter (Tab B) and
propose a comprehensive solution to all the remaining problems.
Background
Your March 21 letter to Gorbachev (Tab C) emphasized your desire
to find practical solutions that would result in the Soviets
living up to their treaty obligations without forcing them to
make an embarrassing acknowledgement that the public position
they have staked out is unsupportable. Although the specific
proposals in Gorbachev's March 27 reply represent only modest
improvements on what Jim Baker heard in Moscow and still fall
short of what we need, his letter shows that he is personally
seized with the CFE problem and wants to find a way to put it
behind us. Your proposed response offers a comprehensive
solution which, if Gorbachev accepts it, should finally allow us
to move forward with CFE ratification.
Gorbachev's letter points the way to resolving the problem of the
coastal defense divisions that the Soviets have claimed are not
covered by CFE limits. He is now prepared to meet all of the
treaty limits in a way that amounts to a de facto inclusion of
the coastal defense units. He insists, however, that the excess
equipment be withdrawn from the CFE zone rather than be destroyed
as the treaty envisages. To compensate, he would destroy an
equal amount of equipment that is located east-of-the-Urals. The
net result is that the Soviets would dismantle the correct
quantity of equipment, but would be able to destroy older models
instead of more modern equipment. We can accept that as part of
an overall agreement.
Gorbachev offered nothing new on naval infantry, the other major
category that the Soviets claim is not covered by CFE. Your
proposed response (Tab A) suggests that Gorbachev's ideas on
CCI Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
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FRI 05 APR 91 00:53
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SECRET
SECRET
coastal defense be extended to cover naval infantry as well. we
cannot be certain how he will react.
Gorbachev might well go for this approach because it would
require the Soviets to increase only modestly the amount of
additional equipment they would withdraw out of the CFE zone, and
without explicitly acknowledging any direct connection between
those increased withdrawals and naval infantry. On the other
hand, the naval infantry issue (like the entire subject of naval
arms control) is so politically charged in Moscow that Gorbachev
may find himself politically unable to take this step, even to
save the CFE treaty. However, for us to go any further to help
the Soviets out of the bind they have created for themselves on
naval infantry could lead to serious ratification problems.
To demonstrate that you too are prepared to make the extra effort
to solve CFE, your response would accept Gorbachev's proposal for
verifying coastal defense divisions. It also would agree not to
include under the treaty's numerical limitations the armored
personnel carriers assigned to the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces. This exclusion makes sense because, like other equipment
exempted from CFE limits, they provide internal security rather
than being part of the regular Soviet ground forces.
Finally, your letter would seek a series of assurances from
Gorbachev regarding the very large amounts of equipment the
Soviets moved out of the CFE zone immediately before the treaty
was signed in order to escape CFE's destruction requirements.
This technically legal evasion has the potential to undermine
many of the objectives that CFE was designed to achieve, and is
certain to be a major issue during Senate ratification. The
proposed assurances would help us deal with both problems.
If Gorbachev responds positively to your letter, we will next
seek concurrence from our Allies. They almost certainly will
support your proposals provided we continue to consult closely
with them.
You will see that the proposed letter is more detailed and
technical than your typical correspondence with Gorbachev. This
is necessary in order to reach definitive closure with Gorbachev,
who alone can settle the issue on the Soviet side. His March 27
letter to you is likewise detailed and technical, so your reply
will seem appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A
Proposed Letter to President Gorbachev
Tab B
March 27 Letter from President Gorbachev
Tab C
Your March 21 Letter to President Gorbachev
PG.01
FRI 05 APR 91 00:54
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mikhail:
I appreciate your March 27 letter and your
willingness to join with me in the search for
practical solutions to the remaining CFE
problems. In the same positive spirit of
cooperation and frankness, let me propose a
comprehensive approach that elaborates your
ideas in a way that also would achieve a
practical resolution of the difficult naval
infantry issue, and would remove all of the
remaining roadblocks to the ratification and
implementation of the CFE treaty.
Under this comprehensive approach, the Soviet
side would, as you propose, make a binding
commitment outside the treaty not to increase
the equipment held by units in the coastal
defense, naval infantry, and armored combat
vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket
Forces.
The Soviet side also would make a binding
commitment to have 933 fewer tanks, 1,725 fewer
armored combat vehicles, and 1,080 fewer
artillery pieces in the CFE zone and in active
units than the quantities to which it believes
it is entitled under the CFE ceilings. Soviet
equipment holdings in the CFE subzones and on
the flanks would be reduced accordingly. The
Soviet side could withdraw equal numbers of
tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery
pieces outside the CFE zone. It would destroy
or convert equal numbers of operational tanks,
armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces
currently located inside or outside the CFE zone
5
FRI 05 APR 91 00:55
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2
using CFE timetables and CFE procedures (or some
other agreed procedures for equipment outside
the zone that provided visible evidence that it
had been destroyed or rendered militarily
unusable)
As you propose, the equipment held by naval
infantry and coastal defense units within the
CFE zone would be subject to challenge
inspections instead of the declared site
verification regime that applies to other ground
force units, on the understanding that the
Soviet side will allow these inspections to be
conducted in a manner that facilitates effective
verification.
As an additional effort to put us in a position
to move forward on the ratification and
implementation of the CFE treaty, I am prepared
to agree that the armored personnel carriers
that were assigned to the Strategic Rocket
Forces when the treaty was signed will not count
against the treaty's numerical limitations, on
the understanding that no other armored combat
vehicles or other equipment limited by the
treaty will be assigned to the SRF.
Mikhail, I very much appreciate the effort you
have made to bring us to this point, and I hope
that you can appreciate the difficulty of the
steps I would ask the other twenty-one
signatories to take in response. For example,
in our view, equipment located with coastal
defense units should be included in the same
verification regime that applies to other ground
force units. Because of my commitment to work
with you to find practical solutions, however, I
am prepared to agree to your verification
proposal.
I likewise must tell you in all candor that it
is very difficult to accept the withdrawal of
additional equipment outside the CFE zone, not
least because it adds to our already serious
concerns regarding the very large quantities of
equipment that the Soviet side withdrew from the
6
FRI 05 APR 91 00:55
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3
CFE zone immediately before the treaty was
signed. Although these earlier withdrawals were
technically legal, they raise questions and
uncertainties that could undermine the very
objectives of the CFE treaty that you and I so
strongly support.
Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept these
additional withdrawals as part of the
comprehensive approach I have outlined if you
can formally confirm what Soviet representatives
already have told us in extensive exchanges
between our sides over the last several months.
Your assurance is needed to provide confidence
that the equipment already withdrawn outside the
CFE zone could not be quickly moved back and
integrated into military units that remain in
the CFE zone, or be used to build up Soviet
military forces in ways that could destabilize
international stability in Europe, Asia, or
elsewhere. Specifically, I would ask that the
Soviet side formally:
--
Reaffirm that you will destroy or convert
between now and 1995 at least 6,000
tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles, and
7,000 artillery pieces now located east-
of-the-Urals, in addition to the
destruction and conversion obligations
described above. (As you can understand,
it would be essential for you to commit
to carry out these previously announced
plans to ensure that your commitment to
destroy or convert additional equipment
as part of the comprehensive approach was
meaningful.)
Provide notification or the conversion or
destruction of this equipment, as you
have proposed, and perform the planned
destruction or conversion using agreed
CFE procedures or in some other visible
way that builds confidence that the
equipment has been destroyed or
permanently rendered militarily unusable.
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FRI 05 APR 91 00:56
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4
Provide assurances that the withdrawn
equipment will not be used to create new
military units or a strategic reserve,
and will not be stored in a way that
allows the equipment to be returned
quickly to the CFE zone, and that the
military units remaining in the CFE zone
will not be organized in such a way as to
be able to absorb quickly large
quantities of additional equipment.
Finally, if your side could identify the current
locations of the treaty-limited equipment that
your representatives told us have been moved to
depots and units east-of-the-Urals since
January, 1989, it would greatly facilitate the
resolution of the remaining questions concerning
the data the Soviet side has reported in
connection with the treaty.
Mikhail, this elaboration of your proposal would
permit a comprehensive solution to all the
remaining CFE issues in a manner that
satisfactorily addresses our respective concerns
and can be successfully presented to our
legislatures. It differs only slightly from the
numbers you have proposed, but it has one
crucial advantage: it will allow us to move
forward with ratification and implementation of
the CFE treaty because it will bring the Soviet
Union into practical conformity with treaty
obligations as they are understood by the other
twenty-one signatories.
I recognize that the proposed approach requires
further movement by both of us, but without such
reciprocal efforts the CFE treaty and all the
benefits that flow from it are in jeopardy. I
therefore know you share my view that we must do
everything possible to put the entire matter
behind us, quickly and completely, before it
undermines all that we have accomplished.
We have come so far and accomplished so much
through the relationship of cooperation and
trust that we have established. We must not let
8
FRI 05 APR 91 00:56
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5
the present opportunity to move forward elude
us. If you can join with me in accepting this
comprehensive solution, I will urge my NATO
allies and the U.S. Senate to accept it as well,
and will direct my experts to follow up
immediately with yours to formalize our
agreement.
With CFE resolved by our personal efforts, I
will be ready to work with you--in the same
spirit of openness, frankness, and cooperation--
to find practical solutions to the remaining
START issues so that we can sign that treaty at
an early date. I also want to work with you to
move ahead on our broader agenda. We have so
much yet to achieve. Resolving the current
problems now will set the stage for future
progress.
Sincerely,
/s/
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
9
FRI 05 APR 91 00:57
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(TRANSLATION)
LS No.
134636
CT/AO
Russian
Dear George,
I was pleased to learn from your letter of March 22 that you
are satisfied with the talks that we had this month in MOSCOW
with Secretary of State James Baker on a broad range of issues.
In this regard, our assesaments completely coincide. In Moscow,
yet another important step forward was made toward broadening and
deepening the USSR-U.S. interaction in the interest of building a
new world order based on the new thinking and democratic
principles.
The review of the questions relating to the ratification of
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe occupied an
important place at the Moscow talks. Taking into account the
views presented in your letter of February 9, we made an
important step aimed at removing the U.S. side's concerns. It
was an honest attempt to find solutions to the existing problems
on a basis of compromise, and I was pleased to learn that you
value it on its merits. It is precisely in this manner, in an
atmosphere of frankness and openness, that we should pursue this
dialog--for we are talking about the future of a Treaty which
will have, in the fullest sense of this word, an historic
importance for the destiny of peace in Europe and far beyond.
His Excellency
George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
10
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- 2 -
I must say that I strongly favor completing this dialog in
the nearest possible future by achieving mutual understanding on
the entire range of aspects with which We are dealing at
present. I believe that the final agreement on conventional
forces in Europe would open the way for a rapid completion of a
no less important treaty on radical reductions in strategic
offensive arms.
George, you are writing that the moves we made in Moscow on
conventional arms still fall short of resolving the problem as a
whole, and you present your arguments. They have been carefully
analyzed. As a result of this analysis, we have decided that we
can take yet another step, which we are convinced will ensure a
comprehensive settlement in terms of creating the necessary
conditions for the ratification of the Paris Treaty.
In this connection, let me say from the outset that the
approach presented by Secretary Baker in MORCOW and supported by
you in your letter of March 22, under which we should set aside
our differences regarding the interpretation of Article III of
the Treaty and focus on practical approaches, appeals to us.
Like you, we have no desire to make an issue out of who "won" and
who "lost." This point of view, as we have been able to observe,
is taking hold also among the other parties to the Treaty. Like
the United States, the Soviet side favors a solution which would
make it possible to remove the problem in such a way as not to
put any party in an embarrassing situation. This serves the
goals of trust and mutual respect in resolving the difficult
problems involved in arms reductions and in wafeguarding
legitimate security interests.
Thus, we are for a compromise that would not infringe on
anyone's interests, one that would not require amending the
Treaty text and would ensure its non-circumvention.
11
FRI 05 APR 91 00:58
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- 3 -
As a gesture of good will and in order to eliminate U.S.
concerns, we are prepared to offer the following comprehensive
solution:
1. Within the aggregate ceilings established for the USSR by the
Treaty for tanks (13,150), armored combat vehicles (20,000), and
artillery systems (13,175), as well as the levels of arms in
regular units (10,500 tanks, 17,920 armored combat vehicles, and
10,825 artillery pieces), the actual quantities of these Soviet
arms in Europe will be reduced by the number of these arms that
the USSR will have in the coastal defense units, even though,
according to our approach, the latter do not fall under the
Treaty.
This is our new constructive step, which takes into account
the views presented by the U.S. side in MOSCOW with respect to
the regular units' arms. This aspect is now adequately dealt
with as well.
of course, the relevant reduction will be carried out also
within the limits established for the extended area of Central
Europe and for the flank areas.
2. The additionally reduced arms will be withdrawn beyond the
treaty application area for the purpose of replacing the obsolete
arms, which subsequently would be destroyed or converted.
As you can see, here too we are offering a solution which is
fully consistent with the objectives of reducing arms and
drastically lowering the level of military confrontation.
3. The one hundred percent compensation for the coastal defense
arms by all the parameters of the Treaty is the most important
element of the package proposed by the Soviet side. As for the
12
FRI 05 APR 91 00:58
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- 4 -
naval infantry arms (120 tanks, 753 armored combat vehicles, and
234 artillery pieces), they of course should remain outside the
Treaty. As you know, no "reassignment" issue arose with those
weapons, as in the case with the three Soviet coastal defense
divisions. Our naval infantry has always existed as part of our
naval forces. Incidentally, it certainly cannot be compared with
the 200,000-strong U.S. Marine Corps.
A# was said earlier, we are prepared to make a unilateral,
politically binding statement outside the Treaty regarding the
non-buildup of naval infantry arms. This obligation would also
cover the arms of the coastal defense forces--thoee levels that
would remain after additional reductions (the point is that the
reductions under paragraph 1 would be made by cutting the numbers
of arms both in deployed ground-troops divisions and in coastal
defense divisions).
This means that the issue of circumventing the Treaty through
a possible buildup of naval infantry arms would be completely
eliminated.
Of course, we are aware of the fact that a number of states
party to the Paris Treaty also have corresponding systems in
their naval infantry units, and that these states have accepted
the inclusion of these systems in the Treaty-limited items. In
this connection, we would also be ready-for the purpose of
ensuring reciprocity--to have all states party to the Treaty join
the statement (outside the Treaty) on the non-buildup of their
naval infantry arms within the reductions zone. In this context,
one could also agree that these systems of other states not be
counted, and their slots be taken by the relevant ground-forces
arms.
13
FRI 05 APR 91 00:59
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- 5 -
In other words, in this area too, we are not seeking any
unilateral advantages for ourselves. Our goal is to resolve the
issue on the basis of the balance of the parties' legitimate
interests.
4. We would also make a unilateral statement outside the Treaty
about a non-buildup of armored combat vehicles (1,701 pieces) in
the units guarding the Strategic Rocket Forces. The reason for
this solution is that these armored combat vehicles (ACV#) are
not part of the ground forces: their mission is to guard missile
complexes of the strategic nuclear forces, on which we have a
separate negotiation. Accordingly, within the context of the CFE
Treaty, they could in principle be listed under Table IV
[Tranelator's note: Table I in Russian text], which contains the
list of systems that do not fall under reductions.
In Moscow the U.S. side raised the question of converting a
portion of the Soviet armored combat vehicles assigned to the
Strategic Rocket Forces into ACV-like machines. I would like to
note that in the interest of reaching a settlement the Soviet
side is prepared to accept this and agree with the United States
on the number of ACVs that would be subject to conversion. This
is another of our new major steps to meet the U.S. halfway.
Subsequently, the number of the relevant vehicles assigned to
the Strategic Rocket Forces would be determined taking into
account the START Treaty.
5. Verification of the above measures could, in our view, be
performed in the following way. with respect to coastal defense
and naval infantry units, it would be done through challenge
inspections. with respect to the armored combat vehicles in the
Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviet side would be prepared, as a
gesture of good will, to provide the relevant information to all
the parties to the Paris Treaty.
14
FRI 05 APR 91 00:59
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- 6 -
6. As for the issue of the equipment moved beyond the Urals, we
have already provided information to this effect. We intend to
continue, as a gesture of good will, to notify the U.S. side on
elimination and conversion.
Summing up, I would like to stress that we have now proposed
a solution which ensures a comprehensive settlement. I must say
with all frankness that this has not been easy. After all, to
comply with the ceilings established by the Treaty, one has to
literally "cut into the quick," because from the very beginning,
in accordance with the mandate for the Vienna talks, we have
assumed that the coastal defense forces, as those of the naval
infantry, are not covered by the relevant limitations.
As you can see, for the purpose of reaching agreement and to
demonstrate our good will, we have accepted a pragmatic
settlement of the coastal defense problem. We have also taken
into account the U.S. side's considerations concerning the method
of implementing additional reductions, verification, and
conversion of a portion of the armored combat vehicles assigned
to the Strategic Rocket Forces. We have also made a serious
accommodating move on the question of the naval infantry. We are
prepared to provide notifications of the arms pulled out of the
Treaty zone.
George, the package of measures that we are proposing can be
convincingly argued even in the Supreme Soviet. But to expect
the Supreme Soviet to react positively to any measures that would
go beyond this package would, quite frankly, be highly
problematic.
As you see, Mr. President, I have taken the step that you
expected of me, to go as far as I can go in the existing
situation. It ought to eliminate your concerns completely and
15
FRI 05 APR 91 01:00
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- 7 -
get the arms reduction and limitation process back on a
productive track. I hope for your agreement in principle. In
that event I would be ready to appoint plenipotentiary
representatives who, together with your authorized experts, would
translate our understanding into the language of a concrete
agreement.
Respectfully,
M. Gorbachev
March 27, 1991
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LINETED ACCESS
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DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 21, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker has just reported to me on his talks with
you in Moscow. It clearly was a good exchange, and I
am pleased that you had the opportunity to discuss
not only the Gulf but also the broader U.S.-Soviet
relationship, including arms control. Preserving our
broader relationship--indeed developing it further--
is key to shaping a new world order, a goal that I
know we share.
Jim described to me the step you took to help resolve
the CFE problem. It was an important step, and I
genuinely appreciate that effort. At the same time,
I must tell you that it does not meet the basic
concern I expressed in my February 9 letter. As I
explained in that letter, my concern centers on the
willingness of each of the signatories to fulfill the
obligations he undertook when he signed the CFE
treaty. For this reason, it is not helpful to think
of our differences as being about a few hundred
tanks, more or less. That also is why the issue
cannot be resolved by agreeing on some number that is
between what the treaty permits and what one or
another signatory now proposes.
Nevertheless, because you were able to take the step
you did, we were able to respond with the approach
that Jim described in the paper he gave to Foreign
Minister Bessmertnykh on Saturday. That approach is
designed to overcome differences about Article III of
the CFE treaty, by concentrating on producing
practical results that correspond to the obligations
you and I and the other twenty signatories assumed
when we signed it.
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FRI 05 APR 91 01:01
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2
The proposed approach is based on three simple
principles. First, total Soviet holdings of tanks,
artillery, and armored combat vehicles in the CFE
zone (regardless of the branch of the military
service to which they may be assigned) could not
exceed the limits specified in the treaty. Second,
any such equipment in excess of these limits would
have to be converted or destroyed using agreed
procedures. Third, of course, such an approach would
need to be implemented in a manner that is consistent
with the CFE treaty we already have signed (including
the limits by zone and on holdings in active units),
so that it will not be necessary to renegotiate its
terms.
I am persuaded that a solution that is based on these
principles will meet our respective needs.
Consistent with the treaty, it would permit your
military to allocate tanks, artillery, and armored
combat vehicles among your naval and other military
units in whatever manner best fits the needs of the
Soviet Union. You would be free, for example, to
increase or decrease the number of tanks assigned to
coastal defense divisions or naval infantry provided
that the treaty limits on total tank holdings were
not exceeded and that the required number of tanks
were converted or destroyed.
We would be satisfied that the obligations we each
assumed when the CFE treaty was signed would be met.
You and I together would have found a practical way
to resolve the issue, reflecting and building on the
spirit of cooperation and mutual accommodation that
you and I have developed. I am equally persuaded
that if we can find such a solution, the other
remaining CFE issues also can be resolved.
If you agree that a solution could be based on these
three principles, I am confident it would be accepted
by my NATO allies, and I would direct Jim to follow
up quickly to secure its achievement.
18
FRI 05 APR 91 01:01
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3
Leaving CFE unresolved casts a cloud over the future
of all of our arms control efforts and impedes
cooperation on our broader agenda. I do not want
that. In emphasizing to Jim Baker your commitment to
the U.S. -Soviet relationship and underscoring its
centrality to a peaceful and enduring world order, it
is clear that you do not want that either. Resolving
CFE now would have an enormous positive impact,
facilitating progress on other difficult arms control
issues, and helping to pave the way for our next
summit meeting.
Mikhail, let us promptly put the remaining CFE issues
behind us on the basis I have described.
Sincerely,
as
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10. Report
Re: Biography (1 pp.)
3/18/91
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11. Cable
To White House
3/23/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (1
pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By ses
on 2/6/15
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(510)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
PAGE 01
PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE SIT
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 2310307 MAR 91
(b)(1)
TO WHITE HOUSE
SECRE T E-YES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
1. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF TRYING TO CONTACT CHERNAYEV. (HIS OFFICE DOES NOT ANSWER
THE TELEPHONE ON WEEKENDS.) WHILE I SHALL DO MY BEST TO DELIVER THE
LETTER EITHER TO GORBACHEV OR CHERNAYEV THIS WEEKEND, IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THEY WILL MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ONLY ON MONDAY. IF THAT IS THE
CASE, I PRESUME YOU WOULD WAIT UNTIL MONDAY RATHER THAN DELIVERING
THROUGH OTHER HANDS. I SHALL OF COURSE LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS
DELIVERY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
WARM REGARDS,
JACK.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
*0162
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
3r 9/17/13
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12. Cable
From White House
3/22/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Document Partially Declassified
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
WHORM Cat.:
By scs
on 2/6/15
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(511)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
PAGE 01 OF 04
PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY : OUT SIT
PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 221605Z MAR 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
(b)(1)
SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
(b)(1)
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:
PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK EYES ONLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-
-
1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY
SECRETARY BAKER, TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF
GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE. LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV.
ANY REPORTING ON DELIVERY OR REACTIONS SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS
CHANNEL.
-
2. IN DELIVERING LETTER, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT
IS TRYING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE REMAINING
CFE PROBLEMS, AND URGE GORBACHEV TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WALK
THROUGH THAT DOOR WITH A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT PUTS THIS
ISSUE BEHIND US.
-
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY
HAS REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV
ON BW, AND THAT THE SECRETARY WILL SHORTLY BE SENDING BESSMERTNYKH
THE PAPERS GORBACHEV REQUESTED SO THAT GORBACHEV CAN TAKE THE
ACTIONS NEEDED TO GET THE PROGRAM OF VISITS AND EXCHANGES BACK ON
TRACK.
-
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
BEGIN TEXT:
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
3r 9/17/13
SECRET
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW.
IT CLEARLY WAS A GOOD EXCHANGE, AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY THE GULF BUT ALSO THE BROADER U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. PRESERVING OUR
BROADER RELATIONSHIP-- INDEED DEVELOPING IT FURTHER- IS KEY TO
SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, A GOAL THAT I KNOW WE SHARE.
-
JIM DESCRIBED TO ME THE STEP YOU TOOK TO HELP RESOLVE THE CFE
PROBLEM. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP, AND I GENUINELY APPRECIATE THAT
EFFORT. AT THE SAME TIME, I MUST TELL YOU THAT IT DOES NOT MEET
THE BASIC CONCERN I EXPRESSED IN MY FEBRUARY 9 LETTER. AS I
EXPLAINED IN THAT LETTER, MY CONCERN CENTERS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF
EACH OF THE SIGNATORIES TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS HE UNDERTOOK
WHEN HE SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS NOT HELPFUL
TO THINK OF OUR DIFFERENCES AS BEING ABOUT A FEW HUNDRED TANKS,
MORE OR LESS. THAT ALSO IS WHY THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY
AGREEING ON SOME NUMBER THAT IS BETWEEN WHAT THE TREATY PERMITS AND
WHAT ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY NOW PROPOSES.
NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE YOU WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE STEP YOU DID, WE
WERE ABLE TO RESPOND WITH THE APPROACH THAT JIM DESCRIBED IN THE
PAPER HE GAVE TO FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH ON SATURDAY. THAT
APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE 111 OF
THE CFE TREATY, BY CONCENTRATING ON PRODUCING PRACTICAL RESULTS
THAT CORRESPOND TO THE OBLIGATIONS YOU AND I AND THE OTHER TWENTY
SIGNATORIES ASSUMED WHEN WE SIGNED IT.
-
THE PROPOSED APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE SIMPLE PRINCIPLES. FIRST,
TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT
VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY
SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) COULD NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS
SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF
SECRET
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04
THESE LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED USING AGREED
PROCEDURES. THIRD. OF COURSE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NEED TO BE
IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CFE TREATY WE
ALREADY HAVE SIGNED (INCLUDING THE LIMITS BY ZONE AND ON HOLDINGS
IN ACTIVE UNITS), SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE
ITS TERMS.
I AM PERSUADED THAT A SOLUTION THAT IS BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES
WILL MEET OUR RESPECTIVE NEEDS. CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY. IT
WOULD PERMIT YOUR MILITARY TO ALLOCATE TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND
ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES AMONG YOUR NAVAL AND OTHER MILITARY UNITS
IN WHATEVER MANNER BEST FITS THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. YOU
WOULD BE FREE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO
INCREASE OR DECREASE THE NUMBER OF TANKS ASSIGNED TO COASTAL
DEFENSE DIVISIONS OR NAVAL INFANTRY PROVIDED THAT THE TREATY LIMITS
ON TOTAL TANK HOLDINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED AND THAT THE REQUIRED
NUMBER OF TANKS WERE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED.
-
WE WOULD BE SATISFIED THAT THE OBLIGATIONS WE EACH ASSUMED WHEN THE
CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED WOULD BE MET. YOU AND I TOGETHER WOULD HAVE
FOUND A PRACTICAL WAY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, REFLECTING AND BUILDING
ON THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION THAT YOU AND
I HAVE DEVELOPED: I AM EQUALLY PERSUADED THAT IF WE CAN FIND SUCH
A SOLUTION, THE OTHER REMAINING CFE ISSUES ALSO CAN BE RESOLVED.
-
IF YOU AGREE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE BASED ON THESE THREE
PRINCIPLES, I AM CONFIDENT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY MY NATO ALLIES,
AND I WOULD DIRECT JIM TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY TO SECURE ITS
ACHIEVEMENT.
-
LEAVING CFE UNRESOLVED CASTS A CLOUD OVER THE FUTURE OF ALL OF OUR
ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND IMPEDES COOPERATION ON OUR BROADER AGENDA.
I DO NOT WANT THAT. IN EMPHASIZING TO JIM BAKER YOUR COMMITMENT TO
THE U.S. SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND UNDERSCORING ITS CENTRALITY TO A
PEACEFUL AND ENDURING WORLD ORDER, IT IS CLEAR THAT YOU DO NOT WANT
THAT EITHER. RESOLVING CFE NOW WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS POSITIVE
SECRET
IMM: DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 04
IMPACT FACILITATING PROGRESS ON OTHER DIFFICULT ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES. AND HELPING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT MEETING.
=0027
ZEM
SECRET
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
-
MIKHAIL, LET US PROMPTLY PUT THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES BEHIND US ON
THE BASIS I HAVE DESCRIBED.
-
SINCERELY,
-
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
-
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
-
END OF TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0028
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13. Cable
To White House
3/11/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador
Matlock (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By SCS
on 2/6/15
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0853-MR(512)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECURI
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 512 JBRARY
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT SUM
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
DTG 111025Z MAR 91
(b)(1)
TO WHITE HOUSE
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT NOON TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING
SECRETARY BAKER FRIDAY AND APPRECIATES PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOOD
WISHES. HE ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT
PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PUBLICLY REFUTED THE ASSERTION THAT GORBACHEV HAD
BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE DURING THE GULF WAR.
WE HAD TIME FOR ONLY THE BRIEFEST CHAT BECAUSE HE WAS SUMMONED
BY GORBACHEV JUST AFTER I ARRIVED. REGARDING THE WEEKEND'S POLITICAL
ANTICS. HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS WHEN I LAST SAW HIM: HE
THOUGHT YELTSIN HAD FINALLY DISCREDITED HIMSELF WITH THE PUBLIC AND
THAT THE KEY REPUBLICS WOULD SOON SIGN THE UNION TREATY.
THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I FEEL MAY BE
JUSTIFIED, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CONFIDENT MOOD HE CONVEYED AS
COMPARED WITH THE LAST TIME WE MET.
REGARDS,
JACK.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
END TEXT.
PER E.O. 13526
DECL: OADR
2011-0853-MR
zr 9/17/13
SECRET
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
S E C R E
# 0 180
SECRET
Dono - you
were gaing to
give me the
Gorby phg -
after you sent the
Orig to nottock
Dent cea
ilessified
pouch 3/12
Donal
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
Limited ACCESS
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 1719
URGENT NOT PROOFED: then
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG 2RM A/O
WELL Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
/
K
A
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
2
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
3
Et.3/12 N/R
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Pres Letter to Gorbaclea
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Er Sees office has deskells
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9101719
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 91 17
TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 10 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
PERSIAN GULF
ARMS CONTROL
MIDDLE EAST
LIMITED ACCESS
PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS
ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA WHSR
DUE DATE: 11 MAR 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BURNS
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BURNS
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
Jhm
DATE 3/12 BY
HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSEF
CLOSED BY: NSEF
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9101719
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SCOWCROFT
Z 91031013 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
002
X 91031016 PRES SGD LTR
002
X 91031016 CABLE SENT VIA WHSR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/14/09
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9101719
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 10 MAR 91
SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: ORGINAL
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By
NARA, Date
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9101719
REFERRAL
DATE: 12 MAR 91
MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J
STATE SECRETARIAT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 10 MAR 91
SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC
POUCHE **
DUEDATE:
COMMENT: ** PLEASE DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH ***
FOR
GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack
Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Document Partially Declassified
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
WHORM Cat.:
By ES
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
on 1/30/14
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2011-0853-MR (513)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
6/14/2013
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
(b)(1)
<DTG> 101446Z MAR 91
<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
(b)(1)
<TEXT>ZEM
SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
HSUB PRESIDENTIAL 513 LIBRARY
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO
AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV.
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MIKHAIL:
NOW THAT THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED IN THE GULF, I WANTED TO WRITE
TO SAY HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED OUR EXCELLENT PERSONAL
COMMUNICATION THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS FROM ITS EARLIEST DAYS UNTIL
NOW. I VALUED OUR MANY DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING THE PRODUCTIVE
MEETINGS IN HELSINKI AND PARIS AND OUR RECENT TELEPHONE
CONVERSATIONS. THIS COOPERATION, BOTH WHEN WE AGREED AND EVEN
WHEN WE HAD DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, PERMITTED UNPRECEDENTED
ACHIEVEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING A CRITICAL TIME. IT WAS A MEASURE OF HOW OUR RELATIONS
HAVE CHANGED, AND THE POTENTIAL THAT CHANGE HAS FOR THE WORLD.
THE SUCCESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE STRONG AND PRINCIPLED CONTRIBUTION OF THE
SOVIET UNION UNDER YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP.
NOW WE WILL TURN TO THE URGENT WORK OF BUILDING A JUST AND
DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY. BUT
I BELIEVE WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE FOR LASTING SECURITY
IN THE GULF AND AN OBLIGATION TO CONFRONT THE MANY PROBLEMS
SEPARATING ISRAEL AND BOTH THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS.
THE USSR HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS
EFFORT. IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER
TOWARD COMMON OBJECTIVES, ONCE AGAIN LAYING THE BASIS FOR
SUCCESS.
JIM BAKER LOOKS FORWARD TO HAVING A GOOD DISCUSSION WITH YOU
ON MARCH 15. HE WILL REPORT TO YOU ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP
AND REVIEW IN DETAIL OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THAT TROUBLED
REGION. I HAVE ALSO ASKED JIM TO DISCUSS THOROUGHLY WITH YOU
THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF HOW WE CAN REGAIN MOMENTUM IN ARMS
CONTROL. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT WE
RESOLVE THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH CFE. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOU CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE MESSAGE HE WILL BRING AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THESE TWO ISSUES FOR THE COURSE OF OUR FUTURE
RELATIONSHIP.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
HIS EXCELLENCY
PER E.O. 13526
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
2011-0853-MR
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ES 6/14/13
MOSCOW
P.S.
I AM SIGNING THIS LETTER AT CAMP DAVID; AND I AM RECALLING OUR
MOST RELAXED AND PLEASANT DISCUSSIONS HERE.
I OFTEN THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE AT HOME, AND I HOPE
YOU WILL TELL JIM IF THERE'S ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE ME TO KNOW
ON A VERY PRIVATE BASIS. AS YOU KNOW I CONSIDER MYSELF LUCKY
TO BE YOUR FRIEND.
GEORGE BUSH
#0170
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0170 <TOR> 910310095113 MSG000289907473
LIMITED ACCESS
1719
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf,
I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated
our excellent personal communication throughout
this crisis from its earliest days until now.
I valued our many discussions, including the
productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and
our recent telephone conversations. This
cooperation, both when we agreed and even when
we had different perspectives, permitted
unprecedented achievements between our two
countries at the UN Security Council during a
critical time. It was a measure of how our
relations have changed, and the potential that
change has for the world. The success of the
international coalition would not have been
possible without the strong and principled
contribution of the Soviet Union under your
personal leadership.
Now we will turn to the urgent work of building
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This will not be easy. But I believe we have an
opportunity to provide for lasting security in
the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many
problems separating Israel and both the Arab
states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the
potential to play an important role in this
effort. It is my hope that we will be able to
work together toward common objectives, once
again laying the basis for success.
Jim Baker looks forward to having a good
discussion with you on March 15. He will report
to you on his Middle East trip and review in
detail our current assessment of that troubled
region. I have also asked Jim to discuss
2
thoroughly with you the critical question of how
we can regain momentum in arms control. As I
have said before, this will require that we
resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I
would ask that you consider carefully the
message he will bring and the importance of
these two issues for the course of our future
relationship.
Sincerely,
as
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
P.S.
I am signing this letter at Camp
David; and I am recalting on
most relaxed and pleasent
dismissions here.
I often think about then problems
you face at home, and there's I hope
will tell Jim if to know
you anything you'd like we basis.
on a my know I consider myself
private
As luchy you to be you friend
an
LIMITED ACCESS
SECRET
SECRET
1719
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SIGNED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis
Purpose
To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal
cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to
reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war
problems in the Middle East and on arms control.
BACKGROUND
Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev
which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build
on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for
cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short
and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.
The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal
communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points
to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the
international coalition. It also states that our eventual
success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's
personal leadership.
The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the
Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially
important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief
Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on
March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of
arms control issues.
RECOMMENDATION
DECLASSIFIED
That you sign the letter to Gorbachev
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
Attachment
11/29/2007 MM
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
CECRET
SECRET
LIMITED ACCESS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1719
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
March 7, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS
FROM:
NICHOLAS BURNS NB
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis
As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the
President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at
Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
D Bob
2 Brent
See Baker has
cleared this version
of the letter to
Gorbo.
David
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
(1917) 3/7/91
Bob:
David Gompert just called and asked that
I pass the following note with the
Gorbachev letter:
Bob Zoellick, State, thinks the letter
is fine; however, he feels very strongly
that Sec Baker should look at it.
Zoellick has faxed the letter to Baker
and has requested his concurrence as
soon as possible. Gompert does not feel
this will take long.
v/r
R.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
17a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack
Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
17b. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack
Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mikhail:
Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf,
I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated
our excellent personal communication throughout
this crisis from its earliest days until now.
I valued our many discussions, including the
productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and
our recent telephone conversations. This
cooperation, both when we agreed and even when
we had different perspectives, permitted
unprecedented achievements between our two
countries at the UN Security Council during a
critical time. It was a measure of how our
relations have changed, and the potential that
change has for the world. The success of the
international coalition would not have been
possible without the strong and principled
contribution of the Soviet Union under your
personal leadership.
Now we will turn to the urgent work of building
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This will not be easy. But I believe we have an
opportunity to provide for lasting security in
the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many
problems separating Israel and both the Arab
states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the
potential to play an important role in this
effort. It is my hope that we will be able to
work together toward common objectives, once
again laying the basis for success.
Jim Baker looks forward to having a good
discussion with you on March 15. He will report
to you on his Middle East trip and review in
detail our current assessment of that troubled
region. I have also asked Jim to discuss
2
thoroughly with you the critical question of how
we can regain momentum in arms control. As I
have said before, this will require that we
resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I
would ask that you consider carefully the
message he will bring and the importance of
these two issues for the course of our future
relationship.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mikhail:
Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I
wanted to write to say how much I appreciated
our excellent personal communication throughout
this crisis from its earliest days until now. I
valued our many discussions, including the
productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and
our recent telephone conversations. This
cooperation, both when we agreed and even when
we had different perspectives, permitted
unprecedented achievements between our two
countries at the UN Security Council during a
critical time. The success of the international
coalition would not have been possible without
the strong and principled contribution of the
Soviet Union under your personal leadership.
Now we will turn to the urgent work of building
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This will not be easy. But I believe we have an
opportunity to provide for lasting security in
the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many
problems separating Israel and both the Arab
states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the
potential to play an important role in this
effort. It is my hope that we will be able to
work together toward common objectives.
Jim Baker looks forward to having a good
discussion with you on March 16. He will report
to you on his Middle East trip and review in
detail our current assessment of that troubled
region. I have also asked Jim to discuss
2
thoroughly with you the critical question of how
we can regain momentum in arms control I would
ask that you consider carefully the message he
will bring and the importance of these two
issues for the course of our future
relationship.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mikhail:
Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I
wanted to write to say how much I appreciated
our excellent personal communication throughout
this crisis from its earliest days until now. I
valued our many discussions, including the
productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and
our recent telephone conversations. This
cooperation, both when we agreed and even when
we had different perspectives, permitted
unprecedented evements between our two
countries at the UN Security Council during a
critical time. The success of the international
coalition would not have been possible without
the strong and principled contribution of the
Soviet Union under your personal leadership.
Now we will turn to the urgent work of building
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This will not be easy. But I believe we have an
opportunity to provide for lasting security in
the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many
problems separating Israel and both the Arab
states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the
potential to play an important role in this
effort. It is my hope that we will be able to
work together toward common objectives.
Jim Baker looks forward to having a good
discussion with you on March 16. He will report
to you on his Middle East trip and review in
detail our current assessment of that troubled
region. I have also asked Jim to discuss
2
thoroughly with you the critical question of how
we can regain momentum in arms control. I would
ask that you consider carefully the message he
will bring and the importance of these two
issues for the course of our future
relationship.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
18a. Cable
From White House
3/10/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack
Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
LIMITED ACCESS
1719
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf,
I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated
our excellent personal communication throughout
this crisis from its earliest days until now.
I valued our many discussions, including the
productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and
our recent telephone conversations. This
cooperation, both when we agreed and even when
we had different perspectives, permitted
unprecedented achievements between our two
countries at the UN Security Council during a
critical time. It was a measure of how our
relations have changed, and the potential that
change has for the world. The success of the
international coalition would not have been
possible without the strong and principled
contribution of the Soviet Union under your
personal leadership.
Now we will turn to the urgent work of building
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This will not be easy. But I believe we have an
opportunity to provide for lasting security in
the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many
problems separating Israel and both the Arab
states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the
potential to play an important role in this
effort. It is my hope that we will be able to
work together toward common objectives, once
again laying the basis for success.
Jim Baker looks forward to having a good
discussion with you on March 15. He will report
to you on his Middle East trip and review in
detail our current assessment of that troubled
region. I have also asked Jim to discuss
2
thoroughly with you the critical question of how
we can regain momentum in arms control. As I
have said before, this will require that we
resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I
would ask that you consider carefully the
message he will bring and the importance of
these two issues for the course of our future
relationship.
Sincerely,
asp
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
P.S.
I am signing this letter at Camp
David; and I am recalting our
most relaxed and pleasent
dismissions here.
I often think about the problems
you face at home, and I hope
will tell Jim if there's know
you anything you'd like we basis. to
on a my know I consider myself
private
As luchy you to be you friend
an
LIMITED ACCESS
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
1719
WASHINGTON
SIGNED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis
Purpose
To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal
cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to
reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war
problems in the Middle East and on arms control.
BACKGROUND
Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev
which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build
on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for
cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short
and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.
The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal
communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points
to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the
international coalition. It also states that our eventual
success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's
personal leadership.
The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the
Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially
important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief
Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on
March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of
arms control issues.
RECOMMENDATION
DECLASSIFIED
That you sign the letter to Gorbachev
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
(999-0304-F/
Attachment
11/29/2007 MM
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
LIMITED ACCESS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1719
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
March 7, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
X
ok
DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS
FROM:
NICHOLAS BURNS NB
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis
As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the
President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at
Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
19. Cable
Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to
3/11/91
(b)(1)
S
General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [111025Z Mar
91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By MM
on 6/12/2023
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0854-MR(518)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 12/12/2016
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
of IIIIIIII personal privacy
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
1.4(c)
<DTG> 111025Z MAR 91
1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)
<ORIG>FM
<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE
<TEXT>ZEM
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
HSUA PRESIDENTIAL 518 JBRAMY
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT NOON TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING
SECRETARY BAKER FRIDAY AND APPRECIATES PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOOD
WISHES. HE ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT
PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PUBLICLY REFUTED THE ASSERTION THAT GORBACHEV HAD
BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE DURING THE GULF WAR.
WE HAD TIME FOR ONLY THE BRIEFEST CHAT BECAUSE HE WAS SUMMONED
BY GORBACHEV JUST AFTER I ARRIVED. REGARDING THE WEEKEND'S POLITICAL
ANTICS, HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS WHEN I LAST SAW HIM: HE
THOUGHT YELTSIN HAD FINALLY DISCREDITED HIMSELF WITH THE PUBLIC AND
THAT THE KEY REPUBLICS WOULD SOON SIGN THE UNION TREATY.
THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I FEEL MAY BE
JUSTIFIED, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CONFIDENT MOOD HE CONVEYED AS
COMPARED WITH THE LAST TIME WE MET.
REGARDS,
JACK.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
SECRET
#0180
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0180 <TOR> 910311060308 MSG000289980188
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
mm 12/12/2016
george bush
But
vey interestus
Please get a
CC for TAB
Done
Need I reply
on can we
discussat
Benneda
3-6-91
Bush Presidential Library Photocopy
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting
To Taff
anie
Kanter
of Rich
Beerns
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
20. Message
Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime
3/5/91
(b)(1)
S
Minister to the President (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
21. Cable
To White House
3/1/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2
pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
By SCS
on 2/6/15
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
11-0860-MR(520)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/22/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 520 UBRARY
PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY. IN SIT
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
DTG: 0112457 MAR 91
(b)(1)
FM
MOSCOW
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
TO WHITE HOUSE
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
31 8/22/13
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BRENT:
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV HAS REPLIED TO YOUR NOTE LAST MONTH WISHING
HIM A SPEEDY RECOVERY. WE ARE POUCHING YOU THE ORIGINAL LETTER. AN
INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.
DEAR MR. SCOWCROFT:
I THANK YOU FOR THE GOOD WISHES. I HAVE RECOVERED AND I RETURNED
TO WORK AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY.
I THINK THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN US HAVE ALREADY TURNED OUT TO BE
SUCH THAT OUR MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TOWARD WHICH YOU ARE
EXPRESSING HOPE, WOULD BE USEFUL.
I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR RESPONSIBLE WORK AND ALL THE BEST FOR
YOUR FAMILY.
SECRET
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
WITH RESPECT.
S AKHROMEYEV
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
22 FEBRUARY 1991.
END TEXT.
DECL. OADR
SECRET
#0925
SECRET
THE PRESIDENT
Feb.20,1991
Dear Eduard,
Your very worm letter of Jan 20th
reached me yesterday. Thank you
much. You can take great soviet
credit very for elevating us-
relations to a new plane- - Your
efforts will be given a very positive
morh by history. I am sorry
that your frend and nine
Mihhail Gorbacher is having
difficulties; for he, too, will be judged
most kindly by history.
I hope that you will stay in
touch with Jim Bahr and with
me. we both will always he grateful
to you for many may things -
with respect - sincere but wishrs,
G Burl
The Minister
of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR
Moscow, January 20, 1991
Dear Mr. President:
In completing a major and, possibly, the most important
phase of my life connected with my work as Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, I should like to thank you sincerely for
your kind attitude toward me and my mission. If it has
succeeded even in part, this is due mostly to the desire of
U.S. leaders--and first among them, to your desire--to see in
me a worthy and honest partner, one that I have endeavored to
be.
The decision to resign did not come easily. After weighing
all the "pros" and "contras", I felt that precisely that step
was necessary today for me and for my country. In a certain way
I took that decision to protect all that we have managed to
attain during the past five and a half years.
His Excellency
George Bush, President
of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
-2-
These have been the years of an historic turn from an
anomalous confrontation of two great powers and nations to a
natural status of friendliness and partnership between them. I
am happy that much in this truly epoch-making endeavor has been
accomplished in cooperation with your administration and with
you personally.
I firmly believe that what has been achieved during these
years is immune to destructive action. The stability of the
foundations laid and of the walls of the new structure of world
policy being erected is warranted by the clearly expressed
intent of the leaders and the people of the USSR to continue on
that path.
I am certain that this is your intent as well.
Many difficult crossroads still lie ahead of us. I have
spoken out frankly and openly about the dangers that threaten
our progress. My words that democracy and freedom must prevail
were not uttered casually or accidentally.
I shall never forget our encounters, especially the last
one, when your wife and you received us at the White House at
the wonderful Christmas tree. And although the Christmas lights
have gone out, I am happy in my conviction that the great work
accomplished together will continue to shine forever.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ E. Shevardnadze
SECRET
2/21/91
EUR/SOV Translation
Dear George,
As I promised during our conversation last night, I am
informing you about the continuation of our work with T. Aziz,
the representative of the Iraqi leadership. Taking into
account the concerns you expressed in our telephone
conversation, we have tried to give concrete expression to the
commitments of the Iraqi side in relation to the withdrawal of
their forces from Kuwait, removing any linkage of this issue
with other problems. The conversation with T. Aziz, which
A. A. Bessmertnykh and Ye. M. Primakov continued today, was
long and difficult, but as a result -- and I can mention this
with satisfaction -- great progress was achieved. We managed
to agree on all aspects of the implementation of Security
Council resolution 660, and received from the Iraqis completely
precise commitments on that score. T. Aziz said that for
understandable reasons he was obliged to obtain the final
agreement of President S. Hussein, to whom the agreed
formulations were sent immediately; however, he had no doubt
that they would be approved in Baghdad.
As a result, the understanding worked out last night with
Iraq includes in definitive form the following provisions:
Iraq took upon itself the commitment to fulfill Security
Council resolution 660 literally, i.e., to withdraw its forces
from Kuwait- not in general but precisely out of Kuwait --
immediately and unconditionally, to the positions which they
occupied before the invasion of Kuwait. The withdrawal will be
carried out from the entire territory of that country. The
Iraqis withdrew their stipulations in relation to the future
political regime in re-established Kuwait. Any linkages
between the withdrawal of the forces and other issues are ruled
out. In this manner, the basis for the Security Council's
adoption of Resolution 660, and all other understandings which
followed it, will be completely eliminated.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
SECRET
ES 3/28/13
SECRET
-2-
We succeeded in establishing a precise timeframe for the
withdrawal of forces from Kuwait. In doing so it became
apparent that there were truly significant difficulties in
doing this in an extremely short timeframe. The Iraqi
representative showed that the issue here was not a lack of
political will on the part of the Iraqi leadership, but that it
was physically impossible to withdraw a half-million-man army
from Kuwait with all its weaponry and ammunition in a few
days -- all the more so, in conditions in which practically all
communications have been destroyed. By the Iraqis'
calculations, it would require 3-4 months for this.
Nonetheless, we convinced the Iraqis to accept a commitment to
complete the withdrawal within a maximum of 21 days and, as far
as the capital of Kuwait is concerned, to carry out the
withdrawal of its forces from there within four days [96
hours]. I believe it is precisely this fact -- the full
liberation of the capital of Kuwait already in the first days
-- that has the most substantive significance from all points
of view.
Commitments regarding the exchange of POWs were also
formulated. The Iraqis strictly promised to do this no later
than in the course of three days. Purely technical
difficulties prevent it from happening any quicker.
The greatest difficulty appeared in nailing down the
details of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreement that was reached
last night. We convinced the Iraqi side to withdraw the
provision requiring economic sanctions to be revoked after Iraq
had removed two-thirds of all its armed forces from Kuwait.
This formulation really caused us to be suspicious concerning
the sincerity of Iraq's promise to completely leave Kuwait. As
a result, a formulation was agreed that implies that the
remaining resolutions of the Security Council connected with
the Kuwait crisis would cease to be in effect only after the
last Iraqi soldier departed Kuwait. That, by the way, will be
an additional factor encouraging the Iraqis not to draw out the
departure of their troops from Kuwait: after the long blockade
and war, it is necessary for them as quickly as possible to
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
resume normal economic relations with other countries. This
formulation of the issue is fair in the sense that the
subsequent eleven resolutions of the Security Council resulted
from the fact of Iraq's refusal to comply with resolution 660.
We deemed it important to place the fulfillment of all of
these Iraqi obligations under strict international
verification. In accordance with this, we proposed language
about the dispatching to Kuwait of observers or peacekeeping
forces under the oversight of the UN Security Council.
I tell you without exaggeration that it seems to us that
the result that has been achieved allows us at last to declare
an end to the development of the military aspect of the
conflict and proceed toward full elimination of it through
political means. We do not consider this result only on its
own merits. That which has today emerged as a possibility to
stop the war and subsequently save perhaps many thousands of
lives -- Americans, Arabs, and citizens of other lands -- is
linked more than anything to the fact that the international
community and the Security Council have displayed extraordinary
unanimity at all stages of the conflict. For the first time in
the history of international relations since the Second World
War, joint efforts have succeeded in stopping aggression and
dealing an advance lesson to any other possible aggressor. It
would not have been achievable if there had not been a
fundamental change in relations between the Soviet Union and
United States, from confrontation to cooperation and
partnership. We have achieved a lot in arriving at a
settlement of the Namibian question, in the Cambodian issue, in
advancing significantly the matter of an Angolan settlement,
and here now, before us, is an excellent opportunity to deepen
our cooperation in the successful resolution of the crisis in
the Persian Gulf region.
Taking account of the agreement reached with the Iraqi
leadership, we will be introducing a proposal to urgently
convene the Security Council, which would then set on a
practical course the whole process of achieving the liberation
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
of Kuwait and its reestablishment as a sovereign, territorially
whole state and an equal member of the United Nations. It
would be magnificent if, in the completion of this step, our
countries could proceed together. The Soviet representative in
the Security Council has instructions to act in close contact
with the representatives of the United States and the other
governments represented in the Council.
M. Gorbachev
[Undated; delivered 22 February 1991]
Genere
2. Florence
Phone call to Gorbachev
Secretary Baker Hello
The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha
-- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted
to give to you.
I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another
engagement.
Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following.
We know you are making an intensive and useful effort as we have
said publicly.
And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is
now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities
-- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy.
It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy
Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been
started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait
and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by
which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end.
In effect, this builds on what you have done.
When the President was unable to reach you, he went ahead with a
press statement that has just been concluded. I will not repeat
that since it will be available to you. Except to say that it
provides for a 24 hour waiting period before there would be the
initiation of any ground campaign. The President said publicly
that he would be releasing a detailed statement on what we think
is required by way of Iraqi withdrawal in order to avert a ground
campaign.
This statement has not yet been released and I would like to
summarize it for you.
It says in the operative part of the statement:
In a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the
international community -- the United States after consulting
with the government of Kuwait and our other coalition partners
declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against
Iraqi forces if prior to 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb 23, Iraq
publicly accepts the following terms and communicates that to the
United Nations: The terms are as follows:
Begin a large scale withdrawal from Kuwait by 12:00 U.N. time,
Saturday Feb. 23.
Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week.
Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter
of hours, anything more than a week would not meet the full terms
of the U.N. Resolution.
Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait
City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government
of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the
Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'iyan and Warbah and
from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field.
Within the one week specified above return all forces to their
positions of August 1 in accordance with 660.
In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country
civilians being held against their will.
Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen.
This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the
withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours.
Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti
oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already
be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison
officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational
details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on
land or sea mines.
Cease combat air patrols over Iraq and Kuwait except for
transport flights carrying withdrawing troops. And allow
coaltion aircraft exclusive control over and use of Kuwaiti
airspace.
Cease all actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and
release all Kuwaiti detainees.
U.S. and coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not
attack retreating Iraqi forces. And will exercise restraint as
long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above
guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.
Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not
read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer
to you must be eliminated. This means the statement that there
must be a recision of all other U.N. resolutions. And the
suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions
in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived
back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with
you.
The President Mikhail, I am anxious to get your reaction. Jim
tells me he has read you the entire statement. But I must tell
you I can't believe that Tariq Aziz knew what Saddam was going to
2
do to these oil fields. The photographs from the air are
absolutely unbelievable they are so devastating. I am so glad to
have this conversation and sorry we couldn't get the call through
before I made the public statement. The details of what Jim has
read to you have not been made public yet. But Marlin Fitzwater
will be announcing it very soon. What is the state of play on
your end? Thanks for trying hard once again.
Gorbachev O.K. thanks and hello to you. I was away because I had
to attend a big political rally in the Kremlin Palace for Army
Day and I really was not in a position to leave that gathering
because all the T.V. cameras were there and I had 6000 people
there.
The President We are both slaves to the T.V. that's why I had to
go ahead with my statement.
Gorbachev So there is no misunderstanding. Now on substance.
I listened very carefully to what Jim has been reading out to me
and I have several questions. The way I understand it, what we
did over the past 24 hours in agreeing with Iraq and what is
submitted to Saddam is not acceptable to participants in the
coalition. I wish to recall once again, exactly what I mean.
And this is how the problem looks and we are awaiting a reply
from Saddam.
(1) Iraq agrees to fully comply with the terms of the U.N.
Resolution in other words to immediately and unconditionally
withdraw all of its troops to their positions prior to August 1.
That is quoted from the U.N. resolution.
The resolution does not mention Kuwait but we incorporated it
into our first point.
(2) The withdrawal of troops is to begin the day following the
ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the air, sea and
ground.
(3) The withdrawal of troops is to be completed within 21 days --
including Kuwait city within the first four days.
JIm mentioned that it took a short time for Iraq to send in its
troops -- to be true to reality -- he was building that group for
seven months.
Now Iraq first demanded a three-four month period then he said he
would need six weeks but we pressed for a twenty-one day period
and we said if we agreed to that time frame it might still be an
unacceptable condition for the U.S. and the coalition.
(4) After the completion of withdrawals from Kuwait the motives
behind the other U.N. Resolutions will have run their course and
will no longer be necessary.
3
This is not a precondition this is just for the U.N. Security
Council to be seized with the issue and to take appropriate
decisions.
(5) All POWs will be released and repatriated within 3 days of
the cessation of hostilities. This has even tougher language
than your proposal.
(6) Confirmation, verification and monitioring will be carried
out by observers and/or by a peacekeeping force to be decided by
the U.N. Security Council.
I wish to express my initial reaction to what I heard from Jim.
But I must put to you and to myself the following question.
Where does our priority lie in putting a final touch on this
settlement is it a political approach or the continuation of
military operations and the escalation to ground operations.
Now, I saw my role in cooperation with you in trying to find a
political solution, as trying to protect the U.S. servicemen and
peaceful Iraqi civilians from the suffering that may befall them.
If you share this understanding then our task is to find a
solution that is tough but also implementable.
From this point of view the demands that troops be withdrawn in 1
week would be impossible to comply with and would open the way
for continuation of the military course. Now of course it would
be different if you see this political option of settlement as
unacceptable. But if on the basis of what we have been able to
accomplish here, though we are waiting for a reply from Saddam
Hussein, and also on the basis of what you have suggested -- if
we could combine them for the Security Council into a joint U.S.- -
Soviet approach. That would be very important solution if we
could do that -- I will pass on to something else.
In the Security Council we could promptly consider the whole
complex of a joint plan based on what the two of us have said --
we would have a joint thing that we could consider in the U.N.
Security Council.
Especially since if we use political language on the need to
withdraw troops from Kuwait city within four days there is a
convergence between us and also on the POWs.
What matters most is that by acting in this way we could show
that as in the first instance, now at the very end we are acting
together and have used all possible means including the first
phase of military activity and now have succeeded in making Iraq
backtrack and comply with the U.N. resolution. This would have
taught a lesson to all others and this will be a new reality that
all potential and likely aggressors would have to reckon with.
Also by acting in this way we would avert the sliding into a
difficult and dangerous phase.
4
I would say that this would be a major victory. The world at
large and Americans would give due course to your actions and
also to our activities. And in light of the steady cooperation
of the the two of us and our other partners this would be
indicative of the current state of our relations. This would
indicate that the two Presidents while remaining true to their
principles never forgot that the highest principle is the
preservation of human life.
If we accept that approach we may not get 100% support but there
is every likelihood we could get 80-90% support. Therefore now
that we have a very good shot at a political solution, I wish
that we could avoid the situation sliding into a difficult phase
and you and I should not squander the opportunity before us. I
think we should not succumb to pressure and grow jittery. I want
to be frank, we are feeling pressure in this country and I know
there is pressure from others -- some would push us toward what
we don't want to do. If we manage to turn events in the
direction I have described, it would be an achievement that would
last for sometime to come.
So much for my line of argument. I am sorry I have been so
emotional and used charged language.
The President. First I have to question. I am correct in saying
that Saddam has not agreed to your six points?
Gorbachev. Tariq Aziz said that he was certain the President
would support the six points but he had to transmit them
personally. This is understandable jsut as Bessmertnykh or Baker
cannot consent without the President.
The President. Do you have a time when he is supposed to come
back to you?
Gorbachev. He said immediately. This reply could come anytime.
Aziz has stayed in Moscow and he is using the lines of
communication we offered him. He has a man in our Embassy in
Baghdad.
The President. Thanks for that clarification. We and those that
I have consulted with and that Jim has consulted and our military
are absolutely convinced he can withdraw in one week. Our
initial proposal was 96 hours. He can get out if he is serious
about it. We think he can get out in one week -- we have a
difference there.
Now on the broad philosophical approach you have outlined for me.
I expect that you have people in your country that suggest you
are too close with the United States. That is particularly true
because of the good relationship with Iraq that you have had over
the years and we understand that. Similarly, we have elements in
this country who suggest we are staying too close to the center
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in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have
elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines --here who
take a different view than Jim and I do.
In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your
role and value your role and believe you are making a
contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We
view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have
tried to do as politically courageous given your long
relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your
ethnic groups' sentiment.
I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound
differences at this moment on this particular question.
Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the
U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust
Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally
incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked.
He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the
prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done
today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He
knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful
solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around
and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to
some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that
after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions
and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone
could have thought after his speech.
But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I
think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to
show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning.
About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me
pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one
from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of
Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city
I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in
good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles
again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over
there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that
I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined
to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda
was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and
didn't target- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years
old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the
young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I
know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.
Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human
life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and
because of our position -- the forces of the coaltion. And I
know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult
position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I
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cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is
on the wall. It is not just the U.S it is the rest of this
coaltion and that we must have compliance with our proposal now.
This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your
proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been
patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and
after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This
proposal is deadly serious.
I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my
request is that you support our position after trying hard for a
more reasonable position from you point of view but one that for
the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you
can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We
have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet
Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I
want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We
will never change from the view that you have a critically
important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are
your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want
to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know
how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as
possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine
what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this
that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the
lives you and I both want to.
That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will
send the proposal on and welcome your views.
Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or
two.
First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein.
I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us
to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his
prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on
the other side he is the only realistic figure there.
Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has
employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the
possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have
behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests
with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I
am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by
turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could
avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main
concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.
Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz
Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them
to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your
approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as
follows -- that we tentatively decide:
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We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the
U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package
of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that
meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that
meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the
best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an
intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we
will continue to give priority to our relationship with the
United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before
the international community and our peoples is to resolve the
conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while
avoiding a tragedy.
The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of
Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this
through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678
through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan
and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a
mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But
having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will
discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you
know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.
Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his
agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is
satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now
we need to hear from him again.
The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a
concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional
withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that
here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.
Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people
on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and
naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because
no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very
good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -
- I want to personally assure you of that.
Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference
but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall
apart over Iraq.
Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to
know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the
matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give
some serious thought to the way the position is developing and
where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic
would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on
what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation.
Best regards to your family.
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The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more
often in these difficult times.
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