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428081805
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Expanded Bilateral Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR, July 31, 1991 (2 of 2)
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428081805
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document
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Expanded Bilateral Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR, July 31, 1991 (2 of 2)
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
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Soviet Union
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1991-07-31
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1991
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SECRET
SECRET
0096
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Expanded Bilateral Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev
of the USSR (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for
PER E.O. 13526
Security Assistance
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for
2005-1153-MR
Economic Affairs and Counselor
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
3r 7/6/11
Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs,
NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Interpreter
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakh SSR
Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister of USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Foreign Minister
Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of Armed
Forces
Valeriy Boldin, Chief of Staff
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Advisor to the President
Aleksey Obukhov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Viktor Komplektov, USSR Ambassador to the US
Interpreter
DATE, TIME
July 30, 1991, 12:55 - 1:22pm
AND PLACE:
St. Catherine's Hall, Kremlin
President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you. I understand we will
be having lunch soon. (U)
I am satisfied with the visit. We've already talked about a wide
range of issues. (U)
First, I want to say that I am prepared to develop relations, and
to fill them with a new quality. This is our choice. This is
the Soviet leadership line.
(c)
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Declassify on: OADR
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We will return to this question tomorrow in the fresh air of Novo
Ogarevo to ponder where we stand and act in this situation.
As I said on the eve of the meeting in the U.S., if the
relationship becomes weaker, we will defend it. It is important.
We have a joint interest in cooperation, in Europe, and
elsewhere.
You can act on the assumption that this is our choice. It meets
the long-term interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
()
Second, Mr. President, I explained the peculiarities of
developments in the USSR. I am grateful to you for your
interest. I consider it the wish of the President of the United
States to understand our reality. I see interest based on a
search for ways to cooperate today.
This is not an easy matter. The questions you raised enable me
to say our partnership is growing. We are trying to understand
each other better.
We also discussed economic cooperation. We want to depend much
more on the U.S. in economic terms -- not slavishly or out of
weakness. We want to develop and build our relationship. We
should be predictable for you. When countries are linked by
economic cooperation at a certain level, they become more
predictable.
()
It might seem a paradox that we want to depend more on you -- but
that's our line. (
We discussed in the one-on-one the subject of "great" projects,
which can only be done with the participation of the U.S. These
are concrete proposals.
()
We are awaiting those delegations you discuss in your letter
[before the London G-7 meeting -- EH]. But I remind you, there
are [also] some issues of great importance for us: 1.) large
projects, and 2.) convertibility. I discussed this with the
President, and we agreed to work on it at the expert level.
()
Also, as I told you in London, it is important that we have
cooperation. But we are hampered by restrictions on your part.
I would like to return to that topic.
I advanced an idea. We need to earn money to pay back for
services we receive from you. We want, for example, machinery
for the food industry. We cannot, however, pay you with the
additional food we produce. You don't need more food. The money
must come from other sources.
We need to link cooperation in areas such as food production with
space research, defense conversion, etc. We could develop liquid
hydrogen engines. Your experts like our technology there. Or,
we could launch satellites, which is a $12 billion market.
(8)
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There are probably other areas. The remnants of the Cold War
need to be eliminated. (c)
Nazarbayev will discuss the Chevron project. We will find a
solution. ()
President Nazarbayev: This is the greatest project in U.S.-
soviet relations such as there has never been before. We should
develop it. We've just solved all the problems. One mistake --
we started the project during the Russian presidential campaign.
Everyone used it the wrong way.
($)
Three days ago, we had talks with the Executive Director of
Chevron and the President. We started with fifteen outstanding
commercial questions, all identified by expert committees. We
have now narrowed that down to four. (S)
President Gorbachev: Are you optimistic?
(d)
President Nazarbayev: Yes. I am confident we will succeed.
(c)
President Gorbachev: I ask once again in the presence of the
delegation that the President instruct them to consider
membership [for the USSR] in the IMF. I have big problems in the
next 1-2 years. Call us what you like "associate members,"
"half associate members. " It is important for us to use that
fund. (S)
So, I express satisfaction with the beginning of our discussions,
as we are raising major issues of discussion.
The President: Thank you. I know we are short of time. I would
like to offer a few brief comments before lunch. (U)
First, U.S. -Soviet cooperation does not run counter to our
interests. What we are talking about with the Soviet Union is in
our interest.
Second, I agree that the partnership is growing. Your
willingness to welcome our administration people -- Agriculture
and Treasury -- is important. They can work out the details, for
example, on the IMF and the World Bank.
Third, I am grateful to the military for their hospitality to
Colin Powell. That kind of military exchange is useful. It
reduces the chance of surprises.
(d)
Fourth, on IFI's, just one word. Associate membership is not an
effort to put down the USSR. The Soviet economy is so
potentially enormous, and facing enormous problems, that it
requires special handling. It could dominate other countries.
(c)
We're talking about exactly what you want, without the burden of
full membership. Everyone has the right to apply.
()
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Fifth, in response to President Nazarbayev. I am not here to
carry water for Chevron. I do believe that, given the size of
the deal and of the potential dollar earnings, we should move it
forward. It would open doors for other investors. One billion
dollars. Take fifty of those, and you have a significant
investment.
(C)
I am delighted to hear that you have found a solution. This deal
is in the interest of the U.S.
Sixth, on projects. We'll look over the specific projects you
raised. We can talk later about what we are doing -- the trade
agreement, MFN, Stevensen and Byrd.
We will help. I approach this in terms of what is in the
interest of the U.S. But what is good for the U.S. is good for
you.
President Gorbachev: I am sure mutual interest will advance our
cooperation. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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