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China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
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China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
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China Chronological Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
OA/ID Number:
91133
Folder ID Number:
91133-002
Folder Title:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
4
5
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Cable
From White House, Re: [Letter from President Bush to Deng
9/6/90
(b)(1)
S
Xiaoping] [060756Z Sep 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS
REDACTED] (3 pp.)
01b. Draft Cable
From White House, Re: [Letter from President Bush to Deng
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Xiaoping] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)
01c. Letter
President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)
8/30/90
(b)(1)
02a. Memo
Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft
9/14/90
(b)(1)
/
Re: Your Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of China, September
17, 1990, 5:00 6:00 p.m. EDT (1 pp.)
02b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of
n.d.
(b)(1)
/
China (2 pp.)
03a. Memo
Richard C. Barth to Robert M. Gates
9/21/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Computer Cases for China (2 pp.)
03b. Background
Re: ACEP Background Paper (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Paper
03c. Letter
Dr. Bo Denysyk to Larry Hall (2 pp.)
3/19/90
(b)(1)
03d. Report
Re: Advisory Committee on Export Policy (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1110
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
03e. Letter
Dr. Bo Denysyk to Larry Hall (1 pp.)
12/13/89
(b)(1)
03f. Letter
Dr. Bo Denysyk to Dennis E. Kloske (2 pp.)
4/19/90
(1)
03g. Background
Re: ACEP Background Paper (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Paper
03h. Attachment
Re: Attachment A Special Conditions and Statement of
n.d.
(b)(1)
Implementation (9 pp.)
03i. Diagram
Re: Schematic Diagram (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03j. Background
Re: ACEP Background Paper (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Paper
03k. Report
Re: Control Data Corporation China State Meteorological
n.d.
(b)(1)
Administration End Use and Security Safeguards Plan (3 pp.)
04a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to Brent Scowcroft
10/5/90
(b)(1)
$
Re: The Gulf Crisis and U.S. -China Relations (2 pp.)
04b. Report
The Domestic Dynamic in China's Response to the Persian Gulf
9/24/90
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
Crisis [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)
04c. Memo
Re: Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft
9/25/90
(b)(1)
Re: The Gulf Crisis and U.S.-China Relations (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1110
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9007079
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 06 SEP 90 15
TO: DENG XIAOPING
CHRON FILE
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 06 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHINA PR
HS
4
PERSONS: ZHU QIZHEN
SUBJECT: LTR TO CHMN DENG XIAOPING FM PRES RE US CHINA RELATIONS
ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE
DUE DATE: 10 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
September 5, 1990
GENERAL SCOWCROFT/BOB GATES:
I would like to send
Jim Lilley the attached
message relaying a copy
of the President's message
to Deng.
VV/Doug Doug Paal Paalln
OK to
dispatch
Cable. not
urgenT.
per Doug
Preal.
Dona
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01a. Cable
From White House, Re: [Letter from President Bush to Deng
9/6/90
(b)(1)
S
Xiaoping] [060756Z Sep 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS
REDACTED] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
China Chronological Files
By MM
on 1/26/2016
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2009-1101-MR(500.01)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 4/8/2014
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
IMMEDIATE
toty
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 03
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 500.01 UBRARY
PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PAAL PRIVACY : OUT SIT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 060756Z SEP 9 0
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
1.4(c)
PER E.O. 13526
TO
BEIJING
2009-1101-MR
4/8/2014 MM
SECRET
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROT
TO:
EMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
-
ON AUG 31. THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO DENG
XIAOPING WAS PRESENTED TO AMB. ZHU.
-
COPY ATTACHED.
-
FYI - - YOU WILL RECEIVE SEPTEL, THROUGH NODIS CHANNELS, AN ACCOUNT
OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT AND AMB. ZHU
AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS HANDED OVER.
-
-
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
-
I AM WRITING TO YOU, MY OLD FRIEND, TO REEMPHASIZE THE HIGH
IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO THE U.S. CHINA RELATIONSHIP. OUR RELATIONS
REMAIN FUNDAMENTAL TO PEACE AND STABILITY, NOT ONLY IN ASIA, BUT IN
THE ENTIRE WORLD. THIS REMAINS AN OBJECTIVE FACT, DESPITE THE
TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTIES AND CHANGES CURRENTLY BEFORE US.
-
THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE NO ATTEMPTS TO MARGINALIZE OR DOWNGRADE
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 03
THIS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. THE RECENT U.S. POLICY
ADJUSTMENT ON CAMBODIA IS NOT A DEPARTURE FROM OUR SHARED GOAL OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT THERE. RATHER. IT WAS AN
ADJUSTMENT IN APPROACH NECESSARY TO OVERCOME GROWING CONGRESSIONAL
OPPOSITION TO U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE. I
REGRET THAT PREMATURE PRESS LEAKS OBSCURED THE IMPORTANT PROGRESS
TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE MADE IN THE PERM FIVE DISCUSSIONS IN
PARIS. I AM GRATIFIED BY THE PERM FIVE AGREEMENT THIS WEEK ON AN
INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR CAMBODIA AND HOPE THAT THE CAMBODIAN
FACTIONS CAN BE INDUCED TO ACCEPT IT IN GOOD FAITH.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE PRINCIPLED
POSITION TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF
KUWAIT I BELIEVE A USEFUL MESSAGE IS CONVEYED TO ALL COUNTRIES
WHEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN STAND TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT.
YOU AND 1, I BELEIVE. HAVE TRIED OUR BEST TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF
RESTORING OUR RELATIONS TO A MORE POSITIVE COURSE. BOTH SIDES HAVE
TAKEN STEPS. INCLUDING SOME VERY BIG ONES. YOUR DIFFICULT BUT WISE
DECISION TO PERMIT THE DEPARTURE OF THE FANG LIZHI FAMILY WAS
HELPFUL, AND I EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION. IN MY JUDGMENT, THIS IS
LIKELY TO BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION DEBATE.
NEVERTHELESS. MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE TO IMPLEMENT THE PACKAGE
SOLUTION. I HAVE INDICATED DESIRABLE FURTHER STEPS IN MY PREVIOUS
LETTERS AND IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS.
FOR NOW, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE PRIORITY I ATTACH TO THE NEXT U.S.
STEP: WINNING A CONTINUATION OF CHINA'S MOST-FAVORED-NATION
STATUS. THAT IS, OF COURSE. A CRUCIAL NEXT STEP. I AM COMPELLED
TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE ON THE CHINESE SIDE
BEFORE I CAN GUARANTEE A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS. ANY
SUCH STEPS YOUR SIDE CAN TAKE WILL MOVE TOWARD ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
THE PACKAGE SOLUTION WHICH IS SO MUCH IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. I AM
WRITING YOU THIS LETTER FROM OUR VACATION SPOT ON THE MAINE COAST
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 03
I AM HOPEFUL THAT YOU HAD SOME TIME FOR REST AND RECREATION AT YOUR
OWN SPECIAL SEASIDE PLACE - - BEIDAIHE.
-
PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM. PERSONAL REGARDS.
-
SINCERELY,
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
-
END OF TEXT
-
=0084
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b. Draft Cable
From White House, Re: [Letter from President Bush to Deng
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Xiaoping] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
China Chronological Files
By MM
on 1/26/2016
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2009-1101-MR(500.01)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 4/8/2014
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
PRIORITY
SECRET
SECRET
>PREC> PRIORITY >CLAS> SECRET >DTG>
FM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: 1.4(c) BEIJING
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 500.02 UBRARY
SECRET
SEPT 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS
FM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
A
TO: EMBASSY BEIJING, PRIORITY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY
BEGIN TEXT.
ON AUG. 31, THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO DENG
XIAOPING WAS PRESENTED TO AMB. ZHU.
COPY ATTACHED TEXT.
FYI -- YOU WILL RECEIVE SEPTEL, THROUGH NODIS CHANNELS, AN
ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT AND
AMB. ZHU AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS HANDED OVER.
END TEXT.
BT.
SECRET
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1101-MR
4/8/2014 MM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 30, 1990
11 Your Excellency:
I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize
the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China
relationship. Our relations remain fundamental
to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in
the entire world. This remains an objective fact,
despite the tremendous difficulties and changes
currently before us.
The United States will make no attempts to
marginalize or downgrade this important strategic
relationship. The recent U.S. policy adjustment
on Cambodia is not a departure from our shared
goal of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict
there. Rather, it was an adjustment in approach
necessary to overcome growing Congressional
opposition to U.S. assistance to the Cambodian
resistance. I regret that premature press leaks
prevented appropriate consultations in advance
with your government and that the leaks obscured
the important progress toward our common objective
made in the Perm Five discussions in Paris. I am
gratified by the Perm Five Agreement this week on
an interim administration for Cambodia and hope
that the Cambodian factions can be induced to
accept it in good faith.
I would also like to express my appreciation for
the principled position taken by your government
regarding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
I believe a useful message is conveyed to all
countries when our two governments can stand
together in support of the fundamental principles
of international conduct.
You and I, I believe, have tried our best to begin
the process of restoring our relations to a more
positive course. Both sides have taken steps,
including some very big ones. Your difficult but
2
wise decision to permit the departure of the Fang
Lizhi family was helpful, and I express my
appreciation. In my judgment, this is likely to
be a crucial factor in the most-favored-nation
debate. Nevertheless, more remains to be done to
implement the package solution. I have indicated
desirable further steps in my previous letters and
in discussions between our governments.
For now, I want to emphasize the priority I attach
to the next U.S. step: winning a continuation of
China's most-favored-nation status. That is, of
course, a crucial next step. I am compelled to
say, however, that more needs to be done on the
Chinese side before I can guarantee a general
improvement in our relations. Any such steps your
side can take will move toward accomplishment of
the package solution which is so much in our
mutual interest. I am writing you this letter
from our vacation spot on the Maine Coast. I am
hopeful that you had some time for rest and
recreation at your own special seaside place --
Beidaihe.
Please accept my warm, personal regards.
Sincerely,
GBul
His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beidaihe, China
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
D
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
90 ATD: 40 A10:40
90SEP 6
E7.916
West Wing Desk
/
NSC Secretariat
Log FRD
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Comback Copy TO Douy Paal
only.
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Lonnie
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9007330
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 90 15
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: PAAL
DOC DATE: 13 SEP 90
JACKSON
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHINA PR
ANSA
4
PERSONS: HAN XU
SUBJECT: MTG W/ AMB HAN XU OF CHINA ON 16 SEP
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 18 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PAAL
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GANTT
JACKSON
NSC CHRON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMJT
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
WEA
LOG # 7330
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG LMSA A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
was Ken Hill
1
KH
A
Bill Sittmann
2
Bob Gates
a
3
300
Brent Scowcroft
11:5d 11 Sd 06_06 06
4
Decomed
Bill Sittmann
TAB A X
Situation Room
President
R
West Wing Desk
2
per General
NSC Secretariat
5
Jhn 10/18
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CEi
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Han Xu
mtg 9/17 5:00pm
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Doug hopes you are
these w/ President Doug
class want to weake Du Meed
you
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7330
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 14, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
LNKARL JACKSON NB
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL
be
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of China,
September 1/7 1990, 5:00 - 6:00 p.m. EDT
Han Xu, "Tiger" Yang and Ambassador Zhu Qizhen will be making an
essentially social call on you as "old friends.' " Nevertheless,
the state of our relations with China makes it very likely they
will want to air their complaints about our policy and seek new
US action.
The points at Tab A are intended to provide you and the President
reminders of the positive steps we have taken and our assessment
of the current state of play in the relationship and Congress.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the points to be made at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Points to be Made
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F11
@ 3/31/10
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7330
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR HAN XU OF CHINA
-- Our goal remains to restore our relations to a positive
course, one that will be sustainable in both of our
countries.
--
Your steps to release the Fang Lizhi family and to hold up
your international responsibilities in the Gulf crisis and
Cambodia have been recognized and welcomed by us.
--
We have also taken steps gradually to improve relations.
--
After Fang Lizhi left China, we used the Houston summit to
give the go-ahead for Japan's third yen loan and to explore
expanding the scope of World Bank lending for China, in step
with further progress.
-- We then gave a warm reception to Mayor Zhu Rongji's
delegation, far beyond anything we would have done for a
mayoral delegation from any other country.
--
We also sent Assistant Secretary Dick Solomon to China when
the opportunity presented itself with the Gulf crisis.
-- Our strategy now is to insure the China's most favored
nation status is retained. Congress can act at any time
before the end of this session to deny MFN.
--
I do not want to do anything that will provoke the Congress
into voting against MFN.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1101-MR
4/8/2014 MM
CONF IDENTIAL
2
CONFIDENTIAL
--
Your actions in dealing with Cambodia and the Gulf crisis
have helped reduce the heat in the Congress; but that can be
reversed overnight if the Congress perceives China is
working against our interests in the Gulf or if there is a
new brutal suppression of disorder in China.
--
After the Congress ends this session, we will have greater
scope to begin to lift the sanctions.
--
You will need to take action, releasing the remaining
prisoners and ending the jamming of VOA, in order for us to
overcome the legal impediments to, for example, our World
Bank voting and TDP activity.
--
Other steps, such as gradually raising the level of our
political dialogue, do not require -- but will be eased by
-- actions on your part.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9007543
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 21 SEP 90 16
TO: GATES
CHRON FILE
FROM: BARTH
DOC DATE: 21 SEP 90
DEAL
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHINA PR
EXPORT CONTROLS
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS
SCIENTIFIC
4
PERSONS: BERMAN, W
SUBJECT: COMPUTER CASES FOR CHINA
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 25 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BARTH
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BARTH
DEAL
KANTER
NSC CHRON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGLM
CLOSED BY: NSRLG
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03a. Memo
Richard C. Barth to Robert M. Gates
9/21/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Computer Cases for China (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ACEP BACKGROUND PAPER
OCM 90-6/D018524,D028987,D029013,D022022
POLICY REGARDING THE EXPORT OF DOWNGRADED
CONVEX C-120 COMPUTERS TO THE PRC
ISSUE
Does the proposed export of four downgraded Convex C-120 Computer
Systems to legitimate civil end users in the PRC, with the
safeguards imposed by the ACEP in 1988 for the approval of a C-1
computer to the Institute of Atmospheric Physics, present an
unacceptable risk to our national security?
BACKGROUND
Convex Computer Corporation has filed four export license
applications to export four downgraded Convex C-120 Computer
Systems to various civil end users in the PRC. These
applications represent an aggregate value of approximately $2.7
million. The applicant states that each system will be identical
to the downgraded C-1 computer system approved for export under
license number B252667 (OCM 1913, ACEP ILD 469 dated 11/11/88).
The applicant has further stated that these four computer systems
cannot be networked, nor can they be upgraded to C2 or C3 series
systems which are capable of networking (see Attachment A).
The Convex C-120 has a PDR of only 252 Mbps, but it has a scalar
and a vector processor. Because the vector processor can perform
an add and a multiply instruction simultaneously, it is a multi-
data-stream processing (MDSP) computer and is, therefore, at the
general exception level. The MDSP feature allows a computer to
perform two or more arithmetic operations simultaneously,
however, the same efficiency can be achieved by a computer with a
higher PDR. The vector processor has a theoretical peak
performance (TPP) of 20 MFLOPS, but the model under consideration
in these applications has been downgraded to 16 MFLOPS.
Two of these C-120's (D028987 and D029013) are to be used in
meteorological studies, the same end use as in B252667, one is to
be used in oil exploration and development (D018524), and one is
to be used in power generation studies (D022022). It should be
noted that all of these uses are legitimate civil activities
under our export policy toward the PRC. Moreover, EXCON has
advised us that it has no derogatory information on any of the
four end users.
The previous approval, B252667, involved the export of a Convex
C-1 Computer System to the Institute of Atmospheric Physics in
Beijing. This case was elevated to the ACEP level and, following
exhaustive technical review by the agencies and protracted
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negotiations with Convex, the ACEP approved the case in November
1988, subject to extensive downgrades and monitoring conditions
designed to minimize the risk of diversion or reverse engineering
(see Attachment B). On December 13, 1989, the applicant reported
full compliance with these conditions (see Attachment C).
On April 19, 1990, Under Secretary Dennis Kloske received a
letter from the applicant urging a prompt decision because they
are in danger of losing this sale if this license application is
not approved by the end of May, 1990 (see Attachment D).
COMMERCE AND STATE POSITION
The U.S. has already provided the PRC with a more powerful level
of computing capability. In D017005, the U.S. approved a system
consisting of a cluster of 5 IBM 3081/3838s and a Star ST-50
array transform processor. The aggregate performance of this
cluster is 75 MFLOPS (estimated). The capability of this system
is 5 times more powerful than the modified C-120 under
consideration.
The previous approval of the Convex C-1 was based on the
conclusion that all of our national security concerns with this
export had been adequately satisfied by the conditions of
approval, and that approval constituted a precedent, irrespective
of what DOD may have stated at the time.
DOD POSITION
Defense believes that the Convex C-120, even with the downgrades
and safeguards imposed on B252667, should not be approved,
because of its multi-data-stream processing capability, and that
the approval of B252667 should not be considered a precedent for
approval of such computer systems. Therefore, the four pending
applications should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
Commerce and State recommend approval of these four applications,
subject to the same conditions of approval as those imposed on
B252667 (see Attachment B).
Attachments
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Attachment A
March 19, 1990
Mr. Larry Hall
Senior Electronic Engineer
Computer Systems Technical Center
U.S. Department of Commerce Room 4082
14th and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20230
Dear Mr. Hall:
Please allow me to submit, on behalf of our client, Convex
Computer Corporation of Dallas, Texas, certain information that you
requested regarding "networking" of Convex computers.
Before discussing the technical aspect of the networking of
Convex computers, you may recall that one of the conditions of the
export license approved last year for the Institute of Atmospheric
Physics (IAP) that stated that there would not be any networking
capabilities within the computer. This condition has, of course,
been strictly complied with. Since the computers described in the
proposed four license applications (No.'s C306452, C306429,
C133038, C308707) are identical to the downgraded IAP computer, no
networking capability exists within the subject computers.
On a technical level, the networking of computers implies real
time (or neal real time) sharing or resources amongst computers,
to more efficiently process software. To accomplish this real time
sharing, "closely" and/or "tightly" coupled operating systems are
required at each node of the network. Also, certain hardware must
be present to rapidly transfer software/data and commands from one
computer to another. This hardware includes communication and
logic hardware. Lastly, certain high level software/firmware
is required to monitor the overall network for one of the computers
in the network to ensure continued real time, efficient allocation
of workload, and successful termination of processing. I might
note that workload balancing and allocation is especially critical
among the computer nodes of a network. Without the necessary
hardware/software, the computers are "stand-alone" computers.
GLOBAL USA Inc.
Suite 650
2121 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel. (202) 296-2400, Tlx. 248273 GLBL UR, Fax. (202) 296-2409
Larry Hall
March 19, 1990
Page 2
The C120 Series of computers manufactured by Convex and
proposed for export to the PRC do not contain any of the networking
features/capabilities described above. These computers were
designed to be stand-alone computers to process certain scientific
problems. Neither the operating system nor hardware can
accommodate even a minimal level of networking.
The only external communication that the C120 Series is
capable of is simple data/file/command transfer from a terminal or
another peripheral. The C120 can, of course, also accept this file
transfer from another computer but, in essence, the transferring
computer acts as a terminal to the receiving computer. There is
no "coupling" between the processors. Lastly, the C120 is capable
of linking to a local area network - LAN - (such as Ethernet) as
a node but only responds as a stand-alone computer that will
process information supplied from other parts of the LAN.
There are Convex computers, such as the C2 Series and the
soon-to-be-announced C3 Series, that are capable of networking, but
this capability simply does not exist in the C120 series. You may
know that it is impossible to upgrade from a C120 to a C2 or C3
series computer, due to different architecture, software, hardware,
etc.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions
or comments.
With best regards, I remain,
Very truly yours,
Dr. Bo Denysyk
Senior Vice President
Attachment 3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPORT POLICY
Conditions of Approval for OCM 1913/B252667
1. The Equivalent Multiply Rate (EMR) of the Convex C-1 is to be
irreversibly downgraded by twenty percent (20%), from 20 million
operations/second to not more than 16 million
operations/second. This downgrade in performance will be
implemented in the vector hardware by changes to 2 printed
circuit boards executing the multiply function;
2. The applicant will make hardware and software changes necessary
to monitor the operation of the Convex C-1 on a continuing basis
by installing hidden, non-erasable software that records, on
protected media, all of the activities of the computer as it is
being used (i.e., a day file). The tapes recording such use
will be reviewed monthly by the applicant's or Convex's
representatives, who are COCOM nationals. Any misuse of the
computer shall be promptly reported to the Department of
Commerce;
3. All software, except the minimum necessary for installation and
operation, is to be in object code only;
4. The applicant will make firmware changes to reduce irreversibly
by fifty percent (50%) the execution rate of the following
logical operations: XORVECTOR, ORVECTOR, ANDVECTOR and
POPCOUNTVECTOR. The microcode will not be accessible by the end
user and will be protected by internal software checks.
5. Networking is to be limited to local area networks only. No
X.25 level 3 software or higher communication protocols are to
be provided;
6. The applicant's or Convex's representatives, who are COCOM
nationals, will be required to verify on-site installation of
the Convex computer system, visit the site every three months
for a period of three years, and report the results of these
visits to the Department of Commerce;
7. No manuals, hardware training or other technical data will be
provided, except that which will allow repair at the board level
only. Only technical data which allows a fault to be traced to
a faulty board is to be furnished.
8. No training or assistance for software design/modification is to
be provided;
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-2-
9. All repairs and maintenance of the CPU and main memory boards
will be performed by the applicant's or Convex's
representatives, who are COCOM nationals. All parts required
for such repairs and maintenance will be held by the applicant
in a Free World country for use on a one-for-one exchange
basis. The applicant will be responsible for retaining custody
of, or destroying, all defective parts associated with the CPU
or main memory boards. All other parts needed for repair or
maintenance may be stored in the PRC in the minimum quantities
required for a three-month period of operation.
FOR Orders USE ONLY
Attachment :
December 13, 1989
Mr. Larry O. Hall
U.S. Department of Commerce Room 4082
14th and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20230
Dear Mr. Hall:
Please allow me to inform you that the conditions specified
in license number B252667, approved last year for the Institute of
Atmospheric Physics (IAP), Beijing, PRC, have been fully satisfied
as of December 11, 1989.
The Convex computer installed at IAP was modified and
downgraded from the original C1 model specifications to those
specified in the subject license. The final modifications were
completed by Mr. Pip, an employee of Convex, on December 10, 1989.
We apologize for the delay. Unforseen technical problems and
Convex's requirement to ensure an "error free" modification from
the onset delayed the final modification.
Please note that the modification cost exceeded $250, 000, none
of which can be recovered from the Chinese on the IAP sale. These
costs can be recovered, however, if the U.S. government allows a
relatively small number of computers for export to the PRC. The
modified machine is only marketable in the PRC.
If necessary, a visit by U.S. Embassy personnel to IAP can be
arranged for verification purposes.
I hope these completed modifications will now allow the four
pending export licenses (D018524, D029013, DO28987, D038061) for
identical computers proposed for export to the PRC to move forward
and be approved.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions
or comments.
Very truly yours,
Bo Bo Denpaph Denysyk
Dr
Senior Vice President
CC: Kenneth Kin, Convex-Singapore
Lana Yeager, Convex-Richardson, Texas
GLOBAL USA Inc. Suite 650 2121 K Street. N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20037 Tel. (202) 296-2400, Tlx. 248273 GLBL UR. Fax. 202) 296-2409
Attachment D
RECEIVED
AS
1990 APR 25 A 5: 46
April 19, 1990
The Honorable Dennis E. Kloske
Under Secretary for Export Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce Room 3898B
14th Street and Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20230
Dear Dennis:
Please allow me to mention a matter relating to the four
pending requests by our client, the Convex Computer Corporation,
(Nos. C306452, C306429, C133038, C308707) to export certain
computers to the People's Republic of China. Please excuse this
inconvenience, but we have been informed that an Advisory Committee
on Export Policy (ACEP) meeting has been scheduled to discuss these
cases and that you may be involved in this process.
The foreign trade organization for the Chinese Academy of
Science has formally notified Convex that they will cancel all
contracts at the end of May, 1990 unless there is visible progress
in the export license approval process. Also, the World Lab (the
international meteorological organization headquartered in Rome and
the financial support organization for one of the Convex computers)
has formally notified Convex of their intent to cancel their
contract. The World Lab is the actual "contract signer" and
purchaser of one of the computers, even though it will reside at
the Chinese Academy of Science. The computer will be used for
dessertification and other meteorological research that will be
published through the world Lab.
If the Convex contracts are cancelled, the Chinese will
likely purchase either a VAX 8800 or a similar Siemens computer
(the Siemens computer is actually manufactured by Hitachi). Both
of these competing computers are comparable in throughput to the
downgraded C120 proposed for export to the PRC. While a direct
comparison of scalar/vector capabilities of the C120 and the VAX
will not show a direct match, the throughput is virtually identical
for both computers (the Convex 120 vector capacity is higher than
the VAX, but the scalar capacity is much lower, with the result of
roughly equal throughput). It is, therefore, not entirely clear
to us why VAX's are approved relatively routinely to the PRC, while
the Convex computers have encountered a rather lengthy review
process.
Dennis Kloske
April 19, 1990
Page 2
Please note that we are not certain whether the Chinese and
World Lab threats are real, but we are treating them as real. If
they are real, Convex will lose over two million dollars in
revenue, another $250, 000 spent for the original downgrade for the
first Convex computer already approved for China, and serious
damage to their reputation as a reliable supplier.
Your continued interest and support is sincerely appreciated,
and please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions
or comments.
With best regards, I remain,
Very truly yours,
Dr WD Bo Denysyk
Senior Vice President
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ACEP BACKGROUND PAPER
OCM 90-21/D045372 AND D051804
EXPORT OF AN IBM 3090 MODEL 120S WITH VECTOR
AND RELATED SEISMIC DATA ANALYSIS SOFTWARE
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ISSUE
The IBM 3090 Model 120S with vector is a COCOM general exception
computer and has near supercomputer performance capability. A
computer of this class has never been approved to China even
though since 1983 the U.S. has approved large general exception
level computers for seismic data analysis. The issue is should
the U.S. Government approve the export of an IBM 3090 Model 120S
with vector and seismic software. The seismic software is also
general exception, but it has been approved previously to China.
BACKGROUND
D045372 is for the sale of an IBM 3090 Model 120S with vector to
the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for seismic data
analysis. The software is to be provided by the Western
Geophysical Division of the Western Atlas International under
D051804. DoD has recommended denial of the hardware application
and returning the software application without action.
The Model 120S is a general exception computer because the vector
processor is an array processor with an equivalent multiply rate
(EMR) that exceeds the current PRC Green Line limit of 800,000
operations per second (OPS). IBM does not publish an EMR rate
for the Model 120S vector processor; however, based on published
MFLOPS rating for this computer, it has an estimated EMR rate of
60 million OPS.
COMMERCE POSITION
Commerce recommends approval because of:
(1) Legitimate need. Seismic data analysis requires processing
a very large amount of data. Since oil exploration is an
important activity, large (general exception) computers have
been approved for this end use. An example is D017005 which
was approved last December. This system consists of a
cluster of 5 IBM 3081/3838s and a Star ST-50 array transform
processor. The aggregate performance of this cluster is 75
MFLOPS (estimated). The capability of the Model 120S is
about 60% higher than this cluster. Although the Model 120S
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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would be the most powerful computer system ever exported to
the PRC, its approval is consistent with our policy of
approving the export of general exception computers for
seismic data processing.
(2) Reliable end-user. The CNPC seismic data analysis center
began its operation in August 1983 with an IBM 3033. An
improvement was made in 1987 with the addition of an IBM
3081 and an IBM 4381. The center is now processing seismic
data on a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, schedule. The IBM
3090 will replace the IBM 3033, which will be transferred to
CNPC if this transfer is approved by the U.S. Government.
No abuse or violation has been reported since the center was
established.
(3) Rigorous safeguards. Since 1983, the U.S. government has
imposed conditions to safeguard against possible
unauthorized use of the approved computers. Western
nationals have manned and operated this center 24 hours a
day and filed monthly reports with the Department of
Commerce. The Model 120S would be approved subject to the
same safeguards.
DEFENSE POSITION
Defense recommends denial because the Model 120S with vector is
too advanced. No supercomputer has been approved to China
before. The Model 120S should therefore be denied because it has
near supercomputer performance capability. Furthermore, this
approval would set a new precedent and would extend the Yellow
Zone for China significantly.
RECOMMENDATION
Commerce recommends approval with extension of the conditions
imposed on the computers currently installed at this site to
include the IBM 3090.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
OCM90-21
ATTACHMENT A
SPECIAL CONDITIONS AND
STATEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION
CONDITIONS FOR WESTERN GEOPHYSICAL'S EXPORT OF AN
IBM 3081 COMPUTER SYSTEM TO THE PETROLEUM CORPORATION OF
THE PRC: OC MEMO 1819/758074
It is understood that the IBM 3081 Computer System, all components thereof,
equipment and software related thereto (hereinafter referred to as "the computer system")
as set forth in the License Application Number A758074, shall be used exclusively for
production processing of geophysical data associated with oil and gas exploration; and
It is further understood that the applicant, Western Geophysical Co. of America
(hereinafter "WESTERN"), shall retain full title to, and ownership of, the computer
system under its services contract with the Petroleum Corporation of the People's
Republic of China (hereinafter "the PCPRC"). Access to the computer system by the
PCPRC to be limited in accordance with the special conditions set out below; and
It is further understood that the computer system will be co-located and operated
under a shared SPOOL with both the IBM 3033 system installed and operating pursuant
to License Number A363365, and an IBM 4381 computer described in License
Application Number B000768. The 4381 computer shall be used to provide the following
services, including but not limited to, on-line data entry, on-line data editing, on-line data
interpretation, on-line plotting, programming capability for both PCPRC and WESTERN
personnel, and other ancillary services normally associated with oil and gas exploration
activities. All terminals attached to the 4381 computer shall be locally attached and at
a distance not to exceed 1500 meters from the computer operating area; and
It is further understood that only persons referred to as "Regular Authorized
Personnel" in the Special Conditions set out below will be responsible for the
management, operation, maintenance and safeguard of the computer system. These must
all be employees of WESTERN or of another entity domiciled in a COCOM country and
be nationals of a COCOM country; and
It is further understood that upon the termination for any reasons of the services
contract between WESTERN and the PCPRC, WESTERN will actively seek to remove
the computer system, and the PCPRC will allow such removal, from the People's
Republic of China; and
It is further understood that the services contract between WESTERN and the
PCPRC will be implemented subject to the following special conditions:
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
1.
Minimum staffing levels for the management, operation, maintenance and
safeguard of the computer system shall be 9 Regular Authorized Personnel for
each year during which the 3033 and the 3081 are operated together. Should
the 3033 be removed, the minimum staffing level shall be maintained at 9.
Such Regular Authorized Personnel shall always include a resident center
manager, two processing supervisors, a geophysical application programmer to
perform program maintenance, all of whom shall participate in the daily
operation of the computer system, and shall monitor the activities of all PCPRC
personnel allowed access to the computer system.
Implementation -- The staff of Regular Authorized Personnel shall consist of
employees of WESTERN and of employees of certain other contractors. A roster
of all such personnel will be furnished to the Department of Commerce and the
passport information for each person will be noted on the roster. The monthly
report as stipulated in Condition 21 will include a duty log of personnel who
were present during the period of time covered by the report. The minimum
staff level of 9 personnel are presently resident at the Zhuoxian site and
participating in the operation of the IBM 3033 Computer System licensed under
ITA Case Number 363365.
2.
Each master console shall be located entirely within an Isolated Area.
Implementation -- A floor plan of the computer room within the Data Center
showing the location of the Isolated Area's walls will be submitted to the
Department of Commerce. The eventual location of the master consoles within
the Isolated Area as indicated on the floor plans will be verified by photographs
and/or video tapes. The Isolated Area will be located on the 2nd floor of the
building in which the computer system is housed. Due to the design of the
building and resultant floor space constraints, the tape drives, line printers, and
the computer operations personnel will also be located on the 2nd floor along
with the Isolated Area. The disk drives and all other items required to be in the
Isolated Area, as mandated by these Special Conditions, will be located in the
Isolated Area. All other equipment will be located on the third floor.
The MVS Operating System will be modified to prevent the switching of the
master console to any other location outside the Isolated Area. This modification
will prevent the alteration of the operating system by an unauthorized user
located outside the Isolated Area.
3.
The Isolated Area will be built with clear glass walls and have a single access
door. At least one Regular Authorized Personnel will provide 24 hour a day,
seven days a week monitoring of the Isolated Area and the immediate
surrounding area. Whenever the Regular Authorized Personnel are outside of
the Isolated Area, the access door will be locked, and the Regular Authorized
Personnel shall remain in the immediate surrounding area so as to maintain
visual observation of the Isolated Area.
Implementation - The monthly duty log will discuss in detail the required
coverage of the Isolated Area.
4.
No person other than Regular Authorized Personnel shall have access to the
Isolated Area, except as shown below:
a. WESTERN's resident computer center manager may authorize access, in
advance, for such persons as, for example: official visitors or cleaning staff.
b. Such persons who are thus exceptionally authorized to enter the Isolated
Area shall be escorted by Regular Authorized Personnel.
Implementation - The key to the access door of the Isolated Area will at all
times be in the personal possession of the Regular Authorized Personnel on
duty to maintain observation of the Isolated Area. Whenever that person is not
physically present inside the Isolated Area, the access door will be locked. The
monthly report will contain the names of all persons who have been exceptionally
authorized to enter the Isolated Area to include the date/time they were present
in the Isolated Area.
5.
The Isolated Area shall house:
a. all the disk drives that contain the operating system, the procedure library,
and the load module library;
b. all magnetic tapes used for systems backup;
C. all the maintenance support items, including but not limited to, logic manuals
and microfiche; and
d. all the disk volumes that contain source libraries, compilers, and the linkage
editor used with the 3033 and the 3081.
e. a computer terminal to be used solely by WESTERN's resident
programmer to perform software maintenance. This terminal shall have
a manual switch which will allow the terminal to be connected to only
one CPU at a time.
Implementation -- The Isolated Area will house all disk drives mentioned in item
5.a above together with all tape media for system maintenance and back-up.
The Isolated Area shall also contain racks for storage of logic manuals and
microfiche. Desks and/or tables will be included to accommodate any work by
Regular Authorized Personnel who require these materials. A floor plan that
shows these facilities will be verified with photographs when construction is
completed. The manual switch on the computer terminal specified in item "e"
above will allow connection only to the 3033, 4381, or 3081 computers.
6.
The programming facilities for the 3033 and the 3081 such as, but not limited
to, the "batch mode" access to compilers and assemblers, shall be stored in the
Isolated Area upon disk devices which must be electrically disabled when not in
use. Such facilities shall be controlled by RACF. "Batch mode" means that
there will exist no direct electrical connection through the SPOOL that will
support program submission from the 4381 to the 3033 or the 3081. All
program development by the PCPRC personnel will be restricted to the
4381.PCPRC source code will be recorded on physical media (i.e. punch cards
or magnetic tape) and will be hand-carried by Regular Authorized Personnel.
Regular Authorized Personnel will conduct the program inspection described
elsewhere in these conditions and will authorize the source code on the 3033 or
the 3081 for compilation and test runs.
Implementation -- The programming facilities will be controlled by RACF and
JES system exits to ensure that only Regular Authorized Personnel can submit
programs to the 3033/3081. RACF dataset profiles will be built for all systems
and datasets; RACF DASDVOL profiles will be built for all disk volumes;
RACF passwords will be encrypted using the IBM standard encryption method
instead of DES (Data Encryption Standard).
7.
No time sharing services shall be available at any time on the 3033 or 3081.
Implementation -- TSO/E and VTAM (Modules IKJEFT01 and ISTINM01
respectively) will be manually removed from the 3033/3081 operating systems.
8.
PCPRC personnel shall be allowed access to the library of WESTERN's
application software only for the purpose of making minor modifications and
adjusting for anomalies peculiar to the PRC exploration environment. Upon
request, WESTERN will make available specific portions of seismic applications
source code on the 4381. WESTERN will submit a quarterly report to the U.S.
Government of all major application software function modifications which have
been distributed to WESTERN's center in Zhuoxian. WESTERN will provide
to the U.S. Government a synopsis of the modifications described above.
Implementation -- Using a WESTERN written JES2 exit routine, all jobs which
do not access the standard production libraries for execution on the 3033 or
3081 shall automatically be placed in a hold status from which Regular
Authorized Personnel will review the job. This would include any job which
accesses the compiler or linkage editor. Upon request WESTERN will copy the
portions of its applications source code to a disk volume that is on-line to the
4381 computer system. This source code may be edited using the standard ISPF
editor resident in the operating system on the 4381. The copy operation will be
performed by Regular Authorized Personnel from the terminal located in the
Isolated Area. WESTERN's source code library will be off-line when not in use
by Regular Authorized Personnel; when it is on-line it shall be RACF protected.
The quarterly report will be submitted to the Department of Commerce and will
detail all the major function modifications made to the application software and
a synopsis thereof.
9.
Before any program that has been modified or developed by PCPRC personnel
is executed on the 3033 or 3081 in a production environment, it shall be tested
and examined by Regular Authorized Personnel to confirm that it is designed
only for processing geophysical data.
No software or test data modified or developed by PCPRC personnel shall be
executed in a non-production environment on the 3033 or 3081 unless it has
been recompiled, loaded, authorized and supervised by Regular Authorized
Personnel. All test runs that execute for a period of time exceeding 2 hours will
be examined once again by Regular Authorized Personnel to verify that the test
runs meets the requirements established by these conditions.
Implementation -- Any program developed or modified by PCPRC will be
executed using a standard seismic test dataset as the input data, and the
resulting seismic profile will be compared to the original. The examination of
source code will be performed by experienced geophysical application
programmers who are Regular Authorized Personnel.
Regular Authorized Personnel will recompile and load programs developed by
PCPRC and place a copy of them in a library accessible only by Regular
Authorized Personnel. All test runs of those programs will execute in a single
job class, and RMF and SMF will log all pertinent information, such as, elapsed
time, I/O counts to each device, and data sets accessed. The test run log shall
be reviewed daily by Regular Authorized Personnel and, if necessary, offending
test runs will be reexamined by Regular Authorized Personnel.
10.
WESTERN shall provide to United States Government on a semiannual basis
a review and analysis of the programs presented for execution on the 3033 or
3081 computer system by the PCPRC. Copies of PCPRC's programs will be
forwarded to WESTERN's corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas, for review
and will be made available to the United States Government upon request.
Implementation - Programs developed or modified by PCPRC will be executed
in Houston on standard seismic test datasets, and the output seismic profile will
be compared to the original profile generated from the same input dataset. The
source code will be reviewed by experienced programming geophysicists to
determine if it is in fact for processing only legitimate geophysical data.
11.
All compilers, assemblers, system utilities and the linkage editor for use on the
3033 and 3081 shall be placed on a single disk volume in a library that is solely
controlled by Regular Authorized Personnel. This volume shall be enabled
(electrically active and on-line to the operating system) only when such personnel
are performing programming maintenance on the system. Limiting the use of
this library to only such personnel shall be controlled by RACF.
Implementation -- The compilers, assemblers, system utilities, and linkage editor
will be in RACF protected libraries located on disk media inside the Isolated
Area. RACF and JES exits will be incorporated into the operating system on the
3033/3081 to ensure that these libraries can only be accessed by Regular
Authorized Personnel. The disk unit shall be active and on-line only when
Regular Authorized Personnel are performing system or application code
maintenance.
12.
All production program libraries for the 3033 and 3081 shall be mounted on disk
drives in the Isolated Area, and all access to such libraries shall be logged by
RACF. On a random basis but at least every thirty days, WESTERN's
geophysical application programmer will run a compare program to verify that
the load modules have not been changed.
Implementation -- RACF will be tailored to accomplish the following:
a. Log the total use of a sensitive resource
b. Identify the resources that are repeated targets of detected unauthorized
attempts to access them
C. Identify the users who make detected unauthorized requests
d. Track the activities of a particular user Changes to the seismic load module
library will be performed only by Regular Authorized Personnel. Before
any changes are made to this library which is stored on disk media, it will
be compared to the original version stored on magnetic tape resident in the
Isolated Area.
13.
RMF, SMF, and RACF shall monitor all work performed on the 3033 and 3081
systems and shall log pertinent information, including but not limited to, elapsed
time, CPU time, I/O counts to each device, and data sets accessed. All data
tapes which require bypass label processing (BLP), must all be run in a single
job classification on either the 3033 or the 3081.
Implementation RMF, SMF, and RACF shall be installed and log tapes will
be maintained in the Isolated Area until a summary report is generated. Once
a month summary reports will be generated and then forwarded to the
Department of Commerce. The log tapes will be stored in the Isolated Area
for twelve months.
JES2 will require all Bypass Label Processing (BLP) jobs to be run in single
class. A report on these jobs shall be incorporated into the summary report
above.
14.
A JES2 exit shall be taken at the initiation of each job on the 3033 and 3081
to ensure that only valid programs from approved libraries can be executed, and
only valid, catalogued procedures from WESTERN's procedure library shall be
allowed.
Implementation -- Immediately after a job is submitted by a user, an installed
JES2 exit written by WESTERN will be taken that interprets the job and will
trap any job which is set up to execute anything other that a production load
module from the standard production library. Any non-standard jobs will be
logged and placed in hold, where Regular Authorized Personnel will review
them.
15.
All non-production jobs read into the 3033 and 3081 computer system shall
automatically be placed in HOLD status that requires overt action from
WESTERN's console operator before the job can be run, and the console
operator shall verify with the submitter that the job has been authorized by
Regular Authorized Personnel before allowing it to execute.
Implementation -- this will be accomplished under Special Condition number 14.
16.
Maintenance of the IBM supplied components of the 3033 and 3081 shall be
performed by Regular Authorized Personnel. Maintenance of the 4381
components will be performed by PRC nationals.Any maintenance activities
performed by PCPRC employees on the 3033/3081 components will be limited
to preventive maintenance functions. WESTERN will furnish an initial report
that will detail the anticipated activities of PCPRC maintenance personnel that
is related to the equipment covered by these special conditions.
Implementation -- Maintenance of the 3033/3081 central processor complex,
Array Transform Processors, and all equipment located in the Isolated Area will
be performed by Regular Authorized Personnel. Maintenance personnel will be
included on the roster of Regular Authorized Personnel and will meet the
citizenship requirements as described for Regular Authorized Personnel. The
initial report on PRC's preventive maintenance activities will be submitted to the
Department of Commerce prior to the shipment of any equipment to the Data
Center.
17.
Training of PCPRC personnel shall be limited to the minimum required for:
a. establishing and operating a tape library and performing tape-mounting
operations;
b. using WESTERN application software, including the ability to modify
programs and to adjust anomalies peculiar to the exploration environment
in the People's Republic of China; and
C. interpreting output data by geophysicists.
Implementation -- our ongoing contract calls for periodic training courses to be
conducted in Houston of some two to four months duration. That training will
be directed toward usage by geophysicists of the WESTERN seismic software
package and toward computer center operations. An outline of those courses
will be submitted to the Department of Commerce. WESTERN personnel
assigned to the Data Center will not offer training beyond the limits of the
particular function for which they are responsible.
18.
No training shall be given to PCPRC personnel in design or development of
signal processing software.
Implementation -- this will be accomplished under Special Condition number 17.
19.
Spare parts on site in the PRC shall be limited to a quantity appropriate for
three months.
Implementation -- the initial spare parts list will be furnished to the Department
of Commerce by WESTERN. Shipping documents will also be sent to DOC for
comparison to the original list. As those spares are exhausted they will be
replaced on an exchange basis.
20.
No Unit Control Words (UCW's) will be placed on any CPU other than the
UCW's necessary for the devices attached to the CPU.
Implementation -- Only the UCW's for devices that will be attached to the
respective CPU's will be placed in the CPU's.
21.
Within thirty days following the end of each month that the computer system is
in the PRC, WESTERN shall submit to the Office of Export Licensing (OEL),
U.S. Department of Commerce, a written report which:
a. states, for each thirty-day reporting period, whether the computer system has
been used only for the authorized purposes at the authorized location, and
whether there has been any change in the configuration of the system; and
b. sets forth in detail, for each reporting period, the manner of compliance with
Conditions 1 through 20 above.
Implementation -- at the end of each month a report shall be submitted to the
Department of Commerce which includes:
a. machine usage
b. physical configuration changes (if any)
C. duty roster of Regular Authorized Personnel
d. table of contents for disk storage devices containing the operating system
and all sensitive libraries
e. if any unauthorized access to sensitive libraries has been attempted, an
exception report from RACF with an explanation from on-site WESTERN
personnel
f. SMF summary of total time used for production runs, total time used for
maintenance.
22.
Prior to the issuance of a license, WESTERN shall submit to OEL a detailed
written statement indicating how it will satisfy Conditions 1 through 21 above.
Such submission shall include a written agreement by PCPRC to the
implementation of said conditions. WESTERN shall receive from OEL written
approval of such submission, which shall constitute final United States
Government approval of the license.
23.
License approval, subject to the above conditions, will be for an initial period of
four years, with requests for extensions at the end of the initial period to be
given favorable consideration by the U.S. Government, consistent with existing
regulations and policies, and provided all terms and conditions of the license
have been fully complied with.
ATTACHMENT B
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
3CS
KX3
-2MB
P.A
N
N
ACRY
24
CHANGE
LS
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
11
2
13
4
5
6
7
18
9
20
2
22
23
4
3803
3603
3823
3803
3880
3800
3490
3480
3080
3880
002
003
A22
3838
3274
002
002
002
00
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00
00 3
041
020
IX
IX
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IX
00 3
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3803
3803
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3003
3380
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3380
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3380
3380
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AD4
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IX
IX
00
3278
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D
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004
3420
3420
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3380
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3278
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006
006
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IX
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IX
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004
10x
10X
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IX
3279
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IX
3838
2x
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003
IX
3420
3420
3420
3880
IX
3207-
3420
-008
000
-003
002
-000
-000
3278
6x
6x
6x
BX
IX
AB2
CRY
IX
3360
STAL
THIS DISK
AD4
IX
THIS DISK
3880
3880
3350
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IS SHARED
IX
-B2F
IS SHARED
-003
003
-B2f
IX
ARONG
3X
BETWEEN
IX
3x
3380
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3081/3033
-804
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IX
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004
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7236
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IX
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-811
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614
IX
IX
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3278
IX
IX
002
IX
IX
IX
3180
HSR
HSR
DIGITIZE
004
110
118
18
TABLET
2x
3830
3830
3830
3830
DIGITIZE
20x
IX
1x
2x
3180
-002
-002
002
-002
TABLET
110
3274
IX
IX
IX
IX
IX
3274
3274
20x
D41
OANI
5170.
A31
B21
18
1200
319
V.80
IX
2x
2x
IX
3278
004
1X
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3268
12x
91NCH
2501
42
3277
002
ADNITOR
3192
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1X
380
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2x
2x
DIY
X
3274
3420
3420
3420
2501-
-B04
IX
CRY
15x
3420
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3278
005
006
006
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3838
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004
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Bx
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3211-
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3380
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001
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-002
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-002
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3803
3174
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-
IX
CONSOLE
IX
IX
IX
IX
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003
1X
3274
002
BIL
100
IX
A31
IX
IX
IX
IX
IX
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
-
2
3033
LOB
BAB
MEMORY
12
CHANNELS
438
R13
16AB
MAIN
ME
MORY
12
CHANNELS
FOR OFFICIAL USE
ACEP BACKGROUND PAPER
OCM 90-24/D013315
POLICY REGARDING THE EXPORT OF A
CDC CYBER 992-31 COMPUTER TO PRC
ISSUE
The State Meteorological Agency (SMA) of PRC wishes to purchase a
CDC Cyber 992-31 computer for civil meteorological applications.
This computer has a PDR of 2035 Mbps, which exceeds the PRC Green
Line limit of 550 Mbps. However, computers with much higher
performance are generally used in the West for meteorological
work. The capability of the Cyber 992-31 is marginal for SMA's
anticipated meteorological program.
The issue is whether the U.S. should approve a Cyber 992-31 to
the PRC for civil meteorological applications.
BACKGROUND
SMA is the meteorological agency of the PRC government, and the
counterpart of the U.S. National Weather Service. The National
Meteorological Center (NMC), a subdivision of SMA, is the
consignee in this case. It has a staff of 1000, including 250
meteorologists. Its function is to provide short and medium
range weather forecasts for all of PRC.
The nature of weather forecasting, including the need for global
data bases, has resulted in the creation of cooperative
meteorological programs among many of the world's nations. PRC
is an active participant in this effort to improve worldwide
weather forecasting. NMC and SMA are well known organiztions in
the international weather community; in fact, SMA Administrator
Zou Jingmeng was elected president of the World Meteorological
Organization in 1987. Also, SMA has participated in cooperative
programs with the U.S. National Weather Service.
NMC needs a high performance Western mainframe in order to expand
their weather prediction activities to a level comparable to that
of Western meteorological centers. The main meteorologicl task
which requires such high computational power is Numerical Weather
Prediction (NWP). Typical NWP products are global five-day and
ten-day weather predictions. These predictions require immense
amounts of CPU time, and are typically produced on supercomputers
in the West. For example, a ten-day prediction using the T₆₃L₁₅
Model would require four hours on the Cyber 992, but only 24
minutes on the Cray XMP supercomputer (NMC will be using the
T₆₃L₁₅ Model, which was developed by the European Center for
Medium Range Weather Forecasts). The projected NWP activities at
NMC will require sixteen hours per day of the Cyber's time. The
remaining eight hours will be filled by program development,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
system maintenance and administration, and other meteorological
tasks. In effect, the Cyber 992 will be dedicated full time to
the stated meteorological end use.
COMMERCE POSITION
Since Commerce and Defense are in agreement that the Cyber 992 is
appropriate for the proposed end use, Commerce believes that an
effective security safeguards plan is the key to approval. To
this end, Commerce has worked with CDC and developed the attached
16-point Security Safeguards Plan. This comprehensive plan
should prevent unauthorized use of the Cyber 992. Commerce
further notes that Defense's denial recommendation of January 10
was based on an earlier, incomplete version of the Plan. The
complete 16-point Plan was introduced at the Operating Committee
on April 19.
DEFENSE POSITION
Defense objects to the export because of the high performance
level of the Cyber 992, and because of its potential diversion to
military end uses. Defense admits that the Cyber performance is
appropriate for the projected weather applications, but continues
to object to approval.
RECOMMENDATION
Commerce recommends approval subject to the conditions in the
attached plan. Some of its major provisions are:
1. CDC personnel will administer the Plan.
2. The Plan includes access control, user validation,
monitoring of system usage, and auditing.
3. Jobs will be divided into two categories: production and
development. Individual users will be restricted as to
which category they can run.
4. CDC will maintain strict control of the production library.
5. Program development will be limited on CPU time, storage
access, and software utilities available.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Control Data Corporation
China state Meteorological Administration
End Use and Security Safeguards Plan
1. The computer will be used only by the end-users
specified in the government-to-government assurances
governing this specific export and only for the purposes
stated in that agreement. Computer use shall be only in
accordance with the provisions of this Safeguards Plan.
2. Control Data will conduct System Administration/Site
Management functions, including installation and update of
systems and software; determination and installation of
production and development capabilities; management of the
system access controls, including user validation and
managing/monitoring system usage logs. System Administration
shall include regular visitation by Control Data Corporation
representatives.
3 A technical consultative committee comprised of State
Meteorological Administration (SMA) and U.S. technical
experts will guide in operating and maintaining the
computer. The U.S. members of this committee will be
employees of the exporting company.
4. The systems will be equipped with access control
software--to classify and track all jobs as either
production or program development jobs; to restrict access
to specific programs and system resources based on the
production or development classification; to restrict system
access to authorized persons and establish accountability
for system use, to prevent execution of unauthorized
programs, and generate logs of system activity.
5. Controlled Execution Based on Job Classification--The
operating system will be configured so that all jobs can be
designated and tracked as either production jobs or program
development jobs.
6. Production Jobs--Jobs classified as production can only
execute applications from an approved production library.
Any attempt to select execution of any other program,
compiler or system services will cause the system to log a
record of that attempt and to terminate the job. In the
production mode, the system will prohibit users from
modifying any program or using utilities which could modify
any program.
7. Production Applications--An initial library of pre-
approved and publicly available weather forecasting and
analysis software applications will be provided. This
library will be specified in cooperation with the National
Weather Service. Provision will be made to approve certain
indigenous weather codes for inclusion in the production
library. Any new applications must be approved by the U.S.
Government or its designee, i.e., Control Data Corporation,
prior to inclusion in the production job library, as well as
for conformance with the end-uses identified in the
government-to-government assurances governing the specific
export.
8. Programs certified for execution in the production mode
will be protected from unauthorized modification by
appropriate software and physical security measures. Any
modifications to the previously-certified production
programs will be certified by the System Administrator.
9. Individual users will be authorized to execute production
jobs and program development jobs. The operating system will
monitor and control users to allow only execution of the
functions permitted within their authorized job class (i.e.,
a production job class or a program development job class)
10. Program Development Jobs-Jobs classified as program
development can only execute approved system utilities such
that weather applications that address specific PRC
requirements can be developed. These utilities will enable
users to create, edit, compile and debug FORTRAN programs.
In the development mode jobs will be limited in CPU time,
memory access, mass storage usage, input/output operations,
etc. These resource constraints will limit the compute power
available for program development.
11. The computer will be provided with accounting and audit
software to generate extensive tracking of all activity,
including functions performed, system startups and
shutdowns, job users, production-development activities,
applications run, system operations utilized and resources
used. A separate log will be maintained and reports made of
actions and events that are deviations from the prescribed
activities.
12. For each job executed in the production mode or
development mode, the operating system will log execution
characteristics in order to permit generation of a
statistical profile of the programs executed and resources
used. Control Data will review the detailed logs as part of
its visitation responsibilities and in cooperation with the
State Meteorological Administration.
13. The source code for the operating system and
applications will be accessible only to the manufacturer.
14. There will be no wide-area networking or use of remote
workstations. Local area networking is permissible with
workstation/terminal access from the end-user's local site.
15. The computer will be housed in a secure building 24
hours/day, 7 days/week and will be protected against theft and
unauthorized entry.
16. A strict password system will be implemented to prevent
unauthorized access to the computer. User IDs and passwords for
access to the computer will be required for all users and will be
strictly controlled by the System Administrator, who must be an
employee of the applicant and a U.S. national.
17. The regular visitation specified in paragraph #2 shall be
monthly for a period of one year, and quarterly for a period of
three years thereafter, and shall include reporting to the U.S.
Department of Commerce.
18. Limits placed on jobs run in the development mode (per
paragraph #10) shall be 2 hours/day of CPU time, 16 MBytes of
main memory, and 500 MBytes of mass storage.
A OF \
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UNITED STATES of /
Office of the Secretary
Washington. D.C. 20230
SENSITIVE -- EYES ONLY
September 20, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR TIM DEALE - National Security Council
FROM:
Wayne L. Berman inBerman
Counsellor to the Secretary
RE:
Follow-up on Chinese Computers Issue
I spoke with Bob Gates today, who agreed to chair a
State/Commerce/Defense meeting on the proposed Computer Data
Corporation sale to the PRC. After discussions with Deputy
Secretaries Eagleburger and Atwood, I believe such a meeting will
produce a decision to which all sides can agree.
Gates suggested that you arrange this meeting. Both Eagleburger
and Atwood believe it should be scheduled for tomorrow,
September 21st. I understand that the proposed participants
would be Dennis Kloske and Bartholomew. I believe Atwood
suggested Wolfowitz, although I am not clear on this.
Please contact the appropriate people for this meeting.
cc: Gates
Eagleburger
Atwood
Murrin
Tim - / Thanks
Kloske
Wayne
4566
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CHRON FILE
September 28, 1990
4
Dear Congressman Phil Crane:
I am replying on behalf of the President to your letter to him on
the issue of extending MFN status for China.
As you and your colleagues know, the President determined that
China's MFN status should be extended because it is in the U.S.
economic interest, because the impact of ending MFN would be
devastating for Hong Kong, and because the President believes
economic engagement is a vital means to promoting human rights in
China over the long term.
I believe your goals and ours are the same in relations with
China, although we have some differences over the means to
employ. The President and his Administration continue to believe
that his approach will work. The departure from the U.S. Embassy
in Beijing of Dr. Fang Lizhi last summer gives us reason to
believe we are on the proper course.
Today, through the UN Security Council, China is contributing
critically to resolution of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and to
an end to the conflict in Cambodia. I believe termination of
China's MFN status would send precisely the wrong signal at this
time. I urge you and your colleagues, for all these reasons, not
to disapprove the President's determination to extend China's MFN
status.
Sincerely,
Brant
Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Philip M. Crane
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
4566
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
July 13, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON KSJ
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL AALDB
SUBJECT:
Congressional Correspondence - China/MFN
At Tab I is a reply to a letter from Representative Phil Crane
and 39 colleagues urging that MFN for China be tied to PRC
commitments to human rights.
Concurrences by: V. Lampley, E. Melby
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the reply to Phil Crane at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Scowcroft/Crane Letter
Tab II
Crane/President Letter dated 5/22/90 with attachment
and McClure/Crane Letter dated 6/1/90
your
ID# 143199
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING
CO 034-02
DATE RECEIVED: MAY 22, 1990
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE PHILIP M. CRANE
SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO NOT RENEW MOST-
FAVORED-NATION STATUS TO CHINA IF THEIR
GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS
AND NOT RELAX THEIR OPPRESSIVE RULE
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
DATE
TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE
ORG 90/05/22 FM A 90/06/01
REFERRAL NOTE:
NSSITT
A 90/06/06
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
99 DOS
I 90/06/07
/
/
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS: original letter had a paragraph Re: taiwan, which
was accidentally incorporated into the China letter and
should not have been there. Cong Crane Supplied
copy of letter as it should have been.
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 39 MEDIA:1 INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 1230
MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
LIP M. CRANE
I
Burre 1035
1989 OF CONGRESS
LONGWORTH BULLING
STRICT OF ILLINOIS
WASHINGTON, DC 20615
202/228-3711
AND MEANS
MITTEE
1450 SOUTH New WILKS ROAD
ARLINGTON HERENTS, IL 80008
*COMMITTERS:
708/384-0780
TRADE
CE CHAIRMAN)
Congress of the United States
3719 W. ILM STREET
HEALTH
McHanny, n. 80050
REF
v STUDY COMMITTEE
House of Representatives
815/344-0110
708/223-3030
(DUTIVE COMMITTEE
Washington, BC 20515
ROBERT C. COLEMAN
CHIEF OF STARF
May 22, 1990
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
On Friday, my office mailed you a letter signed by myself and 39
of my colleagues. I am afraid, however, that due to computer
error, the text of the letter you received is not identical to
that which my colleagues agreed to cosign.
I have enclosed a copy the letter as it should have appeared in
our correspondence to you. I apologize for any confusion this
may have caused you.
this Sincerely, Philip M. Crand, Grane M.C.
PMC/bj
PHILIP M. CRANE
OFFICER:
Burre 1088
MEMBER OF CONGRESS
LONGWORTH BUILDING
12TH DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WASHINGTON, DC 20615
202/225-3711
WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE
1450 SOUTH New Was ROAD
SUBCOMMITTEES:
ARLINSTON HEIGHTS, IL 60008
TRADE
708/384-0780
(VICE CHAIRMAN
HEALTH
Congress of the Hnited States
3719 W. I'm STREET
McHenny, a. 80050
REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE
house of Representatives
818/344-0110
708/222-3030
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Washington, DC 20515
ROBERT C. COLEMAN
CHIEF OF STAPP
May 22, 1990
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
You will soon face a very important decision on whether to
recommend to Congress to extend most-favored-nation status to
the People's Republic of China. We understand that this will be
a very difficult determination for you to make, especially in
light of the fact that it must be reached by June 3rd -- the day
before the first anniversary of the massacre in Tiananmen
Square.
We share your obvious disappointment over the lack of progress
on the part of the People's Republic of China towards improving
their human rights record. The extraordinary confidence that
you placed in Beijing after the crackdown on democracy last year
has clearly gone unnoticed, and rather than make efforts to ease
repression of personal freedoms, the Chinese instead have done
the reverse.
The continuing suppression of the pro-democracy movement has
been especially evident during the past few months. According
to the findings of the State Department, there has been an
increase in the surveillance of dissidents, political education
classes for students, restrictions on overseas study and an
increase in the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church and
other religious groups. In addition to these more recent
developments, the PRC continues its repression and violence in
Tibet, its lethal assistance to the genocidal Khmer Rouge in
East. Cambodia, and also its dangerous missle sales to the Middle
We are aware of the PRC's warnings that lifting MFN will likely
result in "major regression" of Chinese-U.S. relations.
However, we argue that the failure on the part of Beijing to
relax its repressive rule has already seriously damaged our
relations. While we understand the economic and political
benefits of maintaining the status-quo, we hope that you will
The Honorable George Bush
Page 2
take advantage of this opportunity to extract a commitment from
the PRC to take positive steps to improve their human rights
record. If the Chinese government is unwilling to guarantee an
improvement in this area, we urge you to seriously consider not
extending most-favored-nation status.
Sincerely,
OFFICES
PHILIP M. CRANE
SUITE 1035
MEMBER OF CONGRESS
LONGWORTH BUILDING
12TH DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
202/225-3711
WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE
1450 SOUTH NEW WILKE ROAD
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS, IL 60005
SUBCOMMITTEES:
708/394-0790
TRADE
(VICE CHAIRMAN)
Congress of the United States
3719 W. ELM STREET
HEALTH
MCHENRY, IL 60050
815/344-0110
REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE
house of Representatives
708/223-3030
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Washington, DC 20515
ROBERT C. COLEMAN
CHIEF OF STAFF
May 16, 1990
The Honorable George Bush
original
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
with which paragiaph not
Dear Mr. President:
You will soon face a very important decision on whether to
recommend to Congress to extend most-favored-nation status to
the People's Republic of China. We understand that this will be
a very difficult determination for you to make, especially in
light of the fact that it must be reached by June 3rd -- the day
before the first anniversary of the massacre in Tiananmen
Square.
We share your obvious disappointment over the lack of progress
on the part of the People's Republic of China towards improving
their human rights record. The extraordinary confidence that
you placed in Beijing after the crackdown on democracy last year
has clearly gone unnoticed, and rather than make efforts to ease
repression of personal freedoms, the Chinese instead have done
the reverse.
The continuing suppression of the pro-democracy movement has
been especially evident during the past few months. According
to the findings of the State Department, there has been an
increase in the surveillance of dissidents, political education
classes for students, restrictions on overseas study and an
increase in the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church and
other religious groups. In addition to these more recent
developments, the PRC continues its repression and violence in
Tibet, its lethal assistance to the genocidal Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia, and also its dangerous missile sales to the Middle
East.
While China has taken several steps backward in the area of
human rights, Taiwan has taken enormous strides toward freedom
and democracy. We find it exceedingly difficult to understand
why the Administration has allowed the PRC to dictate our policy
toward Taiwan. This year Taiwan has applied for GATT membership
as a developed country under the name of the Customs Territory
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. By endorsing Taiwan's
GATT application we can increase the effectiveness of the GATT
The Honorable George Bush
Page 2
by including the world's thirteenth largest trading nation. At
the same time, we will send a message to the PRC that there are
costs to ignoring our pleas to practice human kindness.
We are aware of the PRC's warnings that lifting MFN will likely
result in "major regression" of Chinese-U.S. relations.
However, we argue that the failure on the part of Beijing to
relax its repressive rule has already seriously damaged our
relations. While we understand the economic and political
benefits of maintaining the status-quo, we hope that you will
take advantage of this opportunity to extract appropriate
concessions from the PRC. If China is unwilling to meet the
challenge, we urge you, Mr. President, not to extend
most-favored-nation status.
Sincerely,
MM Phil Crane Philip M. Crane, M.C.
Barney BangFrank Frank M.C.
Gerald B. H. Solomon, M.C. Benjamin A. Gilman, M.C.
Floyd Spence, M.C.
Tony P.
Tony Hall, P. M.C. Hall
Apbat
Douglas Applegate, M.C.
and Edward G. Feighan M.C.
Valutin
Steve Schiff
Tim Valentine, M.C.
Steven Schiff, M.C.
The Honorable George Bush
Page 3
Liz Pathrsm
Elizabeth J. Patterson, M.C.
Trank Frank McCloskey, McClorday M.C.
Edolphus Flowns
Eheal
Richard E. Neal, M.C.
Frank JuRlog R. Wolf, M.C.
Howard Wolpe, M.C.
Nancy L Johnson
Craig Craig T. James, James N.C.
Nancy L. Johnson, M.C.
Mayn R Shens
Roberts Dornan
Major R. Owens, M.C.
Robert K. Dornan M.C.
Gerry amy Sikorski, Shorli M.C.
Pen th.
SEORE George Miller M.C. Miller Mills
Peter H. Kostmayer, M.C yer
John E. Porter, M.C.
Bill Tree
Bill Green, M.C.
your Louis Stokes, M.C.
The Honorable George Bush
Page 4
Bance A. Morre
Jim Kolbe, M.C.
Bruce
A.
Morrison,
M.C.
Barbara Boxer DoBarton
Barbara Boxer, M.C.
Dan
Burton,
M.C.
Jon L. Kyl, M.C. Julian C. Dixon, M.C.
Hurf. Henry Hyde, Hyde M.C.
William Billiamaneger Dannemeyer, M.C.
Edward Ed Markey Markey M.C.
Jim Jin Jontz, M.C. Jonty
John John M. Spratt, Sprad M.C.
James M.C.
June A. Traficant,
Marilayn Lloyd, M.C. Frank Frank Horton Horton, M.C.
June 1, 1990
Dear Phil:
Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned
by 39 of your colleagues, concerning most-favored-nation
trade status for China.
We appreciate being apprised of your views regarding this
sensitive issue. Please know that in addition to bringing
your concerns to the attention of the President, I have
asked his trade and foreign policy advisors to review your
comments so that they, too, are aware of your perspective
on MFN status for China.
Thank you again for your interest in writing.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The Honorable Philip M. Crane
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
FDM/SLM/efr
(6FDMG)
CHINA.hpf
CC: w/copy of inc to NSC - for Direct Response
CC: w/copy of inc to DOS - FYI
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9007620
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 90 11
4
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 05 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:
2
KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
IRAQ
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: GULF CRISIS & US - CHINA RELATIONS
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT
DUE DATE: 28 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PAAL
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JACKSON
NSC CHRON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEN
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
Gulf Cuses /us-china
Relations
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 7620
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC
INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
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Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
2
8 (2cenote)
Brent Scowcroft
w
APNSA Has Seen
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4 Am19
NSC Secretariat
S
JAM 10/9
MR
At
N
A = Action
I - Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
ccto Scowcroft
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
SECRET
SECRET
7620
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 13526
90 OCT -5 PM 9: 05
2009-1101-MR
October 5, 1990
4/8/2014 MM
INFORMATION
Brent
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
sup.2
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
The Gulf Crisis and U.S. -China Relations
Following our discussion with Ambassadors Han Xu and Zhu Qizhen,
I thought it would be useful to take a closer look at the
dynamics behind China's response to the Gulf crisis. CIA has
prepared a paper taking a relatively detailed look at the foreign
policy debate between hardliners and reformers/moderates. It is
highlighted for your convenience. (Tab A)
There are some points that deserve emphasis as you look at the
paper:
Li Peng and the hardliners are consistently trying to move
China's foreign policy center of gravity farther from the
U.S. and the West. Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping are
resisting this course.
Li Peng and the hardliners have vigorously fought making
concessions to the U.S. Each effort at a breakthrough (my
two trips, the release of Fang Lizhi) evoked strong and
immediate opposition internally in China.
The hardliners ridicule the moderates for producing too
little from the U.S. A private channel has told Doug Paal
that after Fang Lizhi's departure from China, Li Peng made
fun of Jiang Zemin's failure to win new World Bank lending,
immediate resolution of the MFN issue, and high level
visits.
Both moderates and hardliners have been very slow to
understand U.S. legal constraints, such as on World Bank
lending. The visit of Mayor Zhu Rongji helped to get a
clearer message back to Beijing.
The Gulf crisis has exposed the rift in the leadership to
public view. The PRC has little choice but to support the
UN Security Council resolutions, given the unanimity of
world opinion. The moderates are attempting to exploit this
situation by urging the U.S. and the West to improve
relations. The hardliners are trying to keep a distance
from the U.S.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SEGRET
SECRET
2
With power balanced SO precariously in Beijing, any efforts
by the U.S. to improve relations will be complicated by
moderate attempts to oversell your efforts and hardliner
demands for greater concessions.
The leadership stalemate and overriding need for stability
on the streets will make it impossible for Beijing to render
concessions to the U.S. that will satisfy the Congress, if
Congress can ever be satisfied. The Chinese may be able to
release the remaining 350 or SO detainees and lift the
jamming of VOA -- these steps would be helpful on World Bank
lending and other constraints -- but they will also stir
controversy here because of their cosmetic nature.
Our best hope lies in moderating our expectations and taking
advantage of the current Chinese cooperation on the Gulf
(involuntary though it may be) and in Cambodia to improve U.S. -
China relations in areas that are not legally constrained, such
as higher level contacts and exchanges. This would mean
explicitly using the Gulf crisis and Cambodia to justify lifting
your sanction against "high-level exchanges. " This could help
Deng and Jiang move on our other concerns, we
publicly encouraging such linkage.
I but should, avoid
Attachment
Tab A
CIA Memorandum
SECRET
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04b. Report
The Domestic Dynamic in China's Response to the Persian
9/24/90
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
Gulf Crisis [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
China Chronological Files
By MM
on 6/29/2022
Subseries:
Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Post-Tiananmen (September 1990) [2]
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91133-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-2787-MR (502.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency
CERTIBAL INTELLIGENCE
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 502.01 LIBRARY
Washington D.C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 September 1990
(b)(3)
The Domestic Dynamic in China's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis
Summary
A review of China's actions since early August suggests that the
deep divisions within the Chinese leadership are affecting Beijing's
response to the Middle East crisis. We believe Deng Xiaoping and
other party reformers view this crisis as a major opportunity to restore
good relations with the West. In contrast, hardliners, personified by
Premier Li Peng, are arguing that US power and influence on the
world stage are becoming unrivaled and that China must play a strong
role in curbing US actions. This hardline position may be as much an
attempt to undercut Deng's authority and play to a domestic audience
as it is concern over US policies. Thus far, Deng-as the paramount
architect of Chinese foreign policy-appears to be maintaining his sway
in decisionmaking. But we speculate that assurances-either explicit or
implicit-may have been made by Deng and his supporters to the rest of
the leadership that China's cooperation with the West in the United
Nations on the Gulf will lead to an easing of sanctions imposed on
China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. If China is
unable to secure this objective, hardliners are (b)(3) likely to intensify their
criticism of Deng and his foreign policy line.
****
This memorandum was prepared by China Division, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 21 September 1990 was used in its preparation. Comments (b)(3) and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China Division, OEA,
(b)(3)
EA M 90-20116
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
(b)(3)
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2013-1846-MR
MM 2/25/2015
SECRET
(b)(3)
An Extended Assault on Deng's Western Tilt
Over the past year, Premier Li Peng-who, as head of the State Council
foreign policy group, is ostensibly in charge of formulating foreign policy-has
argued for a reorientation of Beijing's foreign policy to place less emphasis on
strong relations with the United States and the West. Since early July, for example,
Li Peng has repeatedly warned publicly about the danger of "new hegemonism"-an
apparent reference to fears that US power and influence have become unbridled as
Soviet global reach wanes and that Washington will use this ascendancy to impose
Western ideology on China and other states. In his speech to the standing
committee of the National People's Congress on 28 August, Li went a step further
in his rhetoric arguing that improved US-Soviet relations (b)(3) are having a negative
effect on global stability and are leading to "turbulence".
Li Peng's sharp attacks on the West appear to be attempts to appeal to the
xenophobic strains in the Chinese political leadership and as backhanded
questioning of Deng Xiaoping's leadership and strategic vision. We believe these
attacks also represent pique by the hardliners at what they perceive as a lack of US
willingness to lift economic and military sanctions on China after Beijing ended
martial law and released Fang Lizhi in June. They are thus implied criticisms (b)(3) of
Deng and his lieutenants for being overly accommodating to the West.
Deng-who over the past decade has controlled foreign policy and made its
cornerstone the opening to the West-has largely eschewed this hardline. Recent
public foreign policy statements show that, while hardline elders Chen Yun and
Peng Zhen have echoed Li Peng's sentiments on the dangers of Western ideological
hegemonism,¹ Deng and his reform allies have not joined publicly 1.4(d); in charging (b)(3) the
United States with "new hegemonism" or "peaceful evolution." 1.4(c);
Signs of Chinese Disunity on the Gulf
A review. of Chinese behavior and intelligence reporting since Iraq invaded
Kuwait on 2 August suggests to us that these internal differences have contributed
to inconsistency and confusion in China's policy. On 3 August, immediately
following the fraqi invasion, China Youth News-controlled by hardliners-blamed the
United States for stirring up tensions in the Gulf and attempting to split the
1 On 16 September, China's People's Daily published a speech delivered by Communist Party
elder Peng Zhen on 27 June in which he leveled a particularly sharp attack on the West.
Peng said, "we have to thank the Voice of America, thank dead Dulles and the Dulleses still
alive who work at peaceful evolution here, and also thank those few national degenerates
who have foreign contacts and who are pawns of the imperialist peaceful evolution." He also
alleged that "the imperialists" will never change their strategy of "peaceful evolution" toward
the socialist countries. (b)(3)
1.4(c); (b)(3)
SECRET
SECRET
(b)(3)
1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)
Arab camp.
There are similarly subtle, and meaningful, differences in how Chinese
leaders discuss the deployment of Western troops to the Middle East. On 8 August,
in reacting to President Bush's announcement that US forces would be dispatched to
Saudi Arabia, Li Peng traveling in Indonesia asserted that Saudi Arabia had the
right to do what it needed for "self- defense" but that China, in principle, opposed
military intervention by any major power because it "may further complicate the
problem." Although other Chinese leaders have since echoed this opposition to major
power intervention, none-except Foreign Minister Qian and other direct
subordinates of Li Peng in the Foreign Ministry-have chosen to take the additional
shot at Western policy implied by claims that major power involvement inflames
the situation.
1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)
the next day, a Beijing- controlled Hong Kong
newspaper contradicted the standard Foreign Ministry formulation on the situation
and warned that Baghdad would be responsible for any escalation of the crisis.
Foreign Ministry positions previously had been warning of the dangers of rash US
(b)(3)
action.
Since 25 August, we continue to see differences in the approach of Deng's
allies and hardliners to the Gulf crisis. On 20 September, President Yang Shangkun
and Premier Li Peng, during. separate meetings in Beijing with Saudi Foreign
Minister Faisal, expressed strikingly different perspectives on the situation.
According to Chinese press reports, President Yang emphasized the withdrawal of
Iraqi troops from Kuwait as the basis for resolving the crisis and voiced
understanding for the "measures" taken by Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to ensure
their security. In contrast, Li Peng emphasized the need for a peaceful settlement
to the crisis and made no statement of understanding of the (b)(3) need for the
deployment of multinational military forces to the region.
3
(b)(3)
SECRET
SECRET
(b)(3)
Implications
We believe China's handling of the Gulf crisis reflects a behind-the-scenes
effort by Deng Xiaoping and reformers to moderate hardline inclinations to create
a sharp distinction between the positions of China and the United States. Deng's
purpose is probably threefold: to ensure that, through Li Peng, hardliners do not
steal the march in foreign policy; to protect his authority and not allow his
opponents to chip away at his strategic vision; and to build goodwill with (b)(3) the
United States and the West so that relations can continue to normalize.
At the same time, we believe that China's stance on the crisis would not be
markedly different if Deng and the reformers had free rein. Even under the best
of circumstances, for example, it is highly unlikely that China would fully endorse
the deployment of Western forces to the region. Beijing would probably be less
vocal in its opposition to US actions, however, if Deng had uncontested control. It
has long been a tenet of Chinese policy to oppose one country's intervention in
another's affairs because of the implications this would have for foreign
intervention in China. Moreover, Deng no doubt shares hardliner concerns about (b)(3)
what they see as growing US dominance in the international political arena.
Given the current domestic struggles within the leadership, we believe Deng
and the reformers cannot risk being perceived as bending too far to accommodate
the United States; thus Chinese policy on the Gulf will continue to be marked by
mixed signals. This is particularly true of the current period running up to the
critical party plenum in late October or November at which, according to Hong
Kong press reports, Deng hopes to have former party General Secretary Zhao
Ziyang exonerated of charges that he was responsible for last year's turmoil.²
(b)(3)
Finally, we speculate that assurances-either explicit or implicit-may have
been made by Deng and his supporters to the rest of the leadership that China's
cooperation with the West in the United Nations on the Gulf will lead to an easing
of sanctions imposed on China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
1.4(c)
recent
statements by Chinese diplomats that the United States and other Western countries
"owe" China on the Gulf suggest this. In this regard, the Chinese appear focused on
the liberalization of World Bank lending and unconditional renewal of Most-
Favored-Nation status. If China is unable to secure these objectives, hardliners (b)(3) are
likely to intensify their criticism of Deng and his foreign policy line.
1.4(c); (b)(3)
4
(b)(3)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
7620
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 25, 1990
Retype
ACTION
pr.B
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON KDJ
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL
SUBJECT:
The Gulf Crisis and U.S.-China Relations
Last week we briefly discussed the need for a close look at
China's position on the Gulf crisis and the implications for
U.S. China relations. I asked FBIS and CIA to provide analyses.
The CIA paper is in the more presentable form and is attached to
a memorandum for the President on the subject.
This package is intended primarily for you, but is in the form of
a memorandum for the President should you wish to show it to him.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Scowcroft/President Memorandum
Tab A
CIA Memorandum
CC: R. Haass
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F11
3/31/10