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China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
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366551886
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China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
Special Separate China Notes Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
OA/ID Number:
91136
Folder ID Number:
91136-005
Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
5
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Coversheet
General Scowcroft to Military Aide
6/17/89
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Eyes Only for the President (1 pp.)
01b. Note
Brent [Scowcroft] to POTUS
6/17/89
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Mr. President: (1 pp.)
01c. Cable
Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)
6/17/89
(b)(1)
S
01d. Cable
Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)
6/13/89
(b)(1)
TS
01e. Cable
Re: U/S Kimmitt Meeting with PRC Ambassador (5 pp.)
6/15/89
(b)(1)
/
01f. Cable
Re: Kimmitt - Han Discussion of Embassy Security (5 pp.)
6/11/89
(b)(1)
$
01g. Cable
Re: Secretary - Han Discussion (5 pp.)
6/12/89
(b)(1)
TS
01h. Cable
Re: Secretary Baker's Meeting with Han Xu (6 pp.)
6/8/89
(b)(1)
02. Memcon
Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor
12/9/89
(b)(1)
S
Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (6 pp.)
03. Draft Memcon Re: Meeting Between Deng Xiaoping and National Security
12/10/89
(b)(1)
&
Advisor Scowcroft (5 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1130
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04. Draft Memcon Re: Meeting Between General Secretary Jiang Zemin and
12/10/89
(b) (1)
National Security Advisor Scowcroft (7 pp.)
05. Draft Memcon
Re: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National Security
12/10/89
(b)(1)
Advisor Scowcroft (8 pp.)
06. Draft Memcon
Re: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and National
12/9/89
(b)
Security Advisor Scowcroft (12 pp.)
07. Draft Memcon
Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft
12/10/89
(1)
with Chinese Minister Qian Qichen (5 pp.)
08. Handwritten
Re: NATO (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Notes
09. Request
Re: Request for Appointments
12/6/89
(b)(6)
[Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)
10a. Outline
Re: Outline of Approach (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b) (1)
10b. Handwritten
Re: Sunday (8 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Notes
10c. Handwritten
Re: Why we are here
(5 pp.)
n.d.
(b) (1)
Notes
10d. Handwritten
Re: Cold War over (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Notes
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Pinksheet Number:
cap 130
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
10e. Handwritten
Re: Why we are here
(9 pp.)
n.d.
(b)/1)
Notes
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1130
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
WHITE HOUSE
IN
'89 6-17 18:43
PAGE 01
TOP SECRE
SERDET
SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
CLASSIFICATION
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
MODE
PAGES 29
IMMEDIATE
SECURE FAX #
DTG
PRIORITY
ADMIN FAX #
RELEASER dr
ROUTI
FROM/LOCATION
1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT
TO/LOCATION/T ME OF RECEIPT
2. 1. Military Aide - EYES ONLY for The President
3
3.
4
5.
6.
7.
NFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
*
NO FILE COPIES *
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
ONTAINS CODEWORD
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1040-MR
Bush Library Photocopy
10/10/2014
Preservation
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b. Note
Brent [Scowcroft] to POTUS
6/17/89
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Mr. President: (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01c. Cable
Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)
6/17/89
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01d. Cable
Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)
6/13/89
(b)(1)
TS
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
S/S-0
SEGRET
DEPARTMENT Oa.
OUTGOING
Department of State
UNITED
PAGE 01 OF 05 STATE 189751
STATES or
C22/26 905004 NOD25@
15/03562
ORIGIN OFFICE EAP-01
INFO SSS-01 SWO-01 SSI-01 SSO-01 TF3-01 INR-01 P-01 D-01
S-03 SS-10 C-91 T-01 SP-01 CATC-91 /026 A2 WF M
INR - EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ: SP - EYES ONLY ROSS
DISI AUTH BY
READ BY
DISTRIBUTED BY
(S/S-1)
EXSEC
DATE/TIME
DEPEXSEC
REPEATED TO
DATE/TIME
BY
SENSITIVE
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND IF NOT
EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED. BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE
CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED. GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OR DISCUSSED WITH
NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.
20012
ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT
OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.
WHEN THIS DOCUMENT is NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR S/S-1 ROOM 7512. TEL. 647-2976.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2010-2778-MR
7/2/2013 MM
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
S/S-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
OUTGOING
Department of State
ORLING
,
/
of
PAGE 02 OF #5 STATE 189751
C22/26 005004
NOD259
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R
DRAFTED BY: EAP/CM: MWONG
APPROVED BY: EAP: RLWILLIAMS
P : JSTROTZ
P. RKIMMITT
S/S: JFCOLLINS
S/S-0: WMENOLD
013171 150338Z /10
0 150334Z JUN 89 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 189751
NODIS
E. 0. 12356: ADR
TAGS: US. CH, PREL, SHUM
SUBJECT:
U/S KIMMITT MEETING WITH PRC AMBASSADOR
HAN XU - JUNE 14
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
2. UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT CALLED IN PRC AMBASSADOR HAN
XU ON JUNE 14 TO PROTEST STRONGLY AND FORMALLYCCHINA' $
EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY.
AMBASSADOR HAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR
XIAO HOUDE AND EMBASSY INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. U/S
KIMMITT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS
P - SPECIAL ASSISTANT STROTZ AND EAP/CM NOTETAKER WONG.
3. U/S KIMMITT BEGAN THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE
SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED THAT AMBASSADOR HAN BE SUMMONED
TO THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE STATEMENTS
S
MADE DURING THE JUNE 14 WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT PRESS
BRIEFINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN
JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. U/S KIMMITT THEN DELIVERED
SECRET
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
S/S-0
SECRET
9a STATE
OUTGOING
Department of State
UNITED
,
of
PAGE 03 OF 05 STATE 189751
C22/26 005904 NOD250
THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:
THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PROTESTS THE DECISION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY TO
EXPEL AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS
WERE PERFORMING FUNCTIONS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR
STATUS. THEY POSSESSED VALID JOURNALISTS' VISAS.
4. NOTING THE END OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION. U/S
KIMMITT SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WERE
TRYING TO MANAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AT THIS TIME
IN A MANNER THAT WILL ALLOW US TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE
THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE PRC ACTION TO EXPEL THE
JOURNALISTS- AND THE WIDE PUBLICITY THIS HAD RECEIVED IN
THE US MEDIA- MADE THE TASK OF MANAGING THE US-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP EXCEEDINGLY MORE DIFFICULT. THAT IS WHY HE
HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO
VIGOROUSLY PROTEST CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE JOURNALISTS
AND TO ASK THAT THIS BE COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN
BEIJING.
5. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED THAT THE TWO AMERICAN
JOURNALISTS HAD VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
AND THAT ACCORDINGLY. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS
JUSTIFIED IN ASKING THEM TO LEAVE. THEREFORE, HE COULD
NOT ACCEPT THE US PROTEST. HOWEVER, HE WOULD CONVEY IT
TO HIS GOVERNMENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECRETARY'S
SENTIMENTS ON US-CHINA RELATIONS. HE WISHED TO POINT OUT
AGAIN THAT CHINA ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE IT WAS CHINA'S HOPE
THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING
ANYTHING THAT VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
6. U/S KIMMITT NOTED THAT THE US ALSO ATTACHED
IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND WAS TRYING TO
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
S/S-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
OUTGOING
Department of State
GRAIND
AMERICA
of
PAGE 04 OF 05 STATE 189751
C22/26 005004 N00250
RESTORE THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH RELATIONS COULD BE
BUILT. EACH SIDE HAD TRIED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE
OTHER OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. HE ADDED THAT THE PRC WAS
WELL AWARE OF THE TRADITION OF ALLOWING JOURNALISTS
ACCESS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY ARE
ASSIGNED. THE STATUS OF JOURNALISTS AND THE
ACCREDITATION OF JOURNALISTS IS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY IN
THIS COUNTRY. WE BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS
HAD ACTED ENTIRELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS GRANTED
BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THAT CAPACITY. THEIR
EXPULSION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON
DIFFERENCES IN OUR RELATIONS AT THIS POINT, INSTEAD OF
ALLOWING US TO GET BACK TO RESTORING THE RELATIONSHIP.
KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY WHAT HAN HAD SAID TO THE
SECRETARY.
7. AMB. HAN RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE JOURNALISTS WERE
EXPELLED, THE PRC GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY
WERE FOUND NOT TO BE ACTING IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH
THEIR STATUS AS JOURNALISTS. AND THEY WERE INFORMED AS TO
WHICH CHINESE LAWS THEY HAD VIOLATED. MR. KIMMITT STATED
THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD A DIFFERENCE ON THAT POINT AND HE
WOULD COMMUNICATE THAT TO THE SECRETARY. HE ADDED THAT
INCIDENTS LIKE THIS NEEDED TO BE AVOIDED TO GET THE FOCUS
AWAY FROM DIFFERENCES WHICH THE PRESS TENDED TO MAGNIFY
AND BACK TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST. WE WERE TRYING
TO HANDLE OUR RELATIONS IN AS LOW-KEY AND QUIET A MANNER
AS POSSIBLE ESPECIALLY WHERE WE HAD DIFFERENCES.
OTHERWISE. IT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO HANDLE PROBLEMS
IN A WAY THAT BEST SERVED OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.
8. AMB. HAN SAID IT WAS CLEARLY STATED IN THE MESSAGE
SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHINA'S LEADERS THAT IT WAS
IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WORK TO ENHANCE MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING. HIS HOPE WAS THAT THE US SIDE WOULD
CEPAIL
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
000 WHITE HOUSE
VALUTEC #2
'89 6-17 18:49
PAGE 10
S/S-0
SECRET
DEPARTMENT as A
OUTGOING
Department of State
AMERICA
STATES of
PAGE 95 OF 05 STATE 189751
022/26 005004 NOD250
RESPECT CHINESE LAW AND THE CHINESE POSITION. U/S
KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THIS TO THE SECRETARY.
9. ACTION REQUEST: THE AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH THE MF A AT AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE
DEMARCHE DRAWING ON POINTS MADE BY U/S KIMMITT. (NOTE:
DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN ANNOUNCED AT JUNE 14 NOON BRIEFING
THAT US WOULD PROTEST THIS ACTION IN BEIJING "TODAY" --
JUNE 15 BEIJING TIME.) BAKER
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
000 WHITE HOUSE
VALUTEC #2
'89 6-17 18:51
PAGE 04
S/S-0
DEPARTMENT OF
SECRET
OUTGOING
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
STATES of
PAGE 01 OF 05 STATE 185359
C14/18 001153 NOD199
11/22237
INFO TF3-01 P-01 D-01 S-83 SS-10 C-01 SP-01 /018 A2
KAK
TF3 WILLIAMS EYES ONLY: S/P ROSS EYES ONLY
DIST AUTH BY
READ BY
DISTRIBUTED BY
EXSEC
(S/S-1)
DEPEXSEC
DATE/TIME
REPEATED TO
BY
DATE/TIME
SENSITIVE
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND IF NOT
EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE
CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OR DISCUSSED WITH
NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.
ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT
OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.
WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR S/S-1 ROOM 7512. TEL. 647-2976.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009- 40-mR
11/24/2014 MY
Bush Library Photocopy
SECRET
Preservation
000 WHITE HOUSE
VALUTEC #2
'89 6-17 18:52
PAGE 05
S/S-0
SECRET
of STATE STATE
OUTGOING
Department of State
UNITED STATES of ,
PAGE 02 OF 05 STATE 185359
C14/18 001153 NOD199
ORIGIN NODS-90
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R
DRAFTED BY: TFCH01: RWILLIAMS: JLF
APPROVED BY: P:JWOLF
S/S-0: JFELT
S/S: JFCOLLINS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
SS SSO TF3- 3 P
146254 1120212 /66
0 112017Z JUN 89 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 185359
NODIS
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR LILLEY FROM U/S KIMMIT
E.0. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ASEC CVIS. PHUM CH (FANG LIZHI)
SUBJECT: TFCH01: KIMMITT-HAN DISCUSSION OF EMBASSY
SECURITY
REF: BEIJING 15831
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. U/S KIMMITT CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU AT
1300 JUNE 11 TO ASSERT US CONCERN ABOUT THE XINHUA PRESS
BULLETIN ANNOUNCING THE ARREST WARRANT FOR FANG LIZHI
AND ADVISING OF HIS PRESENCE AT THE US EMBASSY.
COUPLING THIS WITH THE RECENT ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF
RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY, KIMMITT EMPHASIZED THAT
ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENCES
UNDER ANY PRETEXT WOULD INCUR A PROFOUND AND WIDESPREAD
CRITICAL REACTION IN THE U.S.. THUS MAKING SUBSTANTIALLY
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MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE SINO-US
RELATIONS. HAN INDICATED HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD
REFRAIN FROM FURTHER INTERFERENCE IN CHINESE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND SAID PROTECTION WAS GUARANTEED AS LONG AS
U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBSERVE THE LAWS OF CHINA.
KIMMITT REITERATED SECRETARY'S POINTS ABOUT U.S.
INTEREST IN FINDING WAY WITH THE PRC TO WORK TOWARD
SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE MUTUAL GOALS. HAN RECIPROCATED.
HAN CONCLUDED NOTING AN INCIDENT OUTSIDE HIS RESIDENCE
WHEREIN HE INDICATED A PERSON HAD KNOCKED ON HIS DOOR
DEMANDING TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR. WHILE POLICE DID
NOTHING TO STOP HIM. END SUMMARY
3. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD JUST RECEIVED A
XINHUA REPORT WHICH STATED THAT THE BEIJING PUBLIC
SECURITY DEPARTMENT HAD ISSUED A WANTED CIRCULAR FOR THE
ARREST OF FANG LIZHI AND HIS WIFE L | SHUXIAN AND THAT
IT REPORTED THAT THE COUPLE HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN THE US
EMBASSY IN BEIJING. HE INDICATE WE WERE CONCERNED THAT
THIS REPORT COUPLED WITH THE ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF SOME
RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY MIGHT STIMULATE ACTION
THREATENING TO OUR EMBASSY OR ITS PERSONNEL.
4. CONTINUING KIMMITT SAID WE WERE AWARE THAT POLICE
PROTECTION HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED IN BEIJING. S DIPLOMATIC
AREAS. BUT NONETHELESS WE WERE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT
NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER LARGE SCALE MOB ACTIVITY.
THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM. AND KIMMITT HAD SPOKEN WITH
MR. GATES AT THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT IT TO CALL TO THE
CHINESE SIDE'S ATTENTION THAT ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR
EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS. IN CONNECTION
WITH THE FANG ISSUE THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED WITH THE
AMBASSADOR LAST EVENING OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON WOULD
PRODUCE A WIDESPREAD AND PROFOUND CRITICAL REACTION IN
THE US.
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5. THIS REACTION WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE
DIFFICULT THE RESTORATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP. WHICH AS THE SECRETARY NOTED LAST EVENING
WAS THE GOAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND, WE BELIEVED. THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT. WE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD
CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. AS IT CONSIDERED
ITS RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST OF LAST NIGHT FOR
SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FANG ISSUE
6. HAN RESPONDED THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO POINTS:
-- HE HOPED THE US WOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER
INTERFERENCE INTO CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
- - SO LONG AS US DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBEYED THE LAWS
OF CHINA THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED.
HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONVEY THE UNDER SECRETARY'S REMARKS
TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONVEY A RESPONSE AS SOON AS
IT WAS RECEIVED.
7. KIMMITT SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE CHINESE SIDE'S
POSITION REGARDING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA. AT
THE SAME TIME WE WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY MUTUALLY TO
RESTORE THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. WE COULD NOT ESCAPE
THE FACT THAT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BEIJING WOULD
AFFECT OUR EFFORTS TOWARD THIS GOAL. OUR INTEREST IN
THIS GOAL WAS MUTUAL AND WE HOPED TO WORK WITH THE
CHINESE SIDE TO ACHIEVE IT. HE WOULD REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY AND MR. GATES ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE
AMBASSADOR.
8. HAN SAID HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FANG LIZHI BECAUSE THE VICE
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FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ALREADY STATED THAT TO AMBASSADOR
LILLEY IN BEIJING. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE
CHINESE SIDE VALUED ITS US RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD EXERT
THE GREATEST EFFORT TO PREVENT SINO-US RELATIONS FROM
BEING UNDERMINED. HOWEVER, SUCCESS DID NOT HINGE ON
CHINESE EFFORTS ALONE: COOPERATION BY THE US SIDE WAS
ALSO ESSENTIAL.
9. WE SHARE THIS GOAL. KIMMITT AGREED. AS THE
SECRETARY HAD SAID LAST NIGHT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS OF
IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. WE WANTED TO WORK
COOPERATIVELY WITH THE CHINESE SIDE TO ADVANCE SOLUTIONS
SERVING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.
10. HAN SAID HE WISHED ALSO TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PROTECTION OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC
PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS MORNING A
MAN HAD KNOCKED ON HIS RESIDENCE DOOR AND DEMANDED TO
SEE THE AMBASSADOR. THIS WAS IN THE PRESENCE OF SECRET
SERVICE PEOPLE WHO DID NOTHING TO STOP HIM. AS HE HAD
BEEN HANGING AROUND THE EMBASSY FOR SEVERAL DAYS THE
SECRET SERVICE PEOPLE MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT HE SEEMED TO
BE MENTALLY DISORDERED AND YET THEY DID NOTHING
11. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
INCIDENT BUT WOULD PROMPTLY CHECK IN TO IT. WE WERE
AWARE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHANCERY AND RESIDENCES AND WOULD TAKE ALL MEASURES
NECESSARY TO FULFILL THEM.
BAKER
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01g. Cable
Re: Secretary - Han Discussion (5 pp.)
6/12/89
(b)(1)
TS
Collection:
Record Group:
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Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
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agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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ORIGIN OFFICE EAP- 01
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EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED. BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE
CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OR DISCUSSED WITH
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ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT
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WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE
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DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR S/S-1 ROOM 7512 TEL. 647-2976.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R
DRAFTED BY: TFCH01 JBADER: JB
APPROVED BY: S : THE SECRETARY
S/S-0: WMENOLD
EAP: WCLARK
EAP: RWILLIAMS
S/S: JSROY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
SS SSO TF3-3
270434 080323Z /61
0 080301Z JUN 89 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHOC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 180968
NODIS
E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL CH US
SUBJECT: TFCH01 SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH HAN XU
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY BAKER CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN
XU THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 7 AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
- - THE - PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SPEAK TO
AMBASSADOR HAN. THE PRESIDENT AND ALL AMERICANS ARE
DISTRESSED AND SADDENED OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE
CARNAGE WAS CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE. DESPITE OFFICIAL
STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY
--THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD THE US-CHINA
СГОПСТ
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RELATIONSHIP INTACT. HE HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO TAKE
ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE ALREADY TAKEN. AT THE SAME
TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM.
DEMOCRACY. AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM:
- WE THOUGHT THE CHINESE POSTPONEMENT OF FM QIAN' S VISIT
WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE WOULD HAVE FACED PROTESTS IN THE US:
-- THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SEEK
ASSURANCES THE PRC WOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT
US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. AMBASSADOR LILLEY WOULD BE
CALLING ON PRC OFFICIALS THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO
REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE
AMERICANS SHOULD IT PROVE NECESSARY. THIS WAS ON A
CONTINGENCY BASIS ONLY. IF COMMERCIAL CHARTERS PROVED
INSUFFICIENT.
AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE REQUEST
FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO BEIJING. HE
NOTED THE PRC'S HOPE THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD NOT
INTERFERE IN THE PRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ALSO SAID
THAT CHINA WOULD MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY
AND OPEN DOOR. AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP
LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN MIND AS THE PRC TRIES TO FIND ITS
OWN SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. END SUMMARY.
3. PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU WAS CALLED IN URGENTLY FOR A
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY AT 4:40 P. M. ON JUNE 7.
4. AFTER THANKING AMBASSADOR HAN FOR COMING IN ON SUCH
SHORT NOTICE. THE SECRETARY TOLD HAN HOW DISTRESSED WE
ARE OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD
CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR AT THE REQUEST OF THE
PRESIDENT WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN AT NOON. THE
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PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO CONVEY OUR SENTIMENTS. THE
PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR HE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, WHERE HE HAD SERVED. IT IS
THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT OTHER QUESTIONS ARE INVOLVED
IN THIS INSTANCE. THE CARNAGE IN BEIJING HAS BEEN
OVERWHELMING. AND ALL THE WORLD CAN SEE THIS. OFFICIAL
SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN DENYING THIS BUT WE ALL KNOW IT
HAPPENED. WE ARE GREATLY SADDENED BY THESE EVENTS.
5. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD
US-PRC RELATIONS TOGETHER HE HAS PUT A LOT OF EFFORT
INTO BUILDING THEM HE REGARDS OUR RELATIONSHIP AS VERY
IMPORTANT TO OUR TWO PEOPLES THE SECRETARY NOTED THE
CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE US ON
THIS ISSUE. THE US HAS EXPERIENCED 213 YEARS OF
DEMOCRACY WITH PEACEFUL PROTESTS AND PEACEFUL
TRANSITIONS OF POWER.
6. THE SECRETARY SAID WE THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD
IDEA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN DICHEN TO DELAY HIS
VISIT. HAD HE COME HE WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED MANY
PROTESTS, SO THE POSTPONEMENT WAS WISE. THE SECRETARY
TOOK PARTICULAR NOTE THAT THE VISIT WAS POSTPONED NOT
CANCELED.
7. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED HAN TO CONTACT HIS GOVERNMENT
TO ASSURE THAT IT TOOK ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US
INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. HE SAID AMBASSADOR LILLEY WILL
BE GOING IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE
ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO
EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM BEIJING. THE SECRETARY NOTED
THAT THERE ARE US COMMERCIAL CHARTER AIRCRAFT ARRIVING
SHORTLY, BUT WE ARE REQUESTING ADVANCE CLEARANCE SHOULD
IT BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN A MILITARY CHARTER.
8. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACT
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THAT VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHU HAD SEEN THE AMBASSADOR
SO QUICKLY WHEN THE SHOOTINGS OCCURRED IN THE
JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT
OTHERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEE THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER.
AND WE WERE APPRECIATIVE OF THE QUICK RESPONSE IN OUR
CASE
9. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE HAD
EXPLAINED THE PRC'S POSITION TWICE TO UNDER SECRETARY
KIMMITT IN EARLIER MEETINGS AND SAW NO NECESSITY TO
REITERATE THAT VIEW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE US. HE HAD
SAID THAT CHINA WOULD TRY TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO
THE SITUATION. CHINA HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES
ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WOULD
NOT INTERFERE. HAN PROMISED TO REPORT OUR REQUEST FOR
CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT.
10. THE SECRETARY REITERATED WE WILL ONLY ASK FOR
PERMISSION FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO LAND IF IT PROVES
NECESSARY. HE SAID WE HAVE TWO MILITARY TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT IN YOKOTA READY FOR USE. WE HAVE NO PLANS TO
USE THEM NOW BUT WE WERE MERELY REQUESTING ADVANCE
PERMISSION IF NECESSARY SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE.
11. AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HIS GOAL WAS TO PROTECT
US-CHINA RELATIONS. AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP
LONG-TERM AS WELL AS SHORT- TERM CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.
WE HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO BUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP AND
THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE PERIOD. CHINA MUST
FIND ITS OWN WAY. WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH
OUR WAY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE
IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS WHY
THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO TALK WITH HAN. THE
PRESIDENT WANTS TO PRESERVE OUR RELATIONSHIP AND HE HAS
RESISTED PRESSURES TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE
/
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TAKEN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT JR RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE
BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO
BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE
HEARD FROM. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HOW
DISTRESSED AND SADDENED AMERICANS WERE. AND OUR HOPE
THAT THE SITUATION WILL STABILIZE AND CALM DOWN THAT
CHINA WILL MOVE MARD MORE OPEN AND PLURALISTIC
POLICIES. AND THAT WE CAN GET OUR RELATIONSHIP BACK ON
TRACK. HAN SAID GNIRA WOULD CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT
FOREIGN POLICY AN INTAIN ITS OPEN DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE.
2. PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING WERE US--THE
SECRETARY 078 KIMMITT PA ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER
EAP ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARK EAP ACTING DAS
WILLIAMS AND EAP/CM ACTING DIRECTOR BADER
PRC- AMBASSADOR HAN XU POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUDE.
INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. BAKER
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TOAST BY THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
BEIJING, DECEMBER 9, 1989
MR FOREIGN MINISTER, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN:
MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS
FRIENDS, TO RESUME OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON
INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO BOTH
OUR NATIONS. THIS IS A DIALOGUE WHICH WE BELIEVE
HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE HISTORIC, PEACE, STABILITY,
AND PROSPERITY OF ASIA AND THE WORLD.
LAST WEEKEND, IN ANOTHER CORNER OF THE WORLD,
PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HELD TALKS ON THE
GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. AFTERWARDS, PRESIDENT
2
BUSH INSTRUCTED ME TO COME TO CHINA AND INFORM OUR
CHINESE HOSTS ABOUT THE TALKS IN MALTA. THERE IS
NOTHING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION THAT NEEDS TO BE HIDDEN FROM THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA. THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD ARE
ENHANCED BY THIS DIALOGUE.
WE ALSO COME TODAY TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR
INTO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS
OF AGREEMENT -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC.
AND WE COME TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF
IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.
WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT EXHAUST
OURSELVES IN PLACING BLAME FOR PROBLEMS THAT EXIST.
RATHER, BY WORKING TOGETHER -- WITHIN THE VALUES OF
OUR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS -- WE SHOULD SEEK TO
SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS AND REMOVE IRRITANTS.
3
IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE
SOLUTIONS WE SEEK.
TALKS MAKE PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE
SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, I WOULD NOT BE HONEST IF
DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE PROFOUND AREAS I OF
DISAGREEMENT -- ON THE EVENTS AT TIANANMEN, ON THE
SWEEPING CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE SEE YOUR
COMPLAINTS ABOUT US IN THE PAGES OF PEOPLE'S DAILY.
BUT I RECALL THAT WHEN WE HAVE FOUND WAYS TO WORK
TOGETHER, THE WORLD HAS BEEN CHANGED FOR THE
BETTER; AND WHEN WE HAVE BEEN AT ODDS, NEEDLESS
TENSION AND SUFFERING WERE THE RESULT.
IN BOTH OUR SOCIETIES THERE ARE VOICES OF THOSE WHO
SEEK TO REDIRECT OR FRUSTRATE OUR COOPERATION. WE
NEGATIVE FORCES.
BOTH MUST TAKE BOLD MEASURES TO OVERCOME THESE
4
IN THESE MEETINGS WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS
WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR
ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. THE
SOONER WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER.
THE PATH AHEAD WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL NOT
BE SHORT.
BUT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH WHEN WE HAVE WORKED
TOGETHER IN THE PAST. I CAN CITE SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET
COMBAT FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIMITS ON MISSILE
PROLIFERATION, PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE
WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM'S COMBAT FORCES FROM
CAMBODIA, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES, AND
MORE. WE -- BOTH SIDES -- MUST PERSEVERE. NOW
MORE THAN EVER.
5
WE ARE NOT CHINA'S PRIME ENEMY OR THREAT, AS SOME
WOULD CLAIM. BUT, LIKE YOU, WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN
VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND TRADITIONS. WE CAN BE NO
OTHER WAY. WE EXTEND OUR HAND IN FRIENDSHIP, AND
HOPE YOU WILL DO THE SAME.
NOW MAY I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
--- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YANG
-- TO THE GREAT CHINESE PEOPLE
-- AND TO U.S.-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
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Class.
and Type
02. Memcon
Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor
12/9/89
(b)(1)
S
Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (6 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
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Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
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AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting Between Deng Xiaoping and National
Security Advisor Scowcroft
DATE & TIME:
Sunday, December 10, 1989-11:05 am - 11:45 am
PLACE:
Jujian Room, Great Hall of the People
Beijing, China
PARTICIPANTS:
US Side:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Doug Kio
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker
(Before cameras)
PRC Side:
Deng Xiaoping
This visit of yours IS an important
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
action, It's great significance is that
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
a Hhough there are some disputes
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
over this or that problem and
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
differences between China and the
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
us., the countries will eventually
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Deng
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker
Rong,
restore their good relation This is needed for the peace and stability of the world. Day:
Scowcrolt. 1 completels agree with what you say
(Remarks with cameras present Doug Paal to get)
daughter xiauping to and
(seats) /After taking
Deng Xiaoping: Welcome to China. Despite the differences
between us, Sino-US relations must improve for world stability.
I think it would be impolite and unreasonable for me not to
receive the personal emissary of my friend, President Bush.
General Scowcroft: On behalf of the President may I say I
appreciate it very much, especially on a Sunday, and especially
when one is retired to take the time to receive us.
Deng Xiaoping: General Scowcroft you have come to brief us on
the Malta meeting but in reality you have come here to put an end
to our disputes, so our relations can develop new confidence. I
think I should say it is in the common interest on both sides to
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see improvement of relations. I think we share the common desire
and common need. I think we can find a solution.
General Scowcroft: I agree with you completely. While the
excuse of my coming is to explain the discussions we had with the
Soviet Union in Malta, in fact it is an expression of both the
strategic relationship that we have developed and the President's
interest in discussing with the Chinese leadership the important
developments of the world but even more his interest in returning
the relationship to a positive rather than a negative track that
recent developments have put us on.
Deng Xiaoping: So please convey my best wishes and warm regards
to President Bush. I know that he has done a lot in trying to
find a solution to this problem. And actually, he has run into
some difficulties but I think generally speaking we can see that
the Chinese leaders are faced with even more difficulties. The
main difficulty in our minds lies in the fact that we must
justify ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese people so that the
Chinese people will be more at ease after this problem is
settled.
And also internationally speaking if we cannot find a proper
solution to the problem then our international prestige will be
affected. Take the Japanese, for example, in the past Japan was
quite modest in the face of China because it has a deep debt to
China because of it past history. But it has been very active
against China in putting sanctions on China and it regards
extending loans as a precondition (in Chinese: it has
preconditions for extending the loans). This time they are very
active in putting sanctions on China and they regard extending
loans as a precondition. Recently they said they will not sell
steel to China. That's all right. We can find it on the
international market. And we can do without their loans.
the
Japanese in their relations with China have grown very much
complacent.
As far as Europe is concerned, I am very much dissatisfied with
the attitude of the French. Internationally speaking China can
indeed exert special influence. So instability in China will
create a lot of problems. And surely those problems will not be
confined to a regional nature. At least it will result in chaos
in the Asia-Pacific region. So this will certainly not be a
those
if
blessing for the United States and China.
About the world situation, I want to ask my friend privately and
unofficially about Malta. What kind of world outcome will this
lead to? What kind of outcome will this meeting have with
respect to Eastern Europe?
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This turmoil is even more serious than had occurred in China in
June. It is very difficult to predict the implications and
consequences. I think in these circumstances the Soviets have
scored no points and even if the United States has scored any
points, it can't be much. So it is someone else who scored the
points. It is the rivals of the United States who scored points.
China can do no damage to the United States. China posed no
threat to the United States. So the United States should not
antagonize China. China does not consider the United States as a
rival. Ever since 1972, we have done nothing to hurt the
interests or feelings of the United States. Naturally there have
been some incidents in a technical sense but not in a political
sense.
Over the past 17 years since 1972, the international situation
has enjoyed stability and in this regard the excellent
development of Sino-US relations has played a major role. It has
carried great weight. I am not clear about the possible outcome
of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe but I believe Sino-US
cooperation will be very important for peace. So I think China
and the United States should refrain from fighting each other.
Naturally by fighting I do not mean war -- I mean verbal attacks.
I would like you to bring this message to President Bush. We
should try to put an end to our dispute by taking into
consideration the interests of the other side by both sides. We
should not just take into consideration in carrying out the
sincere cooperation the interest of one side. Both sides need to
be considered. So in this way in the final analysis we can find
solutions.
General Scowcroft, I know you are a trouble shooter (literally,
"you have many ways"). Many of our friends in the United States
are friends of yours. Dr. Kissinger can count as one. So I
think since there are so many people with excellent ideas they
can surely find ways that are mutually acceptable. I think if
both sides can make concessions to solve the difficulties this
question can be resolved, by enabling you to deal with Congress
and to deal with the people. I asked Dr. Kissinger to tell
President Bush that if we can find a proper solution to our
problems then at an appropriate time next year you can arrange
for a visit to the United States by General Secretary Jiang.
That visit should take place when there is a good atmosphere with
all the problems resolved in Sino-US relations. Otherwise why
should he just go there? Just for wrangling? I think that visit
should symbolize that we have put an end to the dispute and we
should go forward together.
Now I am really, truly in retirement. I have made up my mind not
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to interfere in the work of the new leadership because that is
not good. I hope the new leadership can make better progress.
But I am still a citizen of the Peoples Republic of China and a
member of the Communist Party of China, and I am still interested
in the stability of China and I am interested in the security and
stability of the world situation. Please tell President Bush
that he should not forget the fact that in Beijing, in the
Orient, there is an old man who is very much interested in the
excellent development and the improvement of Sino-US relations.
In his recent letter to me he said that although I have retired
he still regards me as a friend and I share his views. So in
spite of the differences between our two countries we are still
friends and I think it would be useful if we can deal with
disputes between our countries and stay as friends. I propose
that after we have settled the recent disputes, then (the General
Secretary Jiang will pay a visit to the United States and during
the visit, President Bush and the General Secretary can find
themselves congenial and make new friends with each other. As
for friends, you can never have too many (laughing). So I am
making these remarks as a friend. Chairman Jiang and Li Peng
will speak on behalf of the party and government of China. So
today although we are holding this talk in the protocol sense of
the word, they speak for the government. Actually I still have
some substantive issues Do you have any comments?
views
General Scowcroft: I thank you very much for your comments and
may I say that President Bush agrees with you completely both in
your appraisal of Sino-US relations, the steps we need to take
and also in terms of the strategic picture in the world. He has
never moved from his objective of sustaining and even improving
the strategic relationship between the United States and China.
During the difficult period of the last several months, in fact,
he tried his best to restrain friends and allies both in Europe
and Japan from taking actions even more extreme than they did.
Deng Xiaoping: I know this.
General Scowcroft: He faces now big problems with the American
Congress and in our political system. On some events when the
Congress and the President are SO opposed, the President has very
little power against the Congress.
Deng Xiaoping: That is why I have said on many occasions that
China cannot adopt the US system. I have said this many times.
We cannot interfere. Some Americans say the US system is good,
but I myself will say that we can't adopt such a system. Should
we put an end to our meeting or do you have any more comments?
General Scowcroft: May I just end by saying that the President
is determined to restore our relationship and he agrees with the
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5
goal of having Chairman Jiang visit the United States in an
atmosphere of cooperation.
Deng Xiaoping: Your side should extend a formal invitation
otherwise it would not do otherwise it would not do for the
General Secretary of our party to go.
General Scowcroft: We still have work to do but that is what we
are working toward. In connection with our strategic
relationship, the President agrees completely that at a time when
there is much turmoil in the world and events are moving rapidly
that the strategic relationship between the US and China, who
have no fundamental interests against EO each other, it is
perhaps even more important than it was in the past 17 years.
Deng Xiaoping: Both sides should make efforts and this must not
be a protracted process. A protracted process does not serve the
interest of either party. That is exactly what I meant now.
Some misconceptions might occur in these circumstances. So it is
very important to make a sober-minded analysis of the situation.
Sometimes you have to wait for a year or two years before you can
come to understand the nature and substance of the changes and
direction and pattern of such changes. If someone can claim that
they can give the final say on the analysis of a situation, then
I shall regard him as boasting.
General Scowcroft: One final personal note. President Bush
considers you and old and very dear friend. He knows that you
are retired. He doesn't want to bother you but he would like to
be able from time to time to write you a letter if that is all
right with you.
Deng Xiaoping: But naturally I will be glad to accept. I will
be glad to receive those letters but I might not necessarily
reply to those letters because I cannot speak on behalf of the
party and the people. The letters may touch on some substantive
issues and I may not speak on the issues. But I would write
letters conveying personal greetings. Please convey my best
wishes to President and Mrs. Bush saying we are indeed still
friends. So in spite of the temporary disputes the two of us are
still friends. Our friendship is not inactive affected (?)
General Scowcroft: Good.
Deng Xiaoping: So our friendship should last for a long time.
General Scowcroft: Very good.
SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting Between General Secretary Jiang Zemin
and National Security Advisor Scowcroft
DATE & TIME:
Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 9:45AM - 10:47AM
(Beijing Standard Time)
PLACE:
Room 202, Zhongnanhai - Beijing, PRC
PARTICIPANTS:
US Side:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S.H Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker
PRC Side:
Jiang Zemin, General Secretary
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker
(plus one unidentified official)
)
General Secretary Jiang: (Welcoming pleasantries.)
General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate very much being here and having the opportunity to
meet you and to exchange views. It is very nice to be here. I
appreciate very much the opportunity to meet you. I bring you
greetings and best wishes from President Bush. I must say on a
personal note the first word I heard when you became General
Secretary was from Mr. Trammell Crowe.
General Secretary Jiang: (In English) My good friend. Many
years friendship. My good friend.
515 years
General Scowcroft: He called to say what a wonderful person you
are and to say how good it is for US-China relations.
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General Secretary Jiang: He is a strong supporter.
General Scowcroft: Let me say that President Bush has asked
Secretary Eagleburger and me to come here in the spirit of the
relationship which has developed between our two countries to
share our perspectives on issues of major world significance.
Over the years that has resulted in the development of a
strategic relationship which the U. S. feels is of great value to
us and to the interest of world stability. And it is in that
spirit that President Bush asked Secretary Eagleburger and me to
come to discuss with you a significant event in US-Soviet
relations, that is the meeting in Malta.
The President also wanted to take this step to underscore his
strong personal interest in putting our relationship back on a
positive track away from the negativism of recent months. In
doing this and in his recent action of vetoing the Pelosi Bill,
he has undertaken some considerable political risks to himself.
The initial reports in the United States of the announcement of
our trip here has aroused strong negative press comments in some
circles. I cite this simply to explain that the President
definitely does want to move forward on our relationship but
there are significant impediments in the United States.
The Foreign Minister last night, for example, presented a
thoughtful package of alternatives on which we might be able to
proceed. We have some problems with that formulation, not with
the objectives, with which we concur, but with the approach. We
can go back and review it and respond in due course. Certainly
there is a strong desire on the part of the United States to move
forward but we do have domestic difficulties, strong political
costs.
If I could just explain briefly why President Bush felt the need
to meet with Chairman Gorbachev, something of the meeting and of
the situation in which we feel the world finds itself at the
moment.
His original notion of the timing for a US-Soviet Summit was
after the completion of the various negotiations we have underway
on different aspects of arms control and different elements in
our bilateral relationship. After his visit to Poland and
Hungary last summer, however, he came to the conclusion that
there were very fundamental, very important and accelerating
movements taking place in that area and that it was important to
discuss those trends and developments in Eastern Europe at the
point of convergence of US and Soviet forces.
The meeting was designed not to negotiate specific issues, not to
come to agreements, or issue communiques, but simply to exchange
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views on developments taking place in the world and on the
possible consequences of those movements in order that there not
be misunderstandings between the two leaders. At the meeting the
two agreed to try to accelerate negotiations on arms control but
the focus of the meeting really was on developments in Eastern
Europe, in the Soviet Union, and the discussion we had on certain
regional issues. That discussion was briefer than anticipated
because the weather did not cooperate and we had to cancel one
meeting and dinner between the two sides.
Chairman Gorbachev seemed to us to be fully aware of the enormous
problems he faced in his attempt to restructure the Soviet
economy. He was, however, full of self-confidence in what he was
about but to us he seemed to have perhaps only superficial
understanding of some of the economic aspects of the efforts he
was making to introduce market economics into the Soviet system.
With respect to Eastern Europe, Chairman Gorbachev seemed not
only to be approving of developments there but indeed took some
credit for what was happening in Eastern Europe. He made it
quite clear that he had no intention of intervening in the
developments in Eastern Europe although he evidenced some
disquiet at the possible pace of developments which could
introduce instabilities.
With respect to the issue of German reunification, he softened
somewhat the formulation which the Soviet Union had been using;
that is that there were two Germanies and that was the way it had
to remain. He presented to President Bush a more ambiguous
formulation, that is that history had given us the two Germanies
as the result of the aftermath of World War II and that since we
had inherited that situation from history, we should let history
solve it and the pace of developments should not be influenced by
the outside. He remained obviously reluctant about the
possibility of German reunification but did not pose an absolute
prohibition on it.
For his part, President Bush pointed out that the United States
had since the 50's supported eventual German reunification and we
would not oppose such an event.
With respect to the discussion of regional issues, there was a
very strong exchange about the situation in Central America in
which President Bush objected strongly to the role of Nicaragua
in supporting the rebels in El Salvador and of Cuba in providing
military support to Nicaraguan-armed forces, which were far
larger than any in that region and far larger than any legitimate
national defense needs would require.
Chairman Gorbachev indicated that during his visit to Cuba last
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spring he had suggested that Castro should begin to emulate the
countries of Eastern Europe and modernize his system, but he said
that in line with Soviet policy not to interfere in the internal
developments and in the right of each country to make its own
choice and to change its mind if it wished, that he was not going
to interfere with Mr. Castro.
President Bush did not find the discussion of Central America to
be satisfactory. The other major regional issue discussed was
Afghanistan which was raised by Chairman Gorbachev. He stated
that the two sides should stop arguing about the past and deal
with the current situation which he described as one in which the
Najibullah and Kabul regime was getting stronger and the
Mujahedin
Mudeheden were in disarray and were already beginning talks with
the Najibullah regime. President Bush disagreed with the
appraisal and the two leaders then turned to the discussion of
possible ways to get discussions going. The position of
Najibullah still remains a major impediment to getting those
talks going. Chairman Gorbachev would propose the notion of a
ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of military supplies to
both sides. I believe it is fair to say that there was no
progress made in discussions about Afghanistan.
Time prevented a discussion of any other of the major regional
issues -- in Asia, for example. There was a brief discussion of
the Middle East focussing on the situation in Lebanon and the new
Government and which both agreed they would support.
Our appraisal of the meeting and of the situation at the present
time is that Chairman Gorbachev is facing very serious troubles
at home, troubles which he perhaps does not fully understand how
to deal with; that he has largely given up on Eastern Europe and
is prepared to let it go with the possible exception of
development of serious instability potentially with East Germany
or Czechoslovakia.
There seems no doubt that the world is in a rapid state of flux
at the present time. The Soviet Union has reduced its
conventional forces and in part its spending on military forces.
It, however, has shown little if any diminution in spending on
its strategic and nuclear forces. The changes in conventional
forces to in fact reduce the threat around the Soviet border of a
surprise massive conventional attack across those borders and the
situation in Eastern Europe with the certain instability of the
forces of those countries does significantly change the character
of the trend of the Warsaw Pact to NATO defenses.
I believe it is premature, however, to come to any final
historical conclusions that the ambitions of the Soviet Union --
either those ambitions coming out of a Stalinist drive for
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expansion after World War II or the fundamental Russian impulse
toward expansion -- have been significantly lessened or
eliminated.
Chairman Gorbachev pointed out that the world was becoming a
multi-polar one with a rapidly unifying Europe, a strengthening
Japan, China and potentially India as great powers of the world.
He suggested the necessity of a US-Soviet cooperative approach to
this new multi-polar world while disclaiming any notion of a US-
Soviet condominium.
While the United States has no particular interest in such an
approach, there is no question that the world is changing
rapidly, that a different coalition of forces and powers is
possible. In these circumstances a strategic relationship has
developed over the years between the United States and China, who
have no points of direct conflict with each other in strategic
matters. While that relationship may alter somewhat with respect
to the Soviet Union in the future, depending on how the situation
develops, in the United States' view, it is as important now or
perhaps more so to deal with this uncertain world of today. In
the areas where the United States and China have cooperated
closely, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, the results have been
very positive, both for the two countries and for the world as a
whole. And the United States looks forward to resolving the
current problems between us in order that we can continue and
accelerate such a relationship.
General Secretary Jiang: Thank you very much, General Scowcroft,
for your detailed account. Because time is so short today I will
just briefly touch on several issues. I can fully understand
that the fact that President Bush has sent Your Excellency to
China and also that some of his previous measures are aimed at
improving the current Sino relations. I can also understand
another point that struck me -- that President Bush was now in a
rather difficult position. I don't say that I have a full grasp
of the relationship between Congressional activities and power of
the Presidency but I think, with my background, I have some
understanding of this because I began to receive an American- and
British style education when I was a young student.
First of all I want to say that both sides are now proceeding in
their own interests, as was the case when President Nixon came
here on his first visit to reestablish Sino-US relations. I am
especially aware of the fact that you came here with the advance
team in 1972 and together with President Nixon. Events have come
a long way since 1972 and at that time our leader Zhou Enlai was
still alive and he had a very important principle: to find
common interest or a Chinese saying that we should find the
common ground while reserving minor differences.
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Just now you have briefed me on your views of international
developments and also on the Malta meeting between President Bush
and Chairman Gorbachev and the analyses that the two made during
the meeting. This reminds me of some remarks which are quite
common, cliches -- a story from the Three Kingdoms that under the
sun everything will become united after a long time of separation
and after a long time of unity they will certainly be separated.
I am not saying this is so but that the world situation is in
constant flux. I think both China and the United States are
committed to peace in the world and I think we can both agree on
two major themes: peace and development.
The second point is that in the Asia-Pacific region our two
countries share several common points. In terms of economic
development in the future, this Asia-Pacific area will develop
very rapidly in the years to come. So we share a common
interest.
The third point is that China is a country with 1.1 billion
people, therefore come what may China will develop more trade
potential and this will provide us for a number of opportunities
for cooperation in the future market. China will be a great
market. Ever since 1972 when China and the United States issued
the Shanghai Joint Communique, I can't say there have been no
differences between us. Actually Taiwan was the major
difference. And in regard to Taiwan, our position has always
the
few
been a clear one. That is a principle of one country, two
years
systems. So I think in general terms the tendency is increasing
exchanges, even in peoples coming to the mainland to visit their
brothers, and now many visit here. One country, two systems has
always been our consistent principle. At a recent press
conference, a reporter we were asked if China would abandon use
of force against Taiwan. We said we couldn't make such a
that emphasize
commitment. Naturally we hope for a peaceful resolution, with
Taiwan returning to the motherland. Some of my classmates are
now working in Taiwan in some rather high posts. Secondly, there
is a question of ideology. Your being a capitalist country and swe
our being a socialist country, but I don't think this should
constitute an obstacle because we have always stood for the five
principles of peaceful coexistence. Ideological differences
should not lead to any obstacles to our relations. When Mr.
Nixon came last time he said that he found it quite different to
understand how China can promote reform and oppose bourgeois
liberalism. We will stick to reform, but by bourgeois
liberalism, we mean that there are some difficulties. We welcome
Western investment, but oppose some influences, such as
prostitution, gambling, pornography, drug taking, etc. We oppose
bourgeois liberalization, but are willing to learn and acquire
advanced technologies and know-how from your country.
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Concerning the developments in Eastern Europe, I want to make
several points especially clear. By comparing China with Eastern
Europe you can find several differences. The first is our party
has been developing and growing in all kinds of struggles since
the May 4th movement in 1919. Second, our Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) has been developing under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China through all kinds of struggles,
including the anti-Japan war. Third, the Chinese people
liberated themselves by themselves. A Fourth difference is
because of geographic location and the historical background and
tradition of China -- because it tends to revisit foreign
aggression.
as
resist
In February of this year, when President Bush came to China, Deng
told him about aggression made by Russia against China. Also
there is the 8-year anti-Japanese war which left a very permanent
bad
a
impression on the Chinese mind. Also the Chinese people want to
maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people but an 8-
year war still remains vivid on their minds and cannot be SO
easily wiped from the minds of the people. So I think after I
have explained the above points I believe that our two sides can
find many common interests in the current turbulent situation. I
think we should adopt a forward-looking approach with a sincere
desire to work for common interests. Our efforts to improve
bilateral relations will be successful.
Give my best regards to President Bush and Mr. Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger.
General Scowcroft: I certainly will. Both President Nixon and
Dr. Kissinger spoke very highly of their visit here. President
Bush invited both of them to the White House immediately upon
their return to have discussions on their meetings.
General Secretary Jiang: Time is limited. We had a long time to
talk with Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. I hope next time we can
have a longer time to talk.
General Scowcroft: Thank you very, very much. I enjoyed meeting
you.
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TOAST BY THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
BEIJING, DECEMBER 9, 1989
MR FOREIGN MINISTER, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS FRIENDS, TO RESUME
OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL
INTEREST TO BOTH OUR NATIONS. THIS IS A DIALOGUE WHICH WE
BELIEVE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE HISTORIC, PEACE, STABILITY, AND
PROSPERITY OF ASIA AND THE WORLD.
LAST WEEKEND, IN ANOTHER CORNER OF THE WORLD, PRESIDENTS BUSH AND
GORBACHEV HELD TALKS ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. AFTERWARDS,
PRESIDENT BUSH INSTRUCTED ME TO COME TO CHINA AND INFORM OUR
CHINESE HOSTS ABOUT THE TALKS IN MALTA. THERE IS NOTHING BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT NEEDS TO BE HIDDEN
FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE
WORLD ARE ENHANCED BY THIS DIALOGUE.
WE ALSO COME TODAY TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR INTO OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT --
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC. AND WE COME TO REDUCE THE
NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.
WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT EXHAUST OURSELVES IN
PLACING BLAME FOR PROBLEMS THAT EXIST. RATHER, BY WORKING
TOGETHER -- WITHIN THE VALUES OF OUR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS --
WE SHOULD SEEK TO SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS AND REMOVE IRRITANTS.
IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE TALKS MAKE
PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE SOLUTIONS WE SEEK.
SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, I WOULD NOT BE HONEST IF I DID NOT
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE PROFOUND AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT -- ON THE
EVENTS AT TIANANMEN, ON THE SWEEPING CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE.
WE SEE YOUR COMPLAINTS ABOUT US IN THE PAGES OF PEOPLE'S DAILY.
BUT I RECALL THAT WHEN WE HAVE FOUND WAYS TO WORK TOGETHER, THE
WORLD HAS BEEN CHANGED FOR THE BETTER; AND WHEN WE HAVE BEEN AT
ODDS, NEEDLESS TENSION AND SUFFERING WERE THE RESULT.
IN BOTH OUR SOCIETIES THERE ARE VOICES OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO
REDIRECT OR FRUSTRATE OUR COOPERATION. WE BOTH MUST TAKE BOLD
MEASURES TO OVERCOME THESE NEGATIVE FORCES.
2
IN THESE MEETINGS WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT
IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF
DISAGREEMENT. THE SOONER WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER.
THE PATH AHEAD WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL NOT BE SHORT.
BUT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH WHEN WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE
PAST. I CAN CITE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, THE
DEPARTURE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIMITS ON
MISSILE PROLIFERATION, PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE
WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM'S COMBAT FORCES FROM CAMBODIA, MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, SCHOLARLY
EXCHANGES, AND MORE. WE -- BOTH SIDES -- MUST PERSEVERE. NOW
MORE THAN EVER.
WE ARE NOT CHINA'S PRIME ENEMY OR THREAT, AS SOME WOULD CLAIM.
BUT, LIKE YOU, WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND
TRADITIONS. WE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY. WE EXTEND OUR HAND IN
FRIENDSHIP, AND HOPE YOU WILL DO THE SAME.
NOW MAY I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
-- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YANG
-- TO THE GREAT CHINESE PEOPLE
-- AND TO U.S.-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National
Security Advisor Scowcroft
DATE & TIME:
Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 8:45 am - 9:40 am
(Beijing Standard Time)
PLACE:
Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai - Beijing, PRC
PARTICIPANTS:
US Side:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker
PRC Side:
Li Peng, Premier
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker
Premier Li Peng: At a quarter to ten you will be meeting with
the General Secretary so there is still an hour to go and I hope
we can make good use of this one hour for an exchange of views.
Here I want to listen to your views because you are our guest.
Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Minister.
Today we are going to talk on the basis of those meeting you had
last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to us as to
the evaluation of the United States with regard to the general
situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does Your
Excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As far as
China is concerned, it does not pose a threat to any country or
any region. We are devoting ourselves to the goal of doubling
our GNP by the end of this century SO that our people can lead a
more comfortable life. We want a peaceful international
alignment and a stable political situation. So here I would like
to listen to your views about the international situation.
environment
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General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Premier Li. May I say
again it is a pleasure to be back and I bring you greetings from
President Bush, who remembers with appreciation your hospitality
for his visit last February.
I appreciate very much your opening comment and question because
it underscores the very reason that President Bush asked me to
come here. Since 1972 we have developed a practice of consulting
together on major world developments. And this practice, we
believe, has been of great value to both sides and to world
stability as a whole. And it is in the spirit of that
relationship that I am here with Secretary Eagleburger to discuss
a major event in US-Soviet relations. President Bush wanted to
make this gesture to underscore his strong interest in putting
our relationship back on a positive track rather than a negative
one. I would just say that in taking this step of sending us
here and of his act in vetoing the Pelosi Bill, which passed the
Congress unanimously, President Bush has not only made a gesture
but has done so at considerable risk to himself, and initial
reports from the United States with the announcement of the news
of our visit has been sharply negative in some quarters.
( Mv in some quarters)
It is important that as we seek to restore the relationship that
you understand the problems the President faces in being able to
move forward. I take the time to state this to you personally
because I believe that at our last meeting we had a very good
exchange on the attitudes between us and a very good
understanding of each other's problems. So I did want you to
understand the current situation with the President.
You asked for our appraisal of the world situation at the current
time
And pointed out China's position and objectives. Let me
say that it is our judgment that a great many very fundamental
currents are moving in the world today, that events are taking
place with great rapidity and it is difficult to predict the
future course of those events. In our judgment Mr. Gorbachev
came to power feeling strongly that the Soviet economy was
stagnant and in serious need of reform. His goal was basically
to improve the efficiency of production and the efficiency and
effectiveness of manpower. As he ran into trouble in his efforts
to bring economic change and reform to the Soviet structure, he
turned more and more to political and social measures to bring
pressure to get his economic reforms adopted. He has tended to
go more and more in that direction as the pressures increased and
indeed the political and social changes have far exceeded the
economic changes he has been able to impose.
This policy has at the same time unleashed forces both inside the
Soviet Union and especially in Eastern Europe which have created
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a momentum of their own, perhaps far beyond anything that Mr.
Gorbachev anticipated. Inside the Soviet Union which, after all
is in some sense an empire of many peoples, he has encouraged
sentiments of nationalism among the minority peoples and also the
demand of the peoples for greater economic and political
representations of their own needs and demands.
In Eastern Europe the results have been even more dramatic. In
those societies in many cases the regimes were imposed rather
than native to the cultures and unrest was waiting just beneath
the surface.
In Poland and Hungary the nationalist impulse was already
underway and in those two countries change has been more gradual
and more moderate and we are seeing in both countries now a
coalition between Communist and non-Communist parties trying to
deal with this new phenomenon. In those countries therefore
there is still a considerable amount of stability and one can
hope that the situation will progress at a measured pace not
creating enormous problems. In other countries, however,
especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia there was a severe
resistance by the leadership to any of the current of change.
When in the course of implementing his internal reforms, Mr.
Gorbachev in a sense encouraged those kinds of reforms in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia. The result has been a very rapid
movement, a rejection of current leadership almost totally, and
the result is the possibility of a collapse of authority of any
kind inside those societies with the consequence of severe and
troubling instability.
Mr. Gorbachev made it clear to us that he does not intend to
interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe. He believes that
they must find their own way at their own pace. The possible
exception to that is the issue of German reunification. Whereas
before our meeting at Malta, the Soviet policy seemed to be a
rejection of the possibility of German reunification, Mr.
Gorbachev formulated that question to President Bush in a
slightly different way. He said that history had created the two
German states in the aftermath of World War II, that the present
world had inherited those two states and that history should
determine the resolution of that situation, that it was not up to
the world leadership to force either the pace or the direction of
that movement. Clearly he is reluctant about German
reunification but has moved off his position of absolute
rejection of that possibility.
That is a very long background leading up to the question which
you posed. Internally, inside the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is
facing severe problems. His economic situation is bad and has
perhaps been made worse by the reforms that he has adopted.
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Economically he seems to have no clear, at least no
sophisticated, understanding of how to introduce the market
economics which he seems to want to employ. He is at the same
time, at least in his conventional military forces making some
cutbacks both in the size of the forces and in procurement,
especially in tanks, for example, apparently in an attempt to
shift resources from the military into the civilian economy. His
increasing preoccupation with his economic problems and his
shifting of resources to the civilian economy do, in fact, have a
military impact. Certainly with respect to NATO and I think
presumably in the East it does reduce capability of the Soviet
Union to mount a massive surprise attack across the border. In
Eastern Europe there has been another change with respect to the
Warsaw Pact and the threat it constitutes to NATO. The rapid
change in the political circumstances in the states of Eastern
Europe has certainly made a significant change in the kind of
threat that NATO would have to face from the Warsaw Pact. Of
that there is no doubt. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have given up on
Eastern Europe in the sense of trying to influence developments
there. Whether or not that change means a turning of greater
attention to the East or whether this is a part of a general
relaxation it is probably too early to say.
With respect to the question about the cold war, President Bush
has taken a position that the term "cold war" is a slogan, an
emotional slogan, and he would prefer dealing with the facts and
realities as we have been discussing rather than to deal with the
slogan itself. In that respect, I think we have to look at two
aspects of the manifestation of Soviet expansionism.
The first is that which came out of World War II, out of
Stalinism, if you will, which constituted a direct threat to all
of the countries, both those surrounding the Soviet Union and in
the Third World at large, in the ideological expansionism of
Soviet Communism. Indications both of developments inside the
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are that there may have been
some lessening, if not termination, of that kind of impulse and
yet in certain regional areas of the world there are still signs
that there has been no diminution of that impulse to
expansionism. But underneath this surface, if you will, in
historic terms, this drive towards expansionism, there is a
deeper historical thrust and this is that the Russian state
itself goes back far before the Revolution of 1917.
I remember Chairman Deng in February eloquently describing some
of the manifestations of that historical impulse to expansionism.
I think in answering the question, one has to look at both of
these impulses and I believe that history has yet to reveal the
ultimate consequences of the activities taking place at the
present time. This is a rapidly moving world at the present time.
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Mr. Gorbachev suggested to President Bush at Malta that the world
was becoming a multi-polar world, moving away from the bi-polar
world of the early post-war period. And that such entities as a
rapidly unifying Europe, a growing strengthening of Japan, of
China and potentially of India meant a very different world. He
suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union needed to
develop a cooperative approach to dealing with this world while
at the same time disclaiming any ideas of condominium.
May I just close by suggesting that in this rapidly changing
world the strategic relationship between the United States and
China, while perhaps modifying somewhat in respect to changes in
the Soviet Union, may be even more important as one looks at the
possibility of different alignment of forces, for example between
Japan and the Soviet Union and that therefore while it may change
somewhat in character from the U.S. point of view, it is perhaps
even more important than it was at the time that we began.
Premier Li Peng: Thank you very much for the detailed account of
your views of the international situation. I want to take this
opportunity to brief you on my views.
The history of the world did not repeat itself but it may have
some striking similarities. The present developments of Eastern
Europe may not necessarily be good. For example, German
reunification, with two German states reuniting, the German state
will emerge as the strongest nation in Europe. And this will
certainly exert some influence on Europe both economically
speaking and in the future in other areas. Take the Soviet
Union, for example, it is now no threat to NATO and the United
States. I don't share this view because I believe with all the
changes that the threat will still be there so you can't depend
on any particular person. For example, Chairman Gorbachev
is
devoted to detente and new thinking, but you have to look at the
entire nation and entire leadership. We can't make any
prediction about prospects for Mr. Gorbachev but afterall he is
faced with many difficulties.
It is our view that the economy is the base while the politics is
the manifestation. Without economic stability you cannot enjoy
political stability for a long time. And also diplomacy is a
continuation of internal affairs of a country. If your internal
affairs are in a mess, such diplomacy will be weak. Also with
the growing economic strengthening of Japan there will be growing
friction between Japan and Europe and the United States. You
see, the Japanese are saying little but are quietly doing a lot
by themselves. Why should they speak so little? Because
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(interpreter stumbling) they have a bad reputation from an
earlier time. But they are doing things. We are not surprised
by current developments in Eastern Europe because of all of that
which used to take place in China. You see when China was in the
Cultural Revolution we had a similar case, that is chaos emerged
in just a few days time. Had we not adopted resolute measures on
June 4, the present situation in China would even be more
turbulent today. So a rift in the Communist Party in China would
lead to a civil war.
I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember
my remarks. In five or ten years time you will see that events
will prove our views, our measures are constructive in China and
even to contributed stability of the world.
Bring a message back to the masses in the United States that the
political situation in China is stable. This year we had a
Gntral
Fourth Plenary committee meeting in June and then in November we
had a Fifth Plenary session of that committee. These were two
very important meetings in which we reached decisions on
personnel and policy. Now the objective, the specific steps and
the line of China are very clear. So in making an analysis of
the situation in China you should not listen to the views of the
radical intellectuals but rather to the broad masses of peasants,
workers, and members of the Communist Party of China because our
party has a total membership of 40 million. I believe it is
worthwhile to deal with such a stable leadership of China and
once more the present China leadership, with Jiang Zemin as the
core, is reliable.
I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some
people who complain about the present government of China. There
are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two
sources. We have lapses in our work and some forces hostile to
the socialist system, but they are not in the mainstream in China
and they cannot develop into the mainstream. So similar events
as in Eastern Europe will not occur in China. As for the
economic situation in China I think there are both good things
and bad things. But the good news is more than bad news. Our
inflation rate has now been brought below the double digit
figure. The ciost is a slowdown in our production growth rate.
But only with this production rate slowdown can we achieve
restructuring. Only with such a restructuring can we make
progress. Now the general public in China is very pleased with
the fact that prices are quite stable and we have an abundance of
commodities -- not like the Soviet Union where their shelves are
empty. Our shelves are full and this can be proved by Ambassador
Lilley. I am not saying that we have more supplies or better
commodities than in the United States but I am saying as compared
with the Soviet Union or as compared with China during the same
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period last year when we had panic buying.
You were right in saying Chinese reform started with economic
reforms and have been coordinated with political reforms. So
China's economy is going through a vicious cycle and we are
constantly encountering all kinds of difficulties. You mention
market forces. We also introduced market mechanism. At the same
time we have preserved the planned economy. We tried to
bring about a combination of the two. So even in the process of
our economic overhaul and economic retrenchment, some major
reform measures will still be worked out and will still be
implemented. So the analysis that in China's economy we have
stopped reforms, that we are now reverting to ten years ago --
this analysis is wrong. So you can wait and see and observe our
development and gradually come to a fair conclusion. But I
estimate that the slowdown in China's economic growth rate will
continue for some time and then achieve a more stable balance.
And finally I want to touch upon Sino-US relations. As far as
China is concerned, it is ready to improve Sino-US relations. We
have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can
understand your repeated explanation of the predicament and
difficulties faced by President Bush. But on the other hand, the
Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with
difficulties and are also under some restraints. We are ready
and not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhi because this
question has also created a lot of trouble for us. So if in the
future we should release Fang Lizhi, then we have to do a lot of
persuasion toward our people. President Bush has on the one hand
vetoed the Pelosi Bill but on the other hand has taken some
administrative measures which are in essence the same as the
legislation. So the Chinese people really find it difficult to
understand this. The US may think this is drastic action but to
China it is like old wine in a new bottle. You see China is a
developing country and by sending one student to study abroad we
have to spend $10,000 each year on each student. This amount of
money can enable us to bring out ten graduates. So I think If
certain individuals don't come back it is okay. If none of them
come back then this would not do. Because the government cannot
justify this before the people. Therefore we have to make a
strong reaction to these administrative measures taken by
President Bush. So after you go back home we will have to make
some strong reactions but while you are here we will not make
such reaction. I think you can understand we will have to make
such strong reaction so I think it would be best if we can solve
the problem of US-Chinese relations at one stroke because we
share common interests. That is, on the other hand we should not
rule out the possibility that both sides taken some practical
steps. That is to say we should do some solid things. For
example, I don't think it would create any difficulty for
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President Bush to send students back to China. It would not
prove difficult for President Bush to ask the World Bank to
extend loans to China because although President Bush does not
control the bank, he can exert some influence.
And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time
because I regard it as a new beginning in improving our
relations. The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But
perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our
relations. You will now meet General Secretary Jiang since you
have never met him before. In years to come he will be #1. I'll
be supporting him. Our cooperation is better than my cooperation
with Zhao Ziyang. This is for your private use. Later you will
meet with Chairman Deng.
(Exiting, to Ambassador Lilley) Don't act like Ambassador Lord
and go meeting with our radicals.
SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
and National Security Advisor Scowcroft
DATE & TIME:
Saturday, December 9, 1989 - 5:00 p.m.
PLACE:
Diaoyutai State Guesthouse - Villa No. 12
Beijing, PRC
PARTICIPANTS:
US Side:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker
PRC Side:
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: We are glad to have the pleasure
of meeting with you again. We very much appreciate the decision
of sending you as the President's personal emissary to Beijing.
We can exchange views on a wide range of subjects -- especially
listen to your report.
General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister.
It is a great pleasure to be back again with my party and to have
a chance to meet with you and exchange views on a wide variety of
issues.
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: You have a very brief visit SO we
have to start working.
General Scowcroft: We are all ready to start, Mr. Foreign
Minister.
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Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: After the press leaves, I will
invite you to brief me on the Malta summit. I think before the
banquet we can listen to the briefing on the meeting and also we
can exchange views on some issues.
General Scowcroft: Very good. Thank you very much. As I said,
we are really very pleased to be here. President Bush has made a
very special gesture in sending me and Secretary Eagleburger here
to consult with you. Since 1972 the two sides have developed a
practice of consulting together on major issues and developments
in world affairs. The strategic relationship which has developed
between us as a consequence of this practice has been a valuable
one for the United States and we hope for the Chinese side as
well. And, as I said, it is in the spirit of that relationship
over the past years that the President has sent us to discuss a
major event in the course of US-Soviet relations. The President
also wanted to make this gesture to underscore his own personal
interest in putting our relationship back on a positive rather
than a negative track. I would just note now and we can discuss
this later that the President by sending Secretary Eagleburger
and me here and by his action on the Polesi bill which he vetoed
has taken major political risks in the United States.
Now, if I may, I will discuss the events of the recent summit
with the Soviets. And let me start by describing just briefly
President Bush's attitude toward a summit with the Soviet Union
and how it evolved since the earlier days of his Presidency. The
President was initially very skeptical of the wisdom of having an
early summit with the Soviet Union on the grounds that those
summits come to be envisaged by the press with so much publicity
and SO much of what the Americans would call hype. They come to
be blown up in the press as major media events. The press tends
to want to write who won, who lost, was the summit a success, was
it a failure. And therefore before one goes into an event like
that the President would want to make sure what the outcome was
going to be in order that the event itself not produce unexpected
results. For that reason he tended to want to wait until
negotiations on a variety of issues such as arms control had
developed so that it would be profitable to hold such a meeting.
As this year moved on, though, and especially in the light of his
trip to Poland and Hungary in July, and the subsequent economic
summit meeting with the 7 European and Japanese in Paris, he
began to change his mind. A visit to Poland and Hungary
convinced him that there were events taking place in Eastern
Europe which were of a very fundamental character -- a major
event in the history of the world since World War II. In view of
the sensitive nature of the events in the Eastern European
countries and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the President
felt that some discussion of events taking place both there and
in the Soviet Union itself would be worthwhile. His colleagues
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urged him to meet early on with Chairman Gorbachev and not to
wait until a regular summit would have been appropriate.
It was at that time that we wrote to Chairman Gorbachev and
suggested the possibility of a meeting. But at the same time he
had not changed his attitude toward the dangers of a summit
without very careful and long preparation and therefore we sought
an occasion and an environment for a meeting which could clearly
be labelled as a meeting and not a summit out of which there
would be no expectations of decisions, negotiations and
communique. And that's how Malta occurred.
The President's objectives, as I have already indicated, were to
provide for an exchange of views with Chairman Gorbachev on the
rapidly evolving world scene and on U.S.-Soviet bilateral
relations, especially in order to reduce possible
misunderstandings in the circumstances of these matters. The
meeting itself was scheduled for a day and a half, alternating on
U.S. and Soviet warships in the harbor at Malta. The weather,
however, was most uncooperative and forced the cancellation of
one of the meetings and the dinner, so exchanges were shortened
below what the two sides had expected. This was unfortunate
because as rapidly as events were moving when the President first
decided to fix such a meeting, by late November they were moving
much more rapidly and of course they have not slowed down even
now.
At the meeting itself the President made an initial presentation
covering a number of major issues both in events in the world and
in bilateral or multilateral relations between the two powers,
and I will just go down briefly the issues that he brought up and
if you wish to discuss them in more detail, I will be happy to.
On arms control the President proposed that the two sides bring
more political effort to the START (or the Strategic Arms Talks)
to plan a course of reviewing the major issues still in dispute
between the two sides so that all those major issues could be
resolved by the time of the regular summit which the two
scheduled for sometime in the last two weeks in June. As I saw,
the hope was that the major issues would all be resolved by then
and a treaty completed if not then, certainly by the end of next
year.
On the conventional arms negotiations which, of course, is the
negotiation between NATO members and the Warsaw Pact, the
President proposed again giving a political impetus to those
negotiations with the hope that they would be completed and could
be signed at a summit meeting sometime next year. At the time
the President proposed conventional negotiations last May in the
conference at NATO, he said they should be able to be completed
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within a year. We will not make that, but hopefully they can be
completed sometime next year. With respect to chemical warfare,
the President in his address to the United Nations last September
had made proposals modifying U.S. position on chemical warfare
and urging the conclusion of a multilateral convention on
chemical warfare.
At the Malta meeting, he revised that proposal and suggested that
the United States would be prepared to renounce any modernization
of its chemical stocks, which had been proposed to make them more
safe, if the Soviet Union would accept the remainder of the
proposal at the United Nations for the reduction and eventual
elimination of all chemical weapons. The goal of this proposal
was not only to reduce early on the very large chemical stocks
held by the Soviet Union but really to advance the possibility of
successful attempts to prevent the proliferation of chemical
warfare, both weapons and capability to build which, as you know,
is spreading fairly rapidly through a number of nations of the
world.
The President also proposed that final negotiation on the
threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions
which actually had been signed by President Nixon in 1974, be
completed so they could be signed at the summit next June. He
also suggested that the Soviet government make a unilateral
Regime
statement in support of the missile technology control which is
a combination of United States and European powers to prevent the
spread of ballistic missile technology. And the last point on
arms control or military areas -- he suggested the Soviet Union
make public much more data on their military budgets, on their
spending on different weapons systems, and provided Gorbachev a
stack of material which the United States makes public about our
budget and military expenditures. This, of course, was not a
negotiating meeting, but the Soviets indicated support for the
President's suggestion about accelerated negotiation on the
various arms control treaties that were under way and said they
would study chemical warfare proposals.
On economic affairs, the President suggested the negotiation of a
trade agreement between the two sides toward the providing of
Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status which would then allow
the President to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment prohibiting
Most Favored Nation which he said he would do after the Soviet
Union had passed a law providing freedom of emigration. Chairman
Gorbachev had earlier made clear to us that he was very
interested in bringing the Soviet economy into the world economy
and out of its very autarkic and isolated position so the
President said he would be prepared to support the position of
observer status for the Soviet Union at the GATT (General
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system following negotiation on
the Uruguay Round of tariff agreements.
With respect to human rights, the President proposed that the two
sides clear up all the issues of divided families, of which there
are quite a number, by the time of the summit next June.
On environmental matters the President told the Chairman that he
was proposing a White House meeting of experts on science,
environment and economics in climate change next spring, and that
later in the year he would be hosting a conference on global
climate change with a view toward completing a treaty; this
conference would be held after a report of the UN Committee of
the IPCC (International Project on Climate Change), and suggested
that the Soviets might wand to be affiliated with it. Since they
are chairing the panel on the second, he was telling him of the
conference he was going to hold.
And in the last of the major issues that the President put forth,
he proposed a U.S. -Soviet student exchange, focusing on
undergraduate students; the proposal was for 1,000 students a
year U.S. and Soviet which hopefully could be expanded later on.
Mr. Gorbachev responded in a very general way to this
presentation, stating that while the United States had
rhetorically stated its support of perestrokia, there had been no
visible evidence of it, but that with this presentation Mr.
Gorbachev said he believed now that the United States was
sincerely supporting his efforts at perestroika.
Mr. Gorbachev really had three major topics which he raised in
his own opening remarks. The first was a rather lengthy
discussion on the theme that the reliance of the cold war on
force and on military superiority had been wrong and that in the
future the two sides should abandon such notions and deal with
the situation as it is now and not as it was in an earlier era.
He pointed out that we were moving out of the world of the cold
war of the super power conflict into a multipolar political world
in which there was first of all a Europe which was close to
becoming unified, a Japanese growing strength, China and India.
He said that the United States and the Soviet Union must develop
patterns of cooperation between the two of them to deal with
these new realities. He said he was not suggesting a U.S. -Soviet
condominium but simply a recognition of the new shape of the
world.
He then turned to a discussion of Europe, both East and West, and
that he supported the changes taking place both toward the
economic unity of Western Europe and greater autonomy and
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6
pluralism in Eastern Europe. He objected to the U.S. formulation
that involved ending the separation of Europe on the basis of
Western values, stating that the term "Western values" was an
ideological formulation which was inappropriate. After a long
discussion in which President Bush carefully pointed out that
there was nothing ideological about the term but the values had
been historically identified with the West; that is, democracy,
pluralism, individual rights, and so on, the two agreed that
ending separation on the basis of "democratic values would be
acceptable. Chairman Gorbachev, as I say, did indicate support
for the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Indeed at one
point he indicated that he had stimulated them and he went on to
say that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Eastern Europe.
He stated that each country had the right to make its own choices
of its political system and affiliation and to change those
choices if it sought to. He indicated a hope that the evolution
in Eastern Europe would go at a moderate pace, however, and
reemphasized that in his comments about German reunification. As
you know, before the meeting at Malta the Soviet had made
statements indicating that the two German states should be a
permanent feature of Europe. He modified that somewhat in the
formulation he expressed to President Bush. He states that
history had created the two German states, that the world had
inherited them as the outcome of World War II, and that we would
leave it to history to resolve the issue of the German states and
not try to force the people in any particular direction or at
all.
With respect to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, he also modified the
formulation he had earlier used which was that the Pacts should
be abandoned. Instead he said that the two Pacts should add a
political dimension to their activities and gradually increase
the extend of their political activities, reduce that of the
military until the two became wholly political associations which
could deal with each other.
He then turned to Soviet internal developments and spoke at some
length about some of the problems and hopes in that area. One of
his main efforts was to develop a means of disposing of the means
of production in the Soviet Union through such devices as
leasing, the development of cooperatives, or of stockholding. He
pointed out that different societies develop social systems to
deal with the control of the means of production in different
ways, and he cited the United States, Sweden and other countries
who looked at them differently and he said at this point he did
not want to foreclose any options on how it should be done. He
said at the present time they are focusing on leasing, leasing --
leasing equipment and leasing land to individuals with the right
to pass on the land up to 50 years to heirs. He discussed the
need eventually to make the ruble convertible and to establish a
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7
market oriented system of pricing. He said that one of the major
impediments to such development was the national overhang of
rubles, that is the fact that the Soviet Union had printed excess
rubles over the past years and they had to figure out a way to
keep those rubles from flooding the market, creating inflation
before they could move to do some of the economic monetary
reforms they had proposed. He said one of his major
philosophical problems with the perestroika reforms was what he
called the leveling principle, that is the notion among the
Soviet citizens that all should be equal and therefore there was
no incentive for anyone to work harder to improve his own
position.
The only separate arms control issue he raised was the question
of naval arms control and in that connection he brought out a map
which showed the Soviet Union completely encircled by United
States bases and especially naval combatants. He said he
understood that geography had made the United States a naval
power to an extent that the Soviet Union was not but that this
kind of dramatic asymmetry was not right and he focused on the
area of sea launch cruise missiles. He didn't make a specific
proposal to deal with sea launch cruise missiles but suggested
that the United States' notion that verification was so difficult
we should not try to control them, gives the United States the
ability to circumvent other (nuclear arms) limits by employing
additional sea launch cruise missiles.
Much of the time which would have been devoted to regional issues
didn't take place because it was in the meeting which had to be
cancelled. But there were two or three regional issues which
were raised. Perhaps the most controversial discussion related
to Central America where President Bush complained particularly
about arms supplies to Nicaragua and to the rebels in El Salvador
provided by Nicaragua in the Salvadoran case and by Cuba or
allies of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had provided us
with assurances that from Nicaragua they were not providing
military equipment to the rebels in El Salvador. We have
obtained and provided to the Soviets irrefutable proof of Soviet
shipments of military equipment to Nicaragua and the President
forcefully said that was unacceptable. Mr. Gorbachev's general
response which the President found unsatisfactory was that the
Soviet Union had no interest in building a bridgehead in Central
America, that Nicaragua was certainly not a Marxist regime in any
sense of the word and indeed Nicaragua and Cuba had the right to
pursue their own policy. Mr. Gorbachev said that he had pointed
out to Mr. Castro last spring that he should follow the lead of
some of the Eastern European states, but that when Mr. Castro
demurred he said he had the right to follow his own policy. As I
say, President Bush found this exchange unsatisfactory. Mr.
Gorbachev followed this up in the same vein with an attack on
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8
U.S. support for President Aquino on the occasion of the recent
attempted coup d'etat and said that this was intervention in the
internal affairs of another country and President Bush was
replacing the Brezhnev doctrine with the Bush doctrine. Mr.
Bush, of course, strongly disagreed and said that we were
supporting a democratically elected government struggling to
bring true democracy to the Philippines to resist a colonel
trying to shoot his way into power.
The other major regional issue which was discussed was
Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev said that the two sides should stop
their mutual recriminations about who was doing what and who was
right and who was wrong and instead deal with the current
situation. The current situation, he said, was that the
Najibullah regime was getting stronger and that the Mujahedin was
in some disarray and were already talking to Najibullah. The
President disagreed with that evaluation of the situation in
every respect and reiterated the unacceptability of Najibullah
and associates to the Mujahedin. Mr. Gorbachev proposed an
interim Afghanistan dialogue designed to set up an interim
council which would prepare elections in Afghanistan under UN
supervision and he said that was supported by both the Kabul
regime and the old King Zahin. Mr. Gorbachev said that he was
willing for a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of arms
aid by both sides. I think it is fair to say that there was no
progress made in the discussions on Afghanistan.
The other major issue which was dealt with but not at great
length was the Middle East and the two agreed on support for the
new President of Lebanon, President Hwari, and agreed to lend
their efforts to his support and to get President Aoun to cease
his operations and the Syrians to refrain from attack. There was
a brief reference to Arab-Israel dispute with Mr. Gorbachev
saying that we should take advantage of Yasir Arafat and his
moderation, if he were to leave there would be a more radical
Arab approach to the problem and a solution therefore would be
less possible. Let me conclude with just a couple of words about
Chairman Gorbachev himself. He seemed clearly to want the
meeting to be perceived to be successful. He was very warm and
genial, kept himself under careful control and even at points
where the dispute became heated, he did not react as sharply as
he has been known to on previous occasions. He seemed to be
aware of the magnitude of the problems facing him, both economics
and ethnic, within the Soviet Union, but he was clearly self-
confident and showed no sense of self-doubt about what he was
doing.
And that is a general summary of what happened at Malta, Mr.
Foreign Minister. I would be happy to expand on any issue you
wish or go into other issues. The NATO meeting which followed
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9
Malta was basically a report by the President to his NATO
colleagues and led to a discussion later in the day of the future
of the NATO alliance and a ringing endorsement on the part of all
the members that the alliance was still a vitally important
institution for peace and cooperation in Europe. As you can see,
what was notably missing was a discussion of Asian regional
issues which unfortunately fell out because of the shortened
meeting. There were really no discussion of Korea, Cambodia or,
except for the brief mention of the Philippines, others in
Southeast Asia.
Foreign Minister Qian Oichen: Thank you very much for your
account. I want to ask a few more questions and I would very
much appreciate it if you can make some more comments.
General Scowcroft: Certainly.
Foreign Minister Qian Oichen: First is that Gorbachev has been
saying that the cold war is over. What is the United States'
evaluation of his comments? May I put 3 questions and then you
answer them.
General Scowcroft: Certainly.
Foreign Minister Qian Oichen: During the meeting both sides seem
to have focused on German issues. Are there any differences and
what is the difference? And ultimately talk about your
impression of Mr. Gorbachev and where the Soviet Union is now.
What is American evaluation of Mr. Gorbachev and his comments
about the prospects for overcoming his difficulties and about his
own position and his own growth. I would very much appreciate it
if you could make some comments on these questions.
General Scowcroft: About the cold war -- is it or is it not
over? President Bush's evaluation on that is that he would
rather not get into the position of discussing slogans. There
were many hopeful signs in the attitude of Mr. Gorbachev on the
Soviet Union, if you will, an apparent willingness to let the
situation in Easter Europe be resolved on the basis of the self-
determination of interest of the people involved, but especially
in many regional issues there were indications that some of the
old thinking had not really changed; after, for example, initial
hopeful signs in Afghanistan, that does not appear so promising.
Perhaps the same in Cambodia, although that may be premature.
And certainly from the United States' point of view in Central
America the kind of behavior that could be expected from the
Soviet Union in the days when clearly there was cold war is still
in evidence. This is a very complicated question and an answer
depends in part on trying to look at two separate aspects of
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10
Soviet behavior. The first is that which clearly developed in
the Stalinist days after World War II with deliberate Soviet
expansionism which threatened all of its neighbors and virtually
the entire world. I think that one must admit the possibility --
whether from a changed attitude or simply from economic problems
-- of a Soviet Union that may have changed or at least moderated.
The other is a Russian manifestation about which Chairman Deng
spoke so eloquently last February and that is sort of historical
impulse, the Russians have a definite aggressive, expansionist
character to them. And therefore, I guess I would say on balance
that it is premature to come to any lasting or optimistic
conclusion but that we must be careful for the possibility of a
reversal of the present apparent attitudes.
The next question was on Eastern Europe and especially on
Germany. I guess with respect to the Eastern European states,
Gorbachev had pretty much given up and that barring some severely
destabilizing event that he was not inclined to interfere any
more.
On Germany it is apparent that Gorbachev is extremely reluctant
to see much progress or certainly progress on a culmination of
the unity of the two Germanies. The U.S. attitude toward German
reunification is that it should be done if it is done on the
basis of self- determination of the German people with no
particular preconceived notion as to what should take place or
how. Any move toward reunification has to take sure account of
West Germany' membership in NATO and in the West European
economic community and the legal obligations of the allied powers
for Germany, especially Berlin. We certainly believe that
reunification should only be in accordance with the declaration
of the Final Act of CSCE (The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe) which says no practices can be changed by
force in Europe but they can be by peaceful means. I guess in the
final statement on that I would say the United States will not
stand in the way of German reunification.
On the evaluation of Gorbachev and his prospects I think one has
to be pessimistic. He faces enormous problems in his announced
goal of the transition of that economic system. He himself does
not appear to have a very sophisticated attitude about the
economic system, of some of the issues in moving to a market
economy or changing the fundamentals from a command to a
commodity economy. He admits he faces severe ethnic problems
with miners in the Soviet Union and says he is prepared to try to
find any kind of arrangement which is mutually agreeable, some
kind of autonomy, federalism, what have you, but I think clearly
would stop at granting independence to those areas. While his
challenges are formidable to say the lest, it is not our view
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11
that he faces any internal challenge to his leadership or any
alternative choices to the policy that he is pursuing. And his
economic approach seems highly experimental and not SO carefully
thought out SO that he continues to follow a fixed course. Faced
with problems he seems quite prepared to abandon an approach to
try something else. That could be good or bad.
Foreign Minister Qian Oichen: Thank you very much for your
additional comments. I think your detailed briefing will surely
help us to understand better the discussion at Malta. It is out
impression that a very important agenda item of that meeting is
the discussion of the attitude of both the United States and the
Soviet Union on the drastic changes in Eastern Europe. That is
the most important change occurring since the Second World Was
and it is developing at such a rapid speed that every week we
have something new. Naturally those events belong to the
internal affairs of the countries. I think it is a good thing
that both the Soviet Union and the United States show their
willingness to refrain from any intervening. It is a good
principle but I don't think it is a principle that is absolute
any more and actually it is because Europe is father away from us
so our concern is mainly in the studies we have conducted about
the Five
these developments. We have dealt on the basis of 5 principles,
especially nonintervention in others' internal affairs. And we
also hope to have stability in Eastern Europe, because
instability in Europe will give rise to many problems. I think
as we approach the end of the 1980s there is now a high frequency
of diplomatic activities and the Malta high level meeting is one
of them and SO are the Warsaw summit and the NATO summit. Then
there is something between the French and the Soviet Union. Also
Mr. Genscher, the Foreign Minister of West Germany, is now
explaining their positions. Many leaders have been paying visits
to Berlin. The European Community is also in meetings. It seems
to me that all are sending officials to these diplomatic
activities, or nearly, and we are observing the developments at a
distance. So what you have said just now will be of great help
to us.
Now to return to some remarks you made in the beginning of your
account. The sending by President Bush of you as personal
emissary is a very important political gesture, especially you
make mention of the fact that ever since 1972, there have been
exchanges between our two sides on major international
developments and that the United States regards its relations
with China as one of great strategic importance and this is also
the approach adopted by China. And we also very much appreciate
President Bush's idea of bringing our relations back to a
positive track and this is something we share with him. At this
time your briefing itself will be of help to us and also the fact
that you have been sent by the President to brief us on the Malta
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12
meeting is of great significance. I would therefore like to
express out thanks again to you. We will go to short banquet and
meet this evening.
General Scowcroft: If I could, just in response briefly to your
last comment, it very much expresses the American sentiment. The
world is changing very rapidly and especially the character
perhaps of the Soviet Union and the threat it has posed for some
time to the rest of the world. It is possible, for example, that
because of the changes in Eastern Europe the military threat to
NATO may be diminishing. It may well represent a general
diminishing of the Soviet threat in all areas. It is too early
to see. But in this connection one also has to look at a time of
change like this of other international alliances which could
conceivably develop such as that, for example, between the Soviet
Union and Japan. The possibility of significant instability
which could develop either in Eastern Europe or other parts of
the world just underscores the value of the strategic
relationship that we have with China, between two countries who do
not constitute threats to each other, whose cooperation in the
past on specific issues such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, has
produced major results. The relationship is perhaps even more
valuable while perhaps changed somewhat in character from the
time we originally started out.
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Memorandum of Conversation
Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9
Sunday December 10, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Stanard
Time)
Participants:
U.S. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for NAtional
Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang
Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, notetaker
General Scowcroft: I would like Secretary Eagleburger to speak
now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.
Secretary Eagleburger: Before we leave I want to establish a few
points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip,
let me be undiplomatic. My impression is that you and we are are
engaged in a kabuki dance. You say, and we accept, that there
has to be movement on our side before you can move. We say to
you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side.
We are now circling each other, each waiting for the other to
move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.
From our side, we are faced with the realities of dates on which
decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be
on December 15, on the agreement to satellite launchings.
Congress returns on January 23. Certainly when they come back,
assuming no movement, the Pelosi Bill and whatever other
legislation they decide will be reintroduced.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET/NODIS/MARKET
Declassify on: OADR
2010-2632-MR
ses 7/12/13
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2
While we have not given you our final word on the package you
gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as
now structured. All of us on the American side agree it will not
work, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the
release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically
cannot manage it.
Let me emphasize that this is not the official government
response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get back
to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response,
we will have to say the same thing to you.
We will pull a small group together. We will get a
counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give
it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of
the package will include, I can indicate that they will include
such issues as martial law, the release of Fang Lizhi, World
Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit
all these pieces into that package.
I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One
proposal we will make will include that, because from our view
his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you
might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do.
We may also give you a second proposal which does not deal with
this issue. If it is difficult to do the other things, we are
prepared to set the issue of Fang aside, and after the atmosphere
in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to
that issue.
Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. Fang
Lizhi is not necessarily the sine qua non to improving the
atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last
months.
With regard to who goes first, there is no need to have an
argument, but from the Washington perspective, we have taken
steps already, not least that we are here already.
On the Pelosi veto, you may not be satisfied with the President's
decision. But it was poltically costly for him, and it will be
so when we go back. I was personally involved in granting an
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3
exception for the export of inertial guidance equipment for the
sale of the Boeing aircraft. And the Peace Pearl project is
moving forward. These are some steps we have taken.
Again, I raise this not to get into an argument or because I feel
they are adequate. I raise them to demonstrate that the
President is trying to take steps to improve the atmosphere. I
should also tell you, if we heard the Premier right this morning,
I thought he said that the Chinese government would make clear
its unhappiness with the President's administrative measures
regarding the Chinese students in the United States after we go
home, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter
from Chinese), the impact in the U.S. will undo whatever we have
done by coming here yesterday and today, undo that completely.
At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we
say we want.
On the issue of the satellite launch, we face a decision date,
December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you
that we have informtion, which some members of Congress have
access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who
are talking of sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the
Middle East. We do not question the statement of your Foreign
Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in the Congress will
doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, if we have a
reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication
that missiles
instability. un We do not expect an answer now, but will need it by
will not be sold to regions of particular
December 15.
curface
me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the
atmosphere to make some small moves on each side, even before we
get the package response to you by the end of next week. We are
looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is
wise to begin the process of improving relations and to help us
with the Congress. I would like to leave a couple of ideas with
you. For example, just for example, if your side could possibly
stop jamming VOA or permit a VOA correspondent to come to China,
in an unconnected fashion, we could remove the travel advisory.
Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but what we are
searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress
returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the
other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help
with military sales, the banks, and convince the American and
Chinese publics that it is wise to move in this direction.
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4
We would like to suggest for your consideration, for Ambassador
Lilley and your designee to work out details on when and how the
Fangs may leave. It appears all of us agree on the need to solve
this issue. Totally off the record, and ad referendum, we need
to agree that both of us want to see his release.
With regard to our response to your package and the
counterproposal, that can be done here or to your ambassador in
Washington as you prefer. We would prefer Washington, but do not
insist on it, assuming it is an effort we jointly want to
accomplish.
Mr. Minister, in the U.S. we have the tradition of the good cop
and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good cop, and
only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.
Ambassador Lilley: I would like to add one thing, if I may.
Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere
on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped
three get out already, and can do the talks.
Secretary Eagleburger: That is if we are prepared to settle the
issue. If it is to put it off to one side, that is another
matter.
Ambassador Lilley: One other matter that might be raised with
Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial
constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attaches
at our embassy are not permited to join attache trips. Resolving
this would help to move our atmosphere along.
Foreign Minister Qian: I think, Mr. Secretary Eagleburger, that I
understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will
respond next week as a counterproposal. First, both sides agree
on a package solution, and while this is in process, the general
public should not get the impression of any package deal. It
should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.
I also agree we should not leave the impression of which side
gains or does not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. I agree
Vice Minister Liu and Ambassador Lilley should meet to discuss
the details on Famg Lizhi. These negotiations can begin without
waiting a response to the package. Naturally, implementation
will come after your response.
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5
I also agree that after your formal response in Washington the
discussions can take place between Ambassador Zhu and your State
Department officials. I also agree both sides should consider
which steps both sides can take to improve relations between our
countries and the atmosphere.
I would like to raise a few points. Our Peace Pearl project is
underway, and we regard this as positive. We hope to see it
continue without further setbacks. Not long ago, due to the
temporary suspension, the actual cost of the program exceeded the
budget for it. We hope the American side will consider that the
Chinese side can hardly bear this burden. Also, in terms of
military cooperation, which includes torpedoes, large-caliber
artillery shells, radar, there are some problems, and they should
also include timely delivery.
You made mention of Premier Li Peng's remarks regarding the
measures taken by president Bush with the Pelosi veto. This is a
misunderstanding on your side. You know very well, the American
side made lots of effort, but the Chinese government cannot
justify this action to the people without reacting. We have
already made our reaction.
Secretary Eagleburger: We noticed.
Foreign Minister Qian: After you leave, we will publish no more
reaction. By reaction, as Vice Foreign Minister Liu already made
clear to your embassy, the Ministry of Education will take action
to send no more graduate students to your country. In the
statement issued by the State Education Commission, this comment
did not appear in the press. So in implementing this measure, we
will take some notice of the impact on the U.S. and we hope the
U.S. will do the same.
As for the sale of intermediate range missiles, China's position
is very clear. The U.S. is very aware of it. The Information
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a clear
declaration. In the days to come, when similar questions are
raised we will make clear our position in the same way.
These are my points. I will add that through this visit we can
start our joint efforts. Both sides should work collectively and
separately.
Secretary Eagleburger: Done.
Foreign Minister Qian: Very good.
SECRET/NODIS/MARKET
2090
Liang
2090 DENG YING
PROGRAM FOR VISIT TO CHINA BY MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT,
U.S. PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL EMISSARY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
9 December (Saturday)
15:00
Arrive Beijing by American special plane Boeing
707 (Southern Apron, Capital Airport)
15:10
Leave Airport for Diaoyutai State Guesthouse
(Guesthouse)
15:50
Arrive Villa No. 9, Guesthouse
16:55
Leave Villa No. 9 for Villa No. 12
*
17:00
Talks with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
LILLEY
(Villa No. 12, Guesthouse)
TRANS
19:00
Welcoming banquet by Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen (Villa No. 12)
20:30
Private talks between Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen and National Security Advisor
Scowcroft (Villa No. 12)
LILLEY
TRANS
10 December (Sunday)
NOTE
7:30
Breakfast
8:20
Leave Guesthouse for Zhongnanhai
(Through northwestern entrance)
8:30
Meeting with Premier Li Peng
(Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai)
9:45
Meeting with General Secretary Jiang Zeming
(Room 202, Zhongnanhai)
11:00
Meeting with Comrade Deng Xiaoping
(Fujian Room, Great Hall of the People, through
northern entrance)
*
12:00
Working lunch with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
(Villa No. 9, Guesthouse)
14:20
Leave Guesthouse for Capital Airport
(Southern Apron)
15:00
Leave Beijing by American special plane
Boeing 707
(Translation)
Toast by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
at Dinner in Honour of
U.S. President's Personal Emissary
9 December 1989
General Scowcroft,
Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger,
Ambassador James Lilley,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives us great pleasure to have the opportunity
of hosting this dinner to entertain General Scowcroft,
U.S. President's Personal Emissary and National Security
Adviser, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and our
other American friends. We wish to express our warm
welcome to you, General Scowcroft, and your party on
your visit to China.
General Scowcroft, you are an old friend very
familiar to us all. Over the years, you have contributed
a great deal to removing obstacle to Sino-U.S. relations
and promoting their development by having visited China
several times at the critical moments of the development
of those relations. The fact that President Bush has
sent you to China this time as his Personal Emissary to
brief Chinese leaders on the recent U.S.-Soviet summit
and to exchange views with them on issues of Sino-U.S.
relations shows the importance he attaches to those
relations, for which we would like to express our
appreciation.
At present, the international situation is
undergoing the most profound change in the post-war
years. The prospects for such change and its influence
on world peace and progress of mankind are a matter of
concern to the people of all countries. I believe that,
under these circumstances, China and the United States
should frequently exchange views with each other.
Undoubtedly, good Sino-U.S. relations are of great
significance to world peace and stability.
Despite periods of trial, Sino-U.S. relations have
all along been able to move forward, which fully
testifies to their vitality. Important as our
differences are, they cannot obliterate the major common
interests between us. So long as our two sides make a
concerted effort, we can certainly safeguard our common
interests while maintaining our respective positions. In
order to find ways to overcome the current difficulties,
there should be increased contact and better
communication between us. We in China believe that
the current visit to China by General Scowcroft will
certainly be helpful to promoting mutual understanding,
overcoming difficulties and removing differences between
us so that Sino-U.S. relations may return to normal and
further develop at an early date.
Now, I propose a toast
to the health of General Scowcroft, Deputy
Secretary of State Eagleburger, Ambassador James Lilley
and all the friends present here, and
to the resumption of normal Sino-U.S. relations and
the development of these relations.
2
- NATO
- Inc morning, C Pgave his colleague
= In e afternoon C Pleda description
a discription of maty act matta
of future of alliance
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hebauan P.
EEur
Wisside proliperation
Pelsi WaldBowk/
Gent ns because ofc strategic
Withouting which Pwants
1
|
we e have actidul our allies
- Trip treats that pettern
1
acknowledge 4 prints
forcer workover some curredistic
I
Don't let extreinests force us into dewsitell
spiral
)
Omagendo
Where we 0 Cline work
together, good ting Suppein
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I
why we are here
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
09. Request
Re: Request for Appointments
12/6/89
(b)(6)
[Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:
China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [5]
Date Closed:
5/7/2009
OA/ID Number:
91136-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Flarence
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
Donth
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
December 6
Please admit the following appointments on
, 19 89
for
THE PRESIDENT
of
White House
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
LILLEY, James
DOB: 1/15/28
SS#:
C
U.S. Ambassador to China
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MEETING LOCATION
White House
Requested by
Douglas Paal
Building
Oval Office
Room No.
Room No. 493 Telephone
5746
3:45 p.m.
December 6, 1989
Time of Meeting
Date of request
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
OUTLINE OF APPROACH
I.
Malta Meeting
II.
Situation in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
-- risks of instability
III.
Importance of U.S. -China Strategic Relationship
-- fosters regional and world stability
-- Japan a new, dynamic factor in region and world
IV.
China's domestic political problems have created
domestic political problems in U.S.
-- You say we should take steps first
--- We took steps: Peace Pearl, Pelosi veto, my
visit
-- We will get nowhere if you do not take steps
now
V.
Need to work from where we are now to solve the
problems before us, not behind us
---- Congress returns on January 23
- - Use window of opportunity
VI.
Economic possibilities remain
-- EXIM
- - IFIs, World Bank in January
- - Economic cooperation, projects
-- Improvements in Chinese business climate
lawch
VII.
Satellite licenses due soon. You need to know that
missile proliferation considerations will be
critical.
VIII.
Military sales and deliveries most sensitive.
Political climate must improve first.
IX.
Need to resolve Fang Lizhi and family. Amb. Lilley can
deal with you here.
X.
In Washington, we can discuss: VOA, travel advisory,
Fulbright, Peace Corps, renewed contacts.
XI.
Imperative to start moving immediately to change the
political climate before our Congress returns.
Sunday
J
why we are here
- Since 1972 we have dlupd practice
of conselting Together on major world
issuess D llupmts.
- a stratgic relationship leas deveped
which has been of great value to
the US and, we hope, TotheCluirese,
-we behive it has made a
major constribution To to statulity
in the world.
- Itis in e spirit aftent. relationship that
Phas sent us to desires whyou a
major eventin US-Sov relations.
- Palso wanted to wasthethis geoture To
underscore his strong interest in
patting C relationship on a positive
rather than ac nigative Track.
- In doing This - and vetoing -
Pelosi Bill, C has incurred
I
If away I would like TO outtive malta,
considerable risk To himself
some conse querres for &
-
HOW malta happened on tracks attonolize with
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- trip to Poland & Hongery 4 Econ
Survint corrected him I was
not wise to wait until substantive
preparations well made for a regular
- Herce malta
- Events since he semiled even in July
have made C mtg were important
2
- Poljectives were cen exchange fiveres
on rapidly evoluing sosues, esp EE, bilateral
relations, in criler To reduce possible miss
understandings which could he dauger-
ous.
- Pinitial preserstation
issues: moving forward are atc
important areas of strategic & conventional
AC, including a new progral for C
elemination of chewical cerpus
- Economics iske
- Human rights
- Environment
- Student. exclanges
-
Gob had 3 major areas in
- Reliance of c ColdWar period on force
and mil superiouty superienty
cesp is) wrong.
- we are moving to a multiplar would
- Eur/ pap/Chinal India
- US&SU uniot dlip patters of coop
To deal w/this evalving setuation
- not suggesting condominium
- But reiog. reality.
- Eastern Europe
- Gorb supports C changes Taking place
in both w of EEur
- InEE Er he tales devpirts Credit fir C
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3
i. He indicated be would not
intervew, act least bareng serve
radical instability.
Each country has c rights
its own choices D to change
its mind.
- German receiption a special case
- Previous formulation lapd
- -His coreclusion is c corrent Transition
- History
may not always be smooth but pace
should not be forced 0 There should be
no intervention,
- NATO/W P - Gradually shift to
political structures who cooperated.
- Sev internal Elipmts.
- Emphanized lies event precrayst
- Disporing 6 state ownership
of means of production products
- Said dif societies had deat
w/ issue in Lif wap
- He
- Descrosed leasing cooperatives, +
stock enverspip.
Said thing were focusing on
leasing - land of faitnes
- Big current prof is ruble overling
- Barrier To comentitulity ruarbed
letermined pricess
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4
- -On arws cortrol, be modelned
issertiality of neval urves control
- To deal w/ encerclemint of USSR
by C US,
\
The repeactive in Time presented full
discription somes.
- Butthose Whicherve desarised calse
done now/migor.
- Central Omerica
- Peomplained about Cuban arms
to Mea. Children both sending armsto
Wedroyer
- Invistation of min pledge.
- -Gob stressed self dater
- no bridgelied, no Median
- P.stressed hela & MIG 29.
- Philippines
1
afghairstan Stop deal
w/c corrent seteration
- Najibullab getting stronger
- muj. in dising already in
Telhs w/ naji
- that approval
- Gob proposed intia-
to get cip miterine council to prepare
elections under UN
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5
- Gorls is willing tosee a leagl fire
of ceosation of and To both.
- no prog was mode.
-ME - Lebauon
- aropt.
- Whatrers Gorb like?
- wanted may to succeed
- will he make it?
- 11 my my component friendly
- Dorsnt fail TO rosoq dept of
pub but docsn't serve aphics
of C lean pubs Incing birm.
- Betno apporient are
pier.
NATO report plus
future of NATO.
-Even more need in this
uniertain elemite.
1
Impact this on
- Carb is go
- This is likely Dreluse c mil
theat TONATO
- not clear how that will affect
SU buders
- But C repearly of
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6
the world, C projectility of Desput
of serious instalectities,
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- all these may alter e creginal
Discussions of - shat relationship,
but in US judgment
- They make that elationship
While nore
undertain future them in
C. part. Possibility of SU- Jap apis.
- When C 2 have coeperated
suchas
world has elearly denefitted
I
just a word about precting C.
selationship back we
- For min make a package
ereaser proposal which CN shall
we
examine w/case. Problem
C
in
- het me just say now that C.
as of
political climition Washington
has greatly restricted Preedom
action,
good
and
- His recto of PelsiBillo our
trip Took great politicalcourage.
- Present Congressional
wabe future
vetoes
- we must work to change
a political probs - pechaps everythies. in both
n
- -a series of recignousl steps might
senr TO mudify J political climate
to permit a gradual return to
full cooperation.
- From US perspective it word
be reseped To Toher steps befre
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Corgress returas are Jan 23.
- -Steps such as revented
our trip really starts), Fullright
renewal, travel adverory, could
begin TO change - wood
- Economic persibilities wethere
- world Bank consideration
in Jan
)
-X-M
- Econ coop to joint centmes
- Satellite laurch beings are due
soon.
- -To make those possible, consideration
on missile proliperation are
important - X of misseles above 300 keen
- -X range of any missiles To areas
of special sensitivities
- The Pis antions to mood, best
his hands must be centred
- we agree w/c package approach
+ its objective of nety of Clim giving
-we weed uper to cerek chochy
Together To mehr it happen.
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I
why we are here
- Since 1972 we have developed
V practice of coresulting together
on major sssees developments
- This strategic relationship
has been a valuable cre for
C US& use hope for c Chinese
- It is in C spirit of that
relationship thete presealest
has sent res to descrips Q meagin
went in The US- Sers relationship
- The P also wanted to wahe This geoture
To underscore his on interest in retterting
a relationship To a positive rather than
a negative track.
- The Pix by This of Pelozi Bill tubing major
For
political rioks to do this
II
malta
- -Hows molta developed
- Pattitude toward security
- Tip To X Econ Survivest
- How we ended rip. on shipat malta
- Pobjectives-
& schough of views rayidly evolving
world scend (esp belateral retations
in order to reduce possible mis-
understanding
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Miscellan
dwriting
2
-
Pmade an initial presentation covering
a number of major issues
- arms certrol
th
- TART
- CFE
- CW
- TTBT/PNE
- Messile TReb Control Regime
- melitary budgets
- Economics
- -MFN (Trade apprement) Jackson Uainek
- GATT
- Human Rights
- Environment
- WH mtg of experts on Climate
- Coref. on Global Climets Change
Change
after reprtIPCC
- Student Echange
-
-
Gorb had 3 wajor issues
7 Releaue of the Collwar on force +
mid sesperiaity was wrong.
- We are morning toa multipolar world
Ear/Jop/China/ India
-USTSO must alley patterns of
coop To deal w/it e new realities
- not sugg esting conditium
- Just Moility
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3
- Eastern Enge
- He Europe. supports c changes in both E+W
- Indicated he would notinteriene
values
- Each country had regist to wehe
itsacan choices - and change them
- Gerwan receivication - Nastery
- Change will not always be smooth
but we should not force the pace
- -NATO-WP NATO - WP
- Old political diversion & gradually lit
military dimension decline.
Spoke a loton Sars internal disputs
Key is disposing fc means of production
products
- Three leasing, cooperatives, storkhoblig
- Dif societies solve This in def
ways - don't prectore options.
-- They are doing leasing lauds tactories
- R uble overhing
- -E verified convertibility
- The leveling principle
- arms certrol
- Supported US recoured atries
- noval arws caretroly Shem
- Showed map
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Brent- note FM QIAN'S special expertive
in siviet Union
11" views worth maring.
n
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- Regional issues
much discussion I Central am.
- complaints about Nicorcogram
arms To FNLN
- Cectan anusto Weediagna
- Sav helos TO Nicardgua
- So MI G ≥ 29 to Cuba
- Philippenes - Govb complained
- afghanisten
- Stomp mutual recrimenations & deal
current setuation
- Naijibullah getting stronger
muej. go Resorray & already
- Carb propares niter - Ologham dialog
talting To naji balloh
90 set cop are interined cornail
To prepare elections under UN
Kabule of King seem to agree
- Gorb is willing for cease fire
& mutual cepsation of arws aid
- -ME
- Lebourn
Horouri
- That
beening up
&
- what was Corb like
- Wanted mily to be success
- Very self confident beet finendly
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-exd war
our
correws
German ground
scimultariety
t Eval food.
/
Farey hi solution
2,
Declare lifting of sacritions
3,
Both should do coop ventures
4.
US invite fiang To insit U.S S
1.
Famq - we ready to solve, but
must be limbed to lifting
- Cleanise will urge
to sanitions
Feing TO give cap.
2.
US should start side billing smoking
(Press release to be provided
Those Receased by Beash 5 Jan.
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activing defacts lifteng
20 Jew.
will be OK
3.
Fang expelled of us would note he would
only engage m
- after they leave we could myner
to 3 copity There they may not
take pail in polition discription
your promise not TO Govt use activities Fring in
w/o similtaneous action, relaising
Faver would be very dif
Following a tion
1) Both make efforts for lurge
scale joint effates in future
2) E xtend invite To Jiang when
good excots
3) Both repairs from doing Thingsto
burt cother
hive action in awrity, support each
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I
why weare here
- P puts great storls in relationship
III
- Our // strategic interests have
leeverly involved CUSSR.
- Pwonted & make this geotuce To
understore his interest in potting
corelationship on a positive rather
than negative track
- as he did by receiving C
and maivediathy
- and vital Pelosi bill
- But mored that later.
II
Sequence of discussions
- Context (wored) in which malta
Discussion of malta D NATO
took place
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- what is happening in SUDEE
- and W Ear 8 Jeepan
- Practical steps to put C relativiship
one a pritive track
- So called "pachage "disinsold
w/Wiport HAK.
III
malta/NATO malta
- Revise How malter happened
- Pattitude toward secumite
- Trip 90 Polard + #conSument
How to arronge mild not sement.
2
If arepat goes, the seteration will
III
become were dif.
NATO mty.
IN
what is c frausherbs w/in which
This meeting Took place
- Gorb COUNT in determined to
relnergize & septem.
- Decided it could only be done by
trying To release creative energies
- Those policies
Hence glassuost.
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3
- Presidents goals cet secumit.
- Discuss course of werets in world
reduce mishadhestanding in ae
- President nitial presentation rosues
rapidly evolving world scene,
Set fath at of practical proposals as
- On AC+ mil essues.
a framewerk for discussion
- Seta date for Sacrement as a
presing mecharism for c work
going on in various areas
Resolve C major issues in START
by Summit of complete treaty then
or ASAP
- Focus C minicaterial intop
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To resolve
issues (ALCM) Telenity NDM
- Presh hard for completing CFE in
1990 for seguing ant a securit
- ww- If Sas would agree To UN
proposal, we would Toreyo modernization
- agreement at security 80/0 rederation
- Complete work on PNE+ITAT bysecument
- S nggest Sers support missile Tech
control Reginue of Ema To constrain
missile purif.
- Sors make public data one nicl
budget, force posture of wphs production
3
mr. Gas suid he reacted very
positively to the P presentation He usede
sectral major parnts
- The reliance ofc Cold was are force
of mil superiority was urong
- The world is changing, there cere
many puro of sursorvel & redverces
oc people of world reject this notion
- many in US think C SU is falling
apart and that is results US polices
of c Cold was
- Your have just demorestrated
you support prestruiled and
we appreciate cheat.
- -We are morning to o multipolar world
- Eml Japan China / India
- US+50 t must Drp patterns of coop
to Dead / these new realities
- not sug gesting confominium
- just reality laswe are c
super powers).
- Each must take ount of C
interests of others,
- Some in US still want to
teach - put pressure one others,
- For example - support change
in EEm on basis of
"waterns values"
7 Decreasic vahik Kr
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it
Econ Steps VS prepared to Take (sorve important) to more
- Trade agreement granting MFH so
Pean wave Juckson Vanils award
- Requires Emigration legis
- S uppat oberver status in GATT after
Uanguary Round oftrade meg tiscomytetete
urged Saws to more to washet preces
(wholesale) GATT to lemore
- Offered tech leon coop in areas like
statistics, budgetotares, finance, etc.
- Open discussions on a lidateral
investment treaty.
Human Rights Resolve rosices of divided
families ing Summit
-
Regional Issues
-
Central am, as a perit of special Concern
,
Environment
- Convene WH meeting in Spring for
officials To
desiress globol climate change issues
- Host ceref next fall on treaty one
global climate change, after UN
their work,
working groups of IPCC complete
Standart E changes 1000 college
a tredentor each
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-Corb arms willing aid Jul correfies & natural eersation
-> - cntmngde conterder capitabulah out, but he leastree
of
coorts prov w/trainseterial process (perhaps even w/najout)
1 Gab supported moving forevard m
all areas of cerus control
- He notedtleat P had not mentioned
SLCM or, navol cours control,
-Pointed out C importance of Sacer
being constraired
- Presented map showing SV
- On registrales surrounded by US bases (esp novel
- On Central america
- Miaragure is changing. het
IT was
not Marpist. het C VN moneter
relations,
- SU not much coverned
- as for Castro, he has his ocere
poticies. we don't certrol them
- Plics - US should not wherene.
- Pare soluing in bildions getting nothing
- SV wruts no bridgebunds in of A.
- - we are not intervening in IF an
- That change is peaceful a supported
by your - here is a Col uging To
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short his way into nower arguest
- Lebauon 7 agreed to support C new
Q democratically elected part
helanose govt
- afgham-
Majibullah is getting stronger
- Cerb proposes inter applim Dirlogue
to set up am interim correct to set
up pee elections under UN
Kabal DC King seew to agree
Quecoming division of Emopera basis
frestem volues.
Ecoreering
- Spake of his receiving prob
- Rubb overhoung
- Proble leveling purcepal
- Leasing - laud & factories
Key for Mine is being able To deopare
fe wears production + products
- There learning, cooperatives,
storlsholding Dif societies do it def drop &
he doesn't want to foreclose
Miscellaneous Handwriting
options.
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E Europe-
- Both E&W Em are changing
E becoming wore open, demorrate
of respecting of neversal because
voleces.
- wis unifying
L
That
idedogled
Dont like overacring division B,,
Ever on & Wisten values,"
- Coob proceeds from reglet of each county
10 newbe its own cleans to etrange ause
choices.
- Change will not always be smooth
but we should not force the pace
NIE
- we should tabs. advantage Grafat
- German recerestion - berreen -
strangest state in Eur,
- Sov threat will be there
- Cuit economic depend on just oree person
- correaing puts pealin bet US/EAN
& Japan
- not perprised det EEcer because
same Thing happened in Chrise -
Cultural revolution
- Other than Emet party Chece is
no other litical force To corrtrol.
-Rift evil in notes cauld when
was.
- History will show that our
weasures statenty to are
Rendy 5 improve Sino -vs relations.
Casts $ 0000 /yr per climese stadent
China back curt afford it if word come
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please leave 15 minutes
for the Premier
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