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366551955
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
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366551955
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
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91143-009
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
Desert Shield and Desert Storm Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91143
Folder ID Number:
91143-009
Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
6
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Profile Sheet
From Chamberlin and Miller to Scowcroft, Re: Terrorism
8/28/90
(b)(1), (b)(6)
S
Update/Terrorist Threats Linked to Crisis in Persian Gulf [FOIA
restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)
01b. Memo
Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft
8/28/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Terrorism Update (2 pp.)
01c. Report
Re: Update on Current Terrorist Threat Reporting (3 pp.)
8/27
(b)(1)
S
01d. Letter
To President Bush (1 pp.)
8/13/90
(b)(1)
01e. Cable
American Embassy Athens to Secretary of State Washington DC
8/27/90
(b)(1)
Re: Rashid to be Tried in Greece (1 pp.)
02a. Memo
C. David Welch to Robert M. Gates
8/28/90
(b)(1)
Re: Egyptian FMS Debt (1 pp.)
02b. Memo
Dick Cheney to POTUS
8/23/90
(b)(1)
Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)
02c. Memo
James A. Baker, III to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Eygpt's FMS Debt (2 pp.)
03a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi [FOIA restrictions redacted]
8/28/90
(b)(1)
S
(2 pp.)
Page 1 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1196
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
03b. Talking Points Points To Be Made for Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi, Omani
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Foreign Minister [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)
03c. Memo
Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft
8/24/90
(b)(1)
Re: Meeting with Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister, and
the President, August 28, 1990 (1 pp.)
04a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney (3 pp.)
8/27-28/90
(1)
04b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
04c. Report
Re: Government report (2 pp.)
4/2/90
(b)(1)
C
04d. Report
Re: Government report (2 pp.)
8/28/89
(b)(1)
C
04e. Memo
J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft
8/22/90
(b)(1)
Re: Event Paper for Bush - Mulroney Kennebunkport Meeting (1
pp.)
04f. Paper
Re: Scope Paper (8 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
05a. Report
Re: Oil Situation as of August 28 (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
05b. Outline
Re: Key Energy Issues Arising Out of Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
06. Memo
Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft
8/31/90
(b)(1
Re: Talks with the Israelis (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1196
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
07a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
&
Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (2 pp.)
07b. Memo
Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (1 pp.)
8/29/90
(1)
08a. Memo
C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft
8/30/90
(b)(I)
Re: Message from Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan (1 pp.)
08b. Fax
The Private Secretary to His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan
8/28/90
(b)(1)
to Mr. David Welch (5 pp.)
09a. Telcon
Re: Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
8/30/90
(1)
Republic of Germany (2 pp.)
09b. Memo
Stephen E. Benko to William F. Sittmann
8/30/90
(b)(1)
Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany of August 30, 1990 (1 pp.)
10a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (2 pp.)
10b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to President Zayyid (2
n.d.
(b)(1)
pp.)
10c. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Amir of Kuwait (2 pp.)
n.d.
10d. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 3 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1196
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
10e. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to President Mitterrand
n.d.
(b)(1)
(3 pp.)
10f. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Prime Minister
n.d.
Thatcher (2 pp.)
10g. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Kaifu (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)$1)
10h. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to Korean President Roh (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
10i. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Andreotti (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
10j. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to EC Commission President Delors (2
n.d.
pp.)
10k. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
101. Draft Letter
Re: Presidential Letter to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
10m. Draft
Draft Message to Taiwan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Message
10n. Memo
Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft
8/30/90
(1)
Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (1 pp.)
11a. Telcon
Re: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the
8/31/90
(b)fi)
United Kingdom (4 pp.)
Page 4 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1 196
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
11b. Memo
Stephen E. Benko to William F. Sittmann
8/31/90
(b)(1)
of
Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United
Kingdom (1 pp.)
Page 5 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1196
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01a. Profile Sheet
From Chamberlin and Miller to Scowcroft, Re: Terrorism
8/28/90
(b)(1), (b)(6)
S
Update/Terrorist Threats Linked to Crisis in Persian Gulf
[FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Chronological Files
By MM
on 3/20/2023
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0401-MR(500)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/24/2016
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006846
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 28 AUG 90 16
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: CHAMBERLIN
MILLER
HSNA R PRESIDENTIAL 500 UBRARY
DOC DATE: 28 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: TERRORISM
INTELLIGENCE
PERSIAN GULF
PERSONS: 1.4(c); (b)(6)
USON FILE
SUBJECT: TERRORISM UPDATE / TERRORIST THREATS LINKED TO CRISIS IN PERSIAN
GULF
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 31 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
CHAMBERLIN
MILLER
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0401-MR
mm 8/24/2016
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSMEN
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b. Memo
Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft
8/28/90
(b)(1)
S
Re: Terrorism Update (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01c. Report
Re: Update on Current Terrorist Threat Reporting (3 pp.)
8/27
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01d. Letter
To President Bush (1 pp.)
8/13/90
(b)(1)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>PRT: COMM SIT
SIT: BEERS BENKO BURNS CHAMBERLIN NEEDELS SIT SUM VAX BRANSCUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEHTH<DTG> 271559Z AUG 90
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9115
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RASHID TO BE TRIED IN GREECE
<TEXT>
SECRET ATHENS 10870
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, KPAL, GR
SUBJECT: RASHID TO BE TRIED IN GREECE
REF: A) COHEN-RANSOM FONECON AUG. 27; B) ATHENS 10551;
C) STATE 285507
1. FOREIGN MINISTER SAMARAS INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR
AUGUST 27 THAT PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS HAD FIRMLY
DECIDED RASHID WOULD STAND TRIAL IN GREECE. MITSOTAKIS
IS PERSUADED THAT THE GREEK AUTHORITIES CAN MOUNT A
SOLID CASE AGAINST RASHID. SAMARAS ASKED THAT THIS
INFORMATION BE HELD VERY TIGHTLY UNTIL THE OFFICIAL
ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE MADE "SHORTLY".
2. COMMENT: WHILE SAMARAS DID NOT GET INTO LEGAL
DETAIL, WE ASSUME RASHID WILL BE TRIED AFTER PARLIAMENT
PASSES NEW LEGISLATION, WHICH NEWS STORIES IN THE PAST
FEW DAYS SAID WOULD BE INTRODUCED IN PARLIAMENT BY
SEPTEMBER 13 (REF. B), ALLOWING PROSECUTION FOR
TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED OUTSIDE GREECE AND APPLYING
RETROACTIVELY. THOUGH THE JUSTICE MINISTRY'S
ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE NEW LEGISLATION DID NOT NAME
RASHID OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC DEFENDANT WHO MIGHT BE
TRIED UNDER IT, THE PRESS, AND WE, HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE
BILL WAS PROMPTED BY THIS CASE. WE ARE CURRENTLY TRYING
TO GET A COPY OF THE DRAFT BILL. END COMMENT.
SOTIRHOS
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 0870<STOR> 900827150335 MSG000273078214
<TOR>900827151206
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0401-MR
mm 8/24/2016
Terrorism Update
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY: RLG
LOG # 6846
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG LMS VO
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
me
So.
Bill Sittmann
I
W
I
Bob Gates
2
M
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
AUG AUG 29 P5 14 P5:14
w
El
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4
NSC Secretariat
90
5
2
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006787
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 17
TO: GATES
CHRON FILE
FROM: WELCH
DOC DATE: 28 AUG 90
HAASS
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: EGYPT
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
CHRON FILE
ECONOMICS
MIDDLE EAST
PERSONS: BAKER, J
2
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HAASS
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
WELCH
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Date 5/26/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRLG
CLOSED BY: NSRLG
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECRET
6787
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 28, 1990
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
all
Deputy has Nati seen Sec Advisor
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH
M
SUBJECT:
Egyptian FMS Debt
For your information, attached at Tab I is a memorandum from
Dick Cheney concerning Secretary Baker's proposals on Egyptian
FMS debt.
Attachment
Tab I
Cheney Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
ByMM NARA, Date 8/12/2013
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
TOTAL OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CONST
STATES
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF columbia
UNITED
INITED STATES or AMERICA
1787
1991 r
1701
is
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
6787
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
23 AUG 1990
(8) As I said yesterday in Kennebunkport, I believe it is
critical that we move out quickly to assist President Mubarak
in establishing his leadership at home and in the Arab world.
(U) I think Jim Baker has the right idea in his memo to you
(attached) and I support it heartily.
De Charge
Attachment
Mr. President - I really believe
Mubarah is crucial to the future of the
middle East and we must find ways to
help him. That means we have to cut through
the red tape that rurround This issue in
our own government! I whole heartadly
support June memo.
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SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
6787
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From:
James A. Baker, III
Subject:
Egypt's FMS Debt
Egypt's supportive role in the Gulf crisis affords us an
opportunity to resolve the long-festering Egyptian FMS debt
issue -- for many years the biggest bilateral irritant between
us and Mubarak. Moving forward decisively on the debt issue
will also demonstrate to our moderate Arab friends that we can
be flexible and responsive to legitimate needs at a time when
their relationships with us are under severe Iraqi attack.
Egypt stands to lose up to $3 billion per year in lower
remittances, Suez Canal revenues and tourism earnings as a
result of the Gulf crisis. Under these conditions, Mubarak
will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the $700 million in
annual FMS debt repayments needed to forestall a cutoff in U.S.
aid under the Brooke amendment. He might approach the Saudis,
the Kuwaitis and the UAE (if he hasn't already) for some help
in the short run. But FMS is really our problem and we need to
be responsive.
I believe we should take a fresh look at finding a way to
eliminate Egypt's FMS debt. At the same time, we should seek
to catalyze Gulf economic aid to Egypt to ensure that the
Saudis, Kuwaitis and UAE also do their share for Mubarak.
While the Arabs would not finance our debt reduction per se,
they might assume responsibility for meeting Egypt's future
balance of payments requirements, especially its vital food
needs. Such a commitment could accelerate the development of
broad assistance relationships between Egypt and its Gulf
allies, similar to those in the:mid-1970's. These in turn
might enable us to reduce gradually our economic aid over the
next decade, thereby reducing the political (for Egypt) and
budgetary (for us) strains of Egyptian dependence on U.S.
assistance.
Unilateral, unconditional FMS debt relief is justified now
by Egypt's support in the Gulf crisis, combined with the
political nature of the original loans themselves. These
considerations, in addition to Egypt's poor economic conditions
and its inability to meet its FMS payments anytime in the
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AS AMENDED
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- 2 -
foreseeable future, should help to ensure that this special
treatment of Egypt does not spill over and affect our overall
debt strategy. The budgetary costs of this approach would need
to be built into the Budget Summit negotiations. However,
given Egypt's poor repayment record and limited
creditworthiness, the effect of Egyptian debt reduction on net
outlays is not likely to be great.
Congress should strongly support a reasonable FMS debt
reduction proposal for Egypt. Senators Leahy and Kasten want
this issue resolved, as does Congressman Hamilton on the House
side. Congressman Obey has also pressed us for a solution to
Egypt's debt problem. Resumption of significant Gulf
assistance to Egypt would help reassure the Hill that others
are doing their part and that over the medium-term U.S.
assistance levels to Egypt could be on a downward path. There
may be reasons to consider extending these debt reduction
benefits to others, like Israel and Turkey, but these are
issues that can best be addressed later. Egypt's need are
immediate, and we should move on Egypt now.
I believe the time is right to attack Egypt's FMS debt
problem in a comprehensive way. Unilateral U.S. official debt
reduction will bolster Mubarak and signal that moderation can
yield tangible benefits. The resumption of broad-scale aid
from the Gulf will help ensure that Egypt's stability is
preserved.
Should you agree, I suggest that Brent Scowcroft
communicate your view to Nick Brady and Dick Darman so that we
can work together to get legislation drafted in time for the
return of Congress in early September. If we are to do this,
we must move quickly to insure that the "costs" of the proposal
are factored into the budget summit discussions and that all
bases are touched on the Hill.
SECRET
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RECORD ID: 9006771
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RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 10
TO: PRESIDENT
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DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: OMAN
IRAN
IRAQ
AP
2
PERSONS: ALAWI, YUSUF
SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ YUSUF BIN ALAWI / FOMIN OF OMAN / AUG 28
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES
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NSC CHRON
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Dates/24/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03a. Outline
Re: Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi [FOIA restrictions
8/28/90
(b)(1)
S
redacted] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Chronological Files
By MM
on 3/20/2023
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
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OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
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RESTRICTION CODES
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Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
SECRET
6771
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 27, 1990
HSNe PRESIDENTIAL 502 UBRARY
MEETING WITH
YUSUF BIN ALAWI
DATE: August 28, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:30 - 5:00 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT Rgfor for
I. PURPOSE
To receive a briefing from the Omani Foreign Minister
1.4(b); 1.4(d)
1.4(b); 1.4(d)
and
to discuss the current situation in the Gulf.
II. BACKGROUND
When you and Sultan Qaboos spoke on August 8 ¹.4(d)
We have seen
reports that Iran is considering ways to circumvent the food
embargo. While reiterating our desire to improve relations
with Iran in the long run, you should remind Alawi of the
obstacles that remain: the hostages in Lebanon and Iran's
continued support for terrorism.
1.4(d)
1.4(d)
our military deployments are purely
defensive in nature, including our naval presence in the
Gulf, and we would hope to avoid any incidents in that
1.4(d)
regard.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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SERRET
III. PARTICIPANTS
See Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
White House photographer.
V. SEQUENCE
4:30 - 5:00 p.m - Photo Opportunity and Brief Remarks
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
SECRET
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Document No.
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03b. Talking
Points To Be Made for Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi,
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Points
Omani Foreign Minister [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
By MM
on 3/20/2023
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0401-MR(502.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/24/2016
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 502.01 VERARY
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
YUSUF BIN ALAWI, OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER
--
I am delighted to see you again, and appreciate your efforts
1.4(d)
--
It is important that we maintain global solidarity in
complying with the UN mandated economic sanctions against
Saddam's regime. We have seen some reports that elements
within Iran are considering circumventing the food embargo.
1.4(d)
--
We also are pleased that Iran has increased its oil
production to help defray the loss of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil.
1.4(d)
--
As I told His Majesty,
1.4(d)
there are great differences between
us and Iran that are still difficult for us to bridge.
1.4(d)
1.4(d)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
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2
1.4(d)
--
I welcome your advice
1.4(d)
--
Please thank his Majesty for his invaluable support in these
difficult times. Oman has been a true and steadfast friend
on so many occasions when we had to stand together to
protect our mutual interests. It is at times like this when
you know who your true friends really are.
SECRET
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
John H. Kelly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Sandra Charles, Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Oman
Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister
Awadh Bader Al-Shanfari, Omani Ambassador to the U.S.
SECRET
6771
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 24, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
Rr
FROM:
SANDRA CHARLES
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign
Minister, and the President, August 28, 1990
Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for the Omani
Foreign Minister's meeting with the President on Tuesday,
August 28 at 4:30 p.m. At Sultan Qaboos direction,
Yusuf bin Alawi has been asked to bring the President a
message concerning their latest contact with Iran.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
Participants List
DECLASSIFIED
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DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CANADA
VISIT
2
PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN
I
SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PM MULRONEY / AUG 27 - 28
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 25 AUG 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BASORA
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Dates/26/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
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OPENED BY: NSMEN
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DOC 3 OF 3
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6716
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
DECLASSIFIED
DATE: August 27-28, 1990
LOCATION: Kennebunkport, Maine
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0402-MR
mm 10/3/2016
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT B
I. PURPOSE
To receive Mulroney in a relaxed setting and to review world
events of common concern.
II. BACKGROUND
Mulroney is now regrouping after his severe political
setback just two months ago with the demise of the Meech
Lake agreement. He has named an expert in
federal/provincial relations as his new Chief of Staff and
he plans to launch a national unity campaign in the fall.
Meanwhile, Francophone leaders in Quebec are starting their
own provincial debate aimed at defining a new form of
"sovereignty-association". While the demise of the Canadian
federation as we know it is not yet imminent, Mulroney faces
a daunting task in trying to regenerate a new Canadian
consensus.
True to form, Mulroney has delivered solid Canadian
cooperation on the Iraq/Kuwait crisis. He has recently
dispatched two Canadian destroyers and an oiler to the area
and -- except for an early "misunderstanding" at the UN
Security Council in which the Canadian representative was
reportedly critical of the U.S. stance -- Canada's position
has been aligned closely with ours. While Canada hopes for
a further UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the use
of force, Ottawa shares our view that the current juridical
basis for interdiction is sufficient. Mulroney himself
plans to wait until September 14, when his task force will
be in the region, to give it precise military orders.
Unless he calls a special session of Parliament, he cannot
instruct Canadian forces to enter combat without getting
legislative approval within 10 days, and Parliament does not
reconvene until September 24.
Mulroney remains very taken with Gorbachev and concerned
about his survival, and he may revisit the issue of economic
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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assistance or other support for Gorbachev. However, Canada
is squeezed by its own fiscal problems and by a faltering
economy, and Mulroney also shares your concern that, in the
absence of serious economic reforms, financial aid to the
Soviets would be wasted.
On the perennial issue of acid rain, the news is good.
Formal negotiations for a bilateral agreement begin
August 29, and the initial U.S. and Canadian texts do not
seem too far apart. Our own legislation is in Conference
and is expected to be ready for your signature by the
October 5 Congressional recess.
Mulroney may raise the question of Canadian participation in
the upcoming U.S. -Mexican trade agreement negotiations. We
have indications that he is currently leaning in favor of
asking to participate, although he may not yet have made a
final decision. If he does open the subject, you should
make it clear that the decision would need to involve the
assent of the Mexicans, who have already told us that they
prefer a bilateral U.S. -Mexico negotiation. You should
reaffirm our commitment to consult closely with Canada as
the negotiations proceed.
Also in the context of not wanting to be "left out",
Mulroney may sound you out about the possibility of Canada's
joining in on a possible U.S. -EC joint declaration this
fall. The idea of a trans-Atlantic declaration was proposed
by Genscher last April, and the Canadians have been
intrigued from the start. Although they have had a formal
agreement with the EC since 1979, they feel they have little
real influence with the EC and that their best chance might
be to join forces with the U.S. Our own purpose in
negotiating a declaration would be to lay the groundwork for
a more effective foreign policy dialogue with the EC and,
historically, Canadian policy has often diverged from ours.
A "North America-EC dialogue" would be both cumbersome and
potentially reduced to a low common denominator -- at least
with some of Mulroney's potential successors.
Other issues that may be touched on are the Mohawk land
claims dispute at Oka near Montreal, in which some of the
Mohawks manning the barricades come from the nearby St.
Regis reservation in the U.S. Mulroney might also mention
lobsters. After the recent finding in our favor of a Free
Trade Agreement Panel, we agreed with Canada to try to reach
a comprehensive agreement on all outstanding lobster
disputes. Although some of the related conservation issues
are still being studied, the initiative seems to hold
promise.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List at Tab B.
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3
IV.
PRESS PLAN
White House Photographer only.
Attachments
Tab A
Points to be Made
Tab B
List of Participants
Tab C
Bio
Tab D
State Department Scope Paper
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE
Iraqi/Kuwait
--
I appreciate Canada's help and support in the Iraqi crisis.
--
Your dispatch of 2 destroyers and an oiler to the Gulf is
especially helpful.
--
Canada's participation in multinational maritime
interdiction operations, either under a new UN resolution or
Article 51, would greatly assist a unified western response
to Saddam Husayn's aggression.
Assistance to the USSR
--
My views on aid to the USSR remain as stated in Houston.
--
I look forward to Soviet passage of an emigration bill which
should open the way for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik, access to
American markets, and the possibility of official USG
lending and credit guarantees.
--
We are working now to expand our technical cooperation
program with the Soviet Union, as suggested in Houston.
--
I do not believe financial aid will promote reform or have
any lasting economic results until Gorbachev embarks on a
serious program of economic reform.
--
He has taken a much more decisive public stance recently on
his commitment to reform and will face a major debate in the
Supreme Soviet on this issue next month.
--
The IMF-led study we commissioned at Houston should help to
focus the Soviets, and us, on the major obstacles to reform
and Soviet integration into the western economic system.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
MR
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2
U.S. - Mexico Free Trade Talks
--
I expect to inform Congress next month, once I hear formally
from President Salinas, that the United States and Mexico
intend to negotiate an FTA. Formal negotiations are
expected next spring, at the end of the required
Congressional notification period.
President Salinas is keenly interested in an FTA with us and
I want to be as responsive as I can. We have an historic
opportunity here to help promote fundamental economic reform
in Mexico, which should benefit the entire region.
(IF CANADA ASKS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN FTA WITH MEXICO)
--
I want to reaffirm our commitment to consult closely with
Canada as the FTA negotiations proceed. Canadian concerns
are appropriately considered as we proceed.
Trying for a trilateral agreement would obviously complicate
matters. The Mexicans have already indicated to us that
they prefer a bilateral negotiation. They add that if there
were a three-way negotiation they would want to reopen the
U.S. - -Canada FTA.
--
From our perspective, this would present serious political
problems, as I imagine it would for you. If you want to
explore the possibilities further, however, we can have Jim
Baker and Joe Clark look at the issues more closely.
U.S. -EC Declaration of Principles
(IF ASKED ABOUT THE U.S.-EC DECLARATION)
We have begun exploratory talks with the EC through the
Italian presidency on a U.S. -EC declaration of principles.
SECRET
SECRET
3
We see this as a general political declaration, including
the listing of the consultative links we have recently
established. New economic agreements are not being
considered as part of this Declaration.
(IF ASKED ABOUT CANADA BEING PART OF A U.S. -EC DECLARATION)
I want to look into the idea further. I am certainly open
to your views. In the meantime, just as we are developing
ideas on the kind of declaration we would like to have with
the EC, you may wish to develop your own ideas on the nature
of a possible Canada-EC declaration and of a trans-Atlantic
declaration.
--
We may find that parallel declarations are more appropriate,
particularly since you already have a formal agreement with
the EC and we don't.
Lobsters
--
I am glad that we are trying to solve our lobster disputes
through consultations.
--
I understand we are making good progress towards an overall
settlement.
Environment
--
I am pleased that formal negotiations on an acid rain accord
will begin August 29. We look forward to an early signing.
--
I understand that EPA Administrator Reilly and Canadian
Environment Minister De Cotret have agreed to give top
priority to dealing with Great Lakes pollution and the zebra
mussel infestation problem. You can count on our full
support.
SECRET
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
CANADA
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Derek H. Burney, Canadian Ambassador
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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C
Collection:
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Series:
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Subseries:
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
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and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520 # 6716
SECRET
August 22, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Event Paper for Bush-Mulroney Kennebunkport Meeting
Attached is the Event Paper for President Bush's Meeting
with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney on August 27-28, 1990 in
Kennebunkport.
Drovert Season
for . Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
SECRET
By MM NARA, Date 8/12/2013
DECL: OADR
SECRET
SCOPE PAPER
I. AGENDA
Prime Minister Mulroney is looking forward to a relaxed
family get together. Stanley Hartt told Ambassador Ney the
Prime Minister would particularly like to discuss: (1) Western
assistance for Gorbachev; (2) possible Canadian participation
in a U.S.- EC Declaration of Principles; and (3) U.S.-Mexican
Free Trade Talks. The Prime Minister also is likely to briefly
raise the subject of lobsters. Naturally, Iraq will be a major
focus of the meeting.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
With the demise of the Meech Lake accord, Prime Minister
Mulroney has been calling for national unity and seeking to
avoid the perception that his government is adrift. In several
regional meetings, provincial premiers have indicated they want
more powers at Ottawa's expense and have ideas of their own
about constitutional reform. A major debate or the appropriate
mix of federal and provincial power appears to be shaping up
for the fall. Mulroney will seek to take the lead by launching
a major debate on the future of the country in the autumn. He
has chosen Norman Spector, the architect of Meech Lake, as his
new Chief of Staff to lead that effort.
The Province of Quebec has initiated a lengthy review to
determine the shape of its future relationship with Canada.
That process could lead to an election/referendum scenario next
spring on a new form of "sovereignty-association" with Canada.
Moderate Liberal Premier Bourassa and PQ leader Parizeau are
sparring over the composition of the commission which will
undertake the review. Former Tory Cabinet Minister Lucien
Bouchard, who defected to form the separatist Bloc Quebecois in
Parliament, is a potential spoiler. The Bloc recently won a
massive by-election victory in Quebec, enhancing Bouchard's
prestige and increasing the possibility of further Quebec Tory
defections to Bouchard's new parliamentary group.
Meanwhile, Mulroney has been criticized for not dealing
more forthrightly with a serious native land claims dispute on
the Oka Reservation near Montreal. Heavily armed Mohawks have
built barricades to hold off provincial police. The dispute
has dragged on for months, enraging local residents, attracting
international attention and generating demonstrations of
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0402-MR
SECRET
MM 10/3/2016
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-2-
support from native groups across Canada. We are watching the
situation carefully because some Mohawks manning the barricades
come from the St. Regis Reservation in New York and fought in
Vietnam.
The economic news from Canada is not encouraging. The
GOC faces considerable domestic criticism of its tough
anti-inflation program. Canadian companies say they can't
compete because of record high interest rates (over 14 percent)
and the high Canadian dollar (87 cents). The GOC's proposed
Goods and Services tax, scheduled for implementation January 1,
1990, also faces widespread opposition across Canada and is
being used by unions to press for unrealistic wage demands.
The difficult economic situation contributes to criticism of
the FTA and narrows the Prime Minister's flexibility on other
trade issues.
Before the Gulf crisis, we expected Canada's economy to
grow by 1-1.3 percent in 1990. Rising oil prices may tip
Canada into recession in the third and fourth quarters of
1990. Higher oil prices will also add to inflation, up to
three tenths of a percent for each dollar increase in the price
of oil. This impact may be mitigated somewhat, since Canadian
oil companies have delayed passing the increased crude prices
through to the retail level.
Despite Canada's domestic problems, the U.S.-Canada
bilateral relationship remains superb. Formal negotiations on
an acid rain accord will begin August 29 and should be
completed by the end of the year, subject to the passage of the
Clean Air Act amendments. The bilateral FTA is working
smoothly, and negotiations to liberalize our civil air
agreement are expected to begin this fall. The recent
successful celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense underscores our excellent bilateral
defense cooperation. Drug and cross border law enforcement
cooperation has been very fruitful.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-3-
III. U.S. OBJECTIVES
Review our position on the Iraq crisis and seek Canadian
support for U.S. efforts.
Encourage the Prime Minister to permit Canadian navy ships
to join the multinational force - whether or not under
U.N. command.
--
Reiterate our commitment to the Houston Summit statement
on aid to the USSR.
--
If Mulroney states that Canada would like to participate
with us in a Declaration of Principles with the EC,
indicate we would like further time to consider such a
proposal.
Update Mulroney on the latest U.S. -Mexico FTA
developments. Explain why we decided to proceed now with
formal Congressional notification. If Canada indicates
interest in joining negotiations, caution the PM that a
three-way negotiation would be difficult and that Mexico
also must agree.
Indicate satisfaction that negotiations on an acid rain
accord are starting this month. Tell Mulroney we look
forward to working closely with Canada on Great Lakes
pollution and the zebra mussel infestation problem.
IV. BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS:
O
Iraqi Crisis
Canada co-sponsored Security Council resolution 661,
promptly implemented a trade embargo, froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti
assets and agreed to dispatch a three ship force to the Gulf.
While the GOC would prefer that its force operate under a U.N.
mandate in a peacekeeping mode, Mulroney has kept open the
possibility of joining a multilateral force under Article 51.
One reason the GOC is reluctant to operate under Article 51,
however, is that this would require recalling Parliament into
session. Mulroney is very concerned about hostages as there
are 700 Canadians in Iraq and Kuwait.
I appreciate Canada's help and support in the Iraqi crisis.
I hope you will maintain the option of joining a
multilateral force under Article 51 at an appropriate
time. Canada's participation would greatly assist a
unified western response to Saddam Hussein's aggression.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-4-
Assistance to the USSR
Mulroney would like to reinforce the economic and
political change taking place in the USSR. He was satisfied
with the results of the Houston Summit including the proposed
IMF-led study, but he believes we need to look for other ways
to be helpful. Mulroney has in mind primarily technical
assistance, but he would also be prepared to have the Soviet
Union join a number of Western economic institutions now.
--
Our policy on aid to the USSR remains as stated in Houston.
We look forward to Soviet passage of an emigration bill
which should open the way for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik,
greater access to American markets, and official USG
lending and credit guarantees.
We are working now to expand our technical assistance to
the Soviet Union, as suggested in Houston.
We do not believe direct aid will promote reform or have
any lasting economic results
O
U.S.-EC Declaration of Principles
Last spring, Foreign Minister Genscher proposed the idea
of a transatlantic Declaration of Principles, an idea later
endorsed by the EC summit in Dublin. Although Canada was
included in both formulations, its role was not clear, and EC
officials have told us they prefer parallel agreements with the
United States and Canada. At this time, we also prefer a
separate approach because one of our key goals is to get better
access to EC political decision-making. We are more likely to
succeed by working with the EC bilaterally, rather than in
tandem with another country, even Canada.
Prime Minister Mulroney has expressed a personal interest
in this issue. The Canadians believe that with EC attention
focussed on 1992 and Eastern Europe, Canada will be neglected
unless it joins with the U.S. Mulroney may seek Canadian
participation in the declaration. We recommend that you make
no commitment on this point. It would be helpful to lay down a
marker that Canada should continue to pursue work on a separate
declaration with the EC to parallel our approach. You may also
wish to remind Mulroney that you are certainly willing to keep
in mind Canadian concerns as the negotiations progress.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-5-
(IF ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. - EC DECLARATION)
I understand your interest in the concept of a
--
transatlantic declaration.
We have begun exploratory talks with the EC through the
--
Italian presidency on a U.S.- EC declaration of principles.
We see this as a general political declaration, including
the listing of the consultative links we have recently
established. New economic agreements are not being
considered as part of this Declaration.
--
(IF ASKED ABOUT CANADA BEING PART OF A U.S.- - EC
DECLARATION)
I want to think about that. As I noted earlier, I am
--
certainly open to your views. In the meantime, just as we
are developing ideas on the kind of declaration we would
like to have with the EC, you may wish to develop your own
ideas on the nature of a Canada-EC declaration.
U.S. Mexico Free Trade Talks
Canada has taken a non-committal stance on the issue of a
U.S. - Mexico FTA as it tries to decide whether it will ask to
take part. Canada is concerned that a decision to participate
will reopen the free trade debate among Canadians; at the same
time, Canada does not want the gains from its FTA with us
undercut by an agreement with Mexico.
We expect that the GOC will make a decision about whether
it wishes to participate by early September. It is possible
that Mulroney will inform the President at Kennebunkport that
Canada will likely wish to participate. Should Mulroney ask to
take an active part, we will need to remind him that a decision
to involve Canada would entail political costs and is not ours
alone to make. It must be a joint decision by the U.S. and
Mexico.
Canadian participation would complicate the negotiations.
Mexico has stated that if Canada joined the negotiations, the
U.S. - Canada FTA would have to be significantly revised. This
would cause significant problems in both the U.S. and Canada.
Beyond this, it reflects a Mexican intention to seek a
considerably lower level of obligations.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-6-
As you recently heard, I expect to inform Congress next
month, once I hear formally from President Salinas, that
the United States and Mexico intend to negotiate an FTA.
Formal negotiations are expected next spring, at the end
of the required Congressional notification period.
President Salinas is keenly interested in an FTA with us
and I want to be as responsive as I can. We have an
historic opportunity here to help promote fundamental
economic reform in Mexico, which should benefit the entire
region.
We accelerated the announcement of our intent to negotiate
--
in response to our and Mexico's interest in moving ahead
promptly with the process and to provide adequate notice
to Congress.
(IF CANADA ASKS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN FTA WITH MEXICO)
--
As we discussed in the past, we are certainly open to your
views and will work with you to ensure that Canadian
concerns are appropriately considered as we proceed.
--
But frankly, broadening the scope of the negotiations
would obviously complicate matters. While we can't speak
for the Mexicans, they have already indicated to us that
in a three-way negotiation they would want to reopen the
U.S. - Canada FTA. From our perspective, this would
present serious political problems.
O
U.S. - Canada FTA
Despite continuing attacks from unions and the opposition,
this is a bright spot for Mulroney and for U.S.- Canadian
relations. The Agreement's implementation is going smoothly.
We have few trade issues looming on the horizon, although the
recent 301 case on beer and our continuing complaints on
Canadian restrictions on U.S. dairy imports are ongoing
irritants.
Should Mulroney raise the FTA, you might note that the
continuing smooth implementation of the agreement is a good
advertisement for free trade in general.
--
We are indeed pleased with the pace and tenor of the
implementation of our Free Trade Agreement.
The fact that the implementation of such a broad agreement
--
is going SO smoothly is indicative of the special and
unique nature of U.S. - Canadian relations.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-7-
O
Lobsters
In May, a Free Trade-Agreement Panel agreed with us that
federal legislation preventing undersized Canadian lobsters from
being sold in the United States was not an impermissible import
restriction. The minimum size legislation, enacted last December,
was sponsored by Senator Mitchell. The panel did not decide other
remaining questions though.
After the panel decision was announced on May 15, we agreed
with Canada to try to reach a comprehensive settlement of all
outstanding lobster disputes. The industries in the two countries
have made a proposal that could form the basis for such a
settlement. Under the proposal, Canada would refrain from
challenging our minimum size requirements and we would agree not
to raise our minimum size for the next three years. In the
meantime, Canada would bring its size requirement up to ours and
we would agree to change certain trade-restrictive state laws.
We are now considering whether we can, consistent with sound
conservation, agree to keep our minimum lobster size constant for
the next three years. If we can do so, it is very likely that we
can reach an agreement ending the lobster disputes. Such an
agreement would be a good precedent for cooperation with Canada on
other common fish resources.
--
I am glad that we are trying to solve our lobster disputes
through consultations.
--
I understand we are making good progress towards a settlement.
O
Environment
The Clean Air bill is in Conference and we hope it will be
ready for Presidential signature by the October 5 Congressional
recess. Meanwhile, formal negotiations with Canada on an acid
rain accord begin August 29 and the agreement should be ready for
signature by the end of the year. The U.S. and Canada have agreed
that future priorities should include (1) a pollution prevention
strategy for the Great Lakes and (2) bilateral action to deal with
the zebra mussel infestation problem in the Great Lakes.
I am pleased that formal negotiations on an acid rain accord
will begin August 29. We look forward to an early signing.
I understand that EPA Minister Reilly and Canadian
Environment Minister De Cotret have agreed to give top
priority to dealing with Great Lakes pollution and the zebra
mussel infestation problem. You can count on our full support.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
-8-
O
U.S. Force Realignment
We have been consulting with our Allies on our planned
restructuring and force reductions in Europe. The only
affected base in Canada is Argentia, Newfoundland, which is
likely to be reduced or closed by the mid 90's.
We are closing bases throughout Europe and the U.S., and
--
in the coming months will be bringing 40,000 troops back
to the U.S. from Europe.
These reductions are part of a belt-tightening effort to
--
make U.S. forces leaner and more efficient.
--
Our plan will begin to adjust the U.S. presence in Europe
to post-CFE force levels, taking political and fiscal
realities into account.
In determining the structure for realigned U.S. forces, we
--
worked to maximize U.S. combat capability, avoid a hollow
force, and retain the ability to support NATO's evolving
strutegy.
We remain firmly committed to NATO and to retaining a
--
substantial force presence in Europe as long as our Allies
want us there. I appreciate your commitment to this
common goal as well.
One of the bases affected will be Argentia in
--
Newfoundland. Bilateral consultations about the future of
that base are currently in progress. I know we can count
on your understanding and support.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
CHRON FILE
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9006888
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 90 20
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: MELBY
DOC DATE: 29 AUG 90
2.
DEAL
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ENERGY
PERSIAN GULF
ANSA
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: MTG W/ PRES & SEC BAKER / BRADY / MOSBACHER & WATKINS RE ENERGY
ISSUES ARISING OUT OF GULF CRISIS
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 01 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: MELBY
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
MELBY
NSC CHRON
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 6888
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
90 AUG 31 AID 48 A10 : 48
transeem
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
2
NSC Secretariat
3
N
2
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCI
Pls note
Tim Deal added
2nd page to TAB I
BS requested
6888
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 29, 1990
ACTION
APNSA Has Seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
L
Nati Sec Advisor
THROUGH:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
has seen
FROM:
ERIC MELBY W
SUBJECT:
Energy Issues Arising Out of the Gulf Crisis
You will be meeting tomorrow with the President, Secretaries
Baker, Brady, Mosbacher and Watkins, Director Darman and Chairman
Deland to discuss energy issues arising out of the Gulf crisis.
At Tab I is a list of key issues which merit discussion.
Attachment
Tab I
List of Key Issues
SECRET
SECRET
Oil Situation as of August 28
(millions of barrels per day)
Production
Country
July
August
OPEC
Saudi Arabia
6.2
7.2
Iran
2.9
3.1
U.A.E
2.1
2.1
Qatar
0.4
0.4
Algeria
1.1
1.2
Ecuador
0.3
0.3
Gabon
0.3
0.3
Indonesia
1.4
1.4
Libya
1.3
1.4
Venezuela
2.3
2.3
Nigeria
1.6
1.8
Neutral Zone
NA
0.2
Iraq
3.0
0.3
Kuwait
1.8
0
Total
24.7
22.0
NON-OPEC
OECD
15.3
LDCs
9.7
Other
3.2
Total
28.2
Shortfall
(based on CIA estimates of third and fourth quarter demand)
Shortfall due to loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude:
4.3 mbd
Existing shortfall taking into account increased
production to date:
2.1 mbd
New production likely:
Saudi Arabia
0.6
U.A.E.
0.2
Venezuela
0.2
Others (including U.S.)
0.1
Total
1.1
Remaining shortfall:
1.0 mbd
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2010- 0402-MR
mm 10/3/2016
Key Energy Issues Arising Out of Gulf Crisis
1.
Oil Supply
O
Iraq/Kuwait shortfall -- 4.3 mbd. OPEC accord clears way
for potential additional 3.0 mbd from Saudi Arabia, UAE,
Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran and other OPEC.
Net shortfall likely to be around 1.5 mbd, depending on how
much companies draw down their stocks. Available IEA
commercial stocks around 470 million barrels.
Heading into winter season where oil demand highest.
Companies build stocks in fall for drawdown in winter.
2.
SPR
O
In September likely to be Congressional pressure to draw
down SPR ($20 billion invested in SPR over past 15 years).
O
Administration must avoid mandated drawdown. Any SPR draw
down should be coordinated fully with allies in IEA.
Unilateral action by U.S. would be badly received by allies
and damage IEA.
3.
Economic Implications
o
Oil prices likely to fluctuate, sometimes sharply, in
response to developments in Gulf and rumors in market.
Prices set by market psychology as much as by supply and
demand.
O
Higher oil prices will cause higher inflation, slower growth
-- developing countries particularly hurt.
4.
U.S. Actions
O
Few credible actions U.S. can take in short term to increase
oil supply substantially or encourage large switch from oil.
O
Can take action to approve natural gas projects pending
before FERC. Iroquois pipeline could replace 100,000 b/d by
late next year.
O
Longer term, need White House leadership to get nuclear
moving again.
O
Conservation potential large but difficult to realize
quickly.
5.
IEA
O
Governing Board meeting August 31 to assess supply and
demand. Likely to issue statement saying situation is in
hand for time being, but complacency unwarranted as demand
will increase next quarter. Will note that increased OPEC
production and draw down of company stocks bringing
additional supplies to market.
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006879
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 90 16
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: HAASS
DOC DATE: 29 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
IRAQ
2
PERSONS: WOLFOWITZ, P
IVRY, DAVID
SUBJECT: TALKS W/ ISRAELIS
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 01 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HAASS
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Date: 5/26/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMDC
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
6879
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 31, 1990
Deputy Nati Sec Advisor
INFORMATION
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD N. HAASS
Mill
SUBJECT:
Talks with the Israelis
Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Clarke, Lee Butler and I met for four hours
with an Israeli team headed by MoD Director General David Ivry.
Our main goal was to persuade them that they ought to move back
their red lines. We made clear that we were serious and that we
had a lot on the line, and that they ought not to play into
Saddam's hands by making this the Arab-Israeli struggle he was
seeking to portray it as. This meant showing more tolerance for
events in Jordan and for missiles in Western Iraq.
I was explicit in saying that we hoped and expected that they
would act differently today than they might have a month ago.
Ivry countered that we could not expect Israel not to act when
its existence was threatened. I argued that in most of the
scenarios we were considering it would be important to
distinguish between Israel's interests and its existence, and
that instability in Jordan or missiles in Iraq fell under the
former. Ivry stated that Israel would calculate differently now,
meaning that they had the message and would be less prone to act.
What they want most of all is intelligence about Iraqi military
deployments (especially missiles) in real time or close to it.
They hinted that their willingness not to act would be increased
if they had a better sense of what was going on. We told them
our willingness to provide it would be affected by what use the
Israelis planned to make of it. As I told Ivry, we would be more
amenable if their intention was to take defensive rather than
pre-emptive measures. We also made clear that we were not
interested in joint or even simultaneous operations. And we made
no promises on their shopping list, which was (as you might
expect) considerable.
What also surfaced was the concern on their part that our current
definition of success did not require the removal of Saddam or
his offensive capability. We tried to make the case that a
containment option was viable, but we have yet to convince many
in Israel. We need to keep working at this, though, because
Israel will be more likely to act in ways contrary to what we
want if they conclude that their interests are not being served
by our policy.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
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National Security Council
The White House
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URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
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Ken Hill
1
copy
Bill Sittmann
2
#
Bob Gates
8
Brent Scowcroft
I
Copy
90 AUG31 P ? . 33
3
Fax'd
to 10 BS BS
this AM.
Bill Sittmann
via
Sitem.
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4
Lms 931
N
NSC Secretariat
5
N/R
A = Action
I = Information
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VP
Sununu
Other
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NSC/S PROFILE
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SOURCE REF
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KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
ECONOMICS
IRAQ
OIL
SANCTIONS
2
PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS / ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN
ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM
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STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
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ByCap NARA, Dates/2009
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THE PRESIDENT PAS 05
SECRET
6887
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NOTED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan
At yesterday's NSC meeting, your advisors unanimously recommended
the adoption of the approach outlined in the interagency report,
calling on our allies and friends to: (a) help alleviate the
economic pressures on the front-line states resulting from
implementation of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and higher oil
prices; and (b) share the defense costs associated with Desert
Shield.
To implement this strategy, your advisors recommend dispatching
high-level Presidential missions to potential donor countries to
discuss the approach with your counterparts and other officials
and to begin the process of nailing down specific commitments by
all contributors. Ideally, these missions could depart by early
next week.
We propose four missions:
--
One headed by Secretary Baker with John Robson and Don
Atwood to Brussels, Bonn, Rome (for EC Presidency), Saudi
Arabia (for both Saudi Government and Kuwaiti
Government-in-exile), and the UAE.
A second headed by Secretary Brady with Larry Eagleburger
and Paul Wolfowitz to Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore and Brunei.
--
A third to Jordan that perhaps I or Bob Gates might lead
with participation by John Kelly of State.
A fourth to Taiwan headed by a non-official American (e.g.,
Richard Armitage).
To launch this effort, your advisors propose that you:
Telephone Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand
to inform them of our approach and game plan for mobilizing
international support.
Call and send messages to Chancellor Kohl, King Fahd, the
Amir of Kuwait, and the President of the UAE, asking them to
discuss the coordinated approach with your special
emissaries.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0403-MR
mr 7/15/2016
SECRET
2
Send messages along similar lines to other potential donors.
Send a separate message to President Gorbachev, drawing
special attention to the specific needs of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union's important role in minimizing the
economic burden of these countries through maintenance of
contracted oil deliveries (at presently subsidized prices).
Send a message to King Hussein, reflecting Jordan's special
situation in this crisis.
Brief the press on the overall approach on your return to
Kennebunkport.
If you approve this approach, I will transmit to you appropriate
talking points, messages and themes for your discussion with the
press.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize us to proceed with the approach outlined
above.
Approve
CB
Disapprove
8.30
SECRET
SECRET
6887
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 29, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
RICHARD HAASS
B
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President,
outlining the proposed implementing strategy for the economic
action plan.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.
Attachment
Tab I
Memo for the President
TAB I BS to The
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
SECRET
By MM NARA, Date 8/12/2013
Declassify on: OADR
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
6887
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG AC A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
\
H
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
RECL /ED
SEP 8 A9 13 A9:13
600
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
90 90SEP 8
West Wing Desk
2
N
NSC Secretariat
3
N
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9006913
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 18
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: WELCH
DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90
HAASS
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: JORDAN
2
PERSONS: HASAN, PRINCE
SUBJECT: MSG TO SCOWCROFT FM JORDANIAN CROWN PRINCE
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WELCH
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSW
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
FyI Msg Fr Jordonan Goven
National Security Council Prince
The White House
"EA
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 6913
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG LMSAV A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken
1
KH
I
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Bill Sittmann
90 AUG 30 P8 15
2
Checkmark_ntt
3
Brent Scowcroft
APNSA Has Seen
Situation Room
4 Amiois
N.
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
5
GRM10/9
N
A = Action
O I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
37
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
6913
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Nutl has Sec Advisor
August 30, 1990
INFORMATION
B
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH
ml
SUBJECT:
Message from Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan
Crown Prince Hasan sent you a manuscript setting out Jordan's
position on the Gulf crisis. There was no accompanying note from
Hasan, although his Private Secretary told me that the Crown
Prince admired your remarks on TV last Sunday and wanted to give
you further elaboration of his own views.
I do not believe it is necessary to respond to this "fyi"
message.
Attachment
Tab I
Fax from Crown Prince Hasan
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08b. Fax
The Private Secretary to His Highness the Crown Prince of
8/28/90
(b)(1)
Jordan to Mr. David Welch (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006909
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 16
TO: SITTMANN
CHRON FILE
FROM: BENKO
DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90
BASORA
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: GERMANY FR
TELCON
IRAQ
KUWAIT
UN
JAPAN
PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT
SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF FRG ON 30 AUG RE SITUATION IN GULF
ACTION: HILL DISAPPROVED RECOM #2
DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BENKO
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BASORA
BENKO
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Dates/24/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSW
CLOSED BY: NSGAD
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6909
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SURON FILE
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff
DATE, TIME
August 30, 1990, 2:45 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.
AND PLACE:
White House Situation Room
The President: Helmut, how are you? Well, I'm calling to give
you an update on the Gulf. I believe we're in pretty good shape.
The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf and at
the UN, to resist aggression. Now we have to wait to see whether
sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
And the UN sanctions are widespread and effective, but this
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
you know, costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic
activity, higher oil prices, etc. And we're spending huge sums
daily, the U.S. is and other nations around the world are, to
roll back Saddam.
We've just enacted a new program of consultation in terms of
coordinating assistance. I know Germany is helping out
militarily within the terms of the constitutional constraints you
explained to me. (S)
Some countries have been hit very hard -- Turkey, Egypt, and
Jordan, and the countries of Eastern Europe and Morocco, the
Philippines, Pakistan, and India. They've all been hit very
hard. We have been working to develop some ideas on the needs of
specific countries and how these might be met. (e)
I'm calling to ask you to see Jim Baker next week to discuss
these ideas with you. I'm also asking Andreotti and Jacques
Delors to meet with him. (S)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes, George, I'm glad to do it. When will he
come? (S)
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
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AS AMENDED
SECRET
2000-0429-F
8/71/2 nm MM
SECRET
SECRET
The President: I'll have to get you exact dates. I'm calling
Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand to see Nick Brady. So
it's not just a Germany trip, but worldwide.
Helmut, I'm sensitive to the burdens you face with unification.
I ask that you listen to Jim with an open mind; I'm very
grateful to you for seeing him.
Chancellor Kohl: George, we don't even need to talk about it at
length. First of all, I am very pleased to see Jim Baker when he
comes. I will not only listen with an open mind, I will start
thinking about what we can do. It is just a matter of costs.
This is a problem we all have now. I only ask him to agree on
dates with me so we can work things out.
()
The President: I'll get him to get them to you right away
through our Embassy. Nick Brady will be visiting the Japanese.
So this is a worldwide coordinating and consultation effort right
now.
()
Thanks very much, Helmut. Good night. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. Good night. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
6909
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
August 30, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
THROUGH:
ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB
FROM:
STEPHEN E. BENKO
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany of August 30, 1990
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Chancellor Kohl.
Concurrence by: Richard Haass
RECOMMENDATIONS
That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.
Approve KJH for
Disapprove
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to State on an "Eyes Only" basis for
insertion in Secretary Baker's briefing book.
Approve
Disapprove KJHfn
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to State
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0403-MR
mm 7/15/2016
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006901
CURON FILE
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 12
TO: PRESIDENT
2.
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
ECONOMICS
OIL
TELCALL
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
PERSONS: FAHD
SABAH, JABER
ZAYYID
KOHL, HELMUT
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS / ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: MELBY
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MELBY
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Date 05/26/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRLG
CLOSED BY: NSMDC
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 6901
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
W
Brent Scowtrpft
E
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West WingDesk R
90 AUG 31 A/O 29
4
N
NSC Secretariat
M
N
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
rusian only unders
National Security Council Economic ACTION
The White House
Plan
PROOFED BY: &
LOG #
6901
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVED
AUG 30 P. 18
1
A
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
06
West Wing Desk
LMS8/30
SEE NOTE
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
6901
8/30
THIS PACKAGE WAS HAND CARRIED
TO SCOWCROFT & SCOWCROFT
HAND CARRIED IT TO THE PRES.
(PER GRAY)
LMS
SECRET
Fation
6901
already
THE WHITE HOUSE
completed
WASHINGTON
8-30-90
30Rug
ACTION
DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
PER E.O. 13526
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT Rt Rtson for
2010-0403-MR
mm 7/15/2016
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan
Purpose
To inform selected world leaders of your proposals for an
economic action plan to deal with the Persian Gulf crisis.
Background
At the NSC meeting yesterday, an economic action plan was
discussed to help deal with the economic consequences of the
Persian Gulf crisis. The implementation strategy, including
missions led by Secretaries Baker and Brady, was discussed with
you this morning. In addition to the phone calls we propose you
make and messages you send, we will get in touch separately with
Taiwan.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That you call King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait, President Zayyid and
Chancellor Kohl this afternoon. Talking points for each call are
at Tab A.
Approve 3
Disapprove
That you call President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher
tomorrow. Talking points for each call are at Tab B.
h
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh,
Prime Minister Andreotti (in his capacity as EC President) and EC
Commission President Delors. Texts of each message are at Tab C.
Approve 4
Disapprove
That you approve a message to King Hussein. Text is at Tab D.
Approve 4
Disapprove
SECRET
CC: The Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
Chief of Staff
SEPRET
SECRET
SECRET
2
That you approve a message to President Gorbachev. Text is at
Tab E.
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve the message to Taiwan at Tab F.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A
Talking Points for Calls to King Fahd, the Amir
of Kuwait, the President Zayyid, and Chancellor
Kohl
Tab B
Talking Points for Calls to President Mitterrand
and Prime Minister Thatcher
Tab C
Messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh,
Prime Minister Andreotti, EC Commission President
Delors
Tab D
Message to King Hussein
Tab E
Message to President Gorbachev
Tab F
Message to Taiwan
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT ZAYYID
-- Your Highness, I want to share our latest thinking on the
effects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Overall, we have made
considerable progress, a tribute to our close cooperation
and the overwhelming international support for our efforts
to get Iraq out of Kuwait.
-- The invasion and sanctions are imposing real costs on many
countries, however. Your decision to increase oil
production will substantially ease the burden on all
oil-importing countries.
--
My military commanders and I appreciate all the support we
have received thus far from your government. Despite your
generosity, the costs to support our forces are high. We
will need additional help to offset these costs.
--
The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis also have hit
Egypt, Turkey and Jordan particularly hard, along with other
countries like Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Sanctions
compliance will be harder still if these countries do not
get some economic support.
-- Today, I approved a proposal for international compensation
for countries most affected by Iraq's invasion and sanctions
compliance. Like our military operations, it will succeed
if we work together.
-- I understand you may already be providing financial aid to
some countries. We would like to coordinate our efforts to
maximize the benefits to the recipients. Therefore, early
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2010-0403-MR
mm 7/15/2016
SECRET
2
next week, I would like to send a high-level delegation, led
by Secretary Baker, to discuss our ideas with you in detail.
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT
-- Your Highness, I want to share our thinking on our efforts
to achieve our mutual objectives in the Gulf. Overall, we
have made considerable progress. The entire world supports
our efforts, a clear tribute to the righteousness of our
cause: Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of your
government in Kuwait.
-- The invasion and sanctions are imposing real costs on many
countries, however. OPEC's decision to increase oil
production will ease the burden somewhat on all
oil-importing countries.
-- The United States and several other countries have come to
Kuwait's aid by providing military forces. The costs to
support our forces are high. We will need additional
financial help to offset these expenses. I appreciate your
offer to assist us in this way.
-- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis also have hit
Egypt, Turkey and Jordan particularly hard, along with
Morocco, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Eastern Europe.
Sanctions compliance will be harder still if these countries
do not get some economic support.
-- Today, I approved a proposal for international compensation
for countries most affected by Iraq's invasion and sanctions
compliance. Like our military operations, it will succeed
if we work together.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2010-0403-MR
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SECRET
2
--
I understand you may already be providing financial aid to
some countries. We would like to coordinate our efforts
with you to maximize the benefits to the recipients.
Therefore, early next week, I would like to send a
high-level delegation, led by Secretary Baker, to discuss
our ideas with you in detail.
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL
-- I want to share with you my assessment of the Gulf situation
and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most
affected economically.
-- Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is
demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at
the U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether
sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
-- While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many
countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced
economic activity and higher oil prices.
-- The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.
However, we need assistance in supporting the military
deployment.
-- I know you are helping out militarily within the limits of
your constitutional constraints.
-- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing
daily. The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan
are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive
economic ties.
-- Eastern Europe and other countries like Morocco, the
Philippines, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.
-- Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2010-0403-MR
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mm 7/15/2016
SECRET
2
-- We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific
countries and how these might be met.
--
I would like to send Jim Baker early next week to discuss
these ideas with you. I am also asking Giulio Andreotti, in
his capacity as EC President, and Jacques Delors to meet
with Jim. I have asked Francois Mitterrand and Margaret
Thatcher to meet with Nick Brady.
-- Helmut, I am very sensitive to the economic costs you face
in connection with unification and know that it is difficult
for you to assume additional financial burdens. But if we
fail in our efforts to keep the pressure on Iraq, we would
all face the prospect of sharply higher oil prices and a
possible recession. The economic costs of unification would
then be much harder to bear.
-- It is in that connection that I would ask that you consider
what steps the Federal Republic can take to provide economic
and other assistance to assure that the sanctions regime
succeeds.
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
-- I want to share with you our assessment of the Gulf
situation and our latest thinking on ways to help countries
most affected.
-- Overall, I believe we are in good shape. Our military
deployment is continuing, as you know, and your own efforts
have been indispensable. We have to see whether sanctions
can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
-- If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. We cannot let Saddam remain in Kuwait.
You understand what is at stake.
-- We are getting great support for the U.N. sanctions, but the
invasion and the embargo are imposing real costs on many
countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced
economic activity and higher oil prices.
--
We are spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We
do this willingly because of the essential interests that
are at stake.
--
However, we will be seeking assistance in supporting the
military deployment, particularly from the oil-rich states
of the Arabian peninsula and from Japan, as well as
continuing support from NATO allies.
-- Given the enormous U.S. contribution to the military effort,
we are going to try to offset some of our incremental costs.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
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2010- 404-MR
mm 6/9/2016
SECRET
2
-- The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are also starting to
be felt. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan
are particularly hard hit.
-- Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free
markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in petroleum
prices and the loss of Iraqi oil supplies, after they have
already begun to lose privileged access to Soviet oil.
-- Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan
and India are hurting too.
-- Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance. Jordan is in a special
situation; we need to consider incentives to keep King
Hussein afloat and encourage him to abide by the U.N.-
mandated embargo.
-- It is time for concerted action to share the responsibility
of helping these countries. I believe our two countries,
the EC, other OECD and NATO countries, the Gulf states and
other major beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to
Saddam should work together to provide economic assistance.
-- We have developed some ideas over the past week on the needs
of specific countries and how these might be met. I would
like to send Nick Brady to discuss these ideas with you
early next week. I am also asking Margaret Thatcher to
receive Nick.
--
I also plan to send Secretary Baker to Rome to discuss these
ideas with Giulio Andreotti in his capacity as EC President
as well as with Jacques Delors in Brussels.
SECRET
SECRET
3
--
I have also asked him to go to Bonn to talk to Helmut Kohl
about economic support, in view of Germany's economic
position and inability to play a military role in the Gulf.
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
--
I want to share with you our assessment of the Gulf
situation and our latest thinking on ways to help countries
most affected.
--
Overall, I believe we are in good shape. Our military
deployment is continuing, as you know, and your own efforts
have been indispensable. We have to see whether sanctions
can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
-- If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. We cannot let Saddam remain in Kuwait.
You understand what is at stake.
--
While we are getting great support for the U.N. sanctions,
the invasion and the embargo are imposing real costs many
countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced
economic activity and higher oil prices.
-- We are spending huge sums everyday to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We
do this willingly because of the essential interests that
are at stake.
-- However, we will be seeking assistance in supporting the
military deployment, particularly from the oil-rich states
of the Arabian peninsula and from Japan.
-- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are also
starting to be felt. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey
and Jordan are particularly hard hit.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010- 1101- MR
SECRET
SCS 5/16/11
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2
-- Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free
markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in petroleum
prices and the loss of Iraqi oil supplies, after they have
already begun to lose privileged access to Soviet oil.
--
Other countries like the Philippines, Pakistan, Morocco and
India are hurting too.
--
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance. Jordan is in a special
situation; we need to consider incentives to keep King
Hussein afloat and encourage him to abide by the U.N.- -
mandated embargo.
-- It is time for concerted action to share the burden of
helping these countries. I believe our two countries, other
OECD countries, the Gulf states and other major
beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam should
work together to provide economic assistance.
-- We have developed some ideas over the past week on the needs
of specific countries and how these might be met. I would
like to send Nick Brady to discuss these issues with you
early next week. I am also asking Francois Mitterrand to
receive Nick.
-- I plan to send Secretary Baker to Rome to discuss these
ideas with Giulio Andreotti in his EC capacity as well as to
Brussels to see Jacques Delors.
-- I have also asked him to go to Bonn to talk to Helmut Kohl
about economic support, in view of Germany's economic
position and inability to play a military role in the Gulf.
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER KAIFU
Dear Toshiki:
L very much appreciated the opportunity to talk with you
last Wednesday
twice yesterday and be personally briefed on your very positive
initial assistance proposals for dealing with the crisis in the
Persian Gulf. Japan's efforts, combined with those of other
countries, clearly demonstrate that the world is united in its
determination to turn back Saddam Hussein.
If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam
Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait.
It is a question of standing firm against aggression and
protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue
here is the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and
future generations.
The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do
this willingly because essential democratic values and economic
freedoms are threatened. As I mentioned to you over the
telephone, we sincerely appreciate your assistance in sharing the
burden of the multinational force deployment. In the near term,
your help with certain kinds of materiel, transport and
construction is very useful.
DECLASSIFIED
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2
While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices.
The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing
daily. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are
particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic
ties.
In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to
democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil
prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies.
Other countries like the Philippines, Morocco, Pakistan and India
also have been hard hit.
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
Since we talked, I have had further discussions with my
senior advisers some ideas on the needs of specific countries,
our requirements for helping with the defense burden and how
these might be met. I would like to send Secretary Brady,
accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these
ideas with you.
As we agreed in our calls, it is time for concerted action
to share the responsibility of helping these countries. I
believe our countries, the European Community, other OECD
countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our
resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide
economic assistance.
SECRET
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3
I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had
a chance to meet with Secretary Brady.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Toshiki Kaifu
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KOREAN PRESIDENT ROH
Dear Mr. President:
I want to share with you my assessment of the situation in
the Gulf region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries
most affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is
demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the
U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions
can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam
Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait.
It is a question of standing firm against aggression and of
protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue is
the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and future
generations.
The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do
this willingly because essential democractic values and economic
freedoms are threatened. However, we need assistance in
supporting the military deployment. We particularly need help on
certain kinds of materiel and transport.
I appreciate your contributions thus far and would like to
discuss additional assistance which Korea may be able to provide.
While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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2
costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices.
The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily.
The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are
particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic
ties.
In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to
democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil
prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies.
Other countries like Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India
have been particularly hard hit.
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific
countries, our requirements to help with the defense burden and
how these might be met, and I would like to send Secretary Brady,
accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these
ideas with you.
It is time for concerted action to share the responsibility
of helping these countries. I believe our countries, OECD
countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our
resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide
economic assistance.
I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had
a chance to meet with Secretary Brady.
Sincerely,
SECRET
SECRET
3
His Excellency
Roh Tae Woo
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI
Dear Giulio:
I want to follow up on our recent telephone conversation by
sharing with you my assessment of the situation in the Gulf
region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most
affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is
demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the
U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions
can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam
Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait.
It is a question of standing firm against aggression and
protecting the economic security of the West.
The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do
this willingly because essential democratic values and economic
freedoms are threatened. However, we will be seeking assistance
in supporting the military deployment. We particularly need help
on certain kinds of materiel and transport. My representatives
at NATO have already provided our allies with information on the
most urgent requirements.
While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
DECLASSIFIED
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costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices.
Both collectively and through individual efforts, the EC is
providing urgently needed food, medical, and other humanitarian
assistance to front-line states. I am gratified that the EC is
also actively considering assistance to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and
other countries.
The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily.
The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are
particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic
ties.
In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to
democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil
prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies.
Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and
India also have been hard hit.
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific
countries and how these might be met. I outlined some of these
ideas in my press conference today. I would also like to send
Jim Baker, accompanied by senior officials, early next week to
discuss these ideas with you in your capacity as EC President. I
have also asked him to meet with Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors.
In addition, I have asked Francois Mitterrand and Margaret
Thatcher to meet with Nick Brady.
SECRET
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3
I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had
a chance to meet with Secretary Baker.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Giulio Andreotti
President of the Council of Ministers
of the Italian Republic
Rome
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO EC COMMMISSION PRESIDENT DELORS
Dear Jacques:
I want to share with you my assessment of the situation in
the Gulf region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries
most affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Overall, I believe we are in good shape for now. The world
is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the
U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions
can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam
Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait.
It is a question of standing firm against aggression and
protecting the economic security the West.
While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices.
Both collectively and through individual efforts, the EC is
providing urgently needed food, medical, and other humanitarian
assistance to front-line states. I am gratified that the EC is
also actively considering assistance to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and
other countries.
The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily.
The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are
particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic
ties.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
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2
In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to
democracy and free markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in
oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil
supplies. Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines,
Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific
countries and how these might be met, and I outlined some of
these in my press conference today. I would like to send
Secretary Baker, accompanied by senior officials, early next week
to discuss these ideas with you. [I I have also asked him to meet
?
with Giulio Andreotti in his capacity as EC President
J
I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had
a chance to meet with Secretary Baker.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Jacques Delors
President of the Commission
of the European Communities
Brussels
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
Your Majesty:
In the days since we met at Kennebunkport, the international
community has strengthened its unified position against Iraq's
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Forces of twenty-two nations
will soon be on the ground or at sea in the region, a remarkable
display of international, including Arab and Islamic, solidarity.
Sanctions are being implemented, with excellent compliance, and
there is additional United Nations support for measures to
enforce them if necessary. Iraq has further isolated itself with
its seizure of innocent people of many nationalities as hostages.
I have thought a lot about Jordan and its special situation,
particularly in light of your commitment to observe the sanctions
resolution. We would like to see the fullest possible compliance
with sanctions by Jordan, in conformity with the international
community's decisions and practice. At the same time, I realize
that the costs for Jordan would be severe unless redressed by
external help. Your Majesty, we have some ideas about what might
be done to enhance Jordan's ability to make these economic
readjustments. I have asked
to discuss our proposals
with you. In the spirit of our friendship, I hope you will be as
candid with him as you always have been with me, and that you
will permit him to be equally open. It is my belief that very
private U.S.-Jordaniar consultation is essential, SO that we may
reach understandings that can be translated into specific
actions.
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We agree, Your Majesty, that a peaceful resolution of this crisis
can only be attained if everyone meets his responsibilities and
shoulders part of the burden. You were eloquent in explaining
Jordan's search for a peaceful resolution, and I was impressed by
your sense of duty. As you know, I have been skeptical of the
possibilities with Iraq, but I sincerely hope for success in
opening the avenue of a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
that we all seek.
With best regards,
His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan
Amman
SECRET
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. President:
I would like to share with you my assessment of the
situation in the Gulf region since my last letter of August 20,
and to inform you of my thinking on how we might help those
countries most affected by the imposition of U.N. sanctions due
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
As I noted in my last letter, I am very gratified by the
constructive position you and your government have taken in
helping to marshall international support for the U.N.
resolutions designed to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait,
agree to the return of the legally constituted Kuwaiti
government, and release all foreign hostages. Thanks in large
part to your own consistent support for these objectives, I
believe we are in good shape.
We have demonstrated at the UN and through the efforts of
the multinational force that the world is united on this issue.
The image of our two nations standing together has sent a
powerful message that the U.S. and USSR will resist unlawful
aggression.
Our task now is to make sure that the U.N. -mandated
sanctions are strictly enforced by all countries. Again, we have
been pleased by your government's public commitment to the
sanctions and prompt efforts to cut off Soviet trade with Iraq.
We will need to consult closely in the weeks ahead to make sure
that the effect of the sanctions begins to be felt by Sadaam
Hussein.
DECLASSIFIED
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In that spirit, while we have no doubt about your commitment
to comply with the sanctions, we have seen reports of possible
slippage on the part of some of your government agencies. We
will be providing further details to your government on this
issue on a confidential and constructive basis.
While we have every reason to believe that the U.N.
sanctions will continue to be widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices. Indeed, the economic costs of the crisis are
increasing daily.
In particular, I believe that Eastern Europe's transition to
stable, free market economies is threatened specifically by the
sharp rise in oil prices. Given the USSR's historical trade and
energy ties with Eastern Europe, any effort you could make to
ensure the delivery of contracted levels of oil to those
countries and to take into account Eastern European difficulties
as you make the transition to hard currency trade, would be most
helpful. I am well aware of the costs and difficulties
associated with your own economic reform efforts, but I believe
that such a step is essential in helping the Eastern Europeans
through this crisis.
I wanted you to know that, during the coming week, I will be
sending representatives to selected countries that are in a
position to help those developing countries which are most
affected by these economic dislocations, such as Turkey, Egypt,
SECRET
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3
Jordan, Morocco, the Philippines, India and Pakistan. We will
also be seeking support for Eastern Europe.
I will keep you informed of the results of these
discussions, and Jim Baker will discuss this matter in full with
Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow during the second week in
September.
I would be most interested in your own views on these
issues, and look forward to continued and fruitful cooperation
between our two countries.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10m. Draft
Draft Message to Taiwan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Message
pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
By MM
on 3/20/2023
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]
Date Closed:
5/26/2009
OA/ID Number:
91143-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0404-MR(509.12)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 6/9/2016
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LID 509.12 LIBRARY
DRAFT MESSAGE TO TAIWAN
Communication to Mr. Scott Hallford, Acting Director of the
American Institute in Taiwan
Message: Please convey the following oral message from the
President to President Lee Teng-Hui. A non-paper with the text
of the oral message should be left with Lee. The message is
classified "Secret." Its contents should not be made public.
BEGIN TEXT: "Dear President Lee, as you know, there are
international efforts underway to demonstrate that the world is
united in its determination to turn back Saddam Hussein.
If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to
review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam
Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait.
It is a question of standing firm against aggression and
protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue
here is the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and
future generations.
The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi
aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do
this willingly because essential democratic values and economic
freedoms are threatened. We need substantial assistance in
sharing the burden of our military deployment. In the near term,
we particularly are interested in help with certain kinds of
materiel, transport and construction.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2010-0404-MR
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2
While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the
invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:
costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and
higher oil prices.
The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing
daily. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are
particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic
ties.
In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to
democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil
prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies.
Other countries like the Philippines, Morocco, Pakistan and India
also have been hard hit.
Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do
not get some economic assistance.
I have discussed with my senior advisers some ideas on the
needs of specific countries, our requirements for helping with
3.3(b)(6)
the defense burden and how these might be met.
Sincerely,
George Bush" END TEXT
If Lee raises his July 3 letter to President Bush, you
should say we are giving it careful study.
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Brant:
the package should be
complete except that the
message to Jordan does
not name the leader
of the Presidented mission
Tem
SECRET
6901
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 30, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL D
RICHARD HAASS w/-
FROM:
ERIC MELBY LBY[U
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan
At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, transmitting
talking points and messages to various heads of state and
government and EC Commission President Delors as the initial step
in implementation of our economic action plan for the Persian
Gulf crisis. The talking points and messages, which have been
coordinated with State, Treasury and DOD, make specific reference
to two missions headed by Secretaries Baker and Brady
respectively.
Secretary Baker has not yet cleared the proposed letter to
Gorbachev. Larry Eagleburger believes the first paragraph on
page 2 of the letter should be deleted and that we should raise
this point separately with the Soviets.
W for
Concurrences by: Adrian/Basora, Peter Watson
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A
Talking Points for Calls to King Fahd, the Amir of
Kuwait, President Zayyid, and Chancellor Kohl
Tab B
Talking Points for Calls to President Mitterrand
and Prime Minister Thatcher
Tab C
Messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh,
Prime Minister Andreotti, EC Commission President
Delors
Tab D
Message to King Hussein
Tab E
Message to President Gorbachev
Tab F
Message to Taiwan
DECLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9006911
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 16
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: DYKE
DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90
MILLER
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
REFUGEES
2.
IRAQ
KUWAIT
JORDAN
UN
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS REFUGEE UPDATE
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DYKE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DYKE
NSC CHRON
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRLG
CLOSED BY: NSRLG
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
6911
August 30, 1990
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Deputy has Nati Sec Advisor
seen
THROUGH:
DAVID C. MIDLER, MALK JR.
NBD
FROM:
NANCY BEARG DYKE
SUBJECT:
Persian Gulf Crisis Refugee Update
The United States has been actively involved with other nations
and international organizations in responding to the Persian Gulf
refugee situation. At present, there are about 60,000 people,
who have fled Iraq and Kuwait, in Jordan. The international
community has already moved about 120,000 people; primarily, this
has been Egypt moving Egyptians home. The refugee population in
Jordan is predominantly Egyptian, Filipino, Pakistani, Sri
Lankan, and Bangladeshi.
The US has sent $1 million in assistance so far in money, tents,
and water jugs, and we pledged $13 million in food assistance.
We are working with international organizations (the UN Disaster
Relief Organization has the coordinating role) to determine how
best to provide further assistance. Emergency funds are
available, if needed.
Problems to be confronted soon by the international community
are:
--
how to move the foreign nationals, such as Filipinos, who
have to go long distances;
--
people moving in large numbers to new borders, such as
20,000 to Turkey and thousands to Iran.
CC: Haass
Charles
Welch
Popadiuk
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9006934
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 90 11
TO: SITTMANN
CHRON FILE
FROM: BENKO
DOC DATE: 31 AUG 90
BASORA
SOURCE REF:
Zim
KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
TELCON
IRAQ
KUWAIT
JORDAN
HOSTAGES
PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET
SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PM THATCHER ON 31 AUG RE SITUATION IN GULF
ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM #1
DUE DATE: 04 SEP 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BENKO
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BASORA
BENKO
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCop NARA, Dates/26/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRCB
CLOSED BY: NSGAD
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
6934
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CHRON FILE
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff
DATE, TIME
August 31, 1990, 6:46 - 7:03 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Kennebunkport, Maine
The President: Margaret, how have you been? We' re back here in
Kennebunkport. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Just fine, George. I'm going to see
Governor Sununu today. ($)
The President: He had very good talks with Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm going to be seeing King Hussein in
half an hour. ($)
The President: I wanted to share a few thoughts with you. The
sanctions are having good effect. I just hung up with King Fahd.
He says he has reports that people in Iraq are becoming quite
dissatisfied with what Saddam has done. This is also what Ozal
of Turkey told me. I'm a little disappointed with Tunisia and
Libya, although not surprised. We must tighten enforcement of
the sanctions. (S)
But if neither diplomacy or sanctions work, we need to review our
options. I have not changed my thinking on our goals, even
though we keep hearing from some of negotiating proposals that
stop short of the UN mandate. I am worried by talk of elections,
or anything that does not restore the legitimate rulers of
Kuwait. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree totally. Our strategy is the
same as ever. We need to maintain the sanctions and tighten
them, following up with every person or country which breaks
them. That's the weapon we need to get him out. We can't rule
out the military option, but that's way, way ahead. In the
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meantime, we must use the embargo. We couldn't have predicted
two months ago that we'd be where we are now, and we can't
predict where we'll be two months from now. ($)
The President: There's another point I wanted to raise with you.
I hope it doesn't complicate your life. Yesterday the hostages
issue came up at a press conference, and I made the statement
that our policy wouldn't change because of the hostages. This
may be distressful to some of the hostage families, but I wanted
you to know about it. I feel very strongly about it. It's
important to get that message to Saddam Husayn. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it's very important. There should
be no negotiations. The UN has said what must be done. Saddam
Husayn must get out. We must not fall into the trap of
negotiations. ($)
The President: I believe Perez de Cuellar has the same views.
Do you think so?
Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes I do. Although some of his staff
has been saying to him that Saddam has released women and
children and therefore there should be a conciliatory gesture on
our side. They may be trying to soften him up. ($)
George, I want to tell you about some intelligence I've got.
There is a ship coming down the Gulf tomorrow, the Hittin. ($)
The President: We have to stop this ship if it comes from Iraq.
($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it has to be stopped. ($)
The President: What did you say the name of the ship was? ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: The Hittin, H-I-T-T-I-N. It's loading
up at the moment, loading up right now. We've got from the UN
what we need to stop it. ($)
The President: This is very interesting. I'll tell Cheney or
Scowcroft. (S)
I want to shift to King Hussein. He came here, and was very
distraught -- caught. I believe he feels trapped. He called me
with what he thought was good news, that is, the release of the
women and children. Well, it was promised, but it hasn't
happened in four days now. I don't trust Saddam Husayn. King
Hussein asked me to kind of cool it and reciprocate. But I feel
that when a hostage is released and people ask "what are you
going to do to show good faith?" that it's impossible -- when
they undo one-third or one-fourth or one-seventh of what they
should never have done. I'm afraid the Gulf states, Mubarak and
others, are very upset with Hussein. (S)
Prime Minister Thatcher: This wrong must be righted. ($)
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3
The President: We can't have any of these arguments about age-
old decisions about Kuwait. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Absolutely. ($)
The President: Margaret, I wanted to talk about the announcement
I made yesterday. Would you be willing to talk to Nick Brady?
We're trying to get a coordinated approach to economic
assistance. I spoke to Kohl yesterday. I saw the statement that
you made up in Finland, which we all appreciated. Britain has
already responded, but we'd like to explain how we want to
coordinate paying for transport and other things. I don't want
this mission to have the appearance that we're coming hat in hand
to beg. The mission is for coordination and consultation. I'd
appreciate it if you could see Brady. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, of course. It's important to
coordinate aid to those states which are suffering. Others can
contribute to support the military effort, for example, Saudi
Arabia. But the Germans have said they are quite willing to
contribute heavily financially. ($)
The President: That's good news. The Saudis and the free
Kuwaitis are ready to step up now. The Kuwaitis are back in
control of their financial assets, and have said they' 11 help.
($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: I'd be delighted to see Nick. This
afternoon I will tell Governor Sununu about my meeting with King
Hussein. Saddam Husayn will be the loser. ($)
The President: Thanks very much. We need to think about how we
get this off dead center if there is no provocation, or if the
sanctions don't hurt a lot. We can't do anything now; all our
forces are not in place yet. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: It won't be difficult. But if it goes
on for a long time, we'll have to look at the military options.
($)
You know, George, I'll be in the States at the end of September
in New York for the Children's meeting. I could stop in at
Washington then if it was needed. ($)
The President: That's a must. Anthony can give us the details.
I'm participating in the Children's event, although I'm not sure
what it will achieve -- but it will be a good way to get some
talks in. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Our strategy is absolutely right. We
must stick together. ($)
The President: Tell Governor Sununu that the President said
to tell you, privately, a very sensitive message. I don't want
to get into it over the phone now, but get him off in a corner
and ask him to tell you in person. ($)
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Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, I will. ($)
The President: All right. King Hussein is a long time friend
but he's under a lot of pressure now. He promised to enforce the
UN embargo but said he needed a clarification of the humanitarian
clause. I'm afraid he hasn't done it yet. ($)
Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, he needs to have things made quite
clear to him. I'll talk to him about it and make certain he
understands it. ($)
The President: I'm sure you will. Thanks so much. (U)
Prime Minister Thatcher: God bless. Thanks for phoning. (U)
End of conversation-
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6934
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 31, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
THROUGH:
ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB
FROM:
STEPHEN E. BENKO
SUBJECT:
Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the
United Kingdom
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the
President and Prime Minister Thatcher on August 31, 1990.
Concurrence by: Richard Haass
RECOMMENDATIONS
That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.
Approve KJH/n
Disapprove
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to State on an "Eyes Only" basis for
insertion in Secretary Brady's briefing book.
Approve
Disapprove KJH/n
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to State
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
SECRET-
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
AS AMENDED
a
7/28/03