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428080157
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Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, August 2, 1989
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document
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1
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id
428080157
contentType
document
title
Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, August 2, 1989
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Telcon Files
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Saudi Arabia
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428080157
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2
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1989-08-02
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8
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1989
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nara-archive
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6b1dfbfbf69adcab
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6058
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
0429-F
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
zr 8/21/09
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
King Fahd
Notetaker: Sandra Charles
DATE, TIME,
August 2, 1989, 10:33 a.m. 10:43 a.m.
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President began by saying he wanted to call to discuss the
situation in Lebanon with the hostages and more generally as
well. (U)
The President said that the world was up in arms about LTC
Higgins. We assumed he was dead and didn't know for sure, and
didn't know when he died. He knew the King didn't have any
influence over the radicals, but wanted to make the same appeal
he had made to the Holy Father, the British Prime Minister and
head of the United Nations. The President suggested that
anything the King could do to influence the return of the body of
LTC Higgins would be greatly appreciated. He continued that it
was brutal to keep the body there when the man's family was
suffering. He told the King we had made a strong appeal to Iran
through the Swiss, but we were not very hopeful there. We were
asking anyone with any influence with Iran to see what they could
do. We had condemned all hostage-taking and called for the
immediate release of all hostages. Lastly, he mentioned the
larger hostage situation. The Secretary General had dispatched a
top aide to the area to help with the return of the body, to
encourage both that they take no more hostages and that there be
no more deaths. (f)
The President then turned to the broader question about Lebanon
itself. He commended the King on his and Prince Saud's efforts
with the tripartite initiative saying he felt it offered the best
hope. Despite these efforts, it appeared the Foreign Ministers
had come to a halt. The President said he didn't know if we
could be helpful in resurrecting the initiative and offered to
call King Hussein and Chadli Bendjedid if the King thought it
would be helpful. He welcomed suggestions from His Majesty on
what the U.S. might do, if anything. While he didn't know
whether the United Nations Security Council could help, he
mentioned that he and Pope John Paul had discussed it the
previous day. He then asked if the King had any strong feelings
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Declassify on: OADR
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on the UN, saying sometimes a UN meeting can be helpful and
sometimes not so. (d)
King Fahd commented on the murder of LTC Higgins, saying it had
hurt them very much in Saudi Arabia and their reaction was very
bad. In Saudi Arabia it was considered to be a barbaric act.
The King said he would make an effort with all parties with which
he believed he had influence. First, he said he would have the
body of LTC Higgins returned. Second, he would try to make an
effort to have all hostages freed and returned, making that
effort with all parties with which he had any influence. (C)
The President thanked him. (U)
King Fahd said he would mediate in these and all other matters
that are abhorrent to the Saudis and other people. (d)
Turning to Lebanon, King Fahd encouraged the President to contact
King Hassan and President Bendjedid to encourage them to make
another effort on the initiative to arrange a ceasefire, remove
the siege, and resolve the other problems in Lebanon.
(f)
The President agreed to do SO. (U)
The President then mentioned Prince Salman's visit, saying he had
been honored to receive him. The Vice President had told him how
fantastic the exhibit was. He told the King it had received wide
acclaim, and he personally wanted to see it. (U)
King Fahd was pleased, saying the success of the exhibit was due
to the strenuous, vigorous efforts of United States officials who
promoted it. He thanked the President and the people of the
United States on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia and his
people. (U)
The President then said he wanted to raise one other subject. He
said he had received a call from King Hussein and that he was
very much concerned about his depressed economy. The President
said he would be sending the King a letter asking for addition
support, if possible. He said he would do this through normal
diplomatic channels in a letter if that was ok with the King.
(d)
King Fahd responded that he would be pleased to receive any
letter from the President. He said King Hussein was a friend and
anything he and other friendly countries could do to help they
would. (f)
The President thanked him and said he looked forward to the
King's visit. The arrangements were all set and they would have
plenty of private time to discuss all these issues. (U)
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King Fahd said he was looking forward to the visit, and to
meeting with the President. He was certain there would be some
time to talk about all the important Middle East issues and
issues from around the world. (U)
The President thanked the King. (U)
In concluding, King Fahd said he hoped and expected by the time
of his visit, we would have accomplished some meaningful things
in the Middle East. (U)
The President hoped SO too.
(U)
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