Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
428080331
label
Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, November 26, 1989
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
428080331
contentType
document
title
Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, November 26, 1989
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
subjects
Canada
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
428080331
levelOfDescription
item
productionDates
day
26
logicalDate
1989-11-26
month
11
year
1989
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b781363b7ed3c6b3
ocrText
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
20. Memcon
Re: Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian
11/26/89
(b)(1)
C
Mulroney (8 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
By
021
(NLGB)
on
10/6/10
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
1999-0273-F(116)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
11/29/2007
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
PRESIDENTIAL
BUSH
519
LIBRARY
CONF IDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
aup of i999-0273
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mrs. Bush
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Ney, U.S. Ambassador to Canada
Canada
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff to
Prime Minister
Derek Burney, Ambassador
DATE, TIME
November 29, 1989, 6:00 - 9:00PM
AND PLACE:
The Residence
Prime Minister Mulroney said that he had spent five hours
with Gorbachev, 10-12 hours with Reykjavik and about the same
with Shevardnadze. Mulroney said that Gorbachev was approaching
Malta expecting no miracles and having no grand design or tricks
up his sleeve. He understands why the President has been quite
conservative in his approach and his need to devise his own
policies after being Vice President for eight years. Gorbachev
regards this as quite legitimate inasmuch as the President will
be there for eight years and that it was important for him to
take time to get it right. At a private lunch, Mrs. Gorbachev
said she looked forward to a close and friendly relationship with
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958. AS AMENDED
COI 11/29/07
1999-0273-F
CONF IDENTIAL
2
Barbara Bush. Gorbachev mentioned that he had invited Ronald
Reagan to visit the Soviet Union in the spring and made a number
of affectionate comments toward Reagan.
When asked about Soviet consumer goods and problems,
Mulroney said that staff and media accompanying him had found
nothing in the stores. Foreign Minister Clark said he had asked
one Soviet whether things were better now under Gorbachev and the
response had been "politically, yes, but there is no meat in the
stores and nothing even in the windows." Mulroney said there are
not even any fur hats in Leningrad. There are no carpets in
carpet stores and no shoes. Even Gorbachev said that times were
tough and that pressures were building.
Mulroney asked Gorbachev, "What is going to happen to you?
Who doesn't agree with you?" Gorbachev responded that he would
be around but, "what are we going to do about them. Mulroney
said it is clear Gorbachev is not losing any sleep, that he is in
control. He is casual, unconcerned. His enemies seem to be
institutional the party, the economy, the nationalities and so
on. At one point, Gorbachev said "Maybe President Bush can give
you help with regard to Quebec, a clear reference in Mulroney's
mind to inviting the US Congress to butt out of Soviet
nationalities issues. He said that the new legislative session
in December would take steps to institutionalize religious
freedom and private property.
Gorbachev said everything must be done within the
federation. Mulroney said that the Prime Minister of Sweden had
asked Gorbachev if he would allow neutrality for Poland and
Hungary and there withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Mulroney said
it was clearly "not on. 11 Gorbachev has said there should be no
changes in the alliances and that any change in the alliances
would be seriously destabilizing.
Mulroney said Gorbachev was quite forthcoming in the
discussion of political liberalization. And that Gorbachev found
this "terrific, just fine. Mulroney continued that what was
absent from Gorbachev was the idea that pluralism should be
extended to the Soviet Union. There is no suggestion in his
remarks of political parties, although everywhere else he
supports pluralism. He said that the problems of the Soviet
Union are such that only one party with him in command can see
the USSR through this period. When asked where he would be in
five years, Gorbachev responded "I'll be here." At this point,
Mrs. Gorbachev said that her mother often talks to his mother and
that his mother had said, "If the Soviet people are so stupid
that they cannot appreciate what my son is doing, then the hell
with them. 11 Mulroney read this anecdote as evidence of growing
disenchantment.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Mulroney then described his discussions with Ivashko, the
new party head of the Ukraine. Ivashko mentioned that there are
52 million people in the Ukraine, 18 million people in the Soviet
Communist Party and 3.4 million Party members in the Ukraine.
Ivashko said all of them supported him and Gorbachev. He
continued that one had to understand that Gorbachev started high
in popularity, and slumped because he couldn't meet expectations.
There are no consumer goods. But now Gorbachev is coming up
again, primarily for international reasons. Nonetheless,
Gorbachev faces trouble in the shortages.
Mulroney asked Ivashko what Gorbachev is expecting from
George Bush. Ivashko responded, no aid. He was not further
specific. Mulroney then noted that Gorbachev had indicated that
Bush was very conservative. Mulroney responded that Gorbachev
had to understand that the Republican Party had several wings and
that a successful politician cannot fly on one wing. Gorbachev
responded that he understood. Mulroney told Gorbachev that Bush
was very moderate (in which context Gorbachev denigrated Kohl)
Mulroney noted that people in congress were given to strident
speeches. Gorbachev responded, "Yeah, Mitchell!" Mulroney
continued that Gorbachev was casual, well informed, relaxed and
had a good sense of humor.
With respect to the Germans, Gorbachev is concerned that
they are trying to do endruns. Gorbachev said that the American
Ambassador in Bonn is acting like a German Gauleiter. He said
the sense of Gorbachev's views was that the Germans could forget
about reunification. According to Clark, Shevardnadze spoke of
anxiety in Western Europe about reunification, adding that "all
of us in the war are against revanchism and neo-Nazis. Mulroney
noted the strength of the Russians' hatred for the Germans.
Mulroney told Gorbachev that to understand Kohl he had to
understand that Kohl was appealing to the electorate. Gorbachev
said he understood that, if that's all it is. But there would be
no reunification. Clark indicated that of all the problems, only
this one was worrying them. Gorbachev indicated, "People have
died eating unripened fruit" -- a clear suggestion that any kind
of reunification was premature. Gorbachev indicated that there
might be reunification but, in effect, "not in my lifetime." If
the Germans want progress towards this, they shouldn't put it on
the table. It should not be brought forward prematurely.
With respect to the Balts, Clark mentioned the large Baltic
population in Canada and the consequences of a crackdown, that
is, a strong reaction. Shevardnadze said there is no crackdown
planned by the Foreign Ministry or by the Army or by anybody
else.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Mulroney then offered several anecdotal observations from
his dinner with Ryzhkov on November 21st:
He underscored he was completely against German
reunification.
He said that "aid to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam was
substantial and must be allowed to rundown.'
Aid to Eastern Europe is insubstantial. In fact, the Soviet
Union owes a number of these countries. Only Poland owes
the USSR -- about one billion dollars.
Mulroney mentioned there would be no reform of agriculture
without farmers owning their property.
Ryzhkov said that the Canadians should take a section of
land in the USSR and run the agriculture there as a pilot
project -- wheat, beef, pork and so on.
Swedish Prime Minister said that the Soviet bottom line was
neutrality for Poland and Hungary. But Ryzhkov said there
would be no border changes allowed because they would
perturb developments in Eastern Europe.
Mulroney pointed out to Ryzhkov the 175 year peace in the
US. The US has no imperialist interests and is inclined
toward peace unless betrayed or attacked. With George Bush,
the Soviets will always know where they stand and that,
unless you provoke him, he will stand with peace.
Shevardnadze asked Mulroney to comment on his own instinct
that James Baker was a man of his word. Mulroney responded,
"you can put it in the bank, noting that Baker had put
aside a week to complete the Free Trade Agreement because he
had recognized its importance and given his word to make it
happen. Shevardnadze was impressed.
According to Mulroney, Ryzhkov was deferred to by all when
Gorbachev was absent. He found him thoughtful, reasonable and
the least ideological of all.
Ryzhkov noted that on 1 January 1988 there was large scale
implementation of the concept of a market economy. Still the
Soviet Union was not ready to do this. He said Gorbachev had
inherited an archaic system and wanted to move toward a new one.
He said the problems of society could be solved only with new
approaches. However, at no point did he acknowledge that the
whole Soviet system is wrong.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5
Gorbachev indicated to Mulroney that he wanted to trust in
George Bush and establish trust at Malta. Gorbachev said any
period of change will bring difficulties and instability. Some
will seek to profit and that would be a dangerous mistake. The
former mistake in Eastern Europe was to insist on a single model.
Each country must decide what's best for it. Eastern Europe will
be allowed to follow reform at its own pace. With respect to
Germany, we should let history determine the issue. "People have
been poisoned by eating unripened fruit." This road must be
traveled without skipping steps.
According to Gorbachev, under new thinking, confrontation is
on the way out and there must be focus on common interest. We
need mutual trust, a long period of trust. Moreover, it is not
only the East that needs new thinking.
With respect to international economic cooperation,
according to Gorbachev, the USSR needs to open up its economy and
bring it into line with the world economy. Decisions about the
future of the USSR though will be made in MQSCOW alone. We will
not have grants or handouts.
According to Gorbachev, perestroika represents a fundamental
change in the mentality of dependence on the state. The
revolution embarked upon, is above all, a revolution of the mind.
We need new people. You can't make them in the classroom.
According to Gorbachev, the world debates how long he has.
What is important is that the country will not go back.
Gorbachev has done his part but intends to go on. He will put in
place new property relations -- public, cooperative and private,
as well as credit, banking and so on. We need to limit the power
of the monopolies.
Gorbachev said, with respect to the nationalities, that if
we destroy what we have it will be a disaster for the smaller
peoples such as the Baltic peoples. He continued that there is
no reasonable alternative to perestroika, although there are
differences on tactics.
Gorbachev admitted that when he announced his decisions
originally he had thought things would happen. In the domestic
economy, the situation is very different. People see shortages
and bare shelves.
Under these circumstances the West should act prudently.
Kohl sometimes is not prudent enough. It is dangerous to appeal
for the votes of revanchists. He understood that Bush and Baker
had had a difficult process in adjusting their thinking. The
West should be less arrogant; act less like they have a hotline
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
to God or as if they have God by the beard. The West has to
change, too. In essence, according to Mulroney, Gorbachev is
saying, "you must help me without looking like you' re helping
me.
"
Mulroney then related several observations from the lunch
that he and his wife had with Gorbachev and Raisa:
Gorbachev's ambitions for Malta are to get to know and
understand George Bush, to convey his objectives and his
rationales.
He expects no miracles or solutions in Malta.
It is entirely normal for George Bush to have taken time to
come up with his own policies.
He was very warm toward Ronald Reagan.
With respect to Mrs. Bush going to Malta, Raisa acknowledged
having received the letter from Mrs. Bush and said that she
looked forward to working with her in a friendly fashion.
The Gorbachev's seem to have a friendly, affectionate
relationship.
Gorbachev said he never thought he'd end up running the
shop; that he had first written down his reform ideas when
he was first transferred to Moscow.
He said that when he became General Secretary he had called
for the memo he had sent in on reform years earlier.
Gorbachev said that George Bush seemed quite conservative in
his view of the world,
Gorbachev gave tempered, quiet responses. Raisa indicated
that he would serve two full terms.
Mulroney then noted a number of observations from his
meetings with Ivashko in the Ukraine:
Gorbachev is completely supported by the Central Committee
in his policies and personally.
Unrealized expectations led to a decline in Gorbachev's
popularity which for a time unsettled him.
Gorbachev will be absolutely in command for five years. On
a scale of 1 to 10 his political strength is over 9.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
7
Gorbachev does not have an identifiable enemy as to cause
him trouble.
(b)
Gorbachev needs a durable peace so that he can concentrate
on the economy.
Ivashko made no attempt to hide problems. He indicated the
system had failed. They want to be like us, but not have it
lorded over them.
Mulroney said to the President, "If you take care, yet lend
a hand, you and Gorbachev will walk together into the history
books.
"
In response to a question about how the US could lend a
hand, Mulroney responded:
Help the Soviets integrate their economy into the West. For
example, see the USSR have observer status at GATT and
perhaps integrate them into the IMF. Perhaps each year the
chairman of the industrial nations summit could meet with
Gorbachev afterward. He noted the importance of the
symbolism of a meeting on economic matters.
It is time for an initiative on ground forces. We must
acknowledge that they will not be around in these numbers in
five years in NATO. We should not have unilateral
reductions but we should take a chance for peace.
Mulroney said he discerned historic opportunities at Malta,
The President responded that he intended to lean forward.
Our purpose for the meeting is exactly as Gorbachev outlined. He
intends to be as informal as possible. He does not intend to put
him down and intends to avoid a "we won, you lost" approach. He
intends to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt. On arms
control, the President indicated he is prepared for a broad
discussion and wants Gorbachev to sense flexibility. He wants to
offer the hope that the status quo will change. He would like to
accelerate START, CFE and CW. On Central America the President
indicated he would be tough, particularly with respect to Castro
and Ortega. He will lean forward and make sure Gorbachev
understands that we will not conduct ourselves in ways to make
life difficult for him.
Clark turned to Central America saying that Shevardnadze had
indicated with regard to Nicaragua and Cuba that the USSR has an
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8
obligation to supply Cuba because it is under blockade. However,
if the US and Cuba were to come to terms, the Soviets could back
off. The President responded that Gorbachev is going to hear
plenty about this. What good does it do him? "I have no
impression that he wants to be in any of these countries. "
Mulroney told the story to Ryzhkov that the Canadian manager
of McDonald's in Moscow advertised for applicants for jobs. He
said 19,000 people applied for 500 jobs, so many that the
postmaster asked them to stop advertising. With these economic
problems Mulroney asked, why should they put so much money into
that dopey little island? He said Ryzhkov seemed to have a sense
of embarrassment about it and a real sense of financial drain.
He said, "Aid to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam is substantial and
must be allowed to run down. 11 Clark added that their whole
preoccupation is with domestic matters. He thinks they have a
sense of obligation to Nicaragua and Cuba.
Mulroney then made a number of suggestions of economic
measures the US could take to help the Soviets.
Repeal Jackson/Vanik.
Join GATT and OECD with observer status.
Include the Soviet Union in IMF and World Bank economic
reviews.
Support the idea of having the Chairman of the Economic
Summit later meet with Gorbachev.
Support an East European Development Bank.
Reduce COCOM restrictions.
Reduce troops in the near future.
The US should untether the Europeans even while providing
strategic leadership. Overall, Mulroney said his impression of
Gorbachev's attitudes toward the President were that "he is there
for the long haul and you're in place for the long haul.'
(This memorandum was prepared by Robert Gates. }
CONFIDENTIAL