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Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, of The Federal Republic of Germany
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428080409
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Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, of The Federal Republic of Germany
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Telcon Files
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1989-11-29
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1989
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CONF IDENT
2467
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0843MR
ES 5/1/13
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut
Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
November 29, 1989, 8:27 - 9:02 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: How are you, Helmut? (U)
Chancellor Kohl: It is nice to hear your voice. I am well.
Things are going well. The economy is going well. But the
better things are, the more difficulties people make. (U)
The President: You're a star of American TV. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: I would like to come back to my letter and
discuss a few points, especially in preparation for your summit
meeting with Gorbachev. Then I would like to know what our
dinner would look like. Would Jim Baker be there? (d)
The President: Sure, he will be, if that's okay with you. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: I only need to know whether we should bring
Genscher. (f)
The President: We're talking as personal friends, but I leave
this to you. Normally I would invite Baker, Scowcroft, and
Sununu; but if that's any problem for you, we can do it just as
White House staff. (d)
Chancellor Kohl: I propose first with the White House staff,
with Baker coming in later. (C)
The President: That is agreeable, but Baker can go off. Why
don't I suggested Sununu, Scowcroft, and me. And you bring two
people. How does that sound? (C)
Chancellor Kohl: I think that's a great idea, but I have nothing
against Jim Baker joining us at a later point. I have great
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
2
admiration for him. He is one of the outstanding figures of our
time. (C)
The President: He understands. There will be no problem. Let's
say we bring three and you bring three, then Baker comes for
coffee. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: I'll bring Horst with me. (e)
The President: Good. I want to hear his views as well as yours.
(f)
Chancellor Kohl: I would like to come back to my message. It is
extremely important now to stabilize developments. Let me turn
first to the USSR. I think it would be useful for you to get
Gorbachev to analyze his internal situation. I just had a
meeting with his Vice Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, who
told me they have enormous problems. This winter it is already
minus 27 degrees, which is very harsh even by Soviet standards.
They have gigantic transport problems. The main problem is not
that they lack coal but that they lack the ability to transport
it. To my mind, the situation is worsening rapidly. They will
have a tremendous problem with supply and distribution, which
will have a tremendous impact on the people and their morale.
This won't for the time being affect his standing, but the number
of disaffected is growing. On December 12, the Supreme Soviet
will be in session again. Discussion will be very open on a
number of proposals. I am convinced that the difficulties for
Gorbachev in the Supreme Soviet will increase, but I still see no
alternative to him. I wouldn't be surprised if he tries to get a
tighter hold. The question may arise, even in your meeting, to
what extent the West could provide the Soviet Union with consumer
goods. My advice is that we should try to avoid anything that
would destabilize him. (φ)
This has implications for other states. Hungary, for example, is
dependent on Soviet energy. I met their Prime Minister a few
days ago for a two-hour talk. He told me the Soviets have cut
energy deliveries to Hungary by 30 percent. They said they
couldn't provide more. It may well be he will require help by
January or February. Between the two of us, I'm going to help
him [Hungarian Prime Minister Nemeth]. If we don't, if it means
the downfall of the reform program, this could have catastrophic
consequences. Poland also has difficulties, but the Mazowiecki
Government has more public support than Nemeth. There is also
the Church's role in supporting the government. In Bulgaria, it
is too early for a final judgment. The present leadership has a
transitional role. The economic situation is rather favorable.
In Romania, there are signs of opposition, but it is weak.
Czechoslovakia has been dramatic. I don't think the present
regime can maintain its position, but I consider it capable of
using the police to a massive extent. Czechoslovakia and Poland
have one thing in common: intellectual leaders not discredited
by the past regime. They are different from the GDR, where most
of the intellectuals have been relying on the support of the
regime. In Czechoslovakia, what is happening is of immense
importance. ()
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The situation in the GDR is dynamic -- through demonstrations and
peaceful means. People are shocked and disappointed at the
corruption. They are not sure that Krenz will survive the
December 15 Congress. The new Prime Minister may become Chairman
of the Party. In a nutshell, things have changed a great deal.
Therefore it is very important that as a whole the reform process
keeps going. We will only be able to realize what the real
structures will look like in a few weeks from now. My prognosis
is that there will be free elections by the autumn of 1990 or the
beginning of 1991. I believe the process has reached a stage
that makes it irreversible. One reason is that they cannot avoid
a mass exodus if they don't reform. They won't be able to close
the borders. If they did, people would leave via Hungary.
Hungary is not going to close its border. Therefore this places
the GDR leaders in a very difficult situation. There are new
groupings, also new political parties. It is too early to say
how this will look. We will have to wait until the end of
February. By that time, they will have passed a new election law
-- if the opposition groups approve, which is a precondition for
our supplying aid. I will see the leading people in the GDR this
year but am waiting until the outcome of the Party Congress to
see who's in the chair. (f)
This was the meaning behind the ten point program I sent
yesterday. There are three equal divisions. First, we must act
with reason and caution. Everything in central Europe and
Germany will have enormous impact. For me personally, this means
everything I do will be coordinated with our American friends.
The second point is the will of the people, what they desire.
Public reporting on the news gives a distorted picture. It will
become clear after the elections. It will be the same as in
Poland. If there are genuine elections, they will throw out all
in the government. Third, it will be a long-term process. They
will remain in the Pact and we, in NATO. The security dimensions
are of great importance. A final point: when you speak with
Gorbachev, it will be important if you make progress on the
agenda Baker and Shevardnadze discussed in Wyoming -- on START,
the Vienna negotiations, and CW. (d)
To summarize: I'm not pompous, but in view of the developments
in Europe at the present time, we in Germany have an enormous
responsibility of which I am well aware. It is very important
that our American friends know everything we are doing. The same
is true of our European friends in the EC. A week from now, in
Strasbourg, I will see to it that we make progress with respect
to the Economic and Monetary Union. I think it a great mistake
on Maggie's part to think that this is a time for caution. It is
an iron law that there will be no going it alone in German
policy. It is our responsibility that we are anchored in a
general whole.
()
George, I did not forget that this has been possible only because
of the United States -- your solidarity, your presence in Berlin.
Without this, it would not be possible. History left us with
good cards in our hands. I hope with the cooperation of our
American friends we can play them well.
(e)
CONF IDENTIAL
IDENTIAL
4
The President: This was a very timely and full report. We have
watched your statements with interest. I am very supportive of
your general approach. I note your stress on stability. We feel
the same way. Stability is the key word. We have tried to do
nothing that would force a reaction by the USSR. We are not
exhorting people. We are not conducting ourselves that way. We
are on the same wavelength. I appreciated your ten points and
your exposition on the future of Germany. I had our top
analysts in talking about that last night. (L)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your good words. Germans East
and West are listening very carefully. Every word of sympathy
for self-determination and unity is very important now. ()
The President: On my meeting with Gorbachev, there is hyper-
interest in our country. Two to five thousand journalists will
be going to Malta. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: That will mean more journalists than
inhabitants. (U)
The President: We will discuss arms control items. It will be
an open meeting, but we have told our press not to expect bold
proposals. We are part of an Alliance and will not surprise the
Germans, British, French, and others. We are not unwilling to
talk about arms control, but I will not be stampeded into a broad
Reykjavik game that is unsettling to our Allies. ()
Chancellor Kohl: Very good. That is completely in harmony with
our intentions. One piece of information: this is very
important to Gorbachev and the people around him who are not
being treated very kindly at home. The meeting, psychologically
speaking, is very important. If the question arises of his
needing help
(I)
The President: We recognize the Soviet Union as a sovereign
nation that has great pride. Shevardnadze said recently that he
didn't want America to "bail us out." I will be sensitive, but
will want to see what I can do to help. We want him to succeed.
In the briefings I have had, it is apparent that the Soviet
economy is much worse than I realized before in-depth study. I
will help, but in a sensitive way.
(&
Chancellor Kohl: That is the right line. There is no doubt that
the meeting will be a success. Everything I heard about the
Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming confirms that. We will
give any support we can provide. I have to go far back -- to
Adenauer -- to find a relationship as strong as yours and mine.
(Q)
The President: We will go forward cautiously, but will be
forward-leaning on arms control and other issues -- as part of a
strong Alliance. I've been criticized for being too cautious,
but, first, things are going our way and, second, stability
should be the by-word. We don't want inadvertently to create
instability. (f)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5
Chancellor Kohl: I look forward to seeing you soon. (U)
The President: Thank you. I will see you Sunday. Love to
Hannelore. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONF IDENTIAL