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428079987
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Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, May 4, 1989
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428079987
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document
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Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, May 4, 1989
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
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Canada
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1989-05-04
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5
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1989
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SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
3469
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles, U.S.
Ambassador to Canada
Rozanne L. Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, Director for
European Economic Affairs, NSC
Canada
Prime Minister Mulroney
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for
External Affairs
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff
Ambassador Derek Burney
Don Campbell, Associate Deputy Minister for
U. S. Affairs
DATE, TIME
May 4, 1989, 11:30 a.m. -12:30 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
The President congratulated Prime Minister Mulroney on his
environmental award and said he was coming at a time when there
would be a lot of questions on SNF. The change in Kohl's
position was not good, and not in keeping with earlier
understandings. The President could understand the political
pressures on Kohl, but policy could not be changed on that basis.
It was essential that the Alliance be seen as demonstrating
solidarity, and outrageous that SNF should be made into a U.S.
problem. The U.S. too faces public opinion pressures for arms
reductions; solidarity is the key word. ($)
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
OM 8/21/2009
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2
Prime Minister Mulroney said he was glad the President had raised
the SNF issue and quoted a line from his own recent speech, to
the effect that the solidarity of NATO and U.S. leadership of the
Alliance were the cornerstones of Western security. This was
most important, and the President's upcoming visit to Brussels
was his first as U.S. President. It was necessary to celebrate
NATO's success and to project his leadership. The French,
Germans, or British could not be the leaders. The fundamentals
had to be respected, and SO what happened between now and the
Summit was essential. Canada had some ideas that might help.
While Prime Minister Mulroney understood Kohl's political
pressures, he had gone through the same thing in the opinion
polls and had fought back. Leadership is often inspired
compromise. ($)
The President said he was being criticized for lack of
leadership, as a result of the policy reviews his Administration
was conducting and because others were going public while the
U.S. was trying to discuss the issues quietly in private. This
had built up fuel in Congress, and people like Biden, Pell and
Nitze were speaking out. President Reagan had taken flack
initially for not talking to Gorbachev, and then when he did it
was a success. He himself was trying to do things in a thoughtful
way, not through the editorial page of the New York Times. (S)
Prime Minister Mulroney said that the Alliance had a position.
Perhaps Mrs. Thatcher's public embrace of Gorbachev had given
Kohl the idea that he too could do business with him. But the
assertion by George Bush of complete leadership in Brussels was
important. (S)
Secretary Baker said the U.S. had started discussions with Kohl
on January 24 and had proposed that there be bilateral
consultations before the coalition reached its position. But the
signals had changed and Kohl had now adopted the SPD or FDP
position. As a result, the U.S. cannot seem too anxious to reach
a compromise. Any U.S. offer could be picked up, just as the
modernization concession was pocketed. (S)
The President said he thought things could be worked out, but it
would be necessary to take some heat in the meantime. (8)
Secretary Baker said that anyone wanting to be helpful should
first line up the Germans, and only then have the U.S. judge the
proposal. (S)
Prime Minister Mulroney said the U.S. position was very
reasonable. He would try to see what the FRG's bottom line was.
He understood the danger that they would pocket any new U.S.
offer. ($)
The President said that Kohl had said he wanted to talk early on,
but then had kept on postponing discussion. (S)
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Secretary Baker said the Germans were playing politics with
Western security. There had been many phone calls, many promises
made, but then we were presented with a fait accompli. The
President could not just accept this and paper it over in the
Alliance. (8)
The President said he was being asked why he was pulling back on
START and displaying a Cold War mentality. He wasn't, but it was
necessary to work patiently. First, Secretary Baker needed to
meet with Shevarnadze and then see him a second time. Only then
should there be a meeting with Gorbachev. He would not change
his views based on New York Times editorials or on Sam Nunn. (S)
Secretary Clark said he understood the problem of German
pocketing, but the Summit risked being defined by the SNF
disagreements. NATO's success should be its central focus.
(9)
Prime Minister Mulroney then referred to Canada's Open Skies
proposal and asked whether there was any U.S. interest. (S)
The President replied that there was interest and the U.S. was
looking at the idea. He asked how it would work in practice.
($)
Secretary Clark said the advantage was that it would be a Western
initiative. The information acquired would be information known
officially, even though much was already available by satellite.
The idea was partly symbolism. Gorbachev knows that President
Eisenhower had proposed the idea and could table it himself. ($)
The President said there is an advantage to taking the offensive,
and again asked for details as to how the proposal would work.
(None were provided.) ($)
Prime Minister Mulroney said that when he had spoken in the
Senate earlier in the day and mentioned that Gorbachev was doing
innovative things the Senators had applauded. It is frustrating
to have to keep fighting a PR battle, but there is a great deal
of "high road" that George Bush can pursue, even if it is not
exciting. ($)
The President alluded again to the German problem. He would
rather be sure than move too fast; this was almost a replay of
the early Reagan/Gorbachev years. Recent USIA polling on
European opinion was encouraging, once one went beyond the simple
"Gorbachev wants peace" type of question. (S)
Prime Minister Mulroney said that was why he was upset at the
Germans. It was like being blindsided in September in the midst
of an election campaign. The Soviet objective was to divide
NATO. (8)
The President said he was very pleased by what Prime Minister
Mulroney was saying. (S)
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Prime Minister Mulroney then said that he'd like to raise two
specific issues, although the bilateral agenda was a very clean
one. The first item was acid rain. He had just met with Senator
Mitchell, who thinks there will be progress. However, what would
the levels be? ($)
The President replied that the levels hadn't been set yet. They
were being discussed in the Domestic Policy Council, but they
might not be precisely what Sen. Mitchell might like. ($)
Prime Minister Mulroney responded that environment was becoming a
prominent foreign policy issue; it was important that the U.S.
exercise leadership in this area. Acid rain was important to him
from a selfish perspective, but also for the U.S. international
leadership role. The U.S. should not niggle about whether the
levels (of pollutant reduction) were 10 or 12 million tons. (S)
The President said he had asked his domestic policy people to
make proposals for the type of conference where something is
actually done. The U.S. can't just go to every conference. He
had already shared his views on The Hague. It was important to
have sensible proposals which would not bring productive
economies to a screeching halt. (8)
Prime Minister Mulroney said Canada was having the same problem
with international conferences. The U.S. needs to lead a
conference and make it the conference. (S)
The President mentioned that even Oscar Arias wanted to have an
environmental conference as part of Costa Rica's 100th
anniversary. The President was glad Prime Minister Mulroney had
raised the issue; we had to do something about the degradation of
the environment. ($)
Prime Minister Mulroney then turned to the Free Trade Agreement
(FTA), making a plea that it be given time to work. Canada was
not Japan, and it hurt him when he heard rumblings of reprisals
before there had been time for full bilateral consultations. He
cited the salmon/herring issues as an example. (S)
The President asked Secretary Baker to talk to Carla Hills and
Clayton Yeutter about the issue. (S)
Secretary Baker explained that the U.S. had taken Canada to the
GATT on the dispute. U.S. fishermen were saying that the new
Canadian landing requirements were tantamount to the old
constraints on export of unprocessed fish against which the GATT
had ruled. ($)
Prime Minister Mulroney replied that he understood Carla's
problems, but could the President please tell her that Canada was
not Japan. (S)
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5
The President alluded to the FSX decision as an example of the
climate on Capitol Hill and in U.S. public opinion on trade
issues. ($)
Secretary Baker added that the climate extends beyond trade, for
example on the SNF issues and pressures to withdraw U.S. troops
from Europe. (S)
Prime Minister Mulroney recalled that he had said in February
that Gorbachev had us in a political game with public opinion.
($)
The President responded that the Summit should be geared to
NATO's success, and to the fact that socialism had failed. ($)
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