Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
470761303
label
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
470761303
contentType
document
title
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls
citationUrl
identifierLocal
90020-003
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
H-Files - National Security Council (NSC)/Deputies Committee (DC) Meetings Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
470761303
coverageEndDate
day
31
logicalDate
1991-05-31
month
5
year
1991
coverageStartDate
day
31
logicalDate
1991-05-31
month
5
year
1991
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
146146221e229e93
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2003-0261-F
2003-0261-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
OA/ID Number:
90020
Folder ID Number:
90020-003
Folder Title:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords:
Middle East, Export Controls
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
15
2
6
3
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. List
Deputy Committee Meeting
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Attendee List
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
01b. Appointment
Mary Emery to Mr. Gates
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Request
Re: Attendees
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
02a. Handwritten
Jim to Bob
n.d.
(b)(1)
Note
Re: pre-brief for this meeting (1 pp.)
02b. Memo
Richard Barth through Timothy Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re:
5/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control
)
Policy, 2:00 P.M. May 31, 1991 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3)
pp.)
02c. Talking Points Re: Points to be made for DC meeting on Middle East Export
n.d.
(b)(1)
Control (2 pp.)
02d. Paper
Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
02e. List
Deputy Committee Meeting
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Attendee List
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East,
Export Controls
Pinksheet Number:
DJC1145
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2003-0261-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
03. Summary
Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies
5/31/91
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted]
(2 pp.)
04a. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
04b. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/91
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
04c. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/91
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
04d. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
04e. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
04f. Memo
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export
403g, Sec. 6]
Control Policy, May 30, 1991
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East,
Export Controls
Pinksheet Number:
DJC1145
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2003-0261-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04g. Paper
Re: Middle East Export Control Policy
(10 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
05. Minutes
Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA restrictions
5/31/91
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
redacted] (6 pp.)
06. Letter
Joan M. McEntee to Reginald Bartholomew
05/29/1991
(b)(1)
S
Re: export licensing options (3 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East,
Export Controls
Pinksheet Number:
DJC1145
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2003-0261-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01a. List
Deputy Committee Meeting
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Attendee List
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
P.RM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
Mr Gates
Andy Card
OVP
Karl Jackson
NSC
Richard Barth
Timothy Deal
Sandy Charles
STATE
Reginald Bartholomew
Allan Wendt
DOD
Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Sullivan
JCS
David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings
CIA
Richard Kerr
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
OMB
Robert Howard
COMMERCE
Joan McEntee
Michael Galvin
DC 284
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b.
Mary Emery to Mr. Gates
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Appointment
Re: Attendees
403g, Sec. 6]
Request
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Rélease would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Please admit the following appointments on
Friday, May 31,
19 91
,
for Mr Gates
NSC
of
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
:
(AGENCY)
Reginald Bartholomew
2/17/36
Allan Wendt
11/8/35
Peter Sullivan
8/18/45
Kevin Cummings
4/26/47
Joan McEntee
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6] 6/3/48
Michael Galvin
7/8/52
DRIVERS:
Ephriam Williams
1/16/41
Bernard Jackson
6/12/25
MEETING LOCATION
White House
Building
Mary Emery
Requested by
Room No. Sit Room
WWGflr
6536
Room No.
Telephone
4: 00PM
5/31/91
Time of Meeting
Date of request
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120407
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 91 09
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: BARTH
DOC DATE: 30 MAY 91
DEAL
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
EXPORT CONTROLS
AGENDA
DC
LIBYA
IRAQ
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: TALKERS W/ AGENDA FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL
POLICY
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES
DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: BARTH
LOGREF: 9021250 9021255
FILES: IFM 0
NSCP: DC284
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BARTH
DEAL
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By or NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSAJC
CLOSED BY: NSAJC
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120407
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 GATES
Z 91053109 FOR INFORMATION
001
X 91072914 NOTED BY GATES
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DR NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 20407
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG De A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
1
I
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
2
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
RECEI ED
Situation Room
91 MAY31 A8: 46
West Wing Desk
W
2
NSC Secretariat
4
Con
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Bob:
If you can spare a few moments, a pre-brief
for this meeting would be descrable. It might also
spare you the agong of wading through the
longish enteragency paper.
I between we can this bring this eperase
to a sensible conclusion if the non-prolfation
types can contain chen desue to control
everything, Barcholonew taching paints,
for example, reportedly include a call for
a massure supplementary list ( an element
in opten II) that could he an administration
nightmare, totally impossitk to negative
multiliterally, and self- defeating given foreign
availablity. State, expert control people
know that, but the non- proleferation camp
may here carred the internal argument
Jim
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02b. Memo
Richard Barth through Timothy Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re:
5/30/91
(b)(1)
S
Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control
Policy, 2:00 P.M. May 31, 1991 FOIA restrictions
redacted] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
National Security Council
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
H-Files
By MM
on 5/25/2022
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-1232-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
PRESIDENTIAL
SECRET
BUSH
20407
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
500.01
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
LIBRARY
May 30, 1991
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
Deputy Net Sec Advisor
has seen
THROUGH:
TIMOTHY DEAL
D
FROM:
RICHARD BARTH
SUBJECT:
Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export
Control Policy, 2:00 PM May 31, 1991
A PCC ad hoc working group has completed a review of our export
control policy towards the Middle East. The group developed
three options for enhancing our controls on dual-use exports for
Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria (Tab III). As the paper indicates,
the group did not believe that any change in our policy toward
other countries in the region was either necessary or desirable.
Background on Options
The paper presents three options covering these key issues:
-- what to control;
-- whether to implement supplemental controls on certain
end-users; and
-- what efforts are required to make sure that the
controls are multilateral to the extent possible.
Option I, the most restrictive, would control (but not embargo)
all non-food/humanitariar items. Option II would continue to use
the COCOM lists, reduced by recent Core List decisions, as the
basis for controls for these countries. It would be supplemented
by a "safety net" control prohibiting any export to a military or
police agency and require licenses for a number (yet to be
determined) of items that could be militarily enabling for these
destinations. Option III, the least restrictive, is the same as
Option II, but without the supplemental list of militarily
enabling items
Agency Positions
State and Defense will likely press for Option II because it
allows for continued reliance on the COCOM lists, an
administrative advantage, while giving them the option of the
supplemental list of problematical goods and technologies focused
on the military needs of the countries in this region.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1232-MR
mm 6/8/2015
SECRET
2
Commerce recognizes the merits of this option, but has been
unwilling to commit to it for several reasons. First, Commerce
believes the recent improvements to the nonproliferation regimes,
particularly in respect to these four countries, will result in
denial of licenses for any items of significant strategic
concern. Further, the safety net, as identified above, would
prevent politically embarrassing shipments such as those that
have embroiled Commerce in the post-Desert Storm finger-pointing
on the Hill.
Commerce also is apprehensive about the yet-to-be-identified
supplemental list, particularly if it ends up taking months to
define, or attempts to control too many items. (State, to a
large extent, shares the concerns on the supplemental list.)
1.4(c)
Trucks, Planes and Other Cases
Not surprisingly, the policy discussion will likely include
reference to a number of pending export license cases that could
be affected by the Deputies Committee decisions. The Commerce-
chaired process should be encouraged to promptly deal with the
cases within the time frames specified in NSD-53. Nonetheless,
for your information, the following synopsizes some pending,
high-priority cases.
Trucks - Heavy duty, on-the-road trucks for Iran for use in
hauling earthquake relief material have never been
controlled according to all agencies. However, despite NSC
and State recommendations to clarify the status of these
trucks as not controlled, and allow the shipment, Commerce
has been unwilling to bite the bullet in the face of DOD's
concern that the trucks could be used to haul SCUD
launchers. This issue has been "in play" for over six
months. Meanwhile Volvo seems to be filling the orders.
Commerce is under strong domestic political pressure to
allow the trucks to be shipped. An added factor is that it
is highly unrealistic to expect to reach a multilateral
consensus to control such trucks, making any U.S. controls
unilateral in nature. Admiral Zumwalt, a board member of
the exporter, calls us weekly on this issue.
Commercial Jets - Airbus is seeking to fill an order to ship
commercial planes to Iran, but U.S. control of the GE jet
engines is preventing such shipments. The U.S. components
of the jets total about 17% of the aircraft value, which is
within the range of "approvable" sales to Iran under current
U.S. policy. Mitterrand will likely press the President to
approve this shipment in the near future. Meanwhile, Airbus
threatens to engineer-out GE from its next generation of
planes as a result of this problem.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3
RECOMMENDED APPROACH
We believe that any of the three options would adequately protect
national security and would provide adequate guidance to industry
and licensing officials. But Option I would be impossible to
"sell" multilaterally.
If State and Defense lay down strong markers for Option II,
Commerce is likely to agree and seek constraints on the length of
the supplemental list. We recommend that you support reasonable
constraints on the supplemental list if a consensus emerges for
Option II. Your talking points suggest several points to that
end:
--
The list shall be developed by the PCC-Technology
Transfer within 30 days.
--
It should contain a limited number of technologies
(e.g., 10 - 15) ; and national security justifications
for each shall be provided by Defense.
:
State must make every effort to make the supplemental
list multilateral and should report to the Deputies on
the results of its efforts within six months; if the
list remains unilateral, the Deputies should reconsider
the list.
Concurrences by: Sandra Charles and Daniel Poneman
Attachment (s)
Tab I
Agenda
Tab II
Talking Points
Tab III
Middle East Policy Paper
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: May 30, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
Agenda
I. Opening Statement
Robert Gates
II. Discussion of Working Group Paper
All Participants
III. Summary
Robert Gates
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 04/10/2029
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DC MEETING ON
MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL
OPENING COMMENTS
The policy paper developed by the working group looks at
Middle East export control policy from nearly every angle.
The group has, however, narrowed the options to three.
Option I would control all but food and humanitarian
items. It includes a presumption of denial for all
problematical end-users or uses.
Option II continues reliance on the diminished COCOM
lists, but allows for a supplemental list of items that
we know could be helpful to the military aspirations of
these countries. It also includes a safety net that
Libya
would embargo shipment of any items to a military or
police entity.
Option III is the same as Option II, without the
supplemental list.
IF CONSENSUS DEVELOPS FOR OPTION II
Option II makes sense from a political and national security
view. However, we must be careful to avoid encumbering a
sensible decision with nonsensical practical difficulties.
What is State's assessment of the negotiability of a
supplemental list?
What are the likely reactions from industry and Congress?
Practically speaking, what can the market bear?
I believe we need to place some careful constraints on the
development of the supplemental list.
The list should be developed by the PCC-Technology Transfer
within 30 days.
2
It should contain not more than ten to fifteen items or
technologies, and national security
justifications for each
must be provided by Defense.
State must make every effort to make the supplemental list
multilateral and should report to the Deputies on the
results of its efforts within six months; if the list
remains unilateral, the Deputies should reconsider the list.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02d. Paper
Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02e. List
Deputy Committee Meeting
05/31/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Attendee List
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
Mr Gates
Andy Card
OVP
Karl Jackson
NSC
Richard Barth
Timothy Deal
Sandy Charles
STATE
Reginald Bartholomew
Allan Wendt
DOD
Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Sullivan
JCS
David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings
CIA
Richard Kerr
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
OMB
Robert Howard
COMMERCE
Joan McEntee
Michael Galvin
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120429
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 91 10
TO: GATES
FROM: DEAL
DOC DATE: 04 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
EXPORT CONTROLS
SOC
DC
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
CONTROL POLICY
ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 07 JUN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF: 9021250 9021255
FILES: IFM 0
NSCP: DC284
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJR NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSAJC
CLOSED BY: NSAJC
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120429
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 GATES
Z 91060608 FOR DECISION
001
X 91060707 GATES APPROVED RECOM
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
Sum of Conel. DC May 31
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
WA
LOG # 20429
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG WEA A/O
werken Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
K
A
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
JUN 5 P6: 05
2
8
I
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
E
Situation Room
16
West Wing Desk
you
N
NSC Secretariat
4
Bim
&
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
SECRET
SECRET
20429
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 5, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
Deputy has Nati Sec Advisor
seen
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL Q
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting
on Middle East Export Control Policy
Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions for the May 31 DC
meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy.
Concurrence by: Sandra Charles
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the attached Summary of Conclusions for the
files.
Approve 8
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Summary of Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJR NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Summary
Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies
5/31/91
(b)(i), (b)(3)
&
Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions
redacted] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Declassified
Office:
National Security Council
Copy OF (Document Follows)
Series:
H-Files
By
MM
on 5/25/2022
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-1232-MR(501)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his, advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
SECRET
20429
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions for
501
LIBRARY
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 31, 1991
BUSH
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00-5:00 P.M.
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Middle East
Export Control Policy
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President's Office:
CIA:
Karl Jackson
Richard Kerr
(b)(3)
State:
Reginald Bartholomew
JCS:
Allan Wendt
David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings
Defense:
Paul Wolfowitz
White House:
Peter Sullivan
Robert Gates
Andy Card
Commerce:
Joan McEntee
NSC:
Michael Galvin
Timothy Deal
Sandra Charles
OMB:
Robert Howard
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
-- DC members should consult Principals to determine their
attitudes toward the possible liberalization of the
export control regime for Syria and Iran resulting from
COCOM's recent adoption of the Core list, which reduced
the number of controlled items. (8)
-- If the Principals support such liberalization, then
COCOM's Core List should provide the basis for an
export control regime for Syria and Iran. (S)
-- If the Principals do not support such liberalization,
then agencies should agree to a supplementary list of
militarily enabling goods and technologies to add to
the Core List. (8)
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2011-
SECRET
MM 6/8/2015
SECRET
2
--
In developing any supplementary list, U.S. agencies
should take account of the special needs of Syria and
Iran. The Core List was developed with the USSR in
mind, and the threshold for approving the export of
militarily enabling goods and technology to these
countries may need to be correspondingly lower. (8)
--
State should be prepared to report to the DC on the
stricter system of export controls adopted by Germany.
(S)
--
The USG should strive to obtain multilateral support
for whatever control regime is established. (8)
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120395
:
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 23 MAY 91 10
TO: AGENCIES
FROM: SITTMANN
DOC DATE: 24 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS
MIDDLE EAST
AGENDA
DC
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
CONTROL POLICY
ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
DUE DATE: 27 MAY 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF: 9021250 9021255
FILES: IFM 0
NSCP: DC284
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJ2 NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSDAI
CLOSED BY: NSMEM
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120395
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SITTMANN
Z 91052412 FOR SIGNATURE
002
X 91052415 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Doz NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 20395
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG std A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS W SEEN
DISPOSITION
of Ken Hill
1
A
Bill Sittmann
2
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
91 MAY24 P12: 05
West Wing Desk
3
MMSK4
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
I - Information
D = Dispatch
R - Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
NOM- DC- may 30
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9120395
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 24 MAY 91
SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
pm
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
5/24/91
4.15
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
anthony Tabh
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
HOWARD, R
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
5/24/91 1613 8 lraves
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
COPY: 1
ROOM 238 OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20503
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DJC 04/10/2009
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C 5/24
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
LOG 9120395
DATE 24 MAY 91
DOCUMENT SUBJECT: CLASSIFICATION: AGENDA & DISCUSSION SECRET PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
5/24 5:00Pm SIGNATURE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
COPY: 1
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
HOWARD, R
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOB
COPY: 1
WASHINGTON, DC 20503
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DJC 04/10/2009
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
C 5/24
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9120398
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 25 MAY 91
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL PCC MTG NOTICE ON 30 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
5/25/91
1645
S. 3eln
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DJC 04/10/2029
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04a. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
:
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
:
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
P.R.M. Removed as a personal record misfile,
TIME OF
D
P4:01
1625
ROOM
THE SITUATION ROOM
PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
RELEASER: Difer
ROUTINE
DTG:
MESSAGE NO. 0826
SECRET
PAGES 14
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN CLASSIFICATION
(Hame)
(Pane Number)
(Room No.)
AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
LOG # 20395
TO (Agensy)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
PHONE NUMBER -
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
EXEC SEC
STATE
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
EXEC SEC
DOD
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
CHIEF OF STAFF/
COMMERCE
SEC
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
CIA
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC
JCS
REMARKS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
Dic 04/10/2009
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04b. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/91
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
TIME OF RECEI
P4:01
ROOM
THE SITUATION ROOM
MAY 24 MAY 4 18 P
PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
RELEASER: DTG: Difen
ROUTINE
MESSAGE NO. 0826
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PAGES 14
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN MASTEY
(Name)
(Phone Number)
(Room No.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG
RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
20395
LOG
TO (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
PHONE NUMBER -
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
EXEC SEC
STATE
DOD
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
EXEC SEC
COMMERCE
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
CHIEF OF STAFF/
ACC SEC
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
CIA
JCS
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC
REMARKS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DTL 04/10/2009
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04c. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/91
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TIME OF TRANSPORTION
TIME OF RECEIP
B
F4 : 01 0
ROOM
THE SITUATION ROOM
5/24/91
PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
RELEASER: DTG: Difer
ROUTINE
MESSAGE NO. 0826
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PAGES 14
Morsed
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(Name)
(Phone Number)
(Room No.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG
RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
20395
LOG #
TO (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER -
STATE
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
EXEC SEC
DoD
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
EXEC SEC
COMMERCE
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
CHIEF OF STAFF/
ACC. SEC
CIA
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
JCS
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC
REMARKS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DJL 04/10/2009
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04d. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TIME UF TRANSPORTION
TIME OF RECEIP
P4:01 0
B
ROOM
THE SITUATION ROOM
PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
RELEASER: DTG: Difer
ROUTINE
0826
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PAGES 14
Morsey
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(Name)
(Plams Number)
(Room No.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG
RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
LOG # 20395
TO (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
PHONE NUMBER -.
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
EXEC SEC
STATE
DOD
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
EXEC SEC
COMMERCE
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
CHIEF OF STAFF/
ASS SEC
CIA
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
JCS
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC
REMARKS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DUE 04/10/2009
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04e. Coversheet
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
n.d.
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting
403g, Sec. 6]
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TIME OF RECEI
01
THE SITUATION ROOM
PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
RELEASER: DTG: Difer
MESSAGE NO.
0826
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MO1524
PAGES 14
FROM
WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(Name)
(Phone Number)
(Room No.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG
RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
20395
LOG
#
TO (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
PHONE NUMBER -
STATE
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
EXEC SEC
DoD
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
EXEC SEC
COMMERCE
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
CHIEF OF STAFF/
S SEC
CIA
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
JCS
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC
REMARKS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
DJC 04/10/2009
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04f. Memo
William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al.
05/24/1991
(b)(3) [50 USC
Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East
403g, Sec. 6]
Export Control Policy, May 30, 1991
[Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
20395
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 24, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Executive Secretary
Associate Director for National
Department of State
Security & International
Affairs
COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6:
MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
Central Intelligence Agency
Chief of Staff and Assistant
Secretary
COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Department of Commerce
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export
Control Policy, May 30, 1991
There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on Middle East
Export Control Policy at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 30, 1991, in
the White House Situation Room. An agenda and discussion paper
are attached at Tabs A and B.
(C)
Attendance is principals plus one. Please phone my office at
202-456-6534 with the names and dates of birth of your attendees.
(U)
William Will F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
Discussion Paper
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJC NARA, Date 04/10/2009
CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: May 30, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. -12:30 p.m.
MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
Agenda
I. Opening Statement
Robert Gates
II. Discussion of Working Group Paper
All Participants
III. Summary
Robert Gates
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DOL NARA, Date 04/10/2009
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04g. Paper
Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
20395
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 23, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL &
SUBJECT:
Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export
Control Policy
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the agencies
forwarding an agenda and discussion paper for the May 30 DC
meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy.
Concurrences by: Sandy Charles
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the agenices at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to Agencies
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
Discussion Paper
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJC NARA, Date 04/10/2009
CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120430
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 91 10
TO: GATES
FROM: DEAL
DOC DATE: 04 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
EXPORT CONTROLS
MINUTES
DC
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON 31 MAY RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 07 JUN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF: 9021250 9021255
FILES: IFM 0
NSCP: DC284
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJ2 NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSAJC
CLOSED BY: NSAJC
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120430
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SITTMANN
Z 91060608 FOR DECISION
001
X 91060609 HILL APPROVED RECOM
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJ2 NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
WEA
LOG # 20430
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
wel Ken Hill
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
K
A
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
VED
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room REUE
E
91 JUN 5 P6. 12
West Wing Desk
2
N
NSC Secretariat
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
SECRET
SECRET
20430
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 4, 1991
ACTION
NOTED
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL &
SUBJECT:
Minutes of DC Meeting on Middle East
Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the May 31 DC meeting on
Middle East Export Control Policy.
Concurrence by: Sandy Charles
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the attached minutes for the files.
Approve KJAfor Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Minutes
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Diz NARA, Date 04/10/2009
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Minutes
Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA
5/31/91
(b)(1), (b)(3)
S
restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
National Security Council
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
H-Files
By My
on 5/25/2022
Subseries:
NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle
East, Export Controls
Date Closed:
4/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
90020-003-
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2003-0261-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-1232-MR(503)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
SECRET
20430
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
PRESIDENTIAL
503
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
BUSH
LIBRARY
DATE: May 31, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00-5:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control
Policy (l)
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President's Office:
CIA:
Karl Jackson
Richard Kerr
(b)(3)
State:
Reginald Bartholomew
JCS:
Allan Wendt
David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings
Defense:
Paul Wolfowitz
White House:
Peter Sullivan
Robert Gates
Andy Card
Commerce:
Joan McEntee
NSC:
Michael Galvin
Timothy Deal
Sandra Charles
OMB:
Robert Howard
Minutes
Mr. Gates: The Working Group has completed a study of our Middle
East export control policy and developed three options:
-- Option I would control all but food and humanitarian
items. It includes a presumption of denial for all problematical
end-users or uses.
-- Option II continues reliance on the diminished COCOM
lists, but allows for a supplemental list of items that we know
could be helpful to the military aspirations of these countries.
It also includes a safety net that would embargo shipment of any
items to a military or police entity.
-- Option III is the same as Option II, without the
supplemental list. ()
I would like to go around the table. But first let me throw out
an idea. Basically, we are talking about four countries. In
effect, Option I is what we have in place for Iraq and Libya.
Option II then is aimed at Iran and Syria. It calls for a
supplementary list of technologies to be added to the COCOM Core
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1232-MR
MM 6/8/2015
SECRET
2
List. We would try to get multilateral agreement to these
controls. (S)
Mr. Bartholomew: I would refine Option II in the case of Syria
and Iran. I assume that when you talk about the Core List you
are talking about a presumption of denial for military end-uses
and end-users and case-by-case review for civilian end-users. (8)
We would then attempt to seek multilateral approval of controls
for Syria and Iran which would encompass the Core List and a
supplementary list of technologies. We can add unilaterally any
important items dropped from the Core List. (S)
In seeking multilateral agreement, it's important to recognize
that we have never had one before for Syria and Iran. In other
COCOM countries exporters had to go to the licensing authorities
for exports to Syria and Iran of items on the COCOM list, but
approval of the licenses was pro forma. Thus, we will be
breaking new ground. (e)
Mr. Gates: In certain cases we must be prepared to go it alone.
(e)
Mr. Bartholomew: We always have that option. (&)
Mr. Wolfowitz: I would like some clarification. Are you talking
about a presumption of approval for civilian end-users? (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: No. Simply case-by-case review. (e)
Mr. Wendt: In COCOM there is generally approval for controlled
items going to bonafide civilian end-users. The allies would
oppose a presumption of denial. (e)
Mr. Wolfowitz: But we are not saying a presumption of approval
either. (C)
Mr. Wendt: The Germans are far ahead of us. They are not
shipping certain items to any end-users. (e)
Mr. Gates: In the case of Iran, Japan and others are going to
ship regardless of what we do. (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: At the present time we have no way of "looking
at" what Britain, for example, will ship to these countries.
With a multilateral agreement, they would have to come in for
case-by-case review. (e)
Ms. McEntee: I recommend that we keep the current total embargo
in place for Iraq and Libya. (8)
Mr. Gates: We would be prepared to keep that in place even if we
were alone. (8)
Ms. McEntee: Commerce has regulations for commodity
classifications. We are getting into a bind. We are getting
SECRET
SECRET
3
calls from exporters concerning dual-use, but non-sensitive goods
destined for these countries. We have looked to the interagency
group for guidance, for example, on heavy duty trucks for Iran.
There is some sensitivity on the part of some agencies because of
the part of the world in which these trucks would be used. (S)
Option II is well-intentioned, but inappropriate. It doesn't
solve the problem of the heavy duty trucks which, for example,
might be used to transport SCUDs. We feel strongly that with the
new non-proliferation regimes we are covered adequately. There
is therefore no need for a new regime. We do not know what a new
list would look like or even why we need it. (S)
Regarding the multilateral approach, let's recall that we
couldn't get the Australia Group to agree to limit exports of the
50 chemicals. The Nuclear Suppliers Group can't agree on limits
either. (8)
Going to COCOM and seeking agreement to control exports to Syria
and Iran of computers with a PDR of 62 or certain machine tools
is unrealistic. This doesn't get at the problem and would prove
more onerous for U.S. exporters. (8)
Mr. Wolfowitz: Isn't the problem the shrinkage of the Core List?
(e)
Mr. Gates: We have had to undertake a massive effort to get
others to agree to the proliferation controls, much less dual-use
items. (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: If you develop a supplementary list, we will be
asking our allies to do even more than they are doing now for
Iran and Syria. (e)
Mr. Wolfowitz: We are not getting them to adopt a multilateral
regime, but to impose a national licensing requirement. (e)
Mr. Gates: There are two basic decisions: our own policy and
our desire to get multilateral agreement. The first is more
important. (Q)
Ms. McEntee: We favor Option III. With the Core List, other
export control regimes, and the safety net for military end-uses
and end-users, we have an adequate system. (e)
Mr. Gates: Before the war, would the regime that Commerce is
proposing have caught dual-use or CBW material for Iraq? Dennis
Kloske made a pitch for regional security for MTCR items. Does
the suggested approach spread the net wide enough to catch the
kinds of stuff that went to Iraq? ()
1.4(c); (b)(3)
Mr. Gates: Would Option II have gotten them? (e)
SECRET
SECRET
4
Mr. Bartholomew: Option II will require fewer licenses. That in
itself is a political statement. Option II says essentially take
the Core List and add things that really count. (e)
Ms. McEntee: Other countries won't add to the list. We will end
up having to drop things from our list or end up with unilateral
controls. (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: The Germans are now controlling items that are
not on the new COCOM Core List, for example, the hydraulic parts
of weapons -- the "big gun"; heavy presses; items used in gas
centrifuge. These are not controlled on the COCOM list. (e)
Mr. Wolfowitz: What about the titanium furnace? (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: We would get that through the provision
concerning whether an exporter "knows or is informed" about a
questionable export. This is EPCI. (e)
Ms. McEntee: Yes, EPCI is a new control regime, but we can't get
the regulations out. (U)
Mr. Bartholomew: Even if we take all the non-proliferation
lists, there are certain things that are not controlled that were
used to build Iraq's war machine. (e)
Mr. Wendt: The only difficulty with the supplementary list will
be obtaining multilateral. agreement. (e)
Mr. Bartholomew: What about heavy duty trucks? (U)
Ms. McEntee: If heavy duty trucks are the target, we need a new
regime. (e)
Mr. Wolfowitz: The basic fact is that we are decontrolling
items, civil aircraft, for example. (e)
Mr. Gates: Yes and because of prior controls Airbus is
engineering out GE parts from Airbus aircraft shipped to these
countries. (&)
Ms. Charles: The fact is that we have not looked at our policy
toward these countries since the end of the war. (C)
Mr. Bartholomew: The controls imposed on Syria and Iran were not
for national security reasons. They were imposed because of
those countries' support for terrorism, to inflict pain. If we
go all the way to Option III, we are in effect making a decision
that the items controlled are controlled not for national
security, but for terrorism purposes. Some in State would.
therefore like to reimpose the old set of controls. (e)
Mr. Gates: That means in effect that we would have a tougher
policy for a recent ally than for the USSR. (e)
SECRET
SECRET
5
Mr. Bartholomew: Let's recall that these countries are on the
list for terrorism. (e)
Mr. Wolfowitz: It's not just a question of trucks. Reducing the
Core List is the problem. These countries are a long way behind
the USSR, and machine tools that are of little use to the USSR
may be a big help to Iranian and Syrian weapons programs. (C)
Mr. Wendt: And we could put advanced computers and semiconductor
technology in the same category. (e)
Ms. McEntee: I come backito what I said before. If we want to
catch such items, you have to have tighter controls. But if we
go back to the old COCOM list, we will not have multilateral
cooperation. (e)
Mr. Wendt: The issue is whether it's worthwhile to get any kind
of multilateral controls on these countries. (e)
Mr. Gates: France, Germany and others want relations with Iran.
Going back to them to tighten controls would be useless. I have
no problem in maintaining controls for punitive reasons, but I am
not sure the Principals are on board. There is no chance of
getting agreement to reinstate the old COCOM list for these
countries. And if we can't get agreement here whether trucks
should be on the list, it's likely to be a long list. People are
going to be conservative to avoid adverse press publicity. (C)
Mr. Bartholomew: Again, using the COCOM list was for foreign
policy and terrorism purposes. (e)
Ms. McEntee: But despite|the terrorism designation, we have no
controls to these countries for dynamite or hand guns. But we
have controls on word processors. (C)
Mr. Gates: We have raised two key issues, and you should all go
back and talk to your Principals about them:
1. This discussion has brought to our attention that we
have been using the COCOM list for controls for punitive
purposes. With the Core List exercise, we are, in effect, moving
to liberalize trade with these countries. Are our Principals
ready to do that? If the answer is yes, then the Core List alone
will serve our purposes for a control regime. If the answer is
no, then we have to have a supplementary list to move back toward
where we were before. (8)
2. If we are going to try to make such controls
multilateral, how do we do it? And what is the potential for it?
(S)
I don't believe that we need an NSR on this subject, but it will
depend on whether we have any disagreement. (8)
Mr. Wolfowitz: There is a third point. Even though items on the
control lists may not be significant militarily to the USSR, they
SECRET
SECRET
6
may be to Iran and Syria. And if the Core List is our only list,
we could find ourselves in the position where our control regime
is more liberal than Germany's. (S)
Mr. Gates: Can we clarify the German controls? Talk to your
Principals, and we will get together again in the middle of next
week. (Q)
-- End of Meeting --
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120416
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 91 17
TO: GATES
FROM: MCENTEE, J
DOC DATE: 29 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
EXPORT CONTROLS
MIDDLE EAST
DC
PERSONS: BARTHOLOMEW, R
SUBJECT: COMMERCE COMMENTS ON DUAL USE EXPORT LICENSING TO MIDDLE EAST
ACTION: NFAR PER BARTH
DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN
LOGREF: 9021250 9021255
FILES: IFM 0
NSCP: DC284
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJ NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSAJC
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120416
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 PONEMAN
Z 91053017 ANY ACTION NECESSARY
001
X 91060109 NFAR PER BARTH
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 04/18/2009
SECRET
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9120416
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 91 17
TO: GATES
FROM: MCENTEE, J
DOC DATE: 29 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
EXPORT CONTROLS
MIDDLE EAST
DC
PERSONS: BARTHOLOMEW, R
SUBJECT: COMMERCE COMMENTS ON DUAL USE EXPORT LICENSING TO MIDDLE EAST
ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY
DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91
STATUS: S
STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN
LOGREF: 9120307
FILES: IFM
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
PONEMAN
BARTH
MERCHANT
HAASS
Bat
Kanter
BARTH
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DUZ NARA, Date 04/10/2009
COMMENTS: 5/31 No action necessary
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY:
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
20416
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for Export Administration
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C. 20230
SECRET
May 29, 1991
Honorable Reginald Bartholomew
Under Secretary for International Security Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Reggie,
I understand that we will soon be asked to make a recommendation
on the following issue: How should we manage dual-use export
licensing to Iran, Libya and Syria now and Iraq later if
sanctions are ever lifted? The NSC has distributed an options
paper on this subject.
This letter seeks your support for Option III. This approach
would embargo all products that appear on any one of the seven
control lists maintained by Commerce and State. It would further
add an additional safety net authorizing denial of any exports or
reexports to any military end-users. No new control lists would
be formed other than the seven product lists already implemented
and in the process of being strengthened multilaterally. The
attached chart diagrams how Option III would work in the context
of the other seven principal export control regimes.
There are four principal reasons why the Administration should
adopt this approach:
1. Option III announces to the world and U.S. industry
that this Administration presumptively disapproves of
any export trade with the Iranian, Libyan or Syrian
military. The Administration's presumption of
disapproval would be overriding and blunt all criticism
of duplicity.
2. Option III would essentially embargo all truly
enabling technology that is crucial to developing a
meaningful defense industrial base around CBW, nuclear,
missile or other sophisticated munitions programs.
3. Option III holds the best promise for coordinated
multilateral adoption because most of our allies have
already begun to implement end-user driven approaches
(e.g. Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Spain). This was
confirmed at last week's Australia Group meeting.
4. Controls on the dual-use products not already
listed on one of the existing control lists would be
meaningless because they are widely available from
numerous foreign sources. These sources include not
only the member countries of these multilateral regimes
but numerous non-member states as well.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1232-MR
4/28/2014 MM
SECRET
Options I and II are well-intentioned but inappropriate. Option
I calls for licensing practically every export into these
countries regardless of strategic criticality or the end user.
If U.S. unwillingness to accept the strategic risk of selling
dual-use word-processors or hand-held calculators is so high as
to require this level of review regardless of the end-user, then
the administration should impose a Cuba-style embargo and not
waste scarce available licensing and enforcement resources on
this overly burdensome exercise.
Option II calls for the creation of yet another "enabling
technologies" control list. This new list would consist of dual-
use products that our multilateral partners (and interagency list
review experts) have already determined not to be strategically
critical. If we want to strengthen control lists, then the
Administration should do so through one or a number of the seven
multilateral control regimes that are already being strengthened
or are in formation.
Neither Option I nor II solves the real issue: Whether to
approve lesser strategic but sophisticated dual-use exports
licenses to even legitimate commercial end-users due to non-
specific and speculative concerns about risk of diversion
scenarios. Examples include heavy trucks to oil exploration
companies, commercial passenger planes to state airlines and
computers to schools and hospitals, all of which could
conceivably be diverted to military use at some future date.
Under Options I and II, case-by-case processing of these lesser
strategic but sophisticated export licenses in the context of
these unspecified diversion concerns means that the NSC will be
asked for country policy clarification on a continuing and
frequent basis.
For all of these reasons, I urge your consideration of Option III
as the most strategically responsible and multilaterally
acceptable approach.
Sincerely,
Joan M. McEntee
CC: Robert M. Gates
SECRET
SECRET
OPTION III:
CURRENT COMBINED CONTROLS
WITH SAFETY NETS
Chemical
Precursors,
Whole
Biologiosi
COCOM
Plants
Agents
Core
&
&
Super-
List
Equip.
MTCR
Equip.
Nuclear
Computer Munitions
LICENSING
STRATEGIC
GUIDANCE
CRITICALITY
Embargo all
Critical
Listed
Products
&
Controllable
END-USER SAFETY NETS
Generally
Useful
Nuclear
Chemical
&
Widely
Permit
Exports of
Available
Non-Listed
Products
Subject to
Safety Nets
Missile
Biological
Non-Useful
All Military
&
Widely
Available
SAFETY NETS require a license, with presumption
of denial, for any exports or reexports to any
chemical, biological, nuclear, missile, or any
other military projects.
SECRET
DC 284
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
LOG 9120395
DATE 24 MAY 91
DOCUMENT SUBJECT: CLASSIFICATION: AGENDA & DISCUSSION SECRET PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
COPY: 1
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
HOWARD, R
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
5/24/91 4:30
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOB
COPY: 1
WASHINGTON, DC 20503
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
Due 04/10/2009
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES