Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
Records pertain to the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
285790867
label
Bromley Global Change Group [3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
285790867
contentType
document
title
Bromley Global Change Group [3]
description
Records pertain to the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
citationUrl
identifierLocal
07668-010
collections
Records of the White House Office of Policy Development (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Teresa Gorman Subject Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
285790867
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
8343a82f7a90c54a
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
foia Number:
2005-0336-F
2005-0336-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Policy Development, White House Office of
Series:
Gorman, Teresa, Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
07668
Folder ID Number:
07668-007
Folder Title:
Bromley Global Change Group [3]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
17
25
1
1
WMO
UNEP
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICYMAKERS
SUMMARY
WORKING GROUP Ш
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
First Draft, May 1, 1990 - For Review Only - Do Not Quote
REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter
1
1. Introduction
2. Anthropogenic Sources of Greenhouse Gases
1
3. Future Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2
4. Climate Change Response Strategies
6
5. Options for Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions
7
7
5.1 Energy Sector
10
5.2 Industry Sector
10
5.3 Agriculture Sector
5.4 Forestry and Other Sectors
11
6. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets
12
7. Measures for Adapting to Climate Change
13
7.1 Coastal Zone Management
14
7.2 Resource Use and Management
16
8. Mechanisms for Implementing Response Strategies
19
8.1 Public Information and Education
19
8.2 Economic (Market) Measures
20
8.3 Technology Development and Transfer
21
23
8.4 Financial Measures
24
8.5 Legal Measures
26
9. Conclusion
1 1.0 INTRODUCTION
2
3
Global climate change is an issue which concerns the entire international
4 community. Should significant climate change occur, the effects on the global
5 environment and the resources relied upon by mankind and natural ecosystems
6 could be significant. As described in the IPCC Impacts Working Group report,
7 these could include a rise in the sea level and impacts on agriculture, forestry,
8 ecosystems and biodiversity, hydrology and water resources, oceans, and
9 human settlements.
10
11
The IPCC's Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG) explored
12 possible options for responding to climate change at the national, regional, and
13 international levels. In carrying out this work the RSWG considered the
14 anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions, a range of measures for
15 limiting the increase in atmospheric concentrations of such gases, and options
16 for adapting to possible climatic changes. The RSWG also reviewed specific
17 mechanisms for implementing response strategies, including a possible
18 framework convention on climate change.
19
20
The RSWG has identified a large number of short and long term response
21 options for consideration by members of the international community in
22 addressing climate change. These include a wide array of options for limiting
23 net greenhouse gas emissions from the energy, industry, agriculture, and
24 forestry sectors through the adoption of a variety of technologies and resource
25 use strategies. Measures have also been identified which may enhance the
26 ability of coastal regions and natural resources to adapt to a changing climate.
27
28
Because of the short time frame involved in the preparation of this report, it
29 was not possible to carry out a complete review of all aspects of climate change
30 response options. The costs, effectiveness, and other economic and social
31 implications of each of these options have not been evaluated and require
32 further analysis. In addition, the effectiveness and desirability of specific
33 options will depend on circumstances which vary substantially from country to
34 country. Hence, much analysis needs to be done on an individual country by
35 country basis.
36
37
Nonetheless, this report provides an important interim assessment for
38 policy makers. It identifies the major issues which need to be considered in the
39 development of national, regional, and international climate change response
40 strategies. The report also provides an overview of the main issues which
41 should be considered in future international negotiations related to climate
42 change.
43
44 2.0 ANTHROPOGENIC GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES
45
46
A wide range of human activities result in the release of greenhouse gases
47 into the atmosphere. Anthropogenic emissions can be categorized as arising
48 from energy production and use, non-energy industrial activities (primarily the
49 production and use of CFCs), agricultural systems, and changes in land-use
50 patterns (including deforestation and biomass burning). The relative
51 contributions of these activities to radiative forcing are shown below in Figure 1
52 (see Science Working Group report for further explanation of the radiative
53 forcing of the various greenhouse gases).
-2-
1
Figure 1
2
3
Current Anthropogenic Contributions to
4
Radiative Forcing by Sector
5
6
Other Industrial (3%)
7
8
Forestry (9%)
9
10
11
Agriculture (14%)
12
13
Energy (57%)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
CFCs (17%)
21
22
23
24
25
26
The largest anthropogenic source of radiative forcing is energy production
27 and use. The consumption of energy from fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and
28 natural gas) for industrial, commercial, residential, transportation, and other
29 purposes results in large emissions of CO2 and other gases and accounts for an
30 estimated 57 percent of the radiative forcing resulting from human activities.
31 Industrial activities not related to energy use comprise another 20 percent of
32 anthropogenic contributions. The vast majority of these emissions result from
33 the production and use of CFCs and other halocarbons in various industrial
34 processes.
35
36
Agricultural systems account for about 14 percent of the radiative forcing
37 resulting from human activities. Significant amounts of methane are released in
38 the process of rice cultivation and from livestock systems, while nitrous oxide is
39 released during the use of nitrogenous fertilizers. Approximately 9 percent of
40 anthropogenic contributions are the result of deforestation, biomass burning, and
41 other land-use patterns which release CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide.
42
43 44 because of uncertainties regarding both total emissions and emissions from
Estimates of current greenhouse gas emissions, however, are imprecise
45 each source. Emissions from certain sources are particularly difficult to
46 measure. For example, estimates of CO2 emissions from deforestation and of
47 methane emissions from rice cultivation, livestock systems, and biomass burning
48 vary by factors of two or more.
49
50 3.0 FUTURE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
51
52 53 significantly in the future. As economic and population growth continues,
Greenhouse gas emissions from most sources are likely to increase
-3-
1 in particular in the developing countries, there is expected to be an increase in
2 energy use, industrial and agricultural activity, deforestation, and other activities
3 which result in greenhouse gas emissions. Although some controls have been
4 put in place under the Montreal Protocol for certain CFCs and halons, emissions
5 of CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gases are likely to
6 increase under current patterns of economic activity and growth.
7
8
However, there are significant limitations on our ability to estimate future
9 rates of population and economic growth, individual behavior, technological
10 innovation, and other factors which are crucial for determining emission rates
11 over the course of the next century. This lends very great uncertainty to
12 projections of greenhouse gas emissions over several decades or longer.
13 Reflecting these inherent difficulties, the RSWG's work on emissions scenarios
14 is incomplete and preliminary.
15
16 3.1 Emissions Scenarios
17
18
One of the RSWG's first tasks was to prepare some initial scenarios of
19 possible future greenhouse gas emissions for the use of the three IPCC Working
20 Groups. An experts' group was formed which looked at four hypothetical future
21 patterns of greenhouse gas emissions and their effect on the atmosphere. The
22 cumulative effect of these emissions was calculated using the concept of
23 equivalent CO2 concentrations (e.g. the contributions of all greenhouse gases to
24 radiative forcing are converted into their equivalent in terms of CO2
25 concentrations).
26
27
The scenarios assumed future emissions patterns which would result in: (1)
28 the equivalent of a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 from
29 pre-industrial levels* by about 2030, with continued increases throughout the
30 century; (2) the equivalent of a CO2 doubling by approximately 2060, with
31 continued increases; (3) the equivalent of a CO2 doubling by about 2090, with
32 stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases thereafter; and
33 (4) the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at a
34 level less than a CO2 equivalent doubling.
35
36
The first of the scenarios, called the 2030 High Emissions Scenario,
37 assumes that few or no steps are taken to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
38 Energy use and clearing of tropical forests continues and fossil fuels, in
39 particular coal, remain the world's primary energy source. The Montreal
40 Protocol comes into effect but without strengthening and with less than 100
41 percent compliance. Under this scenario, the equivalent of a doubling of
42 pre-industrial CO2 levels occurs by around 2030.
43
44
The second of the scenarios, the 2060 Low Emissions Scenario, assumes
45 that a number of environmental and economic concerns result in steps to reduce
46 the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Energy efficiency measures, which
47
48
49
50
The total radiative forcing at any time is the sum of those from the individual
51
greenhouse gases. For simplicity, total forcing is expressed in terms of the
52
amount of CO2 which would give that forcing; this is termed the equivalent
53
carbon dioxide concentration (see the Science Working Group report).
-4-
1 might only be possible with government intervention, are implemented,
2 emissions controls are adopted globally, and the share of the world's primary
3 energy provided by natural gas increases. Full compliance with the Montreal
4 Protocol is achieved and tropical deforestation is halted and reversed. Under
5 this scenario, the cumulative effect of such measures is a CO2 equivalent
6 doubling around 2060.
7
8
The remaining two scenarios reflect futures where steps in addition to those
9 in the 2060 Low Emissions Scenario are taken to reduce greenhouse gas
10 emissions. These steps include rapid utilization of renewable energy sources,
11 strengthening of the Montreal Protocol, and adoption of agricultural policies to
12 reduce emissions from livestock systems, rice paddies, and fertilizers.
13
14
All of the above scenarios, while hypothetical and based on highly variable
15 assumptions, provide a conceptual basis for considering possible future patterns
16 of emissions and the broad responses that might affect those patterns.
17 However, they represent assumptions rather than cases derived from specific
18 studies. In addition, no assessment was made of the economic costs,
19 technological feasibility, or market potential of the underlying policy assumptions.
20
21 3.2 Reference Case
22
23
In addition to these scenarios, the RSWG obtained a limited amount of data
24 from various sources on possible greenhouse gas emissions from a number of
25 countries over the next several decades, under the assumption that no specific
26 efforts are made to limit such emissions. Estimates of future emissions of CO2
27 and methane from the energy sector were developed based on the work of
28 analysts from over 21 countries and submissions from various international
29 organizations. Future emissions of CO2 from tropical deforestation represent
30 the average of two scenarios adopted by RSWG agriculture and forestry experts.
31
32 33 decades were derived from these studies through a process of integration. This
Global estimates of greenhouse gas emissions over the next several
34 has been labelled the "Reference Case". However, the various studies used
35 differing assumptions and methodologies, thus complicating the integration
36 process. As a result, the final emissions estimates are subject to considerable
37 uncertainty.
38
39
The Reference Case, which was projected to the year 2025, contains higher
40 emissions of CO2 and methane than any of the emissions scenarios discussed
41 in Section 3.1 above. It indicates a sharp increase in CO2 emissions from fossil
42 fuel combustion, from 5.2 billion tons of carbon (Bt C) in 1985 to 12.2 Bt C in
43 2025. Methane emissions from coal mining and natural gas production and
44 transport also increase rapidly as fossil fuel use increases. The mid-range
45 estimate of CO2 emissions from deforestation increases from 1.7 Bt C in 1985 to
46 2.6 Bt C in 2025. Emissions from the agriculture sector, on the other hand, grow
47 more slowly than from the energy sector or from deforestation.
48
49
CO2 emissions in the Reference Case are nearly 20 percent greater than
50 those in the 2030 High Emissions Scenario, while methane emissions are more
51 than 10 percent higher. The emissions projected under the
-5-
1 Reference Case, with the comparable figures from the 2030 High Emissions
2 Scenario, are shown in Table 1. Nitrous oxide and CFC emissions, as well as
3 methane emissions from biomass sources, are not shown since such estimates
4 were not developed for the Reference Case.
5
6
7
8
Table 1
9
10
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the RSWG Scenarios
11
12
13
Reference Case
2030 High
Emissions Scenario
14
15
16
1985
2025
1985
2025
17
18
CO2 Emissions (Bt C)
19
20
Energy
5.2
12.4
5.3
10.2
21
Deforestation
1.7
2.6
0.7
1.4
22
Cement
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
23
24
Total
7.0
15.2
6.1
11.8
25
26
CH4 Emissions (Tg CH4)
27
28
Coal Mining
44
126
35
85
29
Natural Gas
22
59
45
74
30
Rice
110
149
110
149
31
Enteric Ferm.
75
125
74
125
32
Animal Wastes
37
59
33
Landfills
30
60
40
71
34
35
Subtotal
318
577
304
503
36
Biomass Burning
57
79
37
Natural
179
179
38
39
541
761
40
Total
41
42
43 44 the 2030 High Emissions Scenario should be labelled the "business-as-usual"
At the IPCC Second Plenary Session in June 1989 participants agreed that
45 scenario, i.e. the level of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases which
46 might occur in the absence of policies to limit emissions. The Reference Case
47 was developed after the IPCC's Second Plenary Session. At least for emissions
48 of CO2 and methane, the Reference Case is closest to the 2030 High Emissions
49 Scenario. As noted above, however, all of these figures are subject to
50 considerable uncertainty. They thus cannot be considered to be predictions of
51 future emissions patterns. Research on future emissions is an important area
52 for further cooperative work.
-6-
1
The Reference Case also indicates that future emissions patterns by world
2 region may be significantly different than those which exist at the present time.
3 It is estimated that, of global CO2 emissions in 1985, emissions from the OECD
4 countries accounted for nearly 50 percent of global emissions, emissions from
5 centrally planned European countries about 25 percent, and emissions from the
6 rest of the world the remaining 25 percent. The Reference Case indicates that
7 by 2025, under the assumptions used in the case studies, these ratios of global
8 CO2 emissions could be around 33, 22, and 44 percent, respectively, for the
9 OECD, centrally planned Europe, and the rest of the world.
10
11
12 4.0 RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
13
14
Because climate change could potentially result in significant impacts on the
15 global environment and human activities, it is important to begin considering now
16 what measures might be taken in response. The RSWG identified a wide range
17 of options for the international community to consider. These include measures
18 both to limit net greenhouse gas emissions and to increase the ability of society
19 and ecosystems to adapt to a changing climate.
20
21
The consideration of climate change response strategies, however, presents
22 formidable difficulties for policy makers. On the one hand, the information
23 available to make sound policy analyses is inadequate because of: (a) remaining
24 scientific uncertainties regarding the magnitude, timing, rate, and regional
25 consequences of potential climate change; (b) uncertainty with respect to how
26 effective specific response options or groups of options would be in actually
27 averting potential climate change; and (c) uncertainty with respect to the costs,
28 effects on economic growth, and other economic and social implications of
29 specific response options or groups of options. On the other hand, the
30 potentially serious consequences of climate change on the global environment
31 may support implementation of some response strategies even in the face of
32 such significant uncertainties.
33
34
Recognizing these factors, a large number of options were preliminarily
35 assessed. It appears that some of these options may be economically and
36 socially feasible for implementation in the near-term while others, because they
37 are not yet technically or economically viable, may be more appropriate for
38 implementation in the longer-term. In general, the RSWG found that the most
39 effective response strategies, especially in the short-term, are those which are:
40
41
0
Beneficial for reasons other than climate change and justifiable in their own
42
right, for example increased energy efficiency, better management of forests
43
and other natural resources, and reductions in emissions of CFCs and other
44
ozone depleting substances that are also radiatively important gases;
45
46
Economically efficient and cost effective, in particular those that use
47
market-based mechanisms;
48
49
Able to serve multiple social, economic, and environmental purposes;
-7-
1 O
Flexible, so that they can be easily modified to respond to increased
2
scientific and economic understanding of climate change;
3
4
O
Compatible with the concept of sustainable economic growth and
5
development;
6
7
O
Administratively practical and effective in terms of application, monitoring,
8
and enforcement; and
9
10
O
Which reflect obligations of both developed and developing countries in
11
addressing this issue, while recognizing the special needs of developing
12
countries.
13
14
The degree to which options are viable will also vary considerably
15 depending on the region or country involved. For each country, the
16 socioeconomic implications of specific options will depend on its social,
17 environmental, and economic context. Only through careful analysis of all
18 available options will it be possible to determine which are best suited to the
19 circumstances of a particular country or region.
20
21
22 5.0 OPTIONS FOR LIMITING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
23
24
The RSWG reviewed potential measures for mitigating climate change by
25 limiting net emissions of greenhouse gases from the energy, industry,
26 transportation, forestry, agriculture, and other sectors. These measures include
27 those which limit emissions from greenhouse gas sources (such as energy
28 production and use) as well as those which increase the use of natural sinks
29 (such as forests and other biomass) for sequestering greenhouse gases. A
30 discussion of both short and long term options for each major emissions sector
31 is provided below.
32
33
34 5.1 Limitation of Net Emissions from the Energy Sector
35
36
The energy sector plays a vitally important role in economic well-being and
37 development for all nations. At the same time, because energy production and
38 use accounts for an estimated 57 percent of current anthropogenic greenhouse
39 gas emissions, energy policies need to ensure that sustained economic growth
40 occurs in a manner that, globally, conserves the environment for future
41 generations. However, there is no single, quick-fix technological option for
42 limiting greenhouse gas emissions from energy sources. A comprehensive
43 strategy is necessary which deals with improving efficiency on both the demand
44 and supply sides as a priority and emphasizes technological research,
45 development, and deployment.
46
47
Various potential options have been identified for reducing greenhouse gas
48 emissions from energy systems. The most relevant categories of options appear
49 to be:
50
51
o
efficiency improvements and conservation in energy supply, conversion, and
52
end-use ;
53
54
o
fuel substitution by energy sources which are lower emitters of greenhouse
55
gases² (e.g. natural gas, nuclear, and renewable sources); and
-8-
1
O
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by removal, fixation, or the
2
maintenance and enhancement of sinks³.
3
4
From an analysis of the technologies in these categories, it appears that
5 some technologies are available now or in the short-term with at least some
6 economic and market potential while others need further development to lower
7 costs or to improve their environmental characteristics. Tables 2 and 3 provide
8 various examples of technological options within each of the broad categories
9 defined above, and their possible application in the short, medium, and
10 longer-term.
11
12
This distinction among time frames is used in order to reflect the remaining
13 technological needs in each category and to assist in formulating technological
14 strategies. Short-term technologies are those which apparently are or will be
15 both technically and economically ready for introduction and/or demonstration up
16 to the year 2005 and beyond. Mid-term technologies are those which, while
17 technically available now, are not yet economic and thus may not be
18 implemented until the period from 2005 to 2030. Longer-term technologies are
19 not yet available but may emerge after 2030 as a result of research and
20 development.
21
22
The technical, economic, and market potential of technological options will
23 vary depending upon the sector in which they are to be applied. The technical
24 potential of an energy technology is its capacity to reduce potential emissions,
25 irrespective of the costs involved, and is largely a function of technical feasibility
26 and resource availability. Economic potential refers to whether the application of
27 the options is economically efficient and cost-effective it may be significantly
28 less than technical potential where there are positive resource costs. Market
29 potential refers to whether the consumer or user is likely to adopt the option - it
30 might be even less than economic potential due to market imperfections,
31 attitudes to risk, and the presence of non-monetary costs.
32
33
There is, in general, extensive information available on the technical
34 potential of the many technological options listed. The economic and market
35 potential, however, depends on the specific circumstances (national, local and
36 even sectoral) in which the option is to be applied and thus can only be analyzed
37 on a country by country basis. Hence, much important analysis can be done
38 only on an individual country by country basis.
39
40
The short-term technological potential of particular relevance to the
41 developed world is discussed by sector below. Technological potential for
42 developing countries has not been developed in the same detail due to a lack of
43 information.
44
45 Transportation Sector:
46
47
Substantial technical potential exists for fuel substitution through the use of
48 fuels derived from natural gas, ethanol, or other fuels from biomass sources⁴.
49 Substantial technical potential also exists for electric or hydrogen-fueled
50 vehicles, which could also reduce emissions with appropriate primary energy
51 sources. Presently, however, the economic and market potentials of most of
52 these options are very low because (a) petroleum fuels are relatively cheap; (b)
53 alternative non-CO2 producing fuels are relatively costly; and (c) some
54 alternative vehicular technologies have performance drawbacks.
-9-
1
The technical potential for vehicle efficiency improvements is significant
2 despite the substantial improvements already made. Economic and market
3 potentials are constrained, however, by replacement rates of vehicles, consumer
4 demand and preference for larger, more powerful and better equipped cars, and
5 higher incremental costs. Improved driver behavior, vehicle maintenance, traffic
6 management, and promotion of public transportation could also reduce CO2
7 emissions.
8
9 Buildings Sector:
10
11
The technical potential for energy efficiency gains in the residential and
12 commercial sectors is substantial⁰. Energy requirements for heating and cooling
13 new homes could be roughly half the current average. Retrofitting existing
14 homes could reduce energy requirements an average of around 25 percent. In
15 addition, reductions of energy use in existing commercial buildings of at least 50
16 percent may be technically feasible, while new commercial buildings could be up
17 to 75 percent more efficient than existing commercial buildings.
18
19
However, market potential is lower and depends on the building's
20 replacement rate. The realization of significant gains in this sector requires the
21 involvement of government, the many concerned institutions, and ultimately the
22 individual residential or commercial consumer. This sector therefore requires
23 special efforts in order to achieve substantial levels of market penetration of
24 energy efficient technologies which are also economic. Institutional barriers
25 must be removed and careful attention given to the design of research and
26 development programs for this sector.
27
28 Industry Sector:
29
30
The technical potential for efficiency improvements in the industry sector
31 ranges from 13 percent in some sub-sectors to over 40 percent in others⁶. The
32 most dramatic efficiency improvements over the last 15 years have been in the
33 energy-intensive industries. Technical options exist for accelerating this trend
34 and for achieving similar savings in other industries. Such options stem mainly
35 from recent improvements in process technologies, as well as better design and
36 materials. Considerable opportunities for energy savings exist in the industrial
37 sector by the recycling of energy-intensive waste. There may also be significant
38 technical potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions through industrial fuel
39 switching, especially since many industrial boilers are already dual-fuel capable
40 with natural gas being the fuel typically substituted for fuel oil under present
41 circumstances. Combined heat and power, cogeneration, combustion of
42 biomass wastes, methane from landfills, and other renewable energy sources
43 also have potential to reduce growth in emissions.
44
45 Electricity Sector:
46
47
Under current price conditions, both efficiency and fuel substitution are
48 largely dependent on the rate of retirement of existing power plants, the growth
49 in demand for electricity, and the cost of the replacement plant⁶. The technical
50 potential for greater efficiency in electricity generation can be in the range of 15
51 to 20 percent (with lower gains for plants which are already relatively efficient).
52 Fuel substitution could achieve in the range of 30 percent (from oil to natural
53 gas) to 40 percent (from coal to natural gas). Much greater
-10-
1 reductions would be possible with greater penetration of low-emitting sources
2 such as nuclear power, hydroelectric, or other renewable energies In addition,
3 the electricity sector has the technical potential to substantially increase its
4 efficiency where cogeneration of electricity and heat or combined cycle power
5 generation can be applied.
6
7
The economic potential for greater fuel efficiency is considerably lower and
8 for substitution from coal or oil to natural gas or non-fossil fuel is critically
9 dependent on the relative prices and availability of the fuels in question. In
10 evaluating switching between fossil fuels it is necessary to account for potential
11 increases in methane emissions from the production and transmission of the
12 fuels in calculating the net benefit of such strategies. Overall, efficiency of the
13 electricity system can be improved through the use of least cost utility planning,
14 whose goal is to meet energy service requirements through the least cost
15 combination of supply additions and demand management.
16
17 5.2 Limitation of Net Emissions from the Industry Sector
18
19
The most significant source of greenhouse gases associated with industrial
20 activity not related to energy use is the production and use of CFCs and other
21 halocarbons. CFCs represent a very important source of greenhouse gas
22 emissions, about 17 percent of global contributions to radiative forcing.
23 However, the RSWG did not consider control strategies for these gases since
24 this issue is already addressed under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
25 Deplete the Ozone Layer.
26
27 5.3 Limitation of Net Emissions from the Agriculture Sector
28
29
About 14 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions can be
30 attributed to the agricultural sector, in particular livestock systems, rice
31 cultivation, and the use of nitrogenous fertilizers. Limitation of emissions from
32 this sector presents a challenge because the processes by which greenhouse
33 gases, in particular methane and nitrous oxide, are released in agricultural
34 activities are not well understood. In addition, response options in the
35 agricultural sector must be designed to ensure maintenance of food supply.
36 There appear, however, to be a number of short-term response options, some
37 economically viable in their own right, which could contribute to a limitation of net
38 emissions from agricultural sources. In addition, there are a number of
39 promising technologies and practices which, in the longer-term, could
40 significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
41
42 Short-Term Options:
43
44
Livestock systems: Methane emissions could be reduced through improved
45
management of livestock wastes; expansion of supplemental feeding
46
practices; and increased use of production and growth enhancing agents°.
47
48
Fertilizer use: Nitrous oxide emissions may be reduced by using improved
49
fertilizer formulations and application technology and practices.
50
51
Marginal lands: Areas marginally suitable for annual cropping systems may
52
be shifted to perennial cover crops for fodder or pastoral land uses, or
53
forests if soils are suitable. Such actions would increase carbon uptake,
54
both in the vegetation and soil, and would yield other benefits.
-11-
1
Sustainable agricultural practices: Where appropriate, minimum or no-till
2
systems should be introduced for those countries currently using tillage as
3
part of the annual cropping sequence, thus increasing soil organic matter
4
and reducing CO2 emissions.
5
6 Longer-Term Options:
7
8
Rice cultivation: A comprehensive approach, including management of
9
water regimes, improvement of cultivars, efficient use of fertilizers, and other
10
management practices, could lead to a 10 to 30 percent reduction in
11
methane emissions from flooded rice cultivation, although substantial 10
12
research is necessary to develop and demonstrate these practices.
13
14
Livestock: Through a number of technologies it appears that methane
15
emissions may be reduced from livestock systems by 25 to 75 percent per
16
unit of product in dairy and meat production, although many uncertainties
17
exist.
18
19
Fertilizers: Fertilizer-derived emissions of nitrous oxide potentially can be
20
reduced (although to what extent is uncertain) through changes in practices
21
such as using fertilizers with controlled nitrogen conversion rates, improving
22
fertilizer-use efficiency, and adopting alternative agricultural systems.
23
24 5.4 Limitation of Net Emissions from Forestry and Other Activities
25
26
Forestry practices and other human activities associated with land-use, such
27 as biomass burning and landfills, account for about 9 percent of anthropogenic
28 greenhouse gas emissions. A number of short and long term response options
29 for limiting net emissions from these sectors have been identified.
30
31 Short-Term Options:
32
33
Forestry: Development and implementation of policies to reduce
34
deforestation and forest degradation and to ensure the health and
35
sustainable management of existing forests in order to enhance CO2
36
sinks. 11
37
38
-- Substitution of wood for high energy input materials and further recycling
39
of forest products in order to enhance long term CO2 storage.
40
41
-- Strengthening and extension of existing international institutions and
42
programs such as the Tropical Forestry Action Plan process and the
43
International Tropical Timber Organization.
44
45
-- Development of a global network of remote sensing data collection and
46
analysis stations to provide the real-time data on deforestation and biomass
47
burning patterns necessary for national forestry plans and fire management.
48
49
-- Conversion of marginal agricultural land to forests in order to enhance
50
CO2 sequestering.
-12-
1
-- Replacement of fossil energy sources with wood through the use of
2
managed sources of biomass, such as greater or more efficient fuel-wood
3
plantations, in particular in temperate and boreal regions.
4
5
Biomass Burning: Reduction of biomass burning through fire management
6
programs and widespread use of alternative sustainable agricultural
7
practices.
8
9
Waste Management: Development of landfill methane recovery systems
10
and flaring and biogas systems to treat wastewater in order to reduce
11
methane emissions. 12
12
13 Longer-Term Options:
14
15
Forestry: Development and implementation of improved silvicultural
16
measures and genetically improved trees to increase wood production and
17
thus foster carbon fixation.
18
19
-- Enhancement of forest protection through the incorporation of strategies
20
for fire, insects, and diseases into future management plans and through
21
the development of silvicultural adjustment and stress management
22
strategies.
23
24
-- Development of national plans to expand temperate forest biomass which
25
are intensively managed, thereby providing specific opportunities to limit net
26
CO2 emissions.
27
28
-- Integration of agriculture and forestry plans in a manner which reconciles
29
the demands on tropical forests for the expansion of agriculture.
30
31
Biomass burning: Widespread adoption of sustainable agricultural
32
practices, use of biomass as a fuel, and improved fire management and
33
protection systems in order to reduce trace gas emission from biomass
34
burning and other land use practices.
35
36
Waste Management: Use of gas collection and flaring to reduce methane
37
emissions from landfills and development of biogas plants to reduce
38
methane emissions from wastewater treatment. Demonstration, training,
39
and technology transfer are necessary to realize these potentials, which
40
may range from 30 to 90 percent for landfills and up to 100 percent for
41
wastewater treatment.
42
43
44 6.0 TARGETS AND TIMETABLES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
45
46
There has been considerable international discussion of targets for specific
47 greenhouse gas emissions, in particular CO2, which is the most abundant of the
48 gases. At the November 1989 Noordwijk Conference on Atmospheric Pollution
49 and Climatic Change, the final declaration called on the IPCC to examine
50 possible quantitative targets for greenhouse gas emissions, including a
51 stabilization of CO2 emissions by the year 2000 and a 20 percent reduction in
52 CO2 emissions by 2005. The Conference also called for assessing the
53 feasibility of increasing net global forest growth by 12 million hectares per year.
-13-
1
The RSWG has made consideration of the feasibility of quantitative targets
2 a priority task, although it was not possible to complete such an analysis by the
3 time of this report's publication. The primary constraint on conducting this
4 analysis is the serious lack of data on the economic and social costs of the
5 various response options for limiting net greenhouse gas emissions. While the
6 technical potential of a number of options has been demonstrated, there is very
7 little information available on the actual economic costs associated with
8 implementation of such options. An adequate understanding of the benefits, in
9 terms of changes in climate variables that are avoided, is also seriously lacking.
10 It is imperative that further work on the cost and benefit implications of response
11 strategies be undertaken. These issues have been identified as one of the most
12 important areas for future research by the RSWG, concerned international
13 organizations, and individual countries.
14
15
In addition, it appears that the capacity of regions and countries varies
16 greatly. Using a scenario based on 20 country studies submitted to the RSWG,
17 some broad generalizations are possible for the energy sector:
18
19
0
West European countries, including the European Community, may be able
20
to stabilize or reduce CO2 emissions by early in the next decade through a
21
variety of measures including taxes, energy efficiency programs, nuclear
22
power, natural gas, and renewables.
23
24
o
East European countries and the USSR may be able to slow the growth of
25
or stabilize CO2 emissions over the next two decades, if policies to
26
restructure their economies, increase efficiency, and promote economic
27
development and substitution are successfully implemented.
28
29
o
Developing countries may be able to reduce the annual growth in CO2
30
emission from over 3 percent to around 2 percent, while maintaining
31
economic growth. The largest opportunities in developing countries appear
32
to be increased efficiency in both energy supply and demand.
33
34
o
North American and Pacific OECD countries may be able to slow the growth
35
in CO2 emissions by increased efficiency in energy supply and demand, fuel
36
switching to nuclear, natural gas and renewables, and other measures.
37
38
39 7.0 MEASURES FOR ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE
40
41
In addition to the limitation options discussed above, the RSWG reviewed
42 measures for adapting to potential climate change. The consideration of
43 adaptation options is critical for a number of reasons. First, because it is
44 believed that there is likely to be a lag time between emissions and subsequent
45 climate change, the climate may already be committed to a certain degree of
46 change. Implementation of adaptation measures may thus be necessary
47 regardless of any limitation actions which may be taken. Secondly, natural
48 climatic variability itself necessitates adaptation.
49
50
Furthermore, should significant adverse climate change occur, it would be
51 necessary to consider limitation and adaptation strategies as part of an
52 integrated package in which policies adopted in the two areas complement each
53 other so as to minimize costs. Limitation and adaptation options
-14-
1 should be developed and analyzed recognizing the relationship between the
2 timing and costs of limitation and adaptation. For example, the slower the rate
3 of climate change, the easier it would be to adapt, and vice versa. It is similarly
4 important to address those cases where limitation and adaptation policies may
5 work at cross purposes. A truly comprehensive approach should recognize that
6 controlling the different gases might have different effects on the adaptive
7 capacity of natural resources.
8
9
The RSWG explored two broad categories of adaptation options:
10
11
O
Coastal zone management, or options which maximize the ability of coastal
12
regions to adapt to possible sea level rise and increased frequency and
13
severity of storms; and
14
15
o
Resource use and management, or options which address the potential
16
impacts of climate change on food security, water availability, natural and
17
managed ecosystems, land, and biodiversity.
18
19 7.1 Coastal Zone Management
20
21
Global climate change is projected to raise sea level by as much as [Note:
22 figure to be obtained from WGI] and, in some areas, to increase the frequency
23 and severity of storms. Although there remain substantial uncertainties
24 regarding the possible rate and magnitude of sea level rise, hundreds of
25 thousands of square kilometers of coastal wetlands and other lowlands could be
26 inundated, while ocean beaches could erode perhaps as much as one hundred
27 meters over the next century. Flooding could threaten lives, agriculture,
28 livestock, and structures, while saltwater could advance inland into aquifers,
29 estuaries, and soils, thus threatening water supplies, ecosystems, and
30 agriculture in some areas.
31
32
Some nations would be particularly vulnerable to such changes. Eight to
33 ten million people live within one meter of high tide in each of the unprotected
34 river deltas of Bangladesh, Egypt, and Vietnam. Half a million people live in
35 various coral atoll nations that lie almost entirely within three meters of sea level,
36 such as the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Tokelau. Even
37 in nations that are not, on the whole, particularly vulnerable to sea level rise,
38 some low-lying areas or regions dependent on fisheries resources could be
39 threatened.
40
41
Available responses to sea level rise fall broadly into three categories:
42
43
o
Retreat: Under this option no actions would be taken to protect the land
44
from the sea the focus would instead be on providing for people and
45
ecosystems to shift landward in an optimal fashion. This choice could be
46
motivated by either excessive costs of protection or by a desire to maintain
47
ecosystems.
48
49
O
Accommodation: Under this strategy, while no attempt would be made to
50
protect the land at risk, measures would be taken to allow for continued
51
habitation of the area. Specific responses under this options would include
52
erecting flood shelters, elevating buildings on pilings, converting agriculture
53
to fish ponds, or growing flood- or salt-tolerant species.
-15-
1 O
Protection: A protection strategy uses site-specific features such as sea
2
walls, dikes, dunes, and vegetation to protect the land from the sea so that
3
existing land uses can be retained.
4
5
There are varying socio-economic implications for each of these options.
6 Retreat could lead to a loss of property, potentially costly resettlement of
7 populations, and, in some notable cases, refugee problems. Accommodation
8 could result in declining property values, increased damage from storms, and
9 costs for modifying infrastructure. The protection option would involve the
10 considerable economic costs of building sea walls and other structures (even
11 ignoring the impacts of flooding and salt water intrusion, a one meter rise would
12 require 360,000 kilometers of coastal defenses) and could have negative
13 impacts on fisheries, wildlife and recreation. The loss of traditional environments
14 could potentially disrupt family life and create social instability.
15
16 Actions to Prepare for Possible Sea Level Rise:
17
18
A number of response options are available which not only enhance the
19 ability of coastal nations to adapt to sea level rise, but are also beneficial in their
20 own right. Implementation of such options would be most effective if undertaken
21 in the short-term, not because there is an impending catastrophe, but because
22 there are opportunities to avoid adverse impacts by acting now opportunities
23 which may not be as effective if the process is delayed. These options include:
24
25 National Coastal Planning:
26
27 O
Development and implementation in the short term of comprehensive
28
national coastal zone management plans which (a) deal with both sea level
29
rise and other impacts of global climate change and (b) ensure that risks to
30
populations are minimized while recognizing the need to protect and
31
maintain important coastal ecosystems.
32
33 O
Identification of coastal areas at risk. National efforts are needed to (a)
34
identify functions and resources at risk from a one meter rise in sea level
35
and (b) assess the implications of adaptive response measures on them.
36
37 O
Provisions to ensure that coastal development does not increase
38
vulnerability to sea level rise. Actions in particular need of review include
39
river levees and dams, conversions of mangroves and other wetlands for
40
agriculture and human habitation, and increased settlement in low-lying
41
areas. In addition, while structural measures to prepare for sea level rise
42
are not yet warranted, the design and location of coastal infrastructure and
43
coastal defenses should include consideration of sea level rise and other
44
impacts of climate change. It is sometimes less expensive to design a
45
structure today, incorporating these factors, than to rebuild it later.
46
47 o
Review and strengthening of emergency preparedness and coastal zone
48
response mechanisms. Efforts are needed to develop emergency
49
preparedness plans for reducing vulnerability to coastal storms through
50
better evacuation planning and the development of coastal defense
51
mechanisms that recognize the impact of sea level rise.
-16-
1 International Cooperation:
2
3
O
Maintenance of a continuing international focus on the impacts of sea level
4
rise. An international organization for focusing attention and awareness of
5
sea level change and climate impacts on the coastal zone may be required
6
to encourage the nations of the world to develop appropriate responses.
7
8
O
Provision of technical assistance to developing nations. Institutions offering
9
financial support should take into account the need for technical assistance
10
in developing coastal management plans, assessing coastal resources at
11
risk, and increasing a nation's ability - through education, training, and
12
technology transfer - to address sea level rise.
13
14
O
Support by international organizations for national efforts to limit population
15
growth in coastal areas. In the final analysis, rapid population growth is the
16
underlying problem with the greatest impact on both the efficacy of coastal
17
zone management and the success of adaptive response options.
18
19 Research, Data, and Information:
20
21
O
Strengthening of research on the impacts of global climate change on sea
22
level rise. International and national climate research programs need to be
23
directed at understanding and predicting changes in sea level, extreme
24
events, precipitation, and other impacts of global climate change on coastal
25
areas.
26
27
O
Development and implementation of a global ocean observing network, for
28
example through the efforts of the IOC, WMO, and UNEP to establish a
29
coordinated international ocean observing network that will allow for
30
accurate assessment and continuous monitoring of changes in the world's
31
oceans and coastal areas, particularly sea level change.
32
33
o
Dissemination of data and information on sea level change and adaptive
34
options. An international mechanism could be identified for collecting and
35
disseminating important data and information on climate change and its
36
impact on sea level and the coastal zone and on various adaptive options.
37
Sharing this information with developing countries is critically important for
38
preparation of coastal management plans.
39
40
41 7.2 Resource Use and Management
42
43
Global climate change could have significant impacts upon the very
44 resources that humans and other species rely on to live. These resources
45 include water, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, land, forests, and wildlife. The
46 RSWG addressed these resource issues in the context of considering options for
47 ensuring food security; conserving species diversity; maintaining water supplies;
48 and using land rationally for managed and unmanaged ecosystems.
49
50
The potential impacts of climate change on natural resources and human
51 activities are very poorly understood. First, credible regional estimates of
52 changes in critical climatic factors, such as temperature, soil moisture,
-17-
1 annual and seasonal variability, and frequencies of droughts, floods and storms,
2 are simply not available. For many of these critical climatic factors even the
3 direction of change is uncertain. Secondly, methods for translating these
4 changes into effects on the quantity and quality of resources are generally
5 lacking. While it is clear that some of the impacts of climate change on
6 resources could be negative and others positive, a more specific quantification of
7 those impacts is not possible at this time. In general, however, it can be said
8 that: (a) those resources which are managed by humans (e.g. agriculture,
9 forestry) are more suited to successful adaptation than unmanaged ecosystems;
10 and (b) the faster the rate of change, the greater the impact.
11
12
It should be noted that there already exists a large reservoir of experience
13 and knowledge to help formulate and implement adaptation response strategies
14 in the event of climate change. Through the ages societies and all living things
15 have developed the capability, and a suite of responses, to adapt to the
16 climate's natural variability and to extreme events (e.g. droughts, floods).
17 Several climatic zones span the globe, and resource use and management is an
18 ongoing challenge in each of these zones. Therefore, society could borrow from
19 these experiences in developing policies to adapt to possible climate change. In
20 addition, expected future economic and technological progress should provide
21 the financial and technical resources required to better adapt to a changing
22 climate.
23
24
In recognition of the uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change
25 on resource use and management, the following sections provide general, rather
26 than specific, options in three categories. The appropriateness of these options
27 for individual countries may vary depending on the specific social, environmental
28 and economic context.
29
30 Short-Term Research Related Options:
31
32
There are a number of actions which would augment our knowledge base
33 for making reasoned judgments about response strategies. These include:
34
35
O
Developing inventories, data bases, monitoring systems, and catalogues of
36
the current state of resources and resource use and management practices.
37
38
o
Improving our scientific understanding of and predictive tools for critical
39
climatic factors, their impacts on natural resources, and their
40
socio-economic consequences.
41
42
o
Undertaking studies and assessments to gauge the resilience and
43
adaptability of resources and their vulnerability to climate change.
44
45
o
Encouraging research and development by both public and private
46
enterprises directed toward more efficient resource use and
47
biotechnological innovation (with adequate safeguards for health, safety,
48
and the environment), including allowing innovators to profit from their work.
49
50
o
Continuing existing research and development of methods to cope with the
51
potentially worst consequences of climate change, such as developing more
52
drought- or salinity-resistant cultivars or using classical and modern
53
breeding techniques to help keep farming and forestry options open.
-18-
1
O
Increasing research on the preservation of biological resources in situ and
2
ex situ, including investigations into the size and location of protected
3
natural areas and conservation corridors.
4
5 Short-Term Policy Options:
6
7
Some response strategies are available which are probably economically
8 justified under present-day conditions and which could be undertaken for sound
9 resource management reasons, even in the absence of climate change. In
10 general, these relate to improving the efficiency of natural resource use, fuller
11 utilization of the "harvested" component of resources, and waste reduction.
12 Measures that could be implemented in the short-term include:
13
14
o
Increased emphasis on the development and adoption of technologies
15
which may increase the productivity or efficiency (per unit of land or water)
16
of crops, forests, livestock, fisheries, and human settlements, consistent
17
with the principles of sustainable economic growth and development. Such
18
efficiencies reduce the demand for land for human activities and could also
19
help reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Examples of specific options
20
include more efficient milk and meat production; improved food storage and
21
distribution; and better water management practices.
22
23
O
Increased promotion and strengthening of resource conservation and
24
sustainable resource use -- especially in highly vulnerable areas. Various
25
initiatives could be explored for conserving the most sensitive and valuable
26
resources, including strengthening conservation measures, managing
27
development of highly vulnerable resources, and promoting reforestation
28
and afforestation.
29
30
O
Acceleration of economic development efforts in developing countries.
31
Because these countries often have largely resource-based economies,
32
efforts at improving agriculture and natural resource use would be
33
particularly beneficial. Such efforts would also promote capital formation,
34
which would generally make adaptation to climate change and sustainable
35
development more feasible.
36
37
O
Developing methods whereby local populations and resource users gain a
38
stake in conservation and sustainable resource use, for example by
39
investing resource users with clear property rights and long-term tenure,
40
and allowing voluntary water transfer or other market mechanisms.
41
42
O
Decentralizing, as practicable, decision-making on resource use and
43
management.
44
45 Longer-Term Options:
46
47
There are also a number of other possible responses which are costly or
48 otherwise appear to be more appropriate for consideration in the longer-term,
49 once uncertainties regarding climate change impacts are reduced. Options in
50 this category include:
51
52
o
Building large capital structures (such as dams) to provide for enhanced
53
availability of water and other resources.
-19-
1 O
Strengthening and enlarging protected natural areas and establishing
2
conservation corridors to enhance the adaptation prospects for unmanaged
3
ecosystems.
4
5 O
Reviewing and possibly eliminating direct and indirect subsidies and
6
incentives for inefficient resource use.
7
8
9 8.0 MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING RESPONSE STRATEGIES
10
11 12 addressed in order to adequately implement limitation or adaptation responses.
The RSWG also considered in detail several priority areas which must be
13 These "implementation mechanisms" represent the primary vehicles through
14 which national and international responses to climate can be brought into force.
15 The specific implementation mechanisms considered were:
16
17
o
Public information and education;
18
19
O
Technology development and transfer;
20
21
O
Economic (market) mechanisms;
22
23
O
Financial mechanisms;
24
25
O
Legal and institutional mechanisms, including possible elements of a
26
framework convention on climate change.
27
28 The results of the RSWG's deliberations on these issues are provided below.
29
30 8.1 Public Information and Education
31
32 33 an issue as complex as potential climate change. Because climate change has
A well informed global population is essential for addressing and coping with
34 the potential to affect, either directly or indirectly, almost every sector of society,
35 broad global understanding of the issue will facilitate the adoption and
36 implementation of such response options as may be necessary and appropriate.
37 The dissemination of information also represents a powerful economic
38 instrument for ensuring that markets accurately take into account potential
39 consequences and/or opportunities of climate change.
40
41
The core aims of public education and information programs are to:
42
43
o
Promote awareness and knowledge of climate change issues;
44
45
O
Encourage positive practices to limit and/or adapt to climate change; and
46
47
o
Encourage wide participation by all countries, both developed and
48
developing, in addressing climate change issues and developing
49
appropriate responses.
50
51 52 suggestions and approaches for improving international awareness of the
Given the importance of a well-informed population, the RSWG developed
53 potential causes and impacts of climate change. In this process it was
54 recognized that, while broad-based understanding is essential,
-20-
1 no single mechanism can work for every group or in every culture or country.
2 The social, economic, and cultural diversity of nations will likely require
3 educational approaches and information tailored to the specific requirements
4 and resources of particular locales, countries, or regions.
5
6
A number of national and international actions could be taken to
7 disseminate broadly information on climate change. These include the:
8
9
o
Establishment of national committees or clearing houses to collect, develop,
10
and disseminate accurate information on climate change issues. This could
11
help provide focal points for information on issues such as energy efficiency,
12
energy savings, forestry, agriculture, etc.
13
14
o
Use by international organizations (UNESCO, UNEP, WMO, etc.) of IPCC
15
reports in developing and providing to all countries an adequate
16
understanding for future actions.
17
18
o
Use of an existing international institution, or development of a new
19
institution, to serve as a clearinghouse for informational and educational
20
materials.
21
22 8.2 Technology Development and Transfer
23
24
The development and transfer of technologies is vital to any effort to
25 address global climate change. The development of new technologies may
26 provide the means by which societies can meet their energy, food, and other
27 needs in the face of changes in global climate, while at the same time
28 minimizing emissions of greenhouse gases. Prompt transfer of technologies,
29 especially to developing countries, is likewise an important aspect of any effort
30 to limit or adapt to climate change.
31
32 Technology Research and Development Issues:
33
34
Technological development is needed to limit or reduce anthropogenic
35 greenhouse gas emissions; absorb such gases by protecting and increasing
36 sinks; adapt human activities and resource use and management to the impacts
37 of climate change; and detect and predict climate change and its impacts.
38 Technology development could be pursued in a wide range of activities such as
39 energy, industry, agriculture, transport, water supply, coastal protection, and
40 management of natural resources. Some of the primary areas where further
41 technology research and development is needed include:
42
43
O
Energy, in particular those technologies which provide for using fossil
44
energy resources more efficiently and which promote the use of non-fossil
45
energy sources (e.g. renewable energy sources and safe nuclear power).
46
47
O
Natural Resources, including technologies and practices for increasing
48
yields of forests and other greenhouse gas sinks, reducing emissions from
49
agricultural sources, and measures for enhancing the ability of resources to
50
adapt to climate change.
51
52
o
Monitoring, in particular those technologies which enhance our ability to
53
make accurate predictions about the magnitude, timing, and regional
54
impacts of climate change.
-21-
1 Technology Transfer:
2
3 4 developing countries. As a result, there is a need for the transfer of technologies
The fastest rate of increase of greenhouse gases emission is occurring in
5 for limiting climate change to the developing countries. Such advanced
6 technologies may provide an alternative which would allow developing countries
7 to encourage economic growth and limit greenhouse gas emissions. A number
8 of efforts are currently underway through bilateral and multilateral arrangements
9 which could be further expanded.
10
11
A number of impediments, however, hinder the effective transfer of
12 technologies to developing countries. These include lack of financial resources,
13 necessary institutions, and trained human resources. Existing institutions could
14 be strengthened to finance technology transfers, train human resources, and
15 evaluate, introduce, and operate new technologies.
16
17
Existing legal provisions and restrictive trade practices are also possible
18 constraints. In this context, the issue of intellectual property rights presents a
19 case where international opinion is mixed. Some hold that the universal
20 international protection of such rights will promote the effective development and
21 transfer of technologies, while others hold that provisions for the protection of
22 intellectual property rights should be determined by the recipient countries, in
23 accordance with their particular legal regimes. Because of the importance of
24 technology transfer, this issue should be addressed in the short-term.
25
26 8.3 Economic Mechanisms
27
28 29 change be as economically efficient and cost-effective as possible, while taking
It is important that any potential measures to limit or adapt to global climate
30 into account important social implications. In general, environmental objectives
31 can be achieved either through regulations requiring the use of a specific
32 technology or attainment of specified goals, or economic instruments such as
33 emissions fees, subsidies, tradeable permits, or sanctions.
34
35 36 abatement measures, frequently offer the possibility of achieving environmental
Economic instruments, through their encouragement of flexible selection of
37 improvements at lower cost than regulatory mechanisms. Unlike many
38 regulations, they tend to encourage innovation and the development of improved
39 technologies and practices for reducing emissions. Economic mechanisms also
40 have the potential to provide the signals necessary for more environmentally
41 sensitive operation of markets. It is unlikely, however, that economic
42 instruments will be applicable to all circumstances.
43
44
Three factors are considered as potential barriers to the operation of
45 markets and/or the achievement of environmental objectives through market
46 mechanisms. These are: information problems, which can often cause markets
47 to produce less effective or unfavorable environmental outcomes; existing
48 measures and institutions, which can encourage individuals to behave in
49 environmentally damaging ways; and balancing competing objectives (social,
50 environmental, and economic). An initial response strategy may therefore be to
51 address information problems directly and to review existing measures which
52 may be barriers.
-22-
1
A general advantage of market based economic instruments is that they
2 encourage limitations or reductions in emissions by those who can achieve them
3 at least cost. They also provide an ongoing incentive for industry and individual
4 consumers to apply the most efficient limitation/reduction measures through, for
5 example, more efficient and cleaner technologies. Such incentives may be
6 lacking in the case of regulations.
7
8
Regulations, are the customary means of controlling pollution in both market
9 and centrally planned economies. An advantage of regulations is that, in certain
10 circumstances, they create more certainty as to desired outcomes, whereas
11 major disadvantages are that they may discourage innovation, introduce
12 inflexibilities in meeting objectives, can discourage resource use efficiency, and
13 offer few or no incentives to reduce emissions below specified levels.
14
15
A number of specific economic instruments were identified that might be
16 used as alternatives or supplements to regulatory actions in meeting
17 environmental goals:
18
19
O
A system of tradeable emissions permits: An emission permit system is
20
based on the concept that the economic costs of attaining a given
21
environmental goal can be minimized by allowing for the trading of
22
emissions rights. Once an overall limit on emissions has been set,
23
emissions entitlements amounting to that limit could be provided to emitting
24
sources and free trading of such entitlements allowed. This would reduce
25
the costs of meeting a given emission target because: (a) as in trade,
26
comparative advantages between trading entities would be maximized; and
27
(b) economic incentives would be created for the development of improved
28
greenhouse gas limitation technologies, sink enhancement, and resource
29
use efficiency (energy conservation).
30
31
0
A system of emission charges: Emission charges are levied on specified
32
emissions depending on their level of contribution to climate change. Such
33
charges may provide a means of encouraging emitters to limit or reduce
34
emissions and provide an incentive for diverse parties to implement efficient
35
means of limiting or reducing emissions. Another advantage of charges is
36
that they generate revenue which could provide a funding base for further
37
pollution abatement, research, and administration, or allow other taxes to be
38
lowered.
39
40
O
Subsidies: Subsidies are aimed at encouraging environmentally sound
41
actions by lowering their costs. Subsidies could be used, inter alia, to
42
encourage the use of energy-efficient equipment and non-fossil energy
43
sources, and the development and greater use of environmentally sound
44
technologies.
45
46 O
Sanctions: A final type of economic instrument is the use of economic
47
sanctions for the enforcement of international agreements. This would
48
require an international convention to establish a system of agreed trade or
49
financial sanctions to be imposed on countries not adhering to agreed
50
regimes.
51
52
It has also been suggested that the environmental protection value could be
53 maximized and the economic costs of meeting possible greenhouse gas
54 limitation targets (should such be considered necessary in the future) minimized
-23-
1 by considering all greenhouse gas sources and sinks comprehensively. Under
2 this approach individual countries would be assigned an allowable emissions
3 level, in terms of a parameter or "index" such as CO2 equivalency, for all their
4 net greenhouse gas emissions. Countries would then be free to determine what
5 specific measures to implement domestically to meet that target by limiting
6 sources or enhancing sinks of any combination of greenhouse gases. This
7 would avoid ignoring important greenhouse gases, foster sink development, and
8 enable countries to implement the domestic program which allows them to meet
9 a given target at the least cost for their specific economic and social position.
10
11
Each of the approaches outlined above, however, poses potentially
12 significant challenges in terms of implementation and acceptability. There is an
13 incomplete understanding of the economic and social consequences of these
14 various approaches. It is evident that further work is required in all countries,
15 and in ongoing IPCC work, to fully evaluate the practicality of such measures
16 and costs and benefits associated with different mechanisms. It is appreciated
17 that each instrument assessed has a role in meeting greenhouse emission
18 objectives, but the suitability of particular instruments is dependent on the
19 particular circumstances and at this stage no measure can be considered
20 universally superior to all other available mechanisms.
21
22 8.4 Financial Mechanisms
23
24
Industrialized and developing countries alike have a common responsibility
25 to address the potential consequences of global climate change. Responses to
26 climate change can not be effective unless there is broad participation from all
27 countries, regardless of their level of development or economic structure.
28 However, the special circumstances of the developing countries, including their
29 vulnerability to the consequences of climate change and their lack of financial
30 resources, must be recognized. Financial assistance to developing countries
31 represents an important mechanism for assisting them in undertaking adequate
32 measures to limit or adapt to climate change.
33
34
Bilateral and multilateral development agencies should be used and could
35 be encouraged to strengthen and expand their fields of competence into new
36 areas that are responsive to environmental necessity. Climate change goals
37 would be furthered by a concerted effort by all of these institutions to formulate
38 coordinated and integrated strategies which assure that all development
39 assistance investments, whether undertaken with existing or additional funds,
40 take into account climate change issues.
41
42
Financial resources channelled to developing countries would be most
43 effective if focused on those activities which contribute both to limiting
44 greenhouse gas emissions and promoting economic development. Areas for
45 assistance could include:
46
47
o
Efficient use of fossil energy resources and the increased use of low-fossil
48
or non-fossil fuels;
49
50
o
Rational forest management practices and agricultural techniques which
51
reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
-24-
1 O
Measures which enhance the ability of developing countries to develop
2
programs to address climate change, including research and development
3
activities and public awareness and education;
4
5
O
Participation by developing countries in international fora on global climate
6
change, such as the IPCC.
7
8
A number of possible sources for generating financial resources were
9 considered. These include general taxation, specific taxation on greenhouse
10 gas emissions, and emissions trading. Creative suggestions include using
11 undisbursed official resources, a fixed percentage tax on travel tickets, a climate
12 lottery, and levies on countries that have been unable to meet their obligations.
13 The question has also been raised of whether such financial assistance should
14 only be given to those countries which abstain from activities producing
15 greenhouse gases and whether assistance should be provided for adaptation
16 purposes.
17
18
With respect to institutional mechanisms for providing financial assistance to
19 developing countries, several tracks could be considered:
20
21
O
One track builds on work underway or planned in existing institutions. In
22
this regard, the World Bank, a number of the regional banks, other
23
multilateral organizations, and bilateral agencies have initiated efforts to
24
incorporate global climate change issues into their programs. Bilateral
25
donors could further integrate and reinforce the environmental components
26
of their assistance programs and develop co-financing arrangements with
27
multilateral institutions.
28
29
O
Parallel to this track some have raised the possibility that the creation of
30
new mechanisms and facilities such as a new international fund is already
31
justified. Such new instruments could be located within the World Bank
32
systems (with new rules) or elsewhere.
33
34
O
In addition, individual developing countries could also initiate studies, with
35
donor assistance, on their current and projected emissions levels and
36
assistance needs for limiting such emissions.
37
38
O
Further consideration is also needed of the important contributions which
39
the private sector might make, through technology transfer, foreign direct
40
investment, and other means, to assist developing countries to respond to
41
climate change.
42
43 8.5 Legal and Institutional Mechanisms
44
45
A number of institutions and international legal mechanisms exist which
46 have a bearing on the climate change issue, in particular those dealing with the
47 environment, science and technology, energy, natural resources, and financial
48 assistance. One of these existing international legal mechanisms, the Vienna
49 Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its associated Montreal
50 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, deals specifically with
51 reducing emissions of important greenhouse gases which also deplete the
52 ozone layer. However, there is a general view that, while existing legal
53 instruments and institutions related to climate change should be fully utilized and
54 further strengthened, they are insufficient alone to meet the challenge.
-25-
1
A very broad international consensus has therefore emerged in the RSWG,
2 confirmed notably at the 44th United Nations General Assembly, on the need for
3 a framework convention on climate change. Such a convention should generally
4 follow the format of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
5 in laying down, at a minimum, general principles and obligations. It should
6 further be framed in such a way as to gain the adherence of the largest possible
7 number and most suitably balanced range of countries, while permitting timely
8 action to be taken. In addition, it should contain provisions for the adoption of
9 separate annexes/protocol(s) to deal with specific obligations. As part of the
10 commitment of the parties to action on greenhouse gas emissions and the
11 adverse effects of climate change, the convention should also address the
12 particular needs of the developing countries, the question of the development
13 and transfer of technology, and institutional requirements.
14
15
A number of overarching issues will have to be decided in the negotiation of
16 a convention. These include:
17
18
O
the political imperative of striking the correct balance: on the one hand,
19
between the arguments for a far-reaching, action-oriented convention and
20
the need for urgent adoption of such a convention so as to begin tackling
21
the problem of climate change; and, on the other hand, between the costs
22
of inaction and the lack of scientific certainty;
23
24
O
the extent to which specific obligations, particularly on the control of
25
emissions of greenhouse gases, should be included in the convention itself
26
or be the subject of a separate protocol(s);
27
28
O
the timing of negotiation of such a protocol(s) in relation to the negotiations
29
on the convention.
30
31
In addition, specific issues will need to be addressed, such as:
32
33
O
Financial needs of developing countries: The need for additional resources
34
for developing countries and the manner in which this should be addressed,
35
particularly in terms of the nature, size and conditions of the funding, will
36
have to be considered by the negotiating parties even if detailed
37
arrangements form the subject of a separate protocol.
38
39
o
Development and transfer of technology: The basis on which the promotion
40
of the development and transfer of technology and provision of technical
41
assistance to developing countries should take place will need to be
42
elaborated, taking into account considerations such as terms of transfer,
43
intellectual property rights, and the environmental soundness of such
44
technology.
45
46
O
Institutions: Views differ substantially on the role and powers of the
47
institutions to be created by the convention, particularly in exercising
48
supervision and control over the obligations undertaken.
49
50
Many countries and international organizations have called for the initiation
51 of international negotiations on a framework convention after completion of the
52 IPCC's first assessment report. The RSWG's analysis of possible elements of a
53 framework convention is intended to provide guidance on the major issues which
54 will likely need to be considered in preparing for such negotiations.
-26-
1 9.0 CONCLUSION
2
3
Global climate change is an issue which concerns the entire international
4 community. All countries contribute to the atmospheric concentration of
5 greenhouse gases and, if present trends continue, it is expected that emissions
6 of these gases from all regions of the world will rise through the next century.
7 The potential consequences of global climate change could likewise be felt in all
8 regions of the world.
9
10
A large number of response options have been identified at the national,
11 regional, and international levels to address climate change issues. Actions can
12 be taken both to limit the net quantity of greenhouse gases which are being
13 released into the atmosphere and to adapt to changes in the global climate.
14 While a great many possible response options have been identified in this
15 report, some warrant special attention as being particularly important and
16 feasible for introduction in the short term. These include:
17
18
o
Implementation of measures which are already economically and socially
19
justifiable in their own right and which also provide benefits from a climate
20
change standpoint. Examples include increased energy efficiency,
21
improved use of forests and other natural resources, and reductions in
22
emissions of CFCs.
23
24
Development by individual countries of national inventories of greenhouse
25
gas emissions and national plans evaluating those measures which could
26
be undertaken to limit greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to the potential
27
impacts of global climate change.
28
29
0
Strengthening of existing national, regional, and international institutions
30
which have a bearing on climate change, in particular those which improve
31
our scientific and economic understanding of climate change, promote the
32
development of technologies for limiting or adapting to such change, or
33
assist developing countries in addressing this issue.
34
35
Development of a framework convention on climate change which can gain
36
the adherence of the vast majority of the international community and which
37
lays down general principles and obligations for addressing climate change.
38
39
O
Increased research and development of technologies and practices that
40
reduce greenhouse gas emissions or enhance the ability of countries to
41
adapt to climate change.
42
43
o
Increased research to reduce the scientific uncertainties regarding the
44
magnitude, timing, and regional impacts of global climate change.
45
46
O
Increased research with respect to how effective specific response options
47
or groups of options would be in actually averting potential climate change.
48
49
o
Increased research to understand the economic aspects of specific
50
response options so as to provide an adequate information base for making
51
sound policies.
52
53
The RSWG will continue its work to further define and evaluate the available
54 response options. A number of potential future activities have been
-27-
1 identified and are being developed into specific work programs. The
2 participation of the largest possible number of countries in this work is important
3 and is strongly encouraged.
4
5
The efforts of the participating countries in the RSWG process have served
6 to increase international awareness of the climate change issue and possible
7 response strategies. This first assessment report provides important information
8 for policy makers considering national, regional, and international climate
9 change strategies. We believe these efforts have served and will continue to
10 serve to bring the international community closer together in the process of
11 developing a consensus on addressing this vital issue.
Table
2
Examples of Short-Term Options
1. IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN THE PRODUCTION, CONVERSION AND USE OF ENERGY
Transport Sector
Building Sector
Electricity Generation
Industry Sector
Promotion of further efficiency
Improved fuel efficiency of road
Improved heating and cooling
Improved efficiency in electricity
vehicles;
equipment and systems;
generation
improvements in production
Repowering of existing
process;
Materials recycling (particularly
Electronic engine
Improvement of energy
facilities with high efficiency
management and
efficiency of air conditioning,
energy-intensive materials);
transmission control
Promotion of introduction of
systems;
Introduction of integrated
Substitution with lower energy
gasification combined cycle
intensity materials;
systems;
area heating and cooling
Improved electromechanical
advanced vehicle design;
including use of heat pumps.
systems;
-
drives and motors;
regular vehicle
Improved burner efficiency,
Introduction of atmospheric
Thermal process optimisation,
maintenance;
Use of heat pumps in
fluidised bed combustion;
higher capacity trucks;
buildings;
Introduction of pressurised
including energy cascading and
-
improved efficiency in
Use of advanced electronic
fluidised bed combustion
co-generation.
energy management control
Improved operation and
transport facilities;
with combined cycle power
regenerating units;
systems.
maintenance.
systems;
Improvement of boiler
Technology development in
Improved space conditioning
efficiency.
public transportation;
efficiency in house/building;
Improved system for co-generation of
Intra-city modal shift (e.g.
Improved heat efficiency
electricity and steam.
car to bus or metro);
through highly efficient
advanced train control
insulating materials;
Improved operation and maintenance.
system to increase traffic
Better building design
density on urban rail
(orientation, window,
Introduction of photovoltaics.
lines;
building, envelope, etc.);
especially for local electricity
High-speed inter-city
Improved air to-air heat
generation.
trains;
exchangers.
Better intermodal
Introduction of fuel cells.
integration.
Improved lighting efficiency
Improved appliance efficiency.
Reduced size and weight, with
Improved operation and
use of lightweight composite
maintenance.
materials and structural
Improved efficiency of cook stoves
ceramics; improved
(in developing countries).
aerodynamics, combustion
chamber components, better
lubricants and tyre design, etc.).
Driver behaviour, traffic
management, and vehicle
maintenance.
DRAFT
E-1
EISSX1/15.03.90
Table 2 (continued)
II. NON FOSSIL AND LOW EMISSION ENERGY SOURCES
Other Sectors
Electricity Generation
Substitution of natural gas and biomass for heating oil and coal;
-
Construction of small-scale and large-scale hydro projects:
Solar heating
Expansion of conventional nuclear power plants;
Technologies for producing and utilising alternative fuels;
Construction of gas-fired power plants;
Standardised design of nuclear power plants to improve economics
Improved storage and combustion systems for natural gas;
introduction of flexible fuel and alcohol fuel vehicles.
and safety;
Development of geothermal energy projects;
Introduction of wind turbines;
Expansion of sustainable biomass combustion.
Replacement of scrubbers and other energy consuming control technology with more
energy efficient emission control.
III. REMOVAL, RECIRCULATION OR FIXATION
Landfills
Energy/Industry
Recovery and use of leaked or released CH₄ from fossil fuel storage, coal mining;
Recycle and incineration of waste materials to reduce CH4 emissions;
Improved maintenance of oil and natural gas and oil production and distribution systems
Use or flaring of CH₄ emissions;
to reduce CH4 leakage;
Improved maintenance of landfill to decrease CH4 emissions
Improved emission control of CO, SOx, NOₓ and VOCs to protect sinks of greenhouse
gases.
E-2
DRAFT
F.I.SXS1\15.03.90
Table
3
Examples of Medium-/Long-Term Options
I. IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN THE PRODUCTION, CONVERSION AND THE USE OF ENERGY
Transport Sector
Building Sector
Electricity Generation
Industry Sector
Advanced technologies for storage of
Increased use of less energy
Improved fuel efficiency of road
Improved energy storage systems;
intensive materials;
vehicles;
intermittent energy;
Advanced process technologies;
Improvements in aircraft and
Use of information
Advanced batteries;
Use of biological phenomena in
ship design:
technology to anticipate and
Compressed air energy storage;
satisfy energy needs;
Superconducting energy storage;
processes;
-
Advanced propulsion
Use of hydrogen to store
Localised process energy
conversion;
concepts;
energy for use in buildings
Use of fuel cells for CO-
-
Ultra high-bypass aircraft
generation.
engines;
Improved building systems;
-
Contra-rotating ship
propulsion.
New Building materials for
better insulation at reduced
cost;
Windows which adjust
opacity to maximise solar
gain.
New food storage systems which
eliminate refrigeration requirements
DRAFT
E-3
EISXS1/15.03.90
Table
3 (Continued)
III. NON FOSSIL AND LOW EMISSION ENERGY SOURCES
Other Sectors
Electricity Generation
Other technologies for producing and utilising alternative fuels;
Nuclear power plants:
.
Improved storage and combustion systems for hydrogen;
-
Passive safety features to improve reliability and acceptability.
-
Control of gases boiled off from cryogenic fuels;
-
Improvements in performance of metal hydrides;
Solar power technologies:
-
High-yield processes to convert lingo-cellulosic biomass into alcohol fuels;
-
Introduction of electric and hybrid vehicles;
Solar thermal;
Reduced re-charging time for advanced batteries.
Solar photovoltaic (especially for local electricity generation).
Advanced fuel cell technologies.
III. REMOVAL, RECIRCULATION OR FIXATION
Improved combustion conditions to reduce N₂O emissions.
Treatment of exhaust gas to reduce N₂O emissions.
CO₂ separation and geological and marine disposal.
DRAFT
E-4
EISXSI/15.03.90
FOOTNOTES
1 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 4.5.1.1
2 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 3.2.2
3 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 3.2.3
4 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 4.6.1
5 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 3.4.1.
6 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 3.6.1
7 Energy and Industry Subgroup Report, Section 3.2.2.2
8 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Activities Report, Section 3.4.2
9 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Activities Report, Section 3.4.4
10 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Activities Report, Section 3.4.1
11 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Activities Report. Section 2.0
12 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Activities Report. Section 4.2
DRAFT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
5/17/90
U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Overview:
The United States recognizes that climate change presents a
potentially serious threat to the global environment and that
the international community should cooperate on measures to
address this concern. We support the negotiation of a
framework convention on climate change to provide the basis for
enhanced international cooperation in addressing this issue.
There remain, however, significant scientific uncertainties
regarding the magnitude, timing, and regional impacts of
climate change. Furthermore, our understanding of the
potential economic consequences of measures to limit or adapt
to climate change is very limited. We thus support enhanced
efforts to improve international understanding of the
scientific and economic aspects of this issue.
Given the significant remaining scientific and economic
uncertainties, we believe it is premature at this time to
implement stringent measures for limiting greenhouse gas
emissions solely to mitigate potential climate change.
However, while we take steps to refine our understanding of the
scientific and economic issues, we support implementing now
those measures which are justified in their own right and which
might also provide climate change benefits. Should an improved
understanding of the climate change issue indicate that further
mitigation efforts are warranted, these can be addressed
through a protocol (s) to the framework convention.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
-2-
U.S. Position on Specific Issues
International Cooperation:
-- We support international cooperation to assess all
aspects of climate change. The United States has been a
major supporter and contributor to the activities of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the
primary international forum for addressing this issue.
-- We support the negotiation of a framework convention on
climate change. President Bush has offered the United
States as the venue for the first round of such talks. We
believe the negotiations should begin as soon as feasible
after completion of the IPCC's first assessment report.
-- Like the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, the framework convention on climate change
should include general obligations, cooperation in research
and monitoring, exchange of information, conference of the
parties, secretariat, and provision for possible subsequent
adoption of protocols.
-- Specific agreements on measures for limiting or
adapting to climate change should be addressed in a
subsequent protocol (s) to the convention as our
scientific/economic understanding develops.
Scientific Understanding:
-- Climate change is arguably the most complex
international science policy issue the world has faced.
Because there remain significant uncertainties about the
timing, magnitude, and regional effects of climate change,
further research is essential.
-- This research effort must be international and
encompass all the regions of the world. To address this
issue the USG is undertaking by far the world's largest
global change research program ($1.1 billion in FY1991) and
is planning to contribute to the WMO Climate Studies Fund
to support increased international efforts in climatology.
We urge all countries to increase their research efforts in
order to advance the world's understanding of this problem.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
-3-
Economic Aspects of Climate Change:
-- Although various formulas for limiting greenhouse gas
emissions have been proposed, very little work has been
done on the economic costs of measures to limit or adapt to
climate change. Some preliminary studies show that the
costs of stringent measures to limit greenhouse gas
emissions could be severe.
-- More economic research, comparable to efforts underway
in the scientific area, is needed to reduce the
uncertainties regarding the economic impacts of limitation
measures. The USG is accelerating work on this issue
domestically. We support international efforts to address
this vital issue, for example within the IPCC, OECD, and
other multilateral fora.
-- More work is also necessary on the potential costs and
benefits of global greenhouse gas limitation measures on
U.S. trade and competitiveness as a result of economic
restructuring and the development of new markets for
advanced technologies related to global change.
o
Interim ("No-Regrets") Measures:
-- While we are pursuing the serious scientific and
economic research that is critical to any responsible
approach to climate change, we support taking prompt
actions that are fully justified on independent grounds and
which might also be beneficial from a climate change
standpoint.
-- As reflected in the President's February 5 speech,
these so-called "no-regrets" measures include: (1) phasing
out CFCs by the year 2000; (2) increasing energy efficiency
measures, inter alia, through the National Energy Strategy,
Clean Air Act, and new technology development; and (3)
implementing a major domestic reforestation initiative and
seeking to arrest tropical deforestation through
multilateral channels.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
-4-
Targets and Timetables:
-- We do not believe there is sufficient evidence at this
time to warrant stringent measures, with potentially
serious negative economic consequences, to limit greenhouse
gas emissions. The global implementation of interim ("no
regrets") measures such as those listed above could
significantly limit world greenhouse gas emissions without
imposing costly and politically divisive formal targets.
-- While we supported the Noordwijk Conference goal of
stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions as soon as feasible,
the understanding of what greenhouse gas emissions
limitations can be achieved without unacceptable negative
economic impacts is unclear. Work is continuing
domestically and in the IPCC and other fora to assess the
economic implications of this and other goals.
-- Should an improved understanding of the climate change
issue indicate that specific limitation efforts are
warranted, these can be addressed through a protocol (s) to
the framework convention. Such a protocol (s) must have the
adherence of countries representing much of the world's
land mass and population to be effective.
-- Should the international community eventually agree
that greenhouse gas targets and timetables are necessary,
we would support a comprehensive approach to consider all
greenhouse gas sources and sinks collectively. In
addition, we would support implementation mechanisms which
are economically efficient and market driven.
-- We have thus proposed that any such protocol address
all greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks,
comprehensively. We have also proposed that the
international community consider the economic advantages of
a system of international emissions trading.
Financial Aid and Technology Transfer Issues:
-- Within the IPCC, LDC representatives have called for:
(1) the establishment of new funding sources for climate
change related projects in LDCs; and (2) the transfer of
technology to LDCs on preferential and non-commercial terms.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
-5-
-- The U.S. position is that: (1) existing financial
assistance mechanisms and levels should be evaluated for
their applicability to LDC climate change needs before the
establishment of new sources or additional amounts of
funding is considered; and (2) intellectual property rights
must be protected in technology transfer arrangements,
which should rely to the fullest possible extent on
commercial exchanges and channels.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
U.S. Department of Justice
Land and Natural Resources Division
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
July 11, 1990
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Stephen I. Danzansky
Deputy Assistant to the President
Director of Cabinet Affairs
CC:
C. Boyden Gray
Counsel to the President
D. Allan Bromley
Assistant to the President
for Science & Technology
FROM:
Dick Stewart DS
Assistant Attorney General
SUBJECT: OECD Workshop on Emissions Trading in Greenhouse Gases
Following my memorandum of June 29, I have explored
further with Fred Bernthal (NSF) and Dick Smith (State/OES) the
options for organizing the OECD Workshop on Emissions Trading
proposed for this coming December by Paul Stolpman of OECD. We
believe that the Workshop would function best if it were
sponsored jointly by the OECD and the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC involvement would keep the Workshop
linked to the central existing forum for climate discussions and
thereby avoid encouraging the proliferation of new and
independent fora serving the parochial interests of groups of
nations. OECD has suggested cosponsorship by UNEP itself, but
that arrangement could obscure the central role of the IPCC,
which is a joint project of WMO and UNEP. The chief advantage of
a prominent UNEP role, expanding participation by developing
nations, could be served by the link with the IPCC and perhaps by
appropriate contact with the IPCC's Special Committee on the
Participation of the Developing Countries (chaired by M. Ripert
of France). This could be accomplished by cosponsorship by the
IPCC's Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG).
In order to accomplish these arrangements, we will,
unless instructed otherwise, suggest to Mr. Stolpman that he
write directly to RSWG Chair Fred Bernthal asking for IPCC/RSWG
cosponsorship. The small meeting of experts to plan the
- 2 -
Workshop, suggested by Stolpman for early August, would then
proceed with this organization in mind.
CC: Fred Bernthal
Robert E. Grady
Theresa Gorman
Dick Schmalensee
Curtis Boehlen, Dick Smith, Chris Dawson, Dan Reifsnyder
Dick Morgenstern
Mark Kerrigan
U.S. Department of Justice
Land and Natural Resources Division
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
May 7, 1990
MEMORANDUM
TO:
C. Boyden Gray
Counsel to the President
D. Allan Bromley
Assistant to the President
for Science & Technology
Stephen I. Danzansky
Deputy Assistant to the President
Director of Cabinet Affairs
Theresa Gorman
Associate Director for Environment, Energy
and Natural Resources Policy
FROM:
Dick Stewart DS
Assistant Attorney General
SUBJECT: Task Force to Further Develop the "Comprehensive" and
"Trading" Approaches to Possible Climate Change
Agreements
On April 27-28, I attended the IPCC Seminar on Economic
and Financial Measures in Paris. There was considerable interest
in our "comprehensive" and "emissions trading" approaches,
particularly from the Australians, Dutch, Germans, Japanese, and
New Zealanders. There were many tough questions as to how these
concepts could be institutionalized and put into operation. The
OECD representatives present volunteered to host a future seminar
to examine these issues.
Advancing these approaches in international fora, with
an eye to possible negotiations of a framework convention on
climate which may begin as early as this fall, will necessitate
further attention to the practical details involved, addressing
the institutional, scientific, environmental and economic
underpinnings.
I propose creation of a small task force to develop
further the "comprehensive" and "trading" approaches and consider
- 2 -
how they might be implemented. The Task Force would develop
materials for review and clearance by the DPC Working Group on
Global Change. If at all possible, I would like to have revised
versions of our February "Informal Seminar" papers prepared for
distribution at the RSWG meeting in Geneva the week of June 4,
and to follow up with an OECD-sponsored seminar at some point
later this summer.1 The proposed "Comprehensive/Trading Task
Force" could develop our thinking on these topics and prepare
further materials.
Among the questions to be addressed are the following:
1. What are the gaps and difficulties confronting
development of a comprehensive approach for all greenhouse gases,
their sources and sinks? For example, for which gases, sources
and sinks is more information needed to measure and monitor net
emissions? What remains to be done to develop a comparative
index of the environmental impacts of the various gases? If a
comprehensive approach is not immediately feasible for all
relevant gases, sources and sinks, for which is it feasible, and
how might additional gases, sources, and sinks be folded into a
comprehensive approach as the science and data improve and as the
time to negotiate relevant international instruments advances?
2. What institutions for monitoring and compliance
assurance would be established in connection with a comprehensive
approach?
3. What would be the relation between a comprehensive
approach and agreements that deal with particular gases, sources,
and sinks, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Sulphur and Nitrogen protocols and
the upcoming Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) protocol to the
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) convention, and a
possible agreement on forests?
4. What gases, sources and sinks could feasibly be
included in a trading system, either domestic or international?
5. What institutions would be needed to monitor and/or
administer trading? What would be the respective roles of
international organizations, national governments and private
firms in the operation of international trading? Who would
trade, what would be the currency of trades, how would trading be
¹I think it would be helpful, from the viewpoint of
involving the developing countries, to see if UNEP would co-
sponsor the seminar, and to schedule it immediately before or
after an IPCC or other function which developing countries would
be likely to attend. In addition, the UN Commission on Trade and
Development may be interested.
- 3 -
facilitated and monitored, and would trading involve, sales,
leases, or other arrangements? How would these issues apply to
domestic trading and international trading?
6. What should be done to allay concerns about
"hoarding" of tradeable rights, the moral aspects of "licenses to
pollute," and fears that developed nations would buy up all of
the developing nations' rights?
7. What would be the likely environmental and economic
benefits for the U.S. and the world of employing the
comprehensive and trading approaches?
I propose a Task Force initially consisting of
representatives from CEA, DOC, DOE, DOJ, EPA, State, USDA, and
USTR. We would maintain regular liaison with your offices; we
would be pleased to have representatives from your offices attend
meetings.
U.S. Department of Justice
Land and Natural Resources Division
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
May 14, 1990
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Terry Davies, EPA/OPPE
Gary Evans, USDA
Bob Reinstein, USTR
Dick Schmalensee, CEA
Dick Smith, State/OES
J.R. Spradley, DOC/NOAA
Linda Stuntz, DOE/OPPA
CC:
Theresa Gorman, OPD
Jeff Holmstead, WH Counsel
Nancy Maynard, OSTP
FROM:
Dick Stewart DS / JOW
Assistant Attorney General
SUBJECT: Issues to be Considered by the Task Force on the
"Comprehensive" and "Trading" Approaches to Possible
Climate Change Agreements
For your consideration, attached please find a draft
list of issues that the task force might explore. There may be
other issues and sub-issues that need to be considered as well,
and I look forward to hearing your views on Wednesday, May 16.
COMPREHENSIVE/EMISSIONS TRADING TASK FORCE
Draft List of Issues 5/14/90
Issues to be developed in further detail by the task
force might include:
I. "Comprehensive" approach:
1. Gaps and difficulties in measuring sources and
sinks of greenhouse gases. For some, measurement information is
available, e.g. fossil fuel combustion emissions of CO2, while
for others, measurement information is currently highly
uncertain, e.g. certain emissions of CH4. What would be needed
take? to overcome these gaps and difficulties, and how long would it
2. Related difficulties in developing the capacity to
monitor net emissions of greenhouse gases. Issues include
monitoring nonpoint sources and sinks such as agricultural
fields, forests, and plankton; monitoring and verifying changes
in total abundance of sources and sinks; monitoring and verifying
changes in source output rates and sink uptake rates; development
of reliable and more easily monitorable proxies or surrogates for
actual source output and sink uptake; burdens of proof in
demonstrating new net emissions rates and new monitoring methods;
economic incentives to develop improved monitoring methods.
3. Developing institutions for monitoring and
compliance assurance.
4. Developing a comparative parameter or "index" of
the environmental impacts of the various gases. Issues include
defining the lifetimes of certain gases, relating the index
function to ambient concentrations of gases (the "saturation" or
"window" question), use and choice of discount rates,
incorporating non-warming impacts of gases, mapping the index
function over time, and relating the index to net emissions from
different sources and sinks.
5. If a comprehensive approach is not immediately
feasible for all relevant gases, sources and sinks, an agreement
might target first those for which it is feasible, and then phase
in additional gases, sources, and sinks as the science and data
improve. The initial agreement or set of agreements should not
preclude a comprehensive approach; should promote attention to
all gases, sources and sinks; should promote relevant scientific
research; and could provide incentives for development of a
- 2 -
comprehensive approach, e.g. by rewarding those who demonstrate
the capacity to monitor (or even limit) net emissions of various
gases, including gases not covered in the original agreement.
6. Relationship between a comprehensive approach and
agreements that deal with particular gases, sources, and sinks,
such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, the sulphur and nitrogen protocols and the upcoming
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) protocol to the Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) convention, and a possible
agreement on forests. The comprehensive approach can remain
consistent with these other specific agreements if it provides
additional incentives to reduce the deleterious activities
addressed by those agreements, but does not allow nations to
escape their obligations under those agreements. 1 Categorically
excluding the subjects of these other agreements from the climate
agreement would forfeit the chance to add incentives for
additional reductions in the deleterious activities.
7. Initial allocations. How might they differ under
baselines. the comprehensive and gas-by-gas approaches? Issues in setting
¹Take, for example, the case of CFCs and halons, which are
both ozone-depleting substances regulated under the Montreal
Protocol and greenhouse gases likely to be regulated in a
comprehensive approach. Under the comprehensive approach,
nations would be free to vary their mix of reductions of CO2 and
CFCs/halons, except that CFC/halon reductions must still be at
least as deep and as rapid as those called for in the Montreal
Protocol and its progeny (i.e. London June 1990). In other
words, only additional reductions in CFCs/halons beyond or faster
than the reductions called for under the Montreal Protocol
(likely to be a phaseout by 2000) could serve to offset CO2
reductions, thereby enabling the nation to forego some reductions
in CO2; extra reductions in CO2 could not allow a nation to
reduce CFCs/halons less strictly or less rapidly than it is
required to accomplish under the Montreal Protocol.
At the same time, the question of the baseline to be used
for the greenhouse gas agreement would remain open: the agreement
could give nations credit for all reductions in CFCs and halons
after a certain date or level, or only for reductions that go
beyond their Montreal Protocol obligations. The choice of the
baseline for computation would not lift the legal obligation to
comply with the Montreal Protocol. On the other hand, using a
baseline that accounts for only reductions in CFCs and halons
beyond those mandated under the Montreal Protocol could give
nations a prospective incentive to slow down the negotiations of
more stringent reduction schedules under the Montreal Protocol,
whereas a baseline counting all reductions in CFCs and halons
would not.
- 3 -
8. Defining the terms of agreement and the terms for
admission to an initial or subsequent agreement. These could
differ for different nations or categories of nations, and could
include research commitments as well as emissions limitation
commitments.
9. Documenting the advantages to the comprehensive
approach: avoids ignoring important gases, offers flexibility to
different economic, institutional and social circumstances,
enhances sink development.
- 4 -
II. "Emissions trading" approach:
A. National (Domestic) Trading
1. Informal vs. formal trading: considerations may
differ depending on whether joint arrangements are permissible
subject to governmental oversight (informal trading) or whether
an allowance/permit system is created (formal trading). That is,
informal trading can occur through ad hoc mutual reallocations of
emissions by two or more parties to meet their aggregate
obligations. Formal trading involves the inventory,
registration, or issuance of some kind of permits or allowances,
with subsequent trading to be denominated in these permits or
allowances. Variations and permutations of these approaches can
also be devised.
2. Identifying which gases, sources and sinks could
feasibly be included in a trading system.
3. Identifying who would trade, and to whom emissions
and emissions reductions are assigned. For example, emissions
attributable to electricity use (and attendant tradeable
allowances) could be assigned to utilities, appliance
manufacturers, end users (businesses, farms & households), or
some combination. Similarly, emissions attributable to gasoline
combustion (and attendant tradeable allowances) could be assigned
to oil extraction companies, oil refiners, automobile
manufacturers, automobile owners, or some combination.
4. Consideration given in return for emissions
allowances, including financial and technology assistance that
may flow to allowance sellers. Important distributional impacts
may concern national policymakers, as they have in the debates
about the Clean Air Act here.
5. Facilitating trades. National and subnational
governmental bodies could act as information clearinghouses,
allowance/permit banks, brokers, auctioneers, and so forth.
Private entities might also take on these roles.
6. Monitoring trading. Emissions would have to be
monitored under any agreement, but trading would require some
oversight of the trades. Depending on who does the trading,
monitoring could be designed in different ways. National or
subnational governmental bodies could perform this role, perhaps
hiring private contractors. Monitoring could consist of spot
checks, on site verification (e.g. of sinks), reporting or
registration requirements, designated times and places for
trading, or other arrangements. Administrative costs and
financing of such institutions need to be considered.
- 5 -
7. Nature and duration of allowance/permit rights.
Trading could involve, sales, leases, or other arrangements.
Allowances could expire or diminish in face value over time.
Sophisticated markets for trade currency might arise (as well as
black markets if conditions limit the transferability of
allowances), including futures and options markets. The tax
status of allowance transactions could also be important. These
arrangements can be structured to address concerns about
"hoarding" and market-cornering by wealthy parties (see below).
8. Dealing with moral concerns about trading, such as
the "license to pollute" issue and the notion that extra
reductions should "go to benefit society." Comparison to
regulation and emissions taxes.
9. Dealing with economic concerns about trading.
Concerns may include: "hoarding" of tradeable rights; fears that
wealthy parties would buy up all of the poorer parties' rights;
monopsony and monopoly problems; hindrances to trading related to
inadequate awareness of other market participants; problems of
transferring allowances across industry lines and along vertical
market lines.
10. Possible environmental concerns. Trading in
greenhouse gases generally has no "hotspot" problem because the
gases mix globally in the atmosphere. But there may be spatial
distribution issues regarding, e.g., the residence time of short-
lived gases such as CH4, and the toxicity of gases such as CO and
tropospheric 03. These issues may be too detailed and
insufficiently significant to address at this time.
11. Initial and subsequent allocation of allowances:
how would it differ if trading is available or not. Would the
option of trading ease or exacerbate "gaming" of the initial
allocation? What would the length of rights be? What
flexibility should government have to modify the total stock?
Would government derive revenue by auctioning rights off, taxing
them, or other means?
12. Use of empirical experience with trading to deal
with these issues. Also, what trading has occurred under the
Montreal Protocol?
13. Documenting and predicting the advantages to
trading: allocative efficiency (possibly start with an
explanation of the ordinary gains from trade), incentives to
reduce emissions, dynamic efficiency and innovation, incentives
to use resources efficiently, incentives for sink enhancement,
more affordable pollution control, equity.
- 6 -
14. Relationship to other laws, e.g. laws pertaining
to clean air, energy production, forestry, and agriculture.
Relationship of national law to subnational governmental law,
e.g. federalism concerns, the ability of states to impose
requirements that affect trading, preemption of state law.
B. International Trading
In addition to the elements listed above under national trading,
the following issues may be relevant:
1. Informal or formal trading. As with national
trading, international trading could initially occur "informally"
through ad hoc bilateral or regional governmental treaties. Or
more formal trading systems could be created, involving the
issuance of allowances or permits in which trades are to be
denominated.
2. Identifying who would trade. International trading
could be undertaken, on a bilateral, multilateral or regional
basis, by national governments. Yet private enterprises may be
better situated to identify and make productive trades. Trades
by private enterprises could be subject to clearance or
monitoring by national governments. A mixed system of trading by
both governments and enterprises could also be created.
Nations with different economic systems may find
trading to be best conducted by different actors. For example,
fully centrally planned economies may not find trading by
"private" entities to be appropriate. At the extreme, must a
nation have a domestic trading program in operation in order to
participate effectively in international trading?
3. International institutions to monitor trading. The
questions concerning who would trade have important implications
for how trading would be monitored, and for the degree of
THE
formality and comprehensiveness of the international institutions
enoi
monitoring trades. Unrestricted private trading, for example,
could require a more elaborate international clearinghuse and
monitoring apparatus than might a system limited to trading by
national governments. Private trading could also (or
Iqm.
,
alternatively) be monitored by national governments. Trading by
national governments would presumably be monitored
by
an
international body. Monitoring could vary from sir
reporting
entos
requirements to prior approval requirements; proce
could
routine or elaborate. International monitoring dec
ST
$
as inspections and audits might also raise concerns
sovereignty.
THE
- 7 -
4. Scope of trades. Trading could occur among any
interested parties within a global "bubble," or it could be
conducted under regional "bubbles." The scope chosen could vary
depending on the gas, sources and sinks in question.
5. Consideration for trades and related trade and
development issues. Trading of net greenhouse gas emissions
would create a new medium of exchange, with associated flows of
capital and technology. Trading could be a vehicle for resource
transfers to developing nations. If developing nations have
lower reduction costs than developed nations, perhaps owing to
their ability to shift directly to non-fossil fuel energy sources
and their abundant afforestation opportunities, developing
nations could earn resources by selling excess allowances. (The
same could be true of other low-cost reducers, such as planned
economies about to turn over their capital stock, and nations
that develop useful innovations.) Some argue that this mechanism
poses the risk of undue economic leverage for developing nations,
and that it will influence the gaming of initial allocations.
Others see this mechanism as a decentralized, market-based
alternative to resource flows dictated by international
organizations, central international assistance funds, and
preferential terms for technology transfer demanded by developing
nations. This raises important issues regarding international
aid and trade regimes. There may also be important issues
regarding international trade regimes, e.g. international energy
markets, GATT, efforts by national governments to distort
international trade in allowances or to protect domestic
allowance holders, and others; and regarding international aid
regimes, e.g. alternatives to central aid funds, and the
calculation and ownership of the net emissions impacts of ongoing
aid-funded projects.
6. Facilitating trades. International organizations
and national governments could serve as information
clearinghouses, brokers, bankers, auctioneers, and so forth. In
some national economies and in the world economy, private
entities might also assume these roles.
7. Dealing with moral, environmental and economic
concerns. The usual concerns raised by trading may be
influenced, in an international context, by the variety of
cultures and stages of development of different nations. Some
nations have expressed the view that trading is a "license to
pollute" and therefore immoral. Experience with some debt-for
nature swaps (esp. Bolivia) suggests that trades for sink
resources may raise concerns about sovereignty and local
opposition to outright sales of sink development rights to other
nations. Some nations unfamiliar with trading may express the
view that it is simply a means to allow illicit emissions. There
are also sharp concerns that developed nations would "buy up" all
the allowances held by developing nations. One means for
- 8 -
addressing these concerns would be to make allowances leasable
for a term of years rather than fully alienable.
8. Initial allocation of allowances: how will it be
set? How will the opportunity to trade affect the allocation-
setting process? Will it tend to ease or exacerbate "gaming"?
What scope would there be for varying the basis of allocation
across nations? What flexibility would there be for subsequently
modifying the stock of rights? The opportunity for modifications
in the allocation of rights among nations (as opposed to the
total stock) could discourage trading, because nations
anticipating the allocations to be renegotiated might fear that
selling some of their allowances would demonstrate that their
initial allocations were "too high" and should be reduced.
9. Use of empirical experience with international
trading to support discussion. Trading in goods, services,
currencies, debt-for-nature, under the Montreal Protocol, etc.
10. Documenting and predicting the advantages to
international trading. The advantages mentioned under national
trading must be considered in the international context.
11. Relationship to other international law and
international institutions.
- 9 -
III. Common issues:
1. What would be the likely environmental and economic
benefits for the U.S. and the world of employing (a) the
comprehensive approach, (b) the trading approach, or (c) both? A
preliminary calculation could be undertaken to confirm that these
are likely to be desirable approaches. Then a more in-depth
study could be pursued, perhaps through an independent think
tank.
2. Although the benefits from these approaches are
probably greatest when they are universally adopted, universal
adoption is not absolutely necessary. For example, if full
adoption of the comprehensive and emissions trading approaches is
not forthcoming, an international target could be written in
terms of "net CO2 equivalent emissions," and then could allow
emitters to demonstrate compliance however they wished --
reducing other gases, enhancing sinks, purchasing extra
reductions abroad, innovating CO2 scrubbers, etc. -- so long as
the emitter demonstrated the efficacy of its chosen approach.
This would authorize both the comprehensive and emissions trading
approaches, but put the burden of proof on -- and gives
incentives to -- the emitter to demonstrate the alternative
approaches. Emitters would be influenced by the forum and the
process chosen for deciding whether an emitter has satisfactorily
demonstrated the efficacy of its approach.
- 10 -
IV. Possible subgroup tasks:
1. Collect current information on measuring sources
and sinks of greenhouse gases; identify next steps needed to
measure and to monitor net emissions; estimate the costs (in time
and money) of achieving needed capabilities.
2. Design a comparative index of environmental impacts
of greenhouse gases, including warming and non-warming impacts.
3. Begin work on a model of greenhouse gas limits, for
the United States and selected other national (domestic)
applications, which apply only to CO2, or to several gases.
Assess economic and environmental results.
4. Begin work on models of trading: (a) Model of
greenhouse gas limits, with and without trading, for the United
States and selected other national (domestic) applications.
Scenarios: limits apply only to CO2, or to several gases; trading
is informal, or formal; trading involves sinks, or not; sales or
leases; expiration of allowances; etc. Assess economic and
environmental results. (b) Model of greenhouse gas limits, with
and without international trading. Scenarios: limits apply only
to CO2, or to several gases; nations trade, or private entities
trade; trading is informal, or formal; trading involves sinks, or
not; sales or leases; expiration of allowances; etc. Assess
economic and environmental results.
5. Develop the institutional underpinnings of
international trading: identify international entities that
could assist in monitoring and facilitating trading (e.g. stock
exchanges, agencies with relevant information (IEA? TFAP?)), and
international instruments that might apply to such trading (e.g.
GATT). Identify who would trade. Issues of monitoring and
assuring compliance.
U.S. Department of Justice
Land and Natural Resources Division
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
May 8, 1990
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Terry Davies, EPA/OPPE
Gary Evans, USDA
Bob Reinstein, USTR
Dick Schmalensee, CEA
Dick Smith, State/OES
J.R. Spradley, DOC/NOAA
Linda Stuntz, DOE/OPPA
CC:
Theresa Gorman, OPD
Jeff Holmstead, WH Counsel
Nancy Maynard, OSTP
FROM:
Dick Stewart DS
Assistant Attorney General
SUBJECT: Task Force to Further Develop the "Comprehensive" and
"Trading" Approaches to Possible Climate Change
Agreements
We have been asked to chair a small task force to
further develop the "comprehensive" and "emissions trading"
approaches to possible agreements on climate change, and we
invite your participation on that task force. Advancing these
approaches in international fora, with an eye to possible
negotiations of a framework convention on climate which may begin
as early as this fall, will necessitate further attention to the
practical details involved, addressing the institutional,
scientific, environmental and economic underpinnings. The task
force would develop concepts, options and materials elaborating
the "comprehensive" and "emissions trading" approaches.
On April 27-28, I attended the IPCC Seminar on Economic
and Financial Measures in Paris. There was considerable interest
in our "comprehensive" and "emissions trading" approaches,
particularly from the Australians, Dutch, Germans, Japanese, and
New Zealanders. There were many tough questions as to how these
concepts could be institutionalized and put into operation. The
OECD representatives present volunteered to host a future seminar
to examine these issues.
- 2 -
If at all possible, it would be desirable to have
revised versions of our February "Informal Seminar" papers
prepared for distribution at the RSWG meeting in Geneva the week
of June 4, and to follow up with an OECD-sponsored seminar at
some point later this summer. The proposed task force could
develop our thinking on these topics and prepare further
materials.
Among the questions to be addressed by the task force
will be the following:
1. What are the gaps and difficulties confronting
development of a comprehensive approach for all greenhouse gases,
their sources and sinks? For example, for which gases, sources
and sinks is more information needed to measure and monitor net
emissions? What remains to be done to develop a comparative
index of the environmental impacts of the various gases? If a
comprehensive approach is not immediately feasible for all
relevant gases, sources and sinks, for which is it feasible, and
how might additional gases, sources, and sinks be folded into a
comprehensive approach as the science and data improve and as the
time to negotiate relevant international instruments advances?
2. What institutions for monitoring and compliance
assurance would be established in connection with a comprehensive
approach?
3. What would be the relation between a comprehensive
approach and agreements that deal with particular gases, sources,
and sinks, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Sulphur and Nitrogen protocols and
the upcoming Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) protocol to the
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) convention, and a
possible agreement on forests?
4. What gases, sources and sinks could feasibly be
included in a trading system, either domestic or international?
5. What institutions would be needed to monitor and/or
administer trading? What would be the respective roles of
international organizations, national governments and private
firms in the operation of international trading? Who would
trade, what would be the currency of trades, how would trading be
facilitated and monitored, and would trading involve, sales,
leases, or other arrangements? How would these issues apply to
domestic trading and international trading?
6. What should be done to allay concerns about
"hoarding" of tradeable rights, the moral aspects of "licenses to
pollute," and fears that developed nations would buy up all of
the developing nations' rights?
- 3 -
7. What would be the likely environmental and economic
benefits for the U.S. and the world of employing the
comprehensive and trading approaches?
We would like to convene the first meeting of this
small task force late this week or early next week. My office
will contact you to arrange a time. A more detailed agenda and
draft work plan will be distributed in advance of the meeting. I
look forward to working with you.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 11, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED BERNTHAL
STEVE DANZANSKY
CHRIS DAWSON
MIKE DELAND
THERESA GORMAN
BOB GRADY
BOYDEN GRAY
HENSON MOORE
BILL REILLY
DICK SCHMALENSEE
RICHARD STEWART
FROM:
ALLAN BROMLEY
Pue
SUBJECT:
Global Change Strategy Task Force Meeting
The Global Change Strategy Task Force will meet this afternoon at
2:00 p.m. in Room 22 of the Old Executive Office Building.
We will hear a briefing from Fred Bernthal on last week's meeting
of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group and the UNEP/WMO
Bureau meeting in Geneva. We will also review and discuss
testimony on the state of the international science on global
climate change, to be delivered tomorrow by Dr. Bob Watson, Allan
Hecht and Fred Bernthal at a hearing of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee, chaired by Senator Al Gore.
Copies of the testimony of Watson and Hecht are attached; copies
of Bernthal's testimony will be distributed at the meeting.
EPA contact
DRAFT--6-7-90
Tom Dickerson
TESTIMONY OF
ALAN HECHT
382-5419
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
June 12, 1990
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.
My name is Alan Hecht, and I am Deputy Assistant Administrator for
International Activities at the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. It is with great pleasure that I appear before you today
to testify on the views of the international scientific community
regarding global climate change. I understand that you are
specifically interested in the recent findings of Working Group II
under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since
the beginning of the IPCC I have served as coordinator of U.S.
activities related to Working Group II.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Chaired by Dr. Bert Bolin of Sweden, the IPCC was established
in 1988, under the joint auspices of the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), to
oversee internátionally coordinated assessments of the magnitude,
timing, and potential impacts of climate change. At the IPCC's
first meeting in November 1988, the Panel set up three working
groups to help carry out its work:
06/07/90 14:57 262 252 0516
OCLA/OLA DIV
004
- 2 -
(1) the scientific assessment working group chaired by the
United Kingdom (WG-I);
(2) the impact assessment working group chaired by the Soviet
Union (WG-II) ; and
(3) the response strategies working group (RSWG) chaired by
the United States (WG-III).
The United States has been an active participant in all three
working groups, which have met on numerous occasions over the last
couple of years to continue their work. I have just returned from
the final meetings of the WG-II in Moscow and WG-III in Geneva.
The IPCC and its three working groups will be presenting their
preliminary findings at the Second World Climate Conference in
October 1990.
Organization of Working Group II
As I just mentioned, Working Group II (WG-II) on Impacts was
charged with describing the environmental and socio-economic
implications of possible climate changes over the next decades due
to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
The U.S.S.R. chaired this group with Japan and Australia
serving as vice-chairs. Scientists from approximately 10 countries
played the major role in preparing chapters of the report (Table
1). Dozens of scientists around the world contributed material to
the lead authors of each chapter. Over 30 countries and
organizations [e.g. (OPEC) ] attended the final meeting in MOSCOW,
May 28-31, where the report was adopted by the working group.
- 3 -
Ideally the IPCC process should have proceeded in stages where
WG-I would have had the time to produce scenarios which could have
been used as a basis for the analyses of WG-II. However, work
among all groups proceeded in parallel. is a result, and in order
to complete its work in time, WG-II was forced to use a number of
scenarios based on existing models and analyses in the literature.
These scenarios, largely drawn from the Villach Report and several
reports by the National Research Council, have the features of:
doubling between now and 2025 and 2050 of the greenhouse gases
radiatively equivalent to CO2 in the atmosphere;
an eventual increase of global mean temperature of 1.5°c to
4.5°c above pre-industrial values;
an unequal global distribution of this temperature rise,
namely a temperature increase of half the global mean in the
tropical regions and twice the global mean in the polar
regions;
a sea level rise of 0.3 to 0.5M by 2050 and about 1.0m by
2100.
The temperature scenarios compare reasonably well with the
latest assessment of WG-I of an effective doubling of CO2 for the
IPCC "business as usual scenarie.)"1 This would lead to a mean
global temperature increase of about 1°c above the present value by
2025 and about 3°c before the end of the next century.
The sea level scenarios used by WG-II are, however, higher
than current estimates given by WG-I. Under the IPCC business 05
A
1
This scenario assumes that few or no steps are taken to
limit greenhouse gas emissions. Current energy use and levels of
tropical forests clearing continue and fossil fuels, particularly
coal, remain the world's primary energy source.
MA
- 4 -
usua scenario, an average rate of global Bean sea level rise of
about 6 CE per decade is projected by WG-I for the next decades.
This amounts to a rise of about 20 Cm by 2030 and 65cm by the end
of the next century. Each of these estimates would be
characterized by significant regional variations. The assessment
literature is largely based on assuming a sea level rise of 50 to
2000 cms.
I emphasize that the majority of the analysis done by WG-II
reflects analysis of the available literature as opposed to new
and in depth original studies. This literature reflects a wide
variety of methodologies. The report does not critically review
existing methodologies.
The studies in this report also generally assume current
societal, technological and environmental conditions. Some studies
assume natural adaptation or some limited societal response. Such
factors as changes in technology, which would effect sensitivity
to climate change, are usually not considered.
In general, effects studies must rely on regionally detailed
climate forecasts in which there is little confidence at present
(see WG-I report). Thus the results in the WG-II report are best
described as environmental sensitivity studies with respect to a
range of climate scenarios. There is one major disagreement
between WG-I and WG-II, centering around the use of paleoclimate
scenarios as "predictors" of future climates.
Aven the time available YT uses the not
possible to examine 2 details
x two , mpat est. Fel to
the greate uncertainty about tea note cut
strength of dinte charl or about the
character of required ching
1
- 5 -
Paleoclimate analogs are proposed by
Soviet
Scientists
as
a
means by which future climate can be predicted. The methodology
assumes that past warr geologic intervals provide insight into
possible future climate conditions. Constant general circulation
models (GCMs) are based on mathematical representation of the
physical process in the atmosphere and the interactions of the
atmosphere with the earth's surface and oceans. There is
considerable scientific debate about the merits and demerits of
each of these as discussed in the report of WG-I.²
2
The scientific basis for paleoahalogs is described in
the book Anthropogenic Climate Change (in Russian) edited by M.
Budyko and Y. Izrael. The English version will be published by
University of Arizona Press in 1990. Budyko is the leading
proponent of this theory which has its critics in the USSR. The
basic argument is that past warm intervals, especially, the
Holocene (5000-6000 years ago), the Eemian (125,000 years ago)
and the mid Pliocene (about 4-5 million years ago) represent
times when the global average temperatures were respectively 1°,
2° and 4°c above the present. Budyko also believes that the CO2
levels in the atmosphere were near 550 ppm in the Pliocene, an
issue disputed by WG-1 report. Assuming that the intervals can
serve as models of the future, Soviet scientists have attempted
to reconstruct the spatial patterns of past temperature and
precipitation (mainly for the USSR) for each period. They
conclude that the spatial patterns are similar for all of these
intervals. From this analysis Budyko concludes that the overall
climate effect is largely beneficial with abundant precipitation
occurring in areas now relatively dry.
The science under pinning this approach is uncertain. 1 two
year cooperative US-USSR effort, under the US-USSR Environmental
Agreement, to evaluate this approach has been underway and the
results of this study will be published in a book Prospects of
Future Climate Change (1990) edited by M. MacCracken and Alan
Hecht (US) and M. Budyko and Y. Izrael (USSR). Further testing
and evaluation of this approach is underway. Outside of the USSR
this approach is not widely accepted. IPCC WG-1 in their
evaluation concludes: "we cannot therefore advocate the use of
paleoclimates as predictions of regional climate change due to
future increases in greenhouse gases. Largely at the request
of IPCC WG-2 Chairman, WG-2 has included impacts based on
- 6 -
WG-II has chosen to use both GCM and paleoanalog scenarios as
a basis for its impact assessments (except for sealevel rise).
These soenarios provide a different set of boundary conditions
which in some cases, e.g. in agriculture, give different results.
While the report recognizes the importance of rate of climate
change as a major societal factor, the subject is not discussed in
detail. Finally, while the report was intended to deal with both
environmental and economic impacts, the report contains very little
economic analyses.
wasking GNAP II
With respect to overall organization, the full report of
WG-II was extensively reviewed by over 30 U.S. scientists and by
a review panel organized under the leadership of the National
Climate Program office with support from the National oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These reviews were sent to lead
authors to assist them in preparing their final chapters. Similar
extensive reviews were conducted by Canada, U.K. and Australia.
A
Major Conclusions
The major conclusion of Working Group-II 1s that the projected
climate changes of the abusiness as usual jacenario are likely
to have significant impacts on a broad range of managed and
unmanaged ecological systems with the greatest impacts on
those regions exposed to natural hazards, or under
environmental or economic stress. While on balance, the
evidence is that food production at the global level can be
maintained at essentially the same level as would have
occurred without climate change, the cost of achieving this
is unclear. There may, however, be severe effects in some
regions particularly those with high present day
paleoclimate scenarios in its reports.
- 7
AnA
vulnerability. The inability to provide detailed regional
scenarios of climate change limits the ability to adequately
estimate potential regional impacts.
The rotation period of forests is long and current forests
will grow mature and decline during a climate in which they
are increasingly more poorly adapted. Actual impacts depend
on the physiological adaptability of trees and a range of
biological relationships (e.g. parasites, competition, etc.).
Large losses from both factors in the form of forest declines
sin
can occur. The most sensitive areas will be where species are
close to their biological limits in terms of temperature and
the
moisture.
above
The rate of projected climatic changes is the major factor
determining the type and degree of climatic impacts on natural
terrestrial ecosystems. Current models prodict the WG III
"business as usuala) scenario of future trace yas emissions
and
that the global mean annual temperature is likely to increase
at a rate of 0.2-0.5°C per decade. This rate of increase is
greater than seen over the past 10,000 years. These rages are
likely to be faster than the ability of some species to
respond and these responses may be sudden or gradual.
Some species could be lost due to increased stress leading to
a reduction in global biological diversity. Most at risk are
those communities in which the options for adaptability are
limited (e.g., montane, alpine, polar, island and coastal
communities, remnant vegetation, and heritage sites and
reserves) and those communities where climate changes add to
existing stresses.
chinate?
Relatively small comitate changes can cause large water
resource problems in many areas, especially arid and semi-arid
regions and those humid areas where demand or pollution has
led to water scarcity. Little is known about regional details
of greenhouse gas-induced hydrometeorological change. It
appears that many areas will have increased precipitation,
soil moisture and water storage, thus altering patterns of
agriculture, ecosystems and other water use.
Water
availability will decrease in other areas, a most important
factor for already marginal situations, such as the Sahelian
zone in Africa.
The most vulnerable human settlements are those especially
exposed to natural hazards e.g., coastal or river flooding,
severe drought, landslides, severe wind storms and tropical
cyclones. The most vulnerable populations are in developing
countries, in the lower income groups, residents of coastal
lowlands and islands, populations in semi-arid grasslands, and
the urban poor in squatter settlements, slums and shanty
- 8 -
towns, especially in megacities. In coastal lowlands such as
in Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Egypt, and China as well as in small
island nations inundation due to sea level rise and storm
surges could lead to significant movements of people. Major
health impacts are possible, especially in large urban areas,
due to changes in availability of water and food and increased
health problems due to heat stress spreading of infections.
Changes in precipitation and temperature could radically alter
the patterns of vector-borne and viral diseases by shifting
them to higher latitudes and thus put large populations at
risk. These changes could initiate, as similar events have
in the past, large migrations of people leading a number of
years to severe disruptions of settlement patterns and social
instability in some areas.
A 30-50 Cm sea level rise (projected by 2050) would
contaminate the water supply of several atoll nations such as
the Marshall Islands and Maldive, and threaten tourist beaches
around the world. A 1 m rise by 2100 or later would render
some island states uninhabitable, displace tens of millions
of people seriously threaten low-lying urban areas, flood
productive land, contaminate fresh water supplies and change
coastlines. Coastal protection would involve very significant
costs (see WG-III Report). Rapid sea level rise would change
coastal ecology and threaten many important fisheries.
o
Reductions in sea ice will benefit shipping, but seriously
impact ice-dependent marine mammals and birds. Impacts on the
global oceans will include changes in the heat balance, shifts
in ocean to absorb heat and co2, and changes in upwelling
zones associated with fisheries. Effects will vary by
geographic zones, with changes in habitats and a decrease in
biological diversity and shifts in marine organisms and
productive zones, including commercially important species.
Such regional shifts in fisheries will have major socio-
economic impacts.
The global areal extent and volume of elements of the
terrestrial cryosphere (seasonal snow cover, near-surface
layers of permafrost and some masses of ice) will be
substantially reduced. These reductions, when reflected
regionally, could have significant impacts on related
ecosystems and social and economic activities.
o
Permafrost, which currently underlies 20-25% of the land mass
of the Northern Hemisphere, could experience significant
degradation within the next 40-50 years. Projected increases
in the thickness of the freeze-thaw (active) layer above the
permafrost and a recession of permafrost to higher latitudes
and altitude could lead to increases in certain instability,
erosion and landslides in those areas which currently contain
08/07/80
15:01
aren 709 7070
OCLAVOLA DIV
011
- 9 -
permafrost. AS a result, overlying ecosystems could be
significantly altered and the integrity of man-made structures
and facilities reduced thereby influencing existing human
settlements and development opportunities.
working Group
Recommendations for Future Impact Studies
IPCC WG-II was unable to address one aspect of its mandate,
namely an analysis of likely social-economic impacts of climate
change. This remains a major task for the future. The available
literature on economic impacts is diverse and subject to
considerable controversy. A great deal of future work is needed
to provide credible economic analyses of possible impacts.
Other areas where the Working Group has identified the need
for additional work are:
Improved knowledge of effects of changes in climate on crop
yields and livestock productivity in different regional and
under different types of management.
Better understanding of response of ecosystems to different
rates of climate change.
Mapping of low coastal areas subject to inundation from sea
level rise of various magnitudes with particular stress on
regional and local conditions (e.g., land subsidence) that
will amplify the impacts.
Analysis of Overall IPCC Process
Let me make some observations on the overall IPCC and in
particular the activities of WG-II. The IPCC has been successful
in a number of ways:
o
It has drawn governments into an active debate on climate
change issues.
Further more, immets Lore despribent on
the vote and strength of clinate change
which we appeartly vighty uncert ain.
Analysis of the sensitivity of impacts to
different step and strengths we nee
06/07/90
15:01
202 252 0516
OCLA/OLA DIV
012
and
- 10 -
It has
identified crucial policy and technical issues for
future debate.
It has created a number of informal networks and channels of
communications among scientists and between governments.
It has established a common framework, based on the assessment
reports, from which governments can begin negotiations of a
framework convention.
While the IPCC has encouraged the active participation of
existing international institutions (e.g. ILASA, OEC), future
activities might more actively draw on the excellent technical
capabilities of these organizations.
Many existing organizations have experience in climate impact
studies and can make significant contributions to improving
existing methodologies in this field.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the most important and immediate
tasks is the dissemination of the conclusions of the IPCC reports
to all countries. It is clear to me from our discussions in WG-II
that many developing countries are unfamiliar with many aspects of
the climate change issue. Presentations of the IPCC results in
easily understood ways would greatly increase appreciation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the current understanding of climate
change and its potential impacts on society.
Thank you; I appreciate having been given the opportunity to
discuss these important issues. I would be happy to address any
questions which you may have at this time.
TABLE 1
Chapter
Load Country Authors*
Agriculture and Forestry
U.K., U.S.S.R., India (49)
Natural Terrestrial Ecosystem
Canada, U.S.S.R., U.S. (17)
Hydrology and Water Resources
U.S., U.S.S.R., Algeria (N.A.)
Human Settlement, Energy
Japan, U.S. (31)
Transport, Industry, Health
Oceans and Coastal Zones
U.S.S.R., U.S. (28)
Snow Cover, Ice and Permafrost
Canada, U.S.S.R. (28)
* Numbers in ( ) are expert contributions for sections of the report.
Countries which contributed material include (other than those listed
above) Australia, Benin, Brazil, Ethiopia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Finland, FRG, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Kenya,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Mexico, Philippines, PRC,
Poland, Thailand, U.K., Vietnam and OECD and ILASA.
INSERTS TO EPA OVERSIGHT JUNE 12, 1990
[A]
2030 High Emissions Scenario
[B]
Given the time available, it was not possible to examine in
detail the sensitivity of impact estimates to the high
uncertainties about the rate and strength of global climate
changes or to the even higher uncertainties about regional
changes.
[c]
Current models, assuming the WG-III High Emissions Scenario of
future trace gas emissions, conclude that the global mean annual
temperature is likely to increase.
[D]
While useful as indications of possible types of impacts, these
conclusions are based on specific scenarios and hence are of very
limited policy usefulness. Impacts are dependent upon the rate
and strength of global climate change, which are currently highly
uncertain, and also upon regional variations which can not now be
simulated with any confidence. Hence, the Working Group
conclusions are not predictions of what will happen. Because of
the high uncertainties, analyses of the sensitivity of impacts to
different rates and strengths of climate change are needed, but
are not yet available.
Bob Grady-
You need to decide
whether you want This in
or out. OSTP wants out,
NRD wants in. Given what we're
done to Watson's testimory, d think
we should not con clude what The usefulner
is to policy. Your call. nonie
Statement of
Dr. Robert T. Watson
Earth Science and Applications Division
Office of Space Science and Applications
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
before the
Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
U.S. Senate
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the international Scientific Assessment of
Climate Change conducted under the auspices of Working Group I of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was sponsored by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP).
This testimony will briefly present the background, participation, scope, review
process, timetable, assessment outline, relation to policy, and executive summary of the
IPCC scientific assessment (the executive summary appended to this testimony is verbatim
from the IPCC assessment).
maybe may
could
The dramatic rise in world population and industrial activities during the last century
climate has generated concern that human activities are affecting the global environment. In
change
particular, one global environmental change which may affect both human well being and
the quality of life is global warming; warming caused by increasing atmospherie
change
concentrations of radiatively active trace gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, chlorofluorocarbons and tropospheric ozone. This environmental issue is no longer
climate change
the sole concern of the scientific community and environmental groups. but Its importance
has now been recognized by governments around the world. The current interest in the
global warming issue has resulted in the endorsement, at the highest levels of governments,
for comprehensive scientific, technical and economic assessments to be performed. The
IPCC assessments are in response to the need for such assessments.
the relative contribution of human activities, this
A though there remains significant uncertainty about
Background
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) sponsored the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) to produce an international, state-of-the-knowledge review of climate
change. This review includes three companion IPCC assessments of global climate
change: (i) science, (ii) socio-economic impacts, and (iii) policy options. The IPCC
assigned lead responsibilities for the preparation of the three assessments reports as
(RESPONSE Responsateves
1
010/200'3968
FROM NASA HQTS WDC
DD:51 06. 2 NNI
Response STRATEGIES
follows: (i) Science - United Kingdom; (ii) Socio-Economic Impacts - USSR; and (iii)
Policy Options - USA.
The scientific assessment of climate change is a peer-reviewed scientific document
written by world renowned scientists, accompanied by a "Policymakers Summary" which
is directed to government officials. The scientific assessment was completed, and the
executive summary released, on May 25, 1990. The policymakers summary and the main
assessment were delivered to the IPCC secretariat June 4, 1990.
Participation
The Scientific Assessment of Climate Change was chaired by Dr. J. Houghton,
Director General of the British Meteorological Office, and prepared and peer-reviewed by
the most knowledgeable scientists in the world on this subject. About 250 scientists
participated in the preparation of the assessment, with an additional comparable number
conducting the peer review. The assessment was coordinated, and initial drafts of the
policymakers summary and its executive summary prepared, by a small core team of
scientists at Bracknell, UK. I represented the U.S. as a member of this core team. The
lead authors were selected by the intergovernmental IPCC Science Working Group (WG
1), and were responsible for the preparation of their sections. Daniel Albritton (NOAA)
and I (NASA) were the U.S. Representatives on the IPCC Science Working Group on
behalf of the Committee on Earth Sciences (CES).
(& Envonmental Enuron LE mental
Scope
The main features of the Scientific Assessment of Climate Change are the
following:
The scope encompassed the full climate change phenomenon, namely: climate
forcing agents; processes involved in climate change; climate model formulation;
tests of climate models; simulation of past climate changes; predictions of future
climate; past climate record; and, physical (sea level) and biological responses to
climate change.
A special emphasis throughout the assessment was an identification of gaps in the
knowledge and a better quantification of uncertainties.
Review Process
The scientific assessment was subjected to several levels of peer review, as outlined
in the timetable below. The assessment (the main assessment, the policymakers summary
and its executive summary) was peer reviewed both formally and informally by the
international scientific community. This was followed by an intergovernmental review of
the policymakers summary and its executive summary to ensure consistency between the
main assessment and these two summaries.
2
010/000'3988
can SIOH USUN FROM 50:45 06. 2 NNI
Timetable
The major events and milestones for the Scientific Assessment of Climate Change
included:
9 - 11 Nov 1988
First meeting of the IPCC held to establish the goals, scope, chairs,
and schedule of all three assessments. (Geneva, Switzerland)
24 - 26 Jan 1989
First plenary meeting of the Science Working Group (WG 1) held
to: establish the features of the Scientific Assessment of Climate
Change; select lead authors; and, evaluate required interactions with
the other IPCC Working Groups. (Oxford, United Kingdom)
7- 8 March 1989
Meeting of lead authors of the Scientific Assessment of Climate
Change met to establish: the detailed structure and contents of the
Assessment; the participants; and, the schedule of working
meetings. (Princeton, USA)
April 1989
Subgroup meetings held to draft the individual sections of the
- Jan 1990
Assessment.
Dec 1989
Section drafts available for initial informal peer review by the
- Jan 1990
international scientific community.
Feb 1990
Second draft of assessment sections integrared into complete report,
and an initial policymakers and executive summary prepared and
distributed to lead authors and a small core review group.
26 Feb
Meeting of the lead authors of the Science Working Group and
- 2 Mar 1990
limited number of other experts (two per section) held to review the
second draft of the Assessment (including policymakers summary
and its executive summary). (Edinburgh, United Kingdom)
2- 11 Mar 1990
Lead authors redraft assessment based on reviewers comments.
12 Mar
Third draft of the Assessment, including the policymakers
- 9 April 1990
summary and its executive summary, is distributed to the
international scientific community for the second stage
formal peer review.
10- 27 April 1990
Lead authors revised assessment based on peer review comments.
7- - 18 May 1990
Governmental review of "final" version of assessment conducted,
(primarily the policymakers summary and its executive summary).
21 - 25 May 1990
Second plenary meeting of the Science Working Group (WG 1),
with lead authors, held to review the "final" draft Scientific
Assessment of Climate Change. (Windsor, United Kingdom)
4 June 1990
Final Scientific Assessment of Climate Change delivered to IPCC
secretariat.
12 . 16 Nov 1990
Second World Climate Conference scheduled, at which the reports
of the IPCC will be presented. (Geneva, Switzerland)
3
INSERT
It is also important to note several other aspects of the
document that also should be considered by policymakers.
O
Even though the assessment represents a general consensus
of views of the global change scientific community, there
likely will be some scientific viewpoints that fall
outside the ranges of the assessment.
Because the principal focus of the assessment was on the
anthropogenic courses of climate change, issues related
to the natural sources and sinks in the carbon cycle,
although discussed, were not assessed in the same degree
of detail.
The assessment reflects the current state of scientific
research. The pace of scientific research in this field
has been accelerated rapidly in recent years, resulting
in a need to be continually cognizant of new knowledge.
Finally, I would reiterate that the scope of the assessment
was limited to science issues. The question of impacts and
response strategies, both mitigation and adaptation, must also be
considered by the policymakers. In addition, the economic and
other human implications both of climate change and of the
potential response strategies which might be made to such change
are of critical concern to policymakers.
THe purpose OF 1.. IFCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT WAS 70 provide INTUNATORAL
POLICY -MAKERS now A STATE OF - NH KNOXCAGE Review OF The Science
OF G-OBAL CHANCE. AS SUCH,
in severance
Relation to Policy
-AN
IMPORTANT
While/the Scientific Assessment of Climate Change is a scientific document, is
value to decisionmal are should be considerable The reasons for this are severalfold:
REPRESENTS A
GLOBAL CHANGE
It single, concise statement from thescientific community.
GLOBAL CHANGE
In the Assessment, major representatives of the scientific community spoke at one
forum regarding the knowns and unknowns of climate change, including global
warming. The Assessment can, therefore, serve as a common reference point
desistonmakers, in contrast to sporadic and separate statements reflecting the
opinions of individuals.
o
It is an international scientific assessment.
THe ASSESSMENT REFLECTS THE wor- OF AN INTERNATIONAL Group or SCIENTISTS,
All nations now have # common basis of seientific input for their decision making,
as opposed to only several national statements.
BROAD
o
The scientific scope is compr thensive.
A
The Assessment provides decisionmakers with -single, homogeneous summary of
the current scientific understanding of the whole climate change phenomenon,
ranging from the causes of change to the physical and biological responses to that
change. This in likely to be more useful than separate reviews of components of the
phenomenon conducted at different times and perhaps for different purposes
The
VARIABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE AS well AS
0
Both natural human-induced climate change were considered.
100 From ANTROF poliencial sources
In contrast to considering only the potential perturbation of climate by human
activities, the Assessment placed predicted change in the context of the observed
and predicted changes that are a natural part of the climate system. The comparison
of the two affords immediate and straightforward insight into the significance of
any predicted human-induced perturbations.
GREATER
0
The focus on identifying gaps in the knowledge and quantifying uncertainties will
aid risk analysis.
There is a highly relevant difference between (a) "The predicted range of
possibilities is from X to Z, with a best estimate of Y" and (b) "The prediction is
Y" with regard to decision making; the first statement explicitly reflects the
existence of uncertainties in the prediction.
INSERT)
Executive Summary
The Executive Summary of the Scientific Assessment of Climate Change was
released on May 25, 1990. It summarizes the state of knowledge concerning global climate
change, notes the uncertainties associated with our current knowledge, offers predictions
and judgements relating to global change, and provides an overview of the areas in which
we must improve our predictive capacity. The Executive Summary has been carefully
scrutinized to assure that its statements accurately reflect the main assessment. A verbatim
copy of the Executive Summary is appended to my testimony.
5
010/900'398
FROM NASA HQTS WDC
97:46 05. 2 NNI
DISCUSSIONS.
AN IMPORTANT
Conclusions
I believe that the IPCC scientific assessment represents a strong, concise statement
from the international scientific community, and that will provide the required scientific
basis for both national and international policy formulation. The assessment recognizes
that while there are many uncertainties in our scientific knowledge, particularly with respect
to our ability to predict the magnitude, timing, and regional patterns of climate change,
first, there is no doubt that human activities are causing the atmospheric concentrations of
nitrous oxide to increase. And second, that current models predict that with the IPCC High Enuisions 2030.
greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, methane, the chlorofluorocarbons, and
"business as " scenario of future trace gas emissions, the Earth's global mean
temperature is likely to increase at a rate of between 0.2 to 0.5 degrees centigrade per
Scenario
decade. The assessment also noted that while the Earth's global mean temperature has (ScenarioA)
increased between 0.3 and 0.6 degrees centigrade over the last 100 years, that this
observed increase cannot be used to either validate or invalidate the "global warming"
hypothesis, because while the magnitude of the observed warming is broadly consistent
with the predicted global warming due to the increased concentrations of greenhouse gases,
it is also comparable to natural variability.
However, I must stress once again that with these
are significant uncertainties associated
the current models, especially in their
representation of important feedback mechanisms sources
uncertainties associated with the ment
and recommends that improving our knowledge
and sinks of greenhouse gases. The assess of
these complex of climate-related processes and variable the long-term critical to
collection improving our predictive capability.
6
010/200'3988
FROM NASA HQTS WDC
LD:51 06. 2 NNI
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Report to IPCC, 25 May 1990
Executive Summary
We are certain of the following:
there is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the Earth warmer than it would
otherwise be.
emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric
concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, the chlorofluorocarbons and
nirrous oxide. These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an
additional warming of the Earth's surface. The main greenhouse gas, water vapour, will
increase in response to global warming and further enhance it.
We calculate with confidence that:
some gases are potentially more effective than others at changing climate, and their relative
effectiveness can be estimated. Carbon dioxide has been responsible for over half the
enhanced greenhouse effect in the past, and is likely to remain so in the future.
atmospheric concentrations of the long-lived gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and the
CFCs) adjust only slowly to changes in emissions. Continued emissions of these gases at
present rates would commit us to increased concentrations for decades to centuries. The longer
emissions continue to increase at present day rates, the greater reductions would have to be for
concentrations to stabilise at a given level.
the long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from human activities
of over 60% to stabilise their concentrations at today's levels; methane would require a 15-20%
reduction.
1
NOI
Based on current model results, we predict:
under the IPCC Business-as-Usual (Scenario A) emissions of greenhouse gases, a rate of
increase of global mean temperature during the next century of about 0.3°C per decade (with
an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0.5°C per decade); this is greater than that seen over the past
10,000 years. This will result in a likely increase in global mean temperature of about 1°C
above the present value by 2025 and 3°C before the end of the next century. The rise will not
be steady because of the influence of other factors.
under the other IPCC emission scenarios which assume progressively increasing levels of
controls, rates of increase in global mean temperature of about 0.2°C per decade (scenario B),
just above 0.1°C per decade (scenario C) and about 0.1°C per decade (scenario D).
that land surfaces warm more rapidly than the ocean, and high northern latitudes warm more
than the global mean in winter.
regional climate changes different from the global mean, although our confidence in the
prediction of the detail of regional changes is low. For example, temperature increases in
Southern Europe and central North America are predicted to be higher than the global mean,
accompanied on average by reduced summer precipitation and soil moisture. There are less
consistent predictions for the tropics and the southern hemisphere.
under the IPCC Business as Usual emissions scenario, an average rate of global mean sea
level rise of about 6cm per decade over the next century (with an uncertainty range of 3- - 10 cm
per decade), mainly due to thermal expansion of the oceans and the melting of some land ice.
This amounts to a rise of about 20cm in global mean sea level by 2030, and 65cm by the end of
the next century. There will be significant regional variations.
There are many uncertainties in our predictions particularly with regard to the
timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate change:
sources and sinks of greenhouse gases. which affect predictions of future
concentrations
clouds, which strongly influence the magnitude of climate change
oceans, which influence the timing and patterns of climate change
polar ice sheets which affect predictions of sea level rise
These processes are already partially understood, and we are confident that the uncertainties
can be reduced by further research. However, the complexity of the system means that we
cannot rule out surprises.
ham SIDH USUN FROM
15:48
06.
2
NNI
Our judgement is that:
Global - mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last 100
years, with the five global-average warmest years being in the 1980s. Over the same period
global sea level has increased by 10-20cm. These increases have not been smooth with time,
nor uniform over the globe.
The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but it is
also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. Thus the observed increase could be
largely due to this natural variability; alternatively this variability and other human factors could
have offset a still larger human-induced greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the
enhanced greenhouse effect from observations is not likely for a decade or more.
There is no firm evidence that climate has become more variable over the last few decades.
However, with an increase in the mean temperature, episodes of high temperatures will most
likely become more frequent in the future. and cold episodes less frequent.
Ecosystems affect climate, and will be affected by a changing climate and by increasing
carbon dioxide concentrations. Rapid changes in climate will change the composition of
ecosystems; some systems will benefit while others will be unable to migrate or adapt fast
enough and may become extinct. Enhanced levels of carbon dioxide may increase productivity
and efficiency of water use of vegetation. The effect of warming on biological processes,
although poorly understood, may increase the atmospheric concentrations of natural
greenhouse gases.
"To improve our predictive capability, we need:
to understand better the various climate-related processes, particularly those
associated with clouds, oceans and the carbon cycle
to improve the systematic observation of climate-related variables on a global basis,
and further investigate changes which took place in the past
to develop improved models of the earth's climate system.
to increase support for national and international research activities, especially in
developing countries
to facilitate international exchange of climate data
3
FROM NASA HQTS WDC
15:48
06.
2
NNI
Assessment outline.
The Scientific Assessment of Climate Change has eleven sections and an annex.
Section 1.
Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols
Lead Authors:
Watson (USA), Siegenthaler (Switzerland), Oeschger
(Switzerland), and Rodhe (Sweden).
Section 2.
Relative Importance of Climate Forcing Agencies
Lead Authors:
Shine (UK), Morcrette (France), Derwent (UK), and Wuebbles
(USA).
Section 3.
Processes and Modelling
Lead Authors:
Cubasch (FRG) and Cess (USA).
Section 4.
Validation of Climate Models
Lead Authors:
Gates (USA), Rowntree (UK), and Zeng (PRC).
Section 5.
Equilibrium Climate Change
Lead Authors:
Mitchell (UK), Tokioka (Japan), Manabe (USA), and Meleshko
(USSR).
Section 6.
Time-Dependent Greenhouse-Gas-induced Climate
Change
Lead Authors:
Bretherton (USA). Bryan (USA) and Woods (UK).
Section 7.
Observed Climate Variations and Change
Lead Authors:
Folland (USA). Karl (USA), and Vinnikov (USSR).
Section 8.
Detection of the Greenhouse Effect in the Observations
Lead Authors:
Wigley (UK) and Barnett USA).
Section 9.
Sea Level Rise
Lead Authors:
Warrick (UK) and Oerlemans (Netherlands).
Section 10.
Effects on Ecosystems
Lead Authors:
Mellilo (USA), Salari (Brazil), Sinha (India), and Woodward (UK).
Section 11.
Narrowing the Uncertainties
Lead Authors:
McBean (Canada) and McCarthy (USA)
010/500'3988
can SIOH USUN FROM 90:51 06. 2 NNI
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED BERNTHAL
CHRIS DAWSON
THERESA GORMAN
BOB GRADY
BOYDEN GRAY
HENSON MOORE
BILL REILLY
DICK SCHMALENSEE
FROM:
ALLAN BROMLEY
STEPHEN DANZANSKY
SUBJECT:
Meeting of Global Change Strategy Task Force
The Global Change Strategy Task Force will meet Tuesday, May 22
at 4:30 p.m. in Room 340 of the Old Executive Office Building.
An agenda is attached.
Our work will focus principally on the upcoming meetings of the
IPCC working groups, which begin with Working Group 1 (Science)
this week. Each working group is preparing a policymakers
summary, which will in turn be incorporated into the summary
document to be discussed at the next IPCC plenary meeting in
August. Attached you will find the summary of Working Group 3 on
Response Strategies, which is chaired by the U.S. The summary
was the subject of a meeting of the Working Group on Climate at
the State Department last Friday, and we should have available
for tomorrow's meeting a compilation of the preliminary comments
of the various agencies. Please review the summary and provide
any comments at tomorrow's meeting.
Also attached you will find a statement of the U.S. Policy
Overview on Global Change. It was prepared by the State
Department in anticipation of the White House Conference on
Science and Economics Research Related to Global Change, based on
prior statements of U.S. policy, but was not subjected to
interagency or White House Review at that time. It has
subsequently been revised slightly. This document was also the
subject of review by the Working Group on Climate, and we should
have a compilation of comments on it available tomorrow also.
Although this document will not be discussed at the Response
Strategies Working Group meeting in Geneva which begins June 4,
it will be helpful to have it as support for the positions of the
U.S. delegation.
Please call Marcy Anderson at 6630 to advise of your attendance
at tomorrow's meeting.
GLOBAL CHANGE STRATEGY TASK FORCE
AGENDA
May 22, 1990
I.
Status of IPCC Working Groups and Process Overview
II.
Negotiation of Global Climate Change Convention -
Comprehensive Approach on Greenhouse Gases,
Timing, Chairman and Level of Participation
III.
Review of Statement of U.S. Global Climate Change
Policy
IV.
Review of Response Strategies Working Group
Policymakers Summary
V.
Future of IPCC and Response Strategies Working
Group
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 2, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE GLOBAL CHANGE STRATEGY TASK FORCE
FROM:
D. ALLAN BROMLEY Kyfo
SUBJECT:
GLOBAL CHANGE STRATEGY TASK FORCE MEETING
The Global Change Strategy Task Force will meet October 3, 1990,
at 10:00am in room 22 of the Old Executive Office Building.
The Department of State will present a debriefing on the
preparatory meetings for the Framework Convention and the Second
World Climate Conference. Alternative strategies and approaches
to these meetings may be presented. In addition, we will receive
an update on the status of activities of the Comprehensive/
Incentives Approach Task Force by Richard Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division.
Attached, for informational purposes only, is a copy of their
draft report, entitled "Interim Report: Research and Analysis to
Support the Comprehensive and Incentive Approaches." An outline
of the report was sent out earlier, under separate cover.
365 mc/cm3
It
teem 3 hrour 1300 cubic m3
25 sem
G.D,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
AGENDA
GLOBAL CHANGE STRATEGY TASK FORCE MEETING
October 3, 1990
1. Debriefing on Framework Convention
2. Debriefing on Second World Climate Conference
3. Report from Task Force on Comprehensive/Incentives
Approach
4. Other business
10/2/90
REVIEW DRAFT
Do not quote,
cite or
distribute
Task Force on Comprehensive and Incentives Approaches to Climate
Interim Report:
Research and Analysis to Support the
Comprehensive and Incentives Approaches
October 2, 1990
Introduction
This Administration has developed new approaches to the
design of potential climate change policy, the "comprehensive"
and "economic incentives"¹ approaches. The United States first
clearly presented these approaches to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) by letter in December 1989. They were
presented more fully through an "Informal Seminar" for the IPCC
Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG) officers in February
1990, accompanied by a booklet of Discussion Papers that have
since been widely distributed. The new approaches have been
reflected in U.S. positions in the IPCC and now in the IPCC
report itself, and in several speeches, including the President's
April 18 closing remarks to the White House Conference on Science
and Economics Research relating to Global Change, and his July 11
news conference following the Houston Economic Summit meeting.
The discussion to date has largely been of a conceptual
nature. Work must now be done on the practical workings of these
approaches, and to the research and analysis that would be needed
to assess their utility and to support their implementation.
This Task Force was organized in May 1990 to specify, encourage,
and coordinate this work. The Task Force is an interagency
effort chaired by DOJ and involving representatives of numerous
agencies, including CEA, CEES, CEQ, DOC/NOAA, DOE, DOI, DOJ, EPA,
NASA, NSF, OPD, OSTP, State, USDA, USTR, Treasury, and WH
Counsel. This "Interim Report" is provided to identify the
research and analysis needed, the current Administration efforts
¹The "economic incentives" approach was originally focused
on emissions trading, but has since been broadened to encompass
other market-based economic instruments, including emissions taxes.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 2 *
in that direction, and the further work required. Work is needed
in several scientific, economic and institutional research areas
that bear on or underlie these approaches, including efforts to
quantify sources and sinks of multiple greenhouse gases and fill
gaps in information on those sources and sinks, to quantify the
relative environmental impacts of these gases, to compare the
cost-effectiveness of these approaches and their alternatives,
and to develop institutional arrangements that could translate
these approaches from concept to practicality. In light of the
plethora of upcoming discussions, workshops, conferences,
international meetings, ministerial conferences and full
negotiations -- including the first session of negotiations on a
framework convention on climate change, to be hosted by the
United States in February 1991 -- prompt attention to these
topics is needed to prepare U.S. representatives for effective
participation and to assess choices the U.S. may need to make in
responding to others' proposals or putting forward its own.
Policy context
These approaches address the "how to" question -- how
to design any policy that might be adopted to respond to
potential climate change. Their principal aim is to improve the
framework of policy analysis and the cost-effectiveness of any
proposed policy choice. They do not address the larger cost-
benefit question of "how much" policy action should be taken --
what level of social investment, if any, is warranted by risks of
potential climate change. The work of this task force does not
imply that a choice has been made to implement some policy
action.
Furthermore, the "comprehensive" and "economic
incentives" concepts are "approaches" or heuristics that offer
insight into any discussion of response strategies for potential
climate change. The utility of these approaches is not limited
to the design of emissions limitation policies. Whether the
strategy is pursuing scientific research, promoting new
technology, enumerating the measures justified on other grounds
that also have potential climate benefits, 2 or designing actual
2 The major uncertainties surrounding potential climate
change, potential response strategies, and the costs and benefits
of both, have suggested a strategy of pursuing those policies
which are justified on other (non-climate) grounds yet which also
help to address potential climate change. More precisely, these
are climate-relevant policies pursued in the face of
uncertainties about predicted climate change which are so great
that the present expected loss due to climate change (and thus
the expected climate-related benefits of the policy) cannot
(continued )
* REVIEW DRAFT page 3 *
emissions limitations policies (whether domestic or
international), these approaches suggest the desirable breadth,
emphasis and direction of the strategy. The "comprehensive" and
"economic incentives" approaches to potential climate change
policy were originally developed in response to the piecemeal
(C02-focused), command-and-control regulatory approach then
dominating the discussion in the IPCC, but the approaches apply
to the full array of policy types and options. And they apply to
domestic as well as international discussions.
For example, a nation following the strategy of
enumerating climate-relavent measures justified on other grounds
could use the comprehensive approach to calculate the aggregate
impact on net greenhouse gas emissions made by its various
measures. A framework convention on climate change could take a
comprehensive approach to the cooperative scientific and economic
research to which the parties commit, including the development
of international monitoring networks, as well as to any national
emissions reporting, or to credit to be given under any future
obligation for nations' current voluntary emissions-limiting
activities. An economic incentives approach could be applied to
adaptation measures desirable in long-range investments, such as
coastal construction or water use planning.
Summary of the Approaches
The two approaches are compatible, but need not be
employed together. Both approaches offer the possibility of
designing environmental policies that achieve goals at lower cost
and that highten the possibility for diverse, innovative,
flexible, and cost-effective responses.
Comprehensive approach. The "comprehensive" approach
seeks to address all the important contributors to potential
climate change, in contrast to a piecemeal focus on CO2 from the
energy sector. It therefore addresses all radiatively active
trace gases (RATGs), primarily consisting of the greenhouse gases
(GHGs), and their sources and sinks. GHGs include carbon dioxide
(C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), halocarbons such as
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related substances (HCFCs, HFCs),
2 ( continued)
confidently be said to exceed a de minimis level. Examples
include emissions-limiting or adaptive steps taken for non-
climate reasons, such as phasing out CFCs, afforestation,
improving energy efficiency, and developing more drought-
resistant strains of crops. Other examples could include
reducing landfill emissions of NMHCs and CH4, reducing auto
emissions of CO and NOx, and encouraging coastal development to
account for current subsidence trends.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 4 *
and tropospheric ozone (03), whose precursors include oxides of
nitrogen (NOX), non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHCs) (also referred
to as "volatile organic compounds," VOCS), and carbon monoxide
(CO) 3 Different RATGs arise from different sources and are
removed from the atmosphere by different sinks, yielding a "net
emissions" budget. Different RATGs have different impacts on the
environment; for example, each gas has a different ability to
trap certain radiated energy ("radiative forcing") or to reflect
it. In order to relate the comparative environmental impacts of
the various RATGs, the comprehensive approach employs a parameter
or "index" that calculates the relative contribution of
increments of each gas to physical effects, such as radiative
forcing, used as proxies for global externalities. The
comprehensive approach thereby avoids ignoring the important
gases that would be omitted from a CO2-only approach, and avoids
ignoring important sources and sinks that would be omitted from
an energy-only approach.
As a means of developing an agenda for science and
economics research, such as research on the likelihood or impacts
of potential climate change, the comprehensive approach suggests
the scope of the research agenda: the range of relevant inquiry,
the gases and sectors relevant as inputs to economic models of
RATG emissions, and the relative environmental externalities
(both negative and positive) related to emissions of each gas.
As an approach to technology development, the
comprehensive approach assists in identifying and comparing the
relative importance of technologies and practices affecting
potential climate outcomes.
As a means of enumerating climate-relevant measures
justified on other grounds, the comprehensive approach provides a
metric for identifying and assessing the policy actions that are
relavent in the climate context. It could form the basis for
calculating the aggregate impact of various such measures on a
nation's net RATG emissions.
As an approach to emissions limitation rules or
obligations, the comprehensive approach provides an
environmentally coherent and least-cost design for limitations
policy. A piecemeal approach, focused on one gas (e.g. CO2) or
one sector (e.g. energy), would omit salient RATGs, sources and
³other RATGs affect the radiative balance of the atmosphere,
but unlike GHGs, their main influence is not through absorption
of energy reradiated from the Earth's surface. Aerosol
particulates such as sulfur dioxide (S02), which generally
reflect insolation and thus may exert a net cooling influence,
are RATGs but not GHGs. A fully comprehensive approach would
encompass all such RATGs.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 5 *
sinks. By aiming narrowly, it could very well induce unintended
shifts of economic activities to unregulated modes that offset or
even increase emissions of RATGs, much as focusing on air
emissions alone can shift pollutants to toxic solid sludge
discharges. For example, focusing on CO2 alone could induce
fuel-switching from high-CO2 coal to lower-C02 natural gas,
meanwhile leading to increased emissions of CH4 from natural gas
transmission leaks. The comprehensive approach cures these
defects of a piecemeal approach. It also allows the flexibility
to choose the least-cost mix of policy options yielding the
desired overall RATG limitation. And, by addressing "net
emissions, it encourages sink enhancement such as through
afforestation or safeguards against pollution of oceanic
phytoplankton. The comprehensive approach can be applied to a
variety of emissions limitation measures, 4 including emissions
taxes and emissions trading, and including both domestic and
international measures. If applied internationally, it has the
additional benefit of affording each nation the flexibility and
discretion to decide the mix of domestic policies regarding the
array of gases, sources and sinks that that nation determines
would best accomplish policy goals in light of its unique social,
economic, cultural and institutional circumstances.
Economic incentives approach. The "economic
incentives" approach similarly applies to a variety of policy
options. In the emissions limitation area, it encompasses the
panoply of market-based economic instruments, including emissions
trading and emissions taxes, imposed to force internalization of
the external environmental costs accompanying emissions. It
includes the use of incentives to promote innovation in
technologies and practices, and addresses adaptation as well as
emissions limitation. These incentives could be applied
domestically or internationally.
As one example, application of emissions trading to
emissions limitation obligations would allow those emitting a
substance to achieve compliance with limits on such emissions by
voluntary agreements to reallocate emissions among individual
emitters so long as the aggregate output did not exceed their
overall limit. Thus, reductions would be obtained most at those
places where reductions cost least. This could be accomplished
by authorizing informal reallocations among emitters, or by
formally issuing "allowances" and then authorizing a market in
⁴In light of the relative weighting of the various RATGs
according to their environmental externalities and the
flexibility afforded to choose a least-cost mix of measures, it
is possible that the comprehensive approach could achieve an
aggregate net RATG emissions limit by restricting emissions of
some gases while allowing emissions of other gas (es) to rise.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 6 *
the allowances. Experience with emissions trading in the U.S.
indicates that it can achieve environmental quality goals at
substantially lower cost, and therefore could be of use to
nations domestically as they implement any limits on greenhouse
gases. Several U.S. applications of emissions trading have been
highly successful, such as the phasedown of lead in gasoline;
some others have been instructive of the limits of emissions
trading, especially when it is applied in the context of other
regulatory restrictions on emitters. Allowing emissions trading
among nations -- probably initially as informal reallocations
accomplished through bilateral national accords -- could
similarly be advantageous in the context of any international
efforts to develop new technologies or limit emissions.
Emissions taxes would in theory also produce least-
cost results. In general, while emissions trading provides more
certainty about the quantity of emissions limitation achieved,
emissions taxes provide more certainty about the cost imposed on
emitters. Domestic use of emissions taxes could be apt where
certainty as to cost is more important, or where revenue raising
is an important goal. Imposition of international emissions
taxes could raise additional institutional, political and
sovereignty concerns -- such as whether nations would cede their
sovereignty to an international tax authority, how the tax would
be set, how it would be made equivalent across economies, and how
the potentially enormous revenues raised would be allotted and
expended -- that would probably not attend informal bilateral
international emissions trading or domestic taxes.
As another example, market mechanisms could be used to
encourage efficient adaptation practices. Long-range
investments, such as coastal construction or water use planning,
might, because of market failures or other institutional
failures, be undertaken without giving appropriate weight to any
climate change risks (e.g. rising sea levels or shifting
precipitation). Such failures might be addressed by
informational or incentive-based policies, such as by requiring
coastal construction to purchase subsidence insurance, or by
fostering a market in water resources that provides incentives
for efficient use and long-range risk management.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 7 *
Research and Analyses
The remainder of this Interim Report describes the
research and analysis tasks needed to develop and support the
comprehensive and incentives approaches. Our interagency task
force has endeavored to identify all of the current agency
activities related to each task, although we expect to learn of
additional activities as this report is shortly completed.
A companion report being prepared jointly by the CEES'
two working groups, Global Change and Mitigation & Adaptation
Research Strategies, titled "Research in Support of a
Comprehensive Approach to Trace Gas Emissions" (draft 10
September 1990), provides substantial additional detail on the
ongoing scientific research relavent to these approaches and the
research needed in the future.
Priorities and Timelines
For each task described below, our interagency task
force has suggested a priority value and a timeline on which work
could and should be completed to be most useful. The suggested
relative priority is identified for each task as "high,' or
"medium," with the understanding that this list is itself a
capsule summary of the highest priority items and does not
mention numerous tasks judged to be somewhat relevant but not
warranting inclusion here.
A time horizon of 3 months, 18 months, or 5 years is
typically suggested for each task. 5 The timeline developed is a
combination of the practical pace of research, which suggested a
breakdown of tasks into very short-term (3 months), near-term (18
months), or longer-term (5 years) horizons for each task; and the
pace of international discussions, which suggested milestones at
January 1991, the eve of the first negotiating session on a
framework convention (3 to 4 months), June 1992, the target
signing date for the convention (roughly 20 months), or 1995, the
tentative time for the next full IPCC report (5 years).
The priorities and timelines suggested for each task
are suggestions, and we anticipate further discussion and
revision on these points.
5 For certain tasks the timeline is different due to
particular scheduling dates; for example, the Second World
Climate Conference will be held at the end of this month.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 8 *
Research and Analysis Underlying the Comprehensive Approach
I. Measuring and Monitoring Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
concentrations
Any environmental impacts resulting from GHGs would be
associated with changing actual concentrations in the atmosphere,
not emissions per se. The comprehensive approach underscores the
necessity of gathering data on atmospheric concentrations of all
relevant GHGs. Over the last decade much work along these lines
has already been undertaken or accelerated, including (i) direct
measurement through ground station, aerial, and satellite
observation of atmospheric (tropospheric and stratospheric)
concentrations of several trace gases (chiefly CO2, CH4, N20, 03,
and CFCs), and (ii) sample records of past climate change found
in ice cores, tree rings, and other sites. Measuring and
monitoring past, current and future concentrations, temporal and
spatial (e.g. vertical) distributions, chemistry, removal, and
other dynamics of GHGs will remain an essential function under a
comprehensive approach.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Under the U.S. Global Change Research Program,
several CEES agencies are conducting relevant research.
For example, DOE, NASA, NOAA and NSF are conducting or
will soon conduct direct measurement of atmospheric
concentrations and distributions of CO2, CH4, N20,
tropospheric 03, CFCs, CO, NOx and NMHCs. NASA, NSF
and DOI are studying sample records of CO2 and CH4 in
ice cores and tree rings. NASA and NOAA conduct direct
observations of stratospheric 03 and related
substances. EPA monitors ambient concentrations of
NOx, 03, NMHCs, S02, and CO. Internationally, the
United States participates in the work of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the World Climate
Program (WCP), the International Geosphere-Biosphere
Program (IGBP), and many other monitoring efforts.
-- Future work:
- Ensure coverage of all relevant RATGs. Priority:
high. Timeline: continuous.
- Advance the comprehensive approach in any framework
convention on climate change. The science research
section of the convention must address all the relevant
RATGs. It should build networks of cooperative
monitoring among nations. Priority: high. Timeline: 3
months to 18 months.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 9 *
- Advance the comprehensive approach in the Second
World Climate Conference. Priority: high. Timeline: 1
month and thereafter.
- Advance the comprehensive approach in the World
Climate Program. Priority: high. Timeline: 1 month
and thereafter.
- Ensure coverage of relevant temporal and spatial
distributions.
- Advance understanding of chemical interactions among
trace gases.
- Advance understanding of quantitative link between
trace gases and radiative forcing.
II. Impacts of RATGs: Comparative Indices
Changing concentrations of RATGs in the atmosphere are of
interest because those gases may yield environmental impacts on
societies and ecosystems. Different substances in the atmosphere
have different environmental impacts; it goes almost without
saying that the environmental impacts of atmospheric oxygen,
water vapor, and CO2 are quite varied, and are believed to be
fundamental to the present habitability of the planet.
Incremental changes in concentrations of trace gases such as GHGs
will similarly have various impacts depending on the particular
gas at issue.
(A) Radiative forcing index
In the climate change context, the principal impact of RATGs
under study has been radiative forcing. Radiative forcing is not
the ultimate environmental impact of actual concern to societies
and ecosystems; it is rather an intermediate physical effect that
serves as a useful proxy or metric for assessing the impacts of
different RATGs on the potential for warming-induced climate
change, including atmospheric temperature change, changing
precipitation, changing soil moisture, sea level rise, and
temporal and regional variations, all of which in turn could
affect biological and other systems. Molecules of different
RATGs have different radiative forcing properties, and estimates
of the relative radiative forcing of incremental amounts of GHGs
can provide a common scale along which to compare the gases. A
comparative parameter of relative radiative forcing, sometimes
called a "global warming potential" (GWP) index or an index of
"CO2 equivalence," has been developed by several scientists. The
index incorporates the instantaneous radiative forcing of each
type of molecule, its dissipation function and hence its typical
residence time in the atmosphere, and the discount rate applied
* REVIEW DRAFT page 10 *
or the time horizon over which the forcing function is
integrated.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Considerable work has been done on the relative
radiative forcing of many RATGs. Estimates of
instantaneous radiative forcing, derived from
laboratory tests of molecular properties, are well
established, as are residence times for several RATGs.
Work in this area has been done by NASA, NOAA,
NSF, EPA, and DOE, and has been reviewed and reported
by IPCC WG I.
-- Overview of needed work:
Priority: In general, this task is extremely urgent,
as it constitutes the technical focal point of the
comprehensive approach.
Timeline: Current work on relative radiative forcing
is very active; the science is maturing; and robust,
reliable, consensus estimates will likely be ready in
the near term (6 to 18 months), though with continued
uncertainties on specific aspects.
-- Future work:
- Convene international workshop (s) to discuss current
work and needed improvements, to build understanding
among diverse and representative experts, and to
encourage multidisciplinary efforts. EPA, NOAA and
NASA are jointly planning to host such a conference in
November 1990. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Harmonize various quantitative approaches and extend
international understanding of indices. Priority:
high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- Improve accuracy of dissipation functions and hence
of estimated residence times of RATGs. Scientific
uncertainties in the current estimates remain
surrounding the residence time of CO2, due to
complications in the carbon cycle and uncertainties in
CO2 sink removal processes. Atmospheric chemical
reactions involving other gases, such as CH4 and
precursors to tropospheric 03, complicate estimates of
their residence times. Recent work at NOAA is
substantially improving estimates of the dissipation
rate and residence time of CH4. As work is ongoing,
uncertainties in best estimates can be expressed and
revised. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months to 5
years, varying by gas.
- Incorporate indirect effects attributable to various
gases' atmospheric reactions. Certain trace gases
react to form other radiatively important trace gases,
* REVIEW DRAFT page 11 *
or react with substances that would otherwise affect
RATG abundances. Much of this work has already been
conducted, hence: Priority: medium. Timeline: 18
months to 5 years, depending on gas.
- Take account of "saturation" effects. Radiative
forcing by each RATG occurs within a different segment
of the electromagnetic spectrum; as that segment or
"band" becomes occluded, additional increments of the
gas have diminishing marginal radiative forcing
impacts. Radiative forcing estimates thus depend on,
and need to be expressed in terms of, projected
concentrations of relevant RATGs. Much of this
information is already available and needs to be
incorporated into expressed estimates. Priority:
medium to high, depending on significiance of the
effect for each gas. Timeline: 18 months.
- Take account of the implications that vertical and
other distribution of RATGs in the atmosphere may have
for calculated index values. This factor is quite
important for 03 and its determinants -- CH4, CO, NOx,
NMHCs. Priority: high for relavent gases. Timeline:
18 months.
- Improve use of discount rates/time horizons. IPCC
WGI expresses GWPs in three selected time horizons;
analysis is needed of which of these three horizons, or
which other horizon, is appropriate for policymaking.
More broadly, better understanding is needed of the
scientific and economic basis for choosing different
discount rates. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18
months.
- The indices calulated to date have often focused on
GHGs and omitted other RATGs. Assess implications of
including other relevant substances, such as
anthropogenic aerosol particulates (e.g. S02), in the
index. Priority: medium. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- Develop institutional mechanisms for adopting a
consensus index and adjusting it to new research
results. Because uncertainties remain in certain
aspects of the index, index values may change as new
scientific information is discovered. If an
internationally agreed index is used as a tool for
design of national policy portfolios to limit net
index-weighted RATG emissions, changes in the index
values could mean changes in the costs to each nation
of its policy package. Mechanisms should be developed
for giving advance indication of index uncertainties
and likely changes in the index, incorporating new
scientific information, and smoothing transitions to
new index values. Such mechanisms could include
objective science panels and periodic reassessments.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 12 *
(B) Global change index
As indicated above, radiative forcing is only an
intermediate physical effect of trace gases, and is really a
proxy used as a common metric to compare diverse RATGs. 6 But
RATGs have multiple attributes; they yield other, non-warming
environmental impacts of global and local significance which may
be more important (in magnitude, timing, or other features) than
their contributions to radiative forcing. For example, CO, NOx,
urban 03, and SO2 are reactive and/or toxic; CFCs and related
substances deplete the stratospheric ozone layer; higher CO2
concentrations increase plant photosynthesis and increase plants'
water use efficiency. Optimal policy choices would entail
developing a comparative index that incorporates the full
externalities (social and ecological costs) imposed by increments
of each RATG. Without such a "complete" index, a simple
radiative forcing index could provide signals or incentives that
yield desirable changes in aggregate radiative forcing but
undesirable changes in other impacts; in other words, significant
externalities will remain uninternalized.
7
At the same time, a fully "complete" index poses quite
difficult analytic and technical problems. Data are not adequate
on important aspects of the magnitude and variations of the
diverese impacts; for example, data are lacking on the effects of
ozone depletion on UV-B irradiance, and on the effects of changes
in UV-B irradiance on biota. Comparing the dissimilar warming
and non-warming impacts on a common scale, something like
comparing apples and oranges, is a challenge requiring serious
analytic efforts.
A somewhat more realistically achievable index would
incorporate only the key "global change" attributes of each RATG,
namely their radiative forcing and the other salient non-warming
global impacts of GHGs, such as the direct effects of CO2 on
vegetation and the ozone depletion impacts associated with CFCs
and other halocarbons. Essentially local attributes of the
⁶Measurement of the ultimate impacts of warming itself on
biological and other systems, though critical for assessing the
costs and benefits of climate change, are not incorporated into
the radiative forcing index because such impacts stem from
warming generically, and do not vary depending on the type of gas
enhancing the warming.
⁷It is worth noting that, in contrast to the warming-
specific term GWP, the phrase "CO2 equivalence," though
unfortunate for its focus of attention on CO2, does offer the
opportunity to introduce non-warming effects into the generic
concept of "equivalence."
* REVIEW DRAFT page 13 *
gases, such as their toxicity, would be left to local policy
strategies. This "global change" index would capture the main
global externalities associated with the gases, providing
significantly more optimal policy signals than an index limited
to radiative forcing. It would nonetheless require effort and
time to construct.
The desirability of a "global change" index faces a dilemma:
pushing too hard for a more complete index could undercut the
legitimacy of the radiative forcing index, leading to the
latter's disparagement or rejection by other nations, or perhaps
to the view that one must wait years for a more complete index.
This in turn could encourage the reinvigoration of gas-by-gas
policy proposals. A two-pronged effort is therefore needed, to
build, improve and promote the radiative forcing index, and at
the same time to work on a global change index without
undercutting the radiative forcing index.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Conceptual thinking about design of a global change
index. (DOJ, USDA)
- Efforts to quantify direct environmental impacts of
CO2 enrichment, chiefly its impacts on agricultural and
forestry output, and on water resources. (DOE, USDA,
DOI, EPA, NSF). These efforts are high priority in any
event.
- Efforts to quantify environmental impacts of
stratospheric ozone depletion and resultant UV-B
irradiance due to halocarbon emissions, such as impacts
on agriculture, phytoplankton, and cancers. (USDA,
EPA). These efforts are high priority in any event.
-- Future work:
- Address technical and analytic issues in a global
change index. Whereas the common proxy or metric used
in current indices is radiative forcing, a global
change index would require a common metric among the
various warming and non-warming impacts. It would also
require application of discount rates because different
impacts may occur at different times; for example, CO2
enrichment will likely occur much sooner than any
observed warming due to CO2. (DOJ, USDA, DOI).
Priority: medium. Timeline: 18 months.
- Undertake preliminary design and rough quantitative
estimate of a global change index, in order to assess
the difference between the relative RATG values
obtained in a global change index versus a radiative
forcing index. This effort would also indicate whether
a global change index is sufficiently different to be
worth developing. Priority: medium. Timeline: 3 to 18
months.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 14 *
- Improve understanding of direct environmental impacts
of CO2 enrichment, including the impact of CO2 in
concert with changes in other environmental variables
such as temperature, moisture, and other pollutants.
(DOE, USDA, DOI, EPA, NSF). Priority: high. Timeline:
- Improve understanding of impacts of ozone depletion,
including measuring UV-B irradiance and assessing
impacts of UV-B radiation on biological systems.
(USDA, EPA). Priority: high. Timeline:
III. Measuring and Monitoring net GHG emissions
Assessment of current and future net emissions is critical
to the task of predicting the contribution of net emissions to
atmospheric concentrations and hence to forecasting potential
climate change, regardless of whether any emissions limitations
are ever adopted.
The comprehensive approach emphasizes attention to all
RATGs, sources and sinks. Baseline data on all of these is not
always currently available. In addition, much of the data that
are available derives from estimates using data on inputs (e.g.
fuel quantities) and knowledge of or assumptions about input-
output ratios associated with technologies or practices. Better
measurement, forecasting and actual monitoring of net RATG
emissions is suggested by, and needed to support, the
comprehensive approach.
The ability to better monitor future emissions could also be
useful in verifying the implementation of limitation actions and
in assuring others' compliance with their claims and with
international obligations. This is true of domestic limitations
rules as well as international obligations; if a domestic GHG
emissions limitation policy is to be effective and, in
particular, is to employ performance standards rather than
technology-based standards, it will require sound emissions
monitoring techniques.
(A) Measuring net GHG emissions
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Numerous agencies collect and analyze data on various
gases, sources, sinks, sectors, and industries, and
thereby measure emissions from a variety of sources
(e.g. energy utilities, mobile sources, land use,
agriculture) and uptake by a variety of sinks (e.g.
oceans, forests, soils, grasses).
- Efforts are underway to assemble "inventories" of net
* REVIEW DRAFT page 15 *
emissions of GHGs for many nations, 8 chiefly EPA's
analysis of CO2, CH4, CFCs, HCFCs, N20, CO, NOx, and
NMHCs for the US and other nations.
- Data are generally adequate on US and other
industrialized nations' emissions of GHGs from fossil
fuel combustion (generally measured by data on fuel
inputs and knowledge of typical combustion techniques),
and on world emissions of halocarbons (generally
measured by production, consumption and storage rates).
-- Future work:
- Ensure that measurement covers all relevant GHGs,
sources and sinks. Priority: high. Timeline:
continuous.
- Improve data on other nations. Data on developing
nations are particularly scant. The framework
convention could call for development of information on
all nations, including through a network of cooperative
international measuring. Priority: high. Timeline: 18
months to 5 years.
- Develop technologies for measuring net GHG emissions,
including direct observation and remote sensing.
Priority: medium. Timeline: 18 months to 5 years.
- Develop a data set of emissions/uptake factors for
current and potential technologies and practices,
covering all relevant gases, sources and sinks.
Priority: high. Timeline: 18 months.
- Develop practical proxies or surrogates, such as fuel
or fertilizer input data coupled with assumed output
rates (e.g. combustion or cultivation techniques), or
acreage or livestock data coupled with assumed output
rates, to generate emissions factors to assist in
measuring emissions. Ensure that measurement
uncertainties and assumptions, and use of
8 Efforts outside the government include: OECD project,
soliciting data from member states on all GHGs; WRI project (in
conjunction with UNEP/UNDP) on all nations' net emissions of CO2,
CH4, CFCs; Harvard Kennedy School survey of many nations'
emissions of CO2 and CFCs.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 16 *
proxies/surrogates, do not distort policy responses. 9
Priority: high. Timeline: 18 months.
- Improve understanding of the processes involved in
natural emissions and sink uptake, and how these
activities might be influenced by climate change.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months to 5 years.
- Ensure that data presentations are comprehensive,
e.g. avoid C02-only or fossil fuels-only charts in
IPCC, NES, OTA, and other reports except as adjuncts to
complete GHG presentation. Priority: high. Timeline:
continuous.
- Ensure that data presentations include the scientific
uncertainties involved. Priority: medium. Timeline:
continuous.
(B) Forecasting future net emissions
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Use of economic models to generate scenarios of
future emissions. EPA, DOE, and NSF are conducting
such work, using a variety of economic models. U.S.
agency work was reviewed and reported in the IPCC
WGI/WGIII emissions scenarios.
-- Future work:
- Current economic models tend to focus on CO2,
separate sectors, and industrialized nations. Need to
make use of new and expanded models that overhaul and
elaborate current economic models to cover multiple
RATGs, multiple sectors, and other important
improvements. Ensure that these models include GHG
sinks and other aspects of the comprehensive approach.
DOE has a three-year phased project underway to
accomplish this; EPA is working on improving its
models. Priority: high. Timeline: 18 months to 5
years.
⁹For example, measurement of CH4 emissions based on a proxy
such as total acreage of rice cultivation might imply that the
only option to reduce emissions is reduced rice cultivation,
whereas changed practices using existing or new rice strains
might accomplish the same at lower socioeconomic cost. In
general, the use of proxies should not be allowed to conceal
opportunities for changing the emissions factors or other
assumptions from which the proxies derive.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 17 *
(C) Monitoring net emissions in the future
This task is useful to test empirically the effects on RATG
net emissions of observed changes in economic activity, economic
structure, and technologies and practices. It is also useful to
evaluate accomplishment of nations' espoused policies and of any
limitation agreements reached in international accords.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Efforts to improve monitoring of non-point emissions,
including CH4 emissions from rice cultivation (EPA) and
ruminant animal husbandry (EPA) ; and GHG emissions from
biomass burning (deforestation) (EPA, NASA, USDA).
- Efforts to improve monitoring of CH4 emissions from
energy systems such as natural gas transmission and
fossil fuels extraction (DOE, EPA).
-- Future work:
- Use proxies/surrogates, developed for measurement of
net emissions (section (A) above), to monitor emissions
through monitoring of inputs, technologies and
practices. Priority: high. Timeline: 18 months.
- Expand monitoring capacity and data to cover all
relevant gases, sources, and sinks: data are especially
needed on non-point sources of CH4 and N20, e.g.
agriculture, livestock; hydroxyl chemistry and
atmospheric chemical reactions yielding tropospheric
03; non-point sources and sinks of CO2, including
oceanic biota, terrestrial biota, long-term
sequestration, plant lifecycles, grasses, soils, and
trees, extent and effects of deforestation, and sink
behavior. Priority: high. Timeline: 18 months to 5
years.
- Expand monitoring capacity and data to cover all
nations. Current data generally cover industrialized
nations. Develop an international network of
cooperrative net emissions monitoring. Priority: high.
Timeline: 18 months to 5 years, depending on gas and
sources/sinks.
- Harmonize techniques and data among nations and
analysts. For example, resolve differences among
nations monitoring deforestation (Brazil is urging that
only its satellites produce reliable estimates of
Brazilian land use). Priority: high. Timeline: 18
months to 5 years.
- Develop monitoring technologies and capabilities, as
described under (A) Measuring net GHG emissions"
(above). Priority: medium. Timeline: 18 months to 5
years.
- Identify potential international and national methods
for monitoring net GHG emissions; assess institutional,
* REVIEW DRAFT page 18 *
political, social, and economic constraints on such
monitoring, and means to overcome such constraints.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- Assess options for monitoring arrangements, including
arrangements for monitoring and reporting and their
relation to sovereignty concerns, e.g. voluntary or
mandatory national reporting; "national technical
means" of observation of other nations' activities;
remote sensing; atmospheric observations; international
oversight bodies (e.g. UNEP investigators) ; permission
for on-site inspections; bilateral trade partner review
under emissions trading; incentives and institutional
designs to encourage development and application of
accurate monitoring & reporting, for example by
assuring credit for net GHG limitation actions (e.g.
climate-relavent actions justified on other grounds)
upon a showing by the emitter of successful monitoring
practices (see section VI below) ; verification and
enforcement procedures and their rules, reporting and
enforcement procedures, burdens of proof, forum
(international or bilateral, political or scientific
adjudicators, etc.). Examine role of nongovernmental
organizations and public. Priority: high. Timeline:
18 months.
IV. Evaluating current national policies and proposals
Whether or not international agreement is reached on
response strategies to potential climate change, nations are
already announcing their intention to restrict emissions of one
or more RATGs or to expand RATG sinks. The U.S. policy of
pursuing climate-relavent measures justified on other grounds has
been articulated in qualitative form; at some point the U.S. --
or others -- may choose to present quantifications of the net
RATG effects of these U.S. measures. The comprehensive approach
provides the basis for computing the aggregate impact of such
diverse measures. In addition, it may be valuable for the U.S.
to assess the policy claims and policy proposals being made by
other nations, using the comprehensive approach, and to examine
the policy opportunities that would face other nations under a
comprehensive approach.
(A) Extent and costs of net GHG limitations achieved by
U.S. policy options within a comprehensive framework.
As described in the Introduction, it is useful to
identify actions taken for other (non-climate) reasons but
which influence net RATG emissions. One may calculate the
percent limitations or reductions achieved by these policy
actions using the comprehensive approach, and also calculate
the marginal, average, and total cost per policy action.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 19 *
This could be a first step toward assessing the marginal and
total costs of RATG avoidance from different gas/source/sink
policy options and hence toward assessing the relative cost-
effectiveness of the comprehensive versus piecemeal
approaches.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- analysis of US policies in EPA Cost
Study/"Comprehensive Budget" analysis (covering U.S.
energy efficiency and clean energy initiatives, CFC
phaseout, afforestation, landfill rules, and other
policies) through 2000. Priority: high. Timeline: 3
months.
- DOE/NES analysis of US energy policies through 2030,
including NES options, afforestation, and CFCs.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- DOC study of future emissions under different tax
options and under EC-wide strategy or global strategy.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
-- Future work:
- Improve basis for projecting emissions limitations
achieved by current policies
- Expand to cover influence of changes in agricultural
subsidies, other relevant policy measures
- Look beyond 2000.
(B) Analysis of net GHG limitations achieved by other
nations' policies
Analysis similar to that described for U.S. "no
regrets" measures above should be undertaken for the
policies announced and implemented by, proposed by, or
available to, foreign nations. Certain nations have
suggested unilateral limits on CO2 emissions (e.g. Sweden,
possibly Japan), on nuclear power (Sweden, GDR), on S02,
NOx, and NMHCs (U.S.) ; and others have announced willingness
to enact CO2 limits if others do too (e.g. U.K.,
Netherlands), and others have endorsed the Noordwijk
Declaration's suggestion of CO2 emissions stabilization by
industrialized countries by 2000.
-- Current work:
- Obtain information on each nation's policies.
-- Future work:
- Using a comprehensive approach, calculate the value
of current policies in place in nations abroad, as
* REVIEW DRAFT page 20 *
described above for U.S. actions. 10 Assess how other
nations would fare under a comprehensive approach.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Include consideration of foreign nations'
agricultural subsidies and other relevant policies
regarding non-point sources. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
- Expand to cover developing nations. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
- Using a comprehensive approach, calculate the
influence each foreign proposal would have on net RATG
emissions and GHG concentrations. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
- Include modeling of international energy markets and
effect of price responses to unilateral demand
reductions. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
V.
Evaluating the comparative cost-effectiveness of piecemeal,
partial, and comprehensive approaches.
Advocacy of the comprehensive approach is based in part on
the intuitively strong hypothesis that the marginal costs of
control vary across gases, sources, sinks, and nations, so that
for any assumed limitation obligation, 11 each nation's least-cost
mix of limitation strategies would be different and all nations,
regardless of their current RATG inventories, would be better off
under a comprehensive approach than under an approach which
placed separate limitation obligations on each gas or sector. 12
10 Special attention may be due the range of CFC-substitutes
to be used by each nation. Japan, for example, is apparently
presenting figures that show larger reductions in radiative
forcing from phasing out unit amounts of CFCs than is the U.S.,
suggesting that Japan may be counting on selecting CFC-
substitutes with lower GWPs than those to be used in the U.S.
This also suggests that the Montreal Protocol, although
potentially helpful as a no regrets measure, may not by itself be
sufficient to address climate concerns associated with ozone-
depleting substances.
¹¹As stated in the Introduction, given an assumed objective,
the task is to assess the comparative costs of achieving it under
different policy designs. This task does not assess the overall
rationality or economic efficiency of the chosen objective.
12 The aggregate shares calculated in the inventories (in
Part III (B), above) do not indicate the costs of incremental
limitations for each nation. Simply because a nation currently
has a large share in methane, for example, does not mean that
(continued )
* REVIEW DRAFT page 21 *
This task is needed to test that hypothesis and, if
confirmed, to demonstrate the value of the comprehensive
approach.
(A) Marginal costs: information and analyses needed to map
full comparative cost-effectiveness functions and
variations by gas, source, sink, sector, nation.
This task moves beyond analyses of specific existing
policy programs and evaluates the full marginal cost
functions facing policy makers and private actors.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- DOE/NES analysis for US energy sector policies and
afforestation
-- Future work:
- Expand to cover all relevant gases, sources, sinks,
sectors. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Expand to cover other nations. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
- Assess full social costs, using general equilibrium
model rather than expenditures by the regulated
industry. 13 Make use of forthcoming models. Analyze
costs over time, relation to innovation. 14 Priority:
high. Timeline: 18 months.
- Include (qualitative) evaluation of non-economic
costs to response options, e.g. cultural or
institutional barriers to certain policies. Priority:
medium. Timeline: 18 months.
- Assess informational, administrative, and other
transactions costs of piecemeal, partial and
12 ( continued)
that nation would find methane reductions costlier than CO2
reductions, at the margin. Economic analysis is needed to test
the hypothesis of varying costs and to demonstrate the benefits
to every nation of being afforded the cross-gas, cross-sector,
and source-sink flexibility of the comprehensive approach.
13 The comparative impacts on macroeconomic and international
variables (e.g. trade, competitiveness, economic growth) would
require separate study.
14 Evaluation should also address the likely economic
impacts in the US and worldwide of potential future changes in
the understanding of the gas-comparison index, and means to
cushion adverse impacts (e.g. periodic public science reviews).
* REVIEW DRAFT page 22 *
comprehensive approaches. Priority: medium. Timeline:
18 months.
- Evaluate the benefits (effectiveness) of policies, in
terms of RATGs avoided. Priority: high. Timeline: 3
to 18 months.
(B) Use cost-effectiveness analyses to evaluate costs and
benefits to the US and other nations of possible
piecemeal, partial and comprehensive options that will
be suggested for international policy design
This task moves beyond the analysis of current policy
proposals suggested in section IV above to examine the
marginal costs of policy designs, and to consider both
proposed and hypothetical policy designs. It also focuses
on international accords rather than national actions. This
task is essential if U.S. policy makers and negotiators are
to be able to assess policy proposals that inevitably be
made as negotiations on a framework convention on climate
change unfold.
Potential policy designs to be compared include: CO2
only, all RATs, or all RATGs except those covered under the
Montreal Protocol; sources only, point sources only, all
sources and sinks, or sources and terrestrial sinks only;
all sectors, or certain sectors (e.g. energy, industry,
transport, agriculture, forestry).
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
(C) Evaluate the environmental effectiveness of
comprehensive and piecemeal approaches: propensity and
impact of induced shifts in residuals
Thus far, for any given policy goal, a piecemeal (e.g.
CO2-only) approach and a comprehensive approach have been
assumed to yield identical results in terms of aggregated
GWP (or full environmental impacts). In other words,
whether a reduction in net index-weighted ("CO2-equivalent")
emissions were achieved in CO2 or in a combination of gases,
the overall calculated effect on the index value of concern
would be the same.
But such analysis fails to account for actual economic
and social responses to policy interventions. Advocacy of
the comprehensive approach is based in part on the
intuitively strong hypothesis that including all gases,
sources and sinks ensures better effectiveness in any effort
to limit contributions to potential radiative forcing (or
full impacts), because piecemeal rules applying to one gas,
source (or sector), or sink will engender shifts of
* REVIEW DRAFT page 23 *
socioeconomic activity from regulated to unregulated modes,
undercutting achievement of policy goals. Case studies will
be especially helpful to illustrate these issues.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- Understanding of prior piecemeal approaches in
environmental regulation and their resultant shifts of
residuals, including single-medium approaches, e.g. to
discharges into air, land, and water; and single-
pollutant approaches, e.g. to S02.
- DOE/NES study will address CO2 and CH4 emissions from
energy sector; it should consider potential GHG-related
environmental effects of fuel switching, new energy
sources, and sectoral shifts.
-- Future work:
- Develop "crisp retorts" to piecemeal approaches:
Conduct case studies of cross-gas shifts: e.g. fossil
fuel switching (coal to natural gas) induced by CO2-
only policies could have attendant impacts on C02-to-
CH4 emissions shifts due to CH4 leakage from natural
gas transport. 15 Expand cross-gas shift studies, e.g.
apply coal-to-gas CO2-CH4 shift analysis to actual
global GHG output and in light of likely GHG
emissions/leaks from future coal and gas facilities.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Evaluate cross-source/sector shifts: e.g. under a
transport-only policy (such as a high CAFE statute),
possible shift from fossil fuel combustion on board
vehicles to electric cars powered by central utility
combustion, or to use of intensely cultivated biomass
fuels; e.g. under an energy-only or fossil fuel-only
policy, possible shift to biomass fuels whose
cultivation emits other GHGs. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
- Include consideration of international market
responses to unilateral policy choices. Assess cross-
boundary shifts, through price effects and industry
flight, of unilateral or OECD-only policies. Priority:
high. Timeline: 3 months.
(D) Evaluate the environmental benefits of a "net emissions"
approach
15 See, e.g., Rodhe, Science 8 June 1990. Using a 100-year
time horizon and a CO2-equivalent GWP for CH4 of 10, Rodhe
estimates that if a C02-reduction policy were accomplished by
fuel switching from coal to natural gas, a 3-6% CH4 leakage rate
from natural gas transport facilities would fully offset all the
CO2 reductions resulting from the fuel switch.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 24 *
A net emissions approach, encompassing both sources and
sinks, would encourage sink protection and expansion,
whereas a source-only approach would not. Sink policies
encouraged could include afforestation and protection of
marine phytoplankton from pollution. This task is to
evaluate the side benefits of likely sink policies, e.g.
reduced soil erosion, enhanced biodiversity, protected
phytoplankton, and better timber management.
VI. Bridging from piecemeal to comprehensive approaches
(A) Addressing the objection that the comprehensive approach
is technically difficult or infeasible
As discussed in the introduction, the comprehensive approach
can be applied to assist in design of various policies, including
research strategies, technology development strategies,
enumeration of steps justified on other grounds, and emissions
limitation strategies. For most of these options, the
comprehensive approach can be applied immediately, despite
potential uncertainties, as a general guide to intelligent
analysis of the scope and relative importance of policy choices.
For implementing emissions limitations, however, prompt
application of the comprehensive approach might be somewhat more
difficult. In principle, a comprehensive approach appears to be
the most appropriate way to design any emissions limitation
policy. But as indicated above, there are noteworthy gaps and
uncertainties in the information on emissions of certain gases
from certain sources and uptake by certain sinks. If emissions
limitations were to be imposed today, a fully comprehensive
approach would not be available. If emissions limitations are
not needed immediately, work on the comprehensive approach can
continue toward a time when limitations might be agreed. If
emissions limitations are to be agreed at some point before all
informational gaps are filled, a partially comprehensive approach
could be employed with a mechanism for moving to a fully
comprehensive approach as these gaps are filled. 16
The issue for policy makers is not whether the comprehensive
approach is "feasible," but whether at any point the social costs
of implementing an incompletely comprehensive approach -- in
terms of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency, as
¹⁶γet it must be recognized that piecemeal approaches, once
adopted, generally attract vested interests who resist any
efforts to expand toward a comprehensive approach.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 25 *
described in section V above -- are outweighed by the social
costs of obtaining additional information (including costs of
delay). Such costs would also include transactions costs and
administrative costs. In other words, one must ask whether the
marginal value of additional information (leading to a more
comprehensive approach) exceeds the marginal cost of obtaining
additional information. Another way of examining the issue is to
ask at what point would one know enough to proceed
comprehensively; and to ask how (and at what cost) a
comprehensive approach could evolve from incremental steps.
Further, one would consider institutional means to incorporate
incentives into any partial strategy that encourage evolution
toward a comprehensive approach.
The scientific building blocks of the comprehensive approach
are described above in sections I-III. Any framework convention
should foster scientific research through a comprehensive
approach. In addition, consideration of the need to bridge from
a partial to a comprehensive approach would include:
-- Future work:
- Assess the time and expense needed to answer
scientific questions, develop proxy measurement
devices, and build monitoring capabilities to achieve a
workable comprehensive approach.
- Assess other constraints to employment of a fully
comprehensive approach, including institutional,
political, cultural and economic obstacles.
- Compare the costs of acquiring this needed
information to the socioeconomic and environmental
costs (and foregone benefits) of adopting a piecemeal
policy design for want of such information.
- Develop policy and institutional designs that offer
incentives for needed research. For example, an
emissions limitation obligation in an international
agreement could be framed in a piecemeal fashion but
offer the opportunity to emitters to achieve compliance
through limitation actions addressing other GHGs,
sources or sinks, so long as the emitter demonstrates
the accomplishment. This would give emitters
incentives to undertake the research needed to develop
new monitoring capabilities.
- Consider intermediate approaches such as incremental
or phased-in designs toward comprehensivity, and means
to bridge from them to a fully comprehensive approach.
Overview: Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 26 *
(B) Integrating prior and concurrent law and policies into
a comprehensive approach.
Even if a fully comprehensive approach were available for
use in emissions limitations at any relevant point, it is
apparent that other treaties, laws and policies will already be
addressing discrete RATGs, sources, and sinks. Some means would
be needed to accommodate and integrate these diverse endeavors
into the comprehensive approach. Several options are available
for such integration. One option is to use a comprehensive
approach to net RATGs in any emissions limitation protocol while
varying the baseline of allowed credit according to prior treaty
obligations. Another option is to have the convention mandate
that any future protocol (if any) employ a comprehensive
approach. A related option is to incorporate in a framework
convention on climate the assurance to nations, in advance of any
hypothetical future protocol obligations (not yet agreed to),
that they would receive credit against any such obligations for
current or past (after a certain date) net emissions limitations
actions, whether taken pursuant to treaties or national policies;
the convention would further calculate the value of such actions
according to the comprehensive approach. This would assure
credit for measures justified on other grounds, avoid
disincentives to those actions, and give root to the
comprehensive approach, while not yet committing to emissions
limitations obligations.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- devising means to ensure that international agreement
integrates (gives credit for) current actions, other
international agreements (forestry, VOCs, GHGs covered
by ozone agreements), other domestic laws and
initiatives. (DOJ, EPA, State)
-- Future work:
- Demonstrate incentive advantages of integration
- lack of integration would yield perverse
disincentives to take actions, even actions that
are justified on other grounds, lest they be
denied credit once emissions limitations are
agreed. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Address possible overclaiming (see "monitoring" and
"verification," above). Priority: medium. Timeline:
18 months.
- Analyze advantages for other nations under integrated
design. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Analyze environmental advantages of integration.
Priority: medium. Timeline: 3 months.
- Address issues of legal grafting presented by terms
or design of other agreements, laws. Priority: high.
Timeline: 3 months.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 27 *
- Consider possible offset model (e.g. defining any
limitation obligations in terms of CO2 emissions, to
satisfy those eager for CO2 limits, but authorize
offsets for any verifiable limits on any GHG, source,
or sink, thus effectively constructing a comprehensive
approach). Priority: medium. Timeline: 3 to 18
months.
Research and Analysis Underlying the Incentives Approach
As described in the Introduction, a variety of market-based
incentives might be considered in the climate change context.
The possible uses and advantages of these approaches are
summarized in the Introduction.
I. Emissions trading
(A) Domestic trading
-- Current Administration efforts:
- review of past and current experience, e.g. lead
phasedown, netting/bubble/offset program, CFCs
trading, new acid precipitation trading scheme.
Primarily EPA, DOE, CEA.
- consider application to GHGs; consider issues of
implementation, e.g. informal versus formal
trading; who would trade; duration of allowances;
means of distributing allowances; market power;
hoarding; scope of GHGs, sectors, sources and
sinks; monitoring trades; etc.
-- Future work:
- Evaluate the comparative cost-effectiveness of
emissions trading and command-and-control
approaches. Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18
months.
(B) International trading
-- Current Administration efforts:
- present US experience and suggestions at
international discussion on application to climate
-- Future work:
- Extend analysis of above issues to international
context, e.g. informal versus formal trading; who
* REVIEW DRAFT page 28 *
would trade; duration of allowances; means of
distributing allowances; market power; hoarding;
scope of trading among GHGs, sources, sinks,
sectors, industries, geographical areas, stages of
development; monitoring trades. Priority: medium.
Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- In addition, consider international
institutions; trade, assistance and national
income implications; sovereignty issues; cultural
or ethical objections to so-called "selling the
right to pollute"; trading as a decentralized,
market-based 17 vehicle for resource and technology
transfers.
Priority: medium. Timeline: 3 to
18 months.
- Assess informational, administrative, and other
transactions costs of emissions trading and
command and control policies. Priority: medium.
Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- Identify opportunities for cross-national
trades, and hence likely trading partners (for the
US and worldwide). Priority: high. Timeline: 3
months.
- Evaluate the comparative cost-effectiveness of
emissions trading and command-and-control
approaches. Priority: medium. Timeline: 3
months.
II. Emissions fees
Fees might be employed domestically or internationally
to address GHG emissions. Options discussed to date include
carbon taxes based on the carbon content of energy fuels, and
energy taxes. Other options include an energy sector tax that
covers both CO2 and CH4 emissions from energy activities, using
their GWP index ratings to weight the tax; and a more general
multi-sector tax calibrated to the GWP index (or full
environmental impacts index) rating of each gas.
-- Current Administration efforts:
- analysis of energy sector taxes in DOE/NES
- analysis of various fees in EPA "Comprehensive
Budget" analysis
- related efforts: numerous studies have used assumed
taxes to examine costs of GHG limitations policies.
E.g. CBO (Montgomery), Manne & Richels, Nordhaus. See
CEA overview of Economics of Global Change.
17 In addition, consider the options for trading within
regional associations such as OECD, EC, ASEAN. Evidently the EC
and OECD are both considering association-wide policies.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 29 *
-- Future work:
- Improve assessment of tax implications. Consider
international fuels market impacts; use general
equilibrium models; address fiscal concerns. Priority:
high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Consider variety of tax policy designs, including,
carbon, energy, GWP within energy sector, etc.
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months.
- Much of this kind of consideration must be deferred
to budget negotiations.
III. Adaptation Incentives
Market mechanisms and institutional reforms could be used to
encourage efficient adaptation practices. Because of current
institutional or market failures, long-range investments, such as
coastal construction or water use planning, might be undertaken
without giving appropriate weight to any climate change risks
(e.g. rising sea levels or shifting precipitation). Such
institutional or market failures might be addressed by
informational or incentive-based policies, such as requiring
coastal construction to purchase subsidence insurance, or
encouraging long-range water use planning to take account of
potential precipitation patterns. Some of these types of
policies were addressed in the IPCC/RSWG RUMS and CZMS reports.
IV. Economic instruments in general
-- Future work:
- Pursue contacts with OECD regarding Environment
Ministerial in January, Economic Instruments analytic
workplan (experts meeting now tentatively slated for October
1990), and potential OECD Workshop on Economic
Instruments. 18 Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
- Develop suggestions for economic analysis and study of
economic instruments in upcoming IPCC Future Workplan
discussions (tentatively slated for December or January).
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 to 18 months.
18 Preparing for the suggested OECD Workshop on Economic
Instruments, tentatively slated for December 1990, will involve
considerations of forum and cosponsorship, logistics and timing,
relation to other OECD meetings, relation to other international
meetings, invitees, topics to address, an October experts
meeting, relation to the upcoming IPCC meeting on Future Work of
the IPCC, and US presentation at the December Workshop.
* REVIEW DRAFT page 30 *
- Continue to work with CEES groups, including the new Ad
Hoc Economics task group, to develop economic analysis of
policy proposals and designs (addressing "comprehensive
approach" issues as well as "incentives" approach issues).
Priority: high. Timeline: 3 months to 5 years.
Proposed Agenda
First Negotiating Session
Framework Convention on Climate Change
Washington, D.C.
February 4 - 14, 1991
1. Welcoming Remarks
2. Opening of Meeting: Remarks by WMO Sec-Gen Obasi, UNEP Ex
Director Tolba, IPCC Chair Bolin
3. Adoption of Rules of Procedure: Draft to be available
4. Adoption of Agenda
5. Election of Chair
6. Election of Bureau: Refer to Prepcom report and
recommendations
7. Organization of Work: To cover hours of sessions, meeting
rooms, translation facilities (avail-
able only for negotiationg group and
subgroups, not regional and other
interest groups)
8. Credentials Committee
9. Statements by Governments: To be brief (10 min max) and
focused on issues raised in IPCC
and other supporting documents
10. Preparation of Legal Negotiating Text
a. work program
b. establishment of subgroups
C. legal drafting group
d. review of draft legal text
11. Future Work
a. relationship with IPCC
b. time and place of next meeting
12. Adoption of Report
13. Close of Meeting
Suggested timing for proposed agenda:
4
Monday
Agenda items 1 to 8
5
Tuesday
Agenda item 9
6
Wednesday
Agenda item 9 cont'd
7
Thursday
Agenda item 10
8
Friday
Agenda item 10 cont'd
11
Monday
Agenda item 10 cont'd
12
Tuesday
Agenda item 10 cont'd
13
Wednesday
Agenda item 10c and 11
14 Thursday
Agenda item 10d, 12 and 13
AD HOC WORKING GROUP OF GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVES TO PREPARE FOR
UNEP/WMO
NEGOTIATIONS ON A FRAMEWORK
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Geneva, 24-26 September 1990
I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
The meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Government Representatives
to prepare for negotiations on a Framework Convention on Climate Change was
held in Geneva, from 24-26 September 1990, at the International Conference
Centre. The meeting was convened in pursuance of Resolution 8 (EC-XLII)
adopted by the Executive Council of WMO at its forty-second session in June
1990 and decision SS. II/3 adopted by the special session of the Governing
Council of UNEP in August 1990 both entitled "Framework Convention on Climate
Change".
II. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
A. Opening of the meeting
2.
In his opening statement, Professor G.O.P. Obasi, Secretary-General of
WMO summarized the background to the preparation for negotiations and
emphasized the sound and thorough technical basis provided by the recent
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
He stressed WMO's role as the independent authoritative scientific
voice and pledged WMO's full support in any agreed international strategy,
through the World Climate Programme and through the Global Atmosphere Watch,
the World Weather Watch and other related international programmes. He
recognized that calls for equity raised problems in agreeing on what was
equitable and that a great deal of economic and social data would need to be
co-ordinated and reviewed in this particular light and interpreted with wisdom.
He emphasized the need for this short meeting to concentrate on
organizational preparations for the first negotiating session in the United
States in February 1991. The real issues behind the negotiations need to be
identified only. Discussing and resolving them are matters for the
negotiations and not this preparatory meeting.
He proposed that as the negotiations proceeded to a more formal stage
it would be necessary to adhere closely to UN type rules of procedure. He
also advocated an effective, inexpensive, even frugal, secretariat for
negotiations and invited views on its role.
(ID: FCCC/FINAL)
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 2
Finally Professor Obasi assured representatives of his own
availability and that of the WMO Secretariat to assist them in their enormous
task. He wished them success and that their discussions might be marked by
wisdom and courage.
3.
The Executive Director of UNEP, Dr. M.K. Tolba, in his opening
statement emphasized that this meeting is to prepare the ground for the start
of negotiations of an international accord to deal with one of the most
serious threats facing the world that of climate change and global warming.
To deal with it, governments will have to agree binding international
legal instruments specifying clear commitments, defined responsibilities,
targets and schedules and workable and equitable institutional mechanisms.
He stressed that recently the world community accepts the fact that
climate change is a global issue which has to be addressed in some
one-and-a-half years, to reach Rio de Janeiro with some meaningful document in
hand.
Dr. Tolba emphasized that both the Secretary-General of the WMO and he
-- as Executive Director of UNEP -- have been requested by their governing
bodies to prepare for negotiations now. The task of this meeting is to
consider how to proceed in the forthcoming negotiations and to decide on a
realistic timetable for future meetings, taking into account of the
difficulties many developing countries face, and which the Governing Council
of UNEP asked to avoid -- the proliferation of venues of meetings and the
coincidence of their dates.
He said both Professor Obasi and himself recommend that negotiations
be conducted in the main ad hoc working group of legal and technical experts,
under which sub-working groups could be established. Those could deal with
the following issues: greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency,
afforestation, research, monitoring and assessment and the special situation
of developing countries. This meeting is expected to advise the first
negotiating session on the points that need to be addressed by them under
these issues. It is not expected to start the negotiations here. This is the
job of the negotiation group. The note by the Secretary-General of WMO and
the Executive Director of UNEP which was prepared for this meeting, sets out a
number of these points for consideration, for example, which gases ought to be
included in atmospheric concentrations stabilization and emission reductions,
target dates, base year, criteria for calculating emission levels -- per
capita, per unit of GNP or GDP, according to area of the country, its climatic
conditions, the size of natural carbon sinks, energy consumption per
production unit or a mixture of all these or other criteria.
Of all the issues highlighted, Dr. Tolba said three would dwarf the
negotiating process, namely: financial requirements, technology transfer and
economic reforms. The financial mechanisms and technology transfer agreement
contained in the amended Montreal Protocol could act as one guide to future
negotiations. With regard to economic reforms, consideration could be given
to issues like CO₂ tax, pollution charges and a global permit trading scheme,
whereby emitters who can achieve specific targets have the option of trading
excess emissions to countries unable to meet immediate targets.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 3
Dr. Tolba emphasized that this meeting is not only an organizational
meeting but the preparatory meeting for the negotiations which goes beyond
organization only. The report of this meeting is going to be the main
document for the negotiating session in Washington D.C. Taking into account
the time constraints, this meeting may not be able go into details but
hopefully will consider the essential elements to be included into future
legal acts dealing with climate change.
B. Attendance
4.
The meeting was attended by representatives of the following
countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Federal
Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico
Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua
New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, USSR, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S.A.,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.
5.
The following organizations attended the meeting as observers: UNDP,
UNCTC, Unesco and its IOC, FAO, UNCED, CEC, EC Council, IPCC, ICSU, IPIECA,
IUCN, Environmental Law Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace
International, Leadership Council for Effective Climate Change Policy and
World Wide Fund for Nature.
C. Bureau
6.
The following Bureau was elected by the meeting:
Chairman
- Mr. I. Topkov, Bulgaria
Vice Chairman
- Mr J.P. Bruce, Canada
Vice Chairman - Mr. A. Al-Gain, Saudi Arabia
Rapporteur
- Mr. L.G. Meira Filho, Brazil
D. Adoption of the Agenda
7.
The following agenda was adopted by the meeting:
1.
Opening remarks by Secretary-General of WMO and Executive
Director of UNEP:
2.
Election of Bureau for the preparatory meeting of the working
group.
3.
Adoption of agenda.
4.
Organization of the negotiations for the framework convention.
5.
Adoption of the report.
6.
Closure of the session.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 4
III. Discussion on Agenda item 4
8.
During the general discussion on the organization of the negotiations
for the framework convention delegations made the following main points:
Regarding the option that the negotiations would be carried by an ad hoc
working group of legal and technical experts, several delegations, while
agreeing with the general approach, proposed that, because of the importance
of these negotiations, the group carrying it out should be given a title
commensurate with its job e.g., International Forum, Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee or a UN specialized conference.
9.
Most of the speakers referred with appreciation to the relevant
decisions of the UNEP Governing Council and the resolutions of the WMO
Executive Council which led to the convening of this session. Delegations
agreed that both WMO and UNEP should assist the negotiations, particularly
taking into account the urgency of the problems to be solved and the very good
past experience regarding the development of international legal instruments,
for example, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
its Montreal Protocol. On relations between the negotiating group and the UN
Conference on Environment and Development, it was agreed that the framework
convention should, if possible, be ready for signing in conjunction with the
1992 UNCED Conference in Brazil in June 1992. The Preparatory Committee of
UNCED should be kept informed on the progress of the negotiations.
Representatives noted that, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution
44/207, preparations for the negotiations will be reported to its 45th session
as a contribution to its discussions on the ways and means and modalities to
be adopted for the negotiating process. It was emphasized by a few
delegations that a meaningful legal act for adoption in 1992 should be a
target but not at the expense of agreeing to an instrument of only declaratory
character. Others cautioned that if necessary the negotiations should
continue after 1992.
10.
Most of the delegations suggested Geneva, Switzerland, as the venue
for the negotiating sessions. Several developing countries delegations
considered it more convenient for them if some of the negotiating sessions
were held elsewhere than Geneva, with Nairobi being prefered by most of those
suggesting this option. Some suggested that meetings alternate between Geneva
and Nairobi; others indicated that, while the prefered place for meetings
would be Geneva, at least one session in 1991 should take place in Nairobi.
The Secretariat reminded the meeting of a decision of UNEP's Governing Council
at its special session in July 1990, which requested that meetings other than
the first negotiating sessions scheduled for Washington D.C., should be held
alternatively in Geneva and Nairobi. A few delegations indicated that if
venues other than those with the customary UN conference facilities were
proposed then the arrangements for sessions should follow the normal UN
practices for organizing such meetings.
11.
Regarding the duration of the meetings, most of the speakers suggested
two weeks as the maximum duration of each meeting. Several delegations
considered one week to be more appropriate. Another considered that two weeks
would be not enough. Some delegations considered a three months interval
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 5
between negotiating meetings to be too short to allow proper consultations in
their countries. Several delegations suggested a four month interval.
12.
It was the general feeling that negotiations should take place in one
single forum and that agreements reached in the negotiating forum, should not
be reopened by another body. Several delegations suggested that the rules of
procedure for the negotiating process should be developed, based on existing
rules of procedure. One delegation recommended that decision-making in the
rules of procedure should be based on consensus. Another cautioned against
that. A few delegations suggested that the current meeting prepare the draft
rules of procedure to be presented to the negotiating forum which is scheduled
for February 1991 in Washington D.C. this year.
13.
All governments should be invited to all negotiation sessions, and the
participation of developing countries should be ensured. It was a common
agreement that the negotiating meetings should be carried in the six official
languages of the UN and that the documentation for the meetings should be
distributed to countries well in advance to allow them time for full
preparation for the meetings. Delegations agreed that relevant NGOs should be
allowed to attend the negotiations as observers, taking into account their
participation in the development of recent international legal instruments in
the field of the environment. UN practice will provide useful guidance in
this respect.
14.
Regarding the proposed small supporting meeting sessions mentioned in
the Note prepared jointly by the Executive Director of UNEP and the
Secretary-General of WMO for the use of the working group and annexed to their
letter of 24 August 1990, reservations were expressed by several delegations
that many developing countries would not be able to attend such meetings and
therefore the geopolitical representation might be unbalanced. Some
delegations emphasized that it would be useful to provide for the setting up
of substantive groups as part of the negotiating process. The need to
establish a legal/drafting group was particularly emphasized. It was also
suggested that the special situation of developing countries could be
addressed either within these substantive subgroups or in a separate one.
15.
All delegates agreed that the proper representation of developing
countries had to be ensured and that the best way would be through the
creation of a trust fund similar to that established for the IPCC. Some
delegations expressed willingness to support such a fund. Some delegations
called for allowing for more regional participation for example the South
Pacific Forum.
16.
Regarding the structure of the Bureau, all delegates agreed that the
Bureau should not be too large but should ensure proper geopolitical
representation. It was suggested that the Bureau should be of a permanent
character session. and that its Chairman and members should attend every negotiating
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 6
17
Many delegations suggested the establishment of a secretariat dealing
with the negotiation process, separate from the IPCC Secretariat but located
in Geneva, to allow regular interaction and exchange of information. The
Secretariat would consist of UNEP and WMO staff supplemented by other
professionals seconded by other UN agencies. One delegation suggested that
staff might also be seconded by governments. The role of the IPCC in the
negotiating process as a scientific and technical input-providing body was
particularly emphasized.
18.
Regarding the documents to serve as a base for the substantive
discussions at the negotiating groups, most delegations suggested that the
main document to serve as a basis for negotiations should be the IPCC First
Assessment Report - including its identification of legal and institutional
mechanisms and the Policymakers summary of Working Group III, particularly the
elements on Pages 41 and 42. This document should be supplemented by the
outcome of other international meetings, eg. the Toronto and Noordwijk
Declarations. Some delegations suggested that the list of elements presented
in the Note for this meeting by the Executive Director of UNEP and
Secretary-General of WMO should also be taken into account at the
discussions. One delegation drew attention to other useful documents which
could be consulted, including the report of the Ottawa meeting on legal issues
relating to the development of a climate convention and that part of the
report of the World Commission on Environment and Development dealing with
principles of Environmental Law. It was suggested that the Secretariat should
gather documents together and that they should be presented to the first
negotiating meeting in Washington with commentary. It is expected that at the
Washington meeting, a legal drafting group will be convened to prepare, on the
basis of consideration of the above documentation by the negotiating forum,
the draft legal instrument or instruments as may be agreed upon. In refering
to the IPCC report some delegations said that it had deficiencies. Not all
developing countries had been able to participate in the IPCC process and the
product contained a bias in favour of developed country opinion. Two
delegations said that relying solely on IPCC documentation would propagate the
bias into the negotiating forum. Delegates agreed that written contributions
be solicited from developing countries relating to their specific concerns.
These contributions should be translated and distributed to all governments
and considered during the negotiating process. Some developing countries
delegations complained that documentation of the kind foreseen during the
negotiations invariably arrived late, due to poor communications in some
developing countries, and asked that the secretariat consider priority
distribution to these countries. Another delegate said that it would be
helpful if the distribution of documents was not limited to the constituencies
of WMO and UNEP but made more widely available within countries which might
consider an appropriate network to ensure this.
19.
The meeting was divided on whether or not protocols and other related
legal instruments should be negotiated simultaneously with the convention.
Many delegations suggested that the convention should contain specific
obligations in order that the legal instrument could be effective in
environmental protection. Many delegations expressed the view that protocols
to the convention, which are required as part of an effective international
regime on climate change, should be negotiated so as to enable their adoption
at the same time as the convention. The meeting considered it important to
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/ REPORT
Page 7
draw up a schedule of activities from the present up to the time of the
proposed adoption of the treaty in 1992.
20.
In order to ensure efficiency, one delegate said that each meeting
should last for the shortest possible period of time, drawing upon the
"marginal utility" principle to ensure efficiency. That delegation, Italy,
offered to host convention-related meetings and workshops, especially those on
the subject of energy efficiency. Some delegations, however, felt there was a
need to limit the establishment of subgroups with some considering them
unnecessary altogether. Several delegations asked for elaboration of plans to
interact with the Preparatory Committee for UNCED and on how the adoption of
the two conventions currently being negotiated, i.e., on climate and
biodiversity, would be co-ordinated with UNCED. The question of the
relationship of the negotiation to the UN General Assembly was raised and
there was widespread agreement that a clear set of recommendations should be
transmitted from the present meeting to the Assembly, concentrating on, inter
alia, the rules of procedure; financial arrangements; composition of the
bureau and the secretariat; basic documentation, the ways to achieve universal
participation, the frequency and nature of the negotiating process and the
venue and other organizational aspects.
21.
A few delegations insisted that the negotiations be conducted in a
forum duly established by the UN General Assembly, and that the best way to to
provide the necessary legitimacy and universality to the process would be
through convening a UN Specialized Conference. It was important that the
process of negotiations be conducted according to the principle of
transparency in the negotiations, without which universal acceptance might
suffer; it was equally important in this connection to avoid the practice of
non-announced meetings in the negotiating process, irrespective of the forum
to be chosen. One delegation further warned that it was not possible for the
meeting to decide on the need for subgroup meetings, it could only recommend
the need for establishing subgroups, recalling that it was within the purview
of the United Nations General Assembly to establish the ways, means and
modalities for conducting the negotiations. Supporting this view, another
delegation said that the issues of financing and frequency of meetings
similarly needed the opinion of the General Assembly.
22.
Many countries, in particular African countries, drew attention to the
importance of climate to their development and the sensitivity of many
economic sectors to drought and flood. Several delegations said that the
convention should include reference to drought and flood impacts and that it
should also refer to the need for action plans on climate change, including
monitoring, data acquisition and regional climate modelling. Several
delegations expressed the need for better information disemination on the
climate change issue to sensitise more people to the potential risks and on
the need for action. The need for regional meetings on the issue and the
involving of relevant regional organizations was also expressed. It was
proposed that the composition of the Bureau for the negotiating body should
include a fair and balanced representation from regions of the world that are
seriously at risk by drought, desertification and land degradation processes.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 8
The countries most affected by this change-of-climate-risk are those in the
IGADD-region (Eastern African countries) and the Sahelian and Magrehb
countries. These regions should be given special consideration during the
formulation of the Bureau for the composition of the negotiating body.
Another representative drew attention to concerns associated with arid lands
such as the Arabian peninsular. The attention of the meeting was also drawn
to the vulnerability and risks of drought and desertification associated with
potential climate change in other regions, such as Australia and North-east
Brazil.
23.
Several delegations, including those of small and lowlying island
states and coastal areas, spoke of the unique vulnerability of such states to
sea-level rise and the need to give prominence to this issue within the
convention. Such countries are unique in that their physical and cultural
survival is at risk from sea-level rise and consequent anihilation of their
homelands. These delegations considered that they should be represented on the
proposed Bureau, citing the degree of risk as a further criterion for
determining the composition of the Bureau. The majority of delegations did
not oppose the fact that these concerns would be taken into account when the
negotiating body discusses the composition of the Bureau.
24.
The representative of the Commission of European Communities reported
on the outcome of the session of the European Council held in June 1990 in
Dublin and attended by Heads of State and of Governments of the Community.
The Heads of Governments considered that the Community and its member states
had a special responsibility to encourage and participate in international
action aimed at tackling global environmental problems. Among comments on
the structure of the future negotiations, the same representative said the
European Community attached great importance to the full participation of
developing countries to the negotiating process and said favourable
consideration would be given towards providing support for this
participation. Many individual states also indicated their intention to
provide financial support through contribution to the Trust Fund. Some
delegations noted their recent increased contributions to UNEP and indicated
that they expected a proportion of the costs, especially that of the joint
secretariat, to be met from UNEP and WMO funds.
25.
The Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
confirmed the Panel's willingness to assist the negotiations process. It
intended to meet the short term needs of the negotiations towards elaboration
of the convention by 1992 and also to satisfy longer term goals of improved
knowledge. He informed the meeting of plans to hold a fifth IPCC meeting, in
February 1991 soon after the first negotiating session in Washington D.C., in
order to assess how to address the key issues identified at the meeting which
were relevant to the IPCC. The IPCC would, if requested, make a presentation
to the first negotiating session on how the IPCC could fulfil the supporting
role suggested for it.
26.
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO said
there was a need to strengthen ocean and coastal area monitoring and that IOC,
together with UNEP and WMO, had been invited by the Preparatory Committee of
UNCED to to study related ways and means through the establishment of a global
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 9
ocean observing system (GOOS). He drew attention to the report by an IOC
Ad Hoc Group of Experts which recommends the need to establish a protocol
among member states in 1992 in order to implement GOOS in a timely fashion.
The representative said that resources for monitoring, assessment and
technical training, and assistance for developing countries were
insufficient. He concluded by expressing his organization's willingness to
support the negotiations.
27.
Similar support was expressed by the representative of FAO who
expressed FAO's intention to nominate a full time liaison officer to support
the convention process. He suggested that similar liaison persons should be
nominated by UNEP and WMO to liaise on the proposed FAO forest convention.
The representative urged close co-ordination in developing legislation on
forests in view of the common objectives and the need for coherent action. He
suggested that, initially, the negotiating group should consider all aspects
of forest conservation and that FAO were willing to co-sponsor a sub-group on
these issues. The development of a forest convention was suggested by the FAO
representative to be undertaken contiguously with the elaboration of treaties
on climate and biodiversity. Some representatives said that the development
of a forest convention should not complicate or delay negotiations of a
climate convention and related legal instruments. Other however, several
delegations responded negatively to this suggestion, fearing that the
attention of governments would be diverted towards an issue which did not
demand the same priority and would also duplicate the current and ongoing
negotiations for a convention on biodiversity. Some of them noted that the
state of the deliberations on forestry differed from that on climate change.
The representive of FAO reassured the delegates of FAO's appreciation of their
concern about conflicts between conventions and stated that he was sure that
the Committee on Forestry would not make any recommendation that would
conflict with the recommendations of the present meeting. He confirmed that
FAO's support for the climate convention process was not dependent on a forest
convention's being developed.
Many delegations said that the development of a forest convention should not
complicate instruments. or delay negotiation on a climate convention and related legal
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 10
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ad-hoc working group of government representatives to
prepare for negotiations on a framework convention on climate
change adopted by consensus the recommendations listed below
in Section A, and identified the option below in Section B,
regarding the organization of the negotiating process for a
framework convention on climate change. Both sections are
submitted for consideration initially by the forty-fifth
session of the United Nations General Assembly in pursuance of
its resolution 44/207 to recommend ways, means and modalities
for further pursuing negotiations, taking into account the
work of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, and then by the negotiating body
at its first substantive session scheduled for February 1991
in Washington, D. C., USA.
A. Recommendations adopted by consensus
1. The negotiating process should be organized and conducted
in such a manner as to ensure openness, transparency,
universality and legitimacy. It should reflect the full
participation and commitment of all States to the
negotiations.
2. There should be a single negotiating process leading to a
framework convention on climate change and any related legal
instruments as might be agreed upon.
3. The negotiating body will discuss the policy issues.
Governments will need to be represented at a level appropriate
for this. The name of the body should also reflect this
function in accordance with options suggested in this
document.
4. The negotiating body should respond to UN General
Assembly decisions. It should also regularly inform the
Assembly, through appropriate channels, of progress in its
deliberations.
5. The bureau of the negotiating body should reflect a proper
geographical representation, balance of interests and specific
concerns as mentioned in the Report, and be of strength
sufficient to ensure equity and still limited to ensure
effectiveness.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 11
6. It is highly desirable that an effective framework
convention on climate change, containing appropriate
commitments, be ready for signing by governments and by
regional economic integration organizations in conjuction with
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Brazil, in June 1992. Any related legal instruments
might be developed on the basis of consensus decision by the
negotiating body.
7. Participation of the maximum number of States and regional
economic integration organizations in the negotiating process
is considered essential for its success. Countries which have
not done so, are urged to set up a national co-ordinating
group to handle national information requirements relevant to
the negotiations, and to serve as a link to the Secretariat of
the negotiations. The special problems associated with
ensuring the participation of developing countries, and the
recommendations contained in the report of the IPCC to
overcome these problems, should receive particular attention.
To ensure adequate participation of the developing countries,
small island states and least developed countries, a special
Trust Fund should be created, on a similar basis to that for
the UNCED and the IPCC, to assist in their adequate
participation.
8. Rules of procedure of the negotiating body need to be
elaborated for approval by the first negotiating session.
They should be based on existing relevant rules of procedure,
be acceptable by all States, Members of the UN, the
Specialized Agencies, IAEA, and regional economic integration
organizations, be compatible with the status of the
negotiating body, and be such as to ensure active
participation by all governments through fully accredited
representatives, and be consistent with Recommendation 1
above.
9. Most negotiating sessions should have a maximum duration
of two weeks, within available resources.
10. A tentative calendar, to be reviewed at the end of each
negotiating session, should be as follows:
February 1991 - Washington D. C., USA
May - June 1991
August - September 1991
November -December 1991
and whichever meetings are needed in 1992, leading into the UN
Conference on Environment and Development, Brazil, June 1992.
11. Non-governmental organizations with a substantive
interest in the field should be permitted to attend
negotiating sessions as observers. The practices of the UN
and of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED will provide useful
guidance before rules of procedure are finalized.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 12
12. The negotiating body must have a strong, efficient
secretariat at its disposal. This would be best assured if
the secretariat were:
(1) located in Geneva and working closely with the
IPCC Secretariat, although independent of it,
and
(2) the joint administrative responsibility of WMO
and UNEP under the guidance of the negotiating body;
this arrangement should be reviewed at the time of
the first negotiating meeting in Washington in
February 1991.
It should be of an appropriate size and quality, (the
professionals consisting mainly of WMO and UNEP staff
supplemented by professionals seconded by other UN agencies)
and be adequately funded, to ensure that meetings are served
to UN standards; in particular that documents were always to
be available in the six official languages of the UN according
to an agreed timetable and that interpretation in the six
languages should be available at all negotiating sessions and
at meetings of any sub-groups. It should work closely, and as
necessary, with agencies of the UN and other international
bodies concerned with climate related issues.
13. Taking into account paragraph 6 above, the Preparatory
Committee of the UN Conference on Environment and Development
should be kept informed of the progress of negotiations.
14. The negotiating body should have a link with the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to ensure
that the IPCC can respond to the needs and requests of the
negotiators for objective scientific and technical advice.
15. Depending on the decision on ways, means and modalities
to be taken in UN General Assembly, the negotiating body may
establish sub-groups as needed. Some sub-groups might be
required only at a later stage of the negotiations. If there
are sub-groups to the negotiating body, not more than two
meetings of the main body or sub-groups should be in session
simultaneously.
16. The main documentation to serve as a basis for
negotiations should be the IPCC First Assessment Report -
including its legal and institutional mechanisms - and the
background documentation. Other supplementary documents for
consideration would include those resulting from previous
international conferences on the subject and from the
forthcoming Second World Climate Conference and such other
documents as the negotiating body chooses.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 13
17. A list of the elements identified by the IPCC for
possible inclusion in the framework convention, or other
related legal instruments, documents containing such elements,
and comparative presentation of general principles of relevant
treaties, should be before the negotiating body.
18. Individual governments are encouraged to present papers
to the negotiating body, with help from the Secretariat
within available resources.
19. The funding of the sessions of the negotiating body, and
of the supporting secretariat, should be arranged through
provisions in the regular budget of WMO and UNEP and/or with
the use of a Trust Fund arrangement and/or other relevant
funds.
20. After the first session of the negotiating body in
Washington D.C. in February 1991, subsequent meetings should
take place in Geneva with at least one of them in 1991 in
Nairobi to be decided at the first session in Washington.
B. Option identified by the Ad-hoc Working Group
1. The negotiating body could be an "Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a framework convention on climate
change", under the auspices of WMO and UNEP, or a "Specialized
Conference for the Negotiation of a Framework Convention on
Climate Change" with a Secretary-General appointed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
UNEP/WMO
Prep./FCCC/L.1/REPORT
Page 14
V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT
29
The report of the meeting was adopted on 26 September 1990 at 11.25pm.
VI. CLOSURE OF THE SESSION
30.
After usual exchange of courtesies the chairman declared the meeting
closed at 11.30pm.
Annex 1
October 2, 1990
TASK FORCE ON COMPREHENSIVE AND INCENTIVES
APPROACHES TO CLIMATE
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS
Wak wl State
1. Draft a framework convention that
-- includes a science research section that addresses all GHGs,
sources and sinks;
-- provides for an international monitoring agenda for all GHGs,
sources and sinks
-- adopts or provides for development of a GHG index based on the
radiative forcing and other environmental effects of all GHGs,
and possibly incorporating radioactively active trace gases (e.g.
sulfate aerosols)
-- provides that any protocol (s) shall, to the extent feasible,
be comprehensive.
-- Mandates that any limitation protocols (s) (a) provides for
voluntary trading among nations in net GHG reductions (b)
provides "credit" for net GHG reductions achieved by nations
unilaterally through measures justified on other grounds, or
through other international, regional, or bilateral agreements
(e.g. forestry)
2. Develop an improved GHG index and an international process for
refining the index. Include, to the extent possible,
environmental effects other than radiative forcing.
3. Develop a plan for developing an international net GHG
monitoring system.
4. Prepare "crisp retorts" to proposal for piecemeal measures by
pointing out the environmental and economic drawbacks of
agreements limited to particular GHGs, sources and sinks,
sectors, or groups of nations, or that use command and control
approaches. These also apply to congressional proposals.
5. Develop quantitative analysis and empirical examples to show
the environmental and economic advantages of a comprehensive
approach.
6. Update "report card" on the contributions to reducing net GHG
of US actions being taken on other grounds. Conduct similar
analyses of selected other nations.
7. Development of a concise but sophisticated vision of decision
making under uncertainty to counter simplistic versions of the
"precautionary principle. "
8. Develop capacity to analyze economic and environmental costs
and benefits of likely proposals by other nations.
9. Systematic intelligence gathering on the views and economic
initiatives of other nations who will be influential in
negotiations, and efforts to persuade them of our approach.
Reviewed by manday
Friday to Ken Yale.
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
PREAMBLE
We, Ministers from — countries, assembled in Geneva,
Switzerland, from 6 to 7 November 1990 at the Second World
Climate Conference.
Conscious of our responsibility to present and future
generations to preserve, protect and defend our fragile planet;
Alarmed by recent evidence that our actions may be altering
the atmosphere which nurtures life and sets Earth apart from
all other planets;
Uncertain still of what may follow, and at what cost, but
convinced that delay will constrain our ability to act;
We embark now with common resolve on an effort which will
require strength, resolution and steadfast purpose, an effort
which will test every virtue of our peoples, but without which
we can have no hope of success.
RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES
1. Science tells us that gases produced by human
activities -- the so-called greenhouse gases -- are
accumulating in the atmosphere. Many of these gases are
produced naturally and are essential to the habitability of our
planet; still, the human contribution, particularly since the
dawn of the industrial age, has perturbed their delicate
balance in the atmosphere.
2. Science also warns us that the accumulation of
greenhouse gases produced by human activities will lead
inevitably to a global warming, perhaps at rates faster than
any experienced since life as we know it began. Science
predicts that the warming will not be even, that it is likely
to occur more rapidly at higher latitudes, but that, once
begun, we may neither be able to control or reverse it.
3. The state of our knowledge is imperfect -- many
important uncertainties remain. Still we are aware that a
signficant warming may have harmful consequences for our planet
and our peoples. Seas may rise, storms may increase and
intensify and many species of life may not be able to adapt.
4. Facing such risks, but acknowledging great
uncertainties, we must determine how extensively we must act,
what the costs of action and inaction may be, and what measure
of success will likely grace our efforts.
5. At this Second World Climate Conference we reaffirm our
support for the World Climate Programme and for other
cooperative scientific initiatives to resolve the questions
before us.
the
-2-
PAST AND PROLOGUE
6. We recall that this endeavor is not without precedent.
Our nations have already developed a common stragegy to address
a related global crisis -- stratospheric ozone depletion. From
a modest beginning in 1985, we have quickly narrowed scientific
uncertainties and summoned the resolve to take more stringent
but necessary action. That action is also the most significant
first step to limit the accumulation in the atmosphere of
greenhouse gases from human activities.
7. We have also concluded an unprecedented international
effort to analyze the science, impacts, and response options
for further dealing with climate change. This effort,
initiated under the joint auspices of the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, has
produced the First Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. The Report has heightened our
awareness and enlisted an increasing number of nations in the
search for solutions.
8. We have thus set the stage for negotiations on a
framework convention on climate change. We note with
satisfaction that these negotiations will begin in three months
time and that all parties have resolved to complete the
convention, together with any related, legal instruments as may
then be agreed, by the time of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in June 1992.
9. We further note that the United Nations General
Assembly will shortly consider ways, means and modalities for
further pursuing these negotiations on the basis of
recommendations produced one month ago by government
representatives.
CALL FOR A GLOBAL STRATEGY
10. While uncertainty complicates our task, it will
neither delay nor deter us. We must develop a global strategy
to preserve our atmosphere. Our strategy must seek both to
slow the predicted rise in temperature and to help us adapt to
its effects.
11. It must be universal, involving all nations of the
world, for only together can we hope to prevail.
-3-
12. It must be comprehensive, addressing all sources and
sinks of the gases we produce, for the problem has many
aspects, which must be considered together if our efforts are
to succeed.
13. It must be equitable, taking into account our
differing abilities to act and our differing contributions to
past and anticipated future accumulations of greenhouse gases.
14. It must be pragmatic, recognizing our common desire to
grow and provide for our peoples, without which prospect hope
for human prosperity and dignity will wither.
15. It must also be farsighted, recognizing that future
innovation will open possibilities as yet unknown, if we but
direct our collective ingenuity to shape that future.
THE EFFORT REQUIRED
16. The challenge before us is great. How we meet it may
influence life to come on our planet. We are aware that the
effort required will be among the most complex and difficult
ever undertaken. Our negotiators must find ways to accomodate
a wide range of legitimate concerns while ensuring that we
develop a specific program of action.
17. Foremost among these concerns is that shared by all
countries -- that the actions we agree to take not foreclose
economic growth. This concern is particularly acute among
developing countries who have not yet attaihed the level of
prosperity that prevails among countries of the industrialized
world. Still, it is not unique to them, for disparities exist
as well within the industrialized world.
18. We are aware that negotiators must also find ways to
accomodate:
--the concerns of countries now determined to limit and
reduce growing emissions of greenhouse gases as well as the
concerns of countries whose growth depends on fossil fuel
production;
--the concerns of countries, whose forests are integrally
tied to their economic development yet which provide a critical
element of the world's defense against global warming;
1)
- 4 -
--the concerns of countries which bear a proportionately
large degree of risk from the anticipated impacts of climate
change, particularly countries in arid and semi-arid regions
and small, low-lying coastal and island countries; and
--the concerns of all who understand that the burgeoning
growth in our planet's population must be taken into account in
our efforts to deal with global climate change.
19. We acknowledge that we must also deal anew with issues
we have encountered in other fora, issues whose resolution
often still eludes us. In particular, negotiators must develop:
--ways to assure that adequate financial resources are made
available to countries that would otherwise be unable to join
fully in this common effort;
--ways to assure that know-how and technological innovation
continue to advance and are made affordable and widely
available to solve this common problem;
--ways to assure that knowledge and information are fully
and openly shared; and
-ways to assure that the educational and scientific
infrastructure in all countries, particularly in the developing
countries, is extended and enhanced to enable each of us fully
to appreciate the scientific basis for climate change, the
potential impacts of such change and evaluations of practical
response strategies.
- -
OUR COMMON FUTURE
20. Generations past once relied on faith in moving toward
the future. Later generations placed their faith in reason.
As we move now toward the second millenium we must seek to
marry the two. We must urgently resolve the uncertainties that
confront us. We must also accept that full knowledge may elude
us for some time. We must begin now to take sustained,
pragmatic action to secure our common future. We dedicate
ourselves henceforth to develop a phased, flexible response
that will enable us to take action now even as we seek to
resolve remaining uncertainties and develop a comprehensive
action plan for the future.
90-11-06 12:40
WHITEHOUSE BULLETIN
TEL=
P01
THE WHITE HOUSE
BULLETIN
BULLETIN BROADFAXING NETWORK, 309 CAMERON ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 (703) 684-2020
Your fax machine was unavailable while our computers were
transmitting this morning's edition of the White House Bulletin.
We are sending this copy via conventional fax technology.
TO:
THERESA GORMAN
SUBJECT:
TODAY'S BRIEFING
DATE:
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1990 -- 11:00 AM
SINCE THE MORNING PAPERS:
*** CIA Director Webster, in a speech today, reported that more Iraqi troops
have moved into Kuwait and are along the Kuwaiti border. *** Defense Secretary
Cheney says US will continue its military buildup in the Middle East. Another
20,000 troops may soon be deployed to join the already 220,000 troops in the
region. If conflict breaks out, up to 100,000 more troops may be sent. ***
Five Americans have arrived in New York from Iraq, with nine more expected to
arrive later today. Meanwhile, Iraq has said it will release all French
hostages. *** President Bush signed a temporary spending bill to keep the
government going through midnight Saturday, and has canceled campaign plans to
stay in Washington today and keep tabs on the budget. *** Israel continues to
ignore two U.N. Security Council resolutions, insisting its own investigation
into Palestinian deaths on the Temple Mount is sufficient. *** A famine of
biblical proportions threatens the Sudan, according to a U.S. relief worker who
warns that as many as 11 million people may starve to death unless relief efforts
are stepped up and pressure increased on the Sudanese government to get the food
to its people.
IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND AROUND THE ADMINISTRATION:
0
The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations are not speeding toward a
timely and successful conclusion, according to a number of Administration
officials. "While the record to date paints a dismal picture," one
official said yesterday, "we may see a flurry of action at the eleventh
hour." Charles Schultz, Senior Fellow for Economic Studies at the
Advisors under President Carter, concurred, telling the of Bulletin Economic
Brookings Institution and former Chairman of the Council
yesterday: "It is just like the budget negotiations -- nobody likes to
flobul warming
put their final card down until the very last minute. My instinct tells
me that when President Bush and the EC prime ministers -- and it will
ultimately get up to that level -- face failure right smack in the face,
the prime ministers will blink. They will somehow cobble together a
compromise on agriculture, enabling the other things to go through. I
would guess the probability of this is around 60-40."
o
A U.S. delegation led by NOAA Administrator John Knauss will take the
message of "let's get serious in February" to the Second World Climate
Conference in Geneva, according to a number of involved Administration
officials. The international conference -- which will begin with
scientific discussions this Monday, with the ministerial session scheduled
for November 6 and 7 -- will address the issue commonly referred to as
The White House Bulletin is a fax-delivered bulletin board reaching over
offices, including 70 medie organizations. The Bulletin welcomes information from Administration officials and
1,000 of Washington's influential
observers. Call 684-2020.
90-11-06 12:41
WHITEHOUSE BULLETIN
TEL=
P02
global warming. During the Geneva meeting, the U.S. expects a number of
Western European governments along with Japan to push strenuously for
targets and timetables for greenhouse gas reductions, "as they have been
doing at every international meeting in the last year." Japan will unveil
its target to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions on a per-capita basis, in
the year 2000 and beyond at about the same level as 1990. These expected
pronouncements from other nations were criticized this morning by an
involved Administration official: "While the Japanese position looks like
stabilization at 1990, it is not. It is an 18% increase over 1988,
steadily increasing as the population grows. Australia wants to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases by 20% by the year 2005, but this
declaration is really no more than a feasibility study and has no legal
significance unless adopted by the territories. France has set a
stabilization target which is actually above its current emission level.
The U.S. is not in favor of continued political statements in the form of
declarations. This is all a shell game with these countries and they are
not making legal commitments. Even the UK, which says it is going to
stabilize to 1990 levels by 2005, seals its lips when you ask how long
after 2005 they will hold at that level." While these nations are
expected to push strongly at the end of the meeting for a declaration
which includes targets, the U.S. negotiating position will be that the
opening round of negotiations on a framework convention (scheduled for
early February in Washington, D.C.) is the right time and setting for such
discussions. The President's Science Advisor Allan Bromley recently
chaired a meeting at which the instructions for the Knauss delegation were
provided. The U.S. will issue a statement to the conference restating
Secretary Baker's "no regrets policy." The statement will highlight
progress that the U.S. has already made on the issue -- CFC reductions,
the clean air act, the President's tree-planting initiative, energy-
efficiency initiatives, as well as the leading role provided by the U.S in
providing climate-change research. According to one U.S. official, "these
actions will bring the U.S. to 1987 levels of net greenhouse gas emissions
by the year 2000, which is really better than the other nations are
doing."
o
While reserving judgement, the White House is optimistic that the final
language of the clean air bill will allow the President to sign it into
law. According to one Administration official, "We haven't seen the fine
print yet, BO that is a caveat, but we are optimistic. The President very
much wants the bill. We think it will be okay, but I want to reserve
judgement until we see the bill."
o
The House Republican vote on the budget package is expected to be in the
neighborhood of 115-60 against, according to sources on Capitol Hill,
whose formulations are based on predictions that those Republicans who
opposed the gummit package will also oppose the current package, and that
the "Group of 71" who voted for the original summit package will likely
lose between 10 and 15 votes. Republican Deputy Whip Robert Walker,
however, told the Bulletin this morning that "ae certain elements inside
the package become known to Members, there is some chance that there will
be even greater defections from the Group of 71." Walker mentioned
specifically a provision in the budget agreement that would eliminate the
option to withdraw lump-sum retirement benefits for all federal employees
except Members of Congress. "My guess is that will be seen as the
feathering of a nest that most Members are not willing to countenance."
o
Speculation is mounting that Connie Newman is already on the short, short
list to replace Elizabeth Dole at the Labor Department. Newman has
several things going for her. For starters, she is very well thought of
among the government employee unions. And, the political advantages she
carries being a woman and Black are further accented by what some say
would be almost a storybook ascension up the government career ladder from
2
90-11-06 12:42
WHITEHOUSE BULLETIN
TEL=
P03
a G-2 secretary to cabinet secretary.
o
Vice President Quayle will travel to Indiana and Illinois on Friday and
Saturday. On Friday, Quayle will attend a VIP reception and convocation
at DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, after which he will attend
a fundraising reception for Rick Hawks in Fort Wayne. On Saturday, Quayle
will travel to Chicago, where he and Indiana Senatorial candidate Dan
Coats will begin a "Dan Coate Victory Train Ride" from Randolph Street
Station to Hammond, Indiana, and then to New Carlisle, Indiana. Quayle
will attend an event for John Hiler for Congress in South Bend, Indiana,
and from there will travel to Springfield, Illinois, where he will stump
at a picnic for gubernatorial candidate Jim Edgar. Quayle will return to
Washington Saturday evening.
o
President Bush has canceled his campaign schedule today which would have
taken him to Albuquerque with Interior Secretary Lujan. Instead, Lujan
and HUD Secretary Kemp will be stumping there for gubernatorial candidate
Frank Bond.
BUDGET FIGURES:
D
The budget package agreed to by the Democratic leadership would:
--
Raise the federal gasoline tax from 9 cents a gallon to 14 cents a
gallon.
--
Raise top marginal income tax rate from 28 percent to 31 percent.
--
Tax capital gains at 28 percent, three percent lower than the top
marginal income tax rate.
--
Phase-out personal exemptions for individuals whose taxable income
is between $100,000 and $200,000 and for those filing jointly with
taxable incomes between $150,000 and $275,000.
--
Reduce itemized deductions for the next five years by three percent
of the amount of gross income over $100,000.
--
Increase the income subject to Medicare payroll tax from $51,300 to
$125,000.
--
Not levy a surtax on millionaires.
POLITICAL ANALYSIS:
This morning, the Bulletin invites two Republican political consultants and two
Republican Congressmen to discuss if and how President Bush and the Republican
Party can increase their party's political fortunes going into the 1990
elections.
BULLETIN: Can the President still turn his political fortunes and those
of
his
party around before the election, and, if so, how?
Doug Bailey, Republican Publisher of the Political Hotline: It would be very
difficult, but the beginning would be to articulate the domestic priorities of
his administration. That is his biggest problem. There is nothing for
candidates to hold on to. They don't know where the President is anymore, which
is to say, his agenda -- the "vision thing." Unless those priorities are
communicated, it is very difficult for candidates to know what it is they are
supposed to say. That, of all problems, is the biggest one.
I think that the President's slide in the polls came quickly, but that's the
nature of the TV world. The shelf life of moods; the shelf life of issues; the
shelf life of phrases, the shelf life of opinion is not very long these days.
Good news can replace bad news in a hurry. But in terms of what is in his
control to do, the single most important thing for him to do is articulate what
the priorities of the White House are. Without that, many candidates are left
high and dry.
3
90-11-06 12:42
WHITEHOUSE BULLETIN
TEL=
P04
BULLETIN: What sort of spin can Republican Congressmen put on this budget deal
going into their election?
Lyn Nofsiger, Republican political and communications consultant: The only thing
that Republicans who vote for this package can do is to go out and say: "Well,
it would have been worse if we hadn't held the line. And if we hadn't fought all
this time, the Democrats would have raised our taxes more than is now the case.
We were outnumbered. And if you vote those guys into office this election, then
you're going to see more and more taxes; and they're going to hit the middle
class, because that's where they always hit. We held this to a minimum."
If I were a Republican in the Congress, I'd vote against any bill that
increases gasoline taxes because you're hitting everybody. You're hitting the
lower middle-class guy who's moved 40 miles out so he can afford to buy a house.
And all of sudden you're increasing his gasoline prices. When you increase gas
prices, you increase the price of every product that is shipped -- and most of
our products are shipped by truck.
If I were up for re-election I would vote against this bill. If I voted for
it, I'd say: "Listen, this is the best we could get; we held it to a minimum.
The Democrate would have raised taxes a lot more and they will raise your taxes
again."
BULLETIN: What should Republican Congressmen be doing as they go into the final
days of the election?
Congressman John Kyle (R-AZ) Our strategy up to now has been to run on the
Republican philosophy that you should not need to raise more revenues to achieve
deficit reduction. That should be done primarily through spending reductions.
Secondly, the worst thing you could do for the economy is things like raising gas
taxes -- things which are antithetical to spurring economic growth. After this
package passes if it does -- I think it will not be too long before it is
evident that this country is digging itself deeper and deeper into a recession.
Frankly, the points I'm going to be making going into the election and even after
the election are similar to what I had to do with catastrophic health insurance.
I'll have to say: "I am predicting to you that this will result in disaster."
I'll hate to say "I told you so," but I'll bet you that I'll have to. Then we'll
have to get to work fixing it. The problem is, however, that it's going to be
tough to fix the economy once we've gone deeper into recession.
Congressman Robert Walker (R-PA) The political climate on matters of taxation
hasn't changed in over a decade. The strong generic support for the Republican
Party has come from younger voters. That's where we have gained over the years.
Those younger voters are families struggling to make it. They don't want to pay
more taxes as they struggle with raising kids and paying for education and all
the things which come along with having to live and work in society. That is
where our base of support is. When they become convinced that we no longer care
about them, they are not going to vote for Republicans. Events of the last five
months have begun to concern them about the Republican commitment to keeping
their taxes down. Republicans who reaffirm their support for no new taxes will
get overwhelming approval from the people who are making up our generic vote
nationwide. Those who do not may not do so well.
PERSONNEL:
0
Solly J. Thomas has been appointed the Executive Director of the Federal
Labor Relations Authority. A graduate of Notre Dame, Thomas came to the
Authority from the U.S. International Trade Commission where he served
since 1987 as Executive Assistant to the Chairman.
Copyright © 1990 by the Bulletin Broadfaxing Network. Reproduction without permission prohibited.
The White House Bulletin is published business days by the Bulletin Broadfaxing Network, Alexandria, Virginia.
4