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Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of Germany, April 29, 1992 (1 of 2)
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428082175
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Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of Germany, April 29, 1992 (1 of 2)
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14. Memcon
Re: Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of
4/29
(b)(1)
S
Germany
[FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
By jr (NLGB) on 4/11/11
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92
Date Closed:
1/29/2009
OA/ID Number:
91109-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
09-0651-MR(513)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 6/16/2010
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
3334
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BUSH
Dupof
LIBRARY
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Richard von
2008-0705-MR
Weizsaecker of Germany (U)
#502
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Jonathan Howe, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Robert Kimmitt, Ambassador to Germany
David C. Gompert, Senior Director, European
and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs,
NSC Staff
Richard von Weizsaecker, President
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
Andreas Meyer-Landrut, Chief of Staff of the
2008-0705-MR
President's Office
Dieter Kastrup, State Secretary, Ministry of
32 6/16/10
Foreign Affairs
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Frank Elbe, Chief of the Planning Staff,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Thomas Matussek, Chief of the Foreign
Minister's Personal Office
Hasso Buchrucker, Office of the President
DATE, TIME
April 29, 10:58-11:40 am
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
The President: Let's see: your schedule has you here until
11:30, then to the State Department for your luncheon. This
evening at the State dinner we will have some private time for
further discussions. Let me say to all of you how very pleased
we are about this visit. The weather is perfect, and the
enormous turnout is a manifestation of the friendship that I
tried to touch on in my remarks. So welcome to all of you. (U)
Before turning to you, Mr. President, let me say a few words
about the domestic situation here. Don't believe everything you
may see on CNN, we are not about to turn isolationist. At the
time of New Hampshire there was a lot of criticism of foreign
trade and investment and even some foreign-bashing. In the
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Declassify on: OADR
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2
democratic party there has been a little of that and my right
wing opponent has perfected it, but there is no substance to it.
No serious person as president would try to pull the U.S. into
isolation, to pull back from Europe or from supporting the new
democracies in Eastern Europe and the CIS. If there is any fear
about this in Germany, it is not true. Ross Perot has the idea
to have Germany pay $50 billion for our forces. Maybe I'll take
that up with Chancellor Kohl (laughter). I hope we will talk
about Europe and the U.S. presence.
(X)
If it is not inappropriate, let me say to Hans-Dietrich that we
will miss you, you have been superb to work with and we have had
wonderful cooperation during these historic times. I mean that
from my heart and will say SO tonight. (U)
I have some other points but I would rather hear your views. Let
me reiterate what I said to the press a few minutes ago: our
relations are good and strong and very important to us. (U)
President von Weizsaecker: Thank you very much for your very
warm words. It is a great honor for me. I have been in the U.S.
many times but never in this solemn way and also never with such
a feeling that our relations really are good. (U)
I have to apologize because someone included in my program a
visit to CNN (laughter).
()
The President: That's a good thing to do but don't make the same
mistake Saddam Hussein made. He listened to CNN and heard that
no one supported our efforts in the Gulf. CNN made him
miscalculate; I'm absolutely convinced of that. First, he didn't
think we would go in and second, he thought that even if we did,
it would be a Vietnam-like standoff.
President von Weizsaecker: My position is a little easier than
Saddam Hussein's.
The President: I was hoping to clarify that (laughter). (U)
President von Weizsaecker: We are satisfied that the economic
development in the U.S. is going up, not only because of its
influence on the campaign but also the importance of the economic
situation in the U.S. For us, relatively speaking, we. are more
interested in trade than you, but the size and strength of the
American market is of vital importance to the rest of the world
leading with us.
(C)
I think our relations are very good and sound because we do not
have to bring one another to do something he doesn't want to do
on his own. Our interests really coincide. A U.S. pullout of
Europe is not even a question in Europe. There is a question of
whether it will be 150,000 or less, but the more important
question is what are those forces for? It is not just to protect
us but it is very important that there be one global, integrated
nuclear security system, which can only be under U.S. leadership.
I think most Americans will understand, especially after the Gulf
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3
War, how important the European factor is. It is not a matter of
our begging you to stay; it is in U.S. interest to stay.
Second, the exemplary cooperation between Secretary Baker and
Herr Genscher shows that it is our common task to move from the
Cold War to a "democratic peace". Except for Cuba and Haiti,
there has been an enormous change in the Americas. In Africa it
is more difficult, but the message African leaders bring to us is
that they want to try to approach democracy and human rights.
After the Cold War we have that great chance of expanding
democracy east of Germany and all the way to Vladivostok. We
have to try to include this whole region in the world economic
system -- especially the G-7 and the international financial
institutions -- and in the world order. We started this in a
multilateral way in Helsinki with Basket Three which was
addressed to the people rather than the governments. To develop
that further into a world order sphere is from the German point
view among our most important tasks. What the two foreign
ministers have done together with the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council and also the CSCE is extremely important.
§
Let me make two more remarks which will be very familiar to you.
We have a great problem with unification. No Germany would be a
reliable partner if it failed to succeed in this, so our
unification is also in the interest of the world. Second, at the
end of the last century our nation was in the middle of the
continent, which gave us options (east and west) that led to so
much tragedy. Then with the division of Germany the option in
the east was no longer open. NOW that we are unified some think
that option is being revitalized and that Germany will again go
it alone. This we don't want, neither the people, who know that
we are a western country, nor the responsible political leaders.
That is why we wanted from the beginning to combine German
unification with European union, this was the idea of Kohl and
Mitterrand. You should not worry about European union, it is the
guarantee of the place of Germany as an integrated Western
nation. There is no other option. While I join you, Mr.
President, in regretting that Minister Genscher is leaving, I am
sure there will be no change in our foreign policy.
The President: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me make a couple
of points. We have been wondering among ourselves: what would
it take in Europe for opinion here to change about the U.S. role?
One thing would be voices rising to say "America out". We are
reassured about that both in Germany and elsewhere. But I must
be honest, we worry that as France pushes for other security
arrangements where they will have a larger role, that will
undermine the confidence of the American people. We will do our
best to persevere, but sometimes we wonder whether they might go
too far and inadvertently undermine the U.S. presence. I believe
from my talks with Francois, and think the same is true of Jim
Baker and Roland Dumas, that they really want us to stay. But
still they present ideas like the four-power talks that present
problems. If it goes too far, if people here are made to believe
that NATO is just one more defense organization or its mission is
murky, it could swing public opinion and our Congress. I would
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4
welcome your comments -- without getting into France-bashing,
because we have good relations.
President von Weizsaecker: Let me say first that German-French
friendship was and remains a vital interest for us in Europe. As
it was for Jean Monnet, it is still true that the French and
Germans are the main movers in the direction of European union.
There are problems that come up from time to time. It is true
that France and Britain have, under your leadership, won two
(b)(1)
world wars, but they also lost those wars.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
The
arrangements made by Herr Genscher and Chancellor Kohl are
certainly not meant to encourage the French in this thinking but
rather to bring them back.
($)
A second issue concerns national identity and ratification of the
Maastricht agreement. We find in France an unlikely coalition of
Communists, Gaullists and supporters of Le Pen who say the
agreement must be rejected. They say benefits will all go to the
Germans,
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
I still think the French will ratify
Maastricht. Mitterrand has committed himself in a very personal
way to it. French cooperation in the field of security will move
rather slowly but it won't prevent us from doing the necessary.
(&)
The President: Jim, what did I leave out? (U)
Secretary Baker: Nothing, Mr. President. Let me just elaborate
on a couple of points. Many of us on both sides of the table are
familiar with what happens at every NATO meeting. Our efforts,
U.S. -German along with others, are aimed at strengthening the
alliance and emphasizing its political nature as we did at
London, but at every stage we have a battle. The French don't
want us to leave, but they believe we will leave. Therefore they
are preparing for a new arrangement. We worry that will become a
self-fulfilling prophecy if every time we try to strengthen NATO,
which is our ticket to Europe, they obstruct. One example is the
Franco-German corps. We have talked about this, but now we
understand that Germany's first commitment will be to the corps
and only second to NATO. We worry about that. CSCE is a
wonderful organization, but it is not a security organization.
It has the flexibility of three Baskets, but the French propose
that we turn it into a security alliance by way of a full fledged
treaty. That's what worries us.
Foreign Minister Genscher: Jim, you should go back to the years
after the Second World War. You decided to stay, unlike your
decision after the First World War. At first your engagement was
based on the East-West conflict. Now some here and in Europe may
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SEURCH
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5
give thought to new considerations. So from the beginning we had
the idea of giving your presence a new justification. Therefore
I am SO glad that we could agree on the NACC, which shows a
follow-up to the old confrontation of blocs and gives a new, and
maybe more important, role to NATO to bring in the states of the
former Warsaw Pact.
(S)
Never before has the U.S. been more interested in CSCE than under
this Administration. It is a great institution for change in
Europe, and it is now very important that you are involved. The
Transatlantic Declaration, which we issued parallel to the Paris
Charter, we understood as a basis for a connection between the
U.S. and Europe that was not only defined by East-West conflict.
(C)
France is very much occupied by the Yalta system. They gained a
strong position, especially with regard to Germany: nuclear
power, not integrated into NATO, and having a seat on the
Security Council. Some in France are concerned that the U.S.
will leave; therefore, they want structures to constrain Germany.
We can meet their concerns, but not at the price of relations
with the U.S. I just met with Roland Dumas and Skubiszewski. We
had a discussion of the security treaty idea and agreed that at a
later stage we could consider if a security treaty could be
useful. Dumas has backed off. He understood that this is not
the time to create a new problem for your presence. (S)
Secretary Baker: But they have opposed every initiative we have
taken, many of them jointly with you, to revitalize NATO. The
NACC for example: the French vetoed every meaningful element of
our work plan. Why do they object?
(S)
Foreign Minister Genscher: We have to proceed step by step. It
takes time. (U)
The President: Is there anything coming out of the political
process in France that would cause them to look differently at
NATO? (8)
Minister Genscher: No. (U)
President von Weizsaecker: The French won't spoil our plans.
France remains difficult but lovable. They have given up on
convincing us of their positions. Sometimes they say, "we French
are monogamists, you Germans bigamists. " They always worry that
we have another wife.
(S)
The President: This would be a good time to break off SO that we
do not delay your luncheon. Thank you very much. (U)
End of Conversation
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