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NATIONAL SECURITY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(NSTAC)
Reports Submitted
for
NSTAC IX
Volume II
September 22, 1988
Reports Submitted for the
Ninth Meeting of the
National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee (NSTAC)
Volume II
September 22, 1988
Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group Reports, September 1988
- Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements
Status Report
— Government and Industry Mobilization Management
Structure Final Report
- Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories Final Report
Joint Industry-Government
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Group Reports
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
MOBILIZATION (TIM)
September 1988
PREFACE
These reports document the work to date of the Joint
Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Group.
It should be noted that, for the purposes of its ongoing study of
telecommunications industry mobilization subjects, mobilization is
considered by the Joint Group to encompass the interval from
peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent conventional military actions
external to the continental United States. The impact on the
telecommunications industry of a nuclear attack on the United States is
judged by the Joint TIM Group to involve reconstitution issues, rather
than mobilization, and is therefore not addressed.
The Joint TIM Group has thus far addressed five TIM subject areas:
Personnel Issues, Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements,
Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure, Dependence on
Foreign Sources, and Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories. This
volume presents the Group's final reports on four of these subjects:
Personnel Issues, Dependence on Foreign Sources, Government and Industry
Mobilization Management Structure, and Maintenance of Stockpiles and
Inventories. The Joint TIM Group is continuing its analysis of
Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements; a status report on that
subject is also included in this volume.
The Joint Group has developed a framework for the evolutionary
completion of a final TIM report. This overall framework is reflected in
this volume's Table of Contents, which identifies those sections of the
report that are yet to be developed. The "Introduction" and "Background
and Approach" sections also reflect the overall scope of the TIM effort.
However, to permit separate distribution and use of specific subject area
reports, each of those reports will contain an executive summary, a brief
description of the background and approach for the ongoing Joint TIM Group
study in that subject area, and supporting appendices.
This volume of reports is published in notebook form to facilitate
the incorporation of new material and any revisions or updates to the
overall report. Any material subsequently provided will be prepared for
insertion in the TIM notebook, and the date of initial publication or most
recent revision will be indicated.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1
2.0 BACKGROUND AND APPROACH
2-1
3.0 PERSONNEL ISSUES (FINAL REPORT)
3-1
4.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
(STATUS REPORT)
4-1
5.0. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE (FINAL REPORT)
5-1
6.0 DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES (FINAL REPORT)
6-1
7.0 DEPENDENCE ON OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS*
8.0 MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
(FINAL REPORT)
8-1
9.0 JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES (FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL)*
10.0 EXERCISE PARTICIPATION*
11.0 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS*
12.0 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS*
*To be completed.
V
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(TO BE COMPLETED)
vii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Revised
September 1988
1-1
The capability to mobilize and use the Nation's telecommunications
resources to meet national security needs is a vital national concern. In
the United States, telecommunications are supplied predominantly through
the private sector. The telecommunications industry thus plays a critical
role in ensuring the Nation's ability to effectively mobilize its
resources.
Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Telecommunications Functions," assigns to the National
Security Council (NSC) responsibility for advising and assisting the
President "in coordinating the development of policy, plans, programs and
standards for the mobilization and use of the Nation's commercial,
government, and privately owned telecommunications resources in order to
meet national security or emergency preparedness requirements." The
National Communications System (NCS) is to assist the President and the
National Security Council in the performance of these responsibilities.
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the NCS
Committee of Principals (COP) to assist the NCS and NSC in identifying
possible impediments to effective telecommunications industry mobilization
and mobilization planning and developing corrective actions to overcome
any identified impediments.
The Joint TIM Group was charged by the NSTAC and the NCS COP to
address seven mobilization subjects:
(1) Personnel Status, Protection, and Relocation,
(2) Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure,
(3) Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements,
(4) Dependence on Foreign Sources,
(5) Dependence on Other Infrastructure Systems, e.g.,
Transportation and Electric Power,
(6) Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories, and
(7) Jurisdictional Issues (Federal, State, and Local).
The Joint TIM Group was directed to report on these subjects to the NSTAC
through its Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) and to the NCS COP
through its Council of Representatives (COR).
1-3
Achievement of this goal will require extensive effort by the Joint
Group over a considerable length of time. When completed, this report
will document the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Joint
TIM Group in the seven mobilization subjects specified. It will also
describe the TIM exercise activities undertaken by the Joint Group and
document the results of those activities. An evolutionary framework for
completing this report was therefore created. This will permit the Joint
TIM Group to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the
NSTAC and the NCS COP as specific subject areas are completed. A schedule
of milestones for the completion of the TIM study is presented in
Figure 1-1.
Within this evolutionary framework, the overall background for the
report and the overall approach used by the Group in developing its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations are described in Section 2.0.
The seven mobilization subjects will be addressed in Sections 3.0
through 9.0. TIM exercise activities and results will be described in
Section 10.0. The overall conclusions and recommendations of the Joint TIM
Group will be presented in Sections 11.0 and 12.0 respectively. An
overall Executive Summary will be developed for the Final Report.
1-4
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM)
Overall Schedule
CY 1986
CY 1987
CY 1988
CY 1989
I. Mobilization Subjects
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
(1) Personnel Issues
(2) Service Surge Requirements
(3) Mobilization Management
1-5
Structure
(4) Dependence On Foreign Sources
(5) Infrastructure Systems
(6) Stockpiles/Inventories
(7) Jurisdictional Issues
II. Exercise Activities
III. Final Report
Key:
0 Study Initiated
Study Completed
Status Report
Exercise
FIGURE 1-1
OVERALL SCHEDULE
2.0 BACKGROUND AND APPROACH
Revised
September 1988
2-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2.1 Background
2-5
2.2 Approach
2-7
APPENDICES
2-A IMPLEMENTATION MEASURE 9, "TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
MOBILIZATION," NSEP TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLAN OF ACTION
2-11
2-B MEMBERSHIP OF JOINT TIM GROUP
2-15
2-C NSTAC CHARGE TO IES AND PROPOSED TIM APPROACH
2-19
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
2-1 MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
2-9
2-3
The joint industry-government telecommunications industry mobiliza-
tion (TIM) study is part of the ongoing joint NSEP telecommunications
planning effort carried out by the NCS and the NSTAC. The NSTAC is
composed of senior officials of leading telecommunications companies and
was established to provide information, advice, and assistance to the
President for national security emergency preparedness (NSEP)
telecommunications. Since its creation by Executive Order 12382 in 1982,
the NSTAC has addressed a series of important NSEP telecommunications
issues including telecommunications industry mobilization. The NCS COP is
a Government body composed of representatives of the 22 NCS member
organizations. It serves as the principal government forum for the review
and consideration of NSEP telecommunications matters.
In creating the Joint TIM Group, the NSTAC and the NCS COP acted upon
recommendations developed by the NSTAC Telecommunications: Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Task Force. The Joint Group subsequently used the work
of the original NSTAC TIM Task Force as the starting point for its more
detailed analyses of the mobilization subjects identified by the Task
Force as warranting further study.
2.1 Background
In December 1984, the NCS asked the NSTAC to assist the Government in
assessing telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities. The NCS request to the NSTAC reflected the
provisions of the TIM Implementation Measure (Implementation Measure 9)
contained in the NCS NSEP Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA). The
TIM Measure calls for "Federal government leadership for and assistance to
telecommunications mobilization planning activities. The first
milestone in the Measure was to obtain the views and recommendations of
the NSTAC regarding telecommunications industry mobilization and
mobilization planning capabilities.
In response to the Government's request, the NSTAC charged its
Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) to assist the Government in bringing
the issue into sharper focus and to develop recommendations regarding a
future role for NSTAC in the area of telecommunications industry
mobilization. The IES, in turn, established a TIM Task Force and
instructed it to develop an issue statement that:
0 Provided a definition of mobilization for NSTAC purposes,
0 Established the scope of the TIM issue,
1
Implementation Measure 9, "Telecommunications Industry Mobilization,"
of the National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications
Plan of Action is Appendix 2-A.
2-5
0 Identified and discussed the mobilization subjects that could be
most fruitfully addressed by the NSTAC, and
0 Offered specific recommendations for further NSTAC actions.
The TIM Task Force defined and clarified the telecommunications
industry mobilization issue, identifying seven areas for further study by
industry and government:
(1) Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements,
(2) Personnel Status, Protection, and Relocation,
(3) Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories,
(4) Dependence on Foreign Sources,
(5) Dependence on Other Infrastructure Systems, e.g.,
Transportation and Electric Power,
(6) Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure, and
(7) Jurisdictional Issues (Federal, State, and Local).
The figdings of the TIM Task Force were documented in a two-volume
report and presented for review and approval at the October 9, 1985
meeting of the NSTAC. The NSTAC subsequently charged its IES to assist
the NCS in addressing the seven mobilization subjects identified.
In response to the NSTAC's findings and recommendations, a Joint
Industry-Government TIM Group was established by the NSTAC and the NCS
COP. The Joint TIM Group is composed of five industry members
representing interexchange carriers, local exchange carriers, and
manufacturers, and five Government members. representing those NCS member
organizations with key mobilization roles. 3 The Joint TIM Group is
chaired by the Assistant Manager for the Joint Secretariat of the Office
of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS). An industry representative serves as the
vice chair of the Joint TIM Group.
In establishing the Joint TIM Group, the NSTAC and the NCS COP agreed
that the Group would initially address three of the seven mobilization
subjects identified by the NSTAC TIM Task Force: Personnel Status,
2 Final Report of the Telecommunications: Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement," and Volume II, "Background
and Supporting Materials," September 5, 1985.
3 The membership of the Joint TIM Group is identified in Appendix 2-B.
2-6
Protection, and Relocation; Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements;
and Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure. The Joint
TIM Group was to report to the NSTAC and the NCS COP on a continuing
basis, presenting its findings, conclusions, and recommendations as they
became available. As the initial studies were completed, the Joint TIM
Group would then take up the remaining mobilization subjects on a
sequential basis until all had been addressed.'
2.2 Approach
The Joint TIM Group is using the work of the original NSTAC TIM Task
Force as the starting point for more detailed analyses of the seven
mobilization subjects. However, a set of objectives for the overall TIM
study was also defined to guide the Group's efforts. The overall
objectives reflect the provisions of the TIM Implementation Measure in the
NCS NSEP Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA), calling for:
0
The identification of possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and
mobilization planning and the recommendation of
corrective actions
0
The identification and recommendation of any Federal
government actions needed to support teleçommunications
industry mobilization planning activities
In addition, the Joint TIM Group defines a series of near term objectives
to guide its efforts in specific subject areas. For example, the near term
objective established for the personnel area was to present a substantive
report on Personnel Issues at the sixth meeting of the NSTAC in May 1986
and at the July 1986 meeting of the NCS COP. Similar objectives are
established in other subject areas as the Joint TIM Group effort proceeds.
As the first step in addressing a specific subject area, the Joint
TIM Group reviews the findings of the original NSTAC TIM Task Force in
that subject area. These findings are in the form of questions or issues
to be addressed and are included in each of the Joint TIM Group's subject
area reports. As part of its review and assessment of the original NSTAC
TIM Task Force's findings, the Joint TIM Group identifies the information
needed to supplement the experience and current knowledge of its members
and arranges for briefings and written materials to be provided by
relevant Federal Government and private sector organizations. Industry
4
The NSTAC charge to the IES and the TIM approach approved by the IES
and the NCS COP are provided in Appendix 2-C.
2-7
members also obtain data from their companies. This information is
discussed and assessed in Group meetings. In addition, the Group visits
industry and Government facilities to gain first-hand information and
insights into specific procedures and capabilities relating to
mobilization.
As information is acquired and reviewed by the Group, each area of
concern is assessed in terms of:
(1) Is there a requirement? If so, what is its nature or
extent?
(2) What is the capability of industry to respond? Is this
adequate? If not, how can it be improved?
(3) Are there any impediments to improving the capability?
If so, how can these impediments be overcome or removed?
The Joint TIM Group works within the context of the mobilization
definition developed by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications resources
needed to make the transition from a normal state 6 to a state
of readiness for war or other national emergency.
However, the Joint TIM Group has further agreed that, for purposes of its
studies, mobilization is considered to encompass the interval from
peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent conventional military actions
external to the continental United States, as illustrated in Figure 2-1.
The impact on the telecommunications industry of a nuclear attack upon the
United States is judged by the Joint TIM Group to involve reconstitution,
as opposed to mobilization, issues and is therefore not addressed.
The following set of four mobilization time periods is being used by
the Joint TIM Group as a further aid in sorting, organizing, and assessing
mobilization capabilities:
(1) Pre-Mobilization: Planning and Pre-Positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 days (Reallocation and
Reprioritization of Existing Capability and Service)
(3) Mid-Term: 90 to 180 days (Reallocation and
Reprioritization of Products and Services in the
Pipeline)
6 Final Report of the Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force: Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement," p.5.
2-8
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL AS CONSIDERED
BY JOINT TIM GROUP
MILITARY ACTIONS
OUTSIDE CONUS WITHOUT
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
PEACETIME - DISASTER - CRISIS
TRANS-ATTACK
POST-ATTACK
EARLY
LATE
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR NOT
AS CONSIDERED BY
CONSIDERED BY JOINT TIM GROUP
JOINT TIM GROUP
-----
MOBILIZATION AS
CONSIDERED
BY TIM GROUP
FIGURE 2-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
2-9
(4) Long-Term: Over 180 days (Expanded Production of
Capacity and Services.)
As a final step, the Joint Group summarizes its findings in
each area, stating conclusions, identifying any follow-on or
remedial actions that might be needed, and developing specific
recommendations for accomplishing such actions. These findings,
conclusions, and recommendations are then documented in the subject
area sections of this report.
Following the completion of the seven subject area studies,
overall conclusions and recommendations will be developed by the
Joint TIM Group on the basis of its analyses and the results of TIM
exercise activities, and incorporated in a final TIM report.
2-10
APPENDIX 2-A
IMPLEMENTATION MEASURE 9
"TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION"
NSEP TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLAN OF ACTION
2-11
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION
I.
PREPAREDNESS AREA: National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP)
Telecommunications
II.
IMPLEMENTATION MEASURE: Provide Federal government leadership for and
assistance to telecommunications industry mobilization planning activities.
III. STATUS: Included in current programs
IV.
EXPECTED BENEFIT: The Nation's dependence upon commercially provided
telecommunications systems makes it essential that adequate provisions are made for
the effective mobilization of the productive resources of the commercial
telecommunications industry, including its capability to meet surge demands and to
supply adequate human resources to support mobilization. This measure provides for
Federal government action to encourage, support, and enhance telecommunications
industry mobilization planning activities. These actions would be undertaken in
coordination with the Industrial Mobilization Working Group (IMWG) of the Emergency
Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Accomplishment of this measure will assist the EOP in executing the
responsibilities assigned by Section 2(c)(1)a of Executive Order 12472.
V.
IMPLEMENTING MILESTONES
Deliverable
Organization
Date
a. Obtain the views and recommend-
NSTAC Report
OMNCS
3 FY 86
ations of the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) with respect to
telecommunications industry
mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities, providing
any necessary technical assistance
for NSTAC study and deliberations
b. Identify possible impediments
Report/
OMNCS/COP
4 FY 86
to effective telecommunications
Recommend-
industry mobilization and mobil-
ations
ization planning (e.g., regulatory
and legal constraints) and
recommend corrective actions.
C. Identify and recommend, in
Draft
OMNCS/COP
1 FY 87
consultation with the EMPB IMWG,
Recommend-
any Federal government actions
ations
needed to support telecommunica-
tions industry mobilization
planning activities
d. Forward to EOP for review and
Transmittal
OMNCS
2 FY 87
assignment of responsibilities
of COP
for action
Recommend-
ations
2-13
APPENDIX 2-B
MEMBERSHIP OF JOINT TIM GROUP
Revised
August 1988
2-15
JOINT INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM) GROUP
Industry Members
ATT
Mr. John P. Miller
BELLCORE
Mr. W. Gordon Ramsey
MARTIN MARIETTA
Mr. John R. Hocker
NORTHERN TELECOM
Dr. John S. Edwards
ROCKWELL
Mr. James T. Carter
Government Members
DOD
Mr. Donald Kraft
DOJ
Mr. Luin Fitch
FEMA
Mr. Steven F. Hood
GSA
Mr. J. B. Brilliant
NTIA
Mr. Arthur J. Altenburg
Chair
OMNCS
CAPT Terrence N. Danner, USN
Vice-Chair
NORTHERN TELECOM
Dr. John S. Edwards
Other Participating Organizations
MCI
ITT
CONTEL ASC
GTE
DOS
2-17
APPENDIX 2-C
NSTAC CHARGE TO IES AND
PROPOSED TIM APPROACH
2-19
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM)
NSTAC CHARGE TO IES
ASSIST THE NCS IN FURTHER STUDYING AND RECOMMENDING
ACTIONS REGARDING:
- TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
- PERSONNEL STATUS, PROTECTION, AND RELOCATION
- MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
- DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES
2-21
- DEPENDENCE ON OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
- GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE
— JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES (FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL)
PROVIDE STATUS REPORT AT NEXT NSTAC MEETING
PROPOSED APPROACH
ADDRESS TWO OR THREE SUBJECTS INITIALLY
- ONE SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO
INDUSTRY (PERSONNEL STATUS, PROTECTION, AND
RELOCATION)
- BEGIN IDENTIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
2-22
SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
- ONE SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO BOTH
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY
MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE)
SEEK INDUSTRY (IES) - GOVERNMENT (COR/COP) AGREEMENT
PROPOSED APPROACH (CONCLUDED)
ESTABLISH INDUSTRY/GOVERNMENT TIM GROUP
- Industry members via NSTAC
- Manufacturers
(3)
Martin Marietta, Rockwell,
& Northern Telecom
- Interexchange Carrier
(1)
AT&T
2-23
- Local Exchange Carrier
(1)
Bellcore
- Government members via NCS COR/COP
- DOD/OJCS
(1)
— DOC/NTIA
(1)
- FEMA
(1)
— FCC/DOJ
(1)
— GSA
(1)
- Chair: OMNCS
NCS 488/4
3.0 PERSONNEL ISSUES
(FINAL REPORT)
September 1987
3-1
ADDENDUM
On October 6, 1987, the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) of the
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) approved
the recommendations made in this report, subject to a revision of the
wording of the first recommendation. The IES-approved recommendation is
as follows:
(1) The NCS, in conjunction with the telecommunications
industry, should continue to monitor the potential
effects of mobilization on telecommunications industry
personnel. Experience gained from military and civil
preparedness exercises and real world contingencies
should be used for this purpose.
3-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
3-7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3-9
3.1 Introduction
3-13
3.2 Background/Approach
3-13
3.3 Findings
3-17
3.3.1 Draft, Reserve, and National Guard Obligations
3-17
3.3.2 Employee Status Tracking
3-28
3.3.3 Physical Protection/Support
3-29
3.3.4 Relocation/Movement of Personnel
3-30
3.3.5 Training/Skill Levels
3-31
3.3.6 Work Force Expansion
3-32
3.3.7 Providing for Key Personnel and Their Families
3-32
3.4 Conclusions
3-33
3.5 Recommendations
3-34
APPENDICES
3-A SUMMARY OF TIM TASK FORCE FINDINGS
3-35
3-B CATEGORIES OF RESERVISTS SUBJECT TO CALL-UP
3-39
3-C ANALYSIS OF RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD OBLIGATIONS
3-45
3-D IMPACT OF CONSCRIPTION ON THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
3-61
3-E CANDIDATE POSITIONS/SKILLS
3-73
3-F DOD DIRECTIVES 1200.7, "SCREENING THE READY RESERVES"
AND 1100.18, "WARTIME MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING"
3-77
3-G INITIAL TIM GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS
3-93
3-5
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
3-1 MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
3-15
3-2 EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX AT SELECTED FACILITIES
3-21
3-2 EXTRAPOLATED EFFECT OF THE DRAFT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY FOR A LONG-TERM MOBILIZATION
3-24
C - 1 EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX AT SELECTED FACILITIES
GRAPHIC DEPICTION
3-50
D-1 PERCENTAGE OF THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORK FORCE
AFFECTED BY VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE DRAFT
3-70
LIST OF TABLES
Table Number
3-1
PERCENTAGE OF US TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
EMPLOYEES AT SELECTED FACILITIES WITH RESERVE/NATIONAL
GUARD OBLIGATIONS
3-19
3-2
EFFECT OF THE DRAFT ON THE U.S. AND THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY WORK FORCE IN THE SHORT-TERM
3-23
3-3
TOTAL NUMBER OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY PERSONNEL
INDUCTED AND/OR CALLED UP
3-26
C - 1 DATA SOURCES
3-47
C - 2 EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX AT SELECTED FACILITIES
3-49
C-3
RESERVE/OBLIGATED PERSONNEL BY COMPANY
3-51
C-4 JOB TITLE TOTALS
3-51
D-1
DRAFT-ELIGIBLE POPULATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY-1986 ANNUAL AVERAGE DATA
3-66
D-2 DRAFT AGE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MALES
ESTIMATED TO BE DRAFT-QUALIFIED
3-67
D-3
EFFECT OF DRAFT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
DURING THE SHORT-TO-MID-TERM
3-69
D-4 NUMBER OF AT&T PERSONNEL BY JOB CATEGORY
3-72
D-5 NUMBER OF NTI PERSONNEL BY JOB CATEGORY
3-72
3-7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The telecommunications industry plays a critical role in assuring the
Nation's ability to effectively mobilize its resources. The impact of
mobilization on telecommunications industry personnel is thus a key area of
concern in evaluating the overall ability of the industry to maintain its
existing service and production capabilities and to accommodate increased
service and equipment demands under mobilization conditions.
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
(TIM) Group was established by the President's National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
Communications System (NCS) Committee of Principals (COP) to assist the NCS
in the performance of mobilization responsibilities assigned in Executive
Order 12472. This report documents the final findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Joint TIM Group regarding personnel issues.
Using the work of the NSTAC TIM Task Force as the starting point for
more detailed analysis of telecommunications industry mobilization
personnel issues, the Joint TIM Group reviewed and analyzed the following
personnel issues: (1) Draft, Reserve, and National Guard Obligations, (2)
Employee Status Tracking, (3) Physical Protection/Support, (4) Relocation/
Movement of Personnel, (5) Training/Skill Levels, (6) Work Force Expansion,
and (7) Providing For Key Personnel and Their Families.
Conclusions
The Joint TIM Group has concluded that a military mobilization call-up
would not significantly affect the telecommunications work force in the
Short- and Mid-Term from either a qualitative or quantitative perspective.
Only about 2% of the industry's work force would be affected during this
period. In the Long-Term, the Group concluded that a higher percentage of
telecommunications industry personnel could be affected, perhaps as high as
4-8%. However, the Joint Group concluded that the industry would have time
during the Short- and Mid-Term to plan for these potentially greater
losses.
Although the Joint Group determined that a system for tracking the
military obligations of employees could be useful, it concluded that, given
the estimated small number of employees initially affected, telecommuni-
cations companies would probably not establish or maintain such systems
unless directed to do so by the Federal government. The Group anticipates
that the estimate of affected employees will continue to be assessed during
future NCS and joint industry-government military and civil preparedness
exercises.
3-9
The need for special measures for the physical protection or support
of industry personnel under conditions other than nuclear attack is not
anticipated and is not being planned for by the telecommunications
industry. The Joint Group agreed that there is little or no risk of
attacks on the vast majority of industry personnel in crisis or other
emergencies short of a nuclear attack on the United States. Taking this
information into consideration, the Joint TIM Group determined that there
is no need for extraordinary measures to ensure the physical security and
protection of industry personnel under the conditions addressed in this
report.
On the basis of its initial work, the Joint TIM Group found that there
could be impediments to the transportation of installers or maintenance
personnel to and from field sites under emergency conditions. The Group
concluded that requirements for the priority movement of telecommunications
personnel should be identified and incorporated in DOT emergency plans.
Such efforts are being carried out by the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Office of the Manager NCS, (OMNCS). The Group also concluded
that, as part of its later study of Jurisdictional Issues, it should
review, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), State and
local provisions for the priority movement of telecommunications industry
personnel and materials during mobilization.
The Joint Group concluded that, in the Short- or Mid-Term mobilization
time periods, there is no urgent need for new or additional training
programs. For Long-Term mobilization, the Group concluded that any
increased numbers of skilled personnel needed by the industry could be
supplied by existing training facilities and programs, with principal
reliance on technical schools and in-company training.
The Joint TIM Group also agreed that, for a period of six months, the
telecommunications industry could maintain, or even increase, present
levels of service or production with work forces at their current, or
slightly reduced, levels. Major work force expansion would thus not be
required in the Short- or Mid-Term. However, the Group also agreed that if
mobilization lasted for a longer period during which demand for service
continued to increase, an expansion of existing work forces might be
required.
The Joint TIM Group determined that there is no need for extraordinary
measures to ensure the physical security and protection of key personnel
and their families under the conditions addressed in this report.
3-10
Recommendations
Based on the information and conclusions developed during the Joint
Group's study of personnel issues, the Group recommends the following:
(1) The NCS and the telecommunications industry should periodically
assess the potential effects of mobilization on telecommunications industry
personnel, using both military and civil preparedness exercises and real
world contingencies for this purpose.
(2) If, as a result of continuing personnel impact assessment,
changes are discovered in the composition of company and/or industry work
forces and skill mixes, or increases are found in the estimated percentages
of industry personnel affected by draft/Reserve/National Guard obligations,
then individual companies should consider:
- Tracking the military obligations of their employees (i.e.,
potential draftees and Reservists)
-
Identifying to the NCS occupational skills that they consider
critical in order to seek reinstatement of occupational draft
deferments
-
Requesting the transfer or discharge of identified key personnel
from the Ready Reserve
3-11
3.1 Introduction
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
(TIM) Group was established by the President's National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
Communications System (NCS) Committee of Principals (COP) to: (1) identify
possible impediments to effective telecommunications industry mobilization
and mobilization planning and (2) assist in the development of corrective
actions to overcome any identified impediments. The impact of mobilization
on telecommunications industry personnel is a key area of concern in
evaluating the overall ability of the industry to maintain its existing
service and production capabilities and to accommodate increased service
and equipment demands under mobilization conditions. This report documents
the Joint TIM Group's final findings, conclusions, and recommendations
regarding personnel issues. The NCS and the telecommunications industry
will, however, continue to assess the impacts of mobilization on
telecommunications industry personnel through participation in exercises.
3.2 Background/Approach
In December 1984, the NCS asked the NSTAC to assist the Government in
assessing telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities. In response to the Government's request, the NSTAC
charged its Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) to assist the Government
in bringing the issue into sharper focus and to develop recommendations
regarding a future role for NSTAC in the area of telecommunications
industry mobilization. The IES, in turn, established a TIM Task Force and
instructed it to develop a TIM issue statement.
The TIM Task Force defined and clarified the telecommunications
industry mobilization issue, identifying seven areas for further study by
industry and Government, including Personnel Status, Protection, and
Relocation. The personnel findings of the TIM Task Force were included in
a two-volume report1 and presented for review and approval at the October
9, 1985 meeting of the NSTAC. The NSTAC subsequently charged its IES to
assist the NCS in addressing the seven mobilization subjects identified,
including personnel issues.
In establishing the Joint TIM Group, the NSTAC and the NCS COP agreed
that the Group would initially address three of the seven mobilization
subjects identified by the NSTAC TIM Task Force: Personnel Status,
Protection, and Relocation; Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements;
and Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure. The Group
was to work first toward the development of a substantive report on
Personnel Issues for presentation to the NSTAC and the COP.
i Final Report of the Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement, and Volume II, "Background
and Supporting Material," September 5, 1985.
3-13
The Joint TIM Group used the work of the original NSTAC TIM Task Force
as the starting point for more detailed analysis of telecommunications
industry mobilization personnel issues. The Group's overall objectives in
the personnel area reflect the provisions of the TIM Implementation Measure
in the NCS National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP)
Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA), calling for:
- The identification of possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization planning
and the recommendation of corrective actions
- The identification and recommendation of any Federal Government
actions needed to support telecommunications industry mobilization
planning activities.
As a first step toward the accomplishment of these objectives, the
Joint TIM Group reviewed the personnel findings of the original NSTAC TIM
Task Force, as documented in its September 1985 report. These findings
were in the form of questions or issues to be addressed and are provided as
Appendix 3-A. The Joint TIM Group then sought detailed information from
relevant Federal government agencies, including the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Selective Service System (SSS), the Department of Transportation
(DOT), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Industry
members also obtained data from their companies. In addition, a visit was
made to an industry facility where special procedures had been developed
and implemented to handle rapid expansion, which required the introduction
of new, untrained employees.
The Joint TIM Group worked within the context of the following
definition of mobilization developed by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications
resources needed to make the transition from a normal
state to 2 state of readiness for war or other national
emergency.
Mobilization was considered to encompass peacetime/disaster/crisis through
subsequent conventional military actions external to the continental United
States as shown in Figure 3-1. The impact of a nuclear attack on
telecommunications industry personnel was judged by the Joint TIM Group to
be outside the scope of its study. Four mobilization time periods were
also used by the Joint TIM Group in analyzing personnel issues:
2 Final Report of the Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement", p.5.
3-14
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
AS CONSIDERED BY
JOINT TIM GROUP
MILITARY ACTIONS
OUTSIDE CONUS WITHOUT
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
PEACETIME -- DISASTER -- CRISIS
TRANS-ATTACK
POST-ATTACK
EARLY
LATE
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
AS CONSIDERED BY
NOT CONSIDERED BY
JOINT TIM GROUP
JOINT TIM GROUP
MOBILIZATION AS
CONSIDERED BY
TIM GROUP
FIGURE 3-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
3-15
(1) Pre-Mobilization: Planning and Pre-Positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Existing Capability and Service)
(3) Mid-Term: 90 to 180 days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Products and Services in the Pipeline)
(4) Long-Term: Over 180 days (Expanded Production of Capacity and
Services)
The original NSTAC TIM Task Force summarized its concerns in the
personnel area as follows:
The maintenance of key personnel in critical positions is a
significant telecommunications industry mobilization
concern. However, firms typically do not ask for information
on employees' reserve/draft status because of possible legal
ramifications (e.g., discrimination suits). Government and
industry action is needed to define an acceptable method for
acquiring and maintaining the information needed to determine
employee status. Means for protecting key telecommunications
industry personnel from competing demands for technically-
trained personnel, including military demands, also need to
be addressed by both government and industry.
It may also be necessary for companies to move or relocate
essential employees as part of a mobilization effort. The
practical aspects of personnel movement (e.g., availability
of vehicles and 3 fuel or ability to pass roadblocks) also need
further study.
The following specific issues were raised by the original NSTAC TIM Task
Force:
(1) Draft, Reserve, and National Guard Obligations
(2) Employee Status Tracking
(3) Physical Protection/Support
(4) Relocation/Movement of Personnel
(5) Training/Skill Levels
(6) Work Force Expansion
(7) Providing For Key Personnel and Their Families
3 Final Report of TIM Task Force, Volume I, p.9.
3-16
The Joint Group decided that these seven issues encompass adequately the
personnel aspects of mobilization from the perspective of the
telecommunications industry.
The preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Joint TIM Group were presented in its May 22, 1986 report to the NSTAC and
the NCS COP. In response to questions raised by the NSTAC and the NCS COP,
the Joint TIM Group subsequently gathered and analyzed additional data on
the draft and Reserve/National Guard obligations of telecommunications
industry personnel. Two data sources were used: (1) a survey conducted in
a small number of industry facilities and (2) detailed data on 1986
telecommunications employment demographics obtained from the Department of
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The results of this follow-on
data collection and analysis effort are described in section 3.3.1 below.
3.3 Findings
To maintain continuity with earlier efforts, the personnel-related
findings of the Joint Group are presented below in terms of the seven
issues originally identified by the NSTAC TIM Task Force.
3.3.1 Draft, Reserve, and National Guard Obligations
Despite the high level of automation of both carriers and
manufacturers, the original NSTAC TIM Task Force was concerned that the
ability of the telecommunications industry to meet critical demands under
conditions of mobilization might be adversely affected by the loss of key
personnel. A military mobilization call-up could entail activation of
reserve components⁴ as well as the draft of males from the ages of 18
through 25 by means of the Selective Service System (SSS). Sudden
withdrawal of trained employees would be likely to occur at times of surge
demand for telecommunications service.
The following employee categories were initially identified by the
Joint TIM Group as being of particular concern:
- Trained technicians in the prime draft age range (18-25) 5
- Technical specialists who are currently members of reserve
components
- Others occupying key managerial or operational positions who are
members of reserve components
4
Reserve components include: the Army National Guard, the Army
Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National
Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Categories of
reservists subject to call-up are identified in Appendix 3-B.
5 According to the Selective Service System, registrants aged 26 and
over are no longer maintained on active file.
3-17
Also, telecommunications industry personnel who are retired from the
military services are subject to recall. The Joint TIM Group considered
the potential effect of a military retirees recall on the
telecommunications industry as a whole. It also considered potential
effects on particular geographic areas where there may be significant
concentrations of military retirees. In these areas, those service
providers affected would move personnel from less affected areas to meet
operational requirements. The Joint Group decided that the loss of
personnel through a recall of military retirees was not a major concern.
The principal focus of the Joint Group's investigation of draft,
Reserve, and National guard obligations was assessment of the overall
quantitative and qualitative effects of a loss of industry personnel on
telecommunications industry operations, and the identification of
approaches for minimizing losses.
Quantitative Effects
The overall number of telecommunications personnel who might be
affected by a military call-up was investigated by the Group in two
phases. Although telecommunications companies do not keep formal,
centralized records of the military status of employees, the industry
members of the Joint TIM Group indicated that informal records of status
are kept at department and supervisory levels within companies. Therefore,
to estimate the likely impact of a military call-up, industry members first
obtained informal information from the personnel and operating departments
of their companies. On the basis of this information and industry
experiences during strikes and other emergencies, the Joint TIM Group
initially concluded that the overall impact of a military call-up on
telecommunications personnel would be minimal, both for carriers and
manufacturers. This conclusion was based on the Group's finding that only
a small percentage (approximately 2% in the Short- and Mid-Term) of company
employees would be affected, and that vacated positions could be filled by
other employees with similar training.
Following the submission of its initial report⁶, the Joint Group
undertook more detailed investigations of the effects of the two components
of a military mobilization: (1) a Reserve/National Guard call-up' and
(2) a resumption of the draft.
6 The Joint Group completed an initial Personnel Issues report in May,
1986. The NSTAC and NCS COP raised questions regarding the Draft,
Reserve and National Guard obligations conclusions, prompting the more
detailed investigation and subsequent revision of the Personnel Issues
report.
7 Additional data on the civilian occupations of Reserve personnel may
also be available in the near future through the Defense Manpower Data
Center.
3-18
The extent of the Reserve/National Guard obligations of industry
personnel was investigated through the analysis of data obtained from a
survey distributed to a small number of TIM industry member facilities and
from the personnel data bases of two other companies. 8 Since the survey
was intended as a trial effort, definitive results were not expected.
Nonetheless, some inferences may be drawn from its results. The overall
results, as shown in Table 3-1, confirmed that about 1 to 2% of employees
(male and female combined) had Reserve/Guard obligations. 9 This compares to
a national average of 1.5 % for all industries.
TABLE 3-1
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY EMPLOYEES
AT SELECTED FACILITIES WITH RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD OBLIGATIONS
NUMBER WITH
PERCENTAGE
COMPANY
NUMBER OF
RESERVE/GUARD
WITH
FACILITY
EMPLOYEES
OBLIGATIONS
OBLIGATION
SURVEY RESPONSES
AT&T
377
2
.5
Bellcore
168
11
6.5
NTI
267
6
2.2
Subtotal
812
19
2.3
DATABASE EXTRACTS
Martin Marietta
4401
25
.6
Rockwell
86
9
10.5
Subtotal
4487
34
.8
TOTAL
5299
53
1.0
8 See Appendix 3-C for a more detailed explanation of the survey
methodology and results.
9 Based on size of Reserve forces as reported by DOD, and size of
civilian work force as reported by Bureau of Labor Statistics for
calendar year 1986.
3-19
The survey results, however, varied considerably across facilities.
Some facilities are likely to be quite heavily affected by mobilization
(e.g. 10% personnel loss), even though most are not. In addition, the data
showed marked demographic differences among facilities, further indicating
that mobilization could affect each facility differently. These
demographic differences are shown in Figure 3-2, which presents the data by
age and sex.
In contrast to Reservists, future draftees cannot be specifically
identified. Further, since the Selective Service System (SSS) does not
classify registrants as to their suitability for induction 10 it is not
possible to ascertain whether individual registrants would actually be lost
to industry if the draft were reinstituted. Therefore, a different
approach, based on national employment data obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and on data obtained from the SSS, was used to determine
the number of telecommunications personnel who might be affected by the
draft.
In accordance with current law, a draft call-up would be conducted as
a lottery among all registrants (males from the ages of 18 through 25).
Because of its random nature, the draft can thus be assumed to affect the
same proportion of draft-eligible men employed by the telecommunications
industry as it does for the general draft-eligible population. Therefore,
an estimate of the number of telecommunications personnel likely to be
inducted can be derived from a calculation of the proportion of individuals
from the general draft-eligible individuals likely to be inducted, as
formulated below.
Total Inducted (US POP.)
=
F
=
Total Inducted (TELECOMM POP.)
Total Eligible (US POP.)
Total Eligible (TELECOMM POP.)
Total Inducted (TELECOMM POP.) = F X Total Eligible (TELECOMM POP.)
% Work Force Lost (TELECOMM) =
Total Inducted (TELECOMM POP.)
Total Work Force (TELECOMM POP.)
The current draft-eligible population is approximately
15,247,000. 11 Current policy on the number of personnel to be inducted
is 100,000 within 30 days after mobilization is declared. 12 However,
a
10 The term "inducted" will be used to indicate actual entry into the
Armed Forces; the term "draft-eligible" to mean a male within the 18-25
age range. Draft-eligible registrants may be found unsuitable for
induction based on physical or psychological factors, or the granting of
draft deferments.
11 Total number of registrants on file during 1986.
12 Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense (MR&L) to Director, SSS
dated November 1980.
3-20
100
100
AT&T
BELLCORE
84.8
80
80
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
5
5
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
Age Range
Age Range
100
00
NTI
MARTIN MARIETTA
80
80
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
5
5
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
Age Range
Age Range
M
= MALE
F
= FEMALE
AT&T, Bellcore, and NTI data based on survey responses.
Martin Marietta (MMIC) data based on database extract.
Rockwell data did not include age/sex information
FIGURE 3-2
EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX
AT SELECTED FACILITIES
3-21
policy that would instead require 300,000 within 90 days is now under
consideration by DOD. Using these current and proposed policies as the low
and high bounds for the number of inductees required in the Short-Term
(0 to 90 days), it can be estimated that .66 to 2.0 per cent of the general
draft-eligible population would be inducted. For example, the low
percentage is computed as follows:
Total Inducted (US POP.)
F
100,000
=
=
=
.0066
=
.66%
Total Eligible (US POP.)
15,247,000
Applying this same proportion (.66 %) to the number of draft-eligible
personne] 13 in the telecommunications industry (114,000), the results are as
follows:
Total Inducted (TELECOMM POP.) = .0066 X 114,000 = 750
% Work Force Lost (TELECOMM) = 1,849,000 750 X 100 = .04%
The estimated percentage of the overall industry work force likely to
be inducted in the Short-Term is very small, i.e., 750 to 2,250 employees.
This small number is due both to the small draft requirement in the
Short-Term and the small number of draft-eligible telecommunications
employees. This number represents .04-.12 percent of the
telecommunications work force (see Table 3-2). Table 3-2 also provides
more detailed data on the number of draft-eligible individuals in the
telecommunications industry, the number likely to be inducted, and the
percent of work force likely to be inducted for the service and
manufacturing sectors, respectively, in the Short-Term (0 to 90 days).
The number of inductees required in the Long-Term is dependent on the
scenario assumed, and there is no current policy on which to base an
estimate. Lacking a definitive Long-Term requirement, two historical data
points--World War II and the Vietnam War--were used to explore potential
Long-Term effects on the telecommunications industry work force.
During World War II, U.S. forces grew to over 12 million. During the
Vietnam War, about 1,100,000 individuals were in service at any one time as
a result of the draft. To illustrate the potential effect of a draft
larger than that anticipated in the Short-Term upon telecommunications
industry personnel, the ratio of the percentage of work force lost for
every 100,000 total inductees can simply be extrapolated. However,
extending the extrapolation to World War II draft levels introduces a
problem: the demand for inductees exceeds the supply available under
current policy (see Figure 3-3).
13 See Appendix 3-D for the details of the application of this
methodology.
3-22
TABLE 3-2
EFFECT OF THE DRAFT ON THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
WORKFORCE IN THE SHORT-TERM
(NUMBERS IN THOUSANDS)
PERCENT OF
DRAFT
NUMBER
WORK FORCE
WORK FORCE
ELIGIBLE
INDUCTED
INDUCTED
UNITED STATES
Total Civilian
108,055+
15,247*
100 - 300
.09 - .28
TELECOMMUNICATIONS**
Service
1,322
71
.5 - 1.4
.04 - 11
Manufacturing
517
43
.3 - .85
.06 - .16
TOTAL TELECOMM
1,849
114
.75 - 2.25
.04 - .12
+Source = Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1987.
*Source = Director, Selective Service System, private communication.
**Source = Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (1986 twelve month averages),
microdata tapes.
SIC = Standard Industrial Code (SIC) codes used:
Service: 481, 482, 489
Manufacturing: 365, 366
3-23
CURRENT
ELIGIBLE
DRAFT POOL
6.0
WWI
4.8
% OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
WORK FORCE (1986) INDUCTED
3.6
CURRENT QUALIFIED
DRAFT POOL
2.4
1.8
VIET NAM
1.2
DRAFTEES
IN-SERVICE
.6
0
1.5
3.0
4.5
6.0
7.5
9.0
10.5
12.0
13.5
15.0
SIZE OF U.S. DRAFT (IN MILLIONS)
FIGURE 3-3
EXTRAPOLATED EFFECT OF THE
DRAFT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY AS A RESULT OF HYPOTHETICAL
LONG-TERM FORCE REQUIREMENTS
3-24
This problem of demand exceeding supply is a result of the fact that
not all individuals currently eligible for the draft (males, ages 18
through 25) will be found qualified for induction. Data from the Vietnam
War indicates that only about 36 out of 100 draft-age males would be found
qualified. 14 When this qualification factor is applied to the current
draft-eligible population of 15,247,000, a total of only 5,489,000
potential inductees results. This is less than the World War II
requirement of 12,000,000, and suggests that existing draft policies and
assumptions would be subject to change under Long-Term mobilization
conditions.
Figure 3-3 illustrates the results of the extrapolation of the Joint
Group's Short-Term estimates to the Long-Term. The horizontal axis
illustrates a range of draft levels (actual and projected), including the
actual number of inductees during World War II and Vietnam and points
representing national draft-eligible and draf-qualified pools, as currently
defined by the SSS. The vertical axis shows the resulting percent of the
telecommunications work force that would be inducted.
As indicated in Figure 3-3, the maximum number of individuals that
could be inducted under current elegibility and qualification criteria is
5,489,000. This number falls about midway between the actual figures for
Vietnam and World War II. At the current draft-eligible level (the high
end of the range shown in Figure 3-3), the percent of telecommuniations
industry personnel that could be affected rises to 6.2% (114,000
individuals).
Table 3-3 summarizes the combined effect of a call-up of the Reserves
and a resumption of the draft. In the Short-Term, the total impact would
be less than 2% of the telecommunications industry work force, thus
confirming the Joint Group's earlier estimate. Although the Mid-Term was
not analyzed due to the lack of policy guidelines, it probably would not
differ significantly from the Short-Term. A call-up of the Reserves
represents the dominant effect in the early stages of mobilization (1.5%
versus 0.1% for the draft), and would be completed in the Short-Term.
For the Long-Term, two points along the range illustrated in Figure
3-3--current draft-qualified and current draft-eligible pools--are used as
low and high estimates. Over this range (draft-qualified through
draft-eligible), the impact of the draft exceeds the impact of a maximum
call-up of the Reserves. Under these assumptions, the combined impact of
losing both inductees and Reserve/National Guard personnel in the Long-Term
could approach 4-8% of the industry work force. However, the Joint Group
judged that companies would have time during the Short-and Mid-Term, when
losses would be relatively small, to plan for potentially greater losses of
personnel during a Long-Term mobilization. With such planning, the Group
judged that the impact of these potentially greater losses of personnel
would be minimal.
14
Vietnam-era data is the most recent. A very similar figure (1 in 3)
was provided by an SSS official during a briefing to the TIM Group in
response to a question.
3-25
TABLE 3-3
TOTAL NUMBER OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES
INDUCTED (DRAFTED) AND/OR CALLED UP
SHORT TERM
SHORT TO LONG TERM
(0 - 90 DAYS)
(0 - TO BEYOND 180 DAYS)
Number of
Percent of
Number of
Percent of
Employees
Employees
Employees
Employees
Reserves
27,750*
1.5%
27,750
1.5%
Draft
2,250
.1%
41,000 - 114,000
2.2 6.2%**
TOTAL
30,000
1.6%
68,750 - 141,750
3.7% -7.7%
*Based on 1.5% of work force, the national average. This is consistent with survey results reported above.
**Based on hypothetical Long-Term draft requirements.
3-26
Qualitative Effect
The overall qualitative effect of a military call-up on levels of
service and production was also investigated by the Joint TIM Group. The
telecommunications industry as a whole has not attempted to identify, for
mobilization purposes, either key positions or critical occupational
skills. However, an initial effort was made by the Group's industry
members to identify candidate positions and skills. 15 On the basis of
its preliminary findings and discussions, the Joint Group agreed that, in
the Long Term (over 180 days), the loss of employees occupying critical
positions could affect service and production.
Although the overall number of industry personnel potentially affected
by mobilization appears small, the Group considered the possibility that
the loss of a small number of employees in critical positions might have a
disproportionate effect. Therefore, the Group supplemented its initial
efforts to identify candidate positions and skills by including a question
about "job title" in its survey of a small number of TIM industry member
facilities. The resulting data was analyzed for any unusual concentration
of Reserve/Guard or draft age employees in particular job or skill
categories. The survey data indicated that the job title "service
technicians" (Bellcore) may deserve closer study. Further, there seemed to
be a slight concentration of obligated personnel in the more technical
occupations, although the data on this was inconclusive.
The data also suggested that demographic factors such as age and sex
vary appreciably between companies and facilities, and these factors may
affect the impact of mobilization on any given facility or company.
Minimizing Personnel Losses
In investigating the effect of a military mobilization call-up on the
telecommunications industry, the Joint TIM Group learned that existing
Federal government policies and procedures could be used by
telecommunications 16 industry companies to minimize the loss of
personnel.
In the case of Reserve components, the DOD encourages employers to
identify both the key technical and managerial positions within their
companies and the Reserve status of employees holding such positions.
Designation of key positions and screening of key employees are the
principal mechanisms established to preclude conflicts between the needs of
civilian activities and the military during a mobilization. Using the
procedures and guidelines established by DOD, companies may, under specific
conditions, recommend key employees for removal from the Ready Reserve.
15
See Appendix 3-E.
16 See Appendix 3-E, DOD Directives 1200.7 and 1100.18.
3-27
In the case of potential draftees, the Joint Group initially believed
that occupational deferments could be granted by the Selective Service
System (SSS). The Group later learned that SSS regulations no longer
provide for the granting of occupational deferments based on employment.
Occupational deferments were revoked by the SSS in 1970 based on authority
provided by Executive Order 11527. 17 In revoking occupational
deferments, the SSS stated that "no occupations are now critical or
essential to the nation #18 However, the Director, Selective Service,
with the advice of the National Security Council, retains the authority to
reinstate occupational deferments when needed. Although the procedure for
granting occupational deferments is no longer in place, it could be
reinstated if the telecommunications industry (as well as other industries
critical to national security) could demonstrate that certain categories of
their draft-eligible employees occupy positions "critical or essential to
the nation". This would, however, have to be done before any mobilization
began.
Summary
The Joint TIM Group concludes that a military mobilization call up
would not significantly affect the telecommunications work force in the
Short-and-Mid Term from either a qualitative or quantitative perspective.
Although the loss of employees from a military mobilization could affect
the telecommunications work force more significantly in the Long Term,
adequate time is available to make provisions to compensate for any adverse
effects that might occur.
3.3.2 Employee Status Tracking
In considering the effects of military mobilization on industry
personnel, the original NSTAC TIM Task Force determined that up-to-date
information on the draft or Reserve status of employees would enable
employers to develop more precise estimates of personnel losses and their
impact on company operations. However, the original Task Force also
indicated that many companies are hesitant to ask for and maintain
information on the draft/Reserve status of their employees.
The industry members of the Joint TIM Group also have significant
reservations about maintaining records on, or even inquiring about, the
current military status of employees. While telecommunications companies
represented on the Joint TIM Group are supportive of the Reserve or
National Guard activities of their employees and cooperate fully in
granting leave to fulfill these obligations, the companies prefer that any
arrangements necessary for meeting these obligations be made between the
affected employee and his local management. This attitude is consistent
17 Amending the Selective Service Regulations," Executive Order 11527,
April 23, 1970.
¹⁸ₛSS Headquarters Local Board Memorandum No. 105, April 23, 1970.
3-28
with the prevailing philosophy within the industry of maintaining only
those personnel information records required by law or necessary for
company operations.
Companies are particularly concerned about seeking to obtain or record
information that might expose them to charges of discrimination or invasion
of privacy. Reservists are required by DOD directive to inform
employers of their Reserve status. However, companies are not required to
maintain records of this information, and there appears to be no mechanism
in place, either in Government or industry, to determine if Reservists have
fulfilled this requirement. DOD maintains records on every Reservist, and
each Reservist's record contains a "civilian occupation code". The code is
not sufficiently detailed, however, to permit the identification of
telecommunications industry personnel.
Although the Joint TIM Group has determined that an industry system
for tracking the military obligation of its employees could be useful, the
Group concluded that, given the estimated small number of employees
initially affected, telecommunications companies would probably not
establish or maintain such systems unless directed to do so by the Federal
government. The Group anticipates that the estimates of affected employees
will continue to be assessed during future exercises.
3.3.3 Physical Protection/Support
The original NSTAC TIM Task Force considered the possible need to
physically protect and support key industry personnel under certain
mobilization conditions (e.g., nuclear alert). The Joint TIM Group,
however, excluded nuclear scenarios from its current study and thus
addressed this question from the perspective of threats posed by systematic
terrorism or sabotage under crisis or conventional war conditions.
Acts of terrorism or sabotage involving physical attacks on
telecommunications facilities are conceivable under a variety of
scenarios. Terrorist actions might also be directed against specific key
individuals within the industry. However, in crises or other emergencies
short of a nuclear attack on the United States, the Joint TIM Group agreed
personnel. that there is little or no risk of attacks on the vast majority of industry
This assessment was supported by the industry members of the Group,
who indicated that most telecommunications companies do not currently plan
to take extraordinary measures to protect employees under non-nuclear
mobilization conditions. Companies having plans to provide such protection
or support are concerned primarily with nuclear attack. The need for
special measures for physical protection or support of industry personnel
in general under other conditions, including mobilization, is not
anticipated and is not being planned for.
19 See Appendix 3-F.
3-29
Taking this information into consideration, the Joint TIM Group
determined that there is no need for extraordinary measures to ensure the
physical security and protection of industry personnel under the conditions
addressed in this report.
3.3.4 Relocation/Movement of Personnel
The possible need to provide for relocation or priority movement of
industry personnel was identified by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force.
The question of relocating employees was judged by the Joint TIM Group as
relevant only to a nuclear attack scenario and thus outside the scope of
this study. However, the Joint TIM Group did consider the possible need to
provide for the priority movement of industry personnel during a
mobilization, either to ensure continuity of management or to carry out the
installation, inspection, or servicing of telecommunications equipment.
The Group also reviewed the problem of transporting a large task force of
emergency workers, equipment, and supplies from their normal work site (or
storage site) to the site of a major national level emergency.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) maintains a Civil
Transportation Priority List that provides for the assignment of priorities
for the movement of communications-related equipment under emergency
conditions. At the time of the Joint Group's initial consideration of
Personnel issues, the List did not provide for the priority movement of
industry personnel who might be needed to install, operate, or maintain
such equipment. However, DOT indicated that it would be willing to accept
recommendations regarding the priority movement of key industry personnel.
DOT emergency plans do not address the question of local movement of
communications equipment or movement other than by interstate, "for-hire"
transportation. The Joint TIM Group reviewed potential impediments to
local or short-range transportation of installers or maintenance personnel
to and from field sites under emergency conditions as well as the
home-to-work movement of key employees. The Group also discussed the
difficulties associated with properly identifying industry personnel to
local authorities and ensuring access to emergency sites. The Group
concluded that, while such impediments could seriously affect industry
service or manufacturing operations, they could be addressed more
effectively at State and local levels than at the national level. The
Group agreed, however, that FEMA should encourage State and local emergency
management authorities to make provisions for emergency movement of
telecommunications industry material and personnel during crisis,
mobilization, or other major emergency conditions. Such provisions should
also be exercised at the Command Post Exercise (CPX) level and higher.
On the basis of its review, the Joint TIM Group concluded that
requirements for the priority movement of telecommunications personnel
should be identified and incorporated in DOT emergency plans. The Group
also concluded that, during its later study of Jurisdictional Issues, it
should review, with FEMA, the State and local provisions for the priority
3-30
movement of telecommunications industry personnel and materials during
mobilization. As a result of the Joint TIM Group's initial recommendations
in its May 1986 report, the Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS) has been
working with the DOT to revise the List. A draft revision is currently
being reviewed within the Government.
3.3.5 Training/Skill Levels
The original NSTAC TIM Task Force raised general questions about
increased training requirements and the impact of shortages of trained
technicians and engineers during a mobilization effort, but concluded that
it was not a priority area of concern. The training/skill level concerns
identified by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force focused on the possible
need to train personnel in the specific skills necessary for managing,
operating, maintaining, and supplying the telecommunications industry, as
opposed to training personnel to carry out their functions under
mobilization conditions. The Joint TIM Group revisited these issues and
reached similar conclusions.
The Joint TIM Group found that telecommunications industry
organizations rely on technical schools and company training programs,
including on-the-job training, for the development of their skilled
technicians. Production workers are usually trained on the job or in short
programs offered by employers.
The Joint TIM Group reviewed the need for training various categories
of personnel to meet any losses in number, as well as any increased
demands, resulting from mobilization. The Group agreed that, in general,
skills training was not necessary--and could not be effectively brought to
bear--in either the Short-Term (0-90 days) or Mid-Term (90-180 days). One
possible exception is training for production tasks that require relatively
low skill levels. In these cases, the Joint Group concluded that training
programs could be conducted in the Mid-Term.
In the event of a Long-Term mobilization effort, the Joint TIM Group
determined that personnel might need to be trained to replace skilled
workers lost to military call-up or competing jobs. It was agreed that
current training programs would continue to be available and could be
operated on accelerated schedules. These programs could be staffed by
personnel, including industry retirees, not subject to military call-up.
The fact that some segments of the industry are currently experiencing
shortages of technicians and other qualified personnel in certain
geographic areas was noted. However, these shortages are not being
experienced uniformly throughout the industry and are not considered by the
Group to reflect any deficiencies in existing training facilities or
programs. The Group anticipates that current shortages will be relieved by
the transfer and relocation of currently available personnel to affected
areas and expanded/accelerated training programs.
3-31
The Joint TIM Group concluded that, in the Short- or Mid-Term
mobilization time periods, there is no urgent need for new or additional
training programs. For Long-Term mobilization, the Group concluded that
any increased numbers of skilled personnel needed by the industry could be
supplied by existing training facilities and programs, with principal
reliance on technical schools and in-company training.
3.3.6 Work Force Expansion
The original NSTAC TIM Task Force also raised the general question of
the possible need to expand telecommunications industry work forces in
order to meet significantly increased demands for services and equipment.
As in the case of training and skill levels, it was not considered by the
Task Force to be a priority area of concern, but was revisited by the Joint
TIM Group.
The Group determined that telecommunications industry companies
currently plan for expansion of their work forces only as required to meet
increases in levels of service or production resulting from normal growth.
Most have not developed formal programs for expanding their work forces to
meet any rapid increases in demand for service or production that would
result from mobilization and associated emergency conditions.
In assessing the possible need for work force expansion under
mobilization conditions, the Joint TIM Group reviewed the problem in terms
of specific mobilization time periods. The Group agreed that the
telecommunications industry could maintain, or even increase, present
levels of service or production with work forces at their current, or
slightly reduced, levels for a period of six months. Major expansion would
thus not be required in the Short- or Mid-Term.
However, the Group also agreed that if mobilization lasted for a
longer period during which demand for service continued to increase, an
expansion of existing work forces might be required.
3.3.7 Providing for Key Personnel and Their Families
In reviewing this final question raised by the original NSTAC TIM Task
Force, the Joint TIM Group determined that this concern was relevant only
in a nuclear attack scenario and was therefore outside the scope of the
current study. The Group noted, however, that while some
telecommunications companies have limited plans and facilities for
protecting key employees (i.e., those necessary for the continuity of
operation and management) during and following a nuclear attack, most
companies do not. Several organizations also have strong security measures
in place to protect certain key personnel, particularly senior management
personnel, who might be likely targets of terrorists.
3-32
Most companies do not make special provisions for protecting or
sustaining key personnel and their families during mobilization or related
emergency conditions. The Joint TIM Group determined that there is no need
for extraordinary measures to ensure the physical security and protection
of key personnel and their families under the conditions addressed in this
report.
3.4 Conclusions
On the basis of the information derived from its analyses of survey,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and Selective Service System (SSS) data,
the Joint TIM Group concludes that a military mobilization call-up would
not significantly affect the operations of either carriers or manufacturers
in the Short- and Mid-Term. Only about 2% of the industry's work force
would be affected during this period. In the Long-Term, the Group
concluded that a higher percentage of telecommunications industry personnel
could be affected, perhaps as high as 4 - 8%. However, the Joint Group
concluded that the industry would have time during the Short- and Mid-Term
to plan for these potentially greater losses.
Although the Joint TIM Group determined that a system for tracking the
military status of its employees could be useful, the Group concluded that,
given the small estimated number of employees initially affected,
telecommunications companies would probably not establish or maintain such
systems unless directed to do so by the Federal government. The Group
anticipates that the estimate of affected employees will continue to be
assessed during future NCS and joint industry-government military and civil
preparedness exercises.
The need for special measures for physical protection or support of
industry personnel under conditions other than nuclear attack, including
mobilization, is not anticipated and is not being planned for by the
telecommunications industry. The Joint Group agreed that there is little
or no risk of attacks on the vast majority of industry personnel in crises
or emergencies short of a nuclear attack on the United States. Taking this
information into consideration, the Joint TIM Group determined that there
is no need for extraordinary measures to ensure the physical security and
protection of industry personnel under the mobilization conditions
addressed in this report.
On the basis of its initial work, the Joint TIM Group found that there
could be impediments to the transportation of installers or maintenance
personnel to and from field sites under emergency conditions. The Group
concluded that requirements for the priority movement of telecommunications
personnel should be identified and incorporated in DOT emergency plans.
Such efforts are being carried out by DOT and the OMNCS. The Group also
concluded that, during its study of Jurisdictional Issues, it should
review, with FEMA, State and local government provisions for the priority
movement of telecommunications industry personnel and materials during
mobilization.
3-33
The Joint TIM Group concluded that, in the Short- or Mid-Term
mobilization time periods, there is no urgent need for new or additional
training programs. For Long-Term mobilization, the Group concluded that
any increased numbers of skilled personnel needed by the industry could be
supplied by existing training facilities and programs, with principal
reliance on technical schools and in-company training.
The Joint TIM Group also agreed that, for a period of six months, the
telecommunications industry could maintain, or even increase, present
levels of service or production with work forces at their current, or
slightly reduced, levels. Major expansion would thus not be required in
the Short- or Mid-Term. However, the Group also agreed that if
mobilization lasted for a longer period during which demand for service
continued to increase, an expansion of existing work forces might be
required.
The Joint TIM Group determined that there is no need for extraordinary
measures to ensure the physical security and protection of key personnel
and their families under the conditions addressed in this report.
3.5 Recommendations
The Joint Group offered preliminary recommendations in its initial
report of May 22, 1986. These preliminary recommendations are provided in
Appendix 3-G. Based on the new information and conclusions developed
during the Joint Group's further study of personnel issues, the Group
recommends the following:
(1) The NCS and the telecommunications industry should periodically
assess the potential effects of mobilization on telecommunications industry
personnel, using both military and civil preparedness exercises and real
world contingencies for this purpose.
(2) If, as a result of continuing personnel impact assessment,
changes are discovered in the composition of company and/or industry work
forces and skill mixes, or increases are found in the estimated percentages
of industry personnel affected by draft/Reserve/National Guard obligations,
then individual companies should consider:
- Tracking the military obligations of their employees (i.e.,
potential draftees and Reservists)
-
Identifying to the NCS occupational skills that they consider
critical in order to seek reinstatement of occupational draft
deferments
-
Requesting the transfer or discharge of identified key personnel
from the Ready Reserve.
3-34
APPENDIX 3-A
SUMMARY OF NSTAC TIM TASK FORCE FINDINGS
3-35
The following findings concerning personnel issues are extracted from
the Final Report of the NSTAC TIM Task Force, dated September 5, 1985:
The maintenance of key personnel in critical positions is
a significant telecommunications industry mobilization
concern. However, firms typically do not ask for
information on employees's reserve/draft status because
of possible legal ramifications (e.g., discrimination
suits). Government and industry action is needed to
define an acceptable method for acquiring and maintaining
the information needed to determine employee status.
Means for protecting key telecommunications industry
personnel from competing demands for technically-trained
personnel, including military demands, also need to be
addressed by both government and industry.
It may also be necessary for companies to move or
relocate essential employees as part of a mobilization
effort. The practical aspects of personnel movement
(e.g., availability of vehicles and fuel or 6 ability to
pass roadblocks) also need further study.
The specific questions or issues raised by the original NSTAC TIM Task
Force were grouped under the following headings:
(1) Draft, Reserve, and National Guard Obligations,
(2) Employee Status Tracking Systems,
(3) Physical Protection/Support,
(4) Relocation/Movement of Personnel,
(5) Training/Skill Levels,
(6) Work Force Expansion,
(7) Providing For Key Personnel and Their Families.
3-37
APPENDIX 3-B
CATEGORIES OF RESERVISTS SUBJECT TO CALL-UP
3-39
RECALLABLE RESERVISTS
DEFINITIONS BY CATEGORY
SELECTED RESERVES
The Selected Reserve consists of units and individuals within the
Ready Reserve designated as so essential to initial wartime missions that
they have priority over all other Reserves. This category includes:
a. National Guard Units
Trained members of units manned and equipped to serve either as
operational or as augmentation units.
b. Reserve Units
Trained members of units manned and equipped to serve either as
operational or as augmentation units.
C. Reserve Individuals
(1) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). Trained
individuals preassigned to an active force organization.
3-41
(2) Trainees. Members of the Selected Reserve who are serving on
or scheduled for active duty for training will mobilize with their unit but
will neither train nor deploy with the unit.
READY RESERVES
a. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
A manpower pool consisting principally of individuals who have had
training and who have served previously in the Active Forces or in the
Selected Reserve and have some period of military service obligation
remaining.
b. Inactive National Guard (ING)
National Guard personnel in an inactive status who are attached to
a specific National Guard unit but do not participate in training
activities. Upon mobilization, they would mobilize with their units.
OTHER RESERVES
a. Standby Reserve
A pool of trained individuals who maintain their military
affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve. These individuals are
3-42
not required to perform training and are not part of units but could be
mobilized if necessary to fill manpower needs in specific skills.
b. Military Retirees
A pool of trained individuals consisting of:
Regular officers and enlistees under the age of 60 who have
completed at least 20 years of active duty and are retired with pay.
Reserve officers and enlistees who are otherwise eligible for
retired pay but have not reached age 60.
3-43
RECALLABLE RESERVISTS
AVAILABILITY BY SERVICE (in thousands)
CATEGORIES:
ARMY
NAVY
USAF
USMC
DOD
SELECTED RESERVES
National Guard Units
423.1
--
112.3
--
535.4
Reserve Units
272.1
125.0
68.7
38.8
504.6
Reserve Individuals
IMA
14.7
--
11.2
1.1
27.0
Trainees
62.8
5.5
3.8
4.3
76.4
READY RESERVES
Inactive National Guard
9.4
--
--
--
9.4
Individual Ready
301.6
93.8
42.5
55.0
492.9
Reservists
OTHER RESERVES
Standby Reservists
0.3
9.6
28.7
2.5
41.1
Military Retirees
226.2
174.3
374.6
44.2
819.2
Source: WARMAPS FY1987
3-44
APPENDIX 3-C
ANALYSIS OF RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD OBLIGATIONS
3-45
INTRODUCTION
The Joint TIM Group decided to pursue several paths in investigating
the effect on industry of a mobilization of Reserve/National Guard
obligated personnel. One approach was to survey telecommunications
personnel about their Reserve/National Guard obligations. A small, trial
survey was then undertaken in conjunction with the POWER SWEEP '87
exercise to test the workability of this approach. This report documents
the results of that survey.
Three TIM Group member companies volunteered to survey one of their
facilities, and two other companies provided aggregate data in place of
surveying a facility. Table C-1 shows the amount and type of data
received from each source.
TABLE C-1
DATA SOURCES
SURVEY DATA
COMPANY
RESPONSES
AT&T
377
Bellcore
168
NTI
267
NON-SURVEY DATA
COMPANY
FACILITY SIZE
Martin Marietta
4500
Rockwell
86
This data was analyzed to determine the proportion of responding
employees with Reserve/Guard obligations and whether this proportion
varied across companies, job skills, or other factors. Variation by job
skill, for instance, could be useful in identifying occupations unusually
sensitive to a mobilization.
Several factors limit the extent to which the findings of this survey
can be generalized, e.g. the small size of the trial survey and the
technique of focusing on one facility from each company. Further,
although the companies participating from the Joint TIM Group represent a
cross section of the telecommunications industry, the sample is probably
not representative for two reasons. First, the sample was drawn
20 Bellcore arranged for a facility operated by a Regional Bell Operating
Company to be surveyed. This report will refer to this as a "Bellcore"
facility since Bellcore provides the Joint TIM Group representative.
3-47
exclusively from facilities in the Northeast. This was done purposely,
with the intent that it might later be correlated with information derived
from military mobilization exercises planned for that region. Second, the
relative numbers of each type of facility throughout the industry is
likely to differ from the one used in the survey. Finally, since the
responses were purely voluntary, there is the problem of self-selection.
Therefore, the results can be used only to identify possible areas of
interest, rather than to develop definitive conclusions.
FINDINGS
The data shows that there are major demographic differences among the
facilities. Table C-2 presents the available data by company, age, and
sex. Figure C-1 displays the same data in graphic form.
The preponderance of the employees at AT&T's facility (62%) are
women, while there are virtually none (2%) at the Bellcore facility. Age
distributions also vary greatly. Bellcore's facility has no employees
under 27, for instance, whereas 42% or the personnel at Martin Marietta's
facility are in this range. These observations indicate that a military
mobilization, whatever its effect in the aggregate, will affect different
facilities to different extents.
Table C-3 shows the percentages of respondents, that identified a
Reserve/National Guard obligation at each facility. 21 The overall
percentage of surveyed personnel identified as Reserve/Guard-obligated was
2.3%. When the non-survey data is included, however, this figure drops to
1.0%. This is due to the size of the Martin Marietta sample, which tends
to overwhelm the other data. The facilities split into two groups: (1)
those with a relatively high percentage of obligated personnel, (Bellcore,
Rockwell), and (2) those with a relatively low percentage (all others).
This split tested as significant at the .95 level.
21 Direct comparisons between survey and non-survey data must keep in
mind the differences in how Reserve/Guard personnel were identified in
each. Survey data is based on self-identification. The Martin Marietta
data is based on which personnel took military leaves of absence over the
last year.
3-48
TABLE C-2
EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX AT SELECTED FACILITIES
AGE RANGE
COMPANY
18 - 22
23 26
27 - 32
33+
AT&T
Males
1
11
21
104
Females
6
25
41
153
Total
7
36
62
257
Bellcore
Males
0
0
21
134
Females
0
0
1
2
Total
0
0
22
136
NTI
Males
8
14
35
97
Females
5
10
26
56
Total
13
24
61
153
Martin Marietta
Males
336
732
772
1694
Females
87
171
202
504
Total
423
903
974
2198
Grand Total
Males
345
757
849
2029
Females
98
206
270
847
TOTAL
443
963
1119
2744
3-49
100
100
AT&T
BELLCORE
84.8
80
80
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
5
5
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
Age Range
Age Range
100
100
NTI
MARTIN MARIETTA
80
80
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
5
5
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
18-22
23-26
27-32
33+
Age Range
Age Range
M
= MALE
F
= FEMALE
AT&T, Bellcore, and NTI data based on survey responses.
Martin Marietta (MMIC) data based on database extract.
Rockwell data did not include age/sex information
FIGURE C-1
EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX AT SELECTED FACILITIES
GRAPHIC DEPICTION
3-50
TABLE C-3
RESERVE/OBLIGATED PERSONNEL BY COMPANY
COMPANY
EMPLOYEES
RESERVE/GUARD
PERCENTAGE
AT&T
377
2
.5
Bellcore
168
11
6.5
Martin Marietta
4401
25
.6
NTI
267
6
2.2
Rockwell
86
9
10.5
In addition to estimating the percentage of personnel that would be
affected by a call-up, the data was also analyzed for any indication that
particular occupational skills would be disproportionately affected. This
was difficult because of the great variety of job titles within and among
the facilities surveyed. As Table C-4 shows, one facility had a different
job title for every other employee. This is in part due to
counting different grades of the same title as different titles, e.g.
"Metalworker 2" would be different from "Metalworker 3".
TABLE C-4
JOB TITLE TOTALS
COMPANY
PERSONNEL
JOB TITLES
AT&T
377
74
Bellcore
168
18
NTI
267
184
The large number of job titles required that they be consolidated
before any meaningful analysis could be attempted. A strawman
consolidation of job titles was developed by the Joint TIM Group staff and
given to the participating industry members of the Joint TIM Group for
comment. The strawman consolidation attempted to group job titles into
categories sharing similar functions and occupational skills. One comment
was received. It suggested a matrix breakdown in which skills (clerical,
technical, management) formed the rows, and functions (operations,
operator services, sales/marketing, miscellaneous) formed the columns.
The matrix suggested was useful for the AT&T and Bellcore facilities, but
did not fit the mix of job titles at the NTI manufacturing facility, for
which the staff developed a similar matrix. Subsequent analyses were
performed on both the strawman and matrix groupings.
22
22 The strawman breakdowns of job categories for each company and the
job category matrices are included as an attachment to this Appendix.
3-51
The technique used to identify possible job categories in which a
disproportionate number of Reserve/Guard personnel are employed was to
test the percentages of obligated personnel in each category against the
remaining employee population and against each other category. 22 This
could be done for each company separately. However, it was impractical
for analyzing differences, if any, between companies because each facility
had a separate function and a separate set of job titles. The overall
results of this analysis were:
- At Bellcore's facility, 9 out of a total of 11 Reserve/Guard
employees came from the same job category, "Service Technician".
This represented 10% of employees in that category and was
significant at a .95 level in comparison with other categories
and with the facility population at large.
-
AT&T's facility had only two employees with Reserve/Guard
obligations, and no meaningful groupings of such a small number
for analysis were possible.
NTI's facility had only six employees with Reserve/Guard
obligations. All of these were found in the "Technical" row of
the job category matrix constructed for NTI. Although this
result tested as significant, it is probably not useful in
identifying skills of interest because of its generality. (The
"Technical" row of NTI's matrix included over 50% of its
employees.)
OBSERVATIONS
The results above indicate that a mobilization of Reserve/Guard
obligated personnel is likely to affect roughly 2% of the
telecommunications industry's employees. 23 This is in keeping with the
initial estimate of the Joint TIM Group, and compares to a national
average of 1.5%.
The results also indicate, however, that the effect on individual
facilities may differ considerably from the average effect. Some
facilities may lose 10% or more of their employees upon mobilization, even
though most lose only 2% or less. This difference is probably related to
the finding that the demographics of facilities vary greatly. Therefore,
although the overall figure of 2% may not give rise to concern, companies
may find it prudent to periodically perform a self-assessment of the
vulnerability of their individual facilities to personnel losses due to
military mobilization. Because the overall loss is likely to be small,
concentrated losses at individual facilities could probably be handled by
transferring employees from facilities less affected.
22 The statistical test used is described in pages 263-265 of Probability
and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists by Walpole and Myers.
23 This figure is consistent with the proportion of national
employment that is Reserve/Guard-obligated. Data from the DOD and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that this is about 1.5%.
3-52
A disproportionate concentration of obligated employees was found at
the Bellcore facility. Since no similar concentration was found at the
other facilities, caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from
this fact. The concentration found at the one facility surveyed may be
due to a hiring policy unique to that facility, may indicate that
personnel with the required skills are often recruited from the Armed
Service throughout the company, may reflect an aggressive recruiting
effort by the National Guard/Reserve in that area (perhaps through a
company employee), or may simply be an anomaly attributable to the small
survey size. A further investigation of the category of Service
Technicians seems called for within the company, however, since the
proportion of obligated employees in this category is so large.
3-53
ATTACHMENT
STRAWMAN CONSOLIDATION OF JOB TITLES FOR AT&T
Other
Sales
Account
---
Sales Associate
Account Executive
Sales Manager
Account Executive IC
Account Receivable
Sales Representative
Account Service
Specialist
Sales Specialist
Representative
Compensation Spec.
Account Support
MSS
Service
Representative
Marketing Support
Service Assistant
Specialist
Service Manager
Misc. Management
SOT
Service Order
Administrative
TG-5
Administrator
Supervisor
Service Order
Assistant Manager
Clerical
Administrator in MDC
Assistant Manager MDC
Branch Secretary
Service Order Writer
Assistant Manager PASC
Clerk
Service Representative
Assistant Sales Manager
File Operator
PASC Syr N.Y.
Grade II Clerk
Consultants
Branch Manager
Grade III Clerk
CSC
Data Sales Manager
Marketing Clerk
Communications
District Manager
Records Clerk
Consultant
Consumer Sales &
Reports Clerk
Communications Systems
Marketing - Area
Reports Clerk/FASC
Consultant
Manager
Consultant
Technical Consultant
Force Supervisor
Secretary District
Technical Consultant II
Group Manager
Senior Marketing Clerk
Group Manager - Operator
Senior Operations Clk.
Technicians
Services
Service Order Clerk
Communications
Industry Manager
Technician
Manager
Operator
Communications
Manager National
Operator
Technology
Services
Operator - Traffic
National Account Manager
Operator 1st Class
Operations Management
Operator Services
Operations Manager
Staff Assistant Mgr.
Manager
Operations Network
Staff Manager
TSPS & SOST Operator
Supervisor
Staff Supervisor
TSPS Operator
Operations Service
Store Manager
Manager
Supervisor
Operations Supervisor
Systems Manager
Operations Supervisor
Manager
Control Spec
3-55
STRAWMAN CONSOLIDATION OF JOB TITLES FOR BELLCORE
Cable Repair
Cable Repair Technician
Cable Repairman
Supervisor Cable Repair
Service
Service Repair Technician
Service Technician
SI & M
Service I & M
Service MTCE
Supervisor I & M
Management
Act. Supervisor
MRE Supervisor
Manager
Supervisor
Supervisor Dist. I&M
Other
---
D.I.R.T.
IR
Installer Technician
Network Technician
3-57
STRAWMAN CONSOLIDATION OF JOB TITLES FOR NTI
Assembly
Clerical
Test
Assembler
Bindery Clerk
Group Leader Test
Assembler I
Business Systems
Manager Test
Assembler II
Secretary
Engineering
Assembler III
Clerical
Test Engineer
Assembly Supervisor
Credit & Collection
Test Engineer I
Supervisor P.C. Assy
Clerk
Test Engineer II
Executive Assistant
Test Engineering
Mechanical
H.R. Clerk
Technician IV
Sheet Metal
Manufacturing Document
Test Technician
Sheet Metal Mechanic
Specialist
Test Technician II
Maint. Group Leader
Manufacturing
Maintenance
Documentation Clerk 2
Misc Engineering
Mechanic
Operations Secretary
Applications Engineer
Order Entry Clerk
Customer Engineer
Shipping
Order Processing Clerk
Electronic Technician
Head Shipping
Payroll Clerk
Firmware Technician
Packer
Production Inventory
Group Ldr P.C. Board
Stock Keeper II
Control Clerk
Industrial Engineer
Stockroom Clerk
Purchasing Clerk
Manufacturing Engineer
Supervisor Physical
Receptionist
Market Engineer
Distribution
Sales Clerk II
Mechanical Design
Secretary
Engineer
Engineering (NFI)
Secretary CS
Printed Circuit Designer
Engineer
Secretary to Controller
Engineer 2
Supervisor Order Entry
Senior Systems Engr
Engineer 4
Switchbrd Receptionist
Systems Engineer
Engineer I
Engineer Technician IV
Software Engineering
Quality Control
Engineering Technician
Programmer Analyst
Director QA
Senior Engineer
Programmer Analyst III
Group Leader QC
Senior Engineer
Quality Software
Q.C. Mechanical
Technician
Engineer
Inspector
Technician III
Senior Software
QC Technician
Technician V
Engineer
Quality Analyst
Software Designer
Quality Audit III
Hardware Engineering
Engineer
Quality Control
Hardware Design
Software Engineer
Inspector
Engineer I
Software Engineer I
Quality Control
Hardware Engineer
Software
Engineer II
Inspector II
Hardware Engineer III
Software
Engineer III
Quality Engineer
Hardware Technician II
Software
Intern
Quality Engineering
R & D Hardware Tech II
Software Technician III
Manager
Technician Hardware
3-58
STRAWMAN CONSOLIDATION OF JOB TITLES FOR NTI
(Continued)
Accounting
Graphics/Drafting
Personnel
Accounting Clerk
Drafter II
Dir, Human Resources
Accounting Clerk II
Drafter III
Employee Relations Rep
Associate Accountant
Graphic Artist
Manager Staffing
Associate Cost
Graphic Technician II
Staffing Assistant
Accountant
Typesetter
Charge Administrator
Other
Cost Accountant II
Product/Project
---
Management
Application Person
Finance/Contracts
CAD Systems
Computer System Support
Contracts Administrator
Administrator
Specialist
Contracts Proposals
CAD Unit Supervisor
Information Resources
Manager
Dir, Business Systems
Specialist
Cost Analyst
Manager Product
Intern
Financial Analyst
Management
Bearens Operator
Manager Project
Buyer
Tech Writing/Training
Administration
Checker
Senior Technical Writer
Manager Project
Deleco Present Manager
Systems Training
Management
Messenger
Specialist
Product Development
MTL's Manager
Technical Writer
Manager
Management Manufacturer
Technical Writer Q.A.
Product Manager
Site Manager
Trainer
Production Planner
Supervisor
Project Assistant
TST Group Leader
Marketing
Project Coordinator
Occupational Health
Account Manager
Project Manager
Nurse
Director Marketing
Senior Project Engineer
Operator III
Services
Photo Technician III
Manager Marketing
Misc Middle Management
Product Support
Administrator
Director
Specialist
Marketing Admin
Director Technology
Spray Painter
Assistant
Group Leader
System Support
Marketing Planner
Group Leader MIS
Specialist
Forecaster
Manager
System Support
Marketing Research
Manager Computer
Specialist II
Analyst
Systems Support
Technology Accounts
Marketing Strategic
Manager Design Services
Control Coordinator
Planning Intern
Manager FPA & Cost
Traffic Coordinator
Quotes and Proposals
Manager M.E.
Unit Manager
Coordinator
Manager Results
V.P. GM
Sales Administrator
Accounting
VP Operations
Assistant
Manager
System Sales
Telecommunications
System Sales Manager
Manager of Purchases
Systems Sales Manager
Sales Service Manager
Senior Group Leader
3-59
APPENDIX 3-D
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CONSCRIPTION
ON THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
3-61
INTRODUCTION
This appendix documents the Joint TIM Group's effort to estimate the
effect on telecommunications industry personnel of a resumption of the
draft (i.e., "conscription") during mobilization. The purpose was to
estimate the draft effect in terms of: the numbers, percentages, and age
groups affected; the variation by mobilization time period; and the
particular job categories that might be affected.
Currently, the Selective Service System (SSS), which implements
conscription when authorized by the Congress and the President
maintains a registry of virtually all U.S. male citizens and certain, other
males residing in the United States from the ages of 18 through 25. 25
However, the SSS does not classify its 15 million plus registrants
according to their draft status. Neither the individuals nor the SSS know
who is qualified for conscription. In contrast to Reservists, individuals
cannot identify themselves to their employers as draft-qualified, but only
as draft-eligible (i.e., registered with SSS). Therefore, a statistical
approach to estimating the number of telecommunications industry personnel
affected had to be adopted.
The approach consisted of the following steps:
1. Estimate the potential demand on telecommunications industry
personnel from a resumption of the draft
2. Estimate the supply of draft-qualified personnel employed by the
telecommunications industry
3. Estimate the effect in terms of the numbers, percentages, and
age groups affected. Project the magnitude of these effects from
the Short-Term to the Long-Term mobilization period.
4. Identify telecommunications job categories that may be
significantly affected, if any.
24
Induction into the Armed Forces after July 1, 1973 was revoked by the
Congress in Section 467 (cc), USC. 50., Military Selective Service Act.
25 In accordance with the definition of "between the ages of eighteen,
and twenty-six" in Section 466, USC 50., Military Selective Service Act
3-63
ESTIMATE OF THE DEMAND
Two estimates of the demand from the draft were used. The current
draft policy, in effect since 1980, 26 imposes a requirement on SSS to
deliver 100,000 men within 30 days after mobilization is declared. A
proposed policy, under consideration by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management and Personnel, is to require the SSS to deliver
approximately 300,000 personnel within 90 days after mobilization is
declared. 27 The current and proposed policies were used as the low and
high estimates, respectively, of the draft demand. These policies apply
only during the first 90 days, or Short-Term mobilization period as defined
by the Joint TIM Group. No policy requirement exists beyond the Short-Term
period. Therefore, historical data on past conscriptions as well as
current SSS data were used to estimate possible demand during the Long
Term.
To estimate the demand specific to the telecommunications industry, a
basic assumption was required. That assumption was that the percentage of
the U.S. draft-eligible population as a whole that is affected by a
resumption of the draft also applies to the draft-eligible population
within the telecommunications industry. The Group believed this to be a
valid assumption because the draft is based on a random drawing (i.e., a
lottery by birthdate), and therefore uniformly affects the entire
draft-eligible population (for each of the single-year age groups,
called-up). Therefore, the percentage demand for draft-eligible members of
the telecommunications work force would be the same as the percentage
demand for individuals from any other portion of the draft-eligible
population.
The total number of SSS registrants --the draft-eligible
population--on file during calendar year 1986 was 15,247,000. 28 The
application of the low and high draft requirements of 100,000 and 300,000
respectively, results in .66% and 1.97% of the draft-eligible population
affected. These percentages apply to the draft-eligible portion of the
telecommunications industry in accordance with the basic assumption stated
above. The resulting number of telecommunications personnel potentially
affected by these percentages is discussed in the next section.
26 Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense (MR&L) to Director, SSS
dated November 1980.
27 Updating the Inductee Delivery Schedule", Report FP 601R2, Logistics
Management Institute, March 1987
28 Telephone conversation with Ms. Mary Ellen Levesque, SSS, Operations
Directorate, March 1987. Also confirmed through private communication with
the Director, SSS.
3-64
Since the estimate of the draft requirement for the Short-Term is
expressed as a policy range, and no policy requirement is stated for the
Mid-Term (90-180 days), it is assumed here that the Mid-Term requirement is
also close to the requirements in this range.
For Long Term mobilization, historical and current SSS data may be
used as guides. During the peak of the Vietnam War military accessions
numbered over half a million per year. The largest U.S. conscription
occurred during World War II. In the five years from 1941 to 1945, U.S.
military force strength increased from under half a million to over 12
million. The largest portion of that expansion was as a result of
conscription. 29 Finally, for purposes of estimating a maximum draft
requirement, the entire 1986 draft-eligible population of 15,247,000 may be
used.
ESTIMATE OF THE QUALIFIED SUPPLY
The supply of draft-qualified personnel from the telecommunications
industry was estimated in two steps:
1. Determine the size of the draft-eligible population. This
population was taken to be equivalent to the number of
telecommunications male personnel from the ages of 18 through 25.
2. Determine the portion of the draft-eligible population that would
be draft-qualified.
For Step 1., data from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics
was used. The results of Step 1 are shown in Table D-1. Historical data
from the SSS was used to perform Step 2.
To estimate the portion of the draft-eligible population that would be
draft-qualified, data from the last two years of the Vietnam War was used.
This data is both the most recent available and is based on a total draft
population size that was about the same size as it is today. Using this
data, a draft qualification factor "Q" was estimated. This factor took
into account the number of personnel that would be deferred (adjusted for
occupational and student deferments, which are no longer in effect); the
number that would not pass the physical/mental entrance examinations; and
the number today that are in the Reserves and therefore would not be
drafted. 30 The numerical value of Q was estimated at .359. This means
that approximately 1 out of every three draft-eligible males registered
with the SSS would be found draft-qualified today. The results are shown
in Table D-2.
29 The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement
1945-1970. James M. Gerhardt, Ohio State University Press, 1974.
30 See TIM Group briefing, "Macro-Analysis: The Impact of Conscription
on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry. Addendum: Back-up Data."
May 20, 1987.
3-65
TABLE D-1
DRAFT ELIGIBLE POPULATION IN
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY - 1986 ANNUAL AVERAGE DATA*
(IN THOUSANDS)
TOTAL
TOTAL MALE
TOTAL DRAFT
(PERCENT OF
EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT
AGE MALES
ALL MALES)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1332
747
71
(9.5%)
Service Sector
(SICs +481, 482, 489)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
517
320
43
(13.4%)
3-66
Manufacturing Sector
(SICs +365, 366)
TOTAL INDUSTRY
1849
1067
114
(10.7%)
*Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from current population survey microdata tapes. Results provided by the Data Services Group, March 1987.
+SICs = Standard Industrial Codes
TABLE D-2
DRAFT AGE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MALES
ESTIMATED TO BE DRAFT-QUALIFIED
NUMBER
DRAFT AGE
DRAFT AGE
Q
MALES QUALIFIED
MALES
FACTOR
FOR INDUCTION
(IN THOUSANDS)
(IN THOUSANDS)
SERVICES
71
.359
25.5
SECTOR
MANUFACTURING
43
.359
15.4
SECTOR
TOTAL
114
.359
40.9
3-67
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS: PERSONNEL
The effect on telecommunications industry personnel was estimated for
both the Short-Term period (see Table D-3), for which a draft requirement
exists, and for the Long-Term period (see Figure D-1) for which no draft
requirement exists.
Short-Term Mobilization Effects
The effect of the draft during this period was estimated by comparing
the supply of draft-qualified industry personnel with the demand derived
from current/proposed draft policy requirements. The demand figures were
determined by applying the previously estimated percentages (.66%-1.97%) to
the size of the draft-eligible population in the telecommunications
services and manufacturing sectors. The results are shown in Table D-3.
The overall results are that during the Short-Term phase of mobilization,
only about 800 to 2,250 males employed by the industry would be drafted.
The numbers are small because: a) the stated demand, relative to the total
size of the draft-eligible population, is small, and b) the size of the
draft-eligible telecommunications population is small. The higher number
corresponds to about two-tenths of one percent of the male employees, and
only slightly more than half that figure for the total employee (male and
female) population. It is most likely that only 20 year olds would be
affected. This is because the 20 year olds represent the first age group
to be called-up, and because the supply of draft-qualified 20 year olds is,
most 31 grobably, higher than the 800- 2,250 draft requirement (Table
D-3).
Long-Term Mobilization Effects
Although no draft requirement is stated for the period beyond 90 days,
historical experience provides a rough guide. To estimate Long Term
effects, a linear extrapolation was made. The extrapolation projected the
percentage of todays industry population that would be affected up to the
point where the entire draft-eligible population would be drafted. The
extrapolation was made by multiplying successively the size of the U.S.
draft requirement --beginning with the high policy requirement of 300,000--
and computing (using the established ratio of .12% per 300,000 males figure
from Table D-3) the corresponding percentage of today's employee population
affected. This extrapolation is presented in Figure D-1. Several points
on the extrapolated line are of interest as they correspond to actual
historical conscription data point. First the point at about eight times
the 300,000 requirement, corresponds to the number of draft-qualified
males in service near the end of the Vietnam War. 32 Third, a point at
about forty times the requirement represents the maximum size of the U.S.
31
Note: The BLS data may not be statistically valid at the single year
age range for the telecommunications industry.
32 The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement
1945-1970. James M. Gerhardt, Ohio State University Press, 1974.
3-68
TABLE D-3
EFFECT OF DRAFT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
DURING THE SHORT TO MID-TERM
(IN THOUSANDS)
DRAFT
DRAFT
QUALIFIED
PERCENT ALL
PERCENT ALL
SECTOR
DEMAND
REQUIREMENT
SUPPLY
MALES
EMPLOYEES
RANGE
RANGE
AFFECTED
AFFECTED
Service
25.5
.5 - 1.4
.5 - 1.4
<.1- .19%
< .06 - .11%
Manufacturing
15.4
.3 - .85
.3 - .85
<.1- < .26%
< .06 - 15%
TOTAL
40.9
.8 - 2.25
.8 - 2.25
<.1- < .21%
< .06 - .12%
3-69
CURRENT
ELIGIBLE
DRAFT POOL
6.0
WWII
4.8
% OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
WORK FORCE (1986) INDUCTED
3.6
CURRENT QUALIFIED
DRAFT POOL
2.4
1.8
VIET NAM
1.2
DRAFTEES
IN-SERVICE
.6
0
1.5
3.0
4.5
6.0
7.5
9.0
10.5
12.0
13.5
15.0
SIZE OF U.S. DRAFT (IN MILLIONS)
FIGURE D-1
PERCENTAGE OF THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
WORK FORCE AFFECTED BY
VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE DRAFT
3-70
military force during the peak of World War II. 33 Finally, if the total
draft-eligible population today of about 15 million were to be drafted,
this would affect 6.2% of todays telecommunications population.
For purposes of estimating "worst case" impacts of the draft in the
Long-Term, it is suggested that the estimates for World War II and the
total draft-eligible population may be used. These estimates result in an
impact in the range of about 5-6% (see Figure D-1) for the
telecommunications employee population as a whole.
ESTIMATE OF AFFECTED JOB CATEGORIES
To estimate the effect of the draft on specific job categories, the
TIM Group's personnel survey data was used. (See Appendix 3-C for a
description of the survey methodology). Three of the four TIM industry
member company facilities surveyed provided employee job title data. One
of the three had no employees in the draft age range, and therefore was
eliminated from this part of the analysis. Results for the remaining two
companies--AT&T and NTI--are presented in Tables D-4 and D-5 below.
draft-eligible employees were identified as males, ages 18-25, who were not
members of the Reserves, and who were not designated as mobilization
augmentees (e.g., members of the National Defense Executive Reserve.)
The findings from the analysis of the limited survey data suggest that
there does not appear to be much clustering of draft affected job titles by
job category, except for some of the more technically oriented categories
"Technical/Sales/Marketing", "Hardware Engineering", and "Test". In
general, however, the Group did not believe that the survey sample was
large enough to draw any definite conclusions.
33
Ibid.
3-71
TABLE D-4
NUMBER OF AT&T PERSONNEL BY JOB CATEGORY
NUMBER OF DRAFT
AT&T
JOB CATEGORIES
ELIGIBLE
EMPLOYEES/TOTAL EMPLOYEES
Clerical/Ops
1/76
Technical/Ops
1/47
Technical/Ops. Services
1/53
Technical/Sales Marketing
5/81*
Management/Misc
1/33
TABLE D-5
NUMBER OF NTI PERSONNEL BY JOB CATEGORY
NUMBER OF DRAFT
NTI STRAWMAN
ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES/
JOB CATEGORIES
TOTAL EMPLOYEES
Clerical/Ops
3/25
Engineering (NFI)
1/19
Hardware Engineering
2/6*
Software Engineering
2/23
Test
2/9*
Quality Control
2/15
Other
2/45
*NOTE: Significant difference from rest of company at 95% confidence level.
3-72
APPENDIX 3-E
CANDIDATE POSITIONS/SKILLS
3-73
Q. What are the critical skills/crafts for network operations?
A. Critical Skills (not all inclusive)
Engineering
Central Office
Data Systems
Voice Systems
Transmission
Maintenance
Translation
Technicians
Central Office Installation/Repair
Circuit Layout
Computer Attendant
Repair Service
Special Services
Switching Equipment
Data Systems
Transmission Systems
Maintenance
Test
Trunk
Circuit Layout
Repair Service
Installation
Installation/Construction/Maintenance/Personnel
Cablers
Splicers
Installers
Loop Maintenance
Analog/Digital Carrier Systems
Central Office Operations (switchman, frame, power, etc.)
Network Management Center Personnel
Facilities Maintenance and Administration Center (FMAC) Personnel
3-75
Switching Control Center Personnel
Operations Support Systems Personnel (TIRKS, ELMOS, EADAS, etc.)
These are somewhat generic titles/crafts/skills. There is variation across
regions in titles. The list is not in order of importance and not all
inclusive. It is intended to be illustrative of the kinds of skills the Bell
Companies consider critical to the operation of their network.
Q. Which of these are currently in short supply?
A. None.
Q. What actions are being taken to address shortages today?
A. None. However, if shortages were to develop, positions could be
backfilled by other personnel within the companies, much as is done during
a strike situation, until new people could be trained. Adequate training
programs and facilities are in place to handle not only current demands,
by a very significant surge requirement.
Q. Which skills would be critical in a mobilization environment?
A. All of them. The consensus is that a short or mid-term mobilization would
pose no problems and that a long-term mobilization would be dealt with
with no significant problems.
Q. Percentage of male work force in 18-24 year age group.
A. About 1% (on the average).
Q. Reservists (as a percentage of male population)?
A. About 2%
Q. Annual growth rates? (Number of lines, trunks, attendant switching facilities
A. Estimated at about 3%.
3-76
APPENDIX 3-F
DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.7, SCREENING THE READY RESERVE
AND
DOD DIRECTIVE 1100.18, WARTIME MANPOWER
MOBILIZATION PLANNING
3-77
"
Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
THE was
April 6, 1984
NUMBER 1200.7
ASD(RA)
SUBJECT: Screening the Ready Reserve
References: (a) DoD Directive 1200.7, subject as above, November 28, 1978
(hereby canceled)
(b) Title 10, United States Code, Sections 269, 271, 272, 652,
672, 673, 674, 685, and 1005
(c) Executive Order 11190, "Providing for the Screening of the
Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces," December 29, 1964
(d) through (o), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a) to update and clarify DoD policy,
procedures, and responsibilities governing the screening of Ready Reservists,
consistent with references (b) and (c).
B. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Military Departments (including their reserve components). The term "Military
Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the
Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard (by agreement with the Department of Trans-
portation). Reserve components include the Army National Guard, the Army
Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard,
the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.
C. DEFINITIONS
The terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
D. POLICY
It is DoD policy that members of the Selected Reserve and other Ready
Reservists who are not on active duty shall be screened at least annually to
provide a Ready Reserve force composed of members who:
1. Meet Military Service wartime standards of mental, moral, professional,
and physical fitness.
2. Possess the military qualifications required in the various ranks,
grades, ratings, and specialties.
3-79
3. Are available immediately for active duty during a mobilization (or
during a war or national emergency or in response to a presidential order to
augment the active forces for an operational mission).
E. PROCEDURES
1. Reserve Component Screening Activities. The following general procedures
shall be followed to ensure the immediate availability of a Ready Reserve force:
a. Annual Screening. All Ready Reservists shall be screened at least
annually to ensure their availability. Upon mobilization, all screening activity
ceases, and all those remaining in the Ready Reserve shall be considered immedi-
ately available for active duty service.
b. Maintaining Current Data. The development and maintenance of
current information pertaining to the mobilization availability of Ready
Reservists shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of the Military Depart-
ment concerned.
C. Civilian Employment. After a mobilization is ordered, no deferment,
delay, or exemption from mobilization will be granted to Ready Reservists
because of their civilian employment.
d. Retention in the Ready Reserve. All Ready Reservists shall be
retained in the Ready Reserve for the entire period of their statutory obliga-
tion or voluntary contract. Exceptions to this policy are made in this Direc-
tive or may be made by the Secretaries of the Military Departments (10 U.S.C.
269, reference (b)).
e. Transfer of National Guard Members to the Standby Reserve. In
accordance with section 269(g) of reference (b), a member of the Army National
Guard or the Air National Guard may be transferred to the Standby Reserve only
with the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the state,
commonwealth, or territory concerned (including the District of Columbia).
f. Transfer from the Standby Reserve to the Ready Reserve. Under
section 272 of reference (b), any eligible member of the Standby Reserve may
be transferred back to the Ready Reserve when the reason for the member's
transfer to the Standby Reserve no longer exists (DoD Directive 1200.15,
reference (d)).
8. Extreme Hardship. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
shall screen extreme hardship cases (section 271a(5) of reference (b)). Ready
Reservists whose immediate recall to active duty during an emergency would
create an extreme personal or community hardship shall be transferred to the
Standby Reserve or the Retired Reserve or shall be discharged, as appropriate.
h. Miscellaneous Screening Requirements. Ready Reservists identified
in the following categories shall be processed as follows:
(1) Civilian Employment Restrictions. Ready Reservists who are
also DoD civilian employees may not hold a mobilization assignment to the same
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Apr 6, 84
1200.7
positions that they fill as civilian employees. These Ready Reservists shall be
reassigned or transferred, as appropriate. Reserve component unit civilian
technicians, as members of reserve units, are excluded from this provision.
(2) Theological Students. Ready Reservists who are preparing
for the ministry in an accredited theological or divinity school cannot be
involuntarily called to active duty or required to participate in inactive duty
training (10 U.S.C. 685, reference (b)). Accordingly, such Ready Reservists
(other than those participating in a military Chaplain Candidate or Theological
Student Program) shall be transferred to the Standby Reserve (active status)
for the duration of their ministerial studies at accredited theological or
divinity schools. Ready Reservists participating in a military Chaplain
Candidate or Theological Student Program may continue their Ready Reserve
affiliation and engage in active duty and inactive duty training.
(3) Health Care Professionals. Ready Reservists may not be
transferred from the Ready Reserve solely because they are students, interns,
residents, or fellows in the health care professions. Upon mobilization, they
either shall be deferred or shall be mobilized in a student, intern, resident,
or fellow status until qualified in the appropriate military specialty as pre-
scribed by the Military Department Secretaries (DoD Directive 1215.4, reference
(e)).
i. Availability Determinations. The Secretaries of the Military
Departments shall make determinations for mobilization availability on a case-
by-case basis, consistent with this Directive, and not by class or group
determinations.
j. Removal Determinations. Under this Directive, the Secretaries of
the Military Departments shall review recommendations for removal of employees
from the Ready Reserve submitted by employers and shall take appropriate action.
2. Screening Activities by Employers of Ready Reservists. In addition
to the Ready Reserve screening activities prescribed in this Directive to be
conducted by the Military Departments, employers of Ready Reservists also have
certain screening responsibilities under the law.
a. Nonfederal Employers. Under 44 CFR 333 (reference (f)), nonfederal
employers of Ready Reservists, particularly in the fields of public health and
safety and defense support industries, are encouraged to adopt personnel manage-
ment procedures designed to preclude conflicts between the emergency manpower
needs of civilian activities and the military during a mobilization. Employers
also are encouraged to use the federal key position guidelines contained
herein for making their own key position designations and, when applicable,
for recommending key employees for removal from the Ready Reserve.
11
b. Federal Employers. Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) A (reference
(g)) promulgated policy for Ready Reserve screening activities that shall be
accomplished by federal sector employers. To ensure that federal employees
3-81
essential to the continuity of the federal government are not retained as
members of the Ready Reserve, the following procedures shall apply:
(1) Key Positions. Some federal employees occupy positions that
cannot be vacated during a national emergency or mobilization without seriously
impairing the capability of their agency to function effectively. Because of
the essential nature of these positions, the federal agency head, or designee,
concerned shall designate such positions as key positions and shall require
that they not be filled by Ready Reservists to preclude such positions from
being vacated during a mobilization. The Military Department Secretaries shall
transfer Ready Reservists occupying key positions to the Standby Reserve or the
Retired Reserve or shall discharge them, as appropriate, under 10 U.S.C. 271 (b)
(reference (b)). However, reserve officers with a remaining military service
obligation at the time of their removal from the Ready Reserve may be transferred
only to the Standby Reserve, Active Status (section 1005 of reference (b)).
(2) Key Position Designation Guidelines. In determining whether
or not a position should be designated as a key position, the following questions
should be considered by the federal agency concerned:
(a) Can the position be filled in a reasonable time after
mobilization?
(b) Does the position require technical or managerial skills
that are possessed uniquely by the incumbent employee?
(c) Is the position associated directly with defense
mobilization?
(d) Does the position include a mobilization or relocation
assignment in an agency having emergency functions as designated by E.O. 11490
(reference (h))?
(e) Is the position directly associated with industrial or
manpower mobilization as designated in reference (h) and E.O. 10480 (reference
(i))
(f) Are there other factors related to national defense,
health, or safety that would make the incumbent of the position unavailable
for mobilization?
3. Removal Recommendations. All employers who determine that a Ready
Reservist is a key employee, in accordance with the guidelines contained in
this Directive, promptly should report that determination to the cognizant
reserve personnel center, requesting the employee be removed from the Ready
Reserve. The letter format shown in enclosure 3 should be used for such
recommendations and should be mailed to the cognizant reserve personnel center
listed in enclosure 4. All the information shown in the letter format should
be provided so the reserve personnel center can assess properly the matter and
take appropriate action.
4. Resolution of Conflicting Manpower Needs. In accordance with 44 CFR 333
(reference (f)), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the authority
3-82
Apr 6, 84
1200.7
to adjudicate, before mobilization, conflicts between the mobilization manpower
needs of the civilian sector and the military that the Ready Reserve screening
process has identified but has not resolved.
5. Individual Responsibilities of Ready Reservists
a. Each Ready Reservist who is not a member of the Selected Reserve
is obligated to notify the Secretary of the Military Department concerned of
any change of address, marital status, number of dependents, or civilian employ-
ment and any other change that would prevent the member from meeting mobili-
zation standards prescribed by the Military Service concerned (10 U.S.C. 652,
reference (b)).
b. All Ready Reservists shall inform their employers of their Reserve
military obligation.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)) shall
manage and control the overall Ready Reserve screening program in accordance
with section 271 of reference (b), E.O. 11190 (reference (c)), and House
Appropriations Committee Report 95-451 (reference (j)).
2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
a. Screen, at least annually, all Ready Reservists under their juris-
diction to ensure their immediate availability for active duty.
b. Ensure that personnel records systems incorporate information on any
factors that limit the mobilization availability of a Ready Reservist.
C. Ensure that all Ready Reservists have a favorably completed National
Agency Check (NAC) or Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC) on file.
d. Ensure that Ready Reservists not on active duty are examined as to
physical fitness in accordance with DoD Directive 1205.9 (reference (k)).
e. Process members of the Ready Reserve who do not participate
satisfactorily in accordance with DoD Directives 1200.15, 1215.5, and 1215.13
(references (d), (1), and (m)).
f. Transfer Ready Reservists identified as occupying key positions to
the Standby Reserve or the Retired Reserve or discharge them, as appropriate.
8. After making a removal determination in response to a petition for
such action, promptly transmit the results of that determination to the Ready
Reservist concerned and his or her employer.
G. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
The ASD(RA) shall provide:
1. Federal agencies with a listing of all federal employees who are also
Ready Reservists to assist them in conducting employer screening activities
3-83
required in FPC-9 (reference (g)). Responses from federal agencies shall be
reported under Interagency Report Control Number 0912-DoD-AN. Standard data
elements shall be used in the report in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.11
(reference (n)).
2. The House Appropriations Committee with an annual report on the status
of Ready Reservists employed by the federal government.
H. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of implementing
documents to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) within 120
days.
William H. 775
WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures - 4
1. References
2. Definitions
3. Letter Format to Cognizant Reserve Personnel Center for Requesting
That Employee Be Removed from the Ready Reserve
4. List of Reserve Personnel Centers to Which Reserve Screening
Determination and Removal Requests Shall Be Forwarded
3-84
Apr 6, 84
1200.7 (Encl 1)
REFERENCES (continued)
(d) DoD Directive 1200.15, "Assignment to and Transfer Between Reserve Cate-
gories, Discharge from Reserve Status, Transfer to the Retired Reserve and
Notification of Eligibility for Retired Pay," February 16, 1973
(e) DoD Directive 1215.4, "Medical Training in the Reserve Components,"
January 26, 1983
(f) Federal Emergency Management Agency Regulations, "Pescetime Screening,"
Chapter 1 (44 CFR 333)
(8) Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 9, "Federal Employees Who Are Members
of the Military Ready Reserve," March 27, 1979
(b) Executive Order 11490, "Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to
Federal Departments and Agencies," October 28, 1969
(i) Executive Order 10480, "Further Providing for the Administration of the
Defense Mobilization Program," August 14, 1953
(j) House Appropriations Committee Report 95-451, PP. 63-66
(k) DoD Directive 1205.9, "Physical Examinations and Annual Certificates of
Physical Condition of Reservists, as Required by Section 1004(a), Title
10, U. S. Code," October 6, 1960
(1) DoD Directive 1215.5, "Participation in Reserve Training Programs,"
May 25, 1979
(m) DoD Directive 1215.13, "Unsatisfactory Performance of Ready Reserve
Obligation," June 30, 1979
(n) DoD Directive 5000.11, "Data Elements and Data Codes Standardization
Program," December 7, 1964
(o) Title 3, United States Code, Section 19
3-85
Anr 6, 84
1200.7 (Encl 2)
DEFINITIONS
1. Defense Support Industry. Any business or corporation so determined by
FEMA.
2. Extreme Community Hardship. A situation that, because a reservist is mobi-
lized, may have a substantially adverse effect on the health, safety, or welfare
of the community. Any request for a determination of such hardship shall be
made by the reservist and must be supported by documentation as required by the
Secretary of the Military Department concerned.
3. Extreme Personal Hardship. An adverse impact upon a reservist's dependents
resulting from his or her mobilization. Any request for a determination of such
hardship shall be made by the reservist and must be supported by documentation
as required by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.
4. Key Employee. Any federal employee occupying a key position.
5. Key Position. A federal position that cannot be vacated during a national
emergency or mobilization without seriously impairing the capability of the
parent federal agency or office to function effectively. There are three
categories of federal key positions. The first two categories are, by defini-
tion, key positions. Only the final category requires a case-by-case determina-
tion and designation:
2. The Vice President of the United States or any official specified in
the order of presidential succession as set forth in 3 U.S.C. 19 (reference (o)).
b. Members of Congress, heads of federal agencies appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate, and the federal judiciary (District,
Circuit, and Supreme Court judges and justices only; all other positions within
the federal judiciary shall be considered under the provisions of paragraph C.
below). For the purpose of the definition contained in this paragraph, the
term "heads of federal agencies" does not include any person appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate to a federal agency as a member of a
multimember board or commission. Positions occupied by such persons may be
designated as key positions only by the application of the criteria set forth
in paragraph E.2.b. of the basic Directive.
C. Other federal positions determined by federal agency heads, or their
designees, to be key positions in accordance with the guidelines specified in
paragraph E.2.b. of the basic Directive.
6. Ready Reserve. Units and individual reservists liable for active duty as
outlined in 10 U.S.C. 672 and 673 (reference (b)).
7. Selected Reserve. Part of the Ready Reserve of each reserve component
consisting of units and individuals who participate actively in paid training
periods and serve on paid active duty for training each year.
8. Standby Reserve. Units or members of the reserve components, other than
those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve, who are liable for active duty
as provided in sections 672 and 674 of reference (b).
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Apr 6, 84
1200.7 (Encl 3)
(Date)
(YYMMDD)
LETTER FORMAT TO COGNIZANT RESERVE PERSONNEL CENTER
REQUESTING THAT EMPLOYEE BE REMOVED FROM THE READY RESERVE
From: (employer-agency or company)
To: (appropriate reserve personnel center)
Subject: Request for Employee to Be Removed from the Ready Reserve
This is to certify that the employee identified below is vital to the
nation's defense efforts in (his or her) civilian job and can't be mobilized
with the Military Services in an emergency for the following reasons:
Therefore, I request that (he or she) be removed from the Ready Reserve
and that you advise me accordingly when this action has been completed.
The employee is:
Name of employee (last, first, M.I.)
Military grade and reserve component
Social security number
Current home address (street, city, state, and ZIP code)
Military unit to which assigned (location and unit number)
Title of employee's civilian position
Grade or salary level of civilian position
Date (YYMMDD) hired or assigned to position
Signature and Title of Agency or Company
Official
3-87
Apr 6, 84
1200.7 (Encl 4)
LIST OF RESERVE PERSONNEL CENTERS TO WHICH
RESERVE SCREENING DETERMINATION AND REMOVAL REQUESTS
SHALL BE FORWARDED
Army National Guard and Army Reserve
Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: DAPE-PSM
Washington, D.C. 20310
Naval Reserve
Officers: Commander
Naval Military Personnel Center
Attention: NMPC-911
Washington, D.C. 20370
Enlisted: Commanding Officer
Naval Reserve Personnel Center
New Orleans, LA 70149
Marine Corps Reserve
Commandant (Code RES)
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380
Air Force Reserve
Commander (ARPC/DP)
Air Reserve Personnel Center
7300 East First Avenue
Denver, CO 80280
Air National Guard
Submit requests to the adjutant general of the appropriate state,
commonwealth, or terrority (including the District of Columbia).
Coast Guard Reserve
Commandant (G-RA/55)
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters
2100 Second St. SW
Washington, D.C. 20593
3-88
INSTITUTE S
Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
January 31, 1986
NUMBER 1100.18
ASD (FM&P)
SUBJECT: Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning
References: (a) DoD Directive 1100.18, "Wartime Manpower Planning"
August 26, 1980 (hereby canceled)
(b) DoD Directive 1100.4, "Guidance for Manpower Programs,"
August 20, 1954
(c) DoD Instruction 1100.19, "Wartime Manpower Planning Policies
and Procedures," August 3, 1982
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a) and updates policies for manpower
mobilization planning during peacetime and manpower utilization during wartime.
It directs the establishment of a standard DoD-wide method for computing and
portraying projected wartime manpower demand and supply.
B.
APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS),
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), and the Defense
Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components") as well as
the Coast Guard, when planning to meet its responsibilities while operating
within the Department of the Navy.
C. POLICY
1. During peacetime, the DoD manpower mobilization planning policy is to:
a. Provide an adequate military and civilian inventory for each
occupation and experience level to satisfy projected mobilization or wartime
manpower demands that cannot be met with personnel acquired after mobilization.
b. Use a mix of military and civilian manpower capable of satisfying
mobilization or wartime demands, consistent with DoD Directive 1100.4
(reference (b)).
C. Obtain the authorities and establish the management procedures
necessary to provide reasonable assurance that both military and civilian
mobilization or wartime manpower demands can be satisfied.
d. Ensure that plans include the optimum priority for the wartime use
of manpower (i.e., determine in peacetime whether a particular individual
occupying a critical civilian position in the public or private sector will or
will not be subject to recall to military duty because of membership in the
Ready Reserve or the Standby Reserve, or as a military retiree).
3-89
e. Ensure that the Military Services and Commanders In Chief plan for
the effective retention or replacement in wartime of civilian employees and
contractor personnel who are performing critical support activities.
f. Ensure that continuous reviews are made of the effective wartime
use of minimally disabled or over-age personnel with current or prior Military
Service, including the study of assignments that directly support State Defense
Forces, Civil Defense or other aspects of the internal defense of the United
States and its possessions.
2. During mobilization or wartime, the DoD manpower utilization policy
is to:
a. Terminate or defer activities not essential to the war effort in
order to permit the reallocation of personnel to higher priority tasks.
b. Assign military personnel only to those jobs that contribute
to the war unless:
(1) Military incumbency is required by law.
(2) Possessing military-unique skills or experience is essential
for successful performance of required duties.
(3) Military authority or discipline is requisite to the position.
(4) Alternative manpower is not available.
C. Upon mobilization, cease all screening, removal, deferral, and
exemption actions for those reservists and retired members who are subject
to recall during mobilization or wartime.
-
d. Upon mobilization, order to active duty all Ready Reservists,
active duty military retirees, other reservists, and reserve military retirees,
not occupying jobs critical to National Security objectives, required to meet the
mobilization or wartime needs of the contingency.
e. Expeditiously detail or reassign civilians to vacant positions to
make optimal use of their skills consistent with mobilization or wartime
priorities and with the mobilization or wartime authorities and procedures in
effect.
f. Integrate civilians with needed skills into the military at the
appropriate grade level using expeditious lateral entry procedures.
8. Encourage civilian employees who occupy emergency-essential (E-E)
positions and contractor personnel who are performing critical support activi-
ties overseas to remain in the theater.
b. Hire additional civilian employees or exercise contingency
contracts to do essential work not requiring military-unique experience.
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Jan 31, 153
1100.18
D. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
(ASD(FM&P)) shall:
a. Establish DoD wartime manpower mobilization planning guidance
and coordinate manpower mobilization plans and their execution.
b. Establish a standard DoD-wide procedure and data base for compu-
ting, compiling, projecting, and portraying the time-phased wartime manpower
demand and supply of all DoD Components.
C. Publish guidance necessary for operating the Wartime Manpower
Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS).
d. In conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve
Affairs) (ASD(RA)), the Service Secretaries and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), direct a continuous review of DoD manpower utilization plans and
programs, and develop suggested programs to enhance the effectiveness and
productivity of military and civilian manpower across the spectrum of DoD
missions.
2. The Heads of DoD Components shall:
a. Ensure that the policies in this issuance are reflected in all
relevant issuances and procedures.
b. Develop, maintain, and submit wartime manpower demand and supply
data as prescribed in DoD Instruction 1100.19 (reference (c)).
C. Conduct a continuous review of manpower utilization plans and pro-
grams for their components, and develop programs to enhance the effectiveness
and productivity of military and civilian manpower across the spectrum of com-
ponent missions, as directed by the ASD(FM&P) in conjunction with the ASD (RA)
and the Chairman, JCS.
E. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
H of
William H. Taft, IV
Deputy Secretary of Defense
3-91
APPENDIX 3-G
INITIAL TIM GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS
3-93
In its initial report on Personnel Issues, the Joint TIM Group
recommended:
(1) The NCS and the telecommunications industry should participate
in exercises to assess the Joint TIM Group's personnel conclusions.
(2) If exercise results show tracking of military obligations of
personnel is necessary, then the Joint TIM Group should revisit this issue
at a later date.
(3) To meet Long-Term mobilization requirements:
- Industry should identify critical occupational skills
- NCS should coordinate within the Federal government to
authorize draft deferments
(4) The NCS should work with the U.S. Department of Transportation
and the telecommunications industry to identify requirements for the
priority movement of industry personnel and to update
telecommunications-related assignments in the DOT Civil Transportation
Priority List.
(5) During its study of Jurisdictional Issues (Federal, State,
local), the Joint TIM Group should review State and local provisions for
the priority movement of telecommunications industry personnel and
vehicles.
3-95
NCS 489/5
4.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
(STATUS REPORT)
June 1988
4- 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
4-5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
4-7
4.1 Introduction
4-11
4.2 Background/Approach
4-11
4.3 Findings to Date
4-15
4.3.1 National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP)
Telecommunications Requirements Analysis
4-15
4.3.2 Industry Service Surge Capability
4-17
4.3.3 Exercise Activities
4-26
4.3.4 Military Mobilization Center Requirements
4-28
4.3.5 Related Activities
4-32
4.4 Preliminary Conclusions
4-32
4.4.1 Industry Service Surge Capability
4-32
4.4.2 Industry Network Management Capability
4-33
4.4.3 Military Mobilization Centers
4-34
4.5 Next Steps
4-35
4.6 Recommendations
4-36
APPENDICES:
4-A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION FORM
CRISIS/MOBILIZATION)
4-37
4-B TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM) SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS STUDY (QUESTIONNAIRE AND COVER MEMORANDUM
ISSUED BY U.S. ARMY 7th SIGNAL COMMAND)
4-41
4-3
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
4-1 MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
4-13
4-2 NUMBER OF TELEPHONE STATIONS
4-19
4-3 LONG DISTANCE CALLS
4-20
4-4 POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
4-21
4-5 PLANT MILEAGE
4-22
4-6 CENTRAL OFFICES
4-23
4-7 CENTRAL OFFICE PRODUCTION CAPACITY & DEMAND
4-24
4-8 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN ARMED SERVICES
4-25
4-9 7th SIGNAL COMMAND MOBILIZATION STATIONS
4-30
4-5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Planning for the satisfaction of the surge in telecommunications
service requirements anticipated under mobilization conditions is a
complex undertaking, requiring substantial industry and government
interaction. The subject of Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements
was thus identified as one of the first of seven subjects to be addressed
by the Joint Government-Industry Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
(TIM) Group, which is charged to: (1) identify possible impediments to
effective telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning and (2) assist in the development of corrective actions to
overcome any identified impediments.
The Joint TIM Group has approached telecommunications service surge
requirements from two perspectives:
(1) The type and quantity of Federal Government telecommunications
service surge requirements under mobilization conditions, and
(2) The estimated capability of industry to meet Federal Government
telecommunications service surge requirements under mobilization
conditions.
The Joint Group has been briefed on the ongoing National Security
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Requirements Analysis
being conducted by the NCS. The Group has also made an effort to estimate
industry's capacity to meet a mobilization service surge, and incorporated
surge requirements events in the POWER SWEEP '87 and the PROUD SCOUT
'88/REX-88 ALPHA exercises. In addition, the Group has worked with the
U.S. Army 7th Signal Command to develop an approach for identifying and
quantifying mobilization center requirements.
Preliminary Conclusions
On the basis of its findings to date, the Joint Group has drawn
preliminary conclusions in three areas: (1) industry service surge
capability, (2) industry network management capability, and (3) military
mobilization center requirements.
In the area of industry service surge capability, the preliminary
conclusions are based upon (1) an assessment of the World War II
mobilization experience and (2) projections of future service capacity and
demand. The Group determined that, during the World War II period,
service plant capacity was not increased in proportion to the imposed
demand for service. Although the overall telecommunications system was
probably saturated, it continued to function because existing facilities
were more intensively used and because use of the system was voluntarily
constrained.
4-7
In terms of projected plant capacity and demand, the Group has
concluded that the current situation is different than the World War II
mobilization period. Intercity/interlata network plant capacity is not
saturated and is growing at a rate that exceeds the growth of current
demand. The dual impetus of competition and technology will probably
cause this trend to continue in the future. Therefore, the Group has
drawn the preliminary conclusion that, on an overall basis, the
Telecommunications Industry would be able to meet the increases in demand
expected during a mobilization period. Despite this overall capacity,
however, problems in meeting particular Government needs could arise.
In the area of Industry network management capability, Industry
network management control systems appear to be capable of handling surges
on the Public Switched Network (PSN). This conclusion is based on the
Group's current general understanding of surge demand rather than on any
quantified statement of surge demand under mobilization conditions. On
the basis of the Group's investigation of network management capabilities,
it has concluded that:
O
Current network management tools can accommodate significant
increases in traffic demand;
0
Current network management controls can help to ensure that users
get service, although some may have a lesser grade of service than
others;
Additional controls will develop as technology evolves, and
Industry is continuing to invest in advanced technology network
management tools to increase network efficiency.
The Joint Group has also concluded that Industry network management
control systems are essential to effective mobilization response and,
accordingly, worthy of further, more detailed investigation. The NSTAC's
Telecommunications Systems Survivability (TSS) Task Force is currently
examining network management techniques, capabilities, and issues. The
Joint TIM Group believes that the specific and unique characteristics of a
mobilization service surge should be recognized in these investigations.
On the basis of a preliminary examination of the communications
annexes to military mobilization centers' mobilization plans, the Group
has concluded that many or most of these annexes are outdated and/or lack
the level of detail needed to obtain new telecommunications services on an
expedited basis, i.e., through the use of the NSEP Telecommunications
Procedures. Current annexes may, for example, not accurately identify the
providers of current services if the annexes have not been updated since
the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T.
4-8
On the basis of further information provided by the U.S. Army 7th
Signal Command, the Group also believes that the ability of military
mobilization centers and installations to gain access to the PSN under
mobilization conditions is a matter of significant concern. While
existing Federal government emergency procurement procedures can be used
to facilitate emergency acquisition of services and equipment, the Group
believes that the effective use of these procedures to ensure the
end-to-end provisioning of service in a timely manner is dependent on the
pre-identification of specific surge requirements by mobilization centers
and installations. Where possible, prepositioning of plant may be in order
if these procedures are considered too slow to implement.
Next Steps
The results of the crisis/mobilization phase of the NSEP
Telecommunications Requirements Analysis have been made available to the
Joint Group in summary form. The Joint TIM Group has determined that
these results have limited applicability to TIM concerns, and lack
sufficient detail to permit an in-depth analysis of the Government's
mobilization surge requirements. Accordingly, the Joint TIM Group will
continue to seek additional specific information on service and equipment
requirements under mobilization conditions to supplement the Requirements
Analysis data.
In addition, the Joint Group's investigations to date have
highlighted the importance of examining the estimated quantity, nature,
and distribution of particular Government mobilization requirements. The
Group is currently working with the U.S. Army 7th Signal Command to
identify and quantify, by means of a special survey, the service and
equipment requirements anticipated by major mobilization centers and
installations. The Joint TIM Group will then use this information to
assess the ability of telecommunications service and equipment providers
to satisfy these mobilization requirements.
Recommendations
The NSTAC's Telecommunications Systems Survivability (TSS) Task Force
is conducting a detailed study of network management techniques,
capabilities, and issues. The Joint TIM Group recommends that the IES
request the TSS Task Force to consider the specific impact of mobilization
surge requirements in their study, making use of the information developed
to date by the Joint Group.
4-9
4.1 Introduction
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
Communications System (NCS) Committee of Principals (COP) to:
(1) Identify possible impediments to effective telecommunications
industry mobilization and mobilization planning, and
(2) Assist in the development of corrective actions to overcome
any identified impediments.
Planning for the satisfaction of the major surge in
telecommunications service requirements anticipated under mobilization
conditions is a complex undertaking, requiring substantial Industry and
Government interaction. The subject of Telecommunications Service Surge
Requirements was thus identified as one of the first of seven subjects to
be addressed by the Joint TIM Group. Reports on the status of the Joint
Group's study of Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements were
provided to the NSTAC in May 1986, February 1987, and November 1987; and
to the NCS COP in July 1986, March 1987 and December 1987. This report
supersedes these earlier reports, presenting the Group's findings and
preliminary conclusions through June 1988, and outlining its anticipated
next steps.
4.2 Background/Approach
In December 1984, the NCS asked the NSTAC to assist the Government in
assessing Telecommunications Industry mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities. In response to the Government's request, the NSTAC
charged its Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) to assist the Government
in bringing the issue into sharper focus and to develop recommendations
regarding a future role for NSTAC in the area of Telecommunications
Industry mobilization. The IES, in turn, established a TIM Task Force and
instructed it to develop a TIM issue statement.
The TIM Task Force defined and clarified the Telecommunications
Industry mobilization issue, identifying seven areas for further study by
Industry and Government, including Telecommunications Service Surge
Requirements. The findings of the TIM Task Force in the area of
telecommunications service surge requirements were included in a
two-volume report and preșented for review and approval at the October 9,
1985 meeting of the NSTAC1. The NSTAC subsequently charged its IES to
i
Final Report of the Telecommunication Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume 1, "TIM Issue Statement, and Volume 2, "Background
and Supporting Materials, September 5, 1985.
4-11
assist the NCS in addressing the seven mobilization subjects identified,
including service surge requirements.
For study purposes, the Joint TIM Group uses the definition of
mobilization developed by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications
resources needed to make the transition from a normal
state to a state of readiness for war or other national
emergency. 2
Mobilization is considered by the Joint TIM Group to encompass
peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent conventional military actions
external to the continental United States, as illustrated in Figure 4-1.
The impact of a nuclear attack on the United States has been judged by the
Joint Group to be outside the scope of its study. In addition, the
following mobilization time periods are being used by the Group:
(1) Pre-mobilization: Planning and Pre-Positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Existing Capability and Service)
(3) Mid-Term: 90 to 180 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Products and Services in the Pipeline)
(4) Long-Term: Over 180 Days (Expanded Production of Capacity and
Services)
In its Final Report to the NSTAC, the original TIM Task Force
summarized its concerns in the telecommunications service surge
requirements area as follows:
Mobilization activity in response to a national emergency
will produce a major surge of telecommunications service
needs. The surge in demand for service will translate
into increased requirements for trained personnel,
equipment, and spare parts in the service sector as well
as increased production levels in the manufacturing
sector. Of particular concern is the potential for using
any excess Industry capacity to satisfy surge demands.
Planning for the satisfaction of these increased demands
is a complex undertaking, requiring substantial
Industry-Government interaction. Reasonable estimates
2 Final Report of TIM Task Force, Volume I, p.5
4-12
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL AS CONSIDERED
BY JOINT TIM GROUP
MILITARY ACTIONS
OUTSIDE CONUS WITHOUT
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
PEACETIME - DISASTER - - CRISIS
TRANS-ATTACK
POST-ATTACK
EARLY
LATE
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
AS CONSIDERED BY
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR NOT
JOINT TIM GROUP
CONSIDERED BY JOINT TIM GROUP
-----
MOBILIZATION AS
CONSIDERED
BY TIM GROUP
FIGURE 4-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
4 13
of Government service requirements must be developed and
provided if Industry is to plan and respond effectively.
The proprietary interests of participating Industry
entities myst 3 also be considered and adequately
protected.
The Joint TIM Group used the work of the original NSTAC TIM Task Force
as the starting point for more detailed analysis of Telecommunications
Industry mobilization service surge requirements. However, the Group's
overall objectives concerning service surge requirements reflect the
provisions of the TIM Implementation Measure in the NCS NSEP
Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA), calling for:
0 The identification of possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning and the recommendation of corrective actions and
0 The identification and recommendation of any Federal government
actions needed to support 4 telecommunications Industry mobilization
planning activities.
The Joint TIM Group has approached the subject of telecommunications
service surge requirements from two perspectives:
(1) The type and quantity of Federal Government telecommunications
service surge requirements under mobilization conditions, and
(2) The estimated capability of Industry to meet Federal Government
telecommunications service surge requirements under mobilization
conditions.
The Joint Group has been briefed on the ongoing National Security
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Requirements Analysis
being conducted by the Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS). The Group has
also initiated its own effort to estimate Industry's capacity to meet a
mobilization service surge, and has incorporated surge requirements events
in the POWER SWEEP '87 and the PROUD SCOUT '88/REX-88 ALPHA exercises.
These exercises provided preliminary data specifically targeted at
mobilization preparedness.
3 Final Report of the TIM Task Force, Volume I p.9.
4 Implementation Measure 9, "Telecommunications Industry Mobilization,"
National Security Energy Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Plan of
Action, NCS Document No. 208/5, June 27, 1985.
4-14
4.3 Findings To Date
The Joint TIM Group has developed preliminary findings in four areas:
(1) NSEP telecommunications requirements, (2) Industry surge capability, (3)
exercise activities and (4) military mobilization center requirements.
Efforts in other related areas are also reported below.
4.3.1 NSEP Telecommunications Requirements Analysis
Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Functions," established the basic framework for the NCS NSEP
telecommunications activities. The Executive Order provides for the
determination by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Directors of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) of what constitutes NSEP telecommunications requirements.
It also requires the Federal departments and agencies to provide information
regarding their NSEP telecommunications requirements to the NCS. To
implement the provisions of the Executive Order, the NCS was tasked in July
1984 to prepare a detailed study that identified and placed in priority order
the NSEP telecommunications requirements of the Federal Government and that
also identified the existing or planned telecommunications systems and
initiatives which support those requirements. This effort was intended to
provide a basis for identifying NSEP telecommunications deficiencies and for
developing a recommended evolutionary NSEP telecommunications architecture to
meet the Federal Government's NSEP telecommunications requirements.
The Requirements Analysis is being conducted on a phased basis and began
with the collection and analysis of data on requirements in the late trans-
and early post-attack time periods. The methodology used for the Analysis,
as well as its initial results, were briefed to the Joint TIM Group. The
Group was also briefed on the next phase of the Requirements Analysis which
addresses the crisis/mobilization time period. The Joint TIM Group reviewed
the data collection form used in the initial phase of the analysis to gather
requirements information from the NCS member organizations. The Group also
reviewed the extended definition of mobilization that the OMNCS developed to
gather period: data from the NCS members on requirements in the crisis/mobilization
Government mobilization, as a part of crisis, is the
process of marshalling resources of Federal, State, and
local government to carry out the tasks required to
manage the transition to a state of readiness for war or
other national emergency. It involves bringing to the
proper state of readiness, the leadership, policymaking
groups, legislative bodies, courts, and the supporting
communications, facilities, procedures, and authorities
to manage the transition. Government mobilization
activates and controls other aspects of mobilization.
4-15
This definition was developed by the OMNCS to assist the Government in
completing the Requirements Analysis survey form and represents an
extension of the definition developed by the NSTAC TIM Task Force. The
Joint TIM Group agreed that the definition developed by the OMNCS is
consistent with the one adopted by the Group and is more useful for the
purpose of the Requirements Analysis. In addition, the Joint Group
suggested that specific mobilization time periods be added to the data
collection form to permit more precise identification of Federal Government
surge requirements.
The NCS Council of Representatives (COR) ultimately adopted the three
mobilization time phases described in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Federal Preparedness Circular Number 2 (FPC-2) as the
framework for the crisis/mobilization requirements analysis. These phases
are (1) normal operations, (2) preparation, and (3) emergency. It was
recommended that Phase 1 in FPC-2 (normal operations) be equated with
peacetime to provide baseline requirements. The COR also concluded that
TIM crisis/mobilization requirements encompass Phase 2 in FPC-2
(preparation) combined with two sections of Phase 3 (emergency), i.e.,
domestic emergencies and conventional war. The Joint Group believes that
the use of these time periods will facilitate both the estimation of
Industry response capacity and the planning necessary to ensure effective
Industry response.
The data collection form used to gather the requirements data is
reproduced in Appendix 4-A. The results of the data collection effort have
been assessed by the OMNCS and the NCS Council of Representatives (COR),
and are documented in a SECRET report entitled, National Security Emergency
Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Requirements, Phase Two (U).
A summary briefing on the results of the Requirements Analysis study
was presented to the Joint TIM Group in March 1988. In this briefing, it
was learned that the cited classified report was also designated by the
OMNCS as a "limited distribution" document. This latter designation was
used by the OMNCS at the request of individual member organizations of the
NCS who expressed the view that the detailed requirements information
contained within the report was sensitive. Accordingly, the results of the
Requirements Analysis were presented to the Joint Group in an unclassified
and summary form to overcome this obstacle.
In general, it was determined that the overall expected demand for
NSEP telecommunications service would increase by a moderate amount in the
transition from peacetime to crisis/mobilization. The NCS Requirements
Analysis study showed that the number of user line terminations (defined as
a current end point at a user location) would increase by approximately
18%, from a level of 24,800 user line terminations in peacetime to a level
of 29,000 user line terminations required in crisis/mobilization. The
number of circuits (defined as a 3Khz or equivalent voice grade path) would
also increase by approximately 21% for the same transition, from a level of
approximately 17,000 circuits in peacetime to a level of approximately
4-16
20,600 circuits required in the crisis/mobilization period. Further
breakdowns were also provided on the expected change in demand for switched
service, dedicated voice service, and dedicated data service.
After receiving this data, the Group determined that the information
was insufficient for in-depth analyses, and had limited utility value for
the Joint TIM Group purposes. More specifically, due to the broad nature
of the data provided, it was not possible to make a full and detailed
assessment of Industry's ability to meet the specific NSEP
Telecommunications service needs of individual NCS member organizations
during the transition from peacetime to crisis/mobilization.
Based upon the Joint TIM Group's assessment of this summary data,
additional information on service and equipment surge requirements will be
sought to supplement the information in the Requirement Analysis, e.g.,
data gathered from representative military mobilization centers and other
key mobilization-related Government installations.
4.3.2 Industry Service Surge Capability
As part of its initial effort to assess the Telecommunications
Industry's capability to respond to service surge requirements, the Joint
TIM Group identified and reviewed surge capacity studies that had
previously been conducted by either Industry or Government. Among the
studies identified were the ongoing work in the Defense Switched Network
(DSN) Western Hemisphere (WESTHEM) Architecture program and the Industrial
Responsiveness Analysis (IRA) conducted, in conjunction with the Operation
PORTCALL exercise in 1985, under the aegis of the Department of Defense
(DOD) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Logistics) and the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA).
Although the Telecommunications Industry as a whole did not take part
in the IRA effort, the results were useful as general background on
mobilization and industrial responsiveness. No specific data on
telecommunications service surge capacity was found in the IRA study
effort. However, the results were also judged to be applicable to the
subject of mobilization management structure and other TIM subjects that
the Group will be addressing. The DSN WESTHEM Architecture study of
projected DSN surge requirements also provided the Group with an example of
one methodology for estimating surge requirements.
In an effort to determine the "elasticity" of telecommunications
service capacity, i.e., the ability of the Industry to supply additional
service in response to increases in service demands, the Joint Group
considered the following questions:
- How much additional telecommunications service could be
handled (maximum) while maintaining existing service?
4-17
- What is the current spare capacity?
- What is the expected growth in capacity?
- How is the ability to handle overload exploited?
The Group's analysis of the "elasticity" of telecommunications service
capacity indicates that service capacity within the Telecommunications
Industry has been increasing at a dramatic rate since the 1940s. The
overall increase in telecommunications service capacity is shown in Figure
4-2, which plots the number of telephones in the U. S. from 1900 to the
present, and in Figure 4-3, which plots the number of long distance calls
per year from 1930 to 1980. This sharp increase in telecommunications
service capacity contrasts with the relatively moderate rate of increase in
population, as shown in Figure 4-4. Federal telephone system usage is also
plotted in Figure 4-3. It amounts to approximately five percent of the
total and is growing at a slower pace than use of the Public Switched
Network (PSN).
The increase in instruments and calls are supported by increased plant
mileage as shown in Figure 4-5, which plots the number of circuit miles
from 1930 to 1980. Although the number of central offices needed to
support the constantly increasing service capacity increased sharply during
the 1940s, it peaked in the mid '50s, and has been declining since that
time, as shown in Figure 4-6. The numeric reduction is due to central
office consolidation because the newer offices have much greater capacity.
In rural areas, remote units are replacing individual offices as well. The
Industry's central office production capacity, shown in Figure 4-7,
increased rapidly from 1980 to 1985, but is projected to remain relatively
constant through the early 1990s, largely because of the increased capacity
of the newer offices.
The number of personnel in the uniformed services from 1940 to 1980 is
shown in Figure 4-8. The tremendous growth during the World War II
mobilization period is evident, and the impact on the Telecommunications
Industry was heavy in 1940-1945.
To obtain additional information on the Industry's ability to handle
surge requirements, the Joint TIM Group toured the C&P Network Management
Center in Washington D.C. On this visit, C&P personnel described the
network management tools that permit C&P to accommodate significant
increases in traffic demand with little noticeable impact upon the user.
Other network management controls were identified that could be employed to
ensure that critical users get service.
Following the visit to the C&P facility, Industry members of the Joint
TIM Group were asked if the facility was representative of what is
available nationwide. It was determined that all of the Bell Operating
Companies have similar facilities and that this network management
philosophy was expanding and taking advantage of new technology. Industry
4-18
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Number of Telephone Stations
Y Axis in Millions
250
3/13/86
200
150
4-19
Source: The U.S.T.A
100
50
0
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
FIGURE 4-2
NUMBER OF TELEPHONE STATIONS
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Long Distance Calls
Public Network
Y Axis Million calls per year
8000
D
Intercity FTS
6000
4-20
4000
Source: AT&T
2000
0
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
FIGURE 4-3
LONG DISTANCE CALLS
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Population of the United States
Y Axis in Millions
250
3/21/86
200
150
4-21
100
Source: The World Almanac
50
O
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
FIGURE 4-4
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Plant mileage
Y Axis millions of circuit miles
500
3/13/86
400
300
4-22
200
Source: AT&T
100
0
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
FIGURE 4-5
PLANT MILEAGE
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Central Offices
Y Axis Central offices in Thousands
25
3/16/36
20
15
4-23
Source: The U.S.T.A
10
5
0
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
FIGURE 4-6
CENTRAL OFFICES
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Central Office Production Capacity & Demand
Production
Y Axis Lines in millions
Capacities
16
Regional Holding
12
GTE Companies
4-24
Remaining Telcos
8
Source:
4
Northern Business Information
0
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
FIGURE 4-7
CENTRAL OFFICE PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND DEMAND
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Uniformed Armed Services
3/21/86
Airforce
Y Axis in Millions
16
Navy
12
Army
4-25 4
8
4
Source: The World Almanac
0
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
FIGURE 4-8
UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN ARMED SERVICES
members from other carrier organizations agreed with the TIM Group that
this assessment also applied to their companies. A subsequent visit by the
TIM Group Chairman to ITT's World Communications Operations Center in
New York City further confirmed the Group's belief that necessary Industry
network management tools are in place. A visit was also made to Northern
Telecom's Canadian Network Management Facility by the TIM Group Vice
Chairman to determine if the network management tools applied in U.S.
facilities were typically used in Canada. It was determined that this
Canadian facility was similar to facilities in the U.S.
4.3.3 Exercise Activities
The Joint TIM Group participated in the POWER SWEEP '87 exercise to
obtain preliminary data on the Government's ability to identify its
telecommunications service requirements and the Industry's ability to
respond. Two specific mobilization events relating to Telecommunications
Service Surge Requirements were included in the exercise:
(1) A surge in service demand resulting from the activation of
four military mobilization centers, and
(2) A surge in service demand within a geographical area containing
many mobilization-critical military and industrial users (i.e.,
Seattle).
The first of these exercise events involved inactive or semi-active
military posts that would be required to accommodate large numbers of
activated reserves during a mobilization. Of particular interest was the
handling of requirements for military mobilization centers served by an
independent telephone company not directly represented in the National
Coordinating Center (NCC). The principal focus of this event was the prior
identification of mobilization centers' requirements through review of the
communications annexes to their mobilization plans and the subsequent
testing of procedures for the expedited provisioning of service
requirements.
Exercise results indicate that the centers' communications annexes may
require updating to reflect changes in the Industry, e.g., divestiture.
However, the limited mobilization surge requirements simulated for this
exercise were handled by NCC member companies without difficulty. At the
time of Power Sweep '87, procedures to contact non-NCC members had not been
fully developed, and an ad hoc process had to be used to contact one
non-NCC company. This deficiency has subsequently been corrected.
The second exercise event addressed the question of whether
telecommunications service providers in a particular area would have
sufficient capacity to fill all NSEP telecommunications service requests by
the requested service dates or whether further guidance would be needed to
determine which requests should be satisfied. The event simulated
conflicts between and among the telecommunications service requirements of
4-26
military, civil agency, and industrial users, and requests for priority
provisioning of these requirements using NSEP Telecommunications Procedures
were forwarded to the NCC. Although the majority of service requirements
were met, conflicts among users did occur and some service requests were
denied by the NCS. Further assessment and testing is required to determine
the significance of these service denials and the potential role to be
played by the Joint Telecommunications Resources Board (JTRB) in resolving
conflicts among military, civil agency, and industrial users.
The Joint TIM Group also participated in the PROUD SCOUT '88/REX-88
ALPHA exercise to gather information on Telecommunications Service Surge
Requirements that would substantiate and augment the preliminary findings
and conclusions of the earlier TSSR Status Report (September 1987). Three
specific mobilization events relating to Telecommunications Service Surge
Requirements were included in the exercise:
(1) Examination of Industry's ability to handle a surge in
communications traffic caused by increasing the Federal
Government's access to the Public Switched Network, through
removal of toll access restrictions.
(2) Examination of possible actions which could be taken
by the Federal Government to reduce demand on the Public
Switched Network during a period of surge demand
(3) Assessment of Government's ability to identify, and Industry's
ability to satisfy military mobilization center surge
requirements
In assessing the exercise results, the Joint TIM Group agreed that
removal of the toll access restrictions would create some congestion of
the network between local central office switches and PBXs (i.e., in the
local loop), but would have only minimal impact on the long distance
portions of the Public Switched Network. Further details of the removal
of toll access restrictions would need to be provided in order to
determine whether the action required to solve the problem rests with the
Federal Government, (i.e., at the PBX) or with Industry, (i.e., at the
central office) or requires joint Government-Industry action.
The second exercise issues involved the use of MINIMIZE, a DOD
procedure to be used during periods of crisis or other abnormal periods to
reduce the volume of record and long distance telephone traffic. The
effectiveness of the Government's action to implement MINIMIZE was
questioned by NCC Industry participants in the exercise for several
reasons. First, in this exercise the request to impose MINIMIZE in the
Government was made in the form of a recommendation and not in the form of
an order, thereby limiting its effect. Second, MINIMIZE would involve
4-27
only Federal Government telecommunications and would not affect the users
placing the greatest demand on the PSN, namely the general public and the
private sector. Finally, it was noted that by limiting Federal Government
communications, MINIMIZE could be a counter-productive procedure
constraining required Government mobilization telecommunications.
Overall, the Joint Group concluded that the Federal Government's
actions during the exercise to reduce demand on the PSN were limited.
Further assessment is required to determine the potential role, if any,
that could be played by the Government in setting policies that would help
to reduce demand on the PSN during a period of surge.
With regard to the ability of Government and Industry to identify and
satisfy military mobilization center surge requirements, the Joint Group
concluded that no determination could be made on the degree to which
selected U.S. Army mobilization center requirements could be met. This
conclusion was based upon the belief that the exercise requirements for
this issue were not realistic, and addressed only the type of service
required, but not its quantity. The Joint TIM Group members further
observed that this problem may be resolved as realistic telecommunications
requirements for military mobilization centers emerge from the analysis of
the 7th Signal Command questionnaire results. The exercise demonstrated,
however, that the seven mobilization centers examined in the exercise,
including one center located in a non-NCC member service area, had their
generic requirements addressed by the NCC. This exercise also
demonstrated that the ad hoc procedures used to contact non-NCC companies
in POWERSWEEP '87 had been replaced by more efficient procedures.
Finally, it was observed that limited off-base cable capacity at one
mobilization center constrained that center's access to expanded local and
long-distance services. These services could have been provided through
surplus switch capacity available at surrounding central offices.
Exercise results also suggested that shortages of on-base Customer
Premise Wire (CPW), and Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) were also
possible under mobilization conditions. These observations of a few
mobilization centers may signal a more general limitation of off-base
cable, CPW, and CPE at mobilization centers and other facilities with
mobilization responsibilities.
4.3.4 Military Mobilization Center Requirements
Following the POWERSWEEP '87 exercise and the PROUD SCOUT '88/REX-88
ALPHA exercise, the Joint Group obtained additional information regarding
the service surge requirements of military mobilization centers and other
installations that have significant mobilization responsibilities, e.g.,
ammunition plants, arsenals, medical centers, military ocean terminals,
and other specialized army facilities. Upon mobilization, the
4-28
telecommunications and other information service requirements 5 of 51
centers and installations (Figure 4-9) would be supported by the U.S.
Army's 7th Signal Command. This command would also support the
information service requirements of any new installations or facilities
that may be activated by the Army due to the mobilization effort.
In a briefing to the Group, 6 mobilization planners from the 7th
Signal Command stated that mobilization will result in an overall increase
in demand for available information services, with the surge peak probably
occurring during the initial critical phase of the mobilization effort.
The following services are considered essential for mobilization support:
Administrative Telephone (Telephone switching system,
switchboards, user telephone lines/instruments, and
normal mix of applicable Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON),
Direct Distance Dialing (DDD), and Wide Area Telecommunications
System (WATS) access lines)
Automation Systems
- Data Processing Installation Facility
- Army Standard Information Management System
(ASIMS) Access
- Office Automation
- Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS)/Developmental Army
Readiness and Mobilization System (DARMS) Access
0
Secure Voice
0
Facsimile (Secure)
0
High Frequency Radio
Nontactical Radio Network(s)
0
Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)
Defense Data Network Access
5
Information services is defined here to encompass automation support
(including office automation); telecommunications (including services and
transmission media); visual information; records management; and printing
and publications.
6
Information briefing received from representatives of U.S. Army 7th
Signal Command, "Overview of Army Information Area Concept and Support
Requirements for CONUS Army Installations and Facilities During
Mobilization, March 18, 1987.
4-29
7TH SIGNAL COMMAND
(AK)
MOBILIZATION
RICHARDSON
STATIONS
DEVENS
LEWIS
FT DRUM®
EDWARDS
CP RIPLEY. CP GRAYLING
TOBYHANNA
MC COY.
DIX
GOWEN FIELD
SHERIDAN
GAP
.
AP6
HARRISON
MEADE
CP ATTERBURY®
LEE.
BELVOIR
4-30
FITZSIMMON
L.WOOD
FT PICKETT. A.P.HILL
CARSON® RILEY®
KNOX.
PEUSTIS-STORY
PRESIDIO OF
SAN FRANCISCO
CAMPBELL BRAGG
ORD
FTCHAFFEE.
MC CLELLAN
JACKSON
ROBERTS
ROBINSON
GORDON
SILL
BENNING
STEWART
IRWIN
BLISS
CP SHELBY
RUCKER
HUACHUCA
HOOD POLK
CP BLANDING
SHAFTER SCHOFIELD
S.
HOUSTON
(PR) BUCHANAN
00
FIGURE 4-9
7TH SIGNAL COMMAND MOBILIZATION STATIONS
Increased traffic volumes at mobilization-related installations and
facilities and the activation of new facilities are thus expected to
generate the following kinds of surge requirements:
Additional trunk lines for individual installations or facilities
to support increases in switched and dedicated voice and data
communications
Additional hardware necessary to expand trunk and subscriber
lines
0
Additional automated data processing equipment, including data
terminals, at many locations
Additional telephone instruments
Additional cable and contractor support for the installation of
cable
Other equipment may also be required, including data modems;
facsimile; nontactical and high frequency radio; and voice or data
security devices. While there are no known requirements for the
acquisition of additional telephone switches upon mobilization, additional
switches would probably be required during the post-mobilization period.
Equipment downtime must be held to a minimum during mobilization.
Accordingly, adequate repair parts must be available, and vendors would be
requested to expedite maintenance support response and equipment repair
time. In addition, many Army telephone exchanges and automation systems
are contractor-operated. The level of contractor support would thus have
to be accelerated during mobilization, and some contractors may experience
problems due to loss of personnel who have been mobilized.
As previously noted, the communications annexes of the mobilization
plans prepared for these centers and installations may not adequately
identify and provide for the satisfaction of mobilization surge
requirements, particularly if they have not been revised and updated to
reflect the results of the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
from AT&T, and a changed regulatory environment. Quantitative data on
anticipated surge requirements of mobilization centers and installations
are not currently available, and specific locations or instances where
NSEP telecommunications support may be necessary have not been identified.
Accordingly, the Group is currently working with the U.S. Army 7th
Signal Command to identify and quantify, by means of a special survey, the
service and equipment requirements anticipated by major mobilization
centers and installations. The Joint TIM Group will then use this
information to assess the ability of telecommunications service and
equipment providers to satisfy these mobilization requirements.
4-31
4.4.3 Military Mobilization Centers
On the basis of an examination of a select number of the
communications annexes to military mobilization centers' mobilization
plans, it appears that many or most of these annexes are outdated and/or
lack the level of detail needed to obtain new telecommunications services
on an expedited basis, i.e., through the use of the NSEP
Telecommunications Procedures. Current annexes may, for example, not
accurately identify the providers of current services if the annexes have
not been updated since the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
from AT&T.
On the basis of information subsequently obtained from the 7th
Signal Command, however, the Joint Group is concerned about the ability of
military mobilization centers and installations to gain access to the
PSN. This problem must be addressed primarily at the field level in close
cooperation with telecommunications service providers, particularly those
providing local exchange service. The Joint Group has developed a
practical approach for the identification of specific services and
equipment required to support a mobilization surge. Once these specific
requirements are identified, centers and installations can consult with
the appropriate service and equipment vendors, carry out any required
procurement actions, or otherwise plan for the satisfaction of identified
requirements under mobilization conditions.
Existing Federal Government emergency procurement procedures (i.e.,
those defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Federal
Information Resource Management Regulation (FIRMR), and the Defense
Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) can be used to facilitate the
emergency acquisition of equipment and wiring. The effective use of these
procedures to ensure the end-to-end provisioning of service in a timely
manner is, however, dependent on the accurate pre-identification of
specific surge requirements by mobilization centers and installations.
Where possible, prepositioning of plant may be in order if these
procedures are considered too slow to implement.
In developing the approach referred to above, the Group decided to
focus on military mobilization center telecommunications service surge
requirements. Representatives of U.S. Army 7th Signal Command gave the
TIM Group the opportunity of obtaining the desired data through a
questionnaire to be distributed by 7th Signal Command to a majority of
the military mobilization centers and to other select organizations (CONUS
Commercial Port Transportation Units and Army Ammunition Plan locations).
Separate arrangements were later made for distribution of the
questionnaire to state-owned-and-operated mobilization centers through the
National Guard Bureau.
7 See Section, 5.0, "Government and Industry Mobilization Management
Structure."
4-34
To take advantage of this unique offer of assistance, the TIM Group
staff worked closely with 7th Signal Command staff to draft and to agree
on the questionnaire, as well as to coordinate the project through
appropriate chains of command. The Joint TIM Group discussed the approach
and questionnaire at several meetings and decided to accept 7th Signal's
offer of assistance, even though this meant a final report on TSSR could
not be completed by NSTAC IX. At their March 1988 meeting, the TIM Group
endorsed the questionnaire and cover memo.
The final schedule calls for submission of questionnaire responses to
the 7th Signal Command no later than mid-June 1988. After the data is
reviewed and analyzed, it will be incorporated in a final report for
NSTAC X.
The questionnaire, as well as the cover memorandum used by the 7th
Signal Command for distribution of the questionnaire, has been reproduced
in this report as Appendix 4-B.
4.5 Next Steps
The results of the NSEP Telecommunications Requirements Analysis data
have been presented to the Joint TIM Group in summary form. It has been
concluded that this information, as received, has limited usefulness for
Joint TIM Group purposes, and additional data on the Government's service
and equipment surge requirements is being sought.
The Joint TIM Group's investigation has highlighted the importance of
examining the estimated quantity, nature, and distribution of specific
Government requirements. For example, early Joint Group estimates of
overall Telecommunications Industry service capacity revealed that the
Industry currently has the capacity to accommodate a significant increase
in aggregate demand. However, Industry service capabilities are typically
concentrated in areas of high sustained service demand while Government
mobilization surge requirements, e.g., those associated with the
activation of military mobilization centers, may be concentrated in areas
where demand is relatively low under normal conditions. Therefore, the
Joint Group has implemented an approach for estimating particular
Government end-to-end connectivity requirements under mobilization
conditions based upon the use of a questionnaire jointly developed with
the U.S. Army 7th Signal Command at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland. The
responses to the questionnaire will be analyzed by the Joint TIM Group,
and used to prepare estimates of the Government's NSEP Telecommunications
needs for these major mobilization installations. This statement of
Government needs will in turn be used to assess the ability of
telecommunications service and equipment providers to satisfy these
mobilization requirements.
4-35
4.6 Recommendations
The Joint TIM Group has assessed the adequacy of current network
management control systems, and has concluded that on an overall basis,
these systems can accomodate significant increases in mobilization service
demand. The Group has also recognized that Industry is continually
investing in the development of advanced technology network management
tools to increase network efficiencies in future time frames. However, the
Joint TIM Group believes that further in-depth investigations should be
conducted in this important area.
An intensive network management study is currently being conducted by
the NSTAC's Telecommunications Systems Survivability (TSS) Task Force. The
Joint TIM Group recommends that the TSS Task Force be requested to
consider the specific impact of mobilization surge requirements in their
study of network management control systems, making use of the information
developed to date by the Joint Group.
4-36
APPENDIX 4-A
NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
DATA COLLECTION FORM
4-37
4-39
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APPENDIX 4-B
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM)
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS STUDY
(QUESTIONNAIRE AND COVER MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY
U.S. ARMY 7th SIGNAL COMMAND)
4-41
CF MEENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS. 7TH SIGNAL COMMAND
FORT RITCHIE. MARYLAND 21719-5010
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
S: 23 Mav SS
ASN-OP-RM (500-5a)
25 MAR 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Support
Requirements Study
1. Request action addressees coordinate with subcrcinate activit-
ies for the completion of a Telecommunications Industry Mobiliza-
tion Support Requirements Study questionnaire (Enclosure 1). A
separate questionnaire will be completed by the Director of Infor-
mation Management (DOIM) Office/USAISC-Activitv for each location
listed in Survey Locations (Enclosure 2). Request that USAISC-
MTMC and USAISC-AMC also provide an estimate of telecommunications
industry mobilization support requirements for CONUS commercial
ocean port Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU) activities and Armv
Ammunition Plant (AAP) locations. Questions for commercial ocean
port and AAF locations are shown as Enclosure 3. Completed
surveys will be submitted through command channels to HQ. 7th
Signal Command, ATTN: ASN-OP-RM, Fort Ritchie, MD 21719-5010 not
later than 23 May 1988.
2. During mobilization, additional hardware expans:on and service
support may be required to meet mobilization surge traffic
demands. The National Communications System (NCS) recuested that
the Army determine what demands will be made of the telecommuni-
cations industry at mobilization. Adequate information is avail-
able which defines existing Information Mission Area support
capabilities and mobilization support requirements. However,
accurate data has not been compiled from which to determine quant:-
tative hardware and service support requirements. Consequently.
this one-time survey must be conducted.
3. The information obtained will be used to complete a final
report by the Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications
Industry Mobilization (TIM) Group on the subject of telecommuni-
cations service surge requirements. For the purposes of this
report, the TIM Group has defined mobilization as "the process of
marshalling those telecommunications resources needed to make the
transition from a normal state to a state of readiness for war or
other national emergency.
4. When completing the questionnaire, assume that full mobiliza-
tion has just occurred and a determination must be made of the
telecommunications industry support required during the first 90
days of mobilization. Then, provide a reasonable best estimate
response for each question based on consideration of your
4-43
ASN-OP-RM
SUBJECT: Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Support
Requirements Study
installation/facility/activity Information Mission Area support
capabilities, mobilization mission. and applicable planning
documents (Mobilization. Information Management. and Contingency).
5. The objective of this survey 15 to determine what demands
mobilization will have on the telecommunications industry, and not
to document or program mobilization support recuirements. This
must be accomolished through the Installation Mobilization Flan
and Information Management Plan process.
6. In addition to completing the questionnaire. USAISC-Activity
Commanders/Directors may wish to include a brie' narrative
description of their installation's requirements for telecommuni-
cations industry support during the first 90 days of mobilization.
7. Generally. the completed questionnaire should not contain
classified information and will be marked for Official Use Only
(FOUO). I+ classified information must be included. the completed
questionnaire will be marked and protected accordingly.
8. The point of contact for HQ. 7th Signal Command. ASN-OP-RM. is
Mr. Ronald D. Belland. AUTOVON 277-5475.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Death
ASSISTANT Desops
3 Encls
as
Colonel, GS
DCS Operations and Plans
DISTRIBUTION:
COMMANDER.
USAISC-FORSCOM. ATTN: ASNA-PRN
USAISC-TRADOC, ATTN: ASNB-IPP
USAISC-AMC. ATTN: ASNC
USAISC-HSC, ATTN: ASNE
DIRECTOR,
USAISC-MTMC. ATTN: ASNG-PL
USAISC-ACTIVITY FORT HUACHUCA, ATTN: ASNH
CF: (w/encls)
Cdr, USAISC, ATTN: AS-OPS-OM
Mgr, National Communications System, ATTN: NCS-JS
4-44
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization Support
Requirements Study Questionnaire
Administrative Information.
Location:
Date Completed:
Point of Contact (POC):
AUTOVON Number of POC:
1.0. Telephone Service.
1.1. Is the installation/facility telephone system adequate to
support mobilization? Yes
No
If no check the
.
applicable item below.
1.1.1.
Inadequate capacity (system expansion possible).
1.1.2.
Inadequate capacity (system expansion not possible or
feasible).
1.1.3.
Other (Define).
1.2.
Upon mobilization will telephone system hardware expansion
be required? Yes
No
.
If yes check applicable items
below and enter quantity required.
1.2.1.
DDD trunk termination units? Quantity
.
1.2.2.
AUTOVON trunk termination units? Quantity
.
1.2.3.
Subscriber line termination units? Quantity
.
1.2.4.
Equipment bays/racks? Quantity
.
1.2.5.
Power supply units? Quantity
.
1.2.6.
Other subassembly items (define/list quantity).
4-45
Emil
1.2.7.
Complete telephone switch. Has requirement been
identified in Information Management Plan? Yes
No
. List
---
subscriber line and trunk capacity required
1.3. Upon mobilization will additional telephone instruments be
required? Yes
No
.
If yes indicate type and quantity
---
required below.
Quantity Type required
1.4. Upon mobilization will additional trunk service be
required? Yes
No
.
If yes check applicable items below
and enter quantity required.
1.4.1.
Commercial DDD trunks. Quantity
.
1.4.2.
AUTOVON trunks. Quantity
.
1.4.3.
WATS lines. Quantity
.
1.4.4.
Other (define/list quantity).
1.5. Upon mobilization will additional leased long-haul
communications circuits be required? Consider requirements for
all additional installation/facility/activity dedicated long-haul
communications circuit which will occur upon mobilization.
Yes
No
. If yes indicate purpose, type (voice or data and
speed (Bits Per Second)), and quantity below.
Purpose
Type
Speed (BPS)
Quantity
4-46
1.6. Upon mobilization will additional commercial telephone
service pay telephones be required for general troop usage?
Yes
No
.
If yes list quantity
.
1.7. Will other local telephone company support services be
required to support mobilization? Yes
No
.
---
If yes
define.
2.0. Cable Distribution System.
2.1. Is the Installation Cable Distribution System adequate to
support mobilization. Yes
No
.
If no check the
following applicable items:
2.1.1.
Inadequate cable pairs.
2.1.2.
Distribution not available for training, staging and/or
cantonment areas.
2.1.3.
Other (define).
2.2. Upon mobilization will new or additional access cables be
required for training, staging and/or cantonment areas. Yes
--
No
. If yes complete the following.
2.2.1. Define mobilization new or additional access cable
requirements by completing the following:
Furpose/identification
Cable pairs Cable distance (feet)
2.2.2. How will the cable be installed?
Contractor,
Local telephone company, Military labor, Don't know.
2.3. Is the installation commercial access cable system adequate
to support mobilization? Yes
No
.
If no check the
applicable item below.
4-47
2.3.1.
Inadequate cable pairs.
2.3.2.
Other (define).
3.0. Secure Voice Service.
3.1. Is available non tactical secure voice equipment adequate to
support mobilization? Yes
No
Not available but
required
Not available and not required
.
3.2. If additional secure voice equipment will be required upon
mobilization indicate quantity of STUII/III secure voice units
required .
4.0. Facsimile Service.
4.1. Is available secure and/or non secure facsimile machines
adequate to support mobilization? Yes
No
Not available
but required
Not available and not required
.
---
4.2. If additional secure and/or non secure facsimile machines
are required upon mobilization indicate quantity required.
Secure
.
Non secure
.
5.0. Non Tactical Radio Systems.
5.1. Will mobilization result in a need for additional non
tactical radio systems or equipment? Yes
No
Not
applicable
.
If yes check and complete the applicable item
:
below.
5.1.1.
Additional portable/hand held units. Quantity
.
5.1.2.
Additional vehicle mobile units. Quantity
.
5.1.3.
Complete system with base station and portable/mobile
units. If checked for each system define purpose
(fire/police/medical/safety), and quantity data for base station,
portable units, and vehicle mobile units.
4-48
5.2. Other Non Tactical Radio service (define).
6.0 Automation.
6.1. Tier III. Will additional tier III computer and associated
telecommunications equipment be required upon mobilization?
Yes
No
.
If yes check the applicable item below and enter
the quantity required.
6.1.1.
Personal computer. Quantity
.
6.1.2.
Printer. Quantity
.
6.1.3.
Modem. Quantity
.
6.1.4.
Software. Quantity
.
6.1.5.
Other (define/list quantity)
6.2 Tier II. Will additional tier II computer and associated
telecommunications equipment be required upon mobilization?
Yes
No
Not applicable
.
If yes check the applicable
item below and enter the quantity required.
6.2.1.
Minicomputer. Quantity
.
6.2.2.
Printer (low speed). Quantity
.
6.2.3.
Printer (high speed). Quantity
.
6.2.4.
Tape drive unit. Quantity
-
6.2.5.
Disk drive unit. Quantity
.
6.2.6.
Modem. Quantity
.
6.2.7.
Software. Quantity
.
6.2.8.
Cluster controller
.
6.2.9.
Work station (dumb or intelligent terminal)
.
4-49
6.2.10.
Other (define/list quantity)
6.3. Office automation. Will additional office automation
equipment be required upon mobilization? Yes
No
Non
---
applicable . If yes, define purpose, type, and quantity (brief
description only).
Purpose
Type equipment
Quantity
6.4. Telecommunications media access associated with automation.
Will additional automation associated telecommunications media
(Long-haul communications circuits/Defense Data Network (DDN) )
access be required upon mobilization? Yes
No
.
6.4.1. If additional DDN access ports are required is the DDN
Node located at the installation? Yes
No
.
How many DDN
node ports will be required. Define purpose and speed (BPS) of
each port.
Purpose
Speed (BPS)
6.4.2. If additional dedicated or DDN node access long-haul
communications circuits are necessary identify in item 1.5.
7.0. Telecommunications Center (TCC). Define purpose, type, and
quantity of any additional TCC equipment which may be required to
support mobilization (Brief description only) [place response on
next sheet].
4-50
Purpose
Type equipment
Quantity
8.0 Printing and Publications.
8.1. Define purpose, type, and quantity of any additional
printing and publications equipment or services which will be
required to support mobilization (Brief description only).
Purpose
Type equipment
Quantity
9.0. Other leased or commercial services.
9.1. Define any other leased or commercial services which may be
required to support mobilization and could be requested from the
telecommunications industry.
4-51
10.0. Contractor services. Will additional contractor support
services be required to support mobilization? Yes
No
.
If yes provide a brief description of services required.
11.0. Personnel.
11.1. Will additional civilian personnel be required by the
USAISC-Activity to support the traffic volume surge or extended
operational periods due to mobilization? Yes
No
.
If yes
check applicable item below and enter the number required.
11.1.1.
Telecommunications Center Operators? Number
.
11.1.2.
Switchboard operators? Number
.
11.1.3.
Other (define/list number) ?
12.0. Mobilization Support Planning. Responses to the following
questions will not be provided to the TIM Group but will be used
for planning purposes at Headquarters, 7th Signal Command.
12.1. Is a copy of the 7th Signal Command Mobilization plan dated
May 1987 with the Logistics Annex dated 23 October 1987 available
at the USAISC-Activity. Yes
No
.
12.2. What is the date of the most recent Installation
Mobilization Plan?
.
12.3. Has a mobilization TDA been prepared for the
USAISC-Activity? Yes
No
Not required
---
.
12.4. Have mobilization civilian personnel requirements been
coordinated with the serving Civilian Personnel Office? Yes
---
No
Not required
.
12.5. Have local telephone company service requirements been
coordinated with the local telephone company? Yes
No
---
Not required
.
4-52
SURVEY LOCATIONS
1. Mobilization Stations.
a. Active and Semiactive.
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, CO
Fort Belvoir, VA
Fort Benning, GA
Fort Bliss, TX
Fort Bragg, NC
Fort Buchanan, PR
Fort Campbell, KY
Fort Carson, CO
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort Drum, NY
Fort Eustis, VA
Fort Gordon, GA
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort A. P. Hill, VA
Fort Hood, TX
Fort San Houston, TX
Fort Huachuca, AZ
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
Fort Irwin, CA
Fort Jackson, SC
Fort Knox, KY
Fort Lee, VA
Fort Lewis, WA
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort McCoy, WI
Fort Meade, MD
Fort Ord, CA
Fort Pickett, VA
Fort Polk, VA
Fort Richardson, AK
Fort Rucker, Al
Fort Sheridan, Il
Fort Sill, OK
Fort Stewart, GA
Fort Story, VA
Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Presidio of San Francisco, CA
4-53
Encl2
b. State Operated. (Resopnses will be provided by the NGB.)
Camp Atterbury, In
Camp Blanding, FL
Camp Edwards, MA
Camp Grayling, MI
Camp Ripley, MN
Camp Robinson, AR
Camp Roberts, CA
Camp Shelby, MS
Gowen Field, ID
2. Depots/Arsenals
Anniston Army Depot
Corpus Christi Army Depot
Fort Wingate Depot Activity
Letterkenny Army Depot
Lexington Army Depot
Navajo Depot Activity
New Cumberland Army Depot
Picatinny Arsenal
Pine Bluff Arsenal
Pubelo Depot Activity
Red River Army Depot
Redstone Arsenal
Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Sacremento Army Depot
Savanna Depot Activity
Seneca Army Depot
Sierra Army Depot
Tobyhanna Army Depot
Tooele Army Depot
Umatilla Depot Activity
Watervliet Arsenal
3. MTMC Army Ocean Terminal Facilities.
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, NJ
Oakland Army Base, Oakland, CA
Sunny Point Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, NC
4-54
Supplemental Telecommunications Industry Mobilization Support
Requirements Study Questionnaire
Administrative Information.
Location:
MTMC commercial ocean port Terminal Transportation
Unit (Attach list of locations considered).
USAMC Army
Ammunition Plant (AAF) (Attach list of locations considered).
Date Completed:
Point of Contact (POC):
AUTOVON Number of POC:
1.0. MTMC Commercial Ocean Fort Terminal Transportation Unit
(TTU) locations.
1.1. For each MTMC commercial ocean port TTU location request
USAISC-MTMC provide a consolidated telecommunications industry
mobilization support requirements response.
1.2. For each location define possible mobilization requirements
for telecommunications industry hardware or service support in the
following areas. For each item identify requirement and estimated
quantity required.
1.2.1. Local telephone service lines.
1.2.2. AUTOVON access lines.
1.2.3. Dedicated long-haul communications circuits.
1.2.4. Defense Data Network node ports.
1.2.5. Facsimile equipment.
1.2.6. Secure voice set (STU II/III).
1.2.7. Personal computers.
1.2.8. Work station (dumb or intelligent terminal)
1.2.9. Data modems.
1.2.10. Officer copier.
1.2.11. Other (define/list quantity).
4-55
Ener 3
2.0. USAMC Army Ammunition Plant.
2.1. For each USAMC Army Ammunition Plant request USAISC-AMC
provide a consolidated telecommunications industry mobilization
support requirements response.
2.2. For each location define possible mobilization requirements
for telecommunications industry hardware or service support in the
following areas.
2.2.1. Commercial DDD trunks.
2.2.2. AUTOVON trunks.
2.2.3. Dedicated long-haul communications circuits.
2.2.4. Facsimile equipment.
2.2.5. Secure voice set (STU II/III).
2.2.6. Personal computers.
2.2.7. Data modems.
2.2.8. AUTODIN access for newly activated inactive AAPs (one FAST
system for each location).
1.2.8. Other (define/list quantity).
4-56
NCS 490/6
5.0 GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY
MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
(FINAL REPORT)
June 1988
5-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
5-5
LIST OF TABLES
5-5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5-7
5.1 Introduction
5-11
5.2 Background/Approach
5-11
5.3 Findings
5-18
5.3.1 Telecommunication Mobilization Management
5-18
5.3.1.1 Federal Government
5-19
5.3.1.2 Telecommunications Industry
5-30
5.3.1.3 Joint Industry-Government
5-33
5.3.2 Federal Government Mobilization Management
5-36
5.3.2.1 Existing Structure and Plans
5-37
5.3.2.2 Evolving Structure and Plans
5-38
5.4 Conclusions
5-40
5.5 Recommendations
5-41
APPENDICES
5-A OMNCS DESCRIPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
5-43
5-B PRELIMINARY MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
5-65
5-C EXTRACTS FROM THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)
5-69
5-D EXTRACTS FROM DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS SYSTEM (DPAS)
5-83
5-3
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
5-1 MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
5-13
LIST OF TABLES
Table Number
Page
5-1 INFORMATION BRIEFINGS
5-16
5-5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A defined and integrated management structure is essential for
effective telecommunications mobilization planning and response.
Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure was thus
identified as one of the first of seven subjects to be addressed by the
Joint Government-Industry Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Group, which is charged to: (1) identify possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization planning and (2)
assist in the development of corrective actions to overcome any identified
impediments.
The Group's specific objectives with respect to the mobilization
management structure subject were to assess the adequacy and effectiveness
of Federal Government and Telecommunications Industry mobilization
management capabilities and to offer recommendations for remedial or
enhancement measures. To achieve these objectives, the Group sought
information from Federal Government and Telecommunications Industry
organizations about existing mobilization management plans, programs, and
procedures; incorporated mobilization management-related events in TIM
exercise play to gain additional insights; and reviewed a paper that
describes, from the perspective of the Office of the Manager, NCS, the
existing structure for telecommunications mobilization management.
In investigating the concerns identified by the original NSTAC TIM
Task Force, the Joint Group gained an appreciation of the complexity of
the management structure subject. The detailed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations presented in the body of this final report reflect this
complexity. While focused primarily on the telecommunications
mobilization management arrangements of the Federal Government and the
Telecommunications Industry and on the specific mobilization management
issues identified by the Group, the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations also address the overall Federal Government structure
within which telecommunications mobilization management activities must be
carried out.
Conclusions
First, the Joint Group has concluded that the fundamental elements
necessary for effective telecommunications mobilization management are in
place. These include:
0
The assignment of national security emergency preparedness (NSEP)
telecommunications functions in Executive Order 12472 and the
National Coordinating Center (NCC) Operating Charter,
The Federal Government regulations and procedures that facilitate
the emergency provisioning of telecommunications under
mobilization conditions,
5-7
The emergency response procedures established by
Telecommunications Industry entities, and
The joint Industry-Government NCC.
However, the Joint Group has also concluded that the ability to fully
and effectively use these existing telecommunications mobilization
management capabilities is significantly constrained by the absence of
both:
Explicit provisions in NSEP telecommunications management plans
and procedures for the performance, coordination, and integration
of telecommunications: mobilization management functions and
activities, and
A formally defined and documented overall Federal Government
structure for mobilization management.
In addition, the Joint Group has concluded that the following
specific mobilization management issue areas need to be addressed:
Regional telecommunications mobilization management
Coordination of NSEP telecommunications equipment provisioning,
Broadened Government and Telecommunications Industry involvement
in the NCC,
Coordination between NSEP telecommunications and other key
functional areas, and
Warning and alert procedures.
Recommendations
On the basis of its final assessment of the adequacy and
effectiveness of Federal Government and Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization Management capabilities, the Joint Group offers the following
recommendations:
The National Security Council (NSC) should, as part of its
national security emergency preparedness and response planning
effort, ensure the timely definition, documentation, and
implementation of an overall Federal Government structure and plan
for mobilization management. These documents should:
-
Specify the relationship of the telecommunications
mobilization management structure defined in Executive Order
12472 to the overall Federal Government mobilization
management structure,
5-8
- Identify the mechanisms to be used to integrate Federal
Government mobilization management activities across
functional/resource areas, and
- Provide for the establishment of regional mobilization
management capabilities.
The National Communications System (NCS) should define, document,
and implement a comprehensive approach to and structure for
telecommunications mobilization management by incorporating
specific provisions for the performance, coordination, and
integration of mobilization-related management functions and
activities in NSEP telecommunications plans and procedures.
With respect to the specific telecommunications mobilization
management issues identified by the Joint Group, the NCS should:
- In accordance with guidance provided by the NSC, make explicit
provisions for the performance of Federal telecommunications
mobilization management functions on a regional basis;
- Clarify the processes and procedures for coordinating the
provisioning of NSEP telecommunications equipment and the
resolution of any provisioning conflicts under mobilization
conditions, particularly with respect to the role to be played
by the NCC;
- Expand and strengthen NCS member organization representation
and participation in the NCC, and broaden Telecommunications
Industry NCC participation by involving equipment
manufacturers, equipment suppliers, and service integrators on
an affiliate basis;
- Establish procedures for coordinating the mobilization
management and response activities of the NCS with those of
other key functional/resource areas, e.g., energy and
transportation; and
- Consistent with security considerations, seek to enhance the
exchange and dissemination of telecommunications
mobilization-related warning and intelligence information.
5-9
5.1 Introduction
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
Communications System (NCS) Committee of Principals (COP) to:
(1) Identify possible impediments to effective telecommunications
industry mobilization and mobilization planning, and
(2) Assist in the development of corrective actions to overcome
any identified impediments.
A defined and integrated management structure is essential for effective
telecommunications mobilization planning and response. Government and
Industry Mobilization Management Structure was thus identified by the
NSTAC and the NCS COP as one of the first of seven subjects to be
addressed by the Joint TIM Group. This report documents the Group's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations regarding the Government and
Industry telecommunications mobilization management structure.
5.2 Background/Approach
In December 1984, the NCS asked the President's NSTAC to assist the
Government in assessing telecommunications industry mobilization and
mobilization planning capabilities. In response to the Government's
request, the NSTAC charged its Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) to
assist the Government in bringing the issue into sharper focus and to
develop recommendations regarding a future role for NSTAC in the area of
telecommunications industry mobilization. The IES, in turn, established a
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Task Force and instructed
it to develop a TIM issue statement.
The NSTAC TIM Task Force defined and clarified the telecommunications
industry mobilization issue, identifying seven subjects for further study
by industry and government. One of the subjects was Government and
Industry Mobilization Management Structure. The mobilization management
structure findings of the TIM Task Force were included in a two-volume
report and presented for review and approval at the October 9, 1985
meeting of the NSTAC. The NSTAC subsequently charged its IES to assist
the NCS in addressing the seven mobilization subjects identified by the
task force, including the mobilization management structure subject.
1
Final Report of the Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement," and Volume II, "Background
and Supporting Materials,' September 1985.
5-11
In its final report to the NSTAC, the TIM Task Force summarized its
concerns about the existing mobilization management structure as follows:
Throughout the review of mobilization subjects, the need
for a defined and integrated management structure for
mobilization was repeatedly articulated. Industry
representatives from both the manufacturing and service
sectors identified the need for a single authoritative
government voice to define needs and establish
priorities. Similarly, methods and procedures for
transmitting critical government information and
requirements, e.g., trigger, notification, and activation
procedures, to appropriate points within industry
management structures are needed to ensure timely
telecommunications industry response. These concerns
apply to Section 706 [Communications Act of 1934, as
amended] situations as well as non-706 emergencies. It
is essential, therefore, that government and industry
work together to define and document clear lines of
communications and responsibility for proper and timely
interaction at all levels of mobilization activity.
The Joint TIM Group has built upon the earlier work of the NSTAC TIM
Task Force, conducting its analysis of mobilization subjects within the
context of the following definition of mobilization developed by the
original NSTAC TIM Task Force:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications
resources needed to make the transition from a normal
state to 3 state of readiness for war or other national
emergency.
Mobilization is considered by the Joint TIM Group to encompass
peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent conventional military actions
external to the continental United States, as illustrated in Figure 5-1.
The impact of a nuclear attack on the United States has been judged by the
Joint Group to be outside the scope of its study. The following
mobilization time periods were used by the Group for the purpose of its
analyses:
(1) Pre-Mobilization: Planning and Pre-Positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Existing Capability and Service)
2 Final Report of TIM Task Force, Volume I, p. 11.
3 Final Report of the TIM Task Force, Volume I, "TIM Issue Statement,"
September 5, 1985, p. 5.
5-12
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL AS CONSIDERED
BY JOINT TIM GROUP
MILITARY ACTIONS
OUTSIDE CONUS WITHOUT
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
PEACETIME - - DISASTER - - CRISIS
TRANS-ATTACK
POST-ATTACK
EARLY
LATE
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
AS CONSIDERED BY
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR NOT
CONSIDERED BY JOINT TIM GROUP
JOINT TIM GROUP
-----
MOBILIZATION AS
CONSIDERED
BY TIM GROUP
FIGURE 5-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
5-13
(3) Mid-Term: 90 to 180 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Products and Services in the Pipeline)
(4) Long-Term: Over 180 Days (Expanded Production of Capacity and
Services).
The Group's overall objectives concerning management structure
reflect the provisions of the Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
Implementation Measure in the NCS's National Security Emergency
Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA), calling for:
The identification of possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning and the recommendation of corrective actions, and
The identification and recommendation of any Federal government
actions needed to support 4 telecommunications industry mobilization
planning activities.
The Group's specific objectives with respect to management structure were
to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of Federal Government and
Telecommunications Industry mobilization management capabilities and to
offer recommendations for remedial or enhancement measures.
The Joint TIM Group adopted a two-part approach for gathering
information on Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure.
The Group first sought information from Federal Government and
Telecommunications Industry organizations about existing mobilization
management plans, programs, and procedures, receiving briefings on the
following subjects:
Legal authorities/framework for Federal Government mobilization
management,
Federal Government emergency procurement authorities and
procedures,
The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS),
The Department of Defense (DOD) Key Assets Protection Program
(KAPP),
The DOD Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP),
4
Implementation Measure 9, National Security Emergency Preparedness
(NSEP) Telecommunications Plan of Action, NCS Document No. 208/5, June
27, 1985.
5-14
A proposed Industrial Alert Conditions (INDCON) concept, 5
Industry emergency response plans and procedures, and
The status of Federal Government efforts to revise and update its
overall national security emergency plans and to develop a
Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) Concept.
The individuals and organizations who provided briefings relating to
mobilization management structure are identified in Table 5-1.
In addition to seeking information briefings, the Joint TIM Group
also reviewed the results of past exercises that involved industry
mobilization, i.e., OPERATION PORTCALL and the Industrial Responsiveness
Analysis (IRA) effort conducted by the Department of Defense and the
American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) in conjunction with
OPERATION PORTCALL. This review brought to the Group's attention the
potential utility of exercises for gaining insights into the Government
and industry mobilization management activities. The Group's interest in
incorporating a TIM element in upcoming exercises was subsequently
identified in briefings to the NSTAC and the NCS COP. These bodies
endorsed this approach to TIM information gathering.
Accordingly, the Joint TIM Group assisted in the definition of a set
of objectives and event items for the POWER SWEEP '87 (Fall 1986) and
PROUD SCOUT '88/REX-88 ALPHA (Fall 1987) exercises. The Master Scenario
Events List (MSEL) items developed to elicit information about
mobilization management structure addressed specific areas of concern
previously identified by the TIM Task Force as well as specific Government
and industry plans and procedures identified in information briefings to
the Joint Group. These mobilization management MSEL items related to:
The Key Assets Protection Program (KAPP),
0
Emergency procurement responsibilities and processes;
Conflict resolution mechanisms and procedures; and
0 Warning, alert, and intelligence dissemination procedures.
MSEL items relating to other TIM subjects, i.e., Telecommunications
Service Surge Requirements and Dependence on Foreign Sources, also yielded
information relevant to mobilization management.
5
This concept subsequently evolved into the Graduated Mobilization
Response System concept discussed in section 5.3.2.
5-15
TABLE 5-1
INFORMATION BRIEFINGS
SUBJECT
BRIEFER
Legal Authorities/Framework
Mr. J. Randolph MacPherson
Office of the Manager, NCS
Emergency Procurement Procedures
Mr. Douglas Phelps
General Services Administration
Mobilization Triggers/
Mr. Stephen Hood
Notification Procedures
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Industrial Responsiveness Analysis
Mr. Ron Vawter
National Defense University
Operation PORTCALL
LTC Jim Olmstead
Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Key Assets Protection Program
Mr. Max Alston
Department of Defense
Interagency Resource Preparedness
Ms. Cher Terry
Initiatives
Office of the Manager, NCS
Defense Priorities and Allocations
Mr. Richard Myers
System (DPAS)
Department of Commerce
Federal Authorities/Plans
Mr. Sean Foohey
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Industrial Mobilization Management
Mr. Jim Bean
GTE Corporation
Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning
LTC Paul C. Gill
Process
Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Industrial Alert Conditions and
Mr. John Starnes
Emergency Preparedness
The Analytic Sciences Corporation
Multiple Award Schedule Contracts
Mr. Les Davison
General Services Administration
Graduated Mobilization Response
Mr. Stephen Hood
Concept
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Procurement
Mr. Cal Persinger
General Services Administration
Section 706
Mr. Carl Smith
Communications Act of 1934
Office of the Manager, NCS
5-16
The Joint Group's initial findings, conclusions, and recommendations
on Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure were
presented in status reports to the NSTAC in May 1986, February 1987, and
November 1987, and to the NCS COP in July 1986, March 1987, and December
1987.
Two of the initial conclusions of the Joint Group were that (1) there
is a need to develop and distribute an updated description of the overall
Federal Government mobilization management structure and (2) more explicit
definition of mobilization management functions and activities within the
overall NSEP telecommunications management structure is needed to
facilitate Government and industry mobilization planning and the training
of personnel for mobilization management operations. The Joint Group,
accordingly, made the following recommendations in its February 18, 1987
Status Report to the NSTAC and the NCS COP:
(1) The overall Federal Government mobilization management structure
is outdated, and ongoing efforts to update that structure should
proceed on a priority basis.
(2) To ensure that the Federal Government telecommunications
mobilization management structure established by Executive Order
12472 and the NCS is effective, its relationship to the evolving
overall Federal Government mobilization management structure
needs to be documented and explained within the Federal 6
Government and to the telecommunications industry.
In response to these preliminary recommendations, a paper that
describes, from the perspective of the Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS),
the existing structure for telecommunications, mobilization management was
developed and provided to the Joint TIM Group'. In addition, the OMNCS
has provided to the Joint Group information regarding the Federal
Government's ongoing efforts to update its national security emergency
response plans. This material was used, in conjunction with information
briefings and exercise results, to develop the Group's final assessment of
the adequacy and effectiveness of the Federal Government and
Telecommunications Industry management structure for telecommunications
mobilization.
6 Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure (Status
Report), February 1987. The complete set of preliminary recommendations
offered in the Joint Group's September 1987 status report on Government
and Industry Mobilization Management Structure is provided as Appendix
5-B.
7 The OMNCS "Description of Telecommunications Mobilization Management"
is included in this report for reference purposes as Appendix 5-A.
5-17
5.3 Findings
The original NSTAC TIM Task Force identified a variety of concerns
regarding the Government and Industry mobilization management
arrangements, e.g., "trigger, notification, and activation procedures" and
"clear lines of communication and responsibility." In investigating these
concerns, the Joint Group gained an appreciation of the overall scope and
complexity of the mobilization management structure subject. To gain
insights into the concerns articulated by the NSTAC TIM Task Force and to
understand and assess the status and adequacy of the Government and
Industry telecommunications mobilization management structure, the Joint
TIM Group found it necessary to examine the general overall Federal
Government approach to mobilization planning and management as well as the
specific telecommunications mobilization planning and management
arrangements of the Federal Government and the Telecommunications
Industry. The Group's findings with respect to Government and Industry
telecommunications mobilization management capabilities are presented in
Section 5.3.1. Its findings regarding the overall Federal Government
mobilization management structure are outlined in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Telecommunications Mobilization Management
The Telecommunications Industry and the Federal Government have,
through the NSTAC and the NCS, established an overall structure for joint
Industry-Government NSEP telecommunications planning and management.
However, while mobilization planning and management are encompassed within
this overall structure, existing NSEP telecommunications management plans
and procedures do not explicitly address mobilization functions and
activities. The Joint Group thus sought information about Government and
Industry telecommunications mobilization management through (1) review of
NSEP telecommunications-related policy, planning, and procedures
documents, (2) information briefings by Government and Telecommunications
Industry representatives, and (3) participation in military/civil
readiness exercises.
In addition, the telecommunications mobilization management structure
description (Appendix 5-A) provided by the OMNCS was used by the Joint
Group to further its understanding of (1) the respective
telecommunications mobilization management roles and responsibilities of
the Federal Government and the Telecommunications Industry, and (2) the
joint Industry-Government structure for mobilization management. The
Joint Group also used the description as one of the bases for identifying
mobilization management issues that may warrant further consideration and
action by Government and/or the Telecommunications Industry.
The Joint TIM Group's findings regarding Federal Government
telecommunications mobilization management, including specific issues
pertaining primarily to the Government, are presented in Section 5.3.1.1.
Its findings regarding Telecommunications Industry mobilization management
5-18
are presented in section 5.3.1.2. Mobilization management issues that are
believed to be largely joint in nature are identified and discussed in
Section 5.3.1.3.
5.3.1.1 Federal Government. Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of
National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications
Functions," sets forth Federal Government functions and responsibilities
relating to the planning for and provision of NSEP telecommunications for
the Federal Government under all circumstances, including mobilization.
This assignment of functions and responsibilities is amplified and further
specified in a number of NSEP telecommunications management-related
documents, including the following:
National Coordinating Center (NCC) Operating Charter (1985), NCC
Operational Guidelines (1984), and NCC Standard Operating
Procedures;
NSEP Telecommunications Procedures (1987)
Interim Standard Operating Procedures for the Joint
Telecommunications Resources Board (JTRB) (1985); and
National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime
Emergencies (1987).
Summary of NSEP Telecommunications Mobilization-Related
Management Functions and Responsibilities
Under Executive Order 12472, NSEP telecommunications management
oversight and direction responsibilities are assigned to entities within
the Executive Office of the President (EOP), i.e., the National Security
Council (NSC) and the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP). The National Communications System (NCS) assists the President,
the NSC, and the Director, OSTP, in the performance of their NSEP
telecommunications functions and the coordination of the planning for and
provision of NSEP telecommunications under all circumstances, including
the conditions and time periods defined by the Joint Group as encompassing
mobilization (see Figure 5-1 in Section 5.2).
The NSC is assigned overall responsibility for advising and assisting
the President in:
Coordinating the development of policy, plans, programs and
standards for the mobilization and use of the Nation's commercial,
government, and privately-owned telecommunications resources in
order to meet national security or emergency preparedness
requirements;
Providing policy oversight and direction of the activities of the
NCS; and
5-19
Providing policy oversight and guidance for the execution of the
responsibilities assigned to the Federal departments and agencies.
In addition, the NSC is also assigned responsibility for providing policy
direction for the exercise of the President's non-war emergency
telecommunications functions and the war power functions of the President
under Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Both
sets of functions could be applicable to telecommunications mobilization.
The Director, OSTP, is also assigned responsibilities with direct
bearing on telecommunications mobilization management activities, i.e.,
responsibility for the following:
Directing the exercise of the war power functions of the President
under Section 706, should the President so instruct, and
Providing information, advice, guidance, and assistance, as
appropriate, to the President and to those Federal departments and
agencies with responsibilities for the provision, management, or
allocation of telecommunications resources, during those crises or
emergencies in which the exercise of the President's war power
functions is not required or permitted by law.
A Joint Telecommunications Resources Board (JTRB) authorized by Executive
Order 12472 and established by the Director, OSTP, assists in the exercise
of non-wartime emergency functions. The JTRB is composed of
representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the General Services
Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the NCS.
The NCS is responsible for assisting the President, the NSC, and the
Director, OSTP, in coordinating the planning for and provision of NSEP
telecommunications. To assist in the accomplishment of this mission, the
NCS is to serve as a focal point for joint Industry-Government NSEP
telecommunications planning and establish a joint Industry-Government NCC
that is capable of assisting in the initiation, coordination, restoration,
and reconstitution of NSEP telecommunications services or facilities under
all conditions of crisis or emergency, including mobilization.
More specifically, the Manager, NCS, is assigned responsibility in
Executive Order 12472 for:
0 Developing, for consideration by the NCS Committee of Principals
and the Executive Agent, NCS, plans and procedures for the
management, allocation, and use of Federally owned and leased
telecommunications assets under all conditions of crisis or
emergency, and
5-20
Implementing and administering any approved plans or programs as
assigned, in consultation with the NCS Committee of Principals and
the Federal Communications Commission.
In addition, specific NSEP telecommunications responsibilities with
mobilization implications are assigned to the following organizations in
Executive Order 12472:
0
Department of Commerce (DOC) Crisis or emergency radio spectrum
assignments, priorities, and allocations for the Federal
Government°;
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - Telecommunications to
support assigned emergency management responsibilities, state and
local government advice and assistance, management oversight for
the Emergency Broadcast System, and private radio licensee advice
and assistance;
Department of State (DOS) -- Telecommunications for diplomatic
activities;
Department of Defense (DOD) -- Military telecommunications support
and telecommunications security and protection;
Department of Justice (DOJ) -- Legal review of NSEP
telecommunications policies, plans, or procedures, as requested;
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -- Telecommunications support
for intelligence activities;
General Services Administration (GSA) -- Federal Government
domestic NSEP telecommunications requirements; and
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) -- Regulatory oversight
and assignment of radio frequencies to Commission licensees.
NCC Participation
The joint Industry-Government NCC, which was authorized by Executive
Order 12472 and established by the NCS and the NSTAC, assists in the
initiation, coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of NSEP
telecommunications services or facilities. The NCC Operating Charter
defines the respective roles and responsibilities of the Federal
8 Although not specifically identified as an NSEP telecommunications
function in Executive Order 12472, the Department of Commerce is also
responsible for industrial resource priorities and allocations.
5-21
for priorities and allocations support, and the DOC has delegated
authority for placing priority ratings on contracts and orders to the
Government agencies that issue such contracts or orders, e.g., DOD, DOE,
FEMA, and GSA. DOC's OIRA has the responsibility for establishing the
basic priorities and allocations rules for industrial production and for
identifying the authorized programs and agencies in its published
regulations.
The use of DPAS is not confined to formally declared emergency
situations. It is also used for national defense purposes under peacetime
conditions, requiring no declaration of emergency to trigger its
provisions. Although its applicability to telecommunications service
provisioning is constrained by regulation, it has been used to obtain
telecommunications equipment on a priority basis. More detailed
information about DPAS is provided in Appendix 5-D.
The use of the DPAS was simulated in the POWER SWEEP '87 exercise in
a situation involving competing requirements within DOD for communications
equipment produced by a single manufacturer. This situation triggered
internal DOD DPAS procedures for resolving conflicts. A Joint Materials
Priorities and Allocations Board (JMPAB) composed of representatives of
the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and the military
services was convened to consider the competing requirements. The JMPAB
determined DOD priorities and satisfactorily resolved the conflict. DPAS
procedures for resolving conflicts between DOD and non-DOD entities or
among non-DOD entities have not, to the knowledge of the Joint TIM Group,
been tested in recent military/civil readiness exercise.
A number of equipment-related events were incorporated in the PROUD
SCOUT '88/REX-88 ALPHA exercise as a result of the Joint TIM Group's
concern about the management of telecommunications equipment surge
requirements. Although caution is necessary in interpreting the limited
and inherently artificial results of exercise play, the responses to the
surge equipment events indicate that there is some uncertainty and
confusion about the role of the OMNCS and the NCC in coordinating NSEP
telecommunications equipment provisioning requirements. For example,
exercise play indicated that the NCC's automated NSEP telecommunications
management tools, i.e., its Emergency Preparedness Management Information
System (EPMIS), are designed to handle service, not equipment, requests.
In addition, there are no established internal and external procedures for
communication and feedback regarding the coordination of equipment
provisioning requests. The functions and roles of the NCC as defined in
the NCC Operating Charter and amplified in the NCC Operational Guidelines
are also unclear on this issue.
Coordination With Other Resource Areas
Reference is made in the OMNCS telecommunications mobilization
management structure description to "infrastructure services
(transportation and energy)" that "may be required to support the
5-28
effective mobilization of telecommunications resources." The description
notes that responsibility for the allocation and management of these
resources under mobilization conditions rests with specific Federal
departments and agencies and private entities. However, no processes or
procedures for ensuring adequate consultation and coordination with the
responsible Federal departments and agencies and private entities to
ensure the maintenance of essential infrastructure support for NSEP
telecommunications services were identified.
Since energy and transportation have been identified as functional
areas for which interagency functional area groups will be responsible in
national security emergencies, the proposed National Security Emergency
Plan discussed in Section 5.3.2.2 below may address the issue of
consultation and coordination between and among functional areas. The
subject of Dependence on Other Infrastructure Elements will also be
separately addressed by the Joint TIM Group as one of its remaining
mobilization subjects, and the NSTAC's Telecommunications System
Survivability (TSS) Task Force and the OMNCS are currently working with
the Department of Energy to address NSEP telecommunications requirements.
In addition, a transportation priorities issue was identified, addressed,
and resolved as a result of recommendations made by the Joint TIM Group in
its study of Personnel Issues. Additional insights regarding the
requirements and arrangements for coordination with other resource areas
may be obtained from the results of trial exercise of the 15 National
Telecommunications Management Structure (NTMS) concept.
Internal Federal Government Warning/Alert Procedures
Internal Federal Government procedures for alerting the OMNCS, and
thereby the NCC, to changes in military and civil readiness conditions
have been tested in recent exercises and found to be effective within the
exercise context. For example, the OMNCS was, on several occasions,
consulted on whether changes were warranted. However, it is not clear
that such alert information is provided to the OMNCS as a standard
operating procedure, i.e., outside the context of exercise play.
In addition, it is not clear that internal Government procedures for
providing warning and other mobilization-related intelligence information
with possible relevance to telecommunications facilities and operations to
the OMNCS/NCC have been established. The limited and inherently
artificial results from TIM exercise participation suggest that the
Federal Government organizations responsible for collecting, analyzing,
and transmitting such information may not be aware of the OMNCS/NCC's need
15
The proposed NTMS provides for the survivabilty and endurability of
NCC capabilities. See National Telecommunications Management Structure
Implementation Concept (U), Office of the Manager, NCS.
5-29
for intelligence information and its ability to effectively protect and
use it. However, the proposed Graduation Mobilization Response (GMR)
concept, which is discussed below in Section 5.3.2.2, specifically calls
for development of the capability to integrate ambiguous and specific
warning with mobilization actions.
5.3.1.2 Telecommunications Industry. The Telecommunications Industry and
its constituent companies have not established specific structures, plans,
and procedures for mobilization management purposes. However, most
telecommunications service and equipment providers have their own
established procedures for responding to emergencies and managing their
companies' emergency response operations. In addition, major elements of
the Telecommunications Industry have actively participated in the
establishment and operation of a joint Industry-Government mechanism --
the NCC -- through which responses to NSEP telecommunications requirements
can be managed and coordinated under a variety of emergency conditions,
including mobilization.
Individual Company Emergency Response Structures, Plans,
and Procedures
The telecommunications industry is large and varied, encompassing
more than 1000 individual telephone companies¹⁶ as well as an array of
manufacturers and suppliers of telecommunications equipment. These
industry entities have not established specific structures, plans, and
procedures for mobilization purposes per se. However, while it is
difficult to generalize with certainty about an entire industry, the
industry members of the Joint Group and other knowledgable observers
believe that most telecommunications companies have established
comprehensive emergency response procedures that would enable them to
respond effectively to mobilization requirements. Such procedures are
regarded by most telecommunications companies as essential for ensuring
continuity of service for their customers. Moreover, telecommunications
companies have traditionally recognized the vital nature of the services
they provide to the public, as well as to government at all levels, and
have responded accordingly.
The information about industry mobilization management structures
provided by the Joint TIM Group's industry participants indicates that
there is considerable variation across companies in terms of the ways in
which emergency responses are managed and the ways in which emergency
procedures have been established. For example, as a result of specific
provisions in the AT&T Modification of Final Judgement (MFJ) and Plan of
Reorganization (POR), the regional Bell companies have established within
their jointly-owned Bellcore organization a group responsible for
16 Information provided by the United States Telephone Association
(USTA).
5-30
coordinating NSEP telecommunications activities within their companies.
The organization, among other things, serves as a single point of contact
for the provisioning of NSEP telecommunications services, e.g., expediting
provisioning for mobilization centers located in areas served by the Bell
Operating Companies.
Bellcore and the regional Bell companies have also developed,
documented, and exercised detailed emergency response plans and procedures
and established a formal structure for emergency management. AT&T, which
served as the de facto single point of contact for much of the
telecommunications industry prior to divestiture, also has an established
structure as well as formal plans and procedures. Another
long-established service provider - GTE - has made special provisions for
the training and deployment of emergency response teams. Other service
providers have made less formal arrangements for emergency response and
have instead built emergency response capabilities into their normal
day-to-day activities and procedures. Non-service providers, e.g.,
manufacturers, equipment suppliers, and system integrators, have indicated
that their existing resource allocation practices and procedures, if
carried out at an accelerated rate, would permit them to respond
effectively to mobilization requirements.
The assurance that individual telecommunications companies are, in
general, well-prepared to respond to emergency situations does not,
however, by itself allay the specific concerns expressed by the original
TIM Task Force. Methods and procedures for transmitting (and receiving)
critical Government information and requirements, e.g., trigger,
notification, and activation procedures, to appropriate points within
industry management structures were felt to be necessary to ensure timely
telecommunications industry response. The establishment of such methods
and procedures has been a major focus of activity for industry
representatives within the NCC, but only a small proportion of domestic
telecommunications companies are so represented. However, these few
companies satisfy the preponderance of the Federal Government's
telecommunications requirements. Furthermore, the NCC can, in most cases,
continue to rely on the major service-providing companies already resident
in the NCC to coordinate requests for service involving non-NCC companies.
NCC Participation
Eleven major U.S. telecommunications service providers have resident
representatives in the NCC. These resident representatives are available
on a daily basis to monitor the status of their systems and networks and
to assist, on an ongoing basis, in the development of emergency procedures
and contingency plans. In addition, the NCC Charter provides for
non-resident participation by Telecommunications Industry entities.
Non-resident representatives of Telecommunications Industry entities would
serve as NCC points of contact within their respective companies and could
5-31
be called upon to perform duties in support of emergency or crisis
situations. All U.S. Telecommunications Industry entities that provide
domestic or international communications services, local or long-haul
communications services, voice or data (including software) communications
services, or telecommunications equipment supply services are considered
eligible for participation. One service integration company, Martin
Marietta Corporation, currently participates in the NCC, along with the
United States Telephone Association (USTA), on a non-resident basis.
Arrangements have also been made through the USTA to identify
operational points of contact within USTA member companies that are not
members of, nor resident in, the NCC. Under contract with USTA, the GTE
representative in the NCC maintains a data base of designated points of
contact within USTA member companies. As verified in exercise play, this
arrangement with USTA and GTE enables the Government to readily identify
and contact a large number of non-member and non-resident service
providers for NSEP purposes.
Some Telecommunications Industry companies that are not members of
the NCC on either a resident or non-resident basis, but that know about
the NCC and its operations as result of their participation in the NSTAC
believe that their own internal emergency response processes and
procedures will enable them to respond effectively to the Government's
requirements. They have therefore not sought to become NCC members. If,
however, the Government determined that wider industry participation were
necessary to meet its requirements, the existing non-resident
participation provisions of the NCC Charter would permit ready expansion
of NCC Telecommunications Industry capabilities.
Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization Management Issue
On the basis of its investigations, the Joint Group has identified,
as a mobilization management issue, the question of whether
Telecommunications Industry representation and participation in the NCC is
adequate to meet overall telecommunications. mobilization requirements.
Current Telecommunications Industry representation and participation
in the NCC - both resident and non-resident - is oriented primarily around
telecommunications service provisioning and restoration. For example,
even those companies with associated equipment manufacturing, equipment
sales, or service integration capabilities typically provide
representation to the NCC from their service operations. As indicated
earlier in the Federal Government mobilization management issue section of
this report, there may be a surge in telecommunications equipment
requirements under mobilization conditions and, therefore, a need for some
NCC action to coordinate NSEP telecommunications equipment provisioning.
However, exercise results suggest that the information currently available
within the NCC may not be sufficient to support an equipment coordination
5-32
17
role, particularly for non-secure customer premise equipment.
No
defined points of contact or standard procedures for coordinating NSEP
equipment provisioning have been formally established with 18
telecommunications equipment suppliers or integrators.
To increase the overall coordination capabilities of the NCC, it may
be desirable to broaden the scope of Telecommunications Industry
participation in NCC operations by identifying telecommunications
equipment providers and integrators, and establishing specific NSEP points
of contact and response procedures within participating companies. Such
participation need not involve actual membership in the NCC; rather,
participating companies could be designated NCC "affiliate" or "associate"
companies and perhaps participate in occasional exercises.
5.3.1.3. Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Mobilization
Management Issues. On the basis of its investigations, the Joint TIM
Group has identified two joint government-industry mobilization management
issue areas:
0
Warning/alert procedures, and
0 Key Telecommunications Industry assets.
Warning/Alert Procedures
The original TIM Task Force identified "trigger, notification, and
activation" procedures as a key area of concern within the mobilization
management structure subject. The Joint TIM Group shared this concern and
studied these kinds of procedures through the design and play of warning,
alert, and intelligence dissemination events in military and civil
readiness exercises. The objective of these exercise events was to
determine if Government and Industry have established reliable procedures
for the mutual exchange of critical information.
Exercise play constituted only a limited and artificial test of
Government and Industry notification procedures. However, assessment of
the exercise results indicated that the major Telecommunications Industry
service providers have established procedures for notifying responsible
officials within their own companies and relevant government officials of
significant service disruptions. These procedures worked well during the
exercise, although it is not clear whether events that did not result in
17
Exercise results indicate that the Federal Government is able to
satisfy its own needs for secure telecommunications equipment such as
secure telephones and facsimiles.
18
Except in the case of mobile/transportable equipment used for service
restoration.
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significant service outages, would have been reported. Also, in some
cases, Government alerts to specific company locations were not reported
by these companies to the NCC.
The exercise results also indicate that standard Government operating
procedures adequately provide for the dissemination of Telecommunications
Industry event reports within the Government. Information provided to the
NCS by Industry during the exercises was passed on to other affected
organizations, e.g., the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), DOD, and
FEMA. Information provided to the NCS by other Government organizations
and by Industry was also made available to the Industry and Government
representatives resident in the NCC.
Although the exchange of information between Industry and Government
within the NCC has proven to be excellent, questions have been raised
about the exchange of warning and alert information between Government and
non-NCC member telecommunications companies. Currently, information
exchange procedures have been established only with those Industry
entities that are members of the NCC. While broader dissemination of
mobilization-related warning and alert information might be desirable, the
lack of secure telecommunications and facilities for storing classified
information across the Telecommunications Industry as a whole constrains
the information dissemination ability of the OMNCS and the NCC.
Key Telecommunications Industry Assets
The subject of key telecommunications industry assets protection was
a particular concern of the Joint Group as a result of briefings to the
NSTAC at U.S. Readiness Command Headquarters in May 1986. These briefings
indicated that no telecommunications industry assets were currently on the
DOD Key Assets List (KAL) or included in the DOD Key Assets Protection
Program (KAPP), which provides for the identification and potential
protection of assets whose loss would halt or unacceptably delay DOD
mobilization and deployment efforts. Following that NSTAC meeting, the
Joint Group was briefed by the DOD KAPP coordinator and extensively
discussed the issues and problems associated with the identification of
key telecommunications assets.
DOD has established the following criteria 19 for the selection of
Key Assets:
1. Key Assets. Any asset selected for inclusion in the KAL must be:
a. A Mobilization, Deployment or Supporting Asset whose loss
would halt or unacceptably delay DoD mobilization and
deployment efforts; or
19
DoD Directive 5160.54, December 5, 1986.
5-34
b. An Industrial Asset that produces items on the Commander In
Chiefs' Surge Critical Items List, or a similar list of
critical items prepared by a DoD component, and whose loss
would halt or unacceptably delay DoD mobilization and
deployment or sustainment efforts.
2. Categories of Importance. Key Assets, when listed on the KAL,
shall be assigned to one of the following categories:
a. Category One. An Industrial Asset, or a Mobilization,
Deployment or Supporting Asset, for which there is no
replacement, substitute, or alternative. Partial or complete
loss would have an immediate and serious impact on the
national defense.
b. Category Two. Alternative assets are available but all
assets are required for contribution to national emergency
needs.
C. Category Three. All Key Assets not in Categories One and
Two.
The issues and problems associated with the identification of key
telecommunications assets included: (1) industry concerns about the
protection of proprietary information and (2) Group concerns about the
feasibility of singling out specific assets given the scale and complexity
of the national telecommunications infrastructure. The Group therefore
decided that a preliminary study should be conducted to determine the
feasibility of identifying candidate key telecommunications assets.
The methodology agreed upon for the study provided, first, for the
identification by the Government of (1) a small number (4-6) of Local
Access Transport Areas (LATAs) and (2) critical facilities within each of
those LATAs. Information about the critical facilities, including
location and exchange codes/prefixes, would then be provided to relevant
industry entities, i.e., those with assets within the LATAs. The industry
participants would then analyze the assets that supported critical
facilities to identify potential key assets, using the following
criterion:
A telecommunications asset for which there is no replacement,
substitute, or alternative within your company. Partial or
complete loss would have immediate and serious impact on the
ability to provide your company's products or services.
The results of the industry analyses would then be provided to the NCS for
5-35
further evaluation, i.e., the identification of telecommunications assets
that should be nominated for inclusion on the DOD Key Assets List (KAL).
With the assistance of the NCS Council of Representatives (COR), five
LATAs and critical facilities within those LATAs were subsequently
identified for the purpose of the preliminary key assets study. The
locations and exchange codes/prefixes of critical facilities within the
selected LATAS were then provided by the NCS to the exchange and principal
interexchange carrier within those LATAs.
One industry analysis was made available for the use of the Joint
Group. This analysis revealed that the number and location of access
tandems in the LATA and the number of critical users served by a single
central office are major factors to be considered in identifying potential
key telecommunications assets. In every LATA studied, multiple critical
users were served by the same access tandem (or, in one case, a single
access tandem). In addition, these access tandems served as, or were
collocated with, the central offices for many of the same and/or other
critical users. These access tandem/central office facilities were thus
identified as potentially warranting designation as key assets.
On the basis of its study, the Group found that potential key
telecommunications assets can be identified by Government and industry,
using the methodology employed in the pilot study. Participating industry
members have noted, however, that (1) more detailed analyses than those
conducted as part of the preliminary study need to be performed and
(2) comprehensive analysis of the national telecommunications
infrastructure will be labor and time intensive and thus quite costly.
The Joint Group is also concerned that a Key Telecommunications Assets
List would contain both proprietary information and information with
significant national security implications.
The Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS), has, in conjunction with the
Defense Communications Agency (DCA), solicited additional key asset
information and nominations from DOD commands and facilities. The OMNCS
is currently integrating and evaluating the information obtained to date
from the Telecommunications Industry and the Government with the objective
of developing an initial list of candidate assets.
5.3.2 Federal Government Mobilization Management
An overview briefing on the existing Federal Government national
security emergency management structure was provided by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist the Joint Group in
understanding the larger context within which telecommunications
mobilization management activities would be conducted. The FEMA briefer
indicated that this management structure was defined over twenty years ago
and was now significantly outdated, e.g., inconsistent with the current
national policy of functional coordination rather than functional
5-36
management. A new framework for national security emergency preparedness
and response has been established in accordance with National Security
Council (NSC) policy guidance, and intensive efforts are currently being
made to revise and update the old management structure and its supporting
plans and procedures. Pending the completion of this effort, the old
structure and the plans and procedures that implement it remain in
effect. These are described below in section 5.3.2.1. The proposed new
approach to national security emergency preparedness and response is
described briefly in section 5.3.2.2.
5.3.2.1. Existing Structure and Plans. In the FEMA briefing, a set of
classified plans and the associated classified Presidential emergency
action documents that would apply to the conduct of Federal government
management activities in different types of national security emergencies
were described. This set included:
(1) Federal Emergency Plan D for nuclear war emergencies,
(2) Plan OTD (Other Than D) for general war emergencies,
(3) The Resource Mobilization Plan for limited war, and
(4) The National Plan for Emergency Preparedness.
All of these plans, except Federal Emergency Plan D, are applicable to
mobilization within the scope defined by the Joint TIM Group (see Figure
5-1 in Section 5.2). While the details of the plans vary somewhat from
situation to situation, the management structure would be essentially the
same for all of the types of national security emergencies indicated.
Pre-coordinated documents designed to implement Presidential
decisions would be used to establish an Office of Defense Resources
(ODR). The ODR would then provide direction for the conduct of emergency
management activities, including the management of essential resources
like telecommunications. Management activities within specific resource
areas, e.g., health, transportation, communications, production/
construction, would be carried out within this overall framework in
accordance with classified resource/functional area annexes to the plans.
For example, specific telecommunications management plans are outlined in
Annex B-11 of the Resource Mobilization Plan.
Since the promulgation of Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of
National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications
Functions," in April 1984, the NCS has significantly modified NSEP
telecommunications management arrangements and supporting plans and
procedures. The telecommunications resource annexes to the older Federal
government plans, however, have not yet been updated since those plans are
currently being revised. Therefore, at this point, the telecommunications
5-37
management structures outlined in the resource annexes are also
significantly outdated.
5.3.2.2. Evolving Structure and Plans. In response to NSEP policy
guidance provided by the President in 198520 , an NSC National
Mobilization Interagency Group (NMIG) has undertaken the task of
developing a new comprehensive framework for national security emergency
preparedness planning and response. This task is being carried out in
conjunction with other related tasks, e.g., the comprehensive revision of
the Executive order that assigns emergency preparedness functions to the
Federal departments and agencies. To reinforce the importance of these
activities from a national security perspective, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, on September 15, 1987, and again
on April 27, 1988, identified the following NSEP priorities in memoranda
to the heads of the Federal departments and agencies:
(1) Revision of Executive Order 11490 assigning NSEP
responsibilities to departments and agencies
(2) Completion of continuity of government policy implementation and
update of standby authority documents
(3) Preparation and issuance of a national security emergency plan.
(4) Development of mobilization programs based on graduated response
to early warning
(5) Establishment of Federal-state-industry plans to minimize the
impact of energy disruptions
(6) Development of a plan for an industry-wide assessment of the
production capabilities of defense and essential civilian
sectors.
(7) Revision of Executive Order 10480 assigning Defense Production
Act responsibilities to the departments and agencies.
Most, if not all, of these priorities have relevance for mobilization
planning and response. However, two of the priority tasks - Number 3 and
Number 4 - have particular significance for telecommunications
mobilization management.
The proposed national security emergency plan (NSEP Priority Number
3) will establish an overall framework for responses to a range of
national security emergencies. Mobilization as defined by the Joint Group
would be included in the proposed range of emergency situations. Although
20 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 188, "Government
Coordination for National Security Emergency Preparedness." (U)
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not yet completed and promulgated, the proposed plan is expected to
replace the four, separate, outdated plans and to establish a coordination
structure that is less centralized than that provided for in the old
plans.
In the proposed plan, principal responsibility for emergency response
activities is assigned to a set of six interagency functional groups,
i.e., telecommunications, energy, transportation, human services, economic
affairs, and legal/law enforcement. Each interagency functional group
would be composed of those Federal departments, agencies, and entities
with the principal authorities and responsibilities for that particular
functional area. Within the framework of these functional groups, Federal
departments and agencies would coordinate functional area emergency
response measures and activities. If the emergency warrants, the
emergency response activities of one or more groups may be coordinated by
a representative of the President.
In response to NSEP Priority Number 4, a Graduated Mobilization
Response (GMR) System concept has been developed to enhance the U.S.'s
capability to rapidly increase the production of supplies and equipment to
support and sustain conventional military forces. This capability, in
turn, "supports deterrence and provides the ability for a timely and
flexible response to the full range of plausible threats." The GMR System
concept calls for interagency coordination to integrate ambiguous and
specific warning with mobilization actions that mitigate the impact of,
improve responsiveness to, or assist in the recovery from a crisis or
national security emergency. Under the GMR concept, mobilization is
viewed as "a continuum of progressively increased activity, rather than an
"off/on" process activated on 'M-Day'." The concept provides for a
defined "menu" of graduated readiness measures for three distinct stages
or phases of mobilization activity, i.e., Planning and Preparation, Crisis
Management, and National Emergency/War. Response option papers would be
developed by Federal departments and agencies in peacetime for collection
and integration by the National Security Council.
The proposed GMR System concept is currently being reviewed and
coordinated within the Federal Government, and current plans call for its
implementation by a DOD instruction and a FEMA preparedness circular.
In addition to the two major mobilization-related initiatives
outlined above, the Federal Government is also revising two Executive
orders -- Executive Orders 11490 and 10480 -- that provide for the
performance of mobilization-related functions. The revision of Executive
Order 11490 (NSEP Priority Number 1) will update the assignment of
21 Graduated Mobilization Response Concept paper, March 28, 1988.
5-39
emergency preparedness functions within the Federal Government. 22 The
revision of Executive Order 10480 (NSEP Priority Number 7) will update the
assignment of responsibility for the exercise of authorities granted by
the Defense Production Act, including the delegation of Title I priority
and allocation authority for industrial resources.
5.4 Conclusions
First, the Joint Group has concluded that the fundamental elements
necessary for effective telecommunications mobilization management are in
place:
Both Federal Government and Industry telecommunications
mobilization management activities can be effectively carried out
within the overall framework for NSEP telecommunications
management established in Executive Order 12472 and the NCC
Operating Charter,
Current Federal Government regulations and procedures adequately
provide for the emergency provisioning of telecommunications
services and equipment that might be required under mobilization
conditions,
Most telecommunications companies have established comprehensive
emergency response procedures that could enable them to respond
effectively to mobilization requirements, and
The joint Industry-Government NCC provides a unique mechanism for
accomplishing the necessary integration of Federal Government and
Telecommunications Industry mobilization management activities.
However, the Joint Group has also concluded that the ability to fully
and effectively use these existing telecommunications mobilization
management capabilities is significantly constrained by the absence of
both:
0
Explicit provisions in NSEP telecommunications management plans
and procedures for the performance, coordination, and integration
of telecommunications mobilization management functions and
activities, and
A formally defined and documented overall Federal Government
structure for mobilization management.
22
Telecommunications are not included in the Order since NSEP
telecommunications functions are assigned in Executive Order 12472.
5-40
While, in the case of the first constraint, the telecommunications
mobilization management structure description provided by the OMNCS
represents an initial step in the development of explicit provisions, that
description does not represent a coordinated NCS perspective and may not
reflect the full range of NSEP telecommunications functions assigned in
Executive Order 12472.
Finally, the Joint Group has concluded that the following specific
mobilization management issue areas need to be addressed:
Regional telecommunications mobilization management
Coordination of NSEP telecommunications equipment provisioning,
Broadened Government and Telecommunications Industry involvement
in the NCC,
Coordination between NSEP telecommunications and other key
functional areas, and
0 Warning and alert procedures.
5.6 Recommendations
On the basis of its final assessment of the adequacy and
effectiveness of Federal Government and Telecommunications Industry
mobilization management capabilities, the Joint Group makes the following
recommendations:
The National Security Council (NSC) should, as part of its
national security emergency preparedness and response planning
effort, ensure the timely definition, documentation, and
implementation of an overall Federal Government structure and plan
for mobilization management. These documents should:
- Specify the relationship of the telecommunications mobilization
management structure defined in Executive Order 12472 to the
overall Federal Government mobilization management structure,
- Identify the mechanisms to be used to integrate mobilization
management activities across functional/resource areas, and
- Provide for the establishment of regional mobilization
management capabilities.
The National Communications System (NCS) should define, document,
and implement a comprehensive approach to and structure for
telecommunications mobilization management by incorporating
5-41
specific provisions for the performance, coordination, and
integration of mobilization-related management functions and
activities in NSEP telecommunications plans and procedures.
0 With respect to the specific telecommunications mobilization
management issues identified by the Joint Group, the NCS should:
- In accordance with guidance provided by the NSC, make explicit
provisions for the performance of Federal telecommunications
mobilization management functions on a regional basis;
- Clarify the processes and procedures for coordinating the
provisioning of NSEP telecommunications equipment and the
resolution of any provisioning conflicts under mobilization
conditions, particularly with respect to the role to be played
by the NCC;
- Expand and strengthen NCS member organization representation
and participation in the NCC, and broaden Telecommunications
Industry NCC participation by involving equipment
manufacturers, equipment suppliers, and service integrators on
an affiliate basis;
- Establish procedures for coordinating the mobilization
management and response activities of the NCS with those of
other key functional/resource areas, e.g., energy and
transportation; and
- Consistent with security considerations, seek to enhance the
exchange and dissemination of telecommunications
mobilization-related warning and intelligence information.
5-42
APPENDIX 5-A
OMNCS DESCRIPTION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
5-43
SATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS STRIEM!
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
OFFICE OF THE MANAGER
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20305 2010
IN REPLY
JUN 1 7 1988
REFERTO
NCS-JS
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT:
"Description of Telecommunications Mobilization Management
Structure"
1. The subject document is enclosed for your information and use.
2. This description of the telecommunications mobilization management
structure has been developed by the Office of the Manager, National
Communications System (OMNCS), for use by the Joint Industry-Government
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization Group in investigating the Government
and Industry Mobilization Management Structure, one of the seven mobilization
subjects being considered by the Group. The description is based on material
extracted from existing documents, e.g., Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of
National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions,' the
National Coordinating Center Operation Charter and Operational Guidelines, and
National Coordinating Center Standard Operating Procedures, and, as such,
should be considered an accurate characterization of telecommunications
mobilization management as described in these plans and procedures.
BEMOUNI
1 Enclosure a/s
B. E. MORRISS
Deputy Manager
5-45
DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Carl Smith, NCS-A
COL Charles L. Gordon, NCS-AD
LTC Steve Seffens, NCS-FMO
Mr. Kenneth Boheim, NCS-PP
Mr. Dennis Bodson, NCS-TS
Col Robert Sparks, NCS-EP
Mr. A. L. Henrichsen, NCS-JS
Mr. William Belford, NCS-EP-0
Ms. Margaret Newland, NCS-PP
5-46
DESCRIPTION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE
OFFICE OF THE MANAGER
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
JUNE 1988
5-47
PREFACE
This description of the telecommunications mobilization management
structure has been developed by the Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS),
for use by the Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group in investigating the Government and Industry
Mobilization Management Structure, one of the seven mobilization subjects
being considered by the Group. The description is based on material
extracted from existing documents, e.g., Executive Order 12472, the NCC
Operating Charter and Operational Guidelines, and NCC Standard Operating
Procedures.
5-49
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
iv
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1
2.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
2
3.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
3
3.1 The President and the NSC
3
3.2 Director, OSTP and the JTRB
3
3.3 Manager, NCS, and the NCC
4
3.4 Telecommunications Resource Providers and Users
6
4.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
7
4.1 Planning and Preparedness
7
4.2 Readiness Alert
7
4.3 Status Monitoring and Technical Analysis/Situation Assessment
8
4.4 Data Collection and Resource Inventory
8
4.5 Resource Allocation and Management
9
4.5.1 Service Facilities
4.5.2 Personnel
9
4.5.3 Other Resources
9
10
4.6 Test and Exercise
10
4.7 Non-Federal Mobilization Management
10
5-51
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
5
5-52
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Telecommunications mobilization and mobilization-related functions,
responsibilities, processes, and procedures are defined and discussed in a
number of NSEP telecommunications source documents. The overall framework
for NSEP telecommunications management, including mobilization management,
is defined in Executive Order 12472. The mobilization functions and
responsibilities of the OMNCS are outlined in the NCS element of the
Department of Defense (DOD) Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). The NSEP
telecommunications functions and responsibilities of the NCC--including
those of Industry and Government representatives; the Manager, NCC; and
his staff--are defined in the NCC Operating Charter, Operational
Guidelines, and associated Standard Operating Procedures. The
responsibilities of the JTRB are described in the JTRB Interim Standard
Operating Procedures. Procedures for expediting the emergency
provisioning of NSEP telecommunications services are outlined in the NSEP
Telecommunications Procedures Manual. Information extracted from these
source documents has been used below to develop the following descriptions
of activities. the telecommunications mobilization management concept, structure, and
5-53
2.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
Telecommunications mobilization is the process of marshalling those
telecommunications resources necessary to make the transition from a
normal state to a state of readiness for war or other national
emergency. The goal of such a mobilization effort is, more specifically,
to ensure that telecommunications resources are available to support the
national emergency response efforts of the Federal Government, including
any call-up and deployment of military forces and the emergency production
and distribution of required goods and services. Under mobilization
conditions, the Federal Government is the principal source of
authoritative guidance regarding national telecommunications priorities
and requirements while the Telecommunications Industry is the principal
source of the assets and expertise needed to support those requirements
and priorities. The process of marshalling telecommunications resources
thus requires close cooperation between, and concerted action on the part
of, the Federal Government and the Telecommunications Industry.
The mobilization management activities of the Federal Government and
the Telecommunications: Industry are carried out within the overall
framework established by Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of National
Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions." This
framework encompasses three generic operating environments that reflect
the specific national security emergency preparedness (NSEP)
telecommunications authorities and responsibilities of the President:
day-to-day, non-wartime emergencies, and war emergencies. Mobilization,
as a process of working toward a state of readiness for war or other
national emergency, is most likely to take place in a non-wartime
emergency operating environment. However, mobilization must be prepared
for in the day-to-day environment and could take place, or continue into,
a war emergency environment.
1 This definition was developed and adopted by the Joint Industry-
Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Group, and
subsquently used, in modified form, by the Office of the Manager, NCS
(OMNCS) in gathering NSEP telecommunications requirements for the crisis/
mobilization period.
2 This characterization of the operating environment for mobilization is
consistent with the emergency phases outlined in Federal Preparedness
Circular 2 (FPC-2), in which peacetime is defined as the "Normal Operations
Phase", and crisis[/mobilization] is defined as including the "Preparation
Phase" and the "Emergency Phase" up to nuclear war, (i.e., domestic and
conventional war portions of Emergency). From Appendix A of National
Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Requirements
Phase Two (U).
5-54
In the day-to-day operating environment, Federal Government and
Telecommunications Industry mobilization management activities are
directed toward mobilization planning and preparedness. These planning
and preparedness activities include the establishment and exercise of
procedures and processes for responding to surge requirements and for
coordinating Government and Industry response activities.
In the non-wartime emergency operating environment, Federal
Government and Telecommunications Industry mobilization management
activities are focused on the timely exchange of essential information and
effective joint Government and Industry coordination of responses to
telecommunications surge requirements on a nationwide basis. Providers
and users of telecommunications resources will seek to satisfy
mobilization needs through normal procurement processes and practices,
using emergency provisioning processes only as necessary to expedite
fulfillment of mobilization-related requirements. However, to facilitate
effective response to national mobilization needs, the Federal Government
will provide authoritative national level policy guidance, ensure that
telecommunications mobilization activities are consistent with and
mutually supportive of mobilization activities in other functional areas,
and establish mechanisms for the authoritative resolution of resource and
response issues.
It is anticipated that close consultation and coordination between
Government and Industry at all levels can assure effective
telecommunications mobilization response under all but the most extreme
circumstances, i.e., attack or war upon the United States. However, the
President may find it necessary to use some or all of the war emergency
powers available under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to meet
national mobilization requirements.
The management structure, processes, and procedures developed for
NSEP telecommunications purposes are designed for flexible use in a range
of crises or emergencies, including mobilization, and across operating
environments. They include: the Joint Telecommunications Resources Board
(JTRB), the National Coordinating Center (NCC), the NSEP
Telecommunications Procedures, the proposed Telecommunications Service
Priority (TSP) System, automated management information systems, and the
National Telecommunications Management Structure (NTMS). The application
of these management "tools" to mobilization management is discussed in
more detail in Sections 2 and 3.
5-55
3.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Overall policy direction and guidance for the mobilization and use of
telecommunications resources is provided by the President and the National
Security Council. The mobilization activities of the various Federal
departments and agencies, including telecommunications mobilization
activities, are coordinated through a structure of interagency functional
groups, e.g., telecommunications, energy, transportation, human services,
economic affairs, and legal/law enforcement.
The key elements of the telecommunications mobilization management
structure are:
The President and the National Security Council (NSC)
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
and the Joint Telecommunications Resources Board (JTRB)
The Manager, NCS, and the National Coordinating Center (NCC)
Telecommunications Resource Providers and Users.
The overall management structure for telecommunications mobilization is
shown in Figure 1.
3.1 The President and the NSC
Under Executive Order 12472, the NSC advises and assists the
President in coordinating the development of policy, plans, programs, and
standards for the mobilization and use of the Nation's commercial,
Government, and privately-owned telecommunications resources in order to
meet NSEP requirements. The NSC provides advice and assistance to the
President during those crises or emergencies in which the exercise of the
President's Section 706 war power functions is not required or permitted
by law, as well as policy direction for the exercise of the war power
functions of the President under Section 706 of the Communications Act.
In addition, the NSC provides policy direction and guidance for the
overall activities of the NCS and NCC, including their telecommunications
mobilization management activities.
3.2 Director, OSTP and the JTRB
If so instructed by the President, the Director, OSTP, is responsible
for directing the exercise of the war emergency functions of the President
under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Director, OSTP,
3 The mobilization activities of the interagency functional groups
will be conducted within the overall national level framework for the
coordination of major domestic emergencies, i.e., the National System for
Emergency Coordination (NSEC), established by the Domestic Policy Council,
and the overall framework for national security emergency response currently
being developed by the National Security Council (NSC).
5-56
also provides, to the President and to Federal departments and agencies
with telecommunications resource responsibilities, information, advice,
guidance, and assistance regarding the provision, management, or
allocation of telecommunications resources during those crises or
emergencies in which the President's war power functions are not
exercised. In the day-to-day environment, the Director advises the
President with respect to the test, exercise, and evaluation of NSEP
telecommunications capabilities and reports the results and any
recommended remedial actions to the President and the NSC.
The Director, OSTP, may solicit the advice and recommendations of the
Joint Telecommunications Resources Board (JTRB). The JTRB is composed of
representatives of those Federal departments and agencies with key NSEP
telecommunications management-related functions and responsibilities, and
assists the Director, OSTP, in the performance of his non-wartime
functions and responsiblities. If the situation is serious enough to
warrant its involvement, the JTRB, chaired by the Director, OSTP, can
serve as a mechanism for policy-level issue and conflict resolution.
3.3 Manager, NCS, and the NCC
The national focal point for telecommunications mobilization
management preparedness and response activities is the Office of the
Manager, National Communications System (OMNCS), and the joint
Industry-Government NCC. The OMNCS has overall responsibility for
telecommunications mobilization planning and preparedness, and works
closely with the NCS Committee of Principals (COP) and the National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) to identify and
address mobilization preparedness issues.
The mission of the NCC is to assist in the initiation, coordination,
restoration, and reconstitution of NSEP telecommunications services or
facilities under all conditions of crisis and emergency. Representatives
from those telecommunications companies that play a major role in the
provision of NSEP telecommunications services for Federal Government use
are resident in the Center on a daily basis along with representatives
from key NCS member organizations. In addition, an OMNCS official--the
Manager, NCC--provides day-to-day direction for Center activities, and
supervises the Center's permanent operational staff.
The NCS member organizations determine their NSEP telecommunications
requirements and "prepare policies, plans, and procedures for maximizing
the mobilization response capabilities of the telecommunications resources
under their management or operational control.' 4 Collective advice and
assistance regarding OMNCS/NCC activities and operations are provided by
the NCS COP, which is the interagency group for NSEP telecommunications,
and by the President's NSTAC.
4 Section 3(i) (2), Executive Order 12472.
5-57
APPENDIX 5-B
PRELIMINARY MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
5-65
APPENDIX 5-C
EXTRACTS FROM THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)
5-69
19,159
PART 50-EXTRAORDINARY CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
19 31,257]
Energy for functions transferred to that
Department from other authorized agencies;
50.000 Scope of part.
and any other agency that may be author-
ized by the President.
This part prescribes policies and proce-
dures for entering into, amending, or modify-
[9 31,260]
ing contracts in order to facilitate the
national defense under the extraordinary
50.102 Policy.
emergency authority granted by Pub. L.
85-804 as amended by Pub. L. 93-155 (50
(a) The authority conferred by the Act
U.S.C. 1431-1435), as amended, referred to
may not (1) be used in a manner that encour-
in this part as "the Act," and Executive
ages carelessness and laxity on the part of
Order (EO) 10789, dated November 14,
persons engaged in the defense effort or (2)
1958, as amended, referred to in this part as
be relied upon when other adequate legal
"the Executive Order." It does not cover
authority exists within the agency.
advance payments (see Subpart 32.4).
(b) Actions authorized under the Act shall
[31,258]
be accomplished as expeditiously as practica-
ble, consistent with the care, restraint, and
exercise of sound judgment appropriate to
50.001 Definitions.
the use of such extraordinary authority.
"Approving authority," as used in this
(c) Certain kinds of relief previously avail-
part, means an agency official or contract
able only under the Act; e.g., recission or
adjustment board authorized to approve
reformation for mutual mistake, are now
actions under the Act and Executive Order.
available under the authority of the Contract
"Secretarial level," as used in this part,
Disputes Act of 1978. In accordance with
means a level at or above the level of a
subparagraph (a)(2) above, Part 33 must be
deputy assistant agency head, or a contract
followed in preference to Part 50 for such
adjustment board.
relief. In case of doubt as to whether Part 33
applies, the contracting officer should seek
SUBPART 50.1-GENERAL
legal advice.
[9 31,261]
IT 31,259]
50.103 Deviations.
50.101 Authority.
Any deviations to this Part 50 shall not be
(a) The Act empowers the President to
effective for defense agencies until approved
authorize agencies exercising functions in
by the Secretary of Defense, and for civilian
connection with the national defense to enter
agencies until approved by the agency head.
into, amend, and modify contracts, without
regard to other provisions of law related to
[9] 31,262]
making, performing, amending, or modifying
contracts, whenever the President considers
50.104 Reports.
that such action would facilitate the national
defense.
(a) The Act and Executive Order require
that each agency listed in 50.101(b) shall
(b) The Executive Order authorizes the
submit to Congress annually by March 15 a
heads of the following agencies to exercise the
report of actions taken on requests for relief,
authority conferred by the Act and to dele-
including indemnity, under the Act's author-
gate it to other officials within the agency:
the Government Printing Office; the Federal
ity.
Emergency Management Agency; the Ten-
(b) The report shall contain the informa-
nessee Valley Authority; the National Aero-
tion in subparagraph (1) below for all actions
nautics and Space Administration; the
on approved requests, and in subparagraph
General Services Administration; the
(2) below for all requests denied. In addition,
Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Treasury,
for each approved request that involves
Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Trans-
actual or potential cost to the Government in
portation Departments; the Department of
excess of $50,000, the report shall include the
FAR 50.104 31,262
5-71
Part 50
19,165
(b) When a case involves matters of inter-
form: "I find that the action authorized
est to more than one Government agency, the
herein will facilitate the national defense."
interested agencies should maintain liaison
with each other to determine whether joint
50.307 Contract requirements.
action should be taken.
(a) The Act and Executive Order require
(c) When additional funds are required
that every contract entered into, amended,
from another agency, the contracting agency
or modified under this Part 50 shall con-
may not approve adjustment requests before
tain-
receiving advice that the funds will be avail-
(1) A citation of the Act and Executive
able. The request for this advice shall give
Order;
the contractor's name, the contract number,
the amount of proposed relief, a brief descrip-
(2) A brief statement of the circumstances
lion of the contract, and the accounting clas-
justifying the action; and
sification or fund citation. If the other
agency makes additional funds available, the
(3) A recital of the finding that the action
agency considering the adjustment request
will facilitate the national defense.
shall be solely responsible for any action
(b) The authority in 50.101(a) shall not be
taken on the request.
used to omit from contracts, when otherwise
required, the clauses at 52.203-5, Covenant
(d) When essentiality to the national
Against Contingent Fees; 52.215-1, Examina-
defense is an issue (50.302-1(a)), agencies
tion of Records by Comptroller General;
considering requests for amendment without
52.222-6, Davis-Bacon Act; 52.222-9, Con-
consideration involving another agency shall
tract Work Hours and Safety Standards
obtain advice on the issue from the other
Act-Overtime Compensation-Construc
agency before making the final decision.
tion; 52.222-10, Compliance with Copeland
When this advice is received, the agency
Regulations; 52.222-20, Walsh-Healy Public
considering the request for amendment
Contracts Act; 52.222-26, Equal Opportu-
without consideration shall be responsible for
nity; and 52.232-23, Assignment of Claims.
taking whatever action is appropriate.
50.30€ Disposition.
SUBPART 50.4-RESIDUAL POWERS
When approving or denying a contractor's
[8 31,275]
request made in accordance with 50.303, the
approving authority shall sign and date a
50.400 Scope of subpart.
Memorandum of Decision containing-
This subpart prescribes standards and pro-
(a) The contractor's name and address, the
cedures for exercising residual powers under
contract identification, and the nature of the
the Act. The term "residual powers" includes
all authority under the Act except (a) that
request;
covered by Subpart 50.3 and (b) the author-
(b) A concise description of the supplies or
ity to make advance payments (see Subpart
services involved;
32.4).
(c) The decision reached and the actual
50.401 Standards for use.
cost or estimated potential cost involved, if
Subject to the limitations in 50.203,
any;
residual powers may be used in accordance
(d) A statement of the circumstances justi-
with the policies in 50.102 when necessary
fying the decision;
and appropriate, all circumstances consid-
ered. In authorizing the inclusion of the
(e) Identification of any of the foregoing
clause at 52.250-1, Indemnification Under
information classified "Confidential" or
Public Law 85-804, in a contract or subcon-
higher (instead of being included in the mem-
tract, an agency head may require the
orandum, such information may be set forth
indemnified contractor to provide and main-
in a separate classified document referenced
tain financial protection of the type and
in the memorandum); and
amount determined appropriate. In deciding
whether to approve use of the indemnifica-
(f) If some adjustment is approved, a
tion clause, and in determining the type and
statement in substantially the following
amount of financial protection the indemni-
FAR 50.401 1 31,275
5-78
19,166
FAR
fied contractor is to provide and maintain,
(iv) Deductibles, if any, applicable to
an agency head shall consider such factors as
losses under the policies;
self-insurance, other proof of financial
responsibility, workers' compensation insur-
(v) Any exclusions from coverage under
ance, and the availability, cost, and terms of
such policies for unusually hazardous or
private insurance. The approval and deter-
nuclear risks; and
mination shall be final.
(vi) Applicable workers' compensation
50.402 General.
insurance coverage.
(a) When approving or denying a proposal
(4) The controlling or limiting factors for
for the exercise of residual powers, the
determining the amount of financial protec-
approving authority shall sign and date a
tion the contractor is to provide and main-
Memorandum of Decision containing sub-
tain, with information regarding the
availability, cost, and terms of additional
stantially the same information called for by
50.306.
insurance or other forms of financial protec-
tion.
(b) Every contract entered into, amended,
or modified under residual powers shall com-
(5) Whether the contractor's insurance
ply with the requirements of 50.307.
program has been approved or accepted by
any Government agency; and whether the
[9 31,278]
contractor has an indemnification agreement
covering similar risks under any other Gov-
ernment program, and, if so, a brief descrip-
50.403 Special procedures for
tion of any limitations.
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks.
(6) If the contractor is a division or subsid-
50.403-1 Indemnification requests.
iary of a parent corporation, (i) a statement
of any insurance coverage of the parent cor-
(a) Contractor requests for the indemnifi-
poration that bears on the risks for which the
cation clause to cover unusually hazardous or
contractor seeks indemnification and (ii) a
nuclear risks should be submitted to the con-
description of the precise legal relationship
tracting officer and shall include the follow-
between parent and subsidiary or division.
ing information:
(b) If the dollar value of the contractor's
(1) Identification of the contract for which
insurance coverage varies by 10 percent or
the indemnification clause is requested.
more from that stated in an indemnification
request submitted in accordance with para-
(2) Identification and definition of the
graph (a) above, or if other significant
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks for
changes in insurance coverage occur after
which indemnification is requested, with a
submission and before approval, the contrac-
statement indicating how the contractor
tor shall immediately submit to the con-
would be exposed to them.
tracting officer a brief description of the
(3) A statement, executed by a corporate
changes.
official with binding contractual authority,
of all insurance coverage applicable to the
50.403-2 Action on Indemnification
risks to be defined in the contract as unusu-
requests.
ally hazardous or nuclear, including-
(a) The contracting officer, with assistance
(i) Names of insurance companies, policy
from legal counsel and cognizant program
numbers, and expiration dates;
office personnel, shall review the indemnifi-
cation request and ascertain whether it con-
(ii) A description of the types of insurance
tains all required information. If the
provided (including the extent to which the
contracting officer, after considering the
contractor is self-insured or intends to self-
facts and evidence, denies the request, the
insure), with emphasis on identifying the
contracting officer shall notify the contractor
risks insured against and the coverage
promptly of the denial and of the reasons for
extended to persons or property, or both;
it. If recommending approval, the con-
tracting officer shall forward the request (as
(iii) Dollar limits per occurrence and annu-
modified, if necessary, by negotiation)
ally, and any other limitation, for relevant
through channels to the appropriate official
segments of the total insurance coverage;
specified in 50.201(d). The contracting
31,278 FAR 50.402
5-79
APPENDIX 5-D
EXTRACTS FROM DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS SYSTEM (DPAS)
5-83
Subpart A-Purpose
350.1 Purpose of this regulation.
(a) Title ] of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50
U.S.C. app. 2061. el seq.) (Defense Production Act), authorizes the Pres-
ident: to require the priority performance of contracts and orders necessary or
appropriate to promote the national defense over other contracts or orders; to
allocate materials and facilities as necessary or appropriate to promote
the national defense; and to require the allocation of, or the priority
performance under contracts or orders relating to. supplies of materials
and equipment in order to assure domestic energy supplies for national
defense needs.
(b) This regulation consolidates, simplifies, and revises the Defense
Materials System and the Defense Priorities System regulations, direc-
tions, and orders. The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS)
helps to keep current national defense programs on schedule and provides
an operating system that can be rapidly expanded in a national emergency.
(c) To aid in understanding and using the DPAS. an overview of its
major provisions is incorporated into this regulation as Subpart B-Overview.
The full text of the DPAS is found in Subparts D through L.
Subpart B-Overview
350.2 Introduction.
(a) The Federal Emergency Management Agency authorizes certain
national defense programs for priorities and allocations support. For example.
military aircraft production. ammunition, and certain programs which
maximize domestic energy supplies are "authorized programs." A com-
plete list of currently authorized programs is provided at Schedule 1.
(b) To ensure the preferential treatment of certain contracts and orders for
authorized programs, the Department of Commerce administers the DPAS.
(c) Commerce has delegated authority to place priority ratings on
contracts or orders necessary or appropriate to promote the national
defense to the government agencies that issue such contracts or orders.
Schedule ] includes a list of agencies delegated this authority. Copies of
the Delegations of Authority are provided at Appendix I. They set forth
the authorities delegated and those retained by Commerce.
350.3 Priority ratings and rated orders.
(a) Rated orders are identified by a priority rating consisting of the
rating-either DX or DO-and a program identification symbol. Rated
orders take preference over all unrated orders as necessary to meet required
delivery dates. Among rated orders. DX rated orders take preference over
DO rated orders. Program identification symbols indicate which author-
ized program is involved with the rated order. For example, Al identifies
5-85
defense aircraft programs and A7 signifies defense electronic programs.
The program identification symbols, in themselves, do not connote any
priority.
(b) Persons receiving rated orders must give them preferential treat-
ment as required by this regulation. This means a person must accept and
fill a rated order for items that the person normally supplies. The exis-
tence of previously accepted unrated or lower rated orders is not sufficient
reason for rejecting a rated order. Persons are required to reschedule
unrated orders if they conflict with performance against a rated order.
Similarly, persons must reschedule DO rated orders if they conflict with
performance against a DX rated order.
(c) All rated orders must be scheduled to the extent possible to ensure
delivery by the required delivery date.
(d) Persons who receive rated orders must in turn place rated orders
with their suppliers for the items they need to fill the orders. This provi-
sion ensures that suppliers will give priority treatment to rated orders
from contractor to subcontractor to suppliers throughout the procure-
ment chain.
(e) Persons may place a priority rating on orders only when they are in
receipt of a rated order. have been explicitly authorized to do so by the
Department of Commerce or a Delegate Agency, or are otherwise permitted
to do so by this regulation.
350.4 Controlled materials.
(a) Federal central management of certain key materials, designated
"controlled materials", has been essential in the past to effective indus-
trial mobilizations. Accordingly, special rules are maintained in peacetime to
provide an operating mechanism that can be rapidly expanded during a
national emergency to meet increased defense and other essential needs.
Currently. the controlled materials are steel, copper, aluminum. and
nickel alloys.
(b) Under the controlled materials program, the Department of Com-
merce requires suppliers of controlled materials to accept rated orders up
to a specified quantity of material during a given period of time. This
quantity is called a "set-aside". This provision ensures that the material
will be available when rated orders are placed. In addition, the system
ensures that controlled materials producers are treated equitably, for
after the set-aside quantity levels have been reached, controlled materials
producers may generally reject additional rated orders. These orders
would then be filled by other controlled materials producers who had not
exhausted their set-aside requirement.
(c) In time of national emergency, the level and scope of the controlled
materials program may be greatly expanded to ensure the necessary
allocation of materials and in order to direct general industrial activity
toward supporting the requirements of the emergency.
(d) Certain other items, in addition to the controlled materials, have
critical importance to national defense programs. From time-to-time,
5-86
special rules, similar to those for controlled materials, may be needed to
manage those materials.
(e) If items become scarce and critical and the requirements of the
national defense cannot be met without creating a significant dislocation
in the civilian market place so as to create appreciable hardship. special
rules may be established under section 101(b) of the Defense Production
Act to control the general distribution of such items in the civilian
market.
350.5 Special priorities assistance.
(a) The DPAS is designed to be largely self-executing. However, from
time-to-time production or delivery problems will arise. In this event.
special priorities assistance is available from Commerce and from the
Delegate Agencies.
(b) Special priorities assistance is available for any reason consistent
with this regulation. Generally, special priorities assistance is provided to
expedite deliveries, resolve delivery conflicts, place rated orders, locate
suppliers. or to verify information supplied by customers and vendors.
Special priorities assistance may also be used to request rating authority
for items not automatically ratable.
350.6 Official actions.
When necessary. Commerce takes specific official actions to imple-
ment or enforce the provisions of this regulation and to provide special
priorities assistance. Such actions may include the issuance of: Rating
Authorizations. Directives. Letters of Understanding. Set-asides, and
compliance documents (Administrative Subpoenas, Demands for Infor-
mation. and Inspection Authorizations).
350.7 Compliance.
(a) Compliance with the provisions of this regulation and official actions is
required by the Defense Production Act. Violators are subject to criminal
penalties.
(b) Any person who places or receives a rated order should be thor-
oughly familiar with, and must comply with, the provisions of this regulation.
Subpart C-Definitions.
350.8 Definitions.
The following definitions pertain to all sections of the regulation:
"Authorized program"-a program approved by the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency for priorities and allocations support under
the Defense Production Act.
"Construction"-the erection. addition, extension. or alteration of any
building. structure. or project, using materials or products which are to be
5-87
an integral and permanent part of the building. structure, or project.
Construction does not include maintenance and repair.
"Controlled materials"-the various shapes and forms of steel, copper,
aluminum, and nickel alloys, whether new, remelted, rerolled or redrawn,
as specified in Schedule 11, and as defined in Schedule III.
"Controlled materials suppliers"-all persons, including producers,
distributors, brokers, importers and exporters engaged in the sale or
resale of controlled materials.
"Delegate Agency"-a government agency authorized by delegation
from the Department of Commerce to place priority ratings on contracts
or orders needed to support authorized programs.
"Defense Production Act"-the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended (50 U.S.C. app. 2061, el seq.).
"Distributors of controlled materials"-those persons (including
warehouse operators or jobbers, but not retailers) engaged in stocking
controlled materials at locations regularly maintained for their sale or
resale in the form or shape as received. or after performing such operations as
cutting to length or shape. slitting. shearing. or sorting and grading.
"Further conversion"-the further processing of controlled materials
by a processor of such materials.
"Item"-any raw. in process. or manufactured material, article, com-
modity, supply. equipment, component, accessory, part, assembly, or
product of any kind. technical information. process, or service.
"Lead time"-the period of time specified in this regulation for the
receipt of orders for controlled materials by a supplier in advance of the
first day of the month in which shipment is required.
"Maintenance and repair and operating supplies (MRO)"-
(a) "Maintenance" is the upkeep necessary to continue any plant,
facility, or equipment in working condition.
(b) "Repair" is the restoration of any plant, facility, or equipment to
working condition when it has been rendered unsafe or unfit for service by
wear and tear, damage. or failure of parts.
(c) "Operating supplies" are any items carried as operating supplies
according to a person's established accounting practice. Operating sup-
plies may include hand tools and expendable tools. jigs, dies, fixtures used
on production equipment, lubricants, cleaners, chemicals and other expend-
able items.
(d) MRO does not include items produced or obtained for sale to other
persons or for installation upon or attachment to the property of another
person, or items required for the production of such items; items needed
for the replacement of any plant. facility, or equipment; or items for the
improvement of any plant, facility, or equipment by replacing items
which are still in working condition with items of a new or different kind,
quality, or design.
5-88
"Minimum mill quantity"-the minimum quantity of a controlled material
that may be obtained from a producer for shipment at any one time to any
one destination.
"Official action"-an action taken by Commerce under the authority
of the Defense Production Act and this regulation. Such actions include
the issuance of Set-asides, Rating Authorizations, Directives, Letters of
Understanding. Demands for Information, Inspection Authorizations,
and Administrative Subpoenas.
"Person"-any individual, corporation, partnership, association. or
any other organized group of persons. and includes any agency of the
United States Government or any other government.
"Production equipment"-any item of capital equipment used in pro-
ducing materials or furnishing services that has a unit acquisition cost of
$2,500 or more. an anticipated service life in excess of one year, and the
potential for maintaining its integrity as a capital item.
"Rated order"-a prime contract. a subcontract. or a purchase order in
support of an authorized program issued in accordance with the provis-
ions of this regulation.
"Set-aside"-the amount of an item for which a supplier must reserve
order book space in anticipation of the receipt of rated orders.
Subpart D-Industrial Priorities
350.10 Delegation of authority.
(a) The priorities and allocations authorities given to the President in
Title I of the Defense Production Act have been delegated to the Director
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who. in turn,
has delegated these authorities with respect to industrial resources to the
Secretary of Commerce. FEMA retains the overall policy and coordinat-
ing functions for this delegated authority.
(b) Within the Department of Commerce. these responsibilities have
been assigned to the Office of Industrial Resource Administration. The
Department of Commerce has authorized the Delegate Agencies to assign
priority ratings to orders for items needed for authorized programs. Cop-
ies of these Delegations of Authority are provided at Appendix 1. They sel
forth the authorities delegated and those retained by Commerce.
350.11 Priority ratings.
(a) Levels of priority. (1) There are two levels of priority established
by this regulation, identified by the rating symbols "DO" and "DX".
(2) All DO rated orders have equal priority with each other and take
preference over unrated orders. All DX rated orders have equal priority
with each other and take preference over DO rated orders and unrated
orders. (For resolution of conflicts among rated orders of equal priority.
see section 350.14(c).)
5-89
(3) In addition, a Directive issued by Commerce takes preference over
any DX rated order, DO rated order, or unrated order, as stipulated in the
Directive. (For a full discussion of Directives, see section 350.62.)
(b) Program identification symbols. Program identification symbols
indicate which authorized program is being supported by a rated order.
The list of authorized programs and their identification symbols are listed
in Schedule I. For example, Al identifies defense aircraft programs and
A7 signifies defense electronic programs. Program identification sym-
bols, in themselves, do not connote any priority.
(c) Priority ratings. A priority rating consists of the rating symbol-
DO and DX-and the program identification symbol, such as Al, B2, or
H6. Thus, a contract for the production of an aircraft will contain a
DO-A1 or DX-A1 priority rating. A contract for a radar set will contain a
DO-A7 or DX-A7 priority rating.
350.12 Elements of a rated order.
Each rated order must include:
(a) The appropriate priority rating (e.g. DO-AI, DX-A4, DO-H1);
(b) A required delivery date or dates. The words "immediately" or "as
soon as possible" do not constitute a delivery date. A "requirements
contract" bearing a priority rating may contain no specific delivery date
or dates and may provide for the furnishing of items from time-to-time or
within a stated period against specific purchase orders or "calls". Such
"calls" must specify a required delivery date or dates and are to be
considered as rated as of the date of their receipt by the supplier and not as
of the date of the original "requirements contract";
(c) The signature of an individual authorized to sign rated orders for
the person placing the order. The signature certifies that the rated order is
authorized under this regulation and that the requirements of this regula-
tion are being followed: and
(d) A statement that reads in substance:
This is a rated order certified for national defense use, and you
are required to follow all the provisions of the Defense Priori-
ties and Allocations System regulation (15 CFR 350).
350.13 Acceptance and rejection of rated orders.
(a) Mandatory acceptance. (1) Except as otherwise specified in this
section, a person shall accept every rated order received and must fill such
orders regardless of any other rated or unrated orders that have been
accepted.
(2) A person shall not discriminate against rated orders in any manner
such as by charging higher prices or by imposing different terms and
conditions than for comparable unrated orders.
(b) Mandatory rejection. Unless otherwise directed by Commerce:
5-90
(1) A person shall not accept a rated order for delivery on a specific
date if unable to fill the order by that date. However, the person must
inform the customer of the earliest date on which delivery can be made
and offer to accept the order on the basis of that date. Scheduling conflicts
with previously accepted lower rated or unrated orders are not sufficient
reason for rejection under this section.
(2) 'A person shall not accept a DO rated order for delivery on a date
which would interfere with delivery of any previously accepted DO or DX
rated orders. However, the person must offer to accept the order based on
the earliest delivery date otherwise possible.
(3) A person shall not accept a DX rated order for delivery on a date
which would interfere with delivery of any previously accepted DX rated
orders, but must offer to accept the order based on the earliest delivery
date otherwise possible.
(c) Optional rejection. Unless otherwise directed by Commerce, rated
orders may be rejected in any of the following cases as long as a supplier
does not discriminate among customers:
(1) If the person placing the order is unwilling or unable to meet
regularly established terms of sale or payment;
(2) If the order is for an item not supplied or for a service not performed;
(3) If the order is for an item produced, acquired, or provided only for
the supplier's own use for which no orders have been filled for two years
prior to the date of receipt of the rated order. If, however, a supplier has
sold some of these items, the supplier is obligated to accept rated orders
up to that quantity or portion of production, whichever is greater, sold
within the past two years;
(4) If the person placing the rated order, other than the U.S. Govern-
ment, makes the item or performs the service being ordered;
(5) If the rated order is for a controlled material in an amount below
the minimum mill quantity established in Schedule II, and the person
placing the order is not willing to buy the minimum quantity;
(6) If the rated order is for a controlled material and is not received by
the controlled materials producer within the time frame specified in
Schedule I;
(7) If the applicable set-aside has been reached or would be exceeded
by acceptance, except that a DX order must be accepted without regard
for such set-aside:
(8) If acceptance of a rated order or performance against a rated order
would violate any other regulation, official action, or order of the Department
of Commerce issued under the authority of the Defense Production Act
(see section 350.75).
(d) Customer notification requirements. (1) A person must accept or
reject a rated order in writing within ten working days after receipt of a
DO rated order and within five working days after receipt of a DX rated
order. The person must give reasons in writing for the rejection.
5-91
(2) If a person has accepted a rated order and later discovers that, due
to circumstances beyond the person's control, deliveries will be delayed,
the person must notify the customer immediately, give the reasons for the
delay, and advise of a new shipment date. If notification is given verbally,
written confirmation must be provided within five working days.
350.14 Preferential scheduling.
(a) A person must schedule operations, including the acquisition of all
needed production items, in a timely manner to satisfy the delivery require-
ments of each rated order. Modifying production or delivery schedules is
necessary only when required delivery dates for rated orders cannot
otherwise be met.
(b) DO rated orders must be given production preference over unrated
orders, if necessary to meet required delivery dates, even if this requires
the diversion of items being processed or ready for delivery against
unrated orders. Similarly, DX rated orders must be given preference over
DO rated orders and unrated orders.
Examples: If a person receives a DO rated order with a delivery date
of June 3 and if meeting that date would mean delaying production
or delivery of an item for an unrated order, the unrated order must be
delayed. If a DX rated order is received calling for delivery on July
15 and a person has a DO rated order requiring delivery on June 2
and operations can be scheduled to meet both deliveries, there is no
need to alter production schedules to give any additional preference
to the DX rated order.
(c) If a person cannot fill all the rated orders of equal priority status
received on the same day. the person must accept those orders which can
be filled which have the earliest delivery dates. For example, the person
must accept order A requiring delivery on December 15 before accepting
order B requiring delivery on December 31. For those orders which cannot
be filled on time, the supplier must inform the customer within the time
limits set forth in section 350.13(d), of the earliest date on which delivery
can be made and offer to accept the order on the basis of that date.
(d) If a person is unable to purchase needed production items in time to
fill a rated order by its required delivery date, the person must fill the
rated order by using inventoried production items. A person who uses
inventoried items to fill a rated order may replace those items with the use
of a rated order as provided in section 350.17(b).
350.15 Extension of priority ratings.
(a) A person must use rated orders with suppliers to obtain items
needed to fill a rated order. The person must use the priority rating
indicated on the customer's rated order, except as otherwise provided in
this regulation or as directed by the Department of Commerce.
For example. if a person is in receipt of a DO-A3 rated order for a
navigation system and needs to purchase semiconductors for its
manufacture. that person must use a DO-A3 rated order to obtain
the needed semiconductors.
(b) The priority rating must be included on each successive order
placed to obtain items needed to fill a customer's rated order. This
5-92
continues from contractor to subcontractor to supplier throughout the
entire procurement chain.
350.16 Changes or cancellations of priority ratings and rated orders.
(a) The priority rating on a rated order may be changed or cancelled
by:
(1) An official action of the Department of Commerce; or
(2) Written notification from the person who placed the rated order
(including a Delegate Agency).
(b) If an unrated order is amended so as to make it a rated order, or a
DO rating is changed to a DX rating, the supplier must give the appropri-
ate preferential treatment to the order as of the date the change is
received by the supplier.
(c) An amendment to a rated order that significantly alters a supplier's
original production or delivery schedule shall constitute a new rated order
as of the date of its receipt. The supplier must accept or reject the
amended order according to the provisions of section 350.13.
(d) The following amendments do not constitute a new rated order: a
change in shipping destination: a reduction in the total amount of the
order: an increase in the total amount of the order which has negligible
impact upon deliveries; a minor variation in size or design; or a change
which is agreed upon between the supplier and the customer.
(e) If a person no longer needs items to fill a rated order, any rated
orders placed with suppliers for the items, or the priority rating on those
orders, must be cancelled.
(f) When a priority rating is added to an unrated order. or is changed or
cancelled. all suppliers must be promptly notified in writing.
350.17 Use of rated orders.
(a) A person must use rated orders to obtain:
(1) Items which will be physically incorporated into other items to fill
rated orders. including that portion of such items normally consumed, or
converted into scrap or by-products. in the course of processing;
(2) Containers or other packaging materials required to make delivery
of the finished items against rated orders;
(3) Services, other than contracts of employment, needed to fill rated
orders; and
(4) MRO needed to produce the finished items to fill rated orders.
However, for MRO, the priority rating used must contain the program
identification symbol H7 along with the rating symbol contained on the
customer's rated order. For example, a person in receipt of a DO-A3 rated
order, who needs MRO, would place a DO-H7 rated order with the
person's supplier.
(b) A person may use a rated order to replace inventoried items (includ-
ing finished items) if such items were used to fill rated orders, as follows:
5 93
(1) The order must be placed within 90 days of the date of use of the
inventory.
(2) A DO rating symbol and the program identification symbol indi-
cated on the customer's rated order must be used on the order (except as
provided in section 350.31(d)-Controlled materials program identifica-
tion symbols). A DX rating symbol may not be used even if the inventory
was used to fill a DX rated order.
(3) If the priority ratings on rated orders from one customer or several
customers contain different program identification symbols, the rated
orders may be combined. In this case, the program identification symbol
H1 must be used (i.e., DO-H1) (not applicable to controlled materials
producers).
(c) A person may combine DX and DO rated orders from one customer
or several customers if the items covered by each level of priority are
identified separately and clearly. If different program identification symbols
are indicated on those rated orders of equal priority, the person must use
the program identification symbol H1 (i.e., DO-H1 or DX-H1), except as
provided in section 350.31(d) (Controlled materials program identifica-
tion symbols).
(d) Combining rated and unrated orders. (1) A person may combine
rated and unrated orders provided that the rated quantities are identified
separately and are also contained in a separate rated order which con-
forms to the requirements of section 350.12 (Elements of a rated order).
In addition to identifying clearly the rated quantities, the combined
purchase order must contain a statement that the rated quantities are
contained in a separate rated order placed in accordance with this regula-
tion. Wherever possible, the separate rated order must be physically
attached to the combined purchase order. A supplier must give preferen-
tial treatment to the rated quantities of the combined order, if necessary.
A supplier may not use the authorities of this regulation to give preferen-
tial treatment to the unrated portion.
(2) Any supplier who believes that rated and unrated orders are being
combined in a manner contrary to the intent of this regulation or in a
fashion that causes undue or exceptional hardship may submit a request
for adjustment or exception under section 350.80.
(e) A person may place a rated order for the minimum commercially
procurable quantity even if the quantity needed to fill a rated order is less
than that minimum. However, a person must combine rated orders as
provided in paragraph (c), if possible, to obtain minimum procurable
quantities.
(f) A person is not required to place a priority rating on an order for less
than $5,000 provided that delivery can be obtained in a timely fashion
without the use of the priority rating.
350.18 Limitations on placing rated orders.
(a) General limitations (1) A person may not place a DO or DX rated
order unless entitled to do so under this regulation.
5-94
(2) Rated orders may not be used to obtain:
(i) Delivery on a date earlier than needed;
(ii) A greater quantity of the item than needed, except to obtain a
minimum procurable quantity. Separate rated orders may not be placed
solely for the purpose of obtaining minimum procurable quantities on
each order;
(iii) Items in advance of the receipt of a rated order, except as specific-
ally authorized by Commerce (see section 350.51(c) for information on
or obtaining authorization for a priority rating in advance of a rated order);
(iv) Any of the following items unless specific priority rating authority
has been obtained from a Delegate Agency or Commerce:
(A) Items for plant improvement, expansion or construction, unless
they will be physically incorporated into a construction project covered by
a rated order; and
(B) Production or construction equipment or items to be used for the
manufacture of production equipment. (For information on requesting
priority rating authority, see section 350.53.)
(b) Jurisdictional limitations. (1) The priorities and allocations author-
ity for certain items has been delegated under Executive Order 10480, as
amended. to other agencies, and, thus, the provisions of this regulation are
not applicable to them. These items include:
(i) Petroleum, gas, solid fuel. and electric power and all other forms
of energy (Department of Energy):
(ii) Food and the domestic distribution of farm equipment and commer
cial fertilizer (Department of Agriculture);
(iii) Civil transportation and the movement of persons and property by
all all modes (Department of Transportation);
(iv) Minerals (Department of Interior);
(v) Water (Department of Defense-U.S. Army Corps of Engineers);
(vi) Housing facilities (Department of Housing and Urban Development);
(vii) Health facilities (Department of Health and Human Services);
and
(viii) Radioisotopes, stable isotopes, source material. and special nuclear
material. produced in Government-owned plants or facilities operated by
or for the Department of Energy (Department of Energy).
(2) The jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce and the Depart-
ments of Energy, Agriculture, and the Interior over certain specific items
included in the categories listed above has been clarified by Interagency
Memoranda of Understanding. Copies of these Memoranda are provided
for information at Appendix II.
(3) The following items under the jurisdiction of Commerce are cur-
rently excluded from the rating provisions of this regulation; however,
5-95
these items are subject to Commerce Directives. These excluded items
are:
Communication services
Copper raw materials (as defined in Schedule III)
Crushed stone
Gravel
Sand
Scrap
Slag
Steam'heat, central
Waste paper
Subpart H-Special Priorities Assistance
350.50 General provisions.
(a) The DPAS is designed to be largely self-executing. However, it is
anticipated that from time-to-time problems will occur. In this event. a
person should immediately contact the appropriate contract administra-
tion officer for guidance or assistance. If additional formal aid is needed,
special priorities assistance should be sought from the Delegate Agency
through the contract administration officer. If the Delegate Agency is
unable to resolve the problem or to authorize the use of a priority rating
and believes additional assistance is warranted, the Delegate Agency may
forward the request to the Department of Commerce for action. Special
priorities assistance is a service provided to alleviate problems that do
arise.
(b) Special priorities assistance can be provided for any reason in
support of this regulation, such as assisting in obtaining timely deliveries
of items needed to satisfy rated orders or authorizing the use of priority
ratings on orders to obtain items not automatically ratable under this
regulation.
(c) A request for special priorities assistance or priority rating author-
ity must be submitted on Form ITA-999 (OMB #0625-0015) to the local
contract administration representative. Form ITA-999 may be obtained
from the Delegate Agency representative, any Commerce District Office, or
from the Department of Commerce. A sample Form ITA-999 is attached
at Appendix III.
5-96
NCS 792/4
6.0 DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES
FINAL REPORT
October 1987
6-1
ADDENDUM
On October 6, 1987, the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) of the
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) approved
the recommendations made in this report, subject to the following changes
in the wording of the first recommendation pertaining to equipment,
materials, and components other than semiconductors. The IES-approved
recommendation is as follows:
0 The Government, in conjunction with the NSTAC, should
establish a mechanism to monitor and assess
telecommunications industry dependence on foreign sources
for identified Government mobilization needs.
6-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
6-7
LIST OF TABLES
6-7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
6-9
6.1 Introduction
6-13
6.2 Background/Approach
6-13
6.2.1 Briefings, Interviews and Review of Literature
6-17
6.2.2 NSTAC Survey
6-17
6.3 Findings
6-21
6.3.1 Dependence on Foreign-Sourced Semiconductors
6-22
6.3.2 Dependence on Other Foreign-Sourced Equipment,
Materials, and Components
6-26
6.3.2.1 Foreign-Sourced Equipment, Materials,
and Components
6-26
6.3.2.2 Other Equipment Items Recommended for Study
6-37
6.3.3 Potential Remedial Measures
6-38
6.4 Conclusions
6-40
6.5 Recommendations
6-42
APPENDICES
6-A ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
6-45
6-B FOREIGN SOURCES QUESTIONNAIRE AND TRANSMITTAL LETTER
6-65
6-C SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES
6-75
6-5
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
6-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
6-16
LIST OF TABLES
Table Number
Page
6-1
JOINT TIM GROUP BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
6-18
6-2
FOREIGN DEPENDENCE ITEMS IDENTIFIED IN SURVEY
RESPONSES
6-27
6-3
CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE ITEMS
6-32
6-4
OTHER POTENTIAL FOREIGN-SOURCE DEPENDENT ITEMS
6-39
6-7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The extent of the telecommunications industry's dependence on foreign
sources for raw materials, components, parts, and equipment is a key area
of concern in evaluating the industry's ability to maintain service and
production capabilities and to accommodate increased service and equipment
demands under mobilization conditions. The Joint Industry-Government
Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by
the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(NSTAC) and the National Communications System (NCS) Committee of
Principals (COP) to: (1) identify possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and (2) assist in the development
of corrective actions to overcome any identified impediments. This report
documents the Joint Group's final findings, conclusions, and
recommendations regarding the industry's overall dependence on foreign
sources.
Using the work of the earlier NSTAC TIM Task Force as a starting
point, the Joint TIM Group sought information from Federal government and
private research organizations that had previously studied the issue of
foreign procurement or foreign dependence. The Group focused initially on
the telecommunications industry's dependence on foreign-sourced
semiconductors, providing recommendations on semiconductor dependency to
the NSTAC in February 1987 and to the COP in March 1987. The subsequent
focus of the Group's study was equipment, materials, and components other
than semiconductors. A survey of NSTAC member companies was conducted to
support this aspect of the study. The Dependence on Foreign Sources
Survey was designed to elicit the views of NSTAC companies concerning
their own, as well as the industry's, dependence on foreign sources for
materials, equipment, and components other than semiconductors. The
survey focused on four major types of equipment: digital central office
switching equipment, fiber optic electronic terminal equipment, telephone
sets, and satellite ground stations. Nineteen NSTAC companies provided
responses to the survey.
On the basis of the survey results and other information obtained
from the literature, briefings, and consultation with experts in the
Federal Government and the private sector, the Joint TIM Group developed
its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
Conclusions
The increasing dependence of the telecommunications industry on
foreign sources raises significant questions about the industry's ability
to respond to and sustain mobilization requirements. On the basis of
briefings received, reports reviewed, and responses to the NSTAC
Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey, the Joint TIM Group has reached the
following conclusions:
6-9
(1) Semiconductors
(a) At this time, if foreign-sourced semiconductors became
unavailable, it would not have significant impact upon the provision of
telecommunications service during Short-Term (0 to 90 days) and Mid-Term
(90 to 180 days) mobilization. While production of telecommunications
equipment would be adversely affected in the Short- and Mid-Term,
available equipment could be allocated to meet mobilization-related
national security emergency preparedness (NSEP) needs.
(b) At this time, to the extent that foreign-sourced semiconductors
became unavailable, expansion of telecommunications service capacity would
be constrained during Short- and Mid-Term mobilization, and overall
capacity would be reduced in the Long-Term because the telecommunications
industry would be competing with other entities (e.g., the Department of
Defense) for the allocation of available supplies.
(2) Equipment, Materials, and Components Other Than Semiconductors
(a) In the Short Term and Mid-Term, the service sector of the U.S.
telecommunications industry would not be immediately or severely affected
by disruption of the supply of foreign items. Adverse effects would be
felt as foreign equipment fails or requires repair parts.
(b) The manufacturing sector of the U.S. telecommunications industry
could be immediately affected by a cut-off of critical foreign-sourced
supplies, equipment, or materials. The effects on production would
depend, in part, on the quantities of foreign-sourced items in domestic
inventories and in the supply pipeline.
(c) The U.S. industry's foreign dependence presents a changing
picture in terms of the specific equipment, components, and materials for
which dependency exists as well as the degree of dependence for each.
Today's list of foreign dependence items is different from last year's,
and next year's will differ from today's. The following conclusions and
observations reflect the current picture as drawn by the NSTAC Foreign
Dependence Survey and related studies!
0
In view of the large number of foreign-made fiber optic terminals
embedded in U.S. telecommunications systems (about 35 percent
foreign according to some estimates) and the inherent
incompatibility between terminals made by different
manufacturers, the foreign-made terminals and their interfacing
connectors could become a problem if maintenance or expanded
capacity is required.
0
The U.S. currently imports over 60 percent of the telephone sets
it uses. Although the demand for telephone sets
6-10
during mobilization is not known, the fact that imports have
risen to this level suggests that telephone sets could be a
problem during mobilization. Therefore, the Joint TIM Group
concluded that domestic production and import status of telephone
sets should be periodically monitored.
0
The foreign dependence status of the ceramic resonators should be
studied in depth, with a view toward identifying possible steps
to reduce the degree of foreign dependence. The availability
status of four other critical items--fiber optic terminals, fiber
optic connectors, telephone sets, and ferrite cores--should be
periodically monitored for the same purpose.
Recommendations
On the basis of its conclusions regarding the impact of semiconductor
foreign dependency on the telecommunications industry, the Joint TIM Group
offered the following recommendation:
0
Semiconductors are major components of the equipment used by the
telecommunications industry, and the industry is almost totally
dependent on foreign-sourced semiconductors. Accordingly, the
ongoing National Security Council and Defense Science Board
efforts in this area are strongly supported. The President
should direct action to identify steps to mitigate the impact of
the loss of foreign-sourced semiconductors on the
telecommunications industry.
Further, on the basis of its collective assessment of the responses
to the NSTAC-wide Dependence on Foreign Sources survey, the Joint Group
has identified other dependencies of concern from a mobilization
perspective. While these dependencies may not have the same wide-ranging
significance to the telecommunications industry as semiconductor
dependency, they are important. Accordingly, the Joint TIM Group offers
the following recommendations:
0
The Government, in conjunction with NSTAC, should establish a
mechanism to periodically assess industry dependence on foreign
sources in light of identified Government mobilization needs.
o
The NCS and NSTAC should jointly keep the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) apprised of any specific foreign dependency
issues relating to telecommunications, and identify, if
necessary, possible measures for reducing or mitigating these
foreign dependencies.
In conjunction with the above Government action, the NSTAC member
firms should ensure that their appropriate internal organizations
6-11
are made aware of the findings of the joint TIM Group. Further,
their internal organizations should be apprised of the need to
plan for contingencies such as a cut-off of non-North American
supplied material during a mobilization.
6-12
6.1 Introduction
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by the President's National
Security Telecommunications: Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the NCS
Committee of Principals (COP) to: (1) identify possible impediments to
effective telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning and (2) assist in the development of corrective actions to
overcome any identified impediments. The extent of the telecommunications
industry's dependence on foreign sources for raw materials, components,
parts, and equipment is a key area of concern to the Joint TIM Group in
its evaluation of the industry's ability to maintain existing service and
production capabilities and to accommodate increased service and equipment
demands under mobilization conditions. This report documents the Group's
final findings, conclusions, and recommendations regarding
telecommunications industry dependence on foreign sources and its
potential effects on mobilization.
For the purpose of the TIM study, foreign-sourced items are those
manufactured, assembled, or otherwise processed outside of the United
States and Canada. Sources within these countries are referred to as
North American sources. It should be noted that the Joint TIM Group has
distinguished between the issue of dependence on foreign sources and the
broader, more inclusive issue of procurement from foreign sources.
Foreign source procurement does not, in the view of the Joint TIM
Group, necessarily equate to foreign source dependence and involves
consideration of a range of trade, economic, national security, and
foreign relations issues that are beyond the scope of the Group's
objectives. The Joint TIM Group has focused on the narrower issue of the
industry's dependence on foreign sources and the implications of any
dependencies for effective industry mobilization. In its study, the Joint
Group has recognized that concerns about foreign source dependency grow
out of the possibility that foreign sources of supply could be cut off
under a variety of mobilization conditions. The Group has thus assumed,
for purposes of its general investigation, that a cut-off of foreign
supplies would occur coincident with the beginning of mobilization.
6.2 Background/Approach
In December 1984, the NCS asked the NSTAC to assist the Government in
assessing telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities. In response to the Government's request, the NSTAC
1 Foreign source definition based on definition of "Industrial Base"
in DoD Directive 4005.1, Enclosure 2, SUBJECT: Industrial Preparedness
Program, November 26, 1985.
2 The specific mobilization interval and time periods addressed by the
Joint TIM Group are discussed in Section 6.2.
6-13
TABLE 6-1
JOINT TIM GROUP BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
BRIEFINGS
TITLE/SUBJECT OF STUDY
CONDUCTED BY
BRIEFED BY
Defense Science Board Semiconductor
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
Richard H. Van Atta
Study
for the Department of Defense
Director, Technology Security Policy
Institute for Defense Analyses
IDA Electronics Dependency Project
Institute for Defense Analyses
Richard H. Van Atta
6-18
Joint Logistics Commanders' Study
Department of Defense
Paige Sullivan
on U.S. Precision Optics Production
Office of Industrial Base Assessment
Base
Department of Defense
Joint Logistics Commanders' Study
The Analytic Sciences Corporation
John F. Starns
on Effects of Foreign Dependency
(TASC) for the Department of Defense
Staff Analyst
The Analytic Sciences Corporation
National Security Assessment of Critical
Department of Commerce, for the
Paige Sullivan
Gas Turbine Engine Subcontractors
Department of Defense
Department of Defense (formerly
with Department of Commerce)
Joint Logistics Commanders' Bearings
Department of Commerce, for the
Brad Botwin and John Tucker
Study
U.S. Air Force
Office of Industrial Resource Administation
Department of Commerce
TABLE 6-1
JOINT TIM GROUP BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
(CONCLUDED)
BRIEFINGS
CONDUCTED BY
BRIEFED BY
TITLE/SUBJECT OF STUDY
Survey of Foreign Dependency Studies
Mobilization Concepts Development
William B. Taylor
Center, National Defense University
Director, Mobilization Concepts
Development Center,
National Defense University
Study on International Competitiveness
Amercian Electronics Association
Stephen R. Levy
Chairman of the Board, Bolt Beranek
and Newman, and President, American
Electronics Association
6-19
U.S. Bureau of Mines
John D. Morgan
Strategic Materials for Electronics
Chief Staff Officer
Applications
U.S. Bureau of Mines
INTERVIEWS BY TIME GROUP STAFF
PERSONS INTERVIEWED
AFFILIATION
Gregory D. Foster
Director, Command and Control
Research Program, National
Defense University
William J. Sullivan
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration,
Department of Commerce
Recent studies clearly show that the U.S. electronics industry is
highly dependent on semiconductors produced offshore. The Group therefore
decided to exclude semiconductors as an equipment category to be addressed
in the survey. Semiconductors are included, however, in the Group's
conclusions and recommendations that are based on the findings of other
studies.
The Joint Group was sensitive to industry concerns about proprietary
information that might be involved in the survey, and worked with the
Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS) to establish information handling and
processing procedures to accommodate those concerns.
After numerous meetings of a specially-organized subgroup that
included all industry members, the Joint TIM Group agreed on five
questions to be asked of all NSTAC member companies:
1. What, if any, particular items, materials, or components
(excluding semiconductors) associated with the four types of
equipment identified [above] warrant detailed study by the
Joint TIM Group from a foreign dependency/mobilization
perspective?
2. In your estimation, how would the unavailability of foreign
sourced materials and components (excluding semiconductors)
affect your company's ability to continue to produce, operate,
maintain or integrate the four types of equipment identified
[above]? In addition, please identify, if possible, those
companies which would constitute primary alternative domestic
sources.
3. In your estimation, how would the unavailability of foreign
sourced materials and components (excluding semiconductors) for
these types of equipment constrain or impair the
telecommunications industry's ability to mobilize and/or
sustain a long term (beyond six months) mobilization effort?
4. What steps might industry and/or the Federal Government take to
mitigate, reduce, or eliminate any adverse effects of foreign
dependencies on the telecommunications industry's ability to
mobilize effectively and to sustain a long term mobilization
effort?
5. Other comments or suggestions (e.g., What other important aspects
or dimensions of the dependence on foreign sources issue should
be addressed by the Joint TIM Group? Are there other types of
equipment that should be studied? Are there identifiable trends
toward greater or lesser reliance on foreign sources?)
6-20
The above questions, together with background material and
instructions to respondents, were prepared after consultation with
specialists from the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce who
had experience in preparing and administering industry surveys. However,
the questions reflect the Joint TIM Group's decision concerning the
information it needed from the NSTAC companies.
A pilot version of the questionnaire was administered to the industry
members of the Joint TIM Group -- AT&T, Bell Communications Research
(Bellcore), Martin Marietta, Northern Telecom, and Rockwell
International. The results were used to fine-tune the questionnaire
before it was presented to the NSTAC Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES)
in November 1986 for review and approval. The questionnaire was approved
by the IES and was distributed to NSTAC member companies at that time.
This questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 6-B. Nineteen NSTAC member
companies have provided responses. The Joint TIM Group staff compiled and
summarized the responses in a manner that precluded the identification of
particular respondents. Following an initial review of the compiled
responses, a further summarization was developed, approved by the Joint
Group, and distributed to the responding NSTAC companies for comment. The
approved summary is Appendix 6-C.
The Joint Group then assessed the mobilization significance of the
foreign-source dependent items identified by survey respondents, using
additional information obtained from a variety of sources, including:
Briefings from Government and private organizations,
Interviews with technical consultants,
Discussions with Department of Commerce "industry specialists",
0
Review of technical literature, and
0
Experience and expertise of Joint TIM Group industry and
Government members.
6.3 Findings
The findings in this report fall into two categories: (1) findings
based on briefings, interviews, and review of the relevant literature, and
(2) findings based on the Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey responses
received from the NSTAC companies, and related information from Government
sources.
In-depth review of the material briefed to the Joint TIM Group or
contained in documentation obtained by the Group revealed no previous or
ongoing study that addressed the dependence of the telecommunications
industry, as a whole, on foreign sources. However, several studies
6-21
address U.S. dependence on foreign sources for equipment and components
used by the telecommunications industry. Among these are the following
Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Commerce (DOC) studies:
0
Defense Science Board Semiconductor Dependency Study (1987)
Joint Logistics Commanders' Study of Effects of Foreign
Dependency (1985)
National Defense University: U.S. Dependence on Foreign
Sources for Components: The Case of Semiconductors (1983)
Department of Commerce: A Competitive Assessment of the U.S.
Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturing Industry (1985)
Department of Commerce: A Competitive Assessment of the U.S.
Fiber Optics Industry (1984)
Department of Commerce: A Competitive Assessment of the
U.S. Advanced Ceramics Industry (1984)
0 Department of Commerce: A Report on the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry (1979)
The first three studies listed were conducted by DOD organizations.
They examine U.S. dependence on foreign sources primarily from the
standpoint of equipment or components needed for military purposes. The
remaining four, conducted by the DOC, are oriented toward trade and
foreign competition considerations. Five of the seven listed above are
concerned principally with semiconductors.
6.3.1 Dependence on Foreign-Sourced Semiconductors
Studies indicate that the nature of the dependence on foreign sources
is complex. For example, a basic semiconductor device may be
mass-produced in the U.S., shipped to a foreign country for the
labor-intensive steps of testing and partial assembly, and then returned
to the U.S. for final assembly. The device may also be produced entirely
in a foreign country by means of printing masks and other equipment
produced in the U.S., with the resulting component or finished equipment
being ultimately returned to the U.S. Or, the device may be produced
totally outside the U.S. The nature of the foreign dependency is thus
related both to the type of semiconductor device and to the processing
steps employed in its manufacture. The fact that a device is labeled
"Made in (Nation)" does not necessarily mean that all (or, in some cases,
any) production steps occurred in that nation.
6-22
The findings of the various semiconductor-related studies and
documents reviewed by the Joint TIM Group and its support staff are
summarized below.
7
Defense Science Board Semiconductor Dependency Study (1987)
0
The current extent of foreign dependency depends greatly on the
type of semiconductor. It is very high for simple, inexpensive,
mass-produced semiconductor devices and for moderately complex,
mass-produced semiconductor devices with higher quality
requirements. At the other end of the complexity/quality
spectrum, foreign dependency is very low for highly complex,
highly reliable semiconductor devices such as complex integrated
circuits. This last type of component includes specialized
devices proprietary to a given user or manufacturer, or devices
required to meet stringent DOD specifications.
0
There is a trend toward a declining U.S. technology base in
semiconductor technology and production. Indicators of this
trend include recent Japanese advances in supercomputers and
high-speed, high-capacity memory; comparative educational trends
in the U.S. and abroad; and the increasing number and advanced
character of Japanese papers presented at technical symposia.
o
High-capacity memory devices for U.S.-made supercomputers are
obtained exclusively from Japanese firms; Japan may dominate the
supercomputer market by 1990.
The U.S. lead in market share (dollar value) of the world-wide
semiconductor market was lost to Japan during 1986. Projections
indicate increasing Japanese share and declining U.S. share.
The recommendations of the above-referenced report of the Task Force
on Defense Semiconductor Dependency are paraphrased in abbreviated form
below:
0
Support the establishment of a semiconductor manufacturing
technology institute
0
Establish eight university centers of excellence for
semiconductor science and engineering
7
Report of the Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency, Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Washington, D.C.,
February 1987. (The material summarized here is from a briefing to the
NSTAC Industry Executive Subcommittee by Dr. Richard Van Atta, Institute
for Defense Analyses, November 18, 1986.)
6-23
0
Increase DOD funding for microelectronics research and
development in semiconductor materials, devices, and
manufacturing infrastructure
0
Provide a source of discretionary funds to the DOD's
semiconductors suppliers
0
Establish under the DOD a Government/industry/university forum
for semiconductors
Joint Logistics Commanders' Study of Effects of Foreign Dependency
(1985)
0
At least six integrated circuits, microcircuits, and related
components used in the guidance and control section of a specific
precision-guided munition (the Sparrow air intercept missile)
were sole-sourced to Japanese manufacturers.
National Defense University: U.S. Dependence on Foreign Sources for
Components: The Case Of Semiconductors (1984)
0
The U.S. semiconductor industry is threatened by competition from
abroad. Some of this competition is subsidized by foreign
governments.
There is an overwhelming dependence within the United States for
semiconductors processed, in some manner, offshore.
0
"There is great potential for military systems to contain large
amounts of semiconductors processed offshore."
0
The military has no established system to track geographical
origin of most of its semiconductors.
0
There may be a problem with regard to mobilization caused by
offshore assembly of semiconductors but DOD does not presently
have the data necessary to make a definite judgement.
0
80-90 percent of semiconductors used by the military were
assembled and tested outside the U.S. (This estimate is
attributed to a 1980 Defense Science Board study.)
6-24
0
"Most studies [in the past five years] have recognized that
approximately 90 percent of the semiconductor industry's assembly
capacity is located off-shore.
Department of Commerce: A Report on the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry (1979)
This in-depth study, now somewhat dated, recognized the declining
U.S. share of the world semiconductor market and the growing
participation of foreign governments in the development and support
of their own semiconductor industries. The report projected that
Japan's share of the U.S. semiconductor market would grow, and the
U.S. semiconductor industry would face a serious challenge to its
then-dominant competitive position. These projections have since
been borne out, as indicated by the findings of the later studies
listed above.
Two other studies have reached the following conclusions concerning
materials used in making semiconductor devices:
0
The U.S. is totally dependent on foreign sources for the
ultra-pure silicon that is required for the manufacture of
certain high-reliability semiconductors. These kinds of
semiconductors are currently needed for defense applications,
e.g., missile guidance systems, and are becoming 10 increasingly
important for non-military applications.
8 More recent data from the U.S. Department of Commerce indicate that
shipments of semiconductors out of U.S. factories in 1985 were valued at
$13.6 billion, while imports during the same period were valued at $5.7
billion. The latter figure includes semiconductors produced at
U.S. -owned offshore facilities. (Private communication with industry
specialists at U.S. Department of Commerce, October 13, 1987.)
9 This term is used here to mean silicon with impurities less than one
part in ten billion, which is much higher purity than ordinary
semiconductor-grade silicon. In 1983, U.S. production of the
semiconductor grade was 414 tons. Total use in the U.S. was 493 tons, of
which 396 tons came from U.S. sources, 85 tons from Japanese sources, and
12 tons from all other sources. (Statistics provided by industry
specialists at U.S. Department of Commerce, October 13, 1987.)
10
U.S. Air Force Memorandum from Air Force Materials Laboratory, Wright
Patterson AFB, Ohio, to Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installation and Logistics, SUBJECT: Strategic Silicon Stockpile.
March 1977. Also, Business Week, "When the Pentagon Wants Something
America Doesn't Have," October 27, 1986.
6-25
Some degree of foreign dependency exists for gallium arsenide
materials/components needed for 11 the satellite portions of
telecommunications systems.
6.3.2 Dependence on Other Foreign-Sourced Equipment, Material, and
Components
The Group's study of foreign-sourced materials, equipment, and
components other than semiconductors was based mainly on industry
responses to the NSTAC Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey, although
suggestions from other sources were considered. Industry responses to the
NSTAC Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey identified 21 materials,
equipment items, or components for which the respondents are dependent on
foreign sources. The Joint TIM Group identified six of these items for
further study or monitoring.
The NSTAC survey focused on four common types of equipment:
0 Digital central office switching equipment
Fiber optic electronic terminal equipment
(including repeaters)
Telephone sets
Satellite ground stations (including uplinks, downlinks, TT&C,
and antennas)
In addition to identifying specific items, the companies were asked to
indicate what effect, if any, the unavailability of these items would have
on the mobilization capabilities of their company and the
telecommunications industry as a whole. They were also asked to identify
any other critical types of equipment (other than semiconductors) for
which they depend on foreign sources.
6.3.2.1 Foreign-Sourced Equipment/Materials/Components. The 21 items
identified by survey respondents as foreign source dependent are listed in
Table 6-2. As a set, the items are extremely varied, ranging from
specific types of moderately complex equipment (low noise amplifiers and
telephone sets) to general classes of materials (silicones and ceramics).
The Joint TIM Group viewed each of the items on this list as being
critically foreign-source dependent to the respondents that named them.
11 Briefing to Joint TIM Group by Dr. Richard van Atta, July 23, 1986,
on Defense Science Board Semiconductor Dependency Study and Institute
for Defense Analyses Electronics Dependency Project.
6-26
TABLE 6-2
FOREIGN DEPENDENCE ITEMS IDENTIFIED IN SURVEY RESPONSES
Adhesives
Ceramics
Ceramic Reasonators
Epoxies
Ferrite Cores for Transformers and Inductors
Fiber Optic Connectors
(Between the Terminal and the Fiber Cable)
Fiber Optic Terminals
Frequency Converters Associated With
Low Noise Amplifiers
Hybrid Circuits Used in Fiber Optic Transmission Equipment
Klystrons
Low-Noise Amplifiers
Photodefinable Polymers
Plastic Sealed Relays
Quartz Tubes for Lightwaves
SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Filters
Silicones
Solder Paste
Spare Parts for Foreign-Made Assembly Equipment for Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs)
Specific-Channel Set-Top Receivers
Telephone Sets
(Including Special Sets Designed for Use With Foreign-Made Switches)
Traveling Wave Tubes
6-27
The foreign dependence status of particular items was often the
subject of considerable debate within the Joint Group, and questions about
why a particular item had been identified by one or more respondents 12
surfaced frequently during the Group's review of the items in Table 6-2.
Detailed reasons were provided by some respondents, but no rationale was
given for most of the items. The principal reasons given for
foreign-source dependence were:
0
No North American manufacturer of the item or acceptable
substitute is known to the respondents. Although the
basic item is produced domestically, component parts (other
than semiconductors) are produced only by foreign manufacturers.
Foreign-produced items are sometimes less expensive than
the same type of items made in North America.
Quantities of the item produced in North America are not adequate
to meet respondent's demand. This problem is seen as becoming
intensified during mobilization conditions when the telecommuni-
cations industry would have to compete not only with heightened
levels of demand from industry and commerce, but also with
demands from the military and the defense industries for
available supplies of this item.
0
Foreign-made versions of the item are currently embedded in
respondent's network or production system. Although the same
type of item is available from North American producers, there
are major incompatibilities between the foreign and domestic
versions that affect both normal maintenance of existing systems
and expansion to meet increased levels of demand during
mobilization.
Some respondents noted that their decision to buy from foreign
sources was based largely on economic considerations and that they would
probably buy from domestic sources if these sources became economically
competitive. Others observed that declining sales of domestically-made
products can lead to reduced levels of domestic production, loss of
revenue, idle production capacity, and, ultimately, shut down and possible
12 In this discussion of survey results, attribution of information,
opinions, etc., to respondents is generally made in the plural, even
though the specific information may have been provided by a single
respondent. This procedure is followed to preclude identification of
particular respondents.
6-28
sale of production facilities. Reduced revenue often leads to lower
research and development (R&D) investment, widening the gap in
manufacturing technology between domestic and foreign producers -- a point
also made in the Defense Science Board Semiconductor Study referred to
earlier. These economic and technological trends combine to create not
only a reduced domestic production capacity, but also a diminished
domestic capability to produce.
As part of the Joint TIM Group's study of these items, the following
types of information were considered for each item:
0
Number of responding companies that identified item as potential
problem
0
Number of responding companies expected to use this item
0
Use or application of item
0
Principal concerns if foreign supplies were cut off
0
Extent of problem across industry
O
Are North American manufacturers identified in the survey
responses?
o
Do North American manufacturers exist? If so, how many are
there?
0
U.S. consumption data
0
U.S. (and Canadian) production data
0
Export-import data
This information was derived from the survey responses, follow-up contacts
with some of the responding companies, interviews with "industry
specialists" at the Department of Commerce and other consultants, and
publications of the Bureau of the Census. The completeness of information
varied substantially from one item to another.
The Joint TIM Group collectively reviewed the information available
on each identified item, taking into account the impacts of a cut-off of
foreign supplies during particular time periods, i.e., Short-Term (0 to 90
days), Mid-Term (90 to 180 days), and Long-Term (over 180 days). The
Group explicitly recognized that the timing of specific effects would be
influenced by (1) the quantities of a given item in domestic
inventories/stockpiles. (2) quantities in the supply pipeline at the time
of cut-off, 13 and (3) the failure-rate of the item in question.
13 The subject of Stockpiles and Inventories will be addressed in
a separate TIM report.
6-29
For some items (e.g., telephone sets), the Group considered the
possibility that idle production capacity could be brought into operation,
or that foreign-designed parts could be duplicated domestically. Those
approaches could be employed in the Long-Term (over 180 days), but
probably could not be used effectively in the Short- and Mid-Term (0-180
days) to satisfy industry's needs. Consequently, the Group decided to
focus on Pre-mobilization, Short-Term, and Mid-Term mobilization (up to
180 days).
During its review of identified foreign dependence items, the Group
recognized that cut-offs of different items would have different effects
not only on the time of impact, but on the nature and magnitude of the
impact as well. Some items would primarily affect satellite systems;
others would affect fiber optic systems. Other items would primarily
affect carrier operations while still others would affect manufacturing
operations.
In view of the differential effects of disruptions in the supply of
various items as well as the different levels of information about the
items, the Joint TIM Group classified the items into the following four
categories:
o
Category 1. Foreign Dependence Items Needing Priority Study:
Item(s) in this category are sufficiently critical to warrant
priority study of their continued availability to the industry.
o
Category 2. Foreign Dependence Items Needing Periodic
Monitoring:
-
Items in this category are critical to NSEP
telecommunications. Although a substantial portion of U.S.
consumption for telecommunications use is produced abroad,
substantial production capacity currently exists in North
America.
-
The production picture for these items is highly dynamic.
U.S. -owned production facilities are being set up overseas
while Japanese firms are building plants in the the U.S.
The production and supply systems need to be frequently
monitored to ensure that NSEP needs can be met following an
interruption of foreign-made supplies.
0
Category 3. Foreign Dependence Items Not Currently Needing To Be
Tracked:
Cut-off of foreign supplies of these items would affect only
6-30
limited segments of the Nation's NSEP-related telecommun-
ications capabilities. Monitoring of supply status does not
appear warranted.
0
Category 4. Items Identified As Having Foreign Dependence But
Lacking Adequate Data To Support Development of Conclusions:
Items were assigned to this category when information available
to the Joint TIM Group from summarized survey responses or other
sources was insufficient to enable the Group to understand the
basis of the item's foreign dependence status.
The distribution of items among these four categories is shown in Table
6-3 and discussed below.
Category 1. Foreign Dependence Items Needing Priority Study
Only one item was assigned to this category: Ceramic Resonators.
This item was identified as an integral component of telephone sets
currently being produced in the U.S. by one or more major manufacturers.
The affected producers did not know of any North American sources of the
item, according to the survey responses. Although some 19 U.S. firms
listed as manufacturers of "acoustical transducers" produced about 5
million units in 1985, 14 the source of this information does not
indicate whether any of these units are ceramic resonators, or whether
they could be used as a substitute for the resonators needed for
telephones. In any event, this total number of acoustic transducers
produced by U.S. manufacturers is substantially less than the 23.8 million
telephone sets produced in the U.S. in 1985.
While it is possible to "design around" ceramic resonators to produce
an acceptable telephone set, this probably could not be accomplished
during a Short-Term mobilization (up to 90 days), during which time the
need to maintain an increased domestic production may be critical. In
view of the key role of ceramic resonators in the production of an
instrument needed in large numbers by the telecommunications industry, and
the apparent high level of foreign dependence for this item, the Joint TIM
Group decided that the item merited further study on a priority basis,
toward the goal of reducing the industry's apparent vulnerability to a
cut-off of foreign supplies of this item.
Category 2. Foreign Dependence Items Needing Periodic Monitoring
This category contains NSEP-critical items that, on the basis of
available data, are believed to be substantially foreign supplied, but for
which there are widely-available, domestically-produced substitutes. The
14
Private communication, U.S. Department of Commerce industry
specialists, July 24, 1987.
6-31
TABLE 6-3
CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE ITEMS
Foreign Dependence
CATEGORY 1
Items Needing
Ceramic Resonators
Priority Study
Foreign Dependence
Ferrite Cores
CATEGORY 2
Items Needing
Fiber Optic Terminals
Periodic Monitoring
Fiber Optic Connectors
Telephone Sets
Frequency Converters
Foreign Dependence
Low Noise Amplifiers
CATEGORY 3
Items Not Currently
SAW Filters
Needing To Be Tracked
Spare Sparts For Foreign-Made
Assembly Equipment For PCBs
Specifc-Channel Set-Top Receivers
Items Identified As
Adhesives (polymeric); Ceramics;
Having Foreign
Epoxies; Hybrid Circuits For Fiber Optic
CATEGORY 4
Dependence But Lacking
Transmission Equipment; Photodefin-
Adequate Data To
able polymers; Quartz Tubes For
Support Development
Lightwaves; Silicones; Solder Paste;
Of Conclusions
Klystrons; Plastic Sealed Relays;
Traveling Wave Tubes
6-32
relation between imported and domestically-produced quantities fluctuates
markedly for most of these items. The supply situation thus needs to be
monitored frequently from an NSEP standpoint. The rationale for assigning
items to this category differs from one item to another. The items,
therefore, will be discussed separately.
Fiber Optic Terminals (FOTs) 15
Fiber Optic Terminals and other parts of fiber optic transmission
systems are produced by a number of large North American companies,
including AT&T, Northern Telecom, and the Collins Divisions of Rockwell
International. Domestic carriers reporting the use of fiber optic systems
in their survey responses stated that some of their fiber optic terminals
were of foreign manufacture. The proportion of foreign-made to
domestic-made FOTs is not stated quantitatively by any of the
respondents. Industry specialists at the Department of Commerce have
provided an informal estimate that FOTs of foreign manufacture now
constitute about 35 percent of the FOTs used by U.S. domestic
carriers. 16
Most respondents who reported the use of fiber optic systems also
acknowledged a problem of compatibility between the fiber optic equipment
of different manufacturers, citing the difficulties of integrating
domestic-made terminals into systems of foreign design and manufacture.
Thus, if the supply of foreign-made terminals were cut off,
incompatibility could be a major problem to a carrier wishing to expand a
system containing a large embedded base of foreign-made terminals.
The production and consumption patterns for this equipment item are
changing. The trend toward use of fiber transmission systems in the U.S.
is increasing. Also, a major foreign producer of fiber systems Nippon
Electric Company (NEC) is relocating fiber optic system manufacturing
facilities from Japan to Oregon. The move is significant to this study
because most domestic carriers that reported the use of fiber systems also
stated that they purchased a portion of their fiber optic equipment in
some cases, the major portion from NEC.
15
The meaning attached to the terms "fiber optic terminal" and "fiber
optic connector" differs from one context to another. "Fiber optic
terminal" here denotes the equipment used to process and transform
electrical signals to optical signals; to enter the optical signals into
transmitting fiber cable; and to receive and transform optical signals
to electrical signals. "Fiber optic connector" denotes here the device
that connects fiber cables together, and provides the physical interface
between the fiber optic terminal and the fiber cable.
16 Personal communications, Department of Commerce industry specialists,
May 22, 1987 and July 10, 1987.
6-33
Fiber Optic Connectors
In comparison with terminals, Fiber Optic Connectors are relatively
simple devices. These were identified as a potentially critical foreign
dependence item by respondents who use FOTs made by several manufacturers
and who purchase connectors almost exclusively from foreign sources.
While standardization of connectors and many other components of
fiber optic systems is far from universal, a relatively small number of
connector designs fit the preponderance of terminals, whether of foreign
or domestic manufacture. Department of Commerce industry specialists
suggest that U.S. manufacturers produce compatible connectors for both
U.S. and foreign-made terminals. 17 No data were found concerning
quantities produced in North America or imported.
Telephone Sets
Telephone Sets present a complex, changing picture from the
standpoint of foreign dependence. For example, U.S. consumption (Imports
plus Production minus Exports) increased from 41 million sets in 1985 to
58 million in 1986. This increase partially reflects an expansion of
overall telecommunications service capacity. However, it also reflects
the new patterns of telephone set marketing, ownership, pricing, and use
that have come about as a result of deregulation and increased
competition. During the same two-year period, domestic production of sets
dropped from 24 million to 18 million. Imports accounted for about 44
percent of U.S. consumption in 1985. This figure increased to 70 percent
in 1986. 18 These changes are, at least in part, attributable to the
transfer by U.S. firms of telephone set production from domestic plants to
offshore plants.
Despite these trends, less than one-third of those respondents
considered to have major requirements for telephone sets (mainly domestic
and international carriers) identified telephone sets as a critical
foreign dependence item. Further, none of the respondents considered to
be manufacturers identified telephone sets as foreign dependence items.
Some respondents gave specific reasons for not identifying telephone sets
as items of concern. For example, some carriers cited their typically
large inventories (120-180 days) of this item and the large amount of idle
capacity in domestic manufacturing plants. The Joint TIM Group was not
able to confirm the existence of this idle capacity.
17
Private communication, U.S. Department of Commerce industry
specialists, May 22, 1987 and June 1, 1987.
18 Private communications, U.S. Department of Commerce industry
specialists, July 13, 1987.
6-34
Other respondents identified special sets designed for use with the
foreign-made switches used in certain large, privately-owned or
government-owned telecommunications systems or networks as a foreign
dependence item. The Joint TIM Group recognized that the unavailability
of special sets could affect the functioning of systems of this type.
In its review, the Joint TIM Group noted that idle production
capacity may not remain in place indefinitely and that inventories vary
over time. It also noted that some, if not all, major manufacturers use
foreign-produced ceramic resonators in their telephone sets, and their
ability to continue or rapidly expand production in the Short-Term was
dependent on the availability of this component.
Ferrite Cores
Ferrite Cores are used in miniature transformers and inductors.
These are, in turn, widely used in the manufacture of several types of
telecommunications equipment, including central office switches, PBX
equipment, and fiber optic terminals. One or more manufacturers
identified ferrite cores as a foreign dependence item. One respondent
noted that there is significant idle capacity for producing ferrite cores
in the U.S. that could be brought into production status in about six
months. Publications by the Department of Commerce show nine U.S.
manufacturers of ferrite cores, but do not distinguish between makers of
small cores for signal processing applications and makers of larger,
heavier cores for power transformers, fractional-horsepower motors,
etc. 19 The Joint TIM Group noted that, while idle production capacity
may exist in North America at the time of the survey, there was no
guarantee that it would be available at the time of a future mobilization.
Category 3. Foreign Dependence Items Not Currently Needing To Be Tracked
This category contains items that, in the view of the Joint TIM
Group, would have only limited impact on NSEP telecommunications,
particularly during the first year of a mobilization. Of the five items
assigned to this category, the following four were identified by
respondents because of their use in satellite earth station equipment for
special-purpose private networks:
Low Noise Amplifiers
Frequency Converters Associated With Low-Noise Amplifiers
Specific-Channel Set-Top Receivers
SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Filters
19 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Report MA36Q(85)-1,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. September 1986.
6-35
Since respondents indicate that suitable substitutes for most of
these items are available from North American manufacturers and that
several months' supply of spare parts is typically available for the
foreign made items, the Joint TIM Group determined that periodic tracking
of the production/consumption/importation of these items is not needed at
this time.
Spare Parts For Foreign-Made Assembly Equipment For Printed Circuit
Boards is the fifth item assigned to this category. These parts are
ordinarily obtained from the equipment manufacturer. No U.S.
manufacturers are identified in the survey responses or by other sources
of information. The Joint TIM Group concluded that the number of
different types of spare parts and the diversity of their applications
make the task of tracking the availability status of such parts
infeasible. Moreover, the Group felt that the users of foreign-made
assembly equipment would be aware of the failure rates of such equipment
and would maintain an inventory of spares adequate to ensure prompt repair
during extended periods of operation. Domestic job shops could duplicate
spare parts if supplies from foreign sources were cut off and inventoried
spares become exhausted.
Category 4. Items Identified As Having Foreign Dependence, But
Lacking Adequate Data To Support Development of Conclusions
This category contains items for which the Joint TIM Group was unable
to identify the basis of foreign dependence. The reasons for assigning
items to this category vary from item to another.
One type of item consisted of broad classes of materials for which
specific applications in the telecommunications industry are not specified
by respondents. These include: Adhesives (polymeric), Ceramics, Epoxies,
Photodefinable Polymers, Silicones, and Solder Paste.
The Joint TIM Group could not determine from survey responses or
other available information whether the respondents' concerns were related
to all types of adhesives, for example, or to specific types used for
particular applications. It is also possible that the respondents were
concerned about a diminishing of the domestic technology base for
ceramics, while the ceramics technology abroad is advancing. Without
greater specificity about respondents' concerns, the Joint TIM Group could
not draw meaningful conclusions.
Another item of equipment, Quartz Tubes for Lightwaves, is assigned
to Category 4 for the reasons similar to those given for the preceding
group: (1) lack of specificity about the application of the item in the
telecommunications industry, (2) unavailability of production,
consumption, and import data, and (3) unclear basis for foreign dependence
status.
6-36
In addition, there are some items Klystrons, Plastic Sealed
Relays, and Traveling Wave Tubes for which available data on
production, consumption, imports, and exports appear inconsistent with the
status of foreign-source dependence. In the case of Klystrons, available
data indicate several U.S. manufacturers whose combined production of all
types of klystrons exceeds 116,000 per year. The U.S. exports about 9,500
per year and imports about 2,500. 20 In the case of Traveling Wave Tubes
and Plastic-Sealed Relays, technical publications indicate that there are
broad classes of equipment containing these items that are manufactured in
North America. However, the information provided is not sufficiently
detailed to indicate the foreign dependence status of these two specific
items.
Finally, respondents state that Hybrid Circuits for Fiber Optic
Transmission Equipment are available only from foreign sources. No
domestic producers have been identified by other information sources.
Information available to the Joint TIM Group does not indicate the reason
for the apparent foreign dependence. (Industry specialists at Department
of Commerce speculate that these circuits require a ceramic substrate
available only from a Japanese manufacturer. ) 21 This item was placed in
Category 4 because of the vagueness of information concerning the basis of
foreign dependence.
6.3.2.2 Other Equipment Items Recommended for Study. In addition to
asking respondents to identify foreign dependence items in four major
types of equipment (digital central office switches, fiber optic
terminals, telephone sets, and satellite ground stations), the NSTAC
survey questionnaire invited them to identify other types of equipment
that should be studied as possible foreign dependence items. These are
listed in Table 6-4. In discussions with the TIM Group staff,
telecommunications industry specialists in the Department of Commerce also
identified four foreign-sgurced items for possible further study in the
context of mobilization. 22 These are also listed in Table 6-4.
20
Types and power ranges are not specified. Possibly the identified
foreign dependence status of this item relates to a U.S. need for
specific types or sizes that are only produced abroad. (Data source:
Electronic Foreign Trade, Electronic Industries Association, Washington
D.C. December 1986)
21
Private communication, U.S. Department of Commerce industry
specialist, July 1, 1987
22
Private communication, U.S. Department of Commerce industry
specialists, July 10, 1987.
6-37
The Joint TIM Group reviewed the items from both sources and agreed
to record the suggested items in this report. However, the Group decided
not to undertake further study of these items.
6.3.3 Potential Remedial Measures
The NSTAC Survey invited respondents to identify steps that
government and/or industry might take to mitigate, reduce, or eliminate
any adverse effects on the telecommunications industry's ability to
mobilize effectively, and to sustain a long-Term mobilization effort
(beyond six months). Some of the responses are summarized below:
o
Maintain a database of equipment, materials, and components,
showing manufacturers and alternate sources.
Promote construction/operation of foreign-owned plants in the
U.S. Encourage North American investment in manufacture of
critical items, possibly as joint ventures.
Monitor trends in the production, consumption, and importation of
critical items.
0
Encourage domestic manufacturing, research, and development by
removing manufacturing restrictions on certain U.S. companies.
Use non-foreign-source dependent facilities for NSEP services.
Incorporate "Buy American" clauses in industry/Government
contracts.
Develop and maintain mobilization contingency plans.
0
Stockpile critical items not obtainable from U.S. or Canadian
sources.
Develop multiple sourcing agreements.
o
Prohibit or control dumping of critical telecommunications
components.
0
Increase dialogue among Government, industry, labor, academia,
and other interested parties.
o
Improve national ability to redeploy labor affected by changing
markets and technologies.
o
Make trade a national priority and give greater emphasis to trade
policy and policy-making. Create a Department of Trade.
6-38
TABLE 6-4
OTHER POTENTIAL FOREIGN SOURCE DEPENDENCE ITEMS
NSTAC SURVEY RESPONSES
Analog Switching and Carrier Systems
Cellular Radio/Telephone
Computers and Peripherals
Gallium Arsenide Field Effect Transistors (GaAs FETs)
HF Radio Equipment
High Speed Modems
Large Satellite Communications Antennas
Matrix Switching Equipment
Microwave Radio
Multiplexing Equipment
Non-Electronic Equipment Needed To Support Telecommunications Equipment,
Such As Power Generators and Switch Gear; Steel Towers; Heating,
Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Equipment; and Fire Suppression Systems
Private Radio Carrier Systems (Such As Used By Pipelines and Power Companies)
Terrestrial Microwave Equipment
Test Equipment
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SUGGESTIONS
Crossfield Amplifiers
Gallium Arsenide Field Effect Transistors (GaAs FETs)
Microwave/Millimeterwave Monolithic Integrated Circuits
Solid State Power Amplifiers (SSPAs)
6-39
While the survey instructions clearly stated that the Joint TIM Group's
primary interest was mobilization rather than the trade or economic
implications of foreign dependency, several of the responses have served
to emphasize the strong and complex interrelationships between
telecommunications industry economics and foreign sourcing. For example,
some respondents noted that one reason U.S. companies buy from foreign
sources is price advantage, and that the competition among several foreign
and domestic sources for the same market tends to minimize the cost of
fielding new facilities and capabilities. The stimulation of
technological development provided by this diverse competition was also
mentioned. These points are consistent with the views expressed in the
briefing to the Group by an official of the American Electronics
Association (AEA) concerning the need to bring U.S. economic, trade, and
foreign policy into closer alignment, toward the goal of restoring U.S.
industry to a position of global leadership, thereby 23 increasing the
Nation's economic strength and national security.
6.4 Conclusions
In drawing conclusions from the information it had assembled, the
Joint TIM Group recognized that technological advances, trends toward
increasing consumption, and the changing patterns of domestic production
versus imports all suggest that there is no one set of critical
foreign-sourced items that can be stockpiled or domestically-produced to
protect against shortages during mobilization. Today's critical item may
be obsolete in a few months, while important segments of today's domestic
production capabilities may be shifted offshore next year. A process or
mechanism is thus needed for monitoring technological developments, as
well as production/consumption/importation trends, and for interpreting
these trends toward the goal of ensuring that NSEP needs can be met in the
event that foreign supplies are cut off.
In identifying dependence on foreign sources as a subject warranting
further study, the original NSTAC TIM Task Force stated:
The increasing dependence of the telecommunications industry on
foreign sources raises significant questions about the industry's 24
ability to respond to and sustain mobilization requirements.
In addressing this concern, the Joint TIM Group has reached the following
conclusions on the basis of briefings received, reports reviewed, and
23 A briefing on international competitiveness was presented to the Joint
TIM Group by Stephen R. Levy, President, American Electronics
Association, on November 19, 1986.
24 Final Report of the TIM Task Force, Volume I, page 10.
6-40
responses to the NSTAC Dependence on Foreign Source Survey.
(1) Semiconductors
(a) At this time, if foreign-sourced semiconductors became
unavailable, it would not have significant impact upon the provision of
telecommunications service during Short-Term (0 to 90 days) and Mid-Term
(0 to 90 days) mobilization. While production of telecommunications
equipment would be adversely affected in the Short- and Mid-Term,
available equipment could be allocated to meet mobilization-related
national security emergency preparedness (NSEP) needs.
(b) At this time, to the extent that foreign-sourced semiconductors
became unavailable, expansion of telecommunications service capacity would
be constrained during Short- and Mid-Term mobilization, and overall
capacity would be reduced in the Long-Term because the telecommunications
industry would be competing with other entities (e.g., the Department of
Defense) for the allocation of available supplies.
(2) Equipment, Materials, and Components Other Than Semiconductors
(a) In the Short-Term and Mid-Term, the service sector of the U.S.
telecommunications industry would not be immediately or severely affected
by disruption of the supply of foreign items. Adverse effects would be
felt as foreign equipment fails or requires repair parts.
(b) The manufacturing sector of the U.S. telecommunications industry
could be immediately affected by a cut-off of critical foreign-sourced
supplies, equipment, or materials. The timing of effects on production
would depend, in part, on the quantities of foreign-sourced items in
domestic inventories and in the supply pipeline.
(c) The U.S. industry's foreign dependence presents a changing
picture in terms of the specific equipment, components, and materials for
which dependency exists as well as the degree of dependence for each.
Today's list is different from last year's, and next year's will differ
from today's. The following conclusions and observations reflect the
current picture as drawn by the NSTAC Foreign Dependence Survey and
related studies:
0 In view of the large number of foreign-made fiber optic·terminals
embedded in U.S. telecommunications systems (about 35 percent
foreign according to some estimates) and the inherent
incompatibility between terminals made by different
manufacturers, foreign-made terminals and their interfacing
connectors could become a problem if maintenance or expanded
capacity is required.
6-41
0
The U.S. currently imports over 60 percent of the telephone sets
it uses. Although the demand for telephone sets during
mobilization is not known, the fact that imports have risen to
this level suggests that telephone sets could be a problem during
mobilization. Therefore, the Joint TIM Group concluded that
domestic production and import status of this item should be
periodically monitored.
The foreign dependence status of the ceramic resonators should be
studied in depth, with a view toward identifying possible steps
to reduce the degree of foreign dependence. The availability
status of four other critical items fiber optic terminals,
fiber optic connectors, telephone sets, and ferrite cores--should
be periodically monitored for the same purpose.
6.5 Recommendations
On the basis of its conclusions regarding the impact of semiconductor
foreign dependency on the telecommunications industry, the Joint TIM Group
offered the following recommendation:
0
Semiconductors are major components of the equipment used by the
telecommunications industry, and the industry is almost totally
dependent on foreign-sourced semiconductors. Accordingly, the
ongoing National Security Council and Defense Science Board
efforts in this area are strongly supported. The President
should direct action to identify steps to mitigate the impact of
the loss of foreign-sourced semiconductors on the
telecommunications industry.
Further, on the basis of its collective assessment of the responses
to the NSTAC-wide Telecommunications: Industry Dependence on Foreign
Sources Survey, the Joint Group has identified other dependencies of
concern from a mobilization perspective. While these dependencies may not
have the same wide-ranging significance to the telecommunications industry
as semiconductors, they are important. Accordingly, the Joint TIM Group
offers the following recommendations:
0
The Government, in conjunction with the NSTAC, should establish a
mechanism to periodically assess industry dependence on foreign
sources in light of identified Government mobilization needs.
The NCS and NSTAC should jointly keep the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) apprised of any specific foreign dependency
issues relating to telecommunications, and identify, if
necessary, possible measures for reducing or mitigating these
foreign dependencies.
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0
In conjunction with the above Government action, the NSTAC member
firms should ensure that their appropriate internal organizations
are made aware of the findings of the joint TIM Group. Further,
these internal organizations should be apprised of the need to
plan for contingencies such as a cut-off of non-North American
supplied material during a mobilization.
6-43
APPENDIX 6-A
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
6-45
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, Arthur J. and Hong W. Tan (September 1984), Barriers to
U.S. Service Trade in Japan, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
This study identifies and describes barriers to trade in Japan
that are believed to exist in six service areas. Case studies are
provided for the six areas: banking and securities; insurance;
law; accounting; data communications; and advertising. Within
these case studies, several possible hypotheses are developed about
the sources of impediments in Japan to U.S. service trade, with the
emphasis on "non-market" impediments to trade--especially those
barriers derived from government policies. Information for the
case studies was derived primarily from interviews with
representatives of American and Japanese firms and from interviews
with Japanese government officials with regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities.
Auerbach, Stuart (March 1986), "Japan Found Dumping Chips",
Washington Post.
This brief article reports on the Department of Commerce
accusing Japan of unfair trading practices. The Japanese were
blamed for dumping chips in the U.S. at prices below production
costs and of blocking the access to their domestic market. These
events point to the intense competition between these countries'
semiconductor industries. The article cites semiconductors as a
"key element of computers and telecommunications systems."
Auerbach, Stuart (January 4, 1987), "Chip Makers Seek Funds for
Proving Ground", Washington Post.
U.S. semiconductor manufacturers are formulating a project
called "Sematech" in an effort designed to regain world leadership
in the advanced computer chip market. The project, to be financed
equally by the Pentagon and industry, would set up a model
production facility for fabricating chips with higher reliability
and lower cost and would improve competitiveness in the world
market.
6-47
Bement, Arden L., Jr. (1985), "Materials Sector Profile",
Technological Frontiers and Foreign Relations, Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, pp. 110-164.
The 54-page article surveys advances in materials technology
(e.g., synthetic polymers, rubbers, plastics, modified bioorganic
substances), forecasts their future applications, and assesses the
impact of these developments on U.S. foreign relations and on the
Federal Government's management of the strategic materials
stockpile. Technological expertise for producing these materials
resides in the West (i.e., U.S., Great Britain, France, and West
Germany) and Japan, and nations are investing heavily in their
high-technology materials development programs. This will lead to
greater interdependence and fiercer competition in the
marketplace. The author, Vice President for Technical Resources at
TRW, says that for the U.S. to be a viable competitor in the
materials marketplace and to avoid being overly dependent on
offshore sources of these materials, the nation's foreign and
domestic economic policy must be adjusted. Moreover, if the
nation's stockpile is to be maintained without obsolete strategic
materials, stockpile management must be more effective. The author
provides numerous conclusions, e.g., because "industry is the major
ultimate supplier and user of strategic materials and will control
the rate of introduction of substitutes for strategic materials,"
it should have "sustained
policy advisory and review roles"
in the critical materials sector.
Borky, John M. et al. (March 1985), Surge Capability of the Defense
Electronics Industry, Washington, DC: Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, National Defense University.
Prepared by students at the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces (ICAF), this research report addresses the ability of the
defense electronics industry to support increased production of
tactical weapons in a "non-war" economy. Three weapons
systems--the APG-66 radar, the AN/UYS Signal processor, and night
vision goggles--were studied to identify surge limiters and to
assess the overall health and surge capability of the industry.
Based on these case studies, the researchers concluded that the
industry can support only a limited surge program due to capacity
saturation at the subcontractor/supplier level, the concentration
of defense programs, existing administrative and business
practices, and the lack of necessary plans and priorities.
Recommendations for the improvement of surge capabilities are
offered in the report, including the provision of adequate funding,
the correction of poor business practices, the development of surge
plans and priority lists, the integration of surge preparation and
program management, and the improvement of productivity and
stockpile/inventory levels.
6-48
Botwin, Brad and John Tucker (August 1986), Industrial Capabilities
Program, a briefing prepared by the Office of Industrial Response
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
This briefing describes the mission, organization, and
programs of the Office of Industrial Resource Administration.
Special emphasis is placed on the industrial capabilities program
in which economic factors are examined for select industries for
the periods of peacetime, surge, and mobilization. Information
sources used in the industrial capabilities program are identified,
and a list is provided on the types of economic data provided in
the program. Completed studies under the program which would be of
special interest to the Joint TIM Group include those concerning
klystrons and travelling wave tubes. A study of the ceramic
capacitor industry is also of interest to the Joint TIM Group but
was not completed as of August 1986.
Bradford, Hazel and Evert Clark (October 27, 1986), "When the
Pentagon Wants Something America Doesn't Have", Business Week,
p. 46.
This article discusses the U.S.'s total dependency on foreign
sources for the super-pure silicon necessary for manufacturing
high-reliability semiconductors used in both defense and
non-military applications. To assure a domestic supply, the DOD
plans to reactivate the 1950 Defense Production Act and offer U.S.
companies guarantees to purchase $8 million worth of super-pure
silicon. However, reaction from manufacturers has been cool, due
to the high cost of doing military work that may have limited
market prospects. The Pentagon argues that such purchase
guarantees will open up new markets.
Caccamise, Richard J. and John S. Fitzgerald (March 1983), U.S.
Dependency on Foreign Sources for Components: The Case of
Semiconductors, Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, National Defense University.
This study assesses the foreign dependency of the military
resulting from the use of semiconductors that are manufactured
totally or in part off-shore. The impact of the foreign dependency
on military mobilization is also examined. Information gathered in
the study confirmed that most semiconductors used by the military
have a high potential for being manufactured off-shore; however,
the absence of a DOD information system precludes determining the
extent of the dependency with certainty. Specific recommendations
are provided for DOD future action.
6-49
"Ceramics as Engineering Materials", (February 18, 1985), Design
News, pp. 70-78.
In the future, ceramics will be used more often for commercial
applications in electronic and optical devices. The ceramics
industry in the U.S. is steadily growing. One forecast has U.S.
shipments of advanced ceramic parts reaching the $10 billion mark
by the year 2000.
Clark, Joel P. and Frank R. Field (August/September 1985), "How
Critical Are Critical Materials?", Technology Review, 88:6,
pp. 38-47.
The authors point out that U.S. dependency on foreign sources
for critical strategic materials is a manageable problem.
Substitute materials, such as ceramics and plastics, or lower grade
materials acquired from alternate foreign sources or domestic
sources, can offset shortfalls arising from a primary foreign
source cutoff. Moreover, the authors say that the historical
record of embargoes indicates that "a complete shutoff of critical
materials is slim."
Department of Commerce (October 22, 1984), News Release on the U.S.
Ceramics Industry, Washington, DC.
The DOC stated that advanced ceramics can reduce U.S.
dependence on foreign sources for critical strategic materials.
Multilayer capacitors and integrated optical devices were cited as
two of the five applications for these advanced ceramics.
Department of Commerce (January 1986), 1986 U.S. Industrial
Outlook, Washington, DC.
Recent performance and forecast statistical data is provided
in the publication for the following industries of interest to the
Joint TIM Group: (1) radio and television communication equipment,
(2) telephone and telegraph equipment, (3) telephone and telegraph
services, and (4) electric components. Additional references are
also provided in the publication for the subject industries.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (March 1985), 1982
Census of Manufacturers Industry Series: Communication Equipment
Including Radio and TV, Washington, DC.
This publication provides detailed statistics on the subject
industry, the products of the industry, and the materials consumed
by the industry for 1982 and earlier years.
6-50
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (August 1985),
Current Industrial Report in "Selected Electronic and Associated
Products, Including Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus", Washington,
DC.
This 33-page, largely tabular, report presents the results of
a 1984 survey of selected electronic and associated products,
including telephone and telegraph apparatus (product codes ranging
selectively from 36611 through 39447) revealed that the value of
telephone switching and switchboard equipment in 1984 was $5.5331
billion, an increase of 19 percent from 1983; other telephone and
telegraph equipment were valued at $8.1479 billion, an increase of
20 percent from 1983. These two categories of telephone- and
telegraph-related equipment are subdivided into 15 and 33 more
detailed categories of equipment described in terms of the number
of producer companies, quantities produced, and dollar value. One
interesting but only approximate result was that the percentage of
the dollar value of equipment consumed domestically deriving from
imports increased for both categories between 1983 and 1984 (from 7
to 11 percent and 14 to 15 percent, respectively). Lack of data in
the report for years prior to 1983 does not allow a determination
of whether this one year's increase is part of an upward trend in
important equipment for these two categories.
Department of Commerce, Industry and Trade Administration
(September 1979), A Report on the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
Washington, DC.
This 132-page report provides an overview of the U.S.
semiconductor industry at the end of the 1970s. It outlines
technological and economic developments, domestic and worldwide,
that have influenced the shape of the semiconductor industry and
the role of semiconductors in the overall electronics industry.
The report describes the cost structure of the industry, including
the prominent role of R&D and the labor-intensive nature of
assembly. Changing patterns of exports and imports are described;
implications of joint government-industry programs such as Japan's
Very-Large-Scale Integrated Circuit (VLSI) Program are discussed,
as well as other trends expected to affect the course of the
industry during the 1980s. The technology of semiconductor
manufacturing and product development is described in a 25-page
appendix.
6-51
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration
(February 1983), An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness in High
Technology Industries, Washington, DC.
This broad assessment of U.S. competitiveness in high
technology industries describes two sectors of importance to the
telecommunications industry: semiconductors and fiber optics. The
major technological challenge to the United States in both sectors
is from Japan. In semiconductor technology, Japan is taking the
lead in both metal oxide semiconductors (MOS) and in complementary
metal-oxide semiconductor (CM-OS). Japan's emerging semiconductor
production equipment technology will soon rival U.S. capabilities.
In the fiber optics area, Japan has been credited with a clear lead
in one of the three components necessary for a fiber optic system
(the light source technology) and is competitive to the U.S. in the
other two components (transmission medium and detectors).
Furthermore, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
has targeted opto-electronics for rapid development. While not
explicit in the report, one possible implication of these findings
is that the healthy U.S. industries in these sectors could be
adversely affected by tough competition from Japan, perhaps forcing
telecommunications equipment manufacturers to become even more
dependent on Japan for supplies of semiconductor and fiber optic
components.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (April
1983), High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks--The
Telecommunications Industry, Washington, DC.
This overview-type document presents an industry profile
designed to assess the telecommunications industry's international
competitive position, identifies competitive issues, and presents
options to address these issues. It gives annual value of products
of leading equipment-producing nations (for 1981), and indicates
regional shares of the world telecommunications market in 1977,
1982, and 1987 (projected). It presents product line share of
world sales in 1982 for switching (3 categories comprising 34
percent of total), transmission (4 categories comprising 33
percent), terminals (4 categories comprising 13 percent), mobile
radios (8 percent), private systems (8 percent), and other types of
equipment (less than 5 percent). It tabulates the value of exports
and imports (SIC 3661) for ten principal producer nations for 1977
and 1981, and aggregate trends in U.S. telecommunications equipment
trade (exports and imports) for 1972 and 1977, and annually for
1979-1983.
6-52
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration
(September 1984), A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Fiber Optics
Industry, Washington, DC.
The competitiveness of the U.S. fiber optics industry is
assessed in terms of world and domestic market structures and
accessibility, R&D (which is a major cost component of the
industry) production and cost structure, and policy constraints.
In light of the scarcity of official statistics, yearly estimates
are presented for the dollar volume of the U.S. and world fiber
optics market for the years 1981 through 1989, during which time
both markets are expected to increase by an order of magnitude.
U.S. government budgets and R&D operational costs of fiber optics
are presented for major defense agencies and civil agencies for the
years 1983 through 1986. The U.S. demand for fiber optics
technology and its production capacity (by firm) are discussed.
The report states that telecommunications applications account for
80 percent of the present fiber optic market (worldwide), and
presents 1982 sales for the 16 leading telecommunications equipment
companies. Recommendations are made to the fiber optics industry
and to the U.S. industry.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (March
1985), A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Semiconductor
Manufacturing Equipment Industry, Washington, DC.
This 110-page report sketches the development of the
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment (SME) industry, and assesses
the competitive position of U.S. SME industry in the world market.
The report describes the relationship of the SME industry and the
semiconductor industry, and presents historical trends as well as
future projections (expressed in dollar value per year) for both
semiconductor production and SME demand. Data of this nature is
presented separately for major producing regions (U.S., Japan, and
Europe). The structure of the SME industry within each of these
regions is described, and examples given of the competitive
strengths and weakness of the industry within each region. The
report presents policy options for both government and industry
that might be used to improve the competitive position of the U.S.
SME industry in the world market.
6-53
Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (July 1985), Issues in Domestic Telecommunications:
Directions for National Policy, Washington, DC.
This 185-page report presents an in-depth description of major
regulatory, structural, and technological changes that have
profoundly affected the U.S. telecomunications industry since the
mid-1970s. Separate chapters address (1) technology, (2)
structural elements and other constraints in the telecommunications
industry, (3) long-term viability of interexchange competition,
(4) Federal/state jurisdiction, (5) depreciation and capital
recovery, (6) meeting telecommunications goals in rural America,
and (7) trade implications of domestic telecommunications policy.
Recommendations and solutions to problems in certain of these
subject areas are presented.
Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource
Administration (July 3, 1986), National Security Assessment of
Critical Gas Turbine Engine Subcontractors, Washington, DC.
This document is intended to survey the critical parts and
components suppliers of the gas turbine engine manufacturing
industry for information related to their defense production
capabilities. As such, the document is applicable to foreign
source dependency because of the form of its questions rather than
the content, which concerns parts and component suppliers for the
telecommunications industry. The document consists of a letter of
transmittal addressed generically to the "Gas Turbine Engine
Subcontractor Industry" dated July 3, 1986. The letter requests
responses from the industry by August 6, 1986 on the enclosed
survey form. The survey form, entitled "National Security
Assessment of Critical Gas Turbine Engine Subcontractor, (form
ITA-9054) is divided into four parts: Part I, Firm Identification;
Part II, Peacetime, Surge Production, and Mobilization Production
Capacity; Part III, Investment, R&D, Government Programs (etc.)
and Part IV, Foreign Relationships/Foreign Sources. Part IV of the
form could be used with little change to survey foreign source
dependency within the telecommunications supplier industry.
Department of Commerce, Office of Industry Assessment, Industry
Analysis Division (March 1984), A Competitive Assessment of the
U.S. Advanced Ceramics Industry, Washington, DC.
This assessment concerns new ceramic materials and products
that have been developed over the last 30 years. These advanced
ceramics have special hardness/strength, thermal, and electrical
properties, and are intended for use in high-performance engines,
6-54
machines/devices, and electronic components. The advanced ceramic
industry described in the assessment encompasses two principal
businesses--electronic components and engineering products. The
assessment concludes that there is no clear indication that either
Japan or the United States has a general technological lead over
the other in advanced engineering ceramics. However, the
assessment concludes that if things continue as they are now, the
United States will fall behind Japan in the field of advanced
engineering ceramics. National implications of the assessment and
Federal options to strengthen the competitive position of the U.S.
advanced ceramics industry are also discussed in the assessment.
Department of Commerce, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis
(November 1985), U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights: January-September
1985, Washington, DC.
This publication presents a third-quarter review report for
Calendar Year 1985 concerning U.S. merchandise trade with major
trading partners and regions. It consists predominantly of data
tables and graphs. Trade data is broken down by commodity category
for leading items and regions of the world. Telecommunications
equipment (Schedule E Number 764) is a leading trade item for many
regions of the world. The telecommunications trade data presented
in this quarterly report permits a number of interesting
statistical results to be derived. All the following results are
for the January-September 1984 and/or 1985 periods. The total
dollar value of U.S. telecommunications equipment imports
exceeded exports by 80 percent and 77 percent for 1984 and 1985,
respectively. For both of these years, nearly two-thirds of the
imports came from developed countries, including Japan. Indeed,
imports from Japan constituted approximately 49 percent in 1984 and
52 percent in 1985 of total U.S. world imports in the telecommuni-
cations equipment category. (The apparent increase between 1984
and 1985 may be due only to price inflation.) Finally, it is worth
noting that telecommunications equipment is not a leading item for
trade with the Centrally Planned Economy countries (e.g., USSR,
China, Eastern Europe). In conclusion, this publication provides
useful data (on a quarterly review basis) on telecommunications
equipment trade from which trends ultimately may be discovered.
1 Dollar values of U.S. exports are expressed in F.A.S. value, while
imports are valued on a Cicif basis. Trade balances are nevertheless
computed by taking the difference between imports and exports.
6-55
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(A&L) (1985), An Industrial Mobilization Handbook for Industry,
Washington, DC.
This handbook provides an introduction to the Federal
government's industrial preparedness program, describing existing
plans, systems, authorities, and procedures for planning and
implementing industrial surge and mobilization. The legal basis
for industrial surge or mobilization is outlined, and
organizational roles and responsibilities are defined. Separate
sections address "Contracting," "Facilities and Equipment," and
"Materials." Industrial surge or mobilization planning,
pre-implementation actions, and implementation of surge and
mobilization plans are also discussed.
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(A&L) (1985), Industrial Mobilization Handbook for Government,
Washington, DC.
See previous entry.
Drucker, Peter F. (Spring 1986), "The Changed World Economy",
Foreign Affairs, 64:4, pp. 768-791.
The author's theme is that "the world economy is in control,
rather than the macroeconomics of the nation-state on which most
economic theory still exclusively focuses." The world is more
economically interdependent today than ever before and adjustment
to that fact will improve a nation's competitive position in the
global marketplace. The author makes the point that the decreasing
demand for raw materials worldwide is due in part to the declining
need for them by high-technology industry. For example, raw
materials account for only one to three percent of the production
cost of a semiconductor microchip. Another interesting point the
author makes is that the emergence of automation is contributing to
the decline of the blue collar labor force in the industrial
nations. Related to this is the following insight: "Some American
semiconductor companies have lower labor costs because they do the
labor-intensive work offshore, e.g., in West Africa, but they are
still the high-cost producers and easily underbid by the heavily
automated Japanese."
6-56
"Executives Cite Erosion of Defense Industry Base" (November 24,
1986), Aviation Week and Space Technology, pp. 68-69.
The Defense Public Advisory Committee (DPACT), composed of
chief executives from major defense firms, concluded that the U.S.
industrial base has been eroded by economic trends and U.S.
Government policies and that U.S. military forces would be
inadequately supported in a major conflict. The article discusses
those policies and regulations which DPACT feels have contributed
to the weakening of the defense industrial base and outlines
suggested safeguards.
Finan, William F. and Chris B. Amundsen (May 30, 1985), An Analysis
of the Effects of Targeting on the Competitiveness of the U.S.
Semiconductor Industry, a study prepared for the Office of the U.S.
Special Trade Representative, Department of Commerce and Department
of Labor, Washington, DC.
This study quantifies the effects of industrial targeting
practices on the competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor
industry. An economic model was used to assess market performance
and to determine the incremental effects on market position
attributable to targeting practices.
Fitzgerald, Edmund B., Chairman, Northern Telecom, Inc. (September
12, 1985), Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
International Trade, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Mr. Fitzgerald expressed support of the objective of global
open market access, stating that Northern Telecom would benefit
from worldwide open market access as much as any company on earth.
He contended, however, that a fully open trading system cannot be
based on attempts to achieve balanced trade by product sector
only. He stated the need for a two-tiered national strategy. The
first tier would be a proactive U.S. business community dedicated
to opening global markets and willing to commit sufficient company
resources and marketing efforts to the global marketplace. The
second tier would be a proactive government committed to an
aggressive open market negotiating strategy and to domestic
policies that provide incentives to domestic producers willing to
aggressively sell their products in the international market.
6-57
Green, Anthony T. (1986), U.S.-Japan Technology Transfer:
Accommodating Different Interests, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Center for Information Policy Research.
This study addresses two major issues relating to the transfer
of computers and computer software technology between the U.S. and
Japan. The first of these issues concerns U.S. national interest.
When is technology transfer in the national interest, and when more
than one U.S. national interest is involved, how should the U.S.
prioritize or achieve the right balance among policies affecting
technology transfer? The second issue is this: Are the U.S.
Government and business communities adequately prepared to deal
with issues affecting or affected by the U.S.-Japan technology
transfer now and in the future? Options for U.S. policy are
discussed, as well as the implications for pursuing some of the
options.
Hayashi, Alden M. (February 15, 1986), "U.S. IC Start-Ups Turn to
Japan for Manufacturing", Electronic Business, p. 32.
A trend in the Integrated Circuit (IC) industry is the forming
of partnerships between U.S. and Japanese firms. The U.S.
possesses the technological expertise and Japan will risk start-up
investments. A long-term danger is that the Japanese will
eventually acquire the technologies. To avert a technology gap and
an eroding market share, some U.S. manufacturers are seeking out IC
start-ups.
"Japan Drops Some Barriers to Communications Trade" (August 20,
1986), Washington Post.
Negotiations over the sale of telecommunications equipment and
service by foreign companies have removed some of the
administration barriers to U.S. firms' access to the Japanese
market. The article reports that 174 types of foreign terminal
equipment had been approved for sale in Japan, of which 103 were
American. However, the approval for Japanese companies to buy
foreign telecommunications satellites has the largest potential
impact in monetary terms.
Morgan, Dr. John D. (May 22-23, 1986), The Defense Production Act,
Fifth Annual Mobilization Conference, Washington, DC: Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.
This paper describes the Defense Production Act, reviewing the
purpose, principal provisions, and application of the Act since its
original passage in 1950.
6-58
National Research Council, Board on Telecommunications-Computer
Applications, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
(February 1983), National Joint Planning for Reliable Emergency
Communications, Washington, DC.
This report to the National Communications System (NCS)
discusses the need for national industry and Government planning
for emergency communications and the issues associated with such
planning. The current commercial environment and its implications
for the NCS and national security emergency preparedness are
described, including the likely effects of judicial and regulatory
decisions. The nature and potential use of communications
satellite and cable television-based communications services for
national security and emergency preparedness purposes are also
examined.
"Protection of Critical Metals Supply Probed" (January 28, 1985),
Chemical and Engineering News, p. 29.
The article summarizes an Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) report on reducing U.S. dependence on foreign sources of
strategic materials. OTA cited alternate foreign sources,
recycling, and substitution as methods to reduce the need from
abroad. OTA recommended that the Government provide financial
assistance to encourage the development of domestic programs to
alleviate this dependence, e.g., new scrap metal recycling
technologies.
Robertson, Jack (June 9, 1986), "Marietta Head: All Industries
Affected by IC Retrenchment", Electronic News, p. 14.
This is a report on public comments about the state of the
U.S. semiconductor industry made by Mr. Norman Augustine, president
of Martin Marietta Corporation and chairman of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on U.S. Semiconductor Dependency. He said that
the high capital expenditure, the prevalent desire for quick
returns on investments, stringent antitrust laws, and a dearth of
quality engineers contribute to the stunted development of the
American semiconductor industry.
Robertson, Jack (December 8, 1986), "DOD Task Force Urges $1.7B for
Five-Year Semicon Thrust", Electronic News, p. 1.
This article discusses a "Defense Semiconductor Initiative"
proposed by a Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductors.
6-59
This initiative would support an industry consortium to produce
next-generation DRAMS, with an appropropriation of $1.7 billion
over a five-year period. The panel report stresses the importance
of restoring U.S. leadership in the semiconductor market.
Schrage, Michael (March 1986), "U.S. Dependence on Japan for Parts
Worries Pentagon", Washington Post.
Mr. Schrage cites DOD concerns that weapons systems rely
heavily on Japanese technology even to the extent that "in some
cases you either buy from Japan or you don't get it," as
stated by an official from the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). The House Armed Services subcommittee staff
estimated that 80 percent of DOD's silicon chips are manufactured
in Asia. The article pointed out that three high-level committees
were studying this issue: the Defense Science Board Task Force on
U.S. Semiconductor Dependency, a panel consisting of DOD's joint
logistics commanders, and a National Academy of Science Electronics
Components Committee.
Semiconductor Industry Association (1985), 1985-1986 Yearbook and
Directory, San Jose, CA.
This annual report of the Semiconductor Industry Association
provides information on the organization of the association,
programs sponsored by the association, relevant industry trade
statistics, and a directory of association members. Information is
also provided on other publications of this association.
Semiconductor Industry Association (Spring 1986), "SIA Circuit",
Semiconductor Industry Association Newsletter, 8:1.
This issue of the newsletter provides a summary of the U.S.
semiconductor industry's allegations of unfair or illegal trade
practices by Japan and its semiconductor manufacturers.
Socolovsky, Alberto (January 1, 1986), "Forecast for U.S. OEM
Electronic Component Purchases", Electronic Business, p. 96.
This brief article summarizes the trends in electronic
component purchases by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
Purchases rose steadily from 1984 through 1985, and they are
expected to continue rising in 1986. Moreover, there will be more
purchases of imported components (capacitors, connectors,
inductors, keyboards, resistors, and semiconductors).
6-60
Socolovsky, Alberto (April 15, 1986), "Communication Equipment
Acquires A Foreign Accent", Electronic Business, p. 17.
U.S. expenditures on non-defense communications equipment
(answering machines, data communications, facsimile, local area
networks, mobile radios, network functions, switching and
transmission equipment, and telephone sets) will increase from $21
billion in 1985 to $27.3 billion in 1987. Importation of this gear
will increase also, with Japan and Korea as the major sources.
SRI International (January 1982), The Emerging Impact of Foreign
Competition on National Security and Emergency Preparedness
Telecommunications--A B, Arlington, VA.
This study provides a pre-divestiture view of the impact of
foreign competition on telecommunications. It presents a great
deal of data relating GNP, patenting activity, production, and
investment. It also discusses trade barriers and the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations.
SRI International (July 1982), Optical Communications Systems: A
Case Study on Protection of the U.S. Mobilization Base, Arlington,
VA.
In 1980, the FCC ordered AT&T to use competitive bidding for a
leg of its new fiber optic cable being installed along the
Northeast Corridor. The low bidder was Fujitsu. This study
examines the resulting debate over the national security
implications of awarding such a contract to a foreign firm. It
includes a review of the technical characteristics of fiber, a
description of the tension between deregulation and national
security, and proposed policies for recognizing similar situations
at an earlier stage in the future.
Standard and Poor's Corporation (November 1, 1984), Industry
Surveys: Telecommunications, Current Analysis, 152:44, Sec. 1.
This publication provides a detailed overview assessment of
the telecommunications industry for 1984-the first year of
transition of the industry from a regulated utility to a
competitive business. Projections are provided for the industry,
as well as financial and market information for 1984. General
information articles are also provided in the publication
concerning the outlook for the industry, regulation and pricing,
telephone services, equipment, composite industry data, and
comparative company analysis.
6-61
"U.S. Market Report: Semiconductors" (January 6, 1986),
Electronics, pp. 53-55.
This 1986 market forecast for semiconductors provides an
interesting view of the semiconductor economy. For example,
semiconductor shortages in 1983 prompted the Integrated Circuit
(IC) industry to step up production and compelled equipment firms
to stock up. A depressed personal computer market in 1985
contributed to an emerging IC glut. Moreover, throughout 1985, the
U.S. and Japan waged a price-slashing campaign against each other.
Astute buyers waited for the bargain prices. Chips for
communications equipment, however, were an exception to the rule as
demand increased by 17 percent. One market projection has
communications ICs maintaining a 30 percent annual growth rate in
demand through the remainder of the 1980s.
Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand (April 5, 1985), The
Impact of Japanese Market Barriers in Microelectronics: An
Analysis Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee on Economic
Goals and Intergovernmental Policy, Semiconductor Industry
Association, San Jose, CA.
This study provides an assessment of market barriers that U.S.
semiconductor companies have encountered in Japan during the past
two decades. The barriers include both formal Government
protective measures and a market structure that is resistant to
foreign products. Estimates are provided on the cost to the U.S.
of Japanese market barriers. The importance of the U.S. market
position is also reviewed in terms of continuing expansion of
capacity in Japan and the possibility of future sales of
accumulated production through trade practices actionable under
U.S. law.
Wilson, John W. (March 11, 1985), "America's High-Tech Crisis",
Business Week, pp. 56-67.
This is an overview of the reasons why the U.S. electronics
industry has been overtaken by foreign competitors, especially by
the Japanese who "have made no secret of their goal to dominate the
world's computer and communications markets." Japan's capital
investment costs are lower than the U.S.'s and automation is
widespread in Japan's electronic industry. The author points out
that the divestiture of AT&T and the deregulation of the
telecommunications equipment business "provided foreign competitors
with the biggest unilateral trade concession of the decade." One
result was a 31 percent increase in imported communications gear in
1984.
6-62
Wolff, Alan W. et al. (1985), Government Procurement of
Semiconductors--Economic and Environmental Issues Affecting a Major
Strategic Resource, a Semiconductor Industry Association White
Paper, San Jose, California.
This paper asserts that the U.S. Government procurement and
specification system in current use for semiconductor procurement
was designed for the production technology in use in the 1960s when
Government purchases accounted for some 90 percent of the
semiconductor market. This system makes it "virtually impossible"
for manufacturers to achieve the production volume that would
enable them to fully utilize modern methods of quality control or
to minimize production costs. The result is higher per-unit cost
for semiconductors whose quality is, at best, no higher than
semiconductors produced commercially but not subject to Government
specifications and testing. The paper recommends that the
Government, U.S. semiconductor industry, and U.S. manufacturers of
Government-use equipment employing semiconductors should form a
board; this board would establish policies and objectives for
improving the Government's system for procurement and specification
of semiconductors, thereby allowing cost-effective volume
production of semiconductors for Government use.
Wolff, Alan W. et al. (June 14, 1985), Japanese Market Barriers in
Microelectronics: Memorandum in Support of a Petition Pursuant to
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as Amended, San Jose, CA:
Semiconductor Industry Association.
This study analyzes the origin and nature of Japanese market
barriers in microelectronics and assesses their effect on the U.S.
semiconductor industry. The results of the study are used to
provide the legal basis for a petition to seek relief for the U.S.
semiconductor industry under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
The requested relief is stated in terms of recommended changes in
U.S. policy objectives and recommended Presidential actions.
6-63
APPENDIX 6-B
FOREIGN SOURCES QUESTIONNAIRE
and
TRANSMITTAL LETTER
6-65
National Security
Telecommunications
Advisory Committee
NOV 14 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INDUSTRY EXECUTIVE SUBCOMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
Telecommunications Industry Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey
1. The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
(TIM) Group is currently studying the telecommunications industry's dependence
on foreign sources. The Group's objective is to assess the implications of any
foreign dependencies for U.S. telecommunications industry mobilization
capabilities. To provide a basis for this assessment, the Joint TIM Group is
seeking National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) member
responses to a Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey (enclosure 1).
2. The Survey consists of a small set of open-ended questions relating to four
common types of equipment, excluding semiconductor components. The Group is
seeking the personal involvement of Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES)
members in overseeing the completion of the survey within their respective
companies. However, it is anticipated that responses will be developed in
consultation with company procurement experts and, if necessary, vendors and
subcontractors.
3. It is recognized that company responses may contain "proprietary
information." The Joint TIM Group staff is prepared to take all steps
necessary to protect such information, including the execution of nondisclosure
agreements where necessary. Responses containing proprietary information will
NOT be made available outside the TIM Group staff absent execution of a
nondisclosure agreement or consent of the company submitting the response.
Survey data will be analyzed, aggregated, and summarized by the Joint TIM Group
staff. Aggregated survey results will be reported to the TIM Group, IES,
NSTAC, and the NCS Committee of Principals/Council of Representatives in a
non-proprietary manner.
4. To permit the Joint TIM Group to make a preliminary report to the NSTAC in
February 1987, completed survey responses should be returned by December 19,
1986 to the Joint TIM Group Chairman, CAPT Charles F. Noll, Assistant Manager,
NCS Joint Secretariat, National Communications System, Washington, DC
20305-2010. A draft letter from IES companies to the Joint Secretariat is
enclosed for your use (enclosure 2). If you desire to have Joint TIM Group
staff members execute nondisclosure agreements with your company prior to being
6-67
provided access to any proprietary information contained in your response,
please notify CAPT Noll as soon as possible. Questions regarding completion of
the survey may also be addressed to CAPT Noll, (202) 692-9274 or to John S.
Edwards, Northern Telecom, Inc., (703) 847-7480.
BEMANS
2 Enclosures a/s
B. E. MORRISS
Chairman, Industry Executive
Subcommittee
Distribution:
(See enclosed list)
6-68
DISTRIBUTION TO JES MEMBERSHIP
AT&T
Mr. Michael A. Brunner
BELLCORE
Mr. Marvin W. Konow
COMSAT
Mr. Gilbert D. Rye
CSC
Mr. Robert Steele
CONTEL
Mr. Larry E. Willner
CDC
Mr. Philip C. Onstad
Fairchild
Mr. Charles Stiles
Ford Aero
Mr. Gary Chesney
GE
Mr. William D. Russell
GTE
Mr. C. J. McLean
Harris
Mr. Frank J. Lewis
Hughes
Mr. Anthony Iorillo
IBM
Dr. George T. Weathers
ITT
Mr. Joseph J. Gancie
MCI
Mr. Arthur R. Roberts
MMC
Mr. Robert J. Polutchko
Motorola
Mr. James R. Lincicome
NTI
Dr. John S. Edwards
PTI
Mr. James C. Warwick
Rockwell
Mr. Keith R. Rathjen
TRT
Mr. John Dunlop
TRW
Mr. John P. Stenbit
UTC
Mr. Frank McAbee
UTI
Mr. Thomas A. Norman
USTA
Mr. John N. Rose
WU
Mr. David E. Trexler
6-69
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES SURVEY
November 18, 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization
(TIM) Group established by the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) and the National Communications System (NCS) is studying the
telecommunications industry's dependence on foreign sources. The Group's
principal objective is to assess the implications of any foreign dependencies
for U.S. telecommunications industry mobilization capabilities. To provide a
basis for this assessment, the Joint TIM Group is seeking the views of the
NSTAC member companies.
The survey consists of a small set of open-ended questions. They relate
to the impact of any interruption or loss of foreign source availability on the
production, operation, maintenance, or integration of equipment currently used
in providing telecommunication services or equipment for lease or sale in the
U.S. To provide a sharper focus for the survey, the industry members of the
Joint TIM Group have identified four common types of equipment, excluding
semiconductor components, for consideration:
- Digital Central Office Switching Equipment
- Fiber Optics Electronic Terminal Equipment
(including repeaters)
- Telephone Sets
- Satellite Ground Stations (including uplinks,
downlinks, TT&C, and antennas).
The industry members of the Joint TIM Group have concluded that foreign
dependency in the semiconductor area is widely acknowledged and
well-documented. Therefore, the Group is excluding semiconductors from this
survey, seeking to identify any other items or components that might present
foreign availability problems under mobilization conditions.
The Joint TIM Group is addressing mobilization issues only and not the
trade and economic implications of foreign dependency. The information
gathered by means of this survey will be used for mobilization assessment
purposes only. More specifically, it will be used by the Joint Tim Group as a
basis for:
-
assessing the overall dependency of the U.S. telecommunications
industry on foreign sources and potential impacts on mobilization
capabilities
-
identifying specific items or areas that should be studied in
more detail
-
formulating recommendations for any actions needed to enhance
industry mobilization capabilities.
Enclosure 1
6-70
The data obtained from company responses to the survey will be collected,
analyzed, aggregated, and summarized by the Joint TIM Group staff. It is
recognized that company responses may contain "proprietary information."
Completed responses from participating companies containing proprietary
information will not be made available outside the staff without the express
permission of those companies. The Joint TIM Group staff is prepared to take
all steps necessary to protect such information, including the execution of
nondisclosure agreements where necessary. A report on the survey results will
be made available to the NSTAC.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Mobilization
The Joint TIM Group has adopted the following definition of
mobilization:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications resources
needed to make the transition from a normal state to a state of
readiness for war or other national emergency.
The Group has further agreed that mobilization encompasses the
transition period from peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent military
actions external to the continental United States.
Under mobilization conditions, there might be an interruption or loss
of foreign source availability as a result of crisis or external military
action. This could, in turn, affect the telecommunications industry's capacity
to sustain its production of telecommunications equipment and its ability to
provide telecommunications services.
The following set of four mobilization time periods is being used by
the Joint TIM Group:
(1) Pre-mobilization: Planning and Pre-positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 days (Reallocation and
reprioritization of existing capability and service)
(3) Mid-term: 90 to 180 days (Reallocation and
reprioritization of products and services in
in the pipeline)
(4) Long-term: over 180 days (Expand production of
capacity and services.)
B. Foreign Sources
For the purposes of this survey, foreign sources are sources outside
the United States and Canada*, whether U.S. or foreign owned. The Joint TIM
Group recognizes that the origin of many common components may not be readily
*"Foreign sources" definition based on definition of "Industrial Base" (Dod
Directive 4005.1, Enclosure 2, SUBJECT: Industrial Preparedness Program,
November 26, 1985)
6-71
determined. For this reason, specific information on particular parts or
components is not sought at this time. Rather, the Joint TIM Group is
requesting your best judgment on the effect foreign source unavailability might
have on your company's and the industry's ability to produce or obtain the
equipments identified.
III. INSTRUCTIONS
The foreign dependence survey consists of five questions. Because of the
open-ended nature of the questions, companies are free to provide the level of
detail that they judge to be appropriate. Although members of the Industry
Executive Subcommittee (IES) may personally oversee the completion of the
survey within their respective companies, it is anticipated that responses will
be developed in consultation with company procurement experts and, if
necessary, with vendors and subcontractors. The Joint TIM Group would
appreciate specific examples or definitive data whenever possible.
Please address the five questions in terms of the following types of
equipment currently produced, operated, maintained, or integrated by your
company:
- Digital Central Office Switching Equipment
- Fiber Optics Electronic Terminal Equipment (including
repeaters)
- Telephone Sets
- Satellite Ground Stations (including uplinks, downlinks,
TT&C, and antennas).
The Joint TIM Group is seeking general information regarding the impact of
foreign source unavailability on existing capabilities and services over the
time periods defined in Section II. The Joint TIM Group is not expecting
information regarding companies' abilities to surge to a specific level of
production (e.g., double or quadruple existing capacity).
Please provide specific examples and/or quantitative data if available. If
your company does not produce, operate, maintain, or integrate one or more of
the four types of equipment, you should simply skip discussion of that
equipment in Question 1.
Completed survey responses should be returned by December 19, 1986 with the
attached form (page 5). Any information which your company believes to be
proprietary should be identified/marked with one of the following, or a similar
notice:
- MCI Proprietary
- AT&T Proprietary
- Notice: Not for use or disclosure outside C&P Telephone except under
written agreement
6-72
IV. QUESTIONS
1.
What, if any, particular items, materials, or components (excluding
semiconductors) associated with the four types of equipment identified in
Section III warrant detailed study by the Joint TIM Group from a foreign
dependency/mobilization perspective?
2.
In your estimation, how would the unavailability of foreign sourced
materials and components (excluding semiconductors) affect your company's
ability to continue to produce, operate, maintain, or integrate the four
types of equipment identified in Section III? In addition, please
specifically identify, if possible, those companies which would
constitute primary alternative domestic sources.
3.
In your estimation, how would the unavailability of foreign sourced
materials and components (excluding semiconductors) for these types of
equipment constrain or impair the telecommunications industry's ability
to mobilize and/or sustain a long term (beyond six months) mobilization
effort?
4.
What steps might industry and/or the Federal government take to mitigate,
reduce, or eliminate any adverse effects of foreign dependencies on the
telecommunications industry's ability to mobilize effectively and to
sustain a long term mobilization effort?
5.
Other comments or suggestions (e.g., What other important aspects or
dimensions of the dependence on foreign sources issue should be addressed
by the Joint TIM Group? Are there other types of equipment that should be
studied? Are there identifiable trends toward greater or lesser reliance
on foreign sources?)
6-73
DRAFT
CAPT CHARLES F. NOLL, USN
Assistant Manager, NCS Joint Secretariat
National Communications System
Washington, D.C. 20305-2010
Dear Captain Noll:
Enclosed is (name of company) response to the Joint TIM Group
Telecommunications Industry Dependence on Foreign Sources Survey.
You (have/do not have) our permission to circulate or disclose our completed
survey response to anyone outside the Joint TIM Group staff. (Name of
company) proprietary information has been provided and so marked as specified
in the instructions. We (do/do not) desire to have all individuals execute
nondisclosure agreements prior to being provided access to such proprietary
information. For further information, please contact (names and phone
numbers)
(signature of IES member)
Enclosure 2
6-74
APPENDIX 6-C
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES
6-75
04/24/87
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #1
ITEMS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY
Adhesives
Ceramics
Ceramics Reasonators
Epoxies
Ferrite Cores for Transformers and Inductors
Fiber Optic Connectors (between the Terminal and the Fiber Cable)
Fiber Optic Terminals
Frequency Converters Associated with Low Noise Amplifiers
Hybrid Circuits Used in Fiber Optic Transmission Equipment
Klystrons
Low-Noise Amplifiers
Photodefinable Polymers
Plastic Sealed Relays
Quartz Tubes for Lightwaves
SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Filters
Silicones
Solder Paste
Spare Parts for Foreign-Made Assembly Equipment for Printed Circuit Boards
Specific-Channel Set-Top - Receivers
Telephone Sets (including Special Sets Designed for Use with Foreign-Made
Switches
Traveling Wave Tubes
6-77
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #2
IMPACT OF CUT-OFF ON COMPANY OPERATIONS?
O
SERVICE PROVIDERS
No Response (1)
Little or No Effect
- Operations normal up to 180 days, but dependent on U.S. and Canadian
sources for replacement parts and new equipment.
- No serious effects on central office switching equipment.
- Very little impact overall; main impact on cost and schedule.
Some Effect
- Difficulty in incorporating/integrating domestic fiber optic terminal
equipment with existing fiber optic systems. Would probably buy new
domestic systems.
- Beyond a year, low noise converters and set-top receivers might become a
problem.
- Cut-off of foreign-sourced telephone sets would probably not
significantly affect operations; cost of sets would be affected.
- Beyond 180 days, normal operations dependent on availability of new
equipment, especially transmission equipment.
Significant Effect
- Serious impacts on telephone sets; alternative domestic plans could be
reactivated.
- As stocks of equipment, components, and supplies are depleted, ability of
company to restore, operate, and maintain services would be dramatically
impacted in the absence of mobilization contingency plans.
- Continued maintenance and expansion of fiber optic transmission systems
would be severely impacted, due to compatibility problems between foreign
and domestic terminals and repeaters.
6-78
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #2 (Concluded)
O
MANUFACTURERS
No Impacts Identified (1)
Little or No Effect
- No impact on equipment needed to build, operate, and maintain
satellite ground stations. Domestic sources adequate.
- No deleterious effect for equipment categories specified.
Some Effect (0)
Significant Effect
- Unavailability of foreign-made materials/components identified in
Question #1 would significantly impair firm's ability to manufacture
two or possibly three of the survey equipment categories. Some
substitution is possible in the mid-term, but the combined capacity
of alternate sources may not be adequate.
O
INTEGRATORS
No Impacts Identified (1)
Little or No Effect (0)
Some Effect (0)
Significant Effect
- Offshore procurement escalating to a serious problem of national
concern.
6-79
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #3
IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY?
- Telecommunications services
-- No impact on satellite service
-- Shortages in all four equipment categories in the short term.
Government and industry priorities would be needed.
-- In long term, effects would be chiefly economic. Higher costs
and lower rate of deployment due to financial constraints.
-- No impact on international service carriers since they are usually
equipped to operate over long periods of time without replacement
of operating equipment.
-- No significant impairment except possibly in fiber optic systems.
-- Little or no disruption in peacetime or pre-hostility mobilization
following hostilities. Essential services could probably be main-
tained by cannibilization until manufacturing surge capability is
brought on-line.
-- The industry is now in a position to sustain a 3-6 month mobiliza-
tion. That period will be significantly reduced over the next few
years. The pipeline "float" provides less and less of a strategic
reserve because of economic factors.
- Telecommunications manufacturing
-- Unavailability of foreign items would impair industry's ability
to mobilize.
-- In short- or mid-term, industry's ability to manufacture central
office, PBX, and possibly other equipment could be adversely
affected by unavailability of foreign-made items.
:- No impact on ability to provide/maintain satellite ground stations
(if semiconductors are not considered).
- Telecommunications Integration
-- Offshore procurement escalating to a serious problem of national
concern.
North American industries could obtain all but most exotic raw
material and manufacture most components. Products with long
lead times could create severe obstacles.
6-80
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #4
MITIGATION STEPS BY GOVERNMENT OR INDUSTRY?
- Maintain list/database of key equipment, materials, and components,
showing manufacturers and alternate sources.
- Promote foreign-owned plants in U.S. Encourage North American
investment in manufacture of critical items, possibly as joint
ventures.
- Gather more data/monitor trends.
- Encourage domestic manufacturing/research and development.
:- Remove manufacturing restrictions on certain U.S. companies.
:- Promote competition.
:- Develop non-foreign sources.
:- Create Department of Science and Technology to formulate national
policy.
:- Enhance incentives for private sector R&D, e.g., tax credits.
:- Support basic research and training for scientists/engineers.
-- Increase support for university and joint private sector
manufacturing technology research efforts.
:- Strengthen protection of intellectual property rights/confidentiality
of scientific information.
:- Balance the legitimate goals of regulation with the need to bring the
results of innovation to the marketplace.
:- Pursue stable monetary policy and let free market determine where
capital will flow.
:- Change U.S. antitrust law to reflect new global markets.
:- Balance the need for competitiveness in world markets with national
security and foreign policy considerations when controlling U.S. exports.
- Use non foreign-source dependent facilities for NSEP services. Incor-
porate Buy American clauses in industry/Government contracts.
- Develop and maintain mobilization contingency plans.
-
Stockpile critical items not obtainable from U.S. or Canadian sources.
6-81
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #4 (concluded)
- Develop multiple sourcing agreements.
- Prohibit or control dumping of critical telecommunications components.
- Increase dialogue among Government, industry, labor, academia, and other
interested parties.
- Improve national ability to redeploy labor affected by changing markets
and technologies.
- Make trade a national priority and give greater emphasis to trade policy
and policy-making. Create a Department of Trade.
6-82
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #5
COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS?
-
Expand the survey to include the following items (List is derived from
five survey responses.)
-- Analog switching and carrier systems
-- High speed modems
-- Terrestrial microwave equipment
-- HF radio equipment
-- Microwave radio
-- Cellular radio/telephone
-- Computers and peripherals
:- Test equipment
-- Private radio/carrier systems (such as used by pipelines and
power companies)
-- Non-electronic equipment needed to support telecommunications
equipment, such as power generators and switch gear; steel towers;
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning equipment; and
fire suppression systems.
-- Matrix switching equipment
:- Multiplexing equipment
-- Large satellite communications antennas
- Trends toward greater reliance on foreign sources need not portend
severe problems if critical areas are recognized and addressed.
:- Note: Respondent does not indicate how these problems should be
approached.
- Consider the creation of hardware stockpiles in strategic locations.
6-83
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION #5 (concluded)
- Identify equipment available from DOD and other Government sources
(as indicated in contingency plans) with distribution/allocation to
be managed by the NTMS and NCC.
- Query all manufacturers of NSEP-related digital central office
switching equipment to complete the identification of
.
foreign-sourced critical items.
- Examine U.S. trade and export policies (including national security
controls) and licensing procedures, with a view to improving our
competitive position and strengthening national security.
6-84
NCS 1064/2
8.0 MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
(FINAL REPORT)
June 1988
8-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES
8-4
LIST OF TABLES
8-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
8-5
8.1 Introduction
8-9
8.2 Background/Approach
8-9
8.2.1 Definitions
8-13
8.2.2 Sources of Information
8-13
8.2.3 Issues
8- 15
8.3 Findings
8-15
8.3.1 Inventory Polices and Practices in Government
8-16
8.3.1.1 Authorities and Responsibilities
8-16
8.3.1.2 National Defense Stockpile
8-17
8.3.1.3 Department of Defense Supply System
8-17
8.3.2 Inventory Practices in Industry
8-20
8.3.3 Inventories Resulting from Contracts or
Special Procurements
8-21
8.3.4 Mobilization Implications of Minimum-Inventory
Techniques in Industry
8-22
8.3.5 Analytical Framework for Developing Conclusions
8-22
8.4 Conclusions
8-23
8.5 Recommendations
8-24
APPENDIX
8-A BIBLIOGRAPHY
8-25
8-3
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Number
Page
8-1 MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
8-11
LIST OF TABLES
Table Number
Page
8-1 BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
8-14
8-2 LIST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE MATERIALS
8-18
8-3 CANDIDATE NEW MATERIALS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
STOCKPILE
8-19
8-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The stockpiling of certain critical items has been proposed as one
solution to supply problems that might arise during mobilization, e.g., as
a result of a cutoff of foreign supplies of telecommunications equipment,
materials, or components. Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories is
thus one of seven subjects to be addressed by the Joint
Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry Mobilization (TIM) Group,
which is charged to (1) identify possible impediments to effective
Telecommunications Industry mobilization and mobilization planning, and
(2) assist in the development of corrective actions to overcome any
identified impediments.
The Group received information briefings on stockpile and inventory
policies and practices from representatives of both the Government and the
Telecommunications Industry and obtained additional information from
Government documents and other sources. The Group found that large
inventories of materials, equipment, and supplies are maintained by
certain organizations within the Federal Government. For example, the
National Defense Stockpile includes 62 types of materials (primarily
metals and minerals) valued at about $9 billion, which are reserved for
use in defined contingencies. In addition, the Department of Defense
maintains an inventory of "secondary items" (replacement parts, spares,
clothing, medicine, and other supplies -- not major weapons systems or
vehicles) that contains 4.7 million line items valued at over $90
billion. In both of these cases, the time required to add new items to
the inventories, while varying considerably by circumstance, is typically
several months to more than a year.
In the Telecommunications Industry, there is a conscious effort to
minimize inventories. The general trend is to keep on hand only the
minimum quantities needed to meet existing or near-future demands. Rapid
acquisition of supplies with delivery on a just-in-time basis has become a
standard operating procedure, largely to reduce costs and to avoid the
accumulation of obsolescent materials.
Modern telecommunications manufacturing systems that employ inventory
minimization techniques have greatly increased the efficiency and maximum
output capacity of domestic manufacturers. Thus, on balance, these
approaches have increased the ability to meet surge requirements during
mobilization and are essential to maintaining the competitiveness of the
Nation's industrial base. However, such fine-tuned production systems may
be more vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of components than would
have been the case in previous national emergencies. In view of the
findings in the Group's earlier report on Dependence on Foreign Sources,
this situation causes concern.
8-5
The Group also found that existing contract mechanisms can be used,
by both Government and Industry, to require telecommunications service and
equipment vendors and component suppliers to maintain inventories of
specified items that might be needed to support the provisioning of
service or production of equipment. These findings have led the Group to
observe that its concern about supply vulnerabilities can perhaps best be
addressed through contractual mechanisms that ensure the availability of
critical components and spare parts, rather than through the imposition by
Government of uneconomic inventory requirements on telecommunications
manufacturers.
Conclusions
On the basis of information received in briefings, its review of
reports and other published documents, and discussions with
representatives of Government and Industry, the Group reached the
following conclusions regarding the maintenance of stockpiles and
inventories for purposes of national security emergency preparedness
(NSEP):
O
No dedicated NSEP stockpiles of telecommunications materials,
components, or equipment available to Industry currently exist
within either Government or Industry.
Rapid advances in technology result in rapid obsolescence of end
items. The task of minimizing obsolescence in NSEP stockpiles of
telecommunications components and equipment would be formidable.
0
The specification and maintenance of such stockpiles, whether by
Government or Industry, would be costly and complex.
O
To the extent that minimum-inventory techniques represent
Industry practice, severe dislocations in supply channels during
mobilization could adversely impact the ability of
Telecommunications Industry manufacturers to deliver goods and
products.
0
The imposition of requirements on Industry to maintain stockpiles
or şurplus inventories for NSEP purposes could adversely affect
U.S. Industry's competitive position in the world market for
telecommunications equipment or services.
8-6
No mechanism is currently available whereby the Government could
compensate Industry as a whole for the costs (including penalties
to competitive position) of meeting a Government-imposed general
requirement to maintain special-purpose stockpiles or surplus
inventories.
0
Contracting mechanisms are currently available and in use whereby
telecommunications service providers or equipment suppliers are
required to maintain (during defined contract periods) specified
inventory levels of certain components, materials, equipment items,
spare parts, backup systems, etc., for use in peacetime emergencies
and other stress conditions.
No compelling need for NSEP stockpiles of surplus inventories to
serve the Telecommunications Industry as a whole has been found
during this study.
o
No further action or study of this subject by this Group is needed
at this time.
Recommendation
Although no compelling need for NSEP stockpiles has been found in this
study, the contracting mechanisms that are currently available and in use
for requiring specified inventory levels of certain critical items should
be considered in telecommunications mobilization policy and planning.
8-7
8.1 Introduction
The Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization (TIM) Group was established by the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
Communications System (NCS) Committee of Principals (COP) to:
(1) Identify possible impediments to effective telecommunications
industry mobilization and mobilization planning, and
(2) Assist in the development of corrective actions to overcome any
identified impediments.
The subject of Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories was
identified by the NSTAC as one of seven mobilization subjects to be
addressed by the Joint TIM Group. This subject is also related to other
subjects addressed by the Group: Dependence on Foreign Sources,
Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements, and Government and Industry
Mobilization Management Structure. Special purpose stockpiles or
greater-than-normal inventories of certain materials, components or
equipment were suggested as possible solutions to problems that could
arise during mobilization, especially if foreign sources of supply were
cut off. A surge in service requirements during mobilization may engender
a surge in the production of equipment or the provisioning of services,
either of which will depend on materials, components, or equipment in
inventory or available for rapid procurement. Finally, the availability
of materials, components, and equipment during periods of mobilization or
other national emergency may be subject to management (i.e., acquisition
and allocation) controls imposed by Government.
This report outlines the Joint TIM Group's approach to the study of
Stockpiles and Inventories, and presents its findings and conclusions.
8.2 Background/Approach
In December 1984, the NCS asked the NSTAC to assist the Government in
assessing Telecommunications Industry mobilization and mobilization
planning capabilities. In response to the Government's request, the NSTAC
charged its Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) to assist the Government
in bringing the issue into sharper focus and to develop recommendations
regarding à future role for NSTAC in the area of Telecommunications
Industry mobilization. The IES, in turn, established a Telecommunications
Industry Mobilization (TIM) Task Force and instructed it to develop a TIM
issue statement.
8-9
The TIM Task Force defined and clarified the Telecommunications
Industry mobilization issue, identifying seven areas for further study by
Industry and Government, including Maintenance of Stockpiles and
Inventories. The findings of the TIM Task Force in the area of Stockpiles
and Inventories were included in a two-volume report and presentęd for
review and approval at the October 9, 1985, meeting of the NSTAC1. The
NSTAC subsequently charged its IES to assist the NCS in addressing the
seven mobilization subjects identified.
For study purposes, the Joint TIM Group uses the definition of
mobilization developed by the original NSTAC TIM Task Force:
The process of marshalling those telecommunications
resources needed to make the transition from a normal
state to a 2 state of readiness for war or other national
emergency.
Mobilization is considered by the Joint TIM Group to encompass
peacetime/disaster/crisis through subsequent conventional military actions
external to the continental United States, as illustrated in Figure 8-1.
The impact of a nuclear attack on the United States has been judged by the
Joint Group to be outside the scope of its study. In addition, the
following mobilization time periods are being used by the Group:
(1) Pre-mobilization: Planning and Pre-Positioning
(2) Short-Term: 0 to 90 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization
of Existing Capability and Service)
(3) Mid-Term: 90 to 180 Days (Reallocation and Reprioritization of
Products and Services in the Pipeline)
(4) Long-Term: Over 180 Days (Expanded Production of Capacity and
Services).
The Group's overall objectives concerning stockpiles and inventories
reflect the provisions of the TIM Implementation Measure in the NCS NSEP
Telecommunications Plan of Action (NTPA), calling for:
0 The identification of possible impediments to effective
telecommunications industry mobilization and mobilization
planning and the recommendation of corrective actions and
1 Final Report of the Telecommunication Industry Mobilization (TIM)
Task Force, Volume 1, "TIM Issue Statement," and Volume 2, "Background
and Supporting Materials," September 5, 1985.
2 Final Report of TIM Task Force, Volume I, p.5
8-10
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL AS CONSIDERED
BY JOINT TIM GROUP
MILITARY ACTIONS
OUTSIDE CONUS WITHOUT
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR
PEACETIME - DISASTER - CRISIS
TRANS-ATTACK
POST-ATTACK
EARLY
LATE
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR NOT
AS CONSIDERED BY
CONSIDERED BY JOINT TIM GROUP
JOINT TIM GROUP
MOBILIZATION AS
CONSIDERED
BY TIM GROUP
FIGURE 8-1
MOBILIZATION INTERVAL
8-11
The identification and recommendation of any Federal Government
planning activities.
actions needed to support 3 telecommunications industry mobilization
The Joint TIM Group is using the work of the original NSTAC TIM Task
Force as the starting point for more detailed analysis. In its final
report to the NSTAC, the original TIM Task Force summarized its concerns
in the Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories area as follows:
As a standard business practice, industry does not maintain
large stockpiles of critical raw materials for use in the
event of mobilization. Any such stockpiling of materials for
mobilization use would therefore typically be undertaken only
at the specific request of the Government and would require
Government funding. Further investigation is required to
assess various incentives that might be used to encourage
industry to stockpile materials for Government use in a
mobilization effort (e.g., the elimination or alleviation of
relevant taxes).
The maintenance of large inventories of equipment (e.g.,
switching equipment), finished goods, subassemblies, critical
single source scarce circuits, spare parts (e.g., integrated
circuit chips), and facilities has associated with it many of
the same problems as stockpiling, including the obsolescence
of items stored for a long period. It is an uneconomic
business practice to maintain large inventories of items in a
dynamic technological environment. On the other hand, there
might be certain types of facilities, such as undersea cables
or manufacturing facilities, that would be critical to a
mobilization effort, impossible to replace quickly, and
irretrievably lost, if not mothballed when taken out of
service. Further study is required so that Government can
advise industry of the items that should be stockpiled or kept
in inventory despite technological advances. The question of
who will pay 4 for the maintenance of such inventories must also
be addressed.
The Groùp's approach to the subject of Stockpiles and Inventories
involved the following steps:
0
purposes; Definition of the terms "stockpiles" and "inventories" for study
3
Implementation Measure 9, "Telecommunications Industry Mobilization,"
National Security Energy Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Plan of
Action, NCS Document No. 208/5, June 27, 1985.
4 Final Report of the TIM Task Force, Volume I p.9.
8-12
0
Establishment of an information base by
- Obtaining Industry briefings on current Telecommunications
Industry stockpiling and inventory policies and practices;
- Obtaining Government briefings on the telecommunications-
related components of Government stockpiles and inventories,
including those overseen by DOD and FEMA;
- Reviewing the relevant technical literature;
- Utilizing the available information on (1) foreign-sourced
materials, equipment and components, and (2) equipment needed
to meet surge demands (developed in the Group's study of
related subjects), and augmenting this information base as
necessary;
0
Identification of specific issues to be studied;
0
Analysis of the available information in light of the issues
identified;
0
Development of conclusions and recommendations.
8.2.1 Definitions
The following definitions were adopted for purposes of this study.
Inventory: The stock of supplies, raw materials, work in process, and
finished goods or merchandise held by a private-sector or Government
entity at any point in time, exclusive of fixed assets.
Stockpile: That part of an inventory, in excess of quantities
normally needed for production of goods or provision of services,
which is held in reserve for use under special circumstances or in
defined contingencies.
8.2.2 Sources of Information
The Joint TIM Group obtained information relative to stockpiles and
inventories through three principal avenues: briefings presented by
representatives of Government or Industry organizations concerned with this
subject, a survey of published documents and articles, and the expertise of
individual Group members.
The organizations that presented briefings are identified, together
with the subjects of the briefings, in Table 8-1. The results of the
literature survey formed the basis for presentations to the Group and the
bibliography presented in Appendix 8-A. Discussions of Government
contracting mechanisms and Industry inventory practices by Group members
served as the basis for significant findings in these two areas.
8-13
TABLE 8-1
MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
BRIEFINGS
Title/Subject
Presented By
National Defense Stockpile
Richard E. Corder
Industry Specialist
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
National Defense Stockpile
Robert O'Brien
Director of Stockpile Operations
General Services Administration (GSA)
DOD Supply System Inventories
James H. Reay
Director, Supply Management Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
8-14
Mobilization for Growth
William M. Boyst, Jr. (III)
Director, Materials Management
Northern Telecom, Inc
Research Triangle Park, N.C.
INTERVIEWS
Person/Subject
Affiliation
Dick Helmer (concerning DOD Inventories)
Deputy Associate Director
National Security and International
Affairs Division
General Accounting Office (GAO)
Uldis Adamsons (concerning
Group Director
National Defense Stockpile)
National Security and International
Affairs Division
General Accounting Office (GAO)
8.2.3 Issues
As its study of Stockpiles and Inventories progressed, the Joint TIM
Group identified specific issues that need to be addressed from the
perspective of national security emergency preparedness (NSEP)
telecommunications. These issues, listed below, provided one basis for
analyzing the information acquired. They have also proved useful in the
formulation of the Group's conclusions.
0 Are the inventories (and, in some cases, stockpiles) that are
normally maintained by telecommunications carriers and
manufacturers adequate for mobilization conditions (especially if
foreign supplies are cut off)?
If normal stockpiles and inventory levels are not adequate for
mobilization, should they be augmented for purposes of national
security or for other use during mobilization?
If above-normal stockpiles/inventories are needed,
- Who should maintain them?
- Who decides what items they should contain, and in what
quantities?
- Who should bear the cost?
0 In view of rapidly changing telecommunications technologies,
obsolescence is a continuing concern. If stockpiles and
inventories beyond those normally maintained by Industry are
needed, what measures or procedures are needed to minimize
obsolescence and ensure that stocked items will meet current needs?
How do the stockpiles and inventories being considered by the Joint
TIM Group relate to the National Defense Stockpile and to
specialized inventories of components and equipment maintained by
the Department of Defense (and other Federal organizations)?
0
The TIM Dependence on Foreign Sources study identifies items that
may be candidates for stockpiles or expanded inventories. Should
the Group recommend Government or Industry criteria for such items?
8.3 Findings
The Group found that certain of the major stockpiles and inventories
maintained by Government organizations serve purposes that are basically
different from those of their Industry counterparts, and are managed under
a very different philosophy. Certain relevant policies and practices in
these two arenas are outlined below.
8-15
8.3.1 Inventory Policies and Practices in Government
Many of the Government departments and agencies that are members of
the National Communications System have substantial telecommunications
assets, and some maintain inventories of repair parts, spares, and
maintenance equipment. Most of these inventories are designed to support
specific Government telecommunications, and cannot be expected to serve as
a source of supply to the Telecommunications Industry during national
emergencies. One major Government inventory, the National Defense
Stockpile, (NDS) is intended to supply certain industrial and essential
civilian needs during emergencies. The Joint TIM Group investigated
whether the NDS could supply certain Telecommunications Industry needs that
could not be otherwise met during times of mobilization. The Group also
investigated the feasibility of drawing from another major Government
inventory, the Department of Defense inventory of secondary items, under
mobilization conditions.
8.3.1.1 Authorities and Responsibilities. The Federal Government's
authorities and responsibilities in this area are derived primarily from
the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, as amended⁶. Executive Order 10489,
as amended, and Executive Order 12155 further delegate the functions
contained in these two statutes. The Defense Production Act authorizes the
Government to use its priorities and allocation system to acquire materials
for stockpiling; provides for the expansion of industrial capacity and the
use of financial incentives to achieve such expansion; and authorizes the
establishment of voluntary agreements between companies for mobilization
purposes. Executive Order 10489 delegates the responsibility for
administering these provisions to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the General Services
Administration (GSA).
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act requires the
President to identify raw material needs and take steps to ensure their
availability in the National Defense Stockpile for national security
purposes. These materials are those that (a) would be needed to supply the
military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States
during a national emergency and (b) are not found or produced in the United
States in sufficient quantities to meet such needs. Executive Order 12155
dated September 10, 1979, delegates responsibility for administering the
provisions of the Act to FEMA, GSA, and the Department of Interior (DOI).
On February 25, 1988, the management functions of FEMA and GSA were
transferred to the Department of Defense by Executive Order 12626.
5 64 Stat. 798; 50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq.
6 Public Law 96-41; 50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.
8-16
8.3.1.2 National Defense Stockpile (NDS) 7 This stockpile contains
"strategic and critical materials" that meet the two criteria given in the
preceding paragraph. In the context of the NDS, materials are defined to
include raw materials, articles, commodities, products, supplies,
components, technical information, and processes.
The content of the NDS is reported in terms of 62 line items
(materials or groups of materials). These are listed in Table 8-2. Most
are raw or semiprocessed materials, primarily metals and other non-energy
minerals. The national petroleum reserve is not part of this stockpile.
The NDS also contains a few organic materials such as rubber, morphine,
quinine, but few (if any) communications-related materials, components, or
equipment.
The current value of the stockpile is about $9 billion. This is just
over half of the stockpile level calculated to be sufficient to meet
military, industrial, and essential civilian needs during a 3-year
conventional global military conflict (as mandated by Congress in 1979).
The content of the stockpile is reviewed annually and may be adjusted,
both in terms of the selection and quantities of materials, to match
current needs. Surplus materials can, with Congressional approval, be
sold, and deficits can be acquired as funds permit. The vast quantities of
materials in this stockpile are stored at various locations around the
country, in facilities that range from open mounds of ore or metal exposed
to the weather, to protectively-packaged containers stored in
environmentally controlled enclosures.
At present, some 22 new items are being considered for addition to the
stockpile. These are listed in Table 8-3. Some of these, such as gallium,
large-diameter float-zone silicon, and certain compound materials, are for
semiconductor devices. The assessment process for selecting new materials
and implementing their addition is quite slow in relation to the rapid rate
of change in semiconductor and integrated-circuit technology.
8.3.1.3 Department of Defense Supply System. DOD's inventory of
secondary items (such as replacement parts, spares, clothing, medicine, and
other supplies, not major weapons systems or vehicles) contains 4.7 million
line items and is valued at over $90 billion. About $5 billion is in
electrical and electronic supplies.
7
The following discussion of the National Defense Stockpile is based
on information obtained before the transfer of management from FEMA
and GSA to DOD had been fully implemented, and therefore reflects
management policies and practices prior to the transfer.
8-17
TABLE 8-2
LIST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE MATERIALS (AS OF MARCH 31, 1987)
1. Aluminum Metal Group
23. Graphite, Natural, other than
44. Quinidine
2. Aluminum Oxide, Abrasive Grain
Ceylon and Malagasy
45. Quinine
Group
24. lodine
46. Ricinoleic/Sebacic Acid Products
3. Antimony
25. Jewel Bearings
47. Rubber
4. Asbestos, Amosite
26. Lead
48. Rutile
5. Asbestos, Chrysotile
27. Manganese, Battery Grade Group
49. Sapphire and Ruby
6. Bauxite, Refractory
28. Manganese, Chemical and
50. Silicon Carbide, Crude
7. Beryllium Metal Group
Metallurgical Group
51. Silver, Fine
8. Bismuth
29. Mercury
52. Talc, Steatite Block and Lump
9. Cadmium
30. Mica, Muscovite Block, Stained
53. Tantalum Group
10. Chromium, Chemical and
and Better
54. Thorium Nitrate
8-18
Metallurigcal Group
31. Mica, Muscovite Film, 1st and
55. Tin
11. Chromite, Refractory Grade Ore
2nd Qualities
56. Titanium Sponge
12. Cobalt
32. Mica, Muscovite Splittings
57. Tungsten Group
13. Columbium Group
33. Mica, Phlogopite Block
58. Vanadium Group
14. Copper
34. Mica, Phlogopite Splittings
59. Vegetable Tannin Extract,
15. Cordage Fibers, Abaca
35. Molybdenum Group
Chestnut
16. Cordage Fibers, Sisal
36. Morphine Sulphate and Related
60. Vegetable Tannin Extract,
17. Diamond, Industrial Group
Analgesics
Quebracho
18. Fluorspar, Acid Grade
37. Natural Insulation Fibers
61. Vegetable Tannin Extract,
19. Fluorspar, Metallurgical Grade
38. Nickel
Wattle
20. Germanium
39. Platinum Group Metals, Iridium
62. Zinc
21. Graphite, Natural, Ceylon
40. Platinum Group Metals, Palladium
Amorphous Lump
41. Platinum Group Metals, Platinum
22. Graphite, Natrual, Malagasy
42. Pyrethrum
Crystalline
43. Quartz Crystals
Source: Stockpile Report to the Congress, October 1986 March 1987
Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA 36, August 1987
TABLE 8-3
CANDIDATE NEW ITEMS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE
DOD HIGH TECH STRATEGIC & CRITICAL MATERIALS
A. MATERIALS
1. Indium
2. Bismuth
3. Gallium
4. Mercury
5. Rare Earth Metals
6. Selenium
7. Tellurium
8. Beryllium
9. Continuous & Discontinuous Metal-Matrix
Composites (MMC)
10. Platinum Group Metals
11. High Purity Chromium
12. Scandium
13. Hafnium
14. Zirconium
15. High Purity Manganese
16. Rhodium
17. Ruthenium
18. Osmium
19. Rhenium
20. Cesium
21. Yttrium
22. Strontium
B. MATERIALS PROCESSES & MATERIALS CATEGORIES
1. Carbon & Ceramic Fibers
2. Compound Semiconductor Materials
3. Large Diameter, Float Zone Silicon Material
4. Advanced Structural (high temperature) Ceramics
5. Piezoelectric and other Transducer/Sensor Devices
6. Semiconductor Injection Lasers
7. Diamond Films for both Structural Purposes (wear, erosion)
and Electronic Applications
8. High Critical Temperature Superconductors based on
Ceramic Compositions
9. Large Diameter, Microelectronic Circuit Quality Czochralski
Silicon Wafers
10. Magnetic and Optical Recording Media
Source: List Provided by FEMA Industry Specialist, January 15, 1988
8-19
While DOD's principal concern is with military hardware and supplies
for deploying and sustaining its forces, it is also concerned with the
broader aspects of supply, such as the availability of strategic materials
and the adequacy of the industrial base to sustain deployed forces.
DOD's determination of needs is based on existing demands augmented by
additional equipment and supplies required for projected wartime
scenarios. To meet these needs, DOD normally maintains minimal inventories
consistent with published Tables of Organizations and Equipment for
specific units of the services. In many field units, inventory levels are
normally intended to satisfy short-term initial replacement requirements
while depots and other tiers in the supply system provide supplies for
longer periods.
There are exceptions to the generality of minimum inventories within
the DOD supply system. One arises as a consequence of the life-of-type
acquisition concept, in which enough spares and parts for certain systems
are purchased to support a particular equipment item or system throughout
its projected lifetime. While this approach can lead to large inventories,
it is a preferable alternative to the risk of a parts shortage at a time of
urgent need. Another exception is the case of certain complex, high-risk
systems such as defense communications satellites, where two entire systems
may be kept in inventory against the possibility of an unsuccessful launch
and to cover a projected 30-year need (assuming a 10-year life for each
satellite).
To meet its current and projected needs for secondary items, DOD
currently purchases this class of supplies (exclusive of major weapons
systems and platforms) at a rate of about $40 billion per year. The length
of time to acquire an item through normal procurement procedures is often a
year or longer.
DOD is currently attempting to strengthen and tighten its supply
system to make it more efficient, economical, and responsive to the needs
of its users. Toward these goals, it is investigating and, where feasible,
will attempt to implement certain of the acquisition and inventory
practices currently being successfully employed in Industry.
With respect to possibility of matches between DOD inventory items and
the Telecommunications Industry's needs during mobilization, a senior DOD
supply official expressed the opinion that some potential opportunity
exists, and expressed willingness to cooperate in exploring the matter in
greater depth. He caution that supplies classified as War Reserve Stocks
could not be used to support Industry needs.
8.3.2 Inventory Practices in Industry
From the beginning of its study of stockpiles and inventories, the
Joint TIM Group recognized that the concept of special-purpose stockpiles
or excess inventories runs counter to the widespread Industry practice of
8-20
minimizing inventories to reduce costs. The prevalence of this practice,
and the degree to which it is carried, was underscored in briefings by
Industry specialists.
Before its briefings by Industry, the Group had considered that
Industry, in general, maintains minimum inventories consistent with demand
for products or services. Under the minimum-inventory assumption, actual
inventory level would be based on such factors as:
- Actual and projected demand levels and schedules
- Cost of:
-- Inventoried items
-- Money (i.e., interest)
-- Storage
- Anticipated change in availability and/costs ofinventoried items
- Taxes on inventory
Within the minimum-inventory philosophy, there is variation in
approach from one company to another. The Group learned that at least one
major manufacturing facility had achieved significant reductions in
inventory by applying two basic concepts. One is the elimination of any
step in the overall production process (including materials management)
that does not contribute to the value of the product to the consumer. The
other is the concept of Just-in-Time (JIT) availability of materials,
components, subassemblies, and finished products. By implementing these
concepts across the entire production process, the facility has
significantly reduced its inventories.
Some companies maintain reserve equipment and supplies for use in
emergencies. These reserves could, of course, be used in event of national
security emergencies, but usually they are drawn upon to maintain service
or to meet production commitments during less extreme emergency situations
such as severe storms, major equipment failures, or transportation
disruptions. The types and quantities of items held in company stockpiles
or surplus inventories are generally based on business considerations, not
national security.
8.3.3 Inventories Resulting from Contracts or Special Procurements
Certain types of procurement mechanisms have the effect of creating
stockpiles or expanded inventories to support the items procured under a
specific contract.
One is the life-of-type purchase (or buy-out), in which the purchaser,
upon notification that certain spare parts or other support items for a
previously purchased system (or other item) will no longer be
8-21
manufactured, purchases a sufficient quantity of such support items to
support the basic item throughout its expected service lifetime. Another
is the system support buy-out, in which a lifetime supply of support items
is purchased for reasons not necessarily related to discontinuation of
production. Both of these types of procurement reflect an attempt to
insure that spare parts and other maintenance or support items will be
available when needed. Both types create a stockpile of such items in the
hands of the purchaser, who then has the responsibility of storing and
maintaining the stockpile.
Another type is the contract for services that stipulates that the
vendor must maintain specified numbers or quantities of certain items that
might be needed to maintain or support the service provided, during a
specified period of time. This type of procurement has the effect of
requiring the vendor (or service provider) to maintain inventory levels of
the specified items that might exceed the levels that would be maintained
in the absence of such contract requirements.
8.3.4 Mobilization Implications of Minimum-Inventory Techniques in
Industry
Modern telecommunications manufacturing systems employ inventory
minimization techniques with greatly increased efficiency. This maximizes
the output capacity of manufacturers. Thus, on balance, these approaches
have increased the Industry's ability to meet surge requirements during
mobilization and are essential to maintaining the competitiveness of the
Nation's industrial base. However, such fine-tuned production systems may
be more vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of components than would
have been the case in prior national emergencies. In view of the Group's
findings in its report on Dependence on Foreign Sources, this situation
causes concern.
The most appropriate remedy for this problem is contractual assurance
of the availability of critical components and spare parts by Industry and
Government telecommunications users, as opposed to the imposition by the
Government of uneconomic inventory requirements on telecommunications
manufacturers.
8.3.5 Analytical Framework for Developing Conclusions
In the process of formulating its conclusions, the Joint TIM Group
addressed the subject of stockpiles and inventories from two perspectives:
- As a potential solution to industrial mobilization problems such as
shortfalls or unavailability of critical telecommunications.
equipment, materials, and components caused by a cut-off of foreign
supplies or a dramatic increase in demand, and
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-
As a potential problem for industrial mobilization response,
reflecting the divergence between probable mobilization needs and
the current Industry practice of maintaining only minimal
stockpiles and inventories.
The Group recognized in its analysis that technological advances,
trends toward increasing consumption, and the changing patterns of
domestic production versus imports all suggest that there is no one set of
critical items that can be stockpiled or domestically-produced to protect
against shortages during mobilization. Today's critical item may be
obsolete in a few months, while important segments of today's domestic
production capabilities may be shifted offshore next year. As noted in
the conclusions of this Group's earlier report on Dependence on Foreign
Sources, no process or mechanism currently exists for monitoring
technological developments and production/consumption/importatior trends,
and for interpreting these trends toward the goal of ensuring that NSEP
needs can be met in the event of a mobilization or other national
emergency.
Within this analytical framework, the Group examined the information
it had acquired in the light of the issues identified, and reached the
conclusions presented in Section 8.4. These conclusions relate to the
Telecommunications Industry as a whole and its relation to Government.
They are not intended to apply to specific Government contracts.
8.4 Conclusions
In addressing the concerns expressed by the original TIM Task Force on
the subject of Stockpiles and Inventories, 8 the Joint TIM Group has
reached the following conclusions on the basis of briefings received,
reports Industry: reviewed, and discussions with representatives of Government and
No dedicated NSEP stockpiles of telecommunications materials,
components, or equipment available to Industry currently exist
within either Government or Industry.
Rapid advances in technology result in rapid obsolescence of end
items. The task of minimizing obsolescence in NSEP stockpiles of
telecommunications components, equipment, and possibly materials
would be formidable to say the least.
The specification and maintenance of such stockpiles, whether by
Government or Industry, would be costly and complex.
To the extent that minimum-inventory techniques represent Industry
practice, severe dislocations in supply channels during
mobilization could adversely impact the ability of
8 Final Report of the TIM Task Force, Volume I, page 10.
8-23
Telecommunications Industry manufacturers to deliver goods and
products.
O The imposition of requirements on Industry to maintain stockpiles
or surplus inventories for NSEP purposes could adversely affect
U.S. Industry's competitive position in the world market for
telecommunications equipment or services.
0
No mechanism is currently available whereby the Government could
compensate Industry as a whole for the costs (including penalties
to competitive position) of meeting a Government-imposed general
requirement to maintain special-purpose stockpiles or surplus
inventories.
o Contracting mechanisms are currently available and in use whereby
telecommunications service providers or equipment suppliers are
required to maintain (during defined contract periods) specified
inventory levels of certain components, materials, equipment items,
spare parts, backup systems, etc., for use in peacetime emergencies
and other stress conditions.
o No compelling need for NSEP stockpiles of surplus inventories to
serve the Telecommunications Industry as a whole has been found
during this study.
o No further action or study of this subject by this Group is needed
at this time.
8.5 Recommendation
Although no compelling need for NSEP stockpiles has been found in this
study, the contracting mechanisms that are currently available and in use
for requiring specified inventory levels of certain critical items should
be considered in telecommunications mobilization policy and planning.
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APPENDIX 8-A
MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES BIBLIOGRAPHY
8-25
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM):
STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(PARTIALLY ANNOTATED)
Bement, Arden L. Jr. "Materials Sector Profile," in Technological
Frontiers and Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1985. pp. 110-164.
The 54-page article surveys advances in materials technology (e.g.,
synthetic polymers, rubbers, plastics, modified bio-organic substances),
forecasts their future applications, and assesses the impact of these
developments on U.S. foreign relations and on the Federal Government's
management of the strategic materials stockpile. Technological expertise
for producing these materials resides in the West (i.e., U.S., Great
Britain, France, and West Germany) and Japan, and nations are investing
heavily in their high-technology materials development programs. This
will lead to greater interdependence and fiercer competition in the
marketplace. The author, Vice President for Technical Resources, says
that for the U.S. to be a viable competitor in the materials marketplace
and to avoid being overly dependent on offshore sources of these
materials, the nation's foreign and domestic economic policy must be
adjusted. Moreover, if the nation's stockpile is to be maintained without
obsolete strategic materials, stockpile management must be more
effective. The author provides numerous conclusions, e.g., because
"industry is the major ultimate supplier and user of strategic materials
and will control the rate of introduction of substitutes for strategic
materials," it should have "sustained
policy advisory and review
roles" in the critical materials sector.
Carrington, Tim. "Military's Dependence on Foreign Suppliers Causes
Rising Concern." The Wall Street Journal. March 24, 1988.
Chaudhari, Praveen. "Electronic and Magnetic Materials." Scientific
American, October 1986.
The author discusses materials technologies that are most essential to the
operation of semiconductor devices. Workers are experimenting with novel
combinations of materials and new transistor designs. Two kinds of
transistors are now common in the electronics industry - bipolar
transistors and the field effect transistor.
"Communications Products (Imports) for Period Ending 12/86." Electronics
Foreign Trade. EIA Marketing Services Department. December 1986.
8-27
Costello, Robert B. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic
Stabilization, House Committee on Banking, July 8, 1987. "DOD Strategy
for Bolstering Industrial Competitiveness." Defense Issues, Vol. 2, No.
40. pp. 1-3.
Congressional Record-House. "Sec. 229. Department of Defense
High-Temperature Superconductivity Research and Development Program."
October 13, 1987, H8355.
Congressional Record-Senate. Title II - Defense Stockpile, Sec. 3201.
Revisions of Stockpile Goals." October 6, 1987, S-13637.
Davis, Bob and Eduardo Lachica. "Possibility of Curbs on Foreigners'
Sales of Phone Switches in U.S. Raised by FCC." The Wall Street Journal.
February 26, 1988.
The Defense Production Action of 1950, as amended. 64 Stat. 798, 50
U.S.C. App. 2061. et seq. August 20, 1980. Executive Order 12626,
National Defense Stockpile Manager, February 25, 1988.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Resource Management: An Historical
Perspective. 31 December 1984.
This report summarizes the principal lessons of past mobilizations and
identifies critical issues for resource management and organizational
planning for future conflicts. The report stresses the importance of
flexibility and capability to meet a variety of potential requirements.
In a major mobilization, existing defense capacity is considerably less
important than the ability to harness new capacity efficiently, in the
form of expansion and conversion. Mechanisms are needed not only to
control resources, but also to pay for facility expansion and conversion.
The report concludes that the specific organizational configuration
created to manage industrial mobilization is only of secondary importance,
but there must be a single central focus to orchestrate production, to
control flow of resources and to resolve conflicts. Principal attention
must be given to what can be done within framework of existing
legislation. Mobilization plans must be written with enough flexibility
to permit different presidential or legislative branch approaches. They
must accommodate a wide range of possible requirements and be designed to
be implemented by any of a variety of organizations.
8-23
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Stockpile Report to the Congress,
FEMA 36. October 1983-March 1984.
This report, submitted in accordance with Section 11 of the Strategic and
Critical Materials stockpiling Act, provides information on foreign and
domestic purchases of materials from October 1983 to March 1984. It also
includes information regarding the acquisition and disposal of materials
by barter. During this six month period, contracts totalling $39.6
million were awarded for the purchase of iridium, tantalum, and titanium.
Disposals of 15 excess stockpile materials totalling $30 million were
accomplished through sales contracts. A barter agreement was negotiated
with the Government of Jamaica for the acquisition of 1,000,000 long dry
tons of bauxite for the National Defense Stockpile. The report also
contains information on the financial status of the National Defense
Stockpile Transaction Fund and details regarding the administration of the
Stockpile program.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Stockpile Report to the Congress,
FEMA 36, April-September 1986.
This Stockpile Report covers operations of the National Defense Stockpile
from April 1986 through September 1986. There were no acquisitions of
stockpile materials funded from the National Defense Stockpile Transaction
Fund during this period. Jewel bearings valued at $502,000 were acquired
under separate appropriation. Under the ferroalloy upgrading program, a
total of 22,844 short tons of ferromanganese were received back into
inventory. Silver valued at $13.3 million was transferred from the
Stockpile inventory to the Department of the Treasury for coinage. There
were no new barter agreements during this reporting period.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Stockpile Report to the Congress,
FEMA 36. Washington, D.C., October 1986-March 1987.
This report covers stockpile program activities under the Stockpiling
Act occurring during the period from October 1, 1986 through March 31,
1987. There were no acquisitions of stockpile materials funded from the
National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund during the report period.
However, in December 1986, the GSA circulated a Basic Ordering Agreement
to prospective offeror of germanium metal to elicit interest from
suppliers in providing that material to the National Defense Stockpile.
Jewel bearings valued at $1.1 million were ordered for the Stockpile
under separate appropriation. Under the ferroalloy upgrading program, a
total of 20,664 short tons of ferrochromium and 22,175 short tons of
ferro-manganese were received back into inventory as upgraded material
during the report period. Quantities of eight excess stockpile materials
with a total value of $24.1 million were transferred out of the Stockpile
8-29
during the report period in payment for services under the ferroalloy
upgrading program. Silver valued at $36 million was transferred from the
Stockpile inventory to the Department of the Treasury for coinage. There
were no new barter agreements negotiated during this reporting period.
General Accounting Office. DOD Inventory Management: Revised Policies
Needed. GAO/NSIAD-88-75, January 1988.
General Accounting Office. National Defense Stockpile: Adequacy of
National Security Council Study for Setting Stockpile Goals.
GAO/NSIAD-86-177BR, August 1986.
This is a briefing report to congressional requestors that assesses
whether the NSC stockpile study is a sufficient basis for U. S.
mobilization planning, including the proposed changes in national defense
stockpile goals. The consensus of the report is that the study does not
appear to provide sufficient basis for setting stockpile goals or for
other U.S. mobilization planning.
General Accounting Office. National Defense Stockpile: National Security
Council Study Inadequate to Set Stockpile Goals. GAO/NSIAD-87-146, May
1987.
General Accounting Office. National Stockpile: Could Recycling DOD
Aluminum Be Used to Meet the Current Aluminum Need? GAO/RCED-86-23,
November 4, 1985.
General Accounting Office. Report to the Honorable Sam Nunn: Overview of
the Status of the Defense Industrial Base and DOD's Industrial
Preparedness Planning. GAO/NSIAD-85-69, May 23, 1985.
Gladwell, Malcolm. "The Big Blue Computer Firm Overlooked in the Trade
War." Insight. April 27, 1987, pp. 42-43.
Lappen, Alyssa A. "Messenger of the Gods." Forbes. March 21, 1988, pp.
150-151.
GE's electronic messenger services has subscribers from 70 countries which
earned them about $400 million last year. Some of the markets in which GE
participates have quadrupled in one year's time. GE's intelligent
computer network understands about 100 computer languages and protocols,
8-30
which makes it desirable in a world of various types of desktop computers
even within one company. The sportswear retailer, Benetton, uses GE to
hook 90 percent of its manufacturers and order agents into an order entry
system so that Benetton receives orders within hours instead of days.
Other retailers use it to cut their stock of inventory, an area with a
potential savings to retailers of $8 billion a year. A 2000-member
cooperative stock clearinghouse transmits instructions for most of its
members' $3 trillion in annual bond trades through the GE network. GE is
proud of its "up time," keeping the network available to customers 99.85
percent of the time. With 500 small computer centers, traffic is
automatically rerouted when one goes down. Not only is it cheaper than
telephone or facsimile, the network is faster and more efficient,
according to GE Information Services' president Tony Craig.
Mackenzie, C. Malcolm. MPAC-Materials and Parts Availability Control
Program, a briefing to the Defense Priorities and Allocations System
(DPAS) Symposium. 6-7 October 1986.
Mikesell, Raymond F. Stockpiling Strategic Materials: An Evaluation of
the National Program. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1986.
Morgan, Dr. John D. "The Defense Production Act." Prepared for the Fifth
Annual Mobilization Conference Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Mines, May 22-23, 1986.
This paper describes the Defense Production Act, reviewing the purpose,
principal provisions, and application of the Act since its original
passage in 1950.
Morgan, Dr. John D. "Management of Mineral Materials in Defense
Emergencies." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Mines, October 10, 1985.
This paper discusses the Department of Interior's responsibilities for
emergency readiness plans and programs for all nonfuel mineral materials.
Interior is responsible for mines, concentrating plants, and refineries
and for the materials treated in such facilities. DOI has chartered the
Emergency Mineral Administration (EMA), through the Bureau of Mines, to
carry out operations in the event of a major emergency. It discusses the
actions that BOM would take in event of an emergency. These actions would
include monitoring exports, export controls, priorities and allocations,
and stockpile releases. A long-lasting supply description would call for
supply expansion programs under Title III of the Defense Production Act.
8-31
Morgan, John D. "Past is Prologue: Strategic Materials and the Defense
Industrial Base," Defense Management Journal, First Quarter. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1982, pp. 15-19.
This report discusses the inadequacies in the defense industrial base
especially in strategic materials needed to meet military, industrial, and
essential civilian needs of the nation in a national defense emergency.
The U.S. is dependent upon distant and unreliable sources for more than
half its supplies, while the Soviet Union is largely source
self-sufficient. Even a slight increase in current defense procurements
would significantly affect a limited group of special property materials.
Stockpiling goals for these items are not being met. The report cites
examples of the expansion of basic materials producing industries under
Title III of the Defense Production Act, which provides wide-ranging
authority to increase supplies. In addition to granting the very broad
authority of the Defense Production Act, Congress enacted other important
measures to stimulate expansion of the defense mobilization base. For
example, it reinstated the rapid depreciation provision of the Internal
Revenue Code which provided a powerful incentive for defense industries
because it granted a 5-year depreciation on facilities certified as
necessary to national defense. Overall, the important difference between
a wartime economy and a peacetime economy is the degree to which the
industrial base can respond to unanticipated wartime demands. Both depend
upon an industrial base that reflects planning and established priorities
and cannot function without ready supplies of virtually every known raw
material.
Murphy, Gerald F. and Raymond E. Brown. Silicon (a Chapter from Mineral
Facts and Problems, 1985 Edition), U.S. Bureau of Mines.
This publication provides information on silicon and the silicon
industry. Silicon supply and production are related primarily to the
requirements of the iron and steel, aluminum and chemical industries and
its price is influenced by the cost and availability of transportation and
energy. No particular problems are foreseen in supply-demand or from
substitution. However, imports of silicon materials continue to take a
larger share of the domestic market. This trend, coupled with a smaller
demand for silicon owing to a shrinking domestic steel industry, could
have a deleterious impact on the viability of the domestic silicon
industry.
8-32
Nocita, John. "The Civil-Military Interface in Industrial Preparedness,"
Defense Management Journal, First Quarter. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982,
pp. 26-33.
The author reviews the mobilization process as it is presently structured,
first providing an historical perspective on the development of that
process and then discussing the civil-military interface, the role of key
agencies, and recent actions to improve the nation's industrial base
preparedness. The author concludes that, with sufficient funding, an
effective mobilization preparedness program is possible.
North American Telecommunications Association (NATA) Report. "U.S.
Balance of Trade in Telephones and Telephone Switching Equipment."
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Logistics. An Industrial Mobilization Handbook for Government.
Washington, D.C., August 1985.
Perle, Richard N. Statement of the Honorable Richard N. Perle, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Before the House
Committee on Science, Space and Technology.
April 23, 1987.
Reich, Robert B. "The Rise of Techno-Nationalism." The Atlantic Monthly.
May 1987, pp. 63-69.
Richards, Bill. "Fire in Fiber-Optic Gateway Sparks Flight Delays,
Problems at Brokerages." The Wall Street Journal. May 11, 1988.
Rutkowski, A. M. "The Exchange Carriers Standards Association."
Telecommunications. January 1987, pp. 77-87.
Smith, Esther. "U.S. Overdependent on Japanese Semiconductors."
Washington Technology. March 19, 1987, Vol. 1, No. 26.
U.S. Bureau of Mines. Mineral Commodity Summaries 1987. Washington,
D.C., 1987.
This report is the earliest Government publication to furnish estimates
covering 1986 nonfuel mineral industry data. Most of the estimates are
8-33
based on 9 months data. The data sheets contain information on the
domestic industry structure, Government programs, tariffs, and 5-year
salient statistics for 88 individual minerals and metals.
U.S. Bureau of Mines. "Strategic Materials for Electronic Applications."
Prepared for the Joint Industry-Government Telecommunications Industry
Mobilization Group. December 12, 1986.
U.S. Department of Commerce (Office of Industrial Resource Administration,
International Trade Administration). The Defense Priorities and
Allocations System. Washington, D.C.: DOC, 1984.
U.S. House of Representatives. The Ailing Defense Industrial Base:
Unready for Crisis. Report of the Defense Industrial Base Panel of
the Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second
Session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980.
This report is based on 13 days of hearings from 34 witnesses. The panel
found that there was a serious decline in the nation's defense industrial
capability. Crucial industrial elements had eroded, while dependence on
foreign sources for critical materials grew. It also found that DOD had
no ongoing adequate plan to address the defense industrial base
preparedness issue; that present procurement policies and procedures by
DOD are inflexible; and that current tax and profit policies discourage
capital investments in new technology that would increase production.
Responsibility for the condition of the base is dispersed among the
congressional committees and within the executive branch. This diffusion
of responsibility has contributed to a lack of effective long-range
planning for industrial responsiveness. The panel makes many
recommendations, legislative and non-legislative, to improve industrial
base preparedness, including that the President establish within the
Executive Office of the President a point of authority to initiate action
and to direct and coordinate the efforts of the several responsible
departments and agencies.
U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. Synopsis of
the Subcommittee on Sea Power and Strategic and Critical Materials
Hearing. Hearing on House Resolution 1392. March 17, 1987.
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