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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Roman Popadiuk Briefings Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
foia Number:
2005-0336-F
2005-0336-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
National Security Council
Series:
Poneman, Daniel B., Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
OA/ID Number:
CF01349
Folder ID Number:
CF01349-011
Folder Title:
OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
8
6
1
3
POSTP
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Dan: Here is the PCAST National Security Panel
material. I'll come by in a day or two
to discussit. H has Jone to Brady to be sent out for
comment.
Regards
Charles H
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01a.
To: Richard Barth From: Daniel Poneman
12/9/91
(b)(1)
C
Memorandum
Re: Comments on PCAST nonproliferation ideas (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Poneman, Daniel B., Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy]
Date Closed:
1/19/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF01349-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0336-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b.
To: President Bush From: Allan Bromley
12/5/91
(b)(1)
C
Memorandum
Re: Report of the PCAST Panel on Science, Technology and
National Security (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Poneman, Daniel B., Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy]
Date Closed:
1/19/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF01349-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0336-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01c.
To: Allan Bromley From: Panel on Science and Technology
12/5/91
(b)(1)
C
Memorandum
and National Security
Re: Report of the Panel on Science, Technology, and
National Security of the President's Council of Advisers on
Science and Technology (PCAST) (22 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Poneman, Daniel B., Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy]
Date Closed:
1/19/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF01349-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0336-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01d. Paper
Options for Presidential Action, recommendations of the
12/5/91
(b)(1)
C
PCAST Panel on Science, Technology and National
Security (6 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Poneman, Daniel B., Files
Subseries:
Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy]
Date Closed:
1/19/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF01349-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0336-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
QOSTP
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 3, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR D. ALLAN BROMLEY
FROM:
THE PANEL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CMH
SUBJECT:
PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PANEL ON SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISERS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (PCAST)
Background
The President's National Security Strategy of the United States, outlined in his Aspen,
Colorado speech of August 2, 1990 identifies America's superior ability to apply science
and technology as one of the cornerstones of U.S. national security. For nearly half a
century, America used technological superiority to offset the numerical superiority of
Soviet military power. More recently, the spectacular performance of U.S. defense and
intelligence technology in Operation Desert Storm graphically demonstrated to the
world American technical military superiority. On September 27, the President took
the lead in reducing the threat from theatre nuclear weapons, reinforcing the need for
a high technology force capable of fighting the most likely wars of the future: very
rapid, very intense actions, using precision weapons with precision information under
precision control, that achieve objectives rapidly with minimum loss of life or
destruction. Leadership in science and technology thus made American leadership in
world affairs effective at a critical juncture. Science and technology have accompanied
a strong economy, democratic institutions, and favorable geography in ensuring U.S.
national security.
Because of the key role science and technology have played in U.S. national security,
the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology in consultation with the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has convened a Panel on
Science, Technology, and National Security of the PCAST to assist him in advising the
President on policy issues related to science and technology and the national security
interests and objectives of the United States.
In its deliberations to date, the Panel has concluded that science and technology will be
even more important to U.S. national security in the future than it has been in the
past:
Understanding the dramatically changing world will require quality intelligence,
which will depend on innovative technologies for collection, processing, analysis
and dissemination of information. Moreover, assessment of important emerging
intelligence problems related to proliferation, conversion of Soviet defense
industries, analysis. and economic issues will require technical expertise to aid intelligence
- 2 -
Technology will be needed to compensate for shrinking defense budgets, making
America's smaller military forces more effective.
Advances in technology will contribute to shortening future wars while causing
fewer casualties (friendly and hostile), and thus will help to create politically
practical military options for the President.
An innovative science and technology base can help the nation hedge against an
uncertain future, since it will contribute to the creation of a wider range of
future security options from which the nation can choose as new threats develop.
Discussion
America enjoys scientific and technological leadership today because of the large
investments made over the past decades. But the Panel is concerned that, looking to
the future, continued American superiority in national security science and technology
is not automatic and can only be assured through deliberate government action. The
reasons for this caution are:
Science and technology are advancing rapidly and other nations are competing
with America for broad scientific and general technological leadership.
Therefore, America's lead is inherently perishable.
Smaller defense budgets and a more varied and uncertain set of threats to U.S.
security call for new and innovative methods of applying technology: some of
the methods and institutions used to counter the Warsaw Pact threat to Europe
may not be suited to the national security challenges of the new world.
Important technology of national security significance increasingly originates in
commercial firms and in foreign nations as well as in U.S. defense laboratories.
High-tech weapons, and weapons of mass destruction, are falling into the hands
of potential opponents.
The government's methods of creating and applying technology, and of
procuring high-technology systems, have become inefficient.
Together, these factors present a strong challenge to the continuing technological lead
called for in the President's National Security Strategy.
The Panel has the task of devising policy options that will provide to future presidents
as wide a lead in defense and intelligence technology as America enjoys today. In its
preliminary deliberations, the Panel has identified six critical areas for priority
attention:
1. Science and Technology's Contribution to Intelligence in the New World
Order. Collecting intelligence through state-of-the-art technical means has been a
unique American national security advantage. Issues for the future identified by the
Panel include protecting this intelligence technology lead in the face of budget
reductions, exploiting new opportunities for satellite and airborne wide-area
surveillance, applying leading edge technologies to intelligence analysis, developing
technically talented personnel in the intelligence community, improving intelligence
support for military operations, especially "near real time" tactical intelligence,
improving counter intelligence and the protection of sensitive technologies, and
selectively sharing the intelligence burden and product with friendly nations.
- 3 -
?
2.[Integrated Systems Approach to Non-Proliferation. The Panel believes that
however strong the pace of American advance in defense science and technology, our
security can be eroded by the proliferation of advanced weaponry to potential
adversaries. In addition, proliferation of high technology weapons/may make conflicts
more likely. An integrated systems approach that combines use of technical, economic,
military, political and financial information with unilateral, bilateral or multilateral
political actions would allow major improvements in our ability to restrain high tech
weapons proliferation. Such an approach to the proliferation threat is a major
international undertaking requiring American leadership. Such an undertaking can be
assisted by the international action to force responsible behavior in Iraq; by new
possibilities for cooperation among the U.N. Permanent Five after the cold war; in the
examples of multinational agreement to limit armaments and of intrusive verification
set in CFE, the chemical biological weapons conventions; and by INF and START; in
?
and
the strong position of the United States to take a leadership role after its cold war and
Desert Storm victories; and, in the clear example provided by Saddam Hussein's Iraq
of the failure of past piecemeal approaches and of the potential price of failure to
contain future proliferation.
The Panel believes that any such approach will require major contributions from
science and technology. Assessing the threat, tracking world trends in technology,
obtaining and assessing intelligence, and devising methods of inspection and verification
will require technical as well as political, military and economic expertise. Moreover,
this approach will require combining the expertise in Defense, State, Commerce,
Energy, the Intelligence Community, and other involved agencies and thus would
inevitably require White House guidance. The Panel will therefore be exploring
innovative technical and policy options for the President that would implement such an
approach.
3. New Approaches to the Application of Science and Technology by
Government. For more than decade, a host of reports like that of the "Packard
Commission" have decried government's inability to develop and procure high-
technology systems efficiently. Today two new factors add to the urgency of solving the
problem. First, American industry is adopting entirely new modes of developing
technology in order to compete with foreign firms, and these new modes make the
barriers between "the government's way" and industry's way even harder to surmount.
Second, the reorientation of U.S. national security strategy to a new and more
uncertain family of potential threats creates the need for a more agile and more diverse
science and technology effort for national security. In this period of declining budgets
inefficiencies cannot be tolerated.
Since many of the barriers to efficiency arise from government-wide regulations
and from Congressional oversight, the several departments and agencies that deal with
national security, and which generally recognize the problems, need Presidential help to
solve them. The Panel is assessing in particular: some experimental streamlined
approaches between government and the nation's leading high-tech defense and
commercial industries, the proper allocation of defence budget cuts within the national
security establishment, and the paramount need to induce technically qualified people
to serve in government.
4. Attracting technically qualified people to serve in sensitive national security
posts. The Panel believes that no combination of policy initiatives will succeed in
preserving the technological lead called for in the National Security Strategy unless the
President regains the ability to attract the best technical personnel to serve in his
- 4 -
administration. When the nation responded to the Soviet Union's Sputnik launch in
1957, a generation of America's finest scientists and engineers involved themselves in
the solution to that era's national security problems. But now, Cabinet officers testify
regularly to the great difficulty they encounter today in recruiting qualified technical
executives, and the Panel believes that the difficulty to attract top talent to key jobs is
the single most significant impediment to fulfillment of the science and technology
component of the President's national security strategy.
5. A New Emphasis on Selected Defensive Systems. The President's National
Security Strategy emphasizes the need to reorient defense planning to regional
contingencies. Regional contingencies like Desert Storm involve projecting U.S. striking
power overseas quickly, with decisive effect, and with minimal casualties to both
friendly and hostile forces. Such striking power is clearly the highest priority for the
U.S. military in the next decade. But looking further into the future, the Panel is
concerned that the United States and its citizens will increasingly come under direct
physical threat from other nations. These threats to U.S. citizens abroad, to U.S.
forces abroad, to U.S. allies and friends, and eventually to the United States itself will
require a new technology emphasis on defensive systems in addition to long-range
projection of striking power. Since technology exploration today is needed to prepare
deployment options a decade hence, the Panel believes that national security technology
efforts should reflect a new emphasis on selected defensive systems, including biological
warfare defenses, counter-terrorism, counter-mine and anti-diesel submarine warfare,
coalition defense of allies, and defenses against theater and intercontinental missiles.
6. Enunciating a technology strategy for superiority. Finally, the Panel believes
that the science and technology component of our national security strategy will not
receive adequate attention unless the President enunciates his policy for this area
clearly to the departments and agencies of the government and unless an integrated
plan and its implementation is overseen by a coordinated effort of the NSC, OSTP, and
OMB. White House effort is needed to enforce adequate budget emphasis on
preserving our science and technology edge, to harmonize the defense science and
technology effort with other such federal efforts and with commercial industry's efforts
for maximum overall national benefit, and to catalyze efforts in new sciences and
technologies that have potentially revolutionary impacts on national security.
Conclusion
The Panel will be preparing specific policy options for its final report to Dr. Bromley
in December.
- 5 -
DISTRIBUTION:
D. Allan Bromley
Thomas J. Welch
Kenneth P. Yale
Solomon J. Buchsbaum
John S. Foster, Jr.