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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
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366551978
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
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91146-007
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
Desert Shield and Desert Storm Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91146
Folder ID Number:
91146-007
Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
6
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Cable
Re: Bahraini Amir's Warm Message to President Bush (3 pp.)
2/1/91
(1)
&
02a. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
Fahd (2 pp.)
02b. Telcon
Re: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)
2/2/91
(b) (1)
02c. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King
n.d.
(1)
$
Fahd (2 pp.)
02d. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King
n.d.
(1)
Fahd (2 pp.)
02e. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Qatari
n.d.
(1)
Amir Khalifa (2 pp.)
02f. Telcon
Re: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar (3 pp.)
2/2/91
(1)
/
02g. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with
n.d.
&
President Mubarak (2 pp.)
02h. Telcon
Re: President's Call to the Egyptian President (3 pp.)
2/2/91
(b)(1)
$
02i. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
Minister Nawaz Sharif (2 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1220
OA/ID Number:
91146-007
Date Closed:
6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
02j. Telcon
Re: Presidential Call to the Prime Minister of Pakistan (4 pp.)
2/2/91
(b)(1)
$
03a. Memo
Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft
2/4/91
(b) (1)
Re: SPR Bids (1 pp.)
03b. Memo
James D. Watkins to John H. Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, Nicholas
1/29/91
(b)(1)
Brady
Re: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Drawdown (1 pp.)
03c. Memo
James D. Watkins to POTUS
1/29/91
(b)(1)
Re: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Drawdown (2 pp.)
03d. Message
Re: Presidential Message to Kaifu (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03e. Message
Re: Presidential Message to Kohl (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03f. Message
Re: Presidential Message to Kaifu (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03g. Message
Re: Presidential Message to Kohl (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b) (1)
04a. Coversheet
Sittmann to Roy, J and Dubia, J
1/9/91
(b)(1)
Re: Classified Subject (1 pp.)
04b. Distribution
Re: National Security Council The White House (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
List
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1220
OA/ID Number:
91146-007
Date Closed:
6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04c. Distribution
Log 9100206 (1 pp.)
2/4/91
(b)(1)
Receipt
04d. Memo
William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy and Colonel John A.
2/4/91
(b)(1)
Dubia
Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)
04e. Memo
Don Piling to Brent Scowcroft
1/10/91
(b)(1)
Re: [Classified Subject] (2 pp.)
04f. Memo
James D. Watkins to Brent Scowcroft
1/9/91
(b)(1)
Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1220
OA/ID Number:
91146-007
Date Closed:
6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONFIDENTIAL-
RECORD ID: 9100836
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 01 FEB 91 16
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: KHALIFA
DOC DATE: 01 FEB 91
2
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: BAHRAIN
HS
IRAQ
KUWAIT
DESERT STORM
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM AMIR OF BAHRAIN KHALIFA RE SUPPORT FOR DESERT STORM
ACTION: OBE PER CHARLES
DUE DATE: 01 FEB 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE
LOGREF: 9100854 9100864
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09
COMMENTS: *** URGENT - PRES REPLY DUE COB TONIGHT ***
*** CY HAS BEEN WASHFAXED TO STATE ***
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
0836
IMMEDIATE
CONF IDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
CHRON FILE
PAGE 01 OF 93
PRES NOTED SUMMARY
PRT BOOK
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS CONF + DENTIAL DTG 011133Z FEB 91
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4330
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6966
C 0 D E A t MANAMA 00518
DEPARTMENT FOR AS KELLY AND NEA/ARP
USIA FOR AMBASSADOR RUGH
E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, BA, US, 1Z
SUBJECT: TFKU01: BAHRAINI AMIR'S WARM MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: MANAMA 38 $
1. (U) THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN, HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH
ISA BIN SULMAN AL-KHALIFA, ARRIVED BACK IN BAHRAIN
ON JANUARY 29, AFTER A THREE-MONTH ABSENCE, MOSTLY
IN THE CLEVELAND CLINIC WHERE HE UNDERWENT HEART
SURGERY AND REHABILITATION.
2. (U) IN ORDER NOT TO PLACE UNDUE STRAIN ON THE
AMIR, SINCE HIS RETURN HIS DOCTORS HAVE NOT
PERMITTED HIM TO RESUME HIS REGULAR OPEN MAJILIS.
THUS. THIS FRIDAY (1 FEBRUARY), TO THE
DISAPPOINTMENT OF MANY OF HIS SUBJECTS, THE MAJILIS
WAS NOT HELD (AND APPARENTLY WILL NOT TAKE PLACE FOR
THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS), THOUGH HUNDREDS GATHERED AT
HIS PALACE IN RIFAA IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD.
3. (U) HOWEVER, THE AMIR MET PRIVATELY WITH THE
AMBASSADOR THIS FRIDAY MORNING, AND WARMLY ASKED
THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE BE SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH.
"CHARLES", HE SAID, "I WANT YOU TO EXPRESS DIRECTLY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0882-MR MR
Es 8/18/15
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 03
MY VERY WARMEST PERSONAL THANKS AND RESPECTS TO
PRESIDENT BUSH FOR
A. HIS GREAT COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP OF THIS
COALITION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TYRANT SADDAM.
AND FOR THE FINE BRAVE U S. FORCES THAT ARE HELPING
US HERE
B. THE EXTENDED AND WARM TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO THE AMIR DURING THE LATTER'S STAY IN
THE USA:
C. "THE FINE. ABLE U.S. DOCTORS IN CLEVELAND. THE
EXCELLENT SECURITY PROVIDED. THE MANY COURTESIES
EXTENDED BY EVERYONE. IT WAS PERFECT. AND,
D. "HIS SENDING YOU HERE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR. YOUR
PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING, AS REFLECTED IN
YOUR SENSITIVE FEELINGS FOR OUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS.
YOUR ABLE DEVOTION TO YOUR DUTIES ON BEHALF OF THE
U.S., BAHRAIN AND OUR ALLIES HAS BEEN PERFECT-- AND
REFLECTED IN ALL FIELDS: MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL. AS I'VE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I WANT TO
KEEP YOU HERE ALWAYS." -
4. (U) I LEAVE IT TO THE. DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE
HOW AND IN WHAT FORM THIS WARM AND SINCERELY-FELT
MESSAGE SHOULD BE RELAYED TO PRESIDENT BUSH, AND
OTHERWISE UTILIZED. CERTAINLY THE CONTENT IS
HEARTFELT. THE AMIR, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE
OF BAHRAIN (A SMALL BUT VERY STRATEGICALLY PLACED
FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE U.S.) ARE TRULY APPRECIATIVE
AND THANKFUL FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S GREAT LEADERSHIP
AND HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS FOR BAHRAIN.
5. (U) I WOULD ADD THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGE HAS EVOKED MANY SPONTANEOUS
ACCOLADES FROM BAHRAINIS, FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND
BUSINESS/INDUSTRIAL LEADERS. OUR STOCK HERE IN
BAHRAIN MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN IT IS TODAY.
6. (&) MAY I AGAIN SUGGEST THAT WE NOT LET THIS
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 03
AUSPICIOUS MOMENT PASS AS WE LOOK TO "FUTURE
ARRANGEMENTS SEE MANAMA 380 AND REFS CITED
THEREIN FOR THIS STRATEGICALLY VITAL CORNER OF THE
GLOBE
HOSTLER
BT
=0518
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9100864
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 91 11
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 02 FEB 91
Jo
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: EGYPT
QATAR
PAKISTAN
SAUDI ARABIA
TELCALL
TELCON
PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI
KHALIFA
SHARIF, NAWAZ
FAHD
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS & DRAFTS OF TELCONS RE PRES MUBARAK / AMIR KHALIFA /
PM SHARIF / KING FAHD ON 2 FEB
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES
DUE DATE: 07 FEB 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
CHARLES
NEIL
O'LEARY
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Date 6/30/09
COMMENTS: ORIGINAL COVER MEMO TO PRES WAS SHREDDED BY SIT ROOM
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSLMS
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
0864
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
haspeen
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
FEBA 310 34
West Wing Desk
2
R
NSC Secretariat
3
N/R
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
2/2/91
WEST WING DESK:
Attached package sent to the President
at Camp David -- Talking Points for
Phone Calls to PM of Pakistan; Amir of
Qatar; President Mubarak of Egypt;
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.
Cover note to President signed by
General Scowcroft was shredded (in error)
by Sit Rm after transmission of document.
Wilma
attached for files
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/2/91
Brent,
APNSA Has Seen
attached are 4 rough
drafts of the telephone
call Memcons, a message
(w/ a from note) Mr from King Hussin
to the Ding President,
and a pro posed draft
message to the Pak
PM as we discussed
cheers!
Sandy
SECRET
CHRON FILE
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD
--
I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding
success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering
some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how
proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have
called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
--
Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule.
This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early
failed miserably. I guess "he didn't believe us when we said
we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in
all its phases.
--
I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate --
with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he
is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is
supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
--
The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing
to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from
Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they
don't want to go back!
--
I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and
President Mubarak's understanding of the joint statement
we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0882-MR
ES 8/18/15
SECRET
2
Iraqi withdrawal. The wording of the statement led to
speculation here of a change of our position. There was
absolutely no change in our conditions for Iraqi withdrawal
and I think that is absolutely clear now. There can be no
daylight in our position. The coalition must remain solid.
--
I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in
Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to
tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and
troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition
at home. But we are concerned about statements by General
Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the
coalition's position on Iráq. This hasn't helped his
political position, and is creating some security problems
for our people in Pakistan.
--
As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off
because of problems with this year's nuclear certification.
But we are working with them to try to get things back on
track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had
longstanding ties. How do you view things there?
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia
PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Sandra Charles
Shukran Kamal, interpreter
DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 3:05-3:35, Camp
David
The President: Hello, your Majesty. How are you?
King Fahd: Hou are you? I am glad to speak to you.
The President: Well, it's nice to talk to you. I just
wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success
in retaking Khafji and thank your forces for helping to
recover some of the marines who were trapped there. We are
really grateful.
Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule.
This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early
failed miserably. I also placed a call to thank the Amir of
Qatar. His forces were involved too. They are performing
quite well.
Another point, I know you understood but on the
Baker/Bessmerytnykh communique, there is no change in our
position. I wanted to tell you that personally. We are not
interested in a ceasefore or to give him a chance to regroup.
There won't be any concessions to Saddam. After what he has
done to our POWs, launching SCUDs at your people and those in
Israel, and now evironmental terrorism he must pay for that
under resolution 674. There can be no compromise and there
is no interest in a ceasefire that will make a concession to
him. But I am anxious to know how you think things are
going.
King Fahd: First of all, thank you for your call and I want
to congratulate you for the success in retaking Khafji. I
also want to thank you Mr. President for what the US Marines
did and the services rendered to Saudi and Qatari forces.
The way we see it we don't think there are varied armies on
the front -- we have one united army.
The President: Good, that's right.
King Fahd: I heard a statement you made Mr President that
there will be no hesitation in the US position, and no
cessation of the action until this matter is resolved -- and
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
0/71/2
that means when Kuwait is restored to its preaggression state
and Saddam has returned where he is supposed to be. I would
like to affirm my beliefe the army on the front has arranged
its operations in a proper manner so that Saddam cannot take
any action. Actually, I believe what happened will make this
area quiet over the next one hundred years.
The President: I hope so. It is our ambition for the Gulf
area too. Your Majesty, what are you hearing inside iraq?
King Fahd: The news we are receiving from inside Iraq is
that the people are unhappy, the army is dissatisified. But
no one talks to Saddam. The only solution if there is
dissatisfaction expressed to him is to be killed. This is
what was told to us by the Iraqi offficers captured with the
soldiers. They told us they don't want to be in the
fighting, but they told us the troops behind us keeping
pushing us so we would fight.
I believe that the end of the revolutionary guard is staring
to happen as a result of the bombing. This is an important
factor for demoralizing the rest of the army and making them
surrender.
The President: I agree with that.
King Fahd: At the same time I also am pleased Mr President
that prime targets are being hit by bombs from Jordan to
Kuwait borders and destroyed. We know this is the places
where missiles are being launched and where binary gases are
made.
The President: The Air Forces are doing a good job -- that's
air forces plural. Could I raise one last question? I
called Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. It was the first
time I talked to him. I thanked him for his steadfast
support despite tough opposition at home. But we are
concerned about statements by General Bega and statements by
some of the Afghan Resistance who oppose your and our
position on Iraq. Beg's statements that inflame the
opposition concern me because we worry about the safety of
American citizens in Pakistan. The Prime Minister was quite
reassuring about managing the dissent and staying with us. I
was just wondering if the situation worries you or if it is
under control.
King Fahd: I spoke at length with the Prime Minister when he
was here three days ago. We discussed this matter clearly.
I asked him that there be no opposition to our position and
to the United states. He promised he would take the
necessary measures to make sure that happens. He asked me to
send an envoy and he will go tomorrow. We also will extend
an invitation to Beg to visit here in Saudi Arabia.
The President: That is all very encouraging. I must say he
sounded confident he could weather the crticism and stay with
us.
King Fahd: This is what the Prime Minister told me also. He
told me he was able to overcome this unexpected problem and
stay the course. I have known him a long time and he is a
strong man. I am willing to help him in a variety of ways
and we are.
The President: Thank you, unless there was something else.
I wanted to call to congratulate you on the heroism of your
troops. I wish you well.
King Fahd: Thank you. God willing, you will be hearing good
news about Pakistan next week.
The President: Well, that's good. Call me if you have nay
problems, but I think things are going well.
King Fahd: Thank you Mr. President for this call. It is
much appreciated.
The President: Good-bye and my respects.
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD
--
I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding
success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering
some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how
proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have
called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
--
Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule.
This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early
failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we said
we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in
all its phases.
-- I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate --
with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he
is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is
supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
--
The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing
to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from
Kuwait. We are treating his POWs SO well, I understand they
don't want to go back!
I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and
President Mubarak's understanding of the joint statement
we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0882-MR
Es
118/15
SECRET
2
Iraqi withdrawal. The wording of the statement led to
speculation here of a change of our position. There was
absolutely no change in our conditions for Iraqi withdrawal
and I think that is absolutely clear now. There can be no
daylight in our position. The coalition must remain solid.
--
I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in
Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to
tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and
troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition
at home. But we are concerned about statements by General
Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the
coalition's position on Iraq. This hasn't helped his
political position, and is creating some security problems
for our people in Pakistan.
As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off
because of problems with this year's nuclear certification!
But we are working with them to try to get things back on
track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had
longstanding ties. How do you view things there?
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD
--
I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding
success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering
some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how
proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have
called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
--
Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule.
This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early
failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we said
we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in
all its phases.
--
I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate --
with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he
is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is
supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
--
The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing
to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from
Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they
don't want to go back!
--
I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and
President Mubarak's understanding statement, eahoing the joint statement
we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2010
2010-0882-MR
Declassify on: OADR
Es 8/18/15
SECRET
2
The wording of The statement led to There specerlation was
here of a change of our position.
absolutely no change pear withdrawal carulitions
Iraqi withdrawal. ^ There can be no daylight in our position. and
I truck that is
The coalition must remain solid.
absolutely clear
was
I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in
Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to
tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and
troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition
at home. But we are concerned about statements by General
Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the
coalition's position on Iraq. This hasn't helped his
political position, and is creating some security problems
for our people in Pakistan.
As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off
because of problems with this year's nuclear certification.
But we are working with them to try to get things back on
track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had
longstanding ties. How do you view things there?
SECRET
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
OATARI AMIR KHALIFA
I am calling to congratulate you on the outstanding success
of your forces in helping to retake Khafji, and in
recovering some of our marines who were trapped there. I
know how proud you must be of your ground forces, as well as
your pilots. I also have called/am calling King Fahd.
Things are going very well, in fact a lot better than we
initially thought. We are particularly pleased that the
casualties have been so low, even in this ground attack. We
are starting to get better bomb damage assessments and it
looks like we are achieving our objectives as planned.
This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early
has failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we
said we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war --
in all its phases.
--
I am beginning to think he is getting more desperate --
creating these oil slicks, setting the oil wells on fire,
parading POWs, and firing SCUDS at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
And now he is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people
he is supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
--
The real tragedy, your Highness, is the harm he is
continuing to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to
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withdraw from Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I
understand they don't want to go back!
--
Our objectives have not changed. As we and the Soviets just
declared in a joint statement during their Foreign
Minister's visit, we want an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal
from all of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. So long as
the coalition stays together, I believe we won't be long in
achieving our goals. I would appreciate your assessment on
Saddam's staying power, your Highness.
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F 0429-F
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
8/21/2009 MM
SUBJECT: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar
PARTICIPANTS: the President
Amir Khalifa
Sandra Charles, NSC Notetaker
Shukran Kamal, interpreter
DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 2:00-2:20 pm; Camp
David
The President: Hello, how are you sir?
Amir Khalifa: Well, thank God.
The President: I am calling first to congratulate you on the
wonderful success of your forces in helping to retake Khafji,
and in helping to save some of our marines who were trapped
there. I know you must be very proud of your ground forces,
as well as your pilots. I also am going to call King Fahd
and congratulate him too. I haven't talked to him yet.
That was one purpose for calling. I think things are going
very well, but I am anxious to get your judgement on that.
Amir Khalifa: First of all Mr President, I appreciate your
call, and I appreicte the position the US has taken on the
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Regarding what the Qatari Air
Force did, Qatar adheres firmly to the UN resolutions, those
for defending Saudi territory and those for the liberation of
Kuwait.
The President: We weresmart to not permit Saddam to tell us
when to start the ground war. He was thinking he could draw
us in early and get us to start when we weren't ready. I am
confident when if necessary a ground offensive is required
our allied forces will do very, very well. And I don't think
it will take long. I must admit, Your Majesty, I have
trouble understaind Saddam and anyone doing what he is doing
to the POWs, and innocent civilians with SCUD missiles, and
environmental terrorism. He is hard to predict. But it is
all bad.
Your Majesty, what is your view on things in Iraq and what do
you think Saddam will try to do next?
Amir Khalifa: Acutually Mr. President, the US position from
the begining of the crisis, the US position has been wise and
smart. But my own evaluation on the character of Saddam is
that he doesn't know he is a human, because a human being
would know how to act. He doesn't. He always said what was
important was the survival of the Ba'ath party even at the
expense of all of Iraq.
The latest information I received -- I got it today from
Syria and I am not certain of its accuracy -- is that the
situation in Iraq is critical. Saddam doesn't trust anyone.
His son is guarding him. When he moves, he is surrounded by
4-5 people who look like him to deceive bystanders and
observers. Actually all the news from inside Baghdad is very
bad. We also believe his relations with some religious
factions are poor. There was a disagreement between them
based on his request that his picture be hung in the mosques,
and when they refused, some of them were executed.
The President: He is a bad man. Your Majesty, I think the
thing for us to do is not to compromise or agree to a
ceasefire, hoping he will do what he should have done long
ago. We should stay with our gameplan. We don't seek the
destruction of Iraq. But there should be no concessions, no
compromises in any way. I am confident we will win the war.
I am confident he will be made to comply with every
resolution including the one on reparations, 674. He must be
held responsible for the environomental damage and to the
other claims against him.
Amir Khalifa: Actually, Mr President, Saddam is worse than
just a bad man. That is why any compromise would not only
hurt this area of the Gulf but would hurt the whole world if
he stays in power. On allied actions targetting civilians, I
understand that civilians are not being targetted. They can
be spared what they are going through if their President
would stop the bombing.
The President: That is a true and wise statement. We will
keep our course. I am proud we are shoulder to shoulder with
your country and your warriors, ground and air. I hope you
will congratulate your commanders for me.
My last point, there has been some confusion about the
statement by Secretary Baker and Bessmerytnykh of the Soviet
Union. I want to tell you there is nothing new in that.
Some have intepreted this as our interest in a ceasefire or
pause. No -- we will not do that and certainly not without
discussion with our coalition partners. There is no interest
on my part to stop to make concessions, to stop to see if
Saddam is ready to do what he should have long ago.
Amir Khalifa: Mr. President, I have no doubt about US
policy, and no doubt about its serious intent. Not stopping
Saddam Hussein would have serious repercussions for the whole
world.
The President: Thank you again, and again thanks to your
young men. I am pround we are together to overcome this evil
in the Gulf. Thank you again.
Amir Khalifa: I wish to thank you for your gracious remarks
and sentiments toward our young men. I hope your next call
will come after the liberation of Kuwait, and I hope it will
come soon.
The President: I hope so too. It was good to talk to you.
Amir Khalifa: Thank you. I was pleased to talk with you.
God bless you and your troops. Good-bye.
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK
--
Hosni, I wanted to call to touch base and share some
thoughts with my close friend.
--
I've just spent Friday going around to several of our
military bases visiting the families of our troops in the
Gulf.
--
Morale here is very, very strong. America continues to be
united and determined. I must say, I was truly touched and
impressed by what I saw and heard from the families of our
soldiers.
--
I had a good chat with Esmat Abd el-Meguid. As he has
probably told you, he and Jim Baker are doing some good work
on the issue of an IMF agreement.
--
The military effort is going very well, all according to
plan. The air campaign will go on as long as necessary. We
will not agree to any pauses. The only way Saddam can stop
the fighting is to leave Kuwait and do so rapidly,
massively, and convincingly.
--
Meguid reported that things are holding up in Egypt. How is
public opinion?
--
Andreotti and Mitterrand are very worried about the Maghreb;
so am I. Is there anything you believe we could or should
do that we are not doing?
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--
What do you hear from Syria? I know there is some concern
there about how Israel fits into the whole picture, and I
hope you are giving the Syrians a dose of your usual
realism. Let me know if there is something you think I
should do there.
--
I know there is concern at the popular level about the
destruction of Iraq as a nation and the targetting of
civilians, but I have been saying again and again here that
we are not trying to dismember or destroy the country. We
are also not targetting civilians.
--
Nor are we hitting the religious sites, and I can prove
that. In fact, I may send you some interesting snapshots,
along with someone to give you a comprehensive update, if
you like.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
8/12/2009 MM
SUBJECT: President's Call to the Egyptian President
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Sandra Charles, NSC Notetaker
DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 2:35-2:45 pm; Camp
David
The President: Hosni, how are you?
President Mubarak: How are you, George?
The President: I thought I'd call to touch base at the
end of the week and compare thoughts. I just spent yesterday
going around to several of our military bases visiting with
some of the families of our troops in the Gulf. I was very
impressed. Morale is very strong here. ANd support in the
coutnry is strong. I was touched and impressed by what I
heard from the families. They have no doubt about what their
husbands and fathers are doing.
I also had a good talk with Esmat Meguid. He and Jim are
doing some good work on the IMF agreement. I'm interested in
helping on that. From our end, the military effort is going
well. We will not let Saddam decide the timing of any ground
action. The air campaing will go on as long as necessary.
Another point I wanted to make is to be sure there is no
misunderstanding about the Baker/Bessmerytknkyk statement.
There is no change. We have no interest in a ceasefire,
concessions or a pause, hoping Saddam will do in the future
what he should have done before.
President Mubarak: I saw your tour yesterday on TV. I saw
your reception. It was very warm. I saw it on TV here.
The President: How do you see things?
President Mubarak: Things are going well, very well. I am
touch with our forces every day. Everything is going well.
The President: He made a mistake trying to get us into
ground combat early. Instead he got his equipment and
personnel captured and killed. We will set the timetabel and
not be drawn in until we are ready.
President Mubarak: I have sent a message to our people, to
General Schwarzkopf that we should not slip into a ground war
until we are ready.
The President: When we do I am ready to go all out. It
won't take long unlike what the press says. And it will not
be costly in life despite what the press says. We will
convince Saddam he will not get a stalmate so he can claim
victory like he did with Iran. He will be beat bad.
President Mubarak: I agree. I have the same conception.
The President: That's good because you know the area. We
are on the same wavelength. Apparently, there was some
misunderstanding by some countries about the
Baker/Bessmerytnkyh commuique. Jim insists there was nothing
new in it. I want our coalition partners to know we are not
deviating from our agreed path. If he is alive after the
war, maybe his own people will take care of him.
President Mubarak: We didn't misunderstand at all. In Saudi
Arabia we issued a statement saying the same thing as yours.
Besides he won't agree on withdrawal.
The President: You told me before he wouldn't after
withdrawing from Iran.
President Mubarak: I think things are going well.
The President: I wish his people would throw him out. That
would make it perfect.
President Mubarak: Inshallah.
The President: Well, I thought we should talk once a week to
see if there are any problems to see how things are going.
One other thing, I am worried about the Maghreb and what to
do there if there is anything. There have been more
demonstrations in Tunis and Morocco. So I worry, but I don't
know what we should do.
President Mubarak: In Tunis things will slow down on their
own.
The President: Good, so we'll leave it. I understand there
was a meeting of religious leaders in Egypt or Saudi arabia
and they called for a jihad against Saddam. If there was a
meeting, there was nothing in the paper on it.
President Mubarak: Yes, it was held in Saudi Arabia. The
meetings here and all the conferences are against that. In
Parliament there was a tough speech against Saddam. That
will be good for public opinion here.
The President: Is public opinion in good shape?
President Mubarak: Yes.
The President: Good, well I was just checking in to say
hello. I appreciate our staying in close touch. I am going
to call King Fahd, and I talked with the Amir of Qatar
already, remembering your advice to stay in touch. I am glad
we are together on this.
President Mubarak: If anything arises, I will contact you.
The President: Okay, good-bye.
SECRET
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER NAWAZ SHARIF
--
I am calling to tell you how much we appreciate your
courageous and firm support for the coalition's efforts to
liberate Kuwait, and particularly for the contribution of
Pakistani forces standing side by side with those of 27
other countries in Operation Desert Storm.
--
I know it has not been easy for you to maintain this
position, and I just wanted you to know how grateful we are
that you understand the vital principles our forces are
defending.
--
Let me assure you that our goal remains the complete
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from all of Kuwait and the
restoration of Kuwait's government, as stated in the UN
Security Council resolutions. We do not want Iraq destroyed
or any harm to come to the Iraqi people. This was stated
clearly in the joint statement we and the Soviets issued
here following their Foreign Minister's visit this week.
--
That is why we are making every effort to minimize civilian
casualties and to safeguard religious and cultural sites in
Iraq sometimes at great risk to allied pilots.
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--
Iraqi propaganda has tried to turn this conflict into a war
between Islam and the West; but as you know, this is
patently false, and like Iraq's scud attacks on civilians,
it is an act of desperation.
--
I also wanted to express my sympathy to you and to the
families of the victims of the earthquake. There are enough
natural tragedies in this world that it is truly unfortunate
when man has to create another by going to war.
--
I also was pleased with the recent exchange of formal
instruments of ratification between you and India on your
agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. We
are ready to help you both further improve your bilateral
relations, including with help on confidence building
measures, if you think that would be useful.
SECRET
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AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
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SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Presidential Call to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC
DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 1030-1050; Camp
David
The President: Mr. Prime Minister, hello. How are you?
PM Nawaz: Good Morning. How are you?
The President: Just fine. I am calling, actually this is
a call I should haved made sooner, to tell you how much we
appreciate your courageous and firm support for the
coalition's efforts to liberate Kuwait. I know this has
not been easy for you. I have been following with some
degree of thoroughness the situation in Pakistan. But with
Pakistani forces shoulder-to-shoulder with those of 27
other countries, well, that's a wonderful thing, and I just
wanted to tell you how grateful we are -- something I have
neglected doing before and should have done sooner.
PM Nawaz: I have made a commitment and am convinced we are
doing the right thing. It is based on principle and we
stand with you and the coalition.
The President: I hope you know when we say we want our
people out as soon as this is over, we mean it. And we
don't want Iraq destroyed or harm to come to the people of
Iraq. I keeping saying this even though Saddam Hussein is
saying something else. We are not trying to wipe out Iraq.
We made this clear in our joint statement with the Soviets
when their new Foreign Minister was here. We are trying to
keep down civilian casualties and to safeguard religious
and cultural shrines. Be we are concerned about his
disinformation. I wouldn't be surprised if he damaged them
himself and then blamed the coalition. He has tried to
make this a war between Islam and the West. We are doing
what we can to resist this. I just wanted to tell you this
personally.
(s)
PM Nawaz: I trust you and believe you. I believe we are
taking the right approach. It is my understanding from the
Soviet President that you want Iraq to withdraw and then
you could agree to a ceasefire.
(
The President: If they clearly withdraw. What we don't
want is a ceasefire and then he rebuilds his forces. We
want full implementation of the resolutions. If he stops,
with his armor, and gets out of Kuwait, then we don't
intend to bomb him and continue the war. But that is what
comes first -- he must get out of Kuwait. They won't be
under attack when he does. But I am not saying that there
will be a ceasefire if he says he will withdraw. Then we
would start all over again with the same propaganda as
before. The Soviets understand this, and have clarified
it.
PM Nawaz: Mr. President, then you would not accept a
ceasefire if he says yes he will withdraw and lays down a
timeframe for you to consider, and then this would be the
basis of a ceasefire.
()
The President: We can't stop this until we know he is
substantially on his way out of Kuwait. He has to cross
many bridges getting out. His statements show he is not
interested in getting out. So if he says we want one, just
talking about withdrawal is not good enough. It would be
unacceptable to the coalition. If a withdrawal is going
forward, and it is thorough, and we are monitoring it to
insure it is happeneing and we can go into liberate Kuwait,
and the Kuwaitis can go back, then that is a different
game, a different formula. But just talking without
leaving is not good enough. The coalition and others don't
trust a word he says.
()
PM Nawaz: We have been working on peace efforts.
The President: Are you encouraged? (U)
PM Nawaz: There are people in his camp and the message
from them is they would like to propose to be accepted a
simultaneous withdrawal, which we know is not acceptable to
us or the allies.
The President: No, not at all. There need to be security
provisions, and reparations as called for by UN resolution
674. He is not in a position to try to go out to declare
victory. If he were, we'd face this aggression some other
place at some other time. If he said he was fully
complying, and not just talk about it -- and that would be
clear soon -- but he is not in a position to make
conditions. As I said, our goal is not the destruction of
Iraq, but full compliance with the UN resolutions without
conditions. Anything else is not good enough. And we
don't want US forces there one more day than they have to
be. I mean that. I don't like the prospect of leaving US
troops there. That would be bad. I will be interested if
there is more in your talks with them, but we don't intend
to accept any conditions.
PM Nawaz: We will keep you posted on developments.
The President: I know there is some opposition in your
country. We have some in ours but support is strong. But
watching TV on the demonstrations it is hard to believe.
So Saddam feels the US won't support the president in what
he is doing. He hoped it would have a backlash, but it has
not materialized. He shouldn't get too much comfort from
CNN watching these demonstrations. The polls show there is
overwhelming support for us and the coalition. Saddam is
misreading US public opinion.
()
PM Nawaz: There is a problem with a section of people
here. They have been demonstrating. I admit Saddam's
public relations are very good and effective. I mentioned
this to King Fahd and he said we must also organize an
effective campaign to counter him. His envoy is coming
here tomorrow. I also plan to take a trip abroad to press
Saddam through the OIC. But I am not impressed by these
demonstrations. Governments must take tough positions to
defend just positions based on principle. I am not feeling
pressure from many quarters. Most have taken a position
that is supportive of our principles.
()
The President: I saw something saying that Egyptian and
Saudi Muslim leaders had declared a jihad against Saddam,
but there have been no reports of that in any of the
newspapers. (U)
PM Nawaz: I also consider it a jihad. He has no
conception for what he is doing to Iraq. He has to be
punished. He is responsible for the destruction of the
Iraqi nation. I wanted to clarify one thing, if he accepts
and agrees to withdraw and you accept a ceasefire with
assurances -- if materially he has said yes, there could be
a ceasefire. Otherwise, no one would stop fighting.
The President: That is what everyone tried before January
15. There has been no indication since then that he is
willing to leave Kuwait. If fact yesterday, I think it was
yesterday, he made another statement to that effect.
Therefore, it would be difficult to accept a withdrawal
with conditions. He must be punished, not given face or a
way out. He has done something bad and the only way to
compensate is for him to fully comply -- not say I'll do
this and this and you do that. We don't have to accept any
conditions. We are opposed to accepting conditions.
With these goals, he will be punished by the results.
He needs to comply with the resolutions. We don't want to
blow him back to the dark ages. That is not what the
coalition military actions are trying to do. We are trying
to get him to fully comply with the resolutions. It gets
complicated but if we stay with no conditions then we'd
look at it and if Kuwait's leaders go back, and if the 674
sanctions thing gets set up. If he is serious, he might
even leave his armor and go. Through full implementation
of resolutions and sanctions, there can be a ceasefire.
But it concerns me that if we talk about being willing to
discuss one, it will be linked to other problems and that
will be unacceptable. That is linkage.
Prime Minister Nawaz: If we come across anything
worthwhile, then we will let you know.
(
The President: I just wanted to say how grateful and
delighted we are with you and to thank you.
()
Prime Minister Nawaz: We were elected with a popular
mandate. We have more than a two-thirds majority in
Parliament. We were going ahead with economic development
with good speed. This has had a little bit of an adverse
effect but it is only temporary. I have one question, how
long do you think this will take to accomplish?
(
The President: Not long, although I have deliberately not
commented on that. Everyone is debating when the next
phase on the ground will be. I don't see it taking too
long even if the ground phase is necessary. I don't see a
protracted war, even though he thinks it will be so. But
we won't move before our officers are ready. We will do
this on our timetable, not his. I wish to clarify that I
have been careful not to say how long it will take. But
General Schwarzkopf has a high degree of confidence that it
won't be too long.
(
Prime Minister Nawaz: It is a noble cause, and I
appreciate it. We are with you.
(
The President: Mr. Prime Minister, one more thing -- I
understand from my staff that it might be better if we
didn't say anything publicly about this call. I appreciate
it if you want to keep this confidential.
(
Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. We will keep you posted
on any progress.
(e)
The President: If in time for some reason, you decide you
want to publish it, that's fine. But General Scowcroft
mentioned that your staff said you wanted to keep it
confidential for now. I just wanted you to know that's
fine with me.
()
Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. (U)
UNCLASSIFIED
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KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
DESERT STORM
2.
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DUE DATE: 09 FEB 91
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Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
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1. General
0914
THE WHITE HOUSE
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APNSA Has Seen
Solong
FEBRUARY 3, 1991
Group
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
77
THROUGH:
DAVID DEMAREST
2. Honse
FROM:
DEB AMEND
RE:
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF
Attached is a press release distributed Friday by a highly
energized Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf. The
feedback on the President's reception with this group has been
tremendous.
Among other things, the committee board is meeting this week
to review future events, fundraising for full page ads and an
op/ed schedule.
As you may know, the committee was created "on paper" as
signatories to statements in support the President's policies.
The only times they have actually met as a group have been at the
President's invitation before Christmas and last week. According
to the Committee staff, the President deserves all the credit for
taking a diverse group of "signatories" and turning them into
members of a working committee with objectives larger than
originally anticipated.
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF
SUITE 600
2300 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
202 293-1525 PHONE
202 293-8965 FAX
PRESS RELEASE
For Immediate Release
Contact: Meg Molyneaux
February 1, 1991
(202) 293-1525
PRESIDENT BUSH MEETS WITH THE BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF:
SIGNATORIES SUPPORTIVE OF PERSIAN GULF WAR
On Wednesday, January 30, 1991, President George Bush and members of his
cabinet met with 37 signatories of the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf.
Over cocktails in the White House residence, President Bush, Secretary of State
James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft thanked the Committee
for its bipartisan support and provided an update on U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf
War. The briefing stressed that the administration's strategy of continuing the
bombing campaign and keeping casualties to an absolute minimum will not be
jeopardized by Saddam Hussein's attempt to lure allied forces into premature ground
action.
On behalf of the Committee, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) praised
the President's leadership during this time of national crisis and reiterated the
necessity for all Americans to remain steadfast in their support for our troops in the
Persian Gulf. Congressman Solarz also outlined the Committee's future plans, which
include a second national newspaper advertisement of its position. After the briefing,
President Bush took his guests on a personally guided tour of the White House
residence.
Wednesday night's event was the second time the President met with the
Committee. The group also met with him for an informal briefing on December 14,
1990, soon after the inauguration of the Committee.
The list of attendees is as follows:
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF
SUITE 600
2300 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
202 293-1525 PHONE
202 293-8965 FAX
WHITE HOUSE RECEPTION ATTENDEES
January 30, 1991
Honorable Richard V. Allen
Former National Security Adviser to President
Reagan
Professor Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University
Honorable Richard Armitage
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. Former U.S. Senator (R-TN) and former White
House Chief of Staff
Honorable Herbert H. Bateman U.S. House of Representatives (R-VA)
Honorable Thad Cochran
U.S. Senate (R-MS)
Honorable C. Christopher Cox
U.S. House of Representatives (R-CA)
Honorable Stuart E. Eizenstat
Former Assistant to President Carter for Domestic
Affairs and Policy
Douglas J. Feith
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mark B. Feldman
Former Deputy Legal Adviser and Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State
Honorable Richard N. Gardner
Former U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Robert A. Georgine
President, Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO
John T. Joyce
President, International Union of Bricklayers and
Allied Craftsmen
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Former Head of U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union
Honorable Bob Lagomarsino
U.S. House of Representatives (R-CA)
Honorable Tom Lantos
U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA)
1
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF
Professor Robert J. Lieber
Chairman, Department of Government, Georgetown
University and former Coordinator of Middle East
issues for the 1988 Dukakis Presidential Campaign
Honorable Richard G. Lugar
U.S. Senate (R-IN)
Honorable Connie Mack
U.S. Senate (R-FL)
Honorable John McCain
U.S. Senate (R-AZ)
Honorable Dave McCurdy
U.S. House of Representatives (D-OK)
General Jack N. Merritt
Former U.S. Representative to the NATO Military
Committee and former Director, Joint Staff, U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Honorable John P. Murtha
U.S. House of Representatives (D-PA)
Honorable Michael G. Oxley
U.S. House of Representatives (R-OH)
Honorable Peter W. Rodman
Former Deputy Assistant to President Reagan for
National Security Affairs
Peter R. Rosenblatt
President, Coalition for a Democratic Majority and
former Personal Representative of President Carter
to the Micronesian Status Negotiations
Honorable Alan K. Simpson
U.S. Senate (R-WY)
Dr. Joseph J. Sisco
Former UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador Michael B. Smith
Former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and
former U.S. Ambassador to the GATT
Honorable Stephen J. Solarz
U.S. House of Representatives (D-NY)
Maurice Sonnenberg
Chairman, Executive Committee, Democratic House
and Senate Council
Maurice Tempelsman
Senior Partner, Leon Tempelsman & Son
General John W. Vogt
Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Air
Forces, European Air Forces and former Director,
Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Leon Wieseltier
Literary Editor, The New Republic
Dr. Dov S. Zakheim
Former Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense for
Planning and Resources
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt
Former Chief of Naval Operations
2
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100730
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 91 08
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: MELBY
DOC DATE: 04 FEB 91
DEAL
SOURCE REF:
2
KEYWORDS: OIL
OIL VULNERABILITY
STOCKPILES
CM
UN
PERSIAN GULF
PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
KOHL, HELMUT
HUSSEIN, SADDAM
SUBJECT: SPR BIDS
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 02 FEB 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: MELBY
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MELBY
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCop NARA, Date 6/30/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSJEB
DOC 2 OF 2
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100730
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 MELBY
Z 91013008 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
002 SCOWCROFT
Z 91020410 FOR INFORMATION
002
X 91042913 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09
CONF IDENT IAL
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100730
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 91 08
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: WATKINS, J
DOC DATE: 29 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: OIL
OIL VULNERABILITY
STOCKPILES
CM
UN
PERSIAN GULF
PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
KOHL, HELMUT
HUSSEIN, SADDAM
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 02 FEB 91
STATUS: S
STAFF OFFICER: MELBY
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MELBY
GORDON
HILL
PILLING
SITTMANN
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
ByCap NARA, Date6/30/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY:
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
SPR Bids
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
Lms
LOG # 0730
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG 24. A/O
less Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
K
I
Bill Sittmann
2
3
Bob Gates
82
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
Y
APNSA Has Seen
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
5
St. 4/29
N
NSC Secretariat
I
NIR
A = Action
C Is Information
D = Dispatch
R - Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
4:
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
0730
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 4, 1991
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL of
BD
FROM:
ERIC MELBY w
SUBJECT:
SPR Bids
At Tab I is a memorandum from Secretary Watkins enclosing his
memorandum to Governor Sununu on SPR bids. After Watkins'
discussion with you at Tuesday's Cabinet meeting, he requested
copies of the letters sent to Kaifu and Kohl on this issue. I
inadvertently gave him an early version of the letters. The
correct letters are at Tab II.
Attachment
Tab I
Watkins Memo
Tab II
Kaifu/Kohl Letters
DECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
2010-0883-MR
my 3/17/2016
CONFIDENTIAL
0730
TRANSMENT OF ENERGY.
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
MMERICA STATES OF
January 29, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS BRADY
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
SUBJECT:
STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN
Brent:
After our discussion today, I further revised our
procedures and approved what I consider the best
arrangement, all things considered. Your copy of my
memorandum notifying the President of actions taken
is attached.
From my standpoint, the U.S. policy to conduct an
automatic coordinated stockdraw in the event of
hostilities was clearly articulated in the President's
cable to Prime Minister Kaifu and Chancellor Kohl on
January 8. These letters were prepared following our
January 4 NSC meeting. Transmittal of this cable served
as guidance to our Governors to the key January 11 IEA
meeting as well. I have attached what I am informed
is an exact copy of the actual cable.
James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Attachments
DECLASSIFIED
When separated from enclosures, handle this document
as UNCLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
(insert proper classification)
2010- 0883-me
1/21/2014 MM
CONFIDENTIAL
RIMENT
OF
ENERGY STATES OF
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
January 29, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN
As you recall, on January 11, the IEA nations adopted
a plan to make 2.5 million barrels of oil available
automatically at the onset of hostilities. This action
was in consonance with your requests to both Prime
Minister Kaifu and Chancellor Kohl on January 8.
According to most experts, the allied military successes,
buttressed by the IEA action, have calmed the oil markets
and removed the "war premium" which was keeping prices high.
As planned, the IEA Governing Board met again yesterday
and reaffirmed the Agency's commitment to proceed with
the January 11 plan, but allowed for "flexibility" in
implementation. This memorandum informs you how we are
proceeding in the execution of our final U.S. drawdown
plans.
The IEA plan allocated about 1.1 million barrels per day.
to the United States. Following normal U.S. bidding
practices, this offered for sale a total of 33.75 million
barrels over the next 30-day contract period. In response
to our offer of sale, we received bids for 25 percent more
SPR oil than we offered, but with a heavy preference (2:1)
for sweet crude. We are now ready to act on bids received.
Taking into account the actual worldwide surplus crude
situation; remaining sensitive to expected taxpayer
interests in selling at the best price possible; anticipating
that the "flexibility" concept will result in achieving
somewhere between 50-75 percent of goal by IEA nations
against initially planned objectives; and satisfying
American crude oil buyers that we are reliable suppliers,
I have made a decision that the best approach would be to
set a policy of acceptance of only the highest priced bids.
Page 2 - The President
As a consequence of the aforementioned, by setting a policy
of selecting only those bids that are above 97.5 percent of
benchmark value for SPR crude oils, we will achieve sales
that actually yield 99 percent of the benchmark value.
As a result, the total amount sold would be approximately
51 percent of the 33.75 million barrels of crude oil
originally offered for sale, or 17.3 million barrels.
This action will satisfy the full U.S. commitment to the
IEA plan. Unless unforeseen disruption to oil supplies
occur, we have no intention of executing further draws.
Our informal contacts with members of the IEA, oil industry
leaders, and key Hill members indicate that the approach we
have taken is prudent and will be viewed as balanced under
the circumstances. We intend to notify successful offerors
early Wednesday morning, January 30, so that contract awards
can take place as scheduled, and expected, by 6 February.
Deliveries will commence any time thereafter as the
successful offeror desires.
It may be useful to note that, were the SPR oil to be
delivered under current market conditions, the average
sale price would be about $20. This could be compared
with the five-year average purchase price of SPR oil
from 1986 to 1991 (includes 100 million barrels) which
was $17.54 per barrel. From SPR opening in 1977, the total
average purchase price of oil, on the other hand, is $27.17
per barrel.
James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
CC: The Honorable John H. Sununu
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Nicholas Brady
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KAIFU
Dear Toshiki:
We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein
tc withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic
and political strategy, it is important that we have in place
adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil
supplies.
In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong
reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of
temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is
better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react
later.
Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by
the IEA before January 15 to authorize an automatic coordinated
stockdraw in the event of hostilities would reassure the markets
as well as sending a clear message to Saddam Hussein.
I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues
in other IEA countries to reach immediate IEA agreement on
coordinated action. For our part, I will make available, in the
event of hostilities, up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for
one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I am requesting
that Japan, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, make
available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure
coordinated action. I am making a similar request to Helmut
Kohl. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in
CONFIDENTIAL
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COVEREL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0883-MR
mm 3/17/2016
CONFIDENTIAL
2
particular must be seen to be carrying our share of the burden of
avoiding additional economic damage.
My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in
touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your
officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.
The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests
for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of
hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the
IEA countries to help calm the market.
I share these concerns and am confident that you do too. in
IEA-wide coordinated action to counter a potential supply
disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts =0
ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.
I am confident that we can count on Japan to do its part to
bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in
the face of Saddam Hussein's aggressive and unprecedented
challenge to the rule of law and the new world order. As the INC
largest economies in the world, Japan and the United States must
join together, under our global partnership, to take the prudent
steps outlined above to minimize potential damage to our own
economies and to the international economic system.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KOHL
Dear Helmut:
We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein
to withdraw totally from Kuwait. While we fervently hope that
Iraq will make the use of force unnecessary by complying fully
with the Security Council's demands, it is important that we have
in place adequate contingency plans to deal with any possible
interruption in oil supplies.
In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong
reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of
temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is
essential to be prepared now rather than to be forced to react
under pressure later.
Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by
the IEA before January 15 to an automatic coordinated stockdraw
in the event of hostilities would provide a margin of comfort.
It would also lessen economic damage to us, the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and developing
countries generally.
I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in
other IEA countries to reach immediate IEA agreement on
coordinated action. For our part, = will make available, in the
event of hostilities, up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for
one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I am requesting
that Germany, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, make
CONFIDENTIAL
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010- 0883-MR
mm 3/17/2016
CONFIDENTIAL
2
available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure
coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Toshiki
Kaifu. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in
particular must act decisively to avert international economic
damage.
My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in
touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your
officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.
The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests
for additional oil production after August 2, In the event of
hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the
IEA countries to help calm the market. I share these concerns
and am confident that you do too.
I trust that we can count on Germany to do its part to
bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in
the face of Iraq's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the
rule of law and the new world order.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KAIFU
Dear Toshiki:
We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein
to withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic
and political strategy, it is important that we have in place
adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil
supplies.
In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong
reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of
temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is
better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react
later.
Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by
the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event
of hostilities would reassure the markets as well as send a clear
message to Saddam Hussein.
Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their
colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program
of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members
to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part,
the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million
barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency
measures.
I request that Japan, as a holder of substantial strategic
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0770-MR
11/26/2014 MM
CONFIDENTIAL
2
stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this
oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request
of Helmut Kohl. As the world's economic leaders, our three
countries in particular must be seen as ready to bear our share
of the burden of avoiding additional economic damage.
My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will ce in
touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your
officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.
The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests
for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of
hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the
IEA countries to help calm the market.
I share these concerns and am confident that you do 100. An
IEA-wide coordinated action to counter a potential supply
disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts to
ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.
I am confident that we can count on Japan to do its part to
bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in
the face of Saddam Hussein's aggressive and unprecedented
challenge to the rule of law and the new world order. -- the two
largest economies in the world, Japan and the United States must
join together, under our global partnership, to take the prudent
steps outlined above to minimize potential damage to our own
economies and to the international economic system.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KCHL
Dear Helmut:
We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein
to withdraw totally from Kuwait. While we fervently hope that
Iraq will make the use of force unnecessary by complying fully
with the Security Council's demands, it is important that we have
in place adequate contingency plans to deal with any possible
interruption in oil supplies.
In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong
reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of
temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is
essential to be prepared now rather than to be forced to react
under pressure later.
Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by
the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event
of hostilities would reassure markets as well as send a clear
signal to Saddam Hussein. It would also lessen economic damage
to us, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin
America and developing countries generally.
Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their
colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program
of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members
to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part,
the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million
barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum
CONFIDENTIAL
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0768-MR
2/25/2013 MM
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency
measures.
I request that Germany, as a holder of substantial strategic
stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this
cil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request
of Toshiki Kaifu. As the world's economic leaders, our three
countries in particular must act decisively to avert
international economic damage.
My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in
touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your
officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.
The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests
for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of
hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the
IEA countries to help calm the market. I share these concerns
and am confident that you do too.
I trust that we can count on Germany to do its part to
bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in
the face of Iraq's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the
rule of law and the new world order.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9100206
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 91 16
TO: DUBIA, J
ROY, J
CHRON FILE
FROM: SITTMANN
DOC DATE: 04 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS
OIL
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
CM
PERSONS:
2
SUBJECT: IRAQI USE OF OIL AS MILITARY WEAPON
ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO
DUE DATE: 12 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PILLING
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
EXECSEC
KANTER
NSC CHRON
PILLING
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0883-MR
mm 3/17/2016
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY Older DATE
2/4
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGLM
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 3 OF 3
SECRET
Energy By on brage use of aitos
a
military Weapon
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY: MEN
LOG # 0206
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Hill
\
Bill Sittmann
2
3
30
A
Bob Gates
A/O 18
8
Brent Scowcroft
4
APNSA Has Seen
Bill Sittmann
5
TABI
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
6
27.2/4
RN
NSC Secretariat
7
RAD44
X
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9100206
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 04 FEB 91
SUBJECT: IRAQI USE OF OIL AS MILITARY WEAPON
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
DUBIA, J
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
COPY: 1
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC
LAVIN, A
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ROOM 7E054
COPY: 1
1000 INDEPENDENCE AVE, SW
WASHINGTON, DC 20585
ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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& 2/3/15
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
0206
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
February 4, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Iraqi Use of Oil as a Military
Weapon (C)
The Department of Energy has recently concluded a study on the
subject. There are some effects analyzed in the study which
might be of interest to our military allies in Desert Shield.
State and Defense should develop a plan to inform those allies,
as appropriate, of the results of the DoE study so that they can
take necessary precautions. The Willing NSC point of contact is Don
Pilling, 202-395-6923. (2)
William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
CC: Ms. Ann Lavin
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy
DECLASSIFIED
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Es 2/3/15
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SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
0206
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 10, 1991
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Natl Sec Advisor
ARNOLD KANTER
Are
has seen
THROUGH:
FROM:
DON PILLING
SUBJECT:
Energy Brief on Iraqi Use of Oil as a Military
Weapon
At Tab II is a briefing book and a cover memorandum from
Admiral Watkins in which he writes that "it is essential that you
receive the briefing at the earliest opportunity so that you can
decide on the most appropriate means to pass the information to
both the Departments of Defense and State." We attended the
briefing when it was presented to OSTP staff members on
January 9, 1991. We believe that there is no need for you to be
briefed, but you should be aware of its essential points and of
the plans to disseminate the information.
The Iraqis have placed detonating charges on many Kuwaiti oil
wells, constructed oil-filled trenches along the Saudi border,
and laid oil pipelines into the Persian Gulf in the vicinity of
Kuwait City. The Energy study examined the potential effects if
the Iraqis decide to exercise the use of oil as a weapon. There
are two effects which could have significant consequences for
Desert Shield forces:
-
The smoke from oil well and oil-filled trench fires
would seriously impact electro-optical equipment. The
region of maximum visibility degradation, i.e., less
than 1 kilometer of visible range, will most likely be
5 kilometers or more downwind of the combustion sources
and will extend for tens of kilometers. High winds
would dramatically reduce the optical effects. For
your information, an unreplenished trench fire would
burn itself out in about a day, whereas oil well fires
could go for years if not capped.
-
The Iraqis could generate a twenty-million barrel oil
spill which could compromise freshwater supplies and
electrical power provided by desalination plants in
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar as the slick moves
down the coast with the counter-clockwise current in
the Gulf. This could threaten the sustainment of
Desert Shield forces, all of which rely on host-nation
fresh water.
DECLASSIFIED
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Es 3/27/15
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SECRET
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
-2-
The brief is to be presented to Defense/JCS today and at CENTCOM
on January 11, 1991, so that appropriate counter-measures and
plans can be made. The briefing tends to be alarmist and doesn't
adequately address possible counters. For example, the extensive
trench system is fed by only two pipelines which could be
targeted early in a conflict. Further, plans could be made to
attempt to prevent an oil spill by targeting the pipelines
constructed for that purpose, and if prevention is unsuccessful,
igniting the spilled oil before it spreads and becomes so thin it
will not sustain combustion.
We believe that the only action NSC staff should take is to
ensure that State and Defense work together to inform our
military allies, as appropriate, of the results of the DOE study
so that they can take necessary precautions. At Tab I is a
memorandum for Bill Sittmann's signature initiating this action.
If you concur, we will ensure that Admiral Watkins is informed of
the action, unless you want to call him.
Concurrences by: Richard Haass and Tim Deal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That we inform Admiral Watkins through his staff of the action.
Approve B
Disapprove
That you request Bill Sittmann sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for Signature
Tab II
Briefing Book with Cover Memorandum
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
OF ENERGY UNITED
The Secretary of Energy
ween
Washington, DC 20585
STATES OF
January 9, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
IRAQI USE OF OIL AS A MILITARY WEAPON
Brent:
Per our telephone conversation, I am attaching the book
that accompanies the briefing by Sandia National
Laboratory on the potential ramifications of the Iraqi
use of oil as a military weapon. The book is divided
into the following three sections:
A. Latest Intelligence Situation
B. Sandia's Study on the Potential Impacts
of Iraqi Use of Oil as a Defensive Weapon
C. Response Options (Very Preliminary)
I believe the information contained in this briefing
is of extreme significance to the current military
situation in the Gulf. Accordingly, I feel that it
essential that you receive the briefing at the earliest
possible opportunity so that you can decide on the most
appropriate means to pass the information to both the
Departments of Defense and State.
Representatives of DOE and Sandia National Laboratory
stand ready to brief you at any time.
wm 0102/02/60
2010-0884-MR
James D. Watkins
PER E.O. 13526
DECLASSIFIED
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Attachment
P.S. Briefings alroady scheduled as follows:
(1) Bromley - 1/9 @ 2:00 pm
(2) Interapency 6NUP (mcl. DOD/JCS)-1/10 @ 2:00 pm)
(3) CENTCOM 7 at M<D,11 AFB - 1/11
CONFIDENTIAL