Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
428079839
label
President's Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, February 10, 1989 (2 of 2)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
428079839
contentType
document
title
President's Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, February 10, 1989 (2 of 2)
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
subjects
Canada
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
428079839
levelOfDescription
item
productionDates
day
10
logicalDate
1989-02-10
month
2
year
1989
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
3a4a8ace7d5dbacf
ocrText
CONFIDENTIAL
4263
Embassy of the United States of America
February 10, 1989
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Subject: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney
Place: 7 Rideau Gate, Ottawa
Participants: Canadian Side
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark
Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister Stanley Hartt
Ambassador Derek Burney
External Affairs Under Secretary James Taylor
External Affirs Assistant Deputy Minister (US Affairs)
Donald Campbell
U.S. Side
The President
Secretary James A. Baker, III
Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles
Chief of Staff to the President John Sununu
General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
Prime Minister Mulroney opened the meeting with a warm welcome,
stressing the government's loyalty and friendship for the United
States. The relationship is complicated, and there is anti-American
feeling in Canada. However, the November 21 election demonstrated
that this sentiment did not run deep. As the two new
Administrations begin, Mulroney said that he wanted the President to
know that he would deal honestly and above board and that when the
United States needed help, Canada would be there. He said he
regarded the President as leader of the Alliance and although he
wasn't asking for miracles, he said he would be delighted with
progress on a certain issue.
The President said his visit sent an important signal of the
importance he attaches to Canada-US relations. He was excited to be
in Ottawa and was looking forward to working with Mulroney. He
noted the "personal" element in the Canadian election, and Mulroney
said he had much appreciated the President's supportive telephone
call after the October 24 Canadian debate. The President said that
he was prepared to discuss acid rain, adding that he understood
Canada's concerns. His Administration will set new standards and
talk frankly with Canada on the issue.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
2009-0655-MR
SCS 1/13/11
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Continuing, the President said he had stressed to the Prime
Minister during the ride in from the airport that he did not plan to
be recalcitrant with the Allies or hesitant with the USSR. However,
as Gorbachev has been informed, the Administration needs to review,
carefully but expeditiously, the broad range of issues facing it.
The President said he had told Gorbachev during their session on
Governors Island in December not to be confused on this point.
There are big opportunities ahead, the President added, in East-West
relations, but it is far from clear how the situation in the USSR
will develop. Gorbachev had stressed during the talks on Governors
Island that there would be no retreat on perestroyka. Given the
dynamic situation, this requires close consultations with our
Allies, and the President said that he was going to be a good
listener in these consultations. He noted that he and Secretary
Baker had met with two German visitors, Chancellery Director
Schaubele and FDP President Lambsdorf, with whom the President might
not normally have met, in order to get their views. Secretary
Baker's trip is a good example of how we plan to work with our
Allies and find ways to take the offensive, not simply react to
Gorbachev's proposals.
The President noted that the United States could not ignore the
Pacific Region and had to keep in close touch with countries such as
the PRC. His trip to Asia was more than simply for the Hirohito
funeral but also to demonstrate our great interest in that part of
the world.
In his talks with the Japanese leaders, the President said he
would stress that they should use their immense financial resources
to help countries such as the Philippines. We must be careful and
not push the Japanese to do too much on defense, given the residual
concerns in ASEAN about Japanese imperialism.
On Central America, the President said he did not know how far
the US and Canada differed. He said he hoped to work with Congress
to avoid two signals: (1) that the US would behave in a "Rambo-like"
fashion or (2) that the US didn't care about what happened in
Nicaragua, as Speaker Wright had signalled last year. Secretary
Baker, the President added, was working closely with Congress in an
effort to ensure that the United States speaks with one voice. He
noted that it had been difficult for Allies to support the US on
Central America since we were so clearly divided ourselves. The
European view of the Sandinistas is changing, and in the FRG, France
and Spain there is a more realistic assessment. We do want to work
with our Allies in this area, the President stressed, noting how
important Central America is to the United States. As far as the
Soviet Union is concerned, the President said he told Gorbachev that
less military support for Nicaragua and Cuba would be a major
contribution to improving US-Soviet relations. As far as US-Cuban
relations are concerned, the President said he was not interested in
any bold initiative involving Castro, who continues to support
subversion and is engaged in human rights abuses.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
The Prime Minister said he was very interested in learning more
about the United States' political/strategic priorities. He noted
that some (unidentified) Western leaders seemed to assume that Japan
is moving into a coequal status with the United States. He did not
agree. However, he said it was important for the United States to
reassert its leadership role in the Alliance. As far as Central
America was concerned, the Prime Minister said that the President
was absolutely right when he discussed the confusing signals
resulting from internal divisions. People in Canada, for instance,
asked why the GOC should support the US, given Congressional
opposition to Administration policies. Coherence is required.
Mulroney repeated his point regarding Japan, stressing that he did
not see the US as a "declining star."
The President said that he certainly was not expecting a total
change in executive-legislative relations in Washington, but he felt
through the consultations conducted by Secretary Baker some progress
could be made. He suggested that Speaker Wright feels exposed and
wants to back off somewhat. The War Powers Act and the requirements
for notification on intelligence operations gives the impression of
confusion. We are talking with Congress, he added, about how to
return to a more bipartisan foreign policy. Senator Nunn, for
example, agrees with the President's point on reducing
"micro-management." As far as Japan is concerned, the President
said he intended to take a firm position on trade issues. We have
been "had" by the Japanese. While he was a free trader, he would
not be a patsy. Thus, the Canadians should expect a tougher stance,
led by Ambassador Hills.
The Prime Minister asked what the President's priorities were
for the Western Alliance. In reply, the President said our first
requirement was to get our individual and collective acts together.
He expressed our concerns about 1992, which he termed a big
potential problem. Our preoccupation with East-West relations does
not exclude, the President said, concern over trade problems with
Europe. Gorbachev, he added, is putting great strains on the
Western Alliance with his flood of proposals. The President said he
was particularly worried about Germany. In order to ensure
continuing American leadership, we have to be firm but reasonable in
our Alliance consultations. Our leadership must reflect
sensitivity. Summing up, the President listed Alliance solidarity,
moving ahead with the USSR, and dealing with 1992 as three main
priorities. There is a big opportunity for us in dealing with
Eastern Europe, he said, if we can get our act together. There is a
potential for economic cooperation, but there is also the danger, he
added, of pushing too far in Eastern Europe and causing the
situation to get out of control, at which point the tanks might come
in.
CONFIDENTIAL
FIDENTIAL
-4-
Prime Minister Mulroney observed that Chancellor Kohl, who has
a good feel for what is happening in Eastern Europe, sees a major
challenge there. Thinking about countering Gorbachev's PR
campaigns, Mulroney asked whether a Bush trip to Eastern Europe
might be a big event. He noted that Mitterrand visited Bulgaria but
made a modest splash. If the President went, however, armed with a
comprehensive plan for dealing with the area and a sense of how to
use the symbolism involved, this could be quite a PR coup. This
would be good for the President, other Allies, and not necessarily
bad for Gorbachev, Mulroney added.
The President recalled his recent visit to Poland where he had
been rather surprised by Jaruzelski, who was more impressive than he
had expected. Jaruzelski spoke frankly about the problems of
dealing with Solidarity, complaining at one point that Solidarity
was demanding five-year maternity leaves. Jaruzelski fancies
himself, the President added, as Gorbachev's best friend in Poland
and responsible for perestroyka in Poland.
Mulroney asked what our assessment was of the situation in the
Soviet Union, specifically whether Gorbachev was "in charge." The
President said it was hard to know whether Gorbachev was in
trouble. He recalled his surprise when Shevardnadze had to leave
the UNGA abruptly last September to go back to the crucial Central
Committee Plenum. He also noted Sakarhov's recent suggestions that
Gorbachev might be overthrown. However, the President added, we
cannot base our policy on one leader.
Mulroney asked again whether we felt Gorbachev's position is
threatened. General Scowcroft said that there was opposition, but
so far that opposition was without focus. The nationalities problem
was a threat, particularly if it became greater in the Ukraine. The
opposition, General Scowcroft said, was essentially is the Party,
which is threatened by Gorbachev's reforms. The President noted
that Gorbachev seemed to be building his own staff in opposition to
the Party, with people like Akhromeyev and Dobrynin popping up in
offices next to the General Secretary. In any case, the President
said, there seemed to be no chance that the USSR could go back to
the status quo pre-Gorbachev.
Secretary Baker said that it was important to know that the
Bush Administration did not believe that it would be to our
advantage for Gorabchev to fail, although there may be some in the
US who feel that way. The President recalled how sensitive
Gorbachev could be on this point, noting that he had flared up when
President Reagan asked him during the Governors Island meeting how
perestroyka was doing. Gorbachev had responded that the US has
plenty of problems too, but after he cooled down, Gorbachev
discussed the opposition within the USSR in very frank terms.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-5-
The Prime Minister asked when it would be possible for the
United States and other Allies to say that there had been such big
changes in the Soviet Union that we could more toward reductions in
our own defense forces. The President said that our review, of our
policy toward the Soviet Union would be completed within a very
brief period. We would then be able to make concrete proposals. At
the same time, we must maintain stability and equality in key areas
with the Soviet Union. We cannot ignore the risks posed by the
USSR, but we must look carefully at Gorbachev's proposals. General
Scowcroft said that we want to move ahead but be prepared, should
Gorbachev fall or should the Soviet Union fail to carry out an
agreement, to recover our own military position quickly. Secretary
Baker said that the bottom line answer to Mulroney's question is
that we will never know whether fundamental changes have taken place
in the USSR that would enable us to make equally far-reaching
changes in our own posture.
Mulroney turned to the public affairs area, recalling that Joe
Clark had recently given a very reasonable and balanced speech on
East-West relations only to find a great uproar in some circles in
Canada where Clark was accused of being a cold warrior. Kohl has
told Mulroney that the same thing happened to him, and Mulroney
asked whether there was any way in which the West could preempt
Gorbachev. The President agreed that we do not simply want to be
reactive. Secretary Baker observed that it was difficult to preempt
Gorbachev given the tremendous imbalance in conventional forces,
which enabled Gorbachev to make one dramatic move after another.
The Secretary added that Gorbachev will decide his own fate and that
what we do in the West will have relatively little impact on his
position. He admitted that it was important for us to take the
public affairs high ground.
Joe Clark suggested that it would be useful to identify areas
where the Bush Administration can distinguish its policies from
those of President Reagan. This was true in relations with the USSR
as well as in Central America.
The President observed that as far as Soviet intentions it was
very difficult to know where they are and where they are going.
However, it was clear that socialism had lost its allure both in the
USSR and elsewhere. Thus far, there was no formal recognition of
this, but that might come in the future.
Even the Sandinistas are changing their rhetoric, claiming to
be following the "Swedish model." The example of the Soviet
economy, as Gorbachev himself has admitted, is not attractive.
Despite the evident failure of the Soviet system, however, Gorbachev
continues to attract public support, and the President said it was
clear that the West needed to regain the propaganda high ground.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-6-
The Prime Minister observed that "They have figured us out, but
we don't have them figured out." We need to do the same sort of
strategic thinking, he added, that the President's campaign used in
the "Boston harbor" case. The Soviets are doing the same thing to
us, he said, that the President did to Governor Dukakis. He
compared NATO and Warsaw Pact consultations, noting how much easier
it is for Gorbachev to run his side of the picture. He asked
whether there might be some dramatic move available to the President
such as President Nixon's visit to the PRC.
The President agreed on the need for us to take the initiative
and build greater public support. Perhaps some move in Eastern
Europe ("playing in his end zone") might be useful. We had to play
this card with care, however, to avoid a Soviet decision to send in
the tanks. We also need to make more of our strengths: the fact
that we are the proponents of democracy, human rights, and free
economies.
The President said he was very concerned over trends in U.S.
defense spending. He noted that he had proposed a one-year freeze,
with increases only to meet inflation, after which modest increases
would be proposed. However, Gorbachev has had a very bad impact on
public support for defense spending. The Prime Minister observed
that the West is "Great on policy but lousy on politics." How could
we, he asked, obtain some quid pro quo for the fact that Soviet
spokesmen such as Vladimir Pozner are always on "Nightline." The
President said that if the West had the resources, a massive program
of youth exchanges would help open up the USSR. Secretary Baker
noted that we have a great story to tell on the economic side but we
are not doing it. On the distinctions between NATO and Warsaw Pact
consultations, the Secretary said it reminded him of the economic
situation in South America, where undemocratic Chile was doing so
much better economically than the democratic states.
Joe Clark suggested that the NATO allies worry too much about
the substance and too little about the presentation. He asked
whether the 1991 Moscow Human Rights Conference gave us an opening.
The President said he would have preferred to hold off on agreeing
to that Conference, but now that it is on, we need to make good use
of it. The idea of a human rights meeting in Moscow appears to be a
contradiction in terms, the President added, and we need to work
together to demonstrate that holding the Conference in Moscow does
not mean that we approve of Soviet behavior. We must also use the
Conference to push the Soviets further in the right direction.
Secretary Baker said that there were some conditions, which we
had to keep stressing, for holding the Conference in Moscow. Clark
recalled that Canada had been one of the last holdouts, but we
cannot renege now. The West must decide, he said, what we require
from the Soviets before the Conference and how best to use it. The
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-7-
President asked whether Western delegates would have access to
Soviet media while in Moscow. Ambassador Ridgway said this was one
of the guarantees we had required.
The Prime Minister again complained about Gorbachev's media
successes in the West. In Canada, he said, Gorbachev has better
media access for his proposals than the Canadian government.
Governor Sununu said the media has a strange relationship with the
message. In domestic politics, you can counter this with paid ads,
an option not available in the international arena. The West needs
to pick its ground carefully and not play on Gorbachev's field. Joe
Clark remarked that the FRG was the key in the public relations war
and that the West was losing there. The President and Secretary
Baker agreed.
The Prime Minister noted that President Mitterrand had some big
plans for the July 14-16 Economic Summitt and the period immediately
before that were not necessarily in the general Western interest.
At the same time, the Prime Minister said he did not believe
Mitterrand was hostile toward the US. The President agreed, noting
that Mitterrand was simply French. The Prime Minister suggested
that the President had a relatively brief grace period when he could
put his personal stamp on events and gain a dominant position in the
Alliance. He said some assertion of the President's role, in part
as a counter to Mitterrand, would be helpful. Clark asked whether
some US gesture to Mitterrand, perhaps by honoring the French
revolution in the U.S., would be helpful. The Prime Minister noted
that Mitterrand was inviting Rajiv Gandhi and 20 or so other heads
of state to Paris for the July 14 ceremonies, a procedure that
threatens to make issues such as third world debt dominate the
Summit.
The President observed that Mitterrand was also moving on a
environmental conference. The Prime Minister said that while
vacationing in Florida around January 1, he had been called by
French PM Rocard to invite him to an environmental conference in The
Hague. It was hard for the Prime Minister to turn this one down.
Bob Hawke had called the Prime Minister from Thailand to ask what
this conference was all about. The Prime Minister said the
Conference would be held in The Hague on March 11, with Bruntland,
Lubbers and Rocard hosting. There were some troubling elements,
such as the secrecy with which it was being planned, the exclusion
of the United States, and the idea that it would adopt a declation
establishing a supernational authority. The President asked whether
Mrs. Thatcher was going to attend. The Prime Minister said there
was some confusion on this, but he said he understood that Mrs.
Thatcher, having heard about the Conference, was told that she would
be invited if she guaranteed that she would accept and would sign
the declaration. He said he understood that Mrs. Thatcher found
both conditions unacceptable.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-8-
The President asked which country was the driving force behind
the conference. Clark said it was a French idea, but that they had
located it in The Hague in the event it was a failure. The Prime
Minister recalled that the President had proposed such a conference
during the recent campaign. The President said this was correct,
adding that we were now talking about arrangements for the
conference. Clark said that Mitterrand was playing the third world
card with both the Conference and the Economic Summit. The Prime
Minister said that Mitterrand exaggerates his role and his
importance. Secretary Baker asked whether Canada had signed the Law
of the Sea Convention. Mr. Hartt said Canada had signed but not
yet ratified.
The President said that Canada did not need advice from the US,
but he urged that the GOC be very careful about Mitterrand's
environmental conference. He said he was very worried by the
secrecy surrounding it. The Prime Minister said he was very
concerned that the US would not be there. Clark said that the
subject of the Conference, climate change and the greenhouse effect,
was a very serious issue. It would be very unhelpful for the
Conference to misfire. Perhaps we should look around for other
auspices, he said. Secretary Baker agreed, and the President noted
that we were working on a similar idea. Governor Sununu said that
the issue had to be handled carefully and that a forum for public
debate was not needed.
Returning to the question of Mitterrand's plans for the
Economic Summit, the Prime Minister said the "Summit isn't really
going to be the Summit. Secretary Baker agreed, adding that it
appeared that we would be joining in "global negotiations" after
having refused this at Cancun in October 1981 and were being set up
for a discussion of third world debt.
The Prime Minister asked whether it would be possible to go
over acid rain before lunch. In reply, the President outlined his
position as follows: 1) full funding of the clean coal technology
program; 2) amendments to the Clean Air Act with targets and
timetables for emission reductions to get our own house in order;
and 3) a different emphasis, i.e. the time for research only has
passed. The Prime Minister congratulated the President on this
initiative. He noted that under his leadership, Canada, too, had
turned first to the home front, cleaning up its own act. He said he
hoped that it would also be possible to negotiate a bilateral
agreement. The President confirmed that it was his intention to
move on to negotiate an agreement with Canada as soon as the
legislative process is well launched.
The President asked what the impact of acid rain was for the
average Canadian. Clark noted that Canadians live the myth of their
close connection with the outdoors. More seriously, however, Clark
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-9-
said that the impact on lakes, rivers, forests etc was serious and
that all Canadians felt it. The Prime Minister went through the
statistics of the number of dead and threatened lakes and rivers.
The President asked how the responsibility for the problem in Canada
is divided between Canada and the US. Mr. Campbell used the
familiar Canadian figures that show both countries contributing
about half of the acid deposition in Canada.
Governor Sununu warned of the dangers of a lack of balance in
the relative contributions of the two countries to a solution of the
problem. In response to Clark's comment that acid rain was a very
serious environmental problem, Governor Sununu said this was not the
point; rather, he said, we face a serious political question due to
the very heavy costs involved if we are to deal with the acid rain
problem, compared with what Canada is spending. Economics,
politics, and trade issues are all involved here. Ambassador Burney
took exception, noting that Canada's contribution to the clean up
was commensurate with Canada's contribution to the problem. Mr.
Hartt said that we should begin to negotiate soon; the longer we
wait, the more difficult it will be. Governor Sununu again pointed
to the politics of the issue and its great sensitivity in the US.
At this point, the discussion adjourned and the group went to
24 Sussex for lunch.
Thomas M. T. Niles
Ambassador
CONFIDENTIAL