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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
91167
Folder ID Number:
91167-006
Folder Title:
[Copies from Other Files] [3]
Stack:
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G
34
49
2
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Letter
Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush (6 pp.)
11/28
(b) (1)
02. Memcon
Re: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev
12/2/89
(b)(1)
of Soviet Union (6 pp.)
03. Handwritten
Re: Malta, Sunday (13 pp.)
12/3/89
(b)(1)
Memcon
04. Memcon
Re: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman
12/3/89
(b)(1)
Gorbachev of Soviet Union (2 pp.)
05. Cable
The White House to American Embassy Moscow
12/8/89
(b)(1)
Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)
06. Draft Demarche Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev
12/20/89
(b)(1)
Re: Demarche to Soviet Union (3 pp.)
07. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of
12/12/89
(b)(1)
X
Germany (6 pp.)
08. Handwritten
Re: Baker/Cheney (1 pp.)
12/26
(b) 1)
Notes
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
[Copies from Other Files] [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1374
OA/ID Number:
91167-006
Date Closed:
9/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
09a. Memo
Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: General Scowcroft's Notes for the One-on-One with President
Mitterand at St. Martin on December 16 (1 pp.)
09b. Memcon
Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (3
12/16/89
(b) (1)
pp.)
10. Letter
President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)
1/5/90
(1)
11a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
1/13/90
(b)(1)
Re: Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (3 pp.)
11b. Memo
Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
1/9/90
(b)(1)
Re: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in
1990 (1 pp.)
12. Handwritten
Re: CFE Meeting with President (2 pp.)
1/15/90
(b)(1)
Notes
13a. Handwritten
Re: Bob Gates - Memcons (12 pp.)
1/16/92
(b)(1)
Notes
13b. Memo
James A. Baker, III for the President
1/16/90
(b)(1)
Re: US Troop Levels in Europe (2 pp.)
13c. Talking Points Re: What Might Be Said on CFE in the State of the Union
n.d.
(b)(1)
Message (2 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
[Copies from Other Files] [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1374
OA/ID Number:
91167-006
Date Closed:
9/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
14. Letter
Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush
1/17/90
(b)(1)
Re: [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)
15. Handwritten
Re: Jaruzelski Phone Call (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Notes
16. Handwritten
Re: Handwritten Notes 89 (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Notes
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
[Copies from Other Files] [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1374
OA/ID Number:
91167-006
Date Closed:
9/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Gorbacher (Dobrynir)
28NoV89
1989- June 1990
WASHFAX RECEIPT
Box 5-2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
a
NOV 28
B
S/S #
044276
CLASSIFICATION ONE IDENTIAL
No. Pages 1,
MESSAGE NO
11
647 - 1,598
7208 NS,
FROM: ROHERT KIMMITT
(Officer name)
(Office symbol)
(Extension)
(Room number)
LETTER TO THE PRI SIDENT FROM GORBACHEV OTRANSLATION}
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
1(w LITTER DURININ TO KIMMITT ON 16/28)
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
NSC
BOB GATES VIA WHSITRM
zelikow
Kanter
Mahley
Blackwill
FOR:
PER REQUEST
X
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
COMMENT
REMARKS:
DECLASSIFIED
S/S Officer:
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/8/09
FORM
DS-1760
7.77
Debinin
11/23
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
I am grateful to you for your letter of September
23, 1989, in which you underscore the fact that the Soviet
Union and the United States have a special responsibility
to play a decisive role in advancing the multilateral
process of prohibition and elimination of chemical
weapons. I would like to tell you at the outset that
I fully and sincerely support such an approach.
In order to promptly achieve a universal ban on
chemical weapons I propose, just as in the case of Vienna
talks, to express ourselves in favor of setting a deadline
for finalizing the invention, through a joint appeal
to the participants in the Conference on Disarmament,
to finalize the text of the convention by 1990-1991 at
latest.
It. is in the context of the determination stated
by our two countries in Wyoming to persist in achieving
chemical weapons prohibition and elimination of all its
stockpiles that we approach the specific ideas, which
you, Mr. President, have put forward in your letter as
well as at the UN.
His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.
TRIAT AS FONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
4/10/13 MM
2.
You've been writing about the readiness of the United
States to eliminate over 98% of its CW stockpilen during
the period of 8 years atter the convention comes into
effect, provided that the Soviet Union is to be one of
the state signatories to that convention. As regards
the Soviet Union participation in the convention, I give
you a completely unequivocally positive answer. The Soviet
Union has already stated that It in ready to be among
the original parties to the convention.
It would be nice, if the United States were to make
a similar announcement, and still better if we were to
make such announcement jointly, for Instance, at our
forthcoming meeting in 1990. Tn turn, that would push
other states to take no less a definite stance with regard
to participating in the convention.
As to the issue of complete destruction of CW under
the future convention, it seems to me that we should
adhere to the agreement reached at the multinational
negotiations, mostly due to the initiative of the USSR
and United States, on their unconditional 100 per cent
destruction within the 10 year period after the coming
into force of the convention. It in on the principles
of complete destruction of CW stockpiles and production
facilities in this time frame that the joint Soviet-US
proposals on the order of destruction of such stockpiles
and facilities have been drafted and than adopted in
Wyoming. The right to retain any stockpiles, however
minimal, would signify the perpetuating of a threat of
CW use, would provide, as a matter of fact, ground for
any state to renounce under various pretexts the complete
destruction of chemical weapons.
As to the participation in the convention of all
CW capable states, the Soviet Union, like the United
States, attaches priority significance to this question.
3.
We believe that it has been resolved to a great extent
by the special Soviet-US agreement on the categories
of states which should be original parties to the
convention, and now It seems to be possible to got down
to discussing a specific plan of action with a view to
involving as parties to the convention such states that
pose a potential threat in terms of CW. Naturally, what
1s required here is a flexible approach, taking into
account diverse conditions existing in each given region
of the world.
You have also proposed a radical reduction of the
CW stockpiles of the USSR and the United States while
the multilateral talks in Geneva are still underway.
I think that our two countries, given their special
responsibility In the area of CW disarmament, could move
even further and without waiting for a convention to
be concluded, undertake an entire package of reciprocal
and mutually interrelated obligations.
First. To halt completely any CW production. It
is a natural and relatively easy first step to take toward
the future convention. It would enable to considerably
reinforce our political impact on those who are possibly
engaged in their own CW production or are planning to
do 80.
[ must frankly say that the recent reports to the
effect that the United States intends to continue the
CW production even after the coming into force of the
convention have given rise to our serious concern. It
18 with a certain degree of mistrust that we have treated
these reports because such US actions would directly
contradict the already existing agreements worked out
mostly through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the
United States. Moreover, you made no mention of this
approach in your letter either. Any permission to produce
4.
chemical weapons in the framework of the convention would
push other states, one way or the other, to initiate
its production In or 'r to retain the right to continue
it after the coming into torce of the convention. It
would inevitably lead to a point where the proliferation
of chemical weapons would become politically and legally
admissible.
Second. To radically reduce and - what in even better
to completely destroy the chemical weapons of the USSR
and the US. The Soviet Union intends to start destruction
ot its stockpiles prior to the conclusion of the
convention, and we like the idea of the USSR and the
US moving along this road on parallel courses. We had
to convert our first pilot CW destruction plant built
near Chapaevsk, into d training center as requested by
the public, and now in order to have an idea of our real
possibilities for destroying the stockpiles, we must
complete the draft comprehensive program for CW
destruction in the USSR to be submitted to the USSR
Supreme Soviet. Consideration of such a complex and
multifaceted issue in the Supreme Soviet as well as
implementation of the decisions to be adopted will
obviously take nome time.
with a view to ensuring the best possible preparation
for CW destruction, including solutions to complex
ecological question, it might he possible to build on
cooperation between our two countries concerning the
mothods of CW destruction, operating respective
facilities, elaboration of suitable verification
procedures, etc. and formalize a special bilateral
agreement to that effect.
In order to avoid any apprehensions on the part
of the participants in the talks to the effect that the
reciprocal steps of the USSR and the US are conceived
5.
as a substitute for a multilateral convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons, it would be possible
to declare that the agreement on reduction and, time
permitting, destruction of US and Soviet chemical weapons
will come into force at the moment of the signing of
the convention itself.
Third. Under no circumstances chemical weapons should
be used. Unlike the USSR and the US the overwhelming
majority of countri have no reservation to the 1925
Geneva Protocol enabling the use of CW in retaliation.
The mutual renunciation by the USSR and the US of their
reservations would make a tangible contribution to the
process of strengthening intolerance toward chemical
weapons. Entablishing an absolute and verifiable ban
on the use of chemical weapons through effective UN
procedures would lessen the incentives for acquiring
chemical weapons by states.
Forth. We resolutely believe that the
discontinuation of CW production, their destruction and
non-use must be verified in the strictest possible manner
in the framework of both convention and the range of
steps which the USSR and the US could implement prior
to its conclusion.
As to our possible joint contribution to the process
of multilateral negotiations, I think there 1n a need
,
for it, now, above all, with a view to finalizing a
solution to the entire range of verification problems.
In this connection I'd like to propose that our two
countries come out with a joint initiative on challenge
inspections.
The important contribution that you, Mr. President,
made in raising this issue at the negotiationn has been
now appreciated on its merits in the Soviet Union. Its
discussion showed that it may be adequately resolved,
6.
provided all states accept the concept of "continuous"
or "open invitation for inspection" which would provide
for a possibility to conduct such inspections by the
international inspectorate at the request of any party
to the convention, at any time, at any point or facility
of the other party within the most limited time-frame,
without any exceptions and the right to refusal. Our
joint initiative on this basis would become a most
significant contribution to the successful completion
of the negotiations on the convention.
In conclusion I'd like to express my conviction
that through joint efforts we will succeed, already In
the near future, to attain our common objective -
introduction of a complete global ban on CW. I would
be interested to know your considerations in reaction
concerning this priority question.
with sincere respect.
M.GORBACHEV
November 28, 1989
Gorbacher (Dobrynin)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
1989-June 1989- 1990
THE WHITE HOUSE
Box 5-2
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman
Gorbachev of Soviet Union
PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter
Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
December 2, 1989, 12:00 - 1:00 pm
AND PLACE:
Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta
Chairman Gorbachev: I have three points. I already referred to
Central America especially Cuba. I recall a letter to you after
Cuba. My talks in Cuba weren't simple. Castro expressed caution
about our policy -- I explained our aims were good. I said as
for our internal affairs we are doing what we want. What you do
is your business. He asked me, in effect, to help normalize
U.S. Cuban relations. ($/SEN)
Recently, the Cuban Chief of Staff visited the Soviet Union. He
talked to Yazov and said some things, I say this for the first
time in the most private way. If Castro found out
(S/SEN)
The President: I understand. It will stay with me. (U)
Chairman Gorbachev: I think perhaps we would think how to do it.
Some contacts. We could participate but that is not necessary.
I can say that Castro understands that the world is changing
dramatically but he has his own sense of dignity and pride. Even
raising this possibility was not easy for him. (S/SEN)
The President: What is he saying? (U)
Chairman Gorbachev: His very words, "Find a way to make the
President aware of my interest in normalization." It is on the
basis of that remark that I made my comment. ($/SEN)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
1999-0273-F
3/28/2008 MM
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
2
The President: Let's put all our cards on the table about
Castro. Our allies can't see why we care about Central America.
It just isn't a gut issue for them. For the political left in
the U.S., it isn't a gut issue. But for the fledgling
democracies in Latin America and the U.S. right it is a gut
issue. Castro is like a sea anchor as you move forward and the
Western Hemisphere moves. He is against all this -- Eastern
Europe and the Western Hemisphere. (S/SEN)
Publicly Latin Americans will not criticize a colleague. But
Arias' call was a clear indication that Castro is now totally
isolated. There is another major Castro problem -- the emigres
(in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator.
We have had feelers from Castro but never with an indication of a
willingness to change. ($)
Switching to Nicaragua, you said Ortega had nothing to do with
[ILLEGIBLE]. I am inclined to agree though I didn't use to think
so. But I am convinced that they are exporting revolution. They
are sending weapons. I don't care what they have told you, they
are supporting the FMLN. I am now convinced there is a new
shipment of helos going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. I
don't question Shevardnadze's word on this. (S/SEN)
Chairman Gorbachev: There were U.S. rockets too. (S)
The President I see a solution as in a verifiable election --
free and open -- and that if Ortega loses he doesn't try to cling
to power. If it is a free election, we will abide by the
results. ($/SEN)
The only other open cancer is Panama, but there is no feeling
that the Soviet Union wants Noriega to succeed. He is a terrible
problem for us. I asked the Attorney General if our indictments
were strong ones. I am seeking for him to get out. This is
quite confidential. He said these are good indictments and given
feelings on drugs in the U.S., I can't drop the indictments. (S)
Chairman Gorbachev: Let me tell you how your steps are perceived
in the Soviet Union. People ask are there no barrier to the U.S.
action in independent countries? The U.S. passes judgement and
executes that judgement. (S)
The President: There is no military operation against Colombia,
but if we are asked for help against the scourge of drugs, we
will help. (S)
Then I would like to mention the Philippines. ($)
I was surprised at your Philippines reaction. Acquino is
democratically elected and asked for our help to prevent the
palace from being bombed by the rebels. It never occurred to me
that this would cause problems in the Soviet Union, though I
probably would have done it anyway. But that notion never
occurred to me. ($)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
3
Chairman Gorbachev: In the Soviet Union some are saying the
Brezhnev doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine. (S)
The President: I want to understand. Here is a democracy saying
that it needs help against rebels. (S)
Chairman Gorbachev: I agree she is democratically elected. It
depends on the context. In Eastern Europe there are governments,
legitimately elected, that are now being replaced. The question
is in Eastern Europe it is prohibited for Soviet troops`to
intervene. All now is interrelated. Some now are seeing that we
are not performing our duty to our friends. But we have not been
asked. ($)
The President: In Eastern Europe, change is peaceful and
encouraged by you. In the Philippines, there is a Colonel trying
to shoot his way into power. (8)
Chairman Gorbachev: I agree -- peaceful change is the way. Our
position is non-interference. The process of change can be
painful but we believe in non-interference. Colonels can be
found everywhere to do those jobs. (S)
The President: If we can stick with the notion of peaceful
change, better relations will occur between the Soviet Union and
the U.S. I would never give advice to a senior office holder
like you. I can accept your criticism, but not on this issue, in
this circumstance. Acquino is struggling to bring democracy. I
would hope your criticism could be muted. I can accept it but I
think that your criticism would cut the wrong way. (S)
I appreciate your explanation in the Philippines. One more
comment on Latin America. I don't want to sound like a broken
record. Let me express U.S. public opinion on you yourself.
There is strong support for perestroika and for establishing
pluralistic answers in Eastern Europe -- strong support. But I
think people see support for Castro -- almost -- speaking frankly
-- as an embarrassment. He is against the causes you are
advocating. ($)
Chairman Gorbachev: That is pluralism (laughs). (U)
The President: I wish we could find a way. You are spending
billions into the pipeline and getting nothing for it, and it
does interfere with our overall relationship. The way you have
handled it is clear. Castro doesn't just do what you say. ($)
Just to end it -- anything we can do to cut support for Cuba and
Nicaragua so we are not on opposite sides. Chile is moving in
the right direction -- not toward the U.S. but toward democracy
and I don't want these others to get in the way of what I want to
do with the Soviet Union. (S)
Chairman Gorbachev: The most important thing is that we have no
plan for Latin America -- no bridges, no bridgeheads. That is
not our policy -- you have it from me. {NEXT LINE ILLEGIBLE]
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
4
I am moving toward democracy. Of course they are fledgling and
the road ahead will be difficult. We are satisfied with that --
as you -- but we will not interfere. ($)
With Cuba, yes, we have a long relationship -- responding to the
economic blockade. We seek to put it on a more normal basis,
especially economic. We are trading with Cuba and that meets our
need -- sugar, citrus, nickel -- but it is much more to Cuba's
advantage. For example, we sell oil to Cuba on a market clearing
basis which we could sell for much more. But Cuba is independent
with its own view and we don't want to interfere. (S)
I mention Castro's signal because I think it shows Castro sees
his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and
others. So please give it some thought. If you have something
to share with us or something we can pass on. We can note we
have had a frank conversation and understand each other better.
($)
The President: We have had feelers from him. But if he could do
something in human rights. I will think carefully on it. I will
let you know so we don't get disconnected on this. ($)
Chairman Gorbachev: We could say that to him about human rights.
($)
The President: He won't even let the U.N. in to see.
(S)
Chairman Gorbachev: I haven't finished (laughs). (U)
The President: Neither have I. (U)
Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. (U)
The President: O.K. (U)
Chairman Gorbachev: Let me address Eastern Europe. I have three
points. ($)
(1) The direction of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe is such as to bring us closer -- that is
important. (S)
(2) What I dislike is when some U.S. politicians say unity
of Europe should be on the basis of Western values. We
have long been accused of exporting ideology. That is
what is now being proposed by some -- not you. (8)
(3) Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German
question. That is not good. I worry that this could
be part of his pre-election game and not because of a
strategic outlook. There are some differences in view
in West Germany, within the coalition, and with the
SPD. We should let Kohl know that his approach could
damage things. ($)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
5
For example, would a united Germany be outside alliances or
within NATO? Answer is premature and we shouldn't put it forth
-- should let it run its natural course. You and I are not
responsible for the division of Germany. Let history decide what
should happen. We need an understanding on this. ($)
The President: I think Kohl feels an enormous emotional response
to what has happened -- as does Genscher. There is some politics
in his three part program and some emotional outpouring. I think
he knows his allies -- after they support right of the German
people to reunify, have some private reservations about
reunification. ($)
Chairman Gorbachev: Yes I know -- and they have let me know.
Unlike they and you -- I am saying there are two states, mandated
by history. So let history decide the outcome. Kohl assures me
he will abide by understandings made in Bonn. Now he says he
wants to talk on the phone and Genscher is coming. I think this
is an ? particular prudence. ($)
The President: I agree and we will do nothing to recklessly try
to speed up reunification. When you talk to Kohl, I think you
will see he agrees. But his rhetoric, you must understand, is
emotional and possibly some politics, but mostly emotion. (8)
Chairman Gorbachev: It is good that things have [ILLEGIBLE] (U)
The President: The most conservative Americans salute how you
have handled this issue. They are now looking back into history.
I will be timid -- that is how in a nutshell they describe my
refusal to jump up and down at the Wall. This is no time for
grandstanding -- a step that looks good but could prove reckless.
($)
Chairman Gorbachev: The times we live in are of great
responsibility -- great opportunity but great responsibility. (S)
The President: I would like to spend some time on one other
point at some time. ($)
Chairman Gorbachev: I have one other point as well -- later. A
point which you carefully avoided. ($)
The President: Yes, I was hoping to avoid it. (S)
Chairman Gorbachev: I once said something -- You used a word
that means "a test" to see if we could solve mutual problems. (S)
The President: Afghanistan is more important to you than to us.
I was wrong about what would happen after Soviet troops left.
Let's discuss it. (S)
The President: Let me not blind side you. You may not want to
discuss it. But I would like to know your views concerning the
sensitive area of the Baltics.
(S)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
6
Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we will. (U)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
yan- Dec? Box5-1 1484
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something about it
2
One fe 3 component mid power
that is nowed forces, are outside C
AC process
- V'S is emotional dont it + we
realize JRC US issue slaparsh
- Back inc 50's, Suwas surrounded, etp
- We have a naval tradetion &
by nowal bases 500, 000 mean, navel
ships vast acpt. (1500 ampt) 150ult
earriers- deployed around SU,
-Vreima talks well refere lnd comportation
- Prospects good Ir steat. AC
- we haved right TO elipe it thet
manyer theat TO us will be reduced
- hetstack med we ceill be thing
realistic positions in there webs
& we realize you house other
threats TO melt
But we also have regults
deal w/threats power Ocenes
-Guil Comments (not negot) on A
3 Items
- eliety are relation
but START 9 AB situaty
- Taking into out Sheved
- rules In Address
proposals in wayong
heavy Howbers
- US countring who would leave
3
notw/ 6000 best areer 8500 washeds
We believe actual loads street
her vases
- SLCM (ples others here)
Bay C twint of Security us you seed
Anos all major for resealish
for treaty before end of 90
- nowel SCOQ trues alrio had interesting diseasions
Subtrances cere verifiable & coulsed
in START
-The rest- Tac needs
should have be chirinated
- as Suoa presenting Seo the
then als my own.
-ie emplete elementing
Vienna & 3 issess
nownl musber exceptsents.
Dredering amos and personal
Propose reduction To 1.3 used
on ench - reduction of / mil
- nato haven't responded no
proposed diy agreept
- Prosourd uswel) cay Dorcep
must be reduced
2) Reductions of statemed fries,
- Propose reduction To 300,000
- Your proposed is thet only us/so
forces he redwed
- That is compair
4
3) acpt. Propessel is 4700
Beat separate limit for intergter
- How nothing and
suggested on either side
-hest ministerial shoulda lust
there ussers
Open shies - we support g will
partic inD Manel
- Propose also open seas spen
spaces raper
-We looking privare to peace $.'.
nid postures new be change
- The fever C upus the en
Chance are well shoot.
- Your deserves
serious consederate
- - cigee thot goal is zao but
movement phase by phase
- US will clase before
P
Cante proly)
G
we agree completely. of
reduce rapidy the
grice us d moral face To
- Fhat is all Ihasler. Sender
deal w/ proting
you Must heare, lots Take
E.Ene E
To percotions & EEERO,
P
Just a faces comments
5
- Rapidate 6 charge & + Sav reserve
90 it
- Gerwan reun
-We can't desappier renu
-Werentize et highly serisiting
statement. subject & how
used /reotraint.
- Have sent delegation to Penul. wt
to cause dis/su butto help
- we well aware FESCE language
onlerders.
- Those justa your tay counerts
G
you are as sumah a partonworkip
in EE us we.
- Something is happeny
in both E+W Em
- in WE willadso
Transferm political structure
casaling a new supe er structures
(power) in Euro
party couner
Ernd house
- FM's should give w
this idea.
- we should continue Helsenbe
process to not dosting what has
- been 20ne,
^ That is why progressee
ah udjust TO this new plical.
6
-we should also molify other arguation
such as NATORW P which should
become more political
- also searn crgaten incl. CONCE CON
- But legislatures, unity of our should not eu
on buins of "western rolues."Thet
- we should not face or
is x8 idealogy
sects to trem their to resides celventey
- This evolution may notalways
be smooth
- -we must use this process which
is underway to lring Excologaths
ened concern endertanding
of I think we Univet
This process will help smolding
& we want Cammon understandy
P
- of pagart
Discussion of Westen values
- blasnost is one (then classribe)
- I wont to you culeur by
Wiston values,
G
Right of every nation To dettruive
its internel offers - or change it-
w/o interpereure
P
2 d rect think we deffer- self deter,
opinings, dec wedo not Caller by
esten values imposition for september when
7
model
G
we dritthink are single wold
should be my ared,
(Discession ending in Gen'l agreement
- - Gorl sup usey universal use "Wertern",
says they values.
you also say change ins sesults
from Western they th-that
bad formulation
P
Let's by To avoid words which capset
your us.
G
we are opening outsendering
those thing which used to elevent as
- Lets' call at
B
Seeppese we said demo-velves
6
Secre - demo & hurrave
values,
P
God corrverutiin
G
very important one
Lets descries
- What should we do in NIE
- -We have purled Chapt us far cas
we can, should move while he
still celive.
P
Wething things are moving okare 10 prot
How what record I?
Trying to get Pates gF 10 Calk
6
justice wegled words. Present set
more Invaste There seer. Created
because ceal have been working
8
Togetters, For years US Tried to yo it
alone - forwed that impossible
We prepared To coop positively to
setterment we behn person Oralot
I recog for us no pack. as serrees
process suder way, we have us pich.
@ Hereing may cervey. Ours are
unity ing if thet hop peris ware
settlement they may not wont
and your euroblyment that be d,
2
Bluche tendorsenent of I is gre.
Have wore to beforeore
(us position)
G
we are involved we my pert
Trabatered. Corp w /Framet Syre
partity
FNIS Should Consult to deveal
paper mouts to push process
Syring say they will work w/in
P
we thousa not appede to be
a Tripartate policy
distating settlement (here or
G
2 what anywhere) Gleved RTO specher applica
S
we should think a of
step mertual reason.
There Thousand be Ce emperience
to set by a hiter govlt horld ell Huris
X.C Shah support this
= Or one tel mtl Cary ender UN
9
- Supply of wpus, we really To
stopon recepioral basis if There
is cease fire That we whent
free cease fine.
- US has mule useful suggetion or
Transitional phase. This
pressued.
G
Bath sides proceded pumpressive used
solution wouldn't work, we got Genloa
decord of now col should follow eep
P
we want rebition W interest in a
G
neicher we wontered D corsidered US an
hostils regione are Sov which borders
P
The energy prof is .
G
you say all alghaver oppers naj Corella
but his position getting stranger &
more groupso are corporating.
most of opposition has been Talking
TO naji
hass of Shah influeuse bad.
of naji apen 8 chocould corre are
that ceterible estence
P
we don't when like him
G
Tress realities - opposition a haji.
(more discression
Term it crice to Univers.
12
reluce at end wait world leave.
We proposed That necottable
10
6
while very or whing place present
set should stry If groups
be their sale decision we can't
want let naji out, that should
force him out.
Oppent is falling capact.
P
TREE press we hand disnessed
We harrint carred Schiping
G
Int's ist is Africa wasterched
upon numbrim process.
we could say press your prog
on Horn & we support Whombai
process.
100/
P
Bibles / silly adhan
Baltis - what if face is used
(described certact be supliction
I hmr desamosed how well zel
begets begticipation creating
G
C pederation Nike
probs have arim we went
to deal w/thron three guiter
autonomy, If reparation work
that whed
he dlynot X exect
dragest pesestivities
Sor puples circurrl ust
11
un tentured we
for 50 years of we are interguated
we have 60 mil lurny
out of their with ared
over 50900 hutria are ich Ress
5012 Est are revu Est
Lich majority hith
In Wrain 50 will the won-Uh.
Rog who only 30 70% permited
Qm country to that way o separation
(meditimel being creat shong C Russ feelings in byc people
not all mused their long once ye)
There has larth culming down but
still purs. This is serisitive
issued 100 It plyson condersione
not our position This could
bring out all serts of thrible
fries. of US has no sw.decthing
it usaned spare relating w/us
P
morethan any are plse
hantrometts - That eath workell
Buting your use force - you
create d prestorn. you will
cc e want allo get information
get chut prozation
G
Fuo If we removal on MVD
Whom 11 1 we will
older commistee
12
40 dews promo + we hayk you
to
what happened here is pricesch
we can say sustice
what we conster. Very pleased
Es increasive
Therease serm in both country
who don't let what wedning.
But colcerl u ght
Destributions Inco Herml not
be adamond S 500 Mindermine
this. het we inicina zone
P
what Tries
G
Service lies are presented and
press, etc. 1e, that Gorb said
his friends doore such as striclent
after dumbin
P
x new heard of This, we have
Decrease you orn don't
lots of nexto.
G
P
Visit exactly what I broyed
I dilit respond to cell AC but
we wont to more prevared Beet
we must represent. we washing
for usdays to more purther
in CFE, E, sampt consult
whertin esp mempowee
W/MATD
B
new ha calls for
new approach
Ruisa mentioned
marrin
8lus Ecm
AC C
Baltics
approved beham
NCF CA Environ
H.R.
Chen Would
CFE
START
Testing
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
Memicons/ Telcous (yan-Dec) 1989
Box 5-1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman
Gorbachev of Soviet Union
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter
Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
December 3, 1989, 11:45 am - 12:45 pm
AND PLACE:
Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta
The President: I want to discuss an idea on bibles and a
proposal on Billy Graham. (Described the question he is asked
about the Baltics). (U) what it Lerce is used (Descibes what says when he
gets questions.
Chairman Gorbachev: I have discussed how we see a [ILLEGIBLE].
Many problems have arisen. We were ready to deal with them
through greater autonomy. If separatism would become dominant,
that would be dramatic. I must not create a danger to
perestroika. The Soviet peoples would not understand. We lived
together for fifty years, we are integrated. We have sixty
million living out there in nationality areas. Fifty percent of
Estonia are Russians, over 50% of Latvians are now Russian,
Lithuanian majority in Lithuania. In the Ukraine, 50 million are
non-Ukrainian. Kazakhs are only 30% of the population. Our
country is that way and separatism brings out strong feelings by
people. ($)
There has been a calming down but still there are problems. Ths
is a sensitive issue for us. I hope you understand our position.
This would bring out all sorts of terrible fires. If the U.S.
has no understanding it would spoil relations with the U.S. more
than anything else. ($)
The President: But if you use force -- you don't want to --
that would create a firestorm. You will get that question. (S)
Chairman Gorbachev: We want all to get equal treatment. If we
removed our MVD troops from Nagarno-Karabakh we would have war.
We are committed to a democratic process and we hope you
understand. ($)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
AS AMENDED
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
2
What happened here is precisely what we wanted. We are very
pleased. There are some in both countries who don't like what we
are doing. But we are right. Destructive forces should not be
allowed to undermine this. Let me [ILLEGIBLE] some. (S)
The President What forces? (U)
Chairman Gorbachev: Sometimes lies are presented in the press,
etc., i.e. that Gorbachev sold his friends down the river as a
student after, drinking
[ILLEGIBLE]
bout.
($)
The President: I never heard of this. We have a lot of nuts.
(U)
Chairman Gorbachev: I know you don't believe it. (U)
The President: The visit is exactly what I hoped. I didn't
respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we
must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further
reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with
NATO.
($)
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
IMMEDIATE
SECRET Gorbarhev (Dobrynir) 1989-fund SCOWCROFT 199
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
Box 5-2
PAGE 01 OF 03
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER COMM OLEARY SIGLER
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM
SIT: COQ PRIVACY _OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 080128Z DEC 89
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECRET
SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
QQQQ
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EYES ONLY, TO AMBASSADOR
JACK MATLOCK, FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO
THE PRESIDENT.
-
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO
SIGNED ORIGINAL.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
-
I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR
PAGE 02 RUEADWW1790
SECRET
SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE
SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED
MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY,
I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF
THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH
WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD
TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS
UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO
DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN
ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 03
CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS, THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY
BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE
JANUARY MINISTERIAL.
-
LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS.
ALL OF THE ALLIES WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT AND TONE
OF OUR TALKS IN MALTA. THEY WELCOMED ACCELERATING THE PACE
OF KEY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE
FURTHER AREAS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION,
YOU MAY WANT TO REVIEW THE FOUR PRINCIPLES I PRESENTED
PAGE 03 RUEADWW1790 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. I WILL ASK AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
TO PROVIDE THEM TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE.
-
AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MALTA MEETING SETS THE STAGE
FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON NEXT JUNE, AND ESTABLISHES
A STRONG BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DIALOGUE WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.
-
ON A VERY PERSONAL BASIS I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU
AGAIN. IN MY VIEW, THE PERSONAL "CHEMISTRY" WAS GOOD AND
I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT DURING 1990 AND
BEYOND.
-
PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A
PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.
-
SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH
END TEXT.
PAGE 04 RUEADWW1790 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
-
WARM REGARDS, BRENT.
-
Gorbacher (Dobrynin)
1989-June!" 1989- 1440
5-2
0100 FINAL
20 December 1989
Demarche to Soviet Union
Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev
1.
Read enclosed Presidential announcement to Gorbachev
2.
President asked me personally to brief you on this matter.
3.
The President wants you to know that he took this action
only after becoming convinced that General Noriega had
become increasing unstable and dangerous and that the
American community, which numbers 35,000 people faced
increasing violent threats. As you know, a U.S. serviceman
was shot to death by PDF forces shortly after General
Noriega declared was on the United States and a serviceman's
was brutalized and his wife sexually threatened in a
separate incident.
4.
The United States sees no precedent in this action. Just
the opposite. This situation is unique.
5.
A democratic election was held May 7th and the results were
internationally recognized. The democratic choice was
denied through violence and repression.
2
6.
Moreover, General Noriega is an indicted drug trafficker
wanted for prosecution in the U.S.
7.
In addition, the United States has obligations under the
Panama Canal Treaties to safeguard safe passage through the
Panama Canal for all nations. Those Treaties have the force
of international law.
8.
The United States intends to remove its forces as quickly as
possible. It also intends to normalize its relations fully
with the Endara government. We hope that the Endara
government will have peaceful friendly relations with
others, including the Soviet Union.
9.
We have informed both Managua and Havana that they face
absolutely no security threat as a result of this action.
We hope you will repeat and reinforce this message.
10. We hope also that Nicaragua does not use this unique action
as an excuse to violate its commitment under Esquipulas to
go forward with the currently scheduled elections. The
United States remains committed to recognize the winner of
the election if it is free and fair no matter which party
wins. The U.S. also remains fully committed to resolve the
conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador under the
3
Esquipulas Treaties, including the commitments relayed by
Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
11.
The President hopes that in the spirit of Malta that your
government will take no action that will inflame this
situation or make it more difficult to resolve this crisis
quickly, peacefully, and democratically.
1989
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
Box 5-1
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Federal Republic
of Germany
?
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
December 12, 1989, 8:23 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Brussels, Belgium
The President: (Describes no agenda character.) Gorbachev was
very accommodating. No emotion like when I first saw him. The
most contentious issues were discussed without rancor.
(Sandanista supply issue, as an example.) This could have been
shouting match, but it was very calm. Spent much time on German
Gors.
question. Barb said you're in too much of a hurry.
Chancellor Kohl: Can I tell you about today in GDR. Everyone
has resigned. There is
supposedly running the government.
People wanted to know about special privileges for leaders.
That is only the beginning. In Restoch people broke into a
factory and found arms. They will now find where the arms were
going. (Describes Kreuzhooing, etc.)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
2010- 1262-MR
Declassify on: OADR
E8 11/23/15
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
2
I told Gorbachev it was not in my interest to invite things to
get out of control. I think Modrow will be new Secretary to
Parliament -- then go to meet new GDR leaders. We can't pay the
100 marks any more. It already amounts to 1.8 billion.
(Discusses how East Germans take advantage of it.) It will be
phased out at end of the year.
We will help in several ways:
-
Big shortage of doctors
-
Environmental protection
-
Telephone system
Gorbachev said to me he would not stand in way of free, open
elections. He has abandoned the old leadership. Hungarians will
be OK in 2-3 years. Not so in Poland.
Let me say a word about my 10-point program. First, thank you
for your clam reception. I will not do anything reckless. I
have not set up a timetable. We are part of Europe and continue
as part of EC. I have always planned carefully with Mitterrand.
Ten points is not an alternative to what we are doing in the
West. That is a precondition to 10 points. The integration of
Europe is a precondition for East European change to be
effective. Yesterday my colleagues said 10 points OK. Andreotti
was most difficult. Everyone in Europe is afraid of two things:
-
Germany would drift east -- this is nonsense,
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
3
-
The real reason is that Germany is developing faster
than my colleagues.
Frankly, 62 million prosperous Germans are difficult to tolerate
-- add 17 million more and they have big problems. Once GDR has
really
government, we will set up confederation structures
--
2
states. Phase IIi is federation -- that is a
matter for the future -- can be stretched out. But I can't say
that will never happen.
The President: Gorbachev's chief problem is uncertainty. Don't
want to say he was ballistic about it, just uneasy. We need a
foundation which doesn't
him but moves forward.
Chancellor Kohl: That's one reason I will do nothing to disturb
the smooth running course. CSCE says borders can be changed by
peaceful means. I don't want Gorbachev to feel cornered. I need
to meet with him. I don't want to create difficulties.
Newspapers write such nonsense. Even HAK mentions two years.
Not possible -- economic imbalance is too great.
The President: What is GDR people attitude toward reunification?
Are there different parties in West Germany?
Chancellor Kohl: In GDR they are badly informed about the
issues. GDR needs time to figure out what they really want. I
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
4
need a period of quiet development. One year ago, talk like this
would have been crazy. In FRG most people and parties are
supportive. The G
are opposed. They want army abolished
and neutrality. they are against re
.
SPD agreed last
Tuesday. Now there is a feud. This is Kohl's victory and theirs
is a failed system. Liberals are in favor but angry because it
is my success. Never have my people earned so much as now -- now
they want entitlement rather than work.
The President: I think the answer is self-determination and then
let things work. Then avoid things which would make it
impossible for Gorbachev.
Chancellor Kohl: Did he talk about internal developments?
The President: Oh yes. But that was very discouraging.
(Discussed how little Gorbachev knows.) (Western values.)
Chancellor Kohl: We're helping Hungary and Poland. We are
carrying the whole burden in Europe. Where is everyone else but
you and me? It's going to be a tough winter in Poland.
The President: And in Soviet Union. Are any of CEC opposed to
10 points?
Chancellor Kohl: Gonzalez very positive. France -- Mitterrand
wise. He knows it would be bad to oppose. But he wants it to
proceed moderately. Difficult to maintain the current structure
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
5
of the European Parliament. But 4th Republican Parliament too
strong. Now it is too weak. Benelux is fine. GB is rather
reticent.
The President: The understatement of the year!
Chancellor Kohl: Switzerland and Austria OK.
The President: Don't the Dutch resent Hitler?
Chancellor Kohl: Yes, very much. The Nazis were very tough in
the Netherlands. They were the worst Nazis from Vience. Neither
was governed by an honorable G
.
Thatcher says European
Parliament can have no power because Whitehall cannot yield a bit
of S
.
Her ideas are simply pre-Churchill. She thinks
prewar era has not come to an end. She thinks history is not
just -- Germany so rich and GB struggling. W
the war but
lost an
and this
.
She should try to bind the
Germans into the EC. (Thatcher and EC.) (French pride.)
Chancellor Kohl: Did he talk AC?
The President: Yes. (Describes)
Chancellor Kohl: Foth?
The President: No. Did Cheney's comments here cause a stir?
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
6
Chancellor Kohl: No. Reagan had reputation as hardliner.
Toward the end, he changed -- too quickly. Then you were elected
-- the VP to RR and the groups under you just C
. Your
visit last spring changed all that. Barbara helped that a lot.
These days now will be very important. Your leadership is
essential and you will have every support from me.
The President: Describes AC discussions; CFE in 90; START
hopefully in 90; chemicals -- Kohl hopes in 90 especially for his
election.
Chancellor Kohl: The schedule you outline would be fantastic.
Let's work these things closely. If we can do something in CFE,
chemicals and START, this would have a big impact on S&E Europe.
Nobody now believes that the EE troops would fight -- so the
numbers have changed dramatically.
The President: True, but I will still feel better when Soviet
divisions pull back.
Chancellor Kohl: But that creates problems for Gorbachev.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
Dreaktast news ,
Backer No acney 12/26
Box 5-3
Giving
X
*
I
Declare envergency these C Two mil
!
NCND
(
Huiti
LSE
-
Euro brueau - won't let
attaches into Baltics
- Refuses exchanges for will
people in Ezech, Pal H-errg,
and to Sero in Dep Crute?
Strat AC.
- hetter feltoin - no Tit
Build new US, ugns targetted
- Den't treat issue on bosis
against c
- P speech secular to Sept.
of purity let antagrists
P
Revision of ABM Treaty
I
VP speech to NATO
money we upsue
- Ceet cb
-
use to security
Memeons/Telcons (yan-Dec) 1489
Box 5-1
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR FLORENCE E. GANTT
FROM:
ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB
SUBJECT:
General Scowcroft's Notes for
the One-on-One with Presi-
dent Mitterand at St.
Martin on December 16
I have tried very hard to decipher the
General's handwriting, and have gotten
only as far as the third page. As you
will see from the attached manuscript,
the number of blanks that I have had
to leave is already considerable. As
I look at the remaining pages, I see
that the problem becomes even greater
as it goes along. I am afraid the
only way to put together a reasonable
transcript would be for someone more
familiar with the General's hand-
writing than I to do a first draft,
as was done with the Cavaco Silva
one-on-one transcript.
Many thanks.
Attachments
Tab I
General Scowcroft's notes
Tab II
Transcribed notes
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President
of France (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Notetaker
Francois Mitterrand, President
DATE, TIME
December 16, 1989,
AND PLACE:
St. Martin (exact place
)
President Mitterrand: It will be a small lunch so we will be
able to talk freely. (U)
The President: It is wonderful of you to have invited me here.
(U)
President Mitterrand: What is going now in Europe is the biggest
event since World War I. We are watching it with wonder. Each
day something unexpected happens. The Strasbourg Summit went
well. We made clear, well defined progress. We are scheduled to
have a completely open market within three years, which is a very
short time. We must therefore force our pace. We have moved
forward on the internal market in the areas of transportation,
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2
telecommunications and insurance. Decisions are needed on the
issue of monetary integration and we have set a schedule to deal
with them. We have also drafted a charter for our social
Tevelopment
institutions. On Eastern Europe we agreed to set up a developed
bank. All can participate. Gorbachev accepted my invitation
The bank will also be a training institution. Training is what
is needed most of all. ($)
In Strasbourg we looked at the events unfolding in Eastern
Europe, especially in East Germany. Two contrary impulses were
evident. The first group were those who think this is natural
and must be prevented. But there are
treaties, arrangements, and the Soviet Union. Great Britain,
Holland and Denmark are nervous about this big state in the
center of Europe. I am not so worried. Let German development
take place smiltaneonly inth Elugian developme
That way on
development can be contained. interturied We have lived with Germany for a
thousand years and we have survived. We know each other starting
with Charles V and the Germanic Empire. We have no inferiority
complex but we want no
embalance
which could
worry Gorbachev. Germany must take a clear stand as to its
These all the two contray trinds but
eastern borders. (whole sentence unintelligible)
this is the dialetic 0 today
($)
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3
The President: I would like your views on the two different ways
of looking at this. I worry about events in East Germany which
could accelerate this and
Gorbachev. I also
worry about the effect on Poland. But, in the short term, I
worry about preventing an event which could push the process too
fast. Do you share this concern?
($)
President Mitterrand: Yes. At any time there could be an
upheaval. The German Government is pushing too hard. The East
German Government is not ready for reunification. And I worry
about Poland more than any other country in Eastern Europe.
There are three problems: the first involves areas which used to
be German.
($)
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Gorbamer (Dobrynir)
1989- June 1990
THE WHITE HOUSE
Box 5-2
WASHINGTON
1-5-90
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the magnificently crafted model of
the "Aleksandr Nevsky." It is an ideal gift for
me because, as an old navy man, I dearly love
the sea.
I am sending along a few pictures which I hope
you will enjoy. When I look at them I am
reminded of our Malta meeting which, in my view,
was a big success.
I am also enclosing a video tape which was
prepared for you by a friend of mine who is a
U.S. movie producer, Jerry Weintraub. He used
some historical footage out of a famous film
library. The announcer on this tape,
incidentally, is a famous U.S. movie actor,
Charlton Heston.
I hope you and Mrs. Gorbacheva have a wonderful
New Year. I am convinced that the next year
will be one of even greater cooperation and
improvement in our relations.
I am determined to follow up on our talk about
START and about CFE. The whole world hopes that
we can reach agreement on these two treaties.
I also hope we can move ahead in the chemical
weapons field. I know you want to ban these
weapons and so do I. I still worry about
verification, but let's find the way to make
real progress in 1990.
2
I have followed the developments in Europe with
keen interest and with a genuine sense of
excitement. I note with great interest and
admiration the way those who support changes all
across Eastern Europe invoke your name in a most
favorable way - a well deserved tribute to your
own leadership for reform.
Let's VOW to stay in close touch during this
coming year.
Most sincerely,
G But
His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow
P.S. That ship model
will always remind we
of Malta and of sur
most constructive
and pleasant meeting
My
Gorbamer (Doprynir)
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1989-fune/990 1990
Box 5-2
0307
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1990
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PER E.O. 13526
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990
This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a
fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in
Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is
clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure
of the reformers -- men who have inadvertently set in motion
events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the
Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a
significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West;
and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions.
The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations
this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he
faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority
in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia's
traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev's sense of security
stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the
conviction -- bordering on faith -- that sophisticated diplomacy
can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But
there are observable cracks in Moscow's confidence about the
fruits of the new foreign policy -- particularly where Germany is
concerned -- and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow.
1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and
the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union's ills are worsening.
Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
should have a constitutionally guaranteed "leading role" --
precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command
economy can be expected to produce the needed economic
turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory
belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether
the Baltic states -- and other republics -- should be allowed to
secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved
through Gorbachev's usual jawboning and equivocation. If they
continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing.
Over time, the Soviet population -- while appreciating his role
in initiating reform -- has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as
ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and
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Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom
line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated
in the face of repeated challenges.
The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still
regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best
hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal -- total
independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may
take Gorbachev's continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them
to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in
Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will
further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a
threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev's
power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within
the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to
resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end
of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for
October 1990, will be crucial tests for him.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S. -Soviet
relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face
of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line
discredited too. Objectively, the U.S. -Soviet relationship has
never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting
at Malta infused U.S. -Soviet relations with a greater sense of
direction -- pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control,
human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every
reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be
sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more
sensible on Central America.
But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in
Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the
face of U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviet domination of Eastern
Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of
American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding
objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and
graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.
A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and
the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a
single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its
course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is
the German question. With that much at stake for the United
States, we will need to be intensively involved in the
increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which
will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany.
While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we
should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev
continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern
Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be
impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything
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about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion.
With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful
June U.S. -Soviet Summit -- particularly in arms control and the
economic sphere -- which may boost Gorbachev's image at home and
thus his staying power.
We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement
which would bring the conventional military balance into line
with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These
reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet
military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid
progress toward an "Open Skies" accord also would
institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale.
Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev
personally while emphasizing that it is the process of
perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based.
As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the
Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present,
Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by
some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and
prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic
goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of
pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in
the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
January 9, 1990
Jand meme.
0307
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
memo
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL RB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
SUBJECT:
Memorandum on Objectives for U.S. Soviet Relations
in 1990
The in memorandum for the President at Tab I examines the challenges
light of continuing Soviet internal difficulties.
U.S. -Soviet relations, particularly relating to Europe, in
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President.
Attachment
Tab I
Memo to President
DECLASSIFIED
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handwritten notes 1989
Box 5-3
CFE mtg W/P
- no disappeement 1/15/90 that
reduction to 200 owo will
happen divpmts. being impressen
-
Real question is how
TO do it
- CFE I
- CFE II
- Unilatercel
-
Since C only reason this
issue is before us is that
& rained it, it is incombert
on me to explain why.
- The main issued for we
is do your get out out ahead
with a bold,move TJ
show you understand
what going are in C
wolld you plan to take
of it, or do your
plan to hold back, let
C long or even C Say take
C lend and uppear to be
what
initeatives responding to bepularing others
Doing it now lets
AC you floor for Exerope set muder are AC e #'s
- additional cuts don't
upset C budget curless
you want it To
Cuts will tube 2-5
- Walling yes. accorday pare
your budget for
To showed dynamic
molvement in C
changes Tabing place
isn't bal.
Dolaying rishs losing
bath inistiative
and C opportunity To
applar bold and
-
separating adjust C cute pow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13a. Handwritten
Re: Bob Gates - Memcons (12 pp.)
1/16/92
(b)(1)
Notes
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
[Copies from Other Files] [3]
Date Closed:
9/8/2009
OA/ID Number:
91167-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: US Troop Levels in Europe
Strategic trends in Eastern Europe and the USSR, our budget
projections, and Congressional views all point to US troop
levels in Europe by end FY94 substantially below the CFE I
275,000 ceiling. The question is how we respond.
NSC proposes we move now to amend the CFE US-Soviet 275,000
ceiling to 200,000. DOD proposes instead that we indicate
publicly that we would expect US force levels to be reduced
substantially below the 275,000 by 1994, and make the reductions
contingent on future conditions and consultations.
There is merit in both approaches. But I am not certain that
either fully advances and protects key objectives:
1. Your commitment to complete CFE I this year.
2. Your continued leadership with the Allies and Congress
on European security issues.
3. Your strong commitment to a significant level of US
forces in Europe over the long term, which is fundamental
for stability and our influence on developments.
An approach combining elements of the DOD and NSC recommen-
dations might better serve these objectives. We would cast it
with the Allies and publicly as a "program for European security
and stability for the long term" with these key features:
1. Completing CFE I in 1990 is the keystone of our
program and we are working with our Allies to resolve the
key outstanding issues and speed agreement. (We are
working compromises that could be outlined if we can get
them agreed here and with the Allies in time.)
2. We and our Allies, propose that immediately after CFE I
is completed, the CFE participants also agree in 1990 on
an "outline of goals for further reductions" for follow-on
CFE II negotiations.
DECLASSIFIED
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3. These goals would reflect US plans to reduce its
forces in Europe to 200,000 at the earliest possible time
and in any event by the end of 1994, in consultation with
our Allies and assuming strategic trends continue. Our
objective is a significant level of forces in Europe for
the long term. (Note also that CFE I reductions agreed in
1990 would be completed by 1992-1993 in the Allies'
proposal and 1994-1995 in the Soviets'.
4. We expect the Soviet level of forces in Eastern Europe
to go much lower in the same time frame. US and Soviet
reductions below the CFE I levels should not be tied
together, whether in CFE II or in independent decisions.
There are important differences in roles and geography
that must be respected, and the will of countries that
host outside forces must be decisive.
This "program" sets out specific and concrete US reductions
rather than the general and hedged objective in the DOD
approach. In our view, the hedged approach will not fly in
Congress and will leave the Allies unsure of your bottom line.
The program also provides for CFE II which the DOD approach does
not; this is important because major Allies want some follow-on
negotiations and we can use it to brake Allied unilateral cuts.
The program breaks the linkage between US and Soviet force
levels whereas amending that level in CFE I, as the NSC approach
suggests, would help tighten it. This is important for our
objective of maintaining a significant US level in Europe while
getting the Soviets totally out of Eastern Europe. Even more
importantly, there is a high risk that moving to amend CFE I, as
the NSC approach calls for, will delay agreement in 1990. This
approach would avoid that.
Whatever we think or hear about possible Allied and Soviet
reactions, dropping the CFE I 275,000 to 200,000 is a major step
that could bog us down in a flood of questions, reservations and
conditions. If there were some way to assure this did not
happen, then this approach could be attractive, though we would
still have to find some way to handle the US-Soviet linkage
effect. But it is not clear that there is such a way and the
program outlined above seems a better way to advance and protect
our key objectives.
James Jim A. Baker / III
SECRET
SECRET EYES ONLY
WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ON CFE IN THE
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE
--
We have a sound program for European security over the long term.
--
Our objectives are:
a secure Europe, whole and free, of states living without fear of
intimidation or intervention in their internal affairs;
a substantially reduced but still significant U.S. military presence,
providing a source of stability; and
a cohesive NATO Alliance, continuing to provide the framework for
Western security.
--
A key element of our program for European security is completion of a CFE
agreement in 1990.
This will make a major contribution to European security.
It will result in the removal of over 300,000 Soviet troops from Eastern
Europe.
It will result in destruction of a large amount of Warsaw Pact military
equipment -- the tools of offensive warfare (tanks, artillery, and
armored troop carriers).
--
We would expect, assuming current trends continue, that U.S. force levels in
Europe would by 1994 be reduced substantially below the 275,000 level
contained in a CFE agreement.
We would complete these reductions only after close consultation with
our Allies as to the substance of the reductions and the manner of
making them.
These consultations would give prudent consideration to the security
situation at the time, political developments, and the impact on NATO
defense strategy.
SECRET EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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SECRET - EYES ONLY
Let no one doubt, however, the strength of our continuing commitment to
NATO and our European Allies.
The U.S. will continue to have a significant military presence in Europe.
Our presence in Europe serves important U.S. security interests.
We will remain in Europe as long as our Allies continue to require it.
SECRET - EYES ONLY
Gorbadhev (Dobrynin)
Hand delivered
1989- June 1990
by And Dutorin
Box 5-2
Comei 1-19-90 has orig
Unofficial translation
His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.
January 17, 1990
Dear Mr. President,
Thank you for your letter of December 8, transmitted throug
Ambassador Matlock. I wish to say from the outset that I share
your assessment of the Malta meeting. I believe we have every
reason to say that it has taken Soviet-American relations to
a new level of mutual understanding.
The fact that we, while remaining realists in approaching
the issues that divide us, have begun to clear the USSR-US
relationship of everything that stands in the way of its normal
development, opens up great opportunities, in my view, for
bilateral cooperation and for building new international
relations based on trust, mutual respect, and a balance of
interests.
Of course, a number of issues were not discussed in depth
at Malta. Therefore, I support your idea that all issues which
are the subject of the Soviet-American dialogue be discussed
in the coming months between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs
Eduard A. Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker.
I took note of your information about the US allies'
reaction to the Malta talks. At a meeting in Moscow we informed
in detail the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member states on the
substance of the Soviet-American talks at Malta. Our allies
welcomed the results of those talks and expressed their
satisfaction with the thoughtfulness and the reasonable
approach to the developments in Western and Eastern Europe.
2.
It is my view that the United States and the Soviet Union
should continue to conduct business with respect to Europe,
which is going through turbulent and profound changes, on the
basis of prudence and great responsibility.
As a separate issue, I would like to touch on the question
of Panama. I acquainted myself with the arguments conveyed by
your Ambassador in Moscow. I must say that I cannot agree with
them, as well as with the statement contained in your message
of December 26, 1989, to the effect that the US action in
Panama is somehow fully consistent with the principles that
we discussed at Malta.
Our position of principle is known to you. We reject the us
of force in international relations as an instrument of
resolving conflict situations. It is in those terms that this
question was discussed during the Malta talks. There, we
sought to make this principal idea clear to the US side: no
objective can serve as a justification of the use of military
force. Universality of the politico-diplomatic procedures must
be recognized as absolute. To allow for a multitude of
interpretations or authorize exceptions here would mean to
emasculate the efforts of the international community (and
both our countries are playing a prominent role in them) to
affirm the primacy of law.
We in the Soviet leadership have begun to reflect on the
possible areas of progress to be made at the forthcoming Soviet-
American negotiations in 1990. We believe that a more specific
determination in this regard could be made as a result of our
foreign ministers' meetings on which you and I agreed earlier.
I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to continue our
correspondence not only on urgent problems, but on key
conceptual issues in the interests of USSR-US rapprochement and
enhancing stability in international relations.
3.
I wish to conclude this letter by expressing the hope
that the year 1990 will be productive for our relations.
Sincerely,
Mikhail GORBACHEV
Moscow
Kremlin
date =?
Memcons/Telcons (yah- Dec.) 1489
Jaruzelshi phone all
Box 5-1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3 billion in dollars
mattresses which
squirled away in
would comeonting then
were in US banks to put it
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require. He weeds
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perbablew 7019 - minum
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Lethere think There
maytions be a federation
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handwritten notes 89
Box 5-3
2079169 -
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end
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