Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
285411057
label
Climate Change 1992
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
285411057
contentType
document
title
Climate Change 1992
description
These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
citationUrl
identifierLocal
06683-017
collections
Records of the White House Office of Policy Development (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Ed Goldstein Subject Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
285411057
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
0d0fac3c00b90b5d
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2017-0310-F
2017-0310-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Policy Development, White House Office of
Series:
Goldstein, Ed, Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
06683
Folder ID Number:
06683-017
Folder Title:
Climate Change 1992
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
22
29
4
DRAFT
April 6, 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR CLAYTON YEUTTER
FROM:
MICHAEL J. BOSKIN
SUBJECT:
Climate Change Policy Issues
Certain key economic aspects of the climate change
policy choices seem to me to have received insufficient
attention to date:
1. Stabilization of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels, even
if achievable in the year 2000, is likely to be very
costly, and increasingly so over time beyond that date.
2. There is a high degree of uncertainty about the
economics as well as the science related to climate
change.
3. Whatever the ultimate necessity of limiting greenhouse
gasses, country-by-country limits based on any
historical standard (such as "stabilization") certainly
not the least-cost approach.
Taking account these factors suggests to me that it is
less important to avoid committing ourselves to some
arbitrary goal in the short or intermediate run than it is a)
to promote vigorously a colloborative approach to dealing
with a worldwide problem in a way that seeks to minimize
worldwide costs, and b), as a corollary, to make very
explicit our expectation that any cost-minimizing strategy
will not involve country-by-country stabilization.
1. Stabilization Will Be Costly
Estimates of the cost of stabilization of greenhouse gas
emissions depend strongly on assumptions about how the
economy works and upon the future course of energy prices and
of economic growth. The Energy Modelling Forum (EMF) at
Stanford has organized cost estimates by several analysts on
the basis of uniform sets of assumptions about energy prices
DRAFT
2
and economic growth. The EMF figures relate to the
stabilization of carbon emissions, but they give an idea of
what would be involved 1 in stabilizing greenhouse gases on a
comprehensive basis.
The following table gives the reduction in the level of
real GDP that would follow from maintaining carbon emissions
at 1990 levels, as estimated using several different models.
Model Name
2000
2010
2020
2030
Global2100 (Manne)
0.5%
0.6%
1.1%
1.7%
Edmonds-Reilly
0.2%
0.3%
0.5%
0.6%
Green (OECD)
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
DGEM (Jorgenson)
0.5%
Goulder
1.0%
The three models providing figures for stabilization in 2000
indicate a cost range from 0.1% to 0.5% of GNP. Because
projected growth in output exceeds the projected rates of
increase in the efficiency with which energy is used, these
costs increase the farther into the future one looks. In
2020, the estimated sacrifice of GNP ranges from .2% to 1.1%;
in 2030 the sacrifice ranges from .3 to 1.7%.
To put these figures in perspective, EPA estimates the
cost of environmental regulation (exclusive of the new Clean
Air Act and of Superfund) this year at $115 billion, or about
2 percent of GDP. The cost of the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act, when fully implemented, are expected to run
between $25-$30 billion, or about .3% of GDP.
1 As a first approximation, carbon stabilization is a
reasonable proxy for stabilization of all greenhouse gases in
that 1) net methane emissions are expected to be about flat
at least until 2010; 2) because of new scientific evidence
about the net warming effect of CFCs, they are not likely to
be counted at all in any international protocol; and 3) the
other gases will show only minor changes from today's levels.
[Check on effect of taking account of forest sinks.]
DRAFT
3
2. Uncertainty in the Projections
The uncertainly involved in the science related to
global climate change has been much discussed. (Many
scientists are unpersuaded there is yet a convincing case
that global warming is likely, and it there is further
question about how costly it would be to adapt to global
warming if it occurred.) There is also significant
uncertainty about the likely path of greenhouse gas
emissions, especially because of the difficulty of predicting
economic growth, which has a major influence on carbon
emissions. The EMF estimates discussed above assume economic
growth a bit below the CEA's long-term growth projections.
We should not at all rule out achieving considerably higher
growth. The attached chart shows how wide are the bands
around projected carbon emissions associated with "higher"
and "lower" economic growth.
Working from the EMF estimates described above, we
estimate that if the Nation succeeds in reaching CEA's
"higher growth" path the cost of maintaining the 1990 carbon
emission level would increase to 1.3% to 2.4% of GDP in 2020
and 1.4% to 3.2% in 2030.2
3. Country-by-Country Emissions Limits
We have focussed a great deal of attention on the degree
to which we should commit ourselves to a goal of
stabilization, and by when. Unless we take a clear (and
positive) position otherwise, we risk backing into a vague
"nonbinding" commitment to stabilization some time in the
future. In my view, this will be the wrong result. This is
not because we may not wish to limit emissions significantly
-- perhaps we will be persuaded it is necessary. It is
2 The cited figures are our own rough estimates, as
summarized in the following table:
Model Name
2000
2010
2020
2030
Global2100 (Manne)
1.5%
2.4%
3.2%
Edmonds-Reilly
0.9%
1.3%
1.6%
Green (OECD)
0.8%
1.3%
1.4%
DRAFT
4
rather because country-by-country stabilization is a bad
long-term approach to whatever may be the required limitation
of worldwide emissions. To reduce emissions worldwide in a
cost-efficient manner requires making the reductions where it
is cheapest. This will certainly not imply any simple
country-by-country formula, but will require a much more
flexible system (perhaps along the lines of the SO₂ allowance
trading scheme in the CAAA).
Just as we were anxious not to limit SO₂ emissions under
the CAAA by uniform reductions, source by source, we should
try hard to avoid a situation of seeking to limit GHG
emissions country by country. The cost of reducing carbon
emissions, for example, varies among nations by a factor of
10. If global emissions are to be restricted it would be
very unlikely that the cost-minimizing way to do so would be
obtained by setting each nation's emissions at any fixed
relationship to current levels, absolutely or relative to GNP
or population. This is not just a technical nicety: The
OECD estimates that a "Toronto-type" agreement to attain the
stabilization described above would be more than twice as
costly as a global cost-minimizing approach.
4. Implications for Our Policy
We have up to now consistently held out against demands
that we commit to stabilization. The attached description of
our negotiating position in the 3rd INC puts the policy well.
But we now appear to be dancing around commitments that
pose a great risk of translation via domestic politics into
an effort to attain long-term stabilization. It would be
better to emphasize that attaining emissions levels at or
near our 1990 levels is not a long-term objective but a short
term place-holder. The farther out one goes beyond 2000, the
larger the cost of achieving 1990 levels.
The negotiating position seems to me still to be the
right one. Our policy should be to continue to work with
other nations to determine the nature and seriousness of
global climate change induced by human activity, to seek the
lowest cost way of dealing with the problems that are
identified, and to seek an acceptable distribution of the
costs that are implied. It should be our announced
expectation that, whatever the degree of problems may be
identified, its solution will not involve a simple country-
by-country stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions, and
that we therefore accept no presumption that the emissions of
greenhouse gases by the United States in the further future
will bear any relationship presently identified present
DRAFT
5
levels. Any acceptance of stabilization by the United States
should be explicitly identified as a goal for the short- or
intermediate term, during which we will continue to work on
the problem.
5. Avoid Commitment to Stabilization of U.S.
Emissions
There is huge momentum to the idea of stabilization. If
we do not announce in no uncertain terms that we do not
accept the desirability of mutual commitments to country-by-
country stabilization as the basis for long-term policy, we
are very likely to find ourselves compelled to stabilize,
probably even to stabilize CO2.
As far as even the nearer future is concerned, based on
what we now know and on what we have pretty well committed to
as a matter of policy, we are not likely to stabilize U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions in the foreseeable future, and we
are very unlikely to stabilize CO₂ emissions. But we might
be able to stabilize greenhouse gases in 2000 if we are able
to leave both CFCs and their substitutes out of the
calculation and if we count forest growth resulting from our
new planting but ignore natural forest growth in doing the
calculations.
As you have emphasized, if we just wordsmith
stabilization in a framework convention, we are headed down
the slippery slope. If we don't buy into stabilization in a
convention, the President is going to be bucking, or appear
to be bucking, the rest if the world. We should find a way
to get off the stabilization train, but not off the train of
seeking a global assessment and global response to the global
climate change issue.
Given the momentum, existing policy, the domestic and
international political setting, the only way I can see to do
this would be to make a clear and public distinction between
our intermediate-term goals and our longer-term goals, which
would be the right position on the merits. That distinction
could be drawn in a way consistent with something like a
mutual commitment with some large group of countries to "hold
the line" on GHG emissions for the next few years through
prudent actions while we assess the situation and develop the
mechanisms for international cooperation for a more rational
approach to whatever we determine the problem to be. This
could be cast as a stabilization objective, but for the
shorter term only (i.e., the exact opposite of a long-term
stabilization goal with a vague and possibly distant
horizon).
Gross CO2 Emissions
Sensitivity of NES+CAAA to GNP Rates
Carbon (Million Metric Tonnes)
2400
Higher GNP Growth
2200
Central GNP Growth
2000
Blue Chip + EMF
Lower GNP Growth
1800
1600
Historical
1400
Data
1200
1000
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
Year
U.S. POSITIONS ON KEY CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES
3RD INC
U.S. OBJECTIVE FOR NEGOTIATIONS
The United States wants a framework convention that can be
signed at the 1992 U.N. Conference on the Environment and
Development by the largest possible number of countries.
The United States will seek to have the convention contain
the views, elements and language provided in the U.S.
Submission to the INC dated March 15, 1991.
NATIONAL STRATEGIES
The United States supports a convention that provides a
framework and process for developing and periodically
updating national strategies to address climate change with
specific response measures suited to the unique
characteristics of each country.
-
The strategies should address all relevant greenhouse
gas sources and sinks comprehensively and quantify to
the degree possible the results of actions committed.
-
The strategies should consider adaptation and
limitation as an integrated package.
-
The convention should provide a process for periodic
review of these national strategies by the Parties.
The "Pledge and Review" process proposed by Japan and
France at the Second INC is an interesting interpretation
of such a process.
-
Because "Pledge and Review" has not been adequately
defined as yet, the United States has not yet taken a
position on it.
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
The United States supports a comprehensive approach to
climate change, addressing all sources and sinks of all
greenhouse gases.
-
A focus on any one gas (e.g., carbon dioxide), or
specific sources or sinks (e.g., forests, energy use)
will limit the effectiveness of a convention and
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 2 -
hamper the development of comprehensive national
strategies by limiting the flexibility of nations to
develop a strategy tailored to its own domestic
circumstances.
-
A comprehensive approach accounts for all greenhouse
gases, insuring that choices do not reduce one gas but
inadvertently increase another.
The United States believes all gases should be covered by a
convention, including those covered by the Montreal
Protocol.
-
Exclusion of those covered by the Montreal Protocol
would provide a disincentive for countries to join the
Montreal Protocol, to control the use of existing
supplies of ozone-depleting substances, and to take
account of greenhouse-gas warming potential in
choosing among CFC substitutes listed in the Protocol
whose use is permitted after 2000.
-
Not all greenhouse gases covered by the Montreal
Protocol are scheduled for complete phase-out and will
continue to be important factors in potential climate
change.
-
The inclusion of gases covered by the Montreal
Protocol, including potential substitutes, is
necessary for scientific and analytical purposes if
comprehensive understanding of radiative forcing is to
be achieved.
TARGETS AND TIMETABLES
The United States cannot support emissions targets or
timetables for achieving them in a framework convention.
-
Insufficient knowledge exists of potential climate
change, its impacts, and the environmental, economic,
and social impacts of potential response strategies to
support establishing targets and timetables.
-
Setting fixed emissions targets for a point in the
distant future presents an open-ended economic risk
that is unacceptable given the great uncertainties
inherent in projecting the costs of reaching such
targets.
-
Given that emissions targets will affect the United
States more than many other countries, the United
States cannot agree to a convention that significantly
disadvantages the U.S. economy in the short term to
the benefit of others.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 3 -
-
Targets and timetables, which will attract low rates
of global participation, shift energy-intensive
activities to non-participating countries, and promote
increased emissions of non-covered greenhouse gases,
are likely to yield lesser benefits than alternative
policies that are also less economically disruptive.
-
A focus on emissions targets will tend to split the
Parties along north-south lines.
-
Developing countries whose economic growth prospects
are linked to the growth of industrialized economies
will suffer rather than benefit from climate policies
that adversely affect growth in the industrialized
region.
Targets and timetables are not necessary for the
development of a framework convention or the creation of
national strategies to address climate change.
The United States believes the convention and all countries
should take a comprehensive approach that includes
consideration of all sources and sinks of greenhouse gases
and that, in the short term, build on actions that have
broad-ranging benefits and that help curb net greenhouse
gas emissions.
PROTOCOLS
The United States believes discussion of specific
protocols is premature at this time.
-
The United States believes a framework convention,
without explicit links to protocols, will garner the
greatest number of signatory countries.
HARMONIZATION OF MEASURES
The United States questions the practicality of harmonizing
response measures as proposed by several countries.
I
Each country will need to determine for itself a
strategy to address climate change that takes into
account its unique circumstances.
-
Harmonization of response measures may compromise the
ability of each state to choose the most
cost-effective mix of measures for its situation.
-
While harmonizing response measures is not practical,
harmonizing standards and methodologies for assessing
needs and developing national strategies is considered
both feasible and desirable.
MARKET MECHANISMS
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 4 -
The United States supports the development of a convention
that allows for the cooperative agreements among the
parties to meet the obligations of the convention.
The United States supports the development of a convention
that does not preclude the use of market-oriented
approaches to meet any preset or future obligations to
which such approaches might be applied.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The United States recognizes that developing countries will
require financial and technical assistance to meet
obligations under a convention on climate change.
-
It will be necessary to quantify the costs associated
with any actions in this area before consideration of
additional funds can be justified.
-
The United States believes that existing resources and
mechanisms, such as the GEF, must be fully utilized
before additional monies can be considered.
-
The United States will not commit to providing new
funding that increases the overall budget.
The United States interprets "additional" to mean
funds for environmental proposes redirected from
total resources, rather than an increase in
overall development assistance.
TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION
The United States recognized the need for technology
cooperation with developing countries.
-
The United States supports the development of a
process for technology cooperation that encourages the
development of action plans and assesses the needs of
developing countries to implement them.
The United States cannot support calls for preferential,
countries. noncommercial transfers of technologies to developing
-
In market economies, governments cannot compel the
transfer of privately-owned technologies or dictate
the terms of transfer.
-
Any arrangements for technology cooperation must
respect intellectual property rights and permit
reasonable rates of return on investments.
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 5 -
The United States can support the following language
concerning a "Precautionary Principle," as proposed in its
submission to the INC:
-
"lack of full scientific certainty should not be used
as a reason for postponing measures that are
commensurate with the expected extent and likelihood
of any adverse impact of climate change, that reflect
the costs and benefits of such measures, and that are
directed, as appropriate, towards understanding,
limiting, reducing, facilitating adaptation to and
preventing such adverse impacts."
-
The United States does not support use of the term
"precautionary principle" without clear definition
such as that contained in the submission to the INC.
RESEARCH
The United States supports a convention that provides a
strong program of research, systematic observation and
information exchange.
-
the convention should promote internationally
coordinated systematic observation and research to
improve capabilities to observe, model, and understand
the global climate system.
-
the convention should promote scientific, economic and
social research, and the Parties should consider both
the social and economic costs and benefits of changes
to the global climate and of potential responses to
those changes.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY