Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
428079967
label
Plenary Session with King Hussein of Jordan, April 19, 1989
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
428079967
contentType
document
title
Plenary Session with King Hussein of Jordan, April 19, 1989
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
subjects
Jordan
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
428079967
levelOfDescription
item
productionDates
day
19
logicalDate
1989-04-19
month
4
year
1989
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
785773fe7d4ebe0c
ocrText
SECRET
SECRET
2826
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Plenary Session with King Hussein of Jordan
PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ambassador Roscoe Suddarth
Paul Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning,
Department of State
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Jordan
King Hussein
Prince Abdullah bin Hussein
Zayd al-Rifai, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense
Zayd bin Shakir, Chief of the Royal Court
Adnan Abu Odeh, Advisor for Political Affairs
Amir Khammash, Special Advisor to the King
Marwan Sidqi al-Kasim, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister
Abdullah Amin Salah, Permanent Representative to
the UN
Hussein Hamami, Ambassador to the United States
DATE, TIME
April 19, 1989, 9:30 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
The President opened the meeting by welcoming King Hussein to the
United States again and noted that he was the seventh President
to meet with Hussein. The President said that he hoped that the
visit would go well and that he looked forward to the opportunity
to discuss anything and everything with King Hussein. We would
like to use the visit to fertilize the field of ideas. The
United States had a continued keen interest to try to help on the
peace process. He mentioned that the King had remarked to the
press that the time was right to make progress. The President
agreed, noting that this did not mean that he had a "five point
program" in mind as a U.S. initiative. 1ST
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
SECRET
AS AMENDED
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2000-0429-F
8/21/09 no
SECRET
King Hussein thanked the President for the opportunity to visit
and expressed his respect and admiration. The visit, he
continued, was important in a very special way. There were very
significant trends and developments in the world and in the
Middle East. In particular, there was a world trend in the
direction of removing problems and solving regional tensions that
threaten regional stability and peace. Now was the time to move
in the Middle East and now was the time for a constructive U.S.
role.
(5)
With this introduction, King Hussein presented Jordan's position,
reading verbatim from a set of talking points which he later gave
to the U.S. side (See Tab A). (S)
The President thanked Hussein for his presentation. He said that
he would like to get the U.S. official position on the table and
then ask Secretary Baker to make some remarks, including on his
meetings with President Mubarak and Prime Minister Shamir.
(S)
As a first point, the President continued, neither he nor
Secretary Baker agreed that Shamir had bought two more years of
the status quo with his proposal for elections. We pushed hard
on the final status issues, not accepting interim arrangements
alone as the basis for moving ahead. The U.S. position, the
President said, was based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338 -- these meant territory for peace and Israeli
withdrawal. The issue of Palestinian representation also
remained to be resolved, and some sense of the shape of a final
settlement should be given. We had no intention of backing down
on our-position regarding a dialogue with the PLO or from
Secretary Baker's statements, which caused some difficulty in
Israel, not ruling out the possibility of Israel talking to the
PLO.
(S)
The President reaffirmed that he did not rule out a properly
structured international conference at the right time; one may be
necessary. At the same time, it was unwise now to focus, repeat
focus, on an international conference; he reiterated that he
would not reject the idea, which Hussein believed had merit, of
an international conference. The U.S. wanted constructive
negotiations for final status, and would look at a conference in
light of how it could contribute to those negotiations. (S)
The U.S. also wanted to ensure movement from transitional
arrangements to final status talks, the President said. Ensuring
Arab support depended on movement to final status talks. The
United States would not stop short of that goal. He said that
the issue of elections also needed to be discussed; we needed to
know where elections fit. The United States did not rule out
other ideas for Palestinian representation, however. In the next
several weeks, we wanted to flesh out the elections idea. (S)
The President noted that the coverage of the intifada had
affected the American people. There was support and backing for
the Administration in its effort to get a process going.
(8)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
The President said that he would be interested in Hussein's views
on Jordan's role and the disengagement Hussein had announced last
year. He added that the United States knew Jordan would not
disengage totally, and stated that Jordan was key to final status
negotiations. (8)
The President asked that Hussein not prejudge in public our
position at this stage. He asked for Hussein to help to
condition the environment by talking to the PLO and Palestinians
and reaching out to Israel. (8)
The President mentioned that Hussein's reading of Arafat's views
and of Iraq and Syria would also be welcome. He noted that he
and Hussein had shared a moment in their private meeting of
concern and worry over the carnage in Lebanon which has so shaken
Americans. In concluding, the President repeated that the status
quo could not come to be regarded as the best of worlds; we could
not permit this attitude to develop. He said that the Israelis
left the U.S. with their views more shook up. There would be no
backing away from our dialogue with the PLO, we would continue to
tip our hat at the international conference, and we would
continue to express our serious opposition to any new Israeli
settlements. The President asked Secretary Baker to add his
comments.
(8)
Secretary Baker opened by saying that the new Administration
confronted a changed situation upon entering office. For the
first time, the United States had a dialogue with the PLO. It
had also issued a human rights report that was more critical of
Israel than the one issued on the Soviet Union. Secretary Baker
recalled that he had also stated that the United States could not
categorically, irrevocably or completely rule out an Israeli-PLO
dialogue. The President had also made a public statement in
support of an end to the occupation. Private remarks were also
made to Arens and Shamir on settlements, expressing our very
strong views. (S)
Continuing, Secretary Baker said that in the U.S. view, the
atmosphere now would not support direct negotiations, and direct
negotiations were necessary for peace. There was a need for an
improved atmosphere to prepare the way for negotiations. In
advance of the Shamir visit, the United States had sent word that
new ideas were needed from Shamir, with some forward thinking to
move the process ahead. (S)
Shamir came with new ideas, Secretary Baker stated.
Specifically, he said four things:
--
Shamir spoke of a "political negotiating process,"
a new position for him. (S)
He said that he was prepared to follow up
transitional arrangements with negotiations on a
permanent agreement. The Secretary recalled
Hussein's earlier remark on the meaning of
"permanent agreement" for Shamir, and said that
the United States would have preferred the words
"final status" in Shamir's presentation. (8)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
Shamir said that all options would be open at
these negotiations.
(8)
Arens and Shamir had both stated privately that
they would deal with whoever was elected, even if
these people had ties to the PLO.
(8)
Secretary Baker said these new points from Shamir fit nicely into
what the United States was prepared to try. The United States
would also support a properly structured international conference
at an appropriate time. He stated that there would be no
solution to the problem, however, unless the United States had
the political strength to pull it off at home. We could lose
this strength if it appeared that we were pushing too hard, he
noted. A high visibility U.S. initiative could preempt more
promising possibilities if it failed. Secretary Baker agreed
that if the United States was going to pursue this approach, it
must not allow the approach to become the means for delay. He
noted that the United States had held another meeting with the
PLO in Tunis, and was now pushing the idea in that channel. As
an aside, he mentioned that Peres had said publicly that Israel
was now dealing with the PLO through the U.S. In closing, the
Secretary said that it may be correct that eventually the effort
would fail, but the United States believed it must give
this approach a serious try and maintain the political support at
home that was necessary for success.
(S)
King Hussein said that he was gratified to hear the President's
and Secretary Baker's views and that he was reassured by their
remarks on elections and how these would fit into-a broader
process. King Hussein said that when he returned to the region
he would continue to speak out in his efforts to give people hope
and encourage them to be positive. Jordan was committed to the
cause of peace; it pursued this commitment in the Arab world, in
the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) and with the PLO. Hussein
said that he would do all he could to help, since U.S. success
was Jordan's success. (8)
King Hussein said that Jordan would always be involved in the
peace process. It had the longest borders and ceasefire lines
with Israel of any Arab state. He reviewed briefly the history
of Jordan's efforts in the peace process, remarking that these
efforts did not get anywhere. Jordan saw that the Palestinians
wanted their own say, and felt that giving the Palestinians
responsibility would open the doors for progress; thus, in the
same way that Jordan accepted union with the West Bank, it
assented to Palestinian requests and decided to disengage. The
result was the memorable PLO decisions of late last year. (S)
At the same time, Hussein continued, the character of the Israeli
occupation was changing. Its pressure on the people in the
Occupied Territories grew. (8)
For the future, Jordan did not rule out a confederation, but it
must be between two sovereign states, Hussein said. This would
lay a much stronger and more secure basis for lasting peaceful
relations.
(S)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRE
Iraq, King Hussein stated, would like to see relations with the
United States improve. The Iran-Contra affair still rankled, but
Iraq wanted to move ahead with better relations. After eight
years of war, Iraq was committed to the cause of peace. Hussein
added that Jordan believed. that the Arabs should support the
PLO's decisions on 242, right of Israel to exist, and renouncing
terrorism; obstacles should not be put in the PLO's way. (S)
King Hussein said that Israel was worried most about the
possibility of Palestinians, especially those in Jordan,
returning to "Palestine." Hussein did not believe this was a
problem, since most Palestinians, including those in Jordan where
they were one family with Jordanians, would elect to stay put.
The issue was one of right of return or compensation. He pointed
out that Jordan had gone a long way, further than other Arab
nations, to assure that the Palestinians in Jordan would develop
a stake in Jordan and stay put. Hussein said that Jordan would
continue to develop opportunities in Jordan for Palestinians so
that this obstacle in Israeli minds may be removed. (S)
King Hussein stated that the problem in the past with direct
negotiations and Jordan was that while the PLO could have such
negotiations, Jordan could not. It was their cause and their
future, he said. Arafat had authority within the PLO; he is the
symbol of Palestine inside and outside the Occupied Territories.
Of course, Hussein added, there were extremists, but we could not
be hostage to them. (S)
Hussein said that the ACC was a new development, grouping -80
million people. Jordan hoped it would serve as a positive force
in the area. There were enough ties beyond economic ones to be
sure that there were controls on all the members, he stated. The
ACC would be a force for stability, complementary to the GCC and
Maghreb Union; he expressed his hope for coordination between the
three groups. 1St
On the Arab-Israeli question and the peace process, we were
committed to reaching peace, Hussein said. The Palestinians
could do much more than anyone else, however. As for Syria, an
international conference, properly structured at the appropriate
time, could bring Syria in. (S)
On elections, King Hussein repeated that we needed to know what
elections were for. On transitional arrangements, Jordan wanted
to know what it is in transition toward -- in moving from point A
to point B, what was point B? (S)
SECRET